"Yes; that is just what I want. I came here for that purpose; and what have you to say against it, Friedrich?"
"Nothing, if your fancy runs that way," replied the lad, laughing; "only you have plenty of leisure for it hereafter, and just now you are wanted."
"Wanted?"
"Yes; I came to look for you."
"Who wants the poor drunkard Mara?"
"They want you at Breithoff's, tonight, at the supper given to Mozart after the concert; and you must bring your instrument; we are to have some rare fun. Come, if you are obedient, you shall go with me to the concert."
Mozart's concert! Surprised and pleased that some of his acquaintances had remembered him, Mara suffered himself to be led away by his companion.
The concert was a splendid one, and attended by all the taste and fashion of Leipsic. The orchestra was admirable, the singers were full of spirit and good humor, the audience delighted, the composer gratified and thankful. Mozart thanked the performers in a brief speech, and as soon as the concert was at an end was led off in triumph by the connoisseurs, his friends.
Magnificent beyond expectation was the entertainment prepared, and attended by many among the wealthy and the noble, as well as the most distinguished artists. The revelry was prolonged beyond midnight, and, as the guests became warmed with good cheer, we are bound to record that the conversation lost its rational tone, and that comical sallies and uproarious laughter began to usurp the place of critical discourse. They had songs from all who were musical; Mara, among the rest, was brought in, dressed in a fantastic but slovenly manner, and made to play for the amusement of the company. When he had played several pieces, the younger guests began to put their practical jokes upon him, and provoke him to imitate the noises of different animals on his violoncello. Mara entered into all their fun, convulsing them with his grotesque speeches and gestures, drinking glass after glass, till, at last, he fell back quite overpowered and insensible. Then his juvenile tormentors painted his face and clipped his mustaches, and tricked him out in finery that gave him the look of a candidate for Bedlam, and had him carried to his own house, laughing to imagine what his sensations would be, next morning, when he should discover how ludicrously he had been disfigured. In short, the whole party were considerably beyond the bounds of propriety and sound judgment, Mozart included.
It was considerably after noon, the next day, that poor Mara, the victim of those merciless revellers, might be seen sitting disconsolately in his deserted home. He had no heart even to be enraged at the cruelties practised on him. Pale as death, his eyes sunken and bloodshot, his limbs shivering, sat this miserable wretch, dressed in the same mockery of finery which had been heaped upon him in wicked sport.
The door soon opened, and Mozart entered. At sight of the composer, Mara rose and mechanically returned his salutation. Mozart looked grave and sad.
"You are much the worse for last night's dissipation, my good fellow," said he.
"Ah Master Mozart!" said the violoncellist, with a faint smile, "it is too good of you to visit such a dog as poor Mara."
"I have something to say to you, friend," answered the composer, in a voice of emotion. "In the first place, let me thank you for your music, last night."
The bewildered artist passed his hand across his forehead.
"I say, let me thank you. It is long since I have heard such music."
"You were pleased with it?" asked Mara, looking up, while a beam of joy shot into the darkness of his soul.
"Pleased? It was noble—heart-stirring! I must own I did not expect such from you. I expected to be shocked, but I was charmed. And when you played the air fromIdomenio—sacré!but it went to my soul. I haveneverhad my music so thoroughly appreciated—so admirably executed. Mara, you are a master of your art! I reverence you!"
"You?" repeated the artist, drawing his breath quickly.
"Yes; I own you for my brother, and so I told them all, last night."
The poor man gave a leap and seized the master by both hands; rapture had penetrated his inmost heart.
"Oh! you make me very happy," faltered he.
"I am glad of it, for now I am going to say something painful."
Mara hung his head.
"Nay, I reproach myself as much as you. We both behaved ill, last night; we both forgot the dignity of the artist and the man."
Again the poor violoncellist looked bewildered.
"We forgot that such as we are set up for an example to the uninitiated, and yielded to the tempter wine! Art—our mother—has reason to blush for us."
"For me," cried Mara, deeply moved; "but not for you."
"Yes, for me," repeated Mozart, "and for all who were there. It was a shameful scene. What," he continued, with rising indignation—"what would the true friends of art have thought of such beastly orgies, celebrated in her name? Why, they would have said, perhaps, 'These men are wild fellows, but we must let them have their way; we owe the fine music they give us to their free living; they must have stimulants to compose or play well.' No, no, no! it is base to malign the holy science we love. Such excesses but unfit us for work. I have never owed a good thought to the bottle. I tell you, I hate myself for last night's foolery."
"Ah master, you who are so far above me?" sighed Mara.
"And lo, here the wreck of a noble being!" said the composer, in a low voice and with much bitterness; then resuming: "Listen to me, Mara. You have been your own enemy, but your fall is not wholly your own work. You are wondrously gifted; you can be, you shall be, snatched from ruin. You can, you shall, rise above those who would trample on you now; become renowned and beloved, and leave an honored name to posterity. You have given me a lesson, Mara—a lesson which I shall remember my life long—which I shall teach to others. You have done me good—I will do something for you. Come with me to Vienna."
The poor violoncellist had eagerly listened to the words of him he so venerated—whom he looked on as a superior being. While he talked to him as an equal, while he acknowledged his genius, lamented his faults, and gave him hope that all was not yet lost, the spirit of the degraded creature revived within him. It was the waking of his mind's energies; the struggle of the soul for life against the lethargy of a mortal malady. Life triumphed! Mara was once more a man; but overcome by the conflict and by the last generous offer, he sank back, bowed his face upon his hands, and wept aloud.
"Come," cried Mozart, after a pause, during which his own eyes moistened—"come, we have no time to lose. I go out to-night by the evening post for Vienna; you must accompany me. Take this purse, put your dress in order, and make haste. I will call for you at eight. Be ready then. Not a word more." And forcing a well-filled purse into his trembling hands, the master hastened away too quickly to hear a word of thanks from the man he had saved from worse than death.
The great composer was early summoned from this and many other works of mercy and benevolence. But if this noble design was unaccomplished, at least good seed was sown, and Mara placed once more within view of the goal of virtuous hope. Rescued from the mire of degradation, he might, by perseverance, have won the prize; if he did not, the fault was wholly his own. Whatever the termination of his career, the moral lesson is for us the same.
A block of marble caught the glanceOf Buonarotti's eyes,Which brightened in their solemn deeps,Like meteor-lighted skies.And one who stood beside him listened,Smiling as he heard;For, "I will make an angel of it!"Was the sculptor's word.And soon mallet and chisel sharpThe stubborn block assailed,And blow by blow, and pang by pang,The prisoner unveiled.A brow was lifted, high and pure;The wak'ning eyes outshone;And as the master sharply wrought,A smile broke through the stone!Beneath the chisel's edge, the hairEscaped in floating rings;And, plume by plume, was slowly freedThe sweep of half-furled wings.The stately bust and graceful limbsTheir marble fetters shed,And where the shapeless block had been,An angel stood instead!O blows that smite! O hurts that pierceThis shrinking heart of mine!What are ye but the Master's toolsForming a work divine?O hope that crumbles to my feet!O joy that mocks, and flies!What are ye but the clogs that bindMy spirit from the skies?Sculptor of souls! I lift to theeEncumbered heart and hands:Spare not the chisel! set me free,However dear the bands.How blest, if all these seeming illsWhich draw my thoughts to theeShould only prove that thou wilt makeAn angel out of me!
A block of marble caught the glanceOf Buonarotti's eyes,Which brightened in their solemn deeps,Like meteor-lighted skies.And one who stood beside him listened,Smiling as he heard;For, "I will make an angel of it!"Was the sculptor's word.And soon mallet and chisel sharpThe stubborn block assailed,And blow by blow, and pang by pang,The prisoner unveiled.A brow was lifted, high and pure;The wak'ning eyes outshone;And as the master sharply wrought,A smile broke through the stone!Beneath the chisel's edge, the hairEscaped in floating rings;And, plume by plume, was slowly freedThe sweep of half-furled wings.The stately bust and graceful limbsTheir marble fetters shed,And where the shapeless block had been,An angel stood instead!O blows that smite! O hurts that pierceThis shrinking heart of mine!What are ye but the Master's toolsForming a work divine?O hope that crumbles to my feet!O joy that mocks, and flies!What are ye but the clogs that bindMy spirit from the skies?Sculptor of souls! I lift to theeEncumbered heart and hands:Spare not the chisel! set me free,However dear the bands.How blest, if all these seeming illsWhich draw my thoughts to theeShould only prove that thou wilt makeAn angel out of me!
From The German Of Dr. B. Werneke.
The enemies of Christianity are, in our days, making war upon its dogmas more fiercely and more generally than at any previous period. Materialism—the teachings of which may be summed up in the following propositions: There exists no God as a spiritual, immaterial personality; there exists no spirit as a supersensible, self-existent, immortal substance—is finding its way into every rank of society. By clothing it in a popular garb, its advocates are meeting with no small degree of success in making converts to its errors, even among the working classes and the deludedprolétaireswho have a dread of labor. Materialism no longer goes to the trouble of exhibiting itself in the guise of a well-connected philosophical system: it prefers the more insidious method of appearing only occasionally, in writings and speeches whose theme is of quite another nature. It puts on an appearance of science and of devotion to genuine progress; and herein consists its principal danger. When doctrines, opposed to faith, are secreted in works on natural science, and placed side by side with evident facts, there must necessarily result a strong temptation for the unwary to look upon them all as undeniable truths.
The science ofmoral statisticsis one of those that have been most recently perverted to the purposes of materialism. The founder of this science is Quetelet, the celebrated Belgian astronomer and statistician. He first observed that, by considering large masses of men during a long period, a certain uniformity in the manner of their accomplishment could be traced, in such voluntary acts as come under the observation of statisticians, more especially in marriages, suicides, and crimes. He even reached the conclusion that acts elicited under the influence of free-will occur with a greater degree of regularity than events which depend exclusively on the influence of physical causes. This discovery was pursued still further. Observations were made upon different nationalities, the results were compared, and upon their evidence it was thought justifiable to speak of a law of nature by which all human acts were supposed to be controlled. This new law could not but be hailed with pleasure by the disciples of materialism. They immediately took it up and adduced it as evidence in favor of their doctrines. It requires but a small amount of perception to see that, if all human acts are controlled by a law of nature, there cannot be any free-will. The denial of free-will implies the elimination of one of the essential faculties of the human soul, and it, at the same time, shakes Christianity to its foundation.. For, if everything is subjected to an immutable necessity, sin and grace, redemption and sanctification, need no longer be mentioned.
It is well worth our while to subject the new doctrine, founded on the evidence of moral statistics, to an examination and to test its tenability. We propose to do this in the following pages. Before entering, however, into the assertions and inferences of the materialists, it will be expedient to state a few of the principal results of the science of moral statistics, so that the reader may see the method by which such unexpected and surprising conclusions have been reached, and may thus be enabled to form a judgment for himself.
A glance at the statistical tables which record the sum-total of marriages contracted in a single country reveals in reality that their number is nearly the same, year after year. Even in so-called anomalous marriages, that is, marriages in which a young man allies himself to a woman much older than himself andvice versa, as well as in marriages between widows and widowers, there seems to be a certain uniformity. Thus, if we take Belgium, with a population of about four and a half millions, we find the total number of marriages, from the year 1844 to the year 1853, running as follows: 29,326,
29,210,25,670,24,145,28,656,31,788,33,762,33,169,31,251,30,636.
During the same years, the number of marriages between men of 30 years and under, with women of 30 years and under, stands thus:
13,024,13,157,11,578,10,749,12,642,13,933,14,440,14,337,13,488,13,161.
Anomalous marriages, between men of 30 years and less, and women of from 45 to 60 years, likewise evince a perceptible regularity during the same years:
129,102,118,98,101,140,130,128,104,115.
On the other hand, marriages between men of 60 years and over, and women of 30 years and under, during the same series of years:
41,36,33,42,44,47,49,42,39,32.
These figures are sufficient for an illustration. The result is similar in the case of other countries.
If we consider, the age at which marriage is contracted, we discover considerable uniformity in a single country, but wide differences in different countries. The following table exhibits what percentage of men and women contract marriages in the different countries, at the different ages indicated:
Under2020-2525-3030-3535-4040-80In EnglandMen2%46%26%11%5%10%Women12%50%20%8%4%6%In FranceMen2%27%33%18%9%11%Women19%38%22%10%5%6%In NorwayMen1%23%39%20%8%9%Women5%35%33%14%6%7%In BavariaMen0%12%32%38%38%18%Women4%25%32%29%29%10%
These figures show that in England 72 per cent of the men marry between the ages of 20 and 30 years; in France, 60 per cent; in Norway, 62 per cent; in Bavaria, however, only 44 per cent. In England, 82 per cent of the women contract marriage at and under the age of 30 years, whilst in Bavaria the percentage is only 61. It is hardly to be supposed that what Quetelet callsla tendance an mariage(the tendency toward marriage) is less strong in Bavaria than in England: we may only infer that the conditions which render marriage practicable are more easily realized in England than in Bavaria, and a single glance at both these countries will show that such is really the case.
We shall now give a few figures from the statistics of suicide. The following table contains the annual aggregate of suicides, during a period of twenty years:
FranceBelgiumDenmarkAustriaPrussiaSaxony183623401892411436214183724431652695341502264183825861672921453261183927471922974861474246184027522042615501480336184128142403371630290184228662203175871598328184330202423015881720420184429732552851575335184530822162905961700338184630122473766111707373184730472513451852377184833012783051649398184935832753374521527328185035963404541743390185135981654015521816402185236761504266372073530185334151614197051942431185437001893637702198547185538101663992351568
Making all possible allowance for increased population in each of these countries throughout the space of twenty years, and for greater accuracy in the later records than in the earlier ones, it still remains incontestable that in civilized countries suicide is on the increase, and that this increase exceeds that of the population.
By taking the annual proportion to a million of inhabitants, we shall perceive that this crime is more frequent in some countries than in others. The following figures comprise the period from 1856 to 1866:
Yearly suicides to one million of inhabitants,
in France111in Belgium47in Denmark276in Austria64in Prussia122in Saxony245in Bavaria72in Hanover137in Würtemberg85in Baden108in Hesse134in Mecklenburg162in Nassau102in Portugal7in England and Wales65in Hungary30in Dalmatia11in Europe generally84
Very notable differences may be observed in these figures. The degree of intellectual culture and social refinement is about the same in Saxony as in Belgium, yet these two countries stand widely apart on the record of suicides, even if it be allowed that the estimate for Belgium is somewhat too low. There can be no doubt that religion exercises a decided influence in this matter. Saxony is a Protestant country, whilst Belgium is Catholic. Similar divergences exist in favor of Austria when compared with Prussia, and of Bavaria compared with Hanover.
Suicides are far more frequent amongst Protestants than amongst Catholics. The latter possess in their faith far more remedies against temptation to suicide than the former are able to obtain from theirs. A Protestant despairs more readily than a Catholic.
These remarks apply only to countries at large. The great metropolises, which may properly be designated hot-beds of suicide, must be taken as exceptions, because in them practical religion easily dies out and cannot exercise its usual influence. In the year 1865, when Paris had a population of 1,863,000 inhabitants, there were 706 cases of suicide, that is, one to every 2638; in Vienna, with a population of 550,000 inhabitants, there were 110 cases, that is, one for every 5000; in London, with 3,000,000 inhabitants, there were 267, that is, one for every 11,715; and in New York, population 1,095,000, 36 cases of suicide, one to every 28,000 inhabitants. Accordingly, the greatest number of suicides is committed in Paris, where reign the highest degree of social culture and the most rigorous police surveillance, and the smallest number occurs in New York, the seat of the greatest social and political liberty.
We may here state, as a general rule, that high intellectual culture is not a preventive of suicide. Observation shows, on the contrary, that it is comparatively most frequent in countries where the enlightenment of the population has attained the highest point, and that it occurs far oftener in cities than in rural districts.This fact is unmistakable evidence that moral improvement is not keeping pace with intellectual progress, and that governments, whilst furthering the latter with increasing zeal, are not bestowing sufficient care on the former. From the year 1826 to the year 1860, suicides increased 130 per cent in France, whilst the population increased but 13 per cent. This astounding circumstance has been looked upon as attributable to the advancement of industry and the progress of science and popular education; and no doubt justly, if we consider how much more frequently suicide is committed in the enlightened northern and eastern departments of France than in the less progressive southern and western.
Something similar is noticeable in Germany. Saxony and its neighboring provinces rank undeniably as high in general education as any state in Germany; but it is also to be remarked that they furnish the largest number of cases of suicide; whilst in the Tyrol, Old Bavaria, and other provinces of a lower grade of general education, the number is considerably less. And if, in the Catholic parts of the Rhenish provinces and in Westphalia, which are not behind Saxony in general culture, suicides are of less frequent occurrence, we are only justified in attributing the difference to the happy influence of the Catholic religion.
Quite a peculiar discovery from statistics, and one that at first thought is rather astonishing, is the fact that the number of suicides increases with the advance of age, and that the proportion appears to be equal in the two sexes. It seems that indifference about life and recklessness about the dread future become greater as the years of life pass by. This, however, may be psychologically accounted for without inventing for the purpose ageneral law, according to which suicides are supposed to be apportioned to the various ages of human life.
We will now cast a glance at the statistics of crimes. Accurate records upon this subject, published in England, Belgium, and France during a series of years, afford us ample material for this investigation. Similar records, commenced at a later period, have been kept in the Netherlands, in Bavaria, in Baden and other states; and since 1854, the Prussian Ministry of Justice has, every second or third year, published a thorough report of the proceedings of the criminal courts of that kingdom. It is impracticable, however, to establish a comparison between different countries on this point, as very notable differences exist between them with respect to their laws and their administration of justice. We are consequently compelled to confine our observations to one country. We choose Prussia as it was before 1866, because its various provinces present a variety of forms of religion, nationalities, degrees of education, industry, and commerce, which affords an excellent opportunity for instituting comparisons. Moreover, the same code is everywhere in use, excepting in the Rhenish provinces, where the Napoleonic is established.
The following table exhibits the number of criminals, with their religious professions, as arraigned before the criminal courts of Prussia from 1855 to 1862:
Accused.Evangelicals.Catholics.Jews.1855808947433245841856872251163509871857626036582493105185849953038187081185951923083202482186052833164202885186157203308231988186256903382232776Average62443686247786
On an average, from eighteen to nineteen per cent of the accused were every year pronounced not guilty. It might naturally be expected that, in the case of special crimes, the ratio of those acquitted to those condemned would vary greatly. Thus, of 100 accused of theft, an average of 6 was acquitted; of serious injury done to the person, an average of 25; of murder, about 16; of violation of official obligations, about 36; of perjury, upward of 41.
By calculating what proportion of the accused from 1859 to 1862 belonged to each of the above-mentioned religious denominations, we find that of the Jews there was one accused for every 2978 inhabitants; one Catholic for every 3087, and one Protestant for every 3415. Hence, the accused were most numerous amongst the Jews; least numerous amongst the Protestants. The unfavorable position here assigned to the Catholics is accounted for by the fact that large figures refer to the eastern provinces of Prussia, which are inhabited in a great measure by Catholic Sclaves, with little culture and very much impoverished. A considerable difference is observable in the provinces. The average of a period of four years (1859-1862) counts 1 accused for every 2345 in Silesia, 2503 in Posen, 2853 in Brandenburg, 3101 in Prussia proper, 4056 in Pomerania, 4436 in Saxony, 4863 in Westphalia, 5095 in the Rhenish province.
The eastern provinces present a sadder condition than the western. Unfortunately the statistical tables give us no information concerning the nationality of the accused. But, if we confine our investigation to Rhineland and Westphalia, where the population is purely German, the result will be found altogether in favor of Catholicity. The census of these two provinces, including Hohenzollern, amounted in 1861 to 1,474,520 Protestants and 3,313,709 Catholics. During a term of five years, (1858-1862,) 1463 Evangelicals and 3138 Catholics appeared before the tribunals, making 1 for 5035 Evangelicals and 1 for 5280 Catholics. Whence we infer that nationality, want of education, and poverty produce effects in the eastern provinces which cannot be found where Catholics and Protestants are on an equality in those respects.
The comparison seems to be specially favorable to the Catholic provinces when the infliction of punishment upon the guilty is considered. For great offences, the punishment is penitentiary; for less offences, imprisonment. Now, although in 1855 the number of accused was much greater amongst the Catholics than amongst the Protestants, nevertheless there was but one penitentiary culprit for 8430 inhabitants in Rhineland and Westphalia, whilst in the Protestant provinces there was 1 for 4179. Hence, the number of penitentiary culprits in these latter being double argues likewise greater crimes.
The foregoing statistics of criminals, considered with respect to creed, enable us to form a conclusion in regard to the influence of the particular form of religion upon the dispositions of men. Amongst Catholics, the crimes peculiar to youth seem to predominate, whilst amongst Protestants they are the crimes of mature and of advanced age.
The former appear to decrease with the advance of intellectual culture and improvement in temporal welfare, whilst the latter, on the contrary, appear to become more numerous.
Further figures might be given showing that the majority of criminals belong to the laboring classes, and that the incentives to crime are want and absence of training amongst the working people, and dissipation and luxury in higher ranks of society. We will, however, content ourselves with what has been stated, and proceed to discuss the conclusions which materialists draw from such data.
At the present day, materialists conclude, from such facts and figures as these, that the volition of man is not free. They pretend that it is impossible to explain the regularity with which acts, seemingly voluntary and deliberate, are elicited, unless we accept the conclusion that free will is a mere fiction of the imagination, and that science inevitably forces us to the conviction that all human acts depend on what they designate a law of nature. They say that such a degree of order in the occurrence of human acts could not possibly result from the unbiased power of self-determination. They reject the distinction between nature and man as a being partly spiritual, and consider him as a purely material product of nature, subjected, like animals, plants, and minerals, to general laws, without the power of exercising the slightest influence on his own destiny. And this outcry against free-will is raised by men in every department of science, by naturalists, philosophers, historians, physicians, and jurists. Says Buckle, in hisHistory of English Civilization, speaking of the evidences of moral statistics:
"In certain conditions of society a large proportion of menmustput an end to their own existence. Such is the general law. The special inquiry as to who is to commit the crime depends, of course, upon particular laws, which, in their united energies, must obey the general law to which they are subordinate. And the force of the higher law is so irresistible that neither the attachment to life nor the dread of the future can to any degree hinder its execution."
Dankwart declares boldly:
"Man is not a free agent. He is just as little responsible for any of his deeds as a stone which, in obedience to the law of gravitation, falls upon one's head. The criminal act was the necessary development of a law of nature."
What are we to say in reply to these attacks? Are the facts of statistics really so decisive and convincing as to compel us to abandon the time-honored dogma of Free-Will, to which the noblest and loftiest minds of all ages have so tenaciously adhered? Can those imposing arrays of figures operate in us to the conviction that, when a man contracts marriage, commits a crime, puts an end to his own life, or performs any other act, he necessarily follows a universal law of nature, and cannot, therefore, be held responsible for his deed? Do the acts of men enter into the economy of nature like ebb and flow of tide, day and night, summer and winter? It is not our purpose to enter into deep philosophical disquisitions on free-will. Its materialist adversaries ignore all philosophical speculation. They occupy themselves exclusively withfacts—visible, palpable facts—and upon this vantage-ground we intend to oppose them. Our task, then, in the present instance, is to demonstrate that the conclusions drawn from the given premises are unwarranted and erroneous; that theregularityin the recurrence of certain acts can be satisfactorily accounted for byothercauses, without having recourse to a mysteriouslawofnature; and lastly, that there are many facts which, even without free-will, are problems not less difficult to solve.
In examining the method by which our adversaries draw inferences from facts, we shall find that their logic is in contradiction to all the laws of correct thinking. "Not all acts are free, therefore some acts are not free," is a proper conclusion; "but some acts are not free, therefore all acts are not free;" who would admit such a conclusion? As an illustration, let us take another example from statistics. According to the testimony of statistics, of 908,000 families in Belgium, only 89,630 were in good circumstances in the year 1857. 373,000 were in a very straitened condition; 446,000 were in downright misery. In all probability, the same relative situation may be found existing through a series of years. Now, what would the enemies of free-will say to the following reasoning: "In Belgium, the masses are in poverty, therefore all Belgians are poor; affluence does not exist at all in Belgium"? Is not the following reasoning of theirs identically the same: "In marriages, suicides, crimes, and other human acts, the influence of free-will is imperceptible, as shown by statistics; therefore, these acts arenotfree; therefore, the influence of free-will is impossible inallacts; there is no free-will at all"? We might even, for argument's sake, grant—which, of course, we do not—that the above-mentioned acts are not free, without thereby doing away with free-will in numberless other human acts.
But this is not the only logical blunder made by our opponents. They infer from thedeedto thevolition. "The deed is not free, therefore neither is the volition." Do the deed and the volition always correspond so perfectly that we may, under all circumstances, infer from the former to the latter? The very fact that in trials before courts extenuating circumstances are so strongly insisted upon, is proof positive that the deed and the volition are not always identical. It is a long way from deliberation to decision, and from decision to execution. We may not more infer from the deed to the volition than from the volition to the deed. How absurd to infer from the volition to the deed! And should the reverse be more logical?
What does experience show—in trials, for example? A man is murdered, for instance. In one case, the evidence shows that the murderer had harbored his dark design for years, until finally a favorable moment presented itself for the execution. In another case, it will appear that, in a casual quarrel, a man dealt a mortal blow to another, perhaps even to his friend,without intending to do it!The criminal courts of all countries present multitudes of such instances. It is the statistician's province to note the deed, but not the volition; and hence, sound logic will never permit inferences in regard to the volition to be drawn from statistical facts.
Let us now examine the foundation on which arguments against the freedom of man's will are based. This foundation is theregularitywith which the aforesaid acts have been observed to recur, as if within the range of a higher and wider law. How have statisticians discovered this regularity? Evidently only by summing up facts as they took place within a period of some duration, and over an extensive range of territory, a process by which the actual differences were entirely put out of sight. We learned above that, from 1855 to 1862, a yearly average of 6244 criminals was arraigned before the criminal courts of Prussia. But particular years fall wide of this average figure. Thus, in 1856, the number was 8722, that is, 2500 more than the average; in 1858, the number was 4995, that is, more than 1300 less than the average; and the total of the difference of these years, 3800.It would seem that this might as truthfully be calledirregularityasregularity. If, in Prussia, crimes are merely the necessary consequences of a natural law, and of political and social circumstances, can it be reasonably believed that these underwent so great a change in the space of two years that the number of crimes was diminished by one half? It is impossible to draw from such premises conclusions strong enough to uproot convictions planted as deeply in the human breast as is that of the freedom of man's will. External circumstances may indeed have undergone changes within two years, still these changes are not sufficient of themselves to account for such variations in statistical figures as we have above quoted. These can be accounted for only by taking into consideration the freedom of the human will, which may be influenced, in a measure, by external circumstances, but notnecessarilycontrolled.
But grant that a certain regularity is perceptible in human acts. Undoubtedly 8722 and 4995 come nearer to the average figure, 6244, than would 1200 and 500. Still the regularity may be explained without subjecting all human acts to the influence of a law of necessity. It is on account of the point of view from which statisticians examine facts that theirregularityappears so remarkably great, and their differences so immaterially small. We will illustrate what we mean by a comparison. By standing on the brink of a river, we hear the plashing and perceive the motion of its waters. By going to a mountain-top, at a distance from the stream, we neither hear a sound nor observe a motion. Now, could we, whilst standing on the mountain-top, reasonably say, "Before, as we stood on the brink of the stream, weimaginedthat the water was in motion and produced a sound but in this elevated position, from which we see the stream for miles, we discover that we were mistaken; the stream is evidently silent and without motion"? Where lies the mistake in this instance? and where the truth? Is not the case of the statistician the same? If, viewing things from his elevated stand-point, he fails to recognize the free-will of the individual, is the cause to be found in the absence of all free volition, or is it not rather owing to his having taken too high a stand-point? In order to obtain correct information concerning the material creation, we must enter into details, and carefully examine single specimens; hence the importance of the microscope in natural sciences. And why shall we pass by the individual altogether, and generalize our observations, when we undertake the study of moral phenomena? Surely, there can be no reason for proceeding thus. No man looking from a high tower upon a flock of sheep can expect to obtain accurate knowledge of their animal nature and conformation.
Quetelet, the founder of the science of moral statistics, and its most talented representative, expresses himself as follows upon the question at issue: "I do not believe that, in view of such evidences, the freedom of the human will can be denied. I only think that it is greatly limited, and, in social affairs, plays therôleof an accidental cause. Accordingly, by not considering individual cases, and by taking things summarily and in bulk, it will appear that the influences of accidental causes neutralize each other in such a manner as to let none but real causes, in virtue of which society exists, appear.The Supreme Being has wisely put limits to our moral powers, as well as to the physical, in order to hinder man from encroaching upon his eternal laws. The possibility of founding a science of moral statistics, and of drawing useful inferences from it, depends mainly on the fact that, as soon as observations are made upon alarge number of individuals, the human will retires and manifests no perceptible influence."
The action of the free-will of man is, in reality, confined within very narrow limits. The less a man knows, the fewer must be the objects of his volition and of his desire. Most men have, in this respect, but a very narrow range. It is the poor and the illiterate who everywhere compose the bulk of the population, and it is this bulk precisely that the statistician is obliged to consider. Thepower of executionis still more limited. For executing, ability and means are required, which, however, in innumerable instances, are found insufficient. But even though the will and the power to execute be limited, freedom of volition may still exist. For we speak of the freedom of a merelyhumanwill, and man is by nature alimited, not an infinite, being. The freedom of man's will can be made available only within the limits placed about the individual. The individual canwillonly that which he has knowledge of, and do that which he has the means to do. Nero once wished that the whole Roman people had but one head, that at a single blow he might strike it off. It was simply the wish of a tyrant gone crazy. It is pretty nearly the same with free-will as with unencumbered bodily motion. We have it in our power to wander in every direction upon the globe, but the globe itself we cannot leave. It revolves about the centre of the planetary system, and carries us with it in its career. In the same manner can we possess freedom of volition and ofdoing; but step beyond the limits of our nature we cannot, and for this very reason, says Quetelet, does the influence of free-will disappear when larger groups become the object of observation.
The transition from the will to the deed depends on the objective possibility of accomplishing the deed. External circumstances must be considered; at times they are favorable, at times again they are unfavorable. Any man can elevate his thoughts to God. The will becomes the deed forthwith. But raising his hands in prayer is quite another thing. This can be done only by a man who has the free use of his members. We may infer from a glance at the statistics of marriages and crimes, how much the execution of the will depends upon external circumstances. We quoted above that, among every 10,000 inhabitants, there are usually 87 marriages in Prussia, 82 in Saxony, and only 66 in Bavaria. Now the question arises, Is there less inclination to marriage amongst young people in Saxony and Bavaria than in Prussia, or does the law of necessity, supposed to control such events, cease to be in force when it reaches the boundaries of Bavaria? Not at all. The difference is simply this. In Prussia it only requires two parties, a bride and a groom, for a marriage contract, whilst in Bavaria it requires three, a bride, a groom, and a functionary of the police department, and, as everybody knows, it is harder for three to come to an agreement than for two. Besides these legal hinderances, there are many others that oppose the will to marry. We have only to look about to notice them.One man may have the will to marry, but cannot find a suitable match; another may not be able to obtain the consent of his parents; a third may not have a sufficient livelihood; a fourth may be prevented from marriage by war, by sickness or any other cause. They all may have the will to get married, but external circumstances do not permit it.
External circumstances exert a similar influence upon crimes. Statistics show that five times more men than women are arraigned for crimes. Are we to suppose hence that women are so much better than men? Hardly. The number of women criminally disposed cannot surely be much less than that of men; but women want the ability, the means, and the adventurous spirit necessary to carry out their evil designs. In years of famine, as the number of marriages decreases, that of theft increases. In France, in 1846, a year of plenty, 31,768 persons were convicted of larceny. In 1847, a year of scarcity, the figure rose to 41,626, and the year after, it fell again to 30,000. Similar facts might be quoted for England. What becomes of thelawofnaturein presence of such evidences? Starvation is something exceedinglynatural, if you will; but if a man prefers starving to stealing, he will not be dragged before the tribunals. In 1836 and 1837, there was great distress in England, during which many died of starvation. Many had not thewillto prolong their lives by stealing, many others had not the chance. No statistical record can acquaint us with the ratio of those who had not the will, to those who had not the chance; whence we are authorized to argue that no inference can be drawn from such records regarding thewillof men.
It is incontestable that the individual is greatly influenced by the social, moral, religious, domestic, and intellectual circumstances in which he happens to be placed. Still it cannot be conceded that these circumstances do away with the freedom of man's will. True enough, men permit themselves to be controlled, in a great measure, by the circumscribed relations of private life, but they do so for the very purpose of remaining in those relations. There are many cases in which men see no motive for withdrawing from under the influence of existing circumstances. Sacrifices are even made to existing circumstances in order that they may continue the same. As for instance, in the case of tax-paying. We may complain loudly of the burden of taxes, still we pay them. Should we have a mind not to pay them, we leave the country for another less oppressed. The man that remains pays his taxesunwillinglyindeed, yet ofhis own free-will. Unwillingness does not preclude free-will.
The narrower the circumstances, the more limited the education, the lower the rank of a man, the greater are his efforts to accommodate himself to circumstances; andvice versa, the greater his wealth and the higher his education, the more independent is he.
In European countries, a son usually adopts the profession of his father. The son of a farmer becomes a farmer, and the son of a mechanic becomes a mechanic. Statisticians might easily adduce imposing columns of figures to prove this, and the enemies of free-will might call it a law of necessity. Yet what multitudes of exceptions are there not? Thousands submit to the circumstances that surround them at their birth, nevertheless there will always be a few who will not submit. These will struggle and push their way into the highest positions of life.