(11) i.e. "given by general word of command, or in writing." As to the"word-of-mouth command," see above, S. 3; "Hell." VII. v. 9; andfor the "herald," see "Anab." III. iv. 36.(12) Reading {pros to dia p.}, or if {pros to}... transl. "with aview to."(13) Lit. pempadarchs, i.e. No. 6 in the file. See "Cyrop." II. i. 22foll., iii. 21.(14) Lit. "so that each officer may pass the word to as few aspossible."(15) Cf. "Anab." IV. vi. 6.
When an advanced guard is needed, I say for myself I highly approve of secret pickets and outposts, if only because in supplying a guard to protect your friends you are contriving an ambuscade to catch the enemy. Also the outposts will be less exposed to a secret attack, being themselves unseen, and yet a source of great alarm to the enemy; since the bare knowledge that there are outposts somewhere, though where precisely no man knows, will prevent the enemy from feeling confident, and oblige him to mistrust every tenable position. An exposed outpost, on the contrary, presents to the broad eye of day its dangers and also its weaknesses. (16) Besides which, the holder of a concealed outpost can always place a few exposed vedettes beyond his hidden pickets, and so endeavour to decoy the enemy into an ambuscade. Or he may play the part of trapper with effect by placing a second exposed outpost in rear of the other; a device which may serve to take in the unwary foeman quite as well as that before named.
(16) Lit. "makes plain its grounds of terror as of confidence."
Indeed I take it to be the mark of a really prudent general never to run a risk of his own choosing, except where it is plain to him beforehand, that he will get the better of his adversary. To play into the enemy's hands may more fitly be described as treason to one's fellow-combatants than true manliness. So, too, true generalship consists in attacking where the enemy is weakest, even if the point be some leagues distant. Severity of toil weighs nothing in the scale against the danger of engaging a force superior to your own. (17) Still, if on any occasion the enemy advance in any way to place himself between fortified points that are friendly to you, let him be never so superior in force, your game is to attack on whichever flank you can best conceal your advance, or, still better, on both flanks simultaneously; since, while one detachment is retiring after delivering its attack, a charge pressed home from the opposite quarter cannot fail to throw the enemy into confusion and to give safety to your friends.
(17) N.B. Throughout this treatise the author has to meet the case ofa small force of cavalry acting on the defensive.
How excellent a thing it is to endeavour to ascertain an enemy's position by means of spies and so forth, as in ancient story; yet best of all, in my opinion, is it for the commander to try to seize some coign of vantage, from which with his own eyes he may descry the movements of the enemy and watch for any error on his part. (18)
(18) As, e.g. Epaminondas at Tegea. See "Hell." VII. v. 9.
Whatever may be snatched by ruse, thief fashion, (19) your business is to send a competent patrol to seize; or again where capture by coup de main (20) is practicable, you will despatch a requisite body of troops to effect a coup de main. Or take the case: the enemy is on the march in some direction, and a portion of his force becomes detached from his main body or through excess of confidence is caught straggling; do not let the opportunity escape, but make it a rule always to pursue a weaker with a stronger force. (21) These, indeed, are rules of procedure, which it only requires a simple effort of the mind to appreciate. Creatures far duller of wit than man have this ability: kites and falcons, when anything is left unguarded, pounce and carry it off and retire into safety without being caught; or wolves, again, will hunt down any quarry left widowed of its guard, or thieve what they can in darksome corners. (22) In case a dog pursues and overtakes them, should he chance to be weaker the wolf attacks him, or if stronger, the wolf will slaughter (23) his quarry and make off. At other times, if the pack be strong enough to make light of the guardians of a flock, they will marshal their battalions, as it were, some to drive off the guard and others to effect the capture, and so by stealth or fair fight they provide themselves with the necessaries of life. I say, if dumb beasts are capable of conducting a raid with so much sense and skill, it is hard if any average man cannot prove himself equally intelligent with creatures which themselves fall victims to the craft of man.
(19) e.g. defiles, bridges, outposts, stores, etc.(20) e.g. a line of outposts, troops in billets or bivouac, etc.(21) "It is a maxim, the quarry should be weaker than the pursuer."(22) Zeune cf. Ael. "N. A." viii. 14, on the skill of wolves inhunting.(23) For {aposphaxas} Courier suggests {apospasas}, "dragging off whathe can."
V
Here is another matter which every horseman ought to know, and that is within what distance a horse can overhaul a man on foot; or the interval necessary to enable a slower horse to escape one more fleet. It is the business rather of the cavalry general to recognise at a glance the sort of ground on which infantry will be superior to cavalry and where cavalry will be superior to infantry. He should be a man of invention, ready of device to turn all circumstances to account, so as to give at one time a small body of cavalry the appearance of a larger, and again a large the likeness of a smaller body; he should have the craft to appear absent when close at hand, and within striking distance when a long way off; he should know exactly not only how to steal an enemy's position, but by a master stroke of cunning (1) to spirit his own cavalry away, and, when least expected, deliver his attack. Another excellent specimen of inventiveness may be seen in the general's ability, while holding a weak position himself, to conjure up so lively an apprehension in the enemy that he will not dream of attacking; or conversely, when, being in a strong position himself, he can engender a fatal boldness in the adversary to venture an attack. Thus with the least cost to yourself, you will best be able to catch your enemy tripping.
(1) Or, "sleight of hand"; and for {kleptein} = escamoter see "Anab."IV. vi. 11, 15; V. vi. 9.
But to avoid suspicion of seeming to prescribe impossible feats, I will set down, in so many words, the procedure in certain crucial instances.
The best safeguard against failure in any attempt to enforce pursuit or conduct a retreat lies in a thorough knowledge of your horse's powers. (2) But how is this experience to be got? Simply by paying attention to their behaviour in the peaceable manouvres of the sham fight, when there is no real enemy to intervene—how the animals come off, in fact, and what stamina they show in the various charges and retreats.
(2) {empeiria}, "empirical knowledge."
Or suppose the problem is to make your cavalry appear numerous. In the first place, let it be a fundamental rule, if possible, not to attempt to delude the enemy at close quarters; distance, as it aids illusion, will promote security. The next point is to bear in mind that a mob of horses clustered together (owing perhaps to the creatures' size) will give a suggestion of number, whereas scattered they may easily be counted.
Another means by which you may give your troop an appearance of numerical strength beyond reality consists in posting, in and out between the troopers, so many lines of grooms (3) who should carry lances if possible, or staves at any rate to look like lances—a plan which will serve alike whether you mean to display your cavalry force at the halt or are deploying to increase front; in either case, obviously the bulk and volume of the force, whatever your formation, will appear increased. Conversely, if the problem be to make large numbers appear small, supposing you have ground at command adapted to concealment, the thing is simple: by leaving a portion of your men exposed and hiding away a portion in obscurity, you may effect your object. (4) But if the ground nowhere admits of cover, your best course is to form your files (5) into ranks one behind the other, and wheel them round so as to leave intervals between each file; the troopers nearest the enemy in each file will keep their lances erect, and the rest low enough not to show above.
(3) Cf. Polyaen. II. i. 17, of Agesilaus in Macedonia, 394 B.C. (ourauthor was probably present); IV. iv. 3, of Antipater in Thessaly,323 B.C.(4) Lit. "steal your troopers." See "Cyrop." V. iv. 48.(5) Lit. "form your decads (squads of ten; cf. our 'fours') in ranksand deploy with intervals."
To come to the next topic: you may work on the enemy's fears by the various devices of mock ambuscades, sham relief parties, false information. Conversely, his confidence will reach an overweening pitch, if the idea gets abroad that his opponents have troubles of their own and little leisure for offensive operations.
But over and beyond all that can be written on the subject—inventiveness is a personal matter, beyond all formulas—the true general must be able to take in, deceive, decoy, delude his adversary at every turn, as the particular occasion demands. In fact, there is no instrument of war more cunning than chicanery; (6) which is not surprising when one reflects that even little boys, when playing, "How many (marbles) have I got in my hand?" (7) are able to take one another in successfully. Out goes a clenched fist, but with such cunning that he who holds a few is thought to hold several; or he may present several and appear to be holding only a few. Is it likely that a grown man, giving his whole mind to methods of chicanery, will fail of similar inventiveness? Indeed, when one comes to consider what is meant by advantages snatched in war, one will find, i think, that the greater part of them, and those the more important, must be attributed in some way or other to displays of craft; (8) which things being so, a man had better either not attempt to exercise command, or, as part and parcel of his general equipment, let him pray to Heaven to enable him to exercise this faculty and be at pains himself to cultivate his own inventiveness.
(6) Cf. "Cyrop." IV. ii. 26; VII. i. 18.(7) {posinda}, lit. "How many?" (i.e. dice, nuts, marbles, etc.); cf.the old game, "Buck! buck! how many horns do I hold up?" Schneid.cf. Aristot. "Rhet."iii. 5. 4.(8) "Have been won in connection with craft." See "Cyrop." I. vi. 32;"Mem." III. i. 6; IV. ii. 15.
A general, who has access to the sea, may exercise the faculty as follows: he may either, whilst apparently engaged in fitting out his vessels, strike a blow on land; (9) or with a make-believe of some aggressive design by land, hazard an adventure by sea. (10)
(9) A ruse adopted by Jason, 371 B.C. Cf. "Hell." VI. iv. 21.(10) Cf. the tactics of the Athenians at Catana, 415 B.C. Thuc. vi.64.
I consider it to be the duty of the cavalry commander to point out clearly to the state authority the essential weakness of a force of cavalry unaided by light infantry, as opposed to cavalry with foot-soldiers attached. (11) It is duty also, having got his footmen, to turn the force to good account. It is possible to conceal them effectively, not only between the lines, but in rear also of the troopers—the mounted soldier towering high above his follower on foot.
(11) Or, "divorced from infantry." In reference to {amippoi}, cf.Thuc. v. 57; "Hell." VII. v. 23.
With regard to these devices and to any others which invention may suggest towards capturing the foeman by force or fraud, I have one common word of advice to add, which is, to act with God, and then while Heaven propitious smiles, fortune will scarcely dare to frown. (12)
(12) Or, "and then by the grace of Heaven you may win the smiles offortune," reading with Courier, etc., {ina kai e tukhe sunepaine}.Cf. "Cyrop." III. iii. 20.
At times there is no more effective fraud than a make-believe (13) of over-caution alien to the spirit of adventure. This itself will put the enemy off his guard and ten to one will lure him into some egregious blunder; or conversely, once get a reputation for foolhardiness established, and then with folded hands sit feigning future action, and see what a world of trouble you will thereby cause your adversary.
(13) S. 15 should perhaps stand before S. 13.
VI
But, after all, no man, however great his plastic skill, can hope to mould and shape a work of art to suit his fancy, unless the stuff on which he works be first prepared and made ready to obey the craftsman's will. Nor certainly where the raw material consists of men, will you succeed, unless, under God's blessing, these same men have been prepared and made ready to meet their officer in a friendly spirit. They must come to look upon him as of greater sagacity than themselves in all that concerns encounter with the enemy. This friendly disposition on the part of his subordinates, one must suppose, will best be fostered by a corresponding sympathy on the part of their commander towards the men themselves, and that not by simple kindness but by the obvious pains he takes on their behalf, at one time to provide them with food, and at another to secure safety of retreat, or again by help of outposts and the like, to ensure protection during rest and sleep.
When on active service (1) the commander must prove himself conspicuously careful in the matter of forage, quarters, water-supply, outposts, (2) and all other requisites; forecasting the future and keeping ever a wakeful eye in the interest of those under him; and in case of any advantage won, the truest gain which the head of affairs can reap is to share with his men the profits of success.
(1) Al. "on garrison outpost duty."(2) Reading {phulakon}, or if with Courier {thulakon}, "haversacks,"i.e. "la farine, le contenant pour le contenu."
Indeed, to put the matter in a nutshell, there is small risk a general will be regarded with contempt by those he leads, if, whatever he may have to preach, he shows himself best able to perform.
Beginning with the simple art of mounting on horseback, let him so train himself in all particulars of horsemanship that, to look at him, the men must see their leader is a horseman who can leap a trench unscathed or scale a parapet, (3) or gallop down a bank, and hurl a javelin with the best. These are accomplishments which one and all will pave the way to make contempt impossible. If, further, the men shall see in their commander one who, with the knowledge how to act, has force of will and cunning to make them get the better of the enemy; and if, further, they have got the notion well into their heads that this same leader may be trusted not to lead them recklesssly against the foe, without the help of Heaven, or despite the auspices—I say, you have a list of virtues which will make those under his command the more obedient to their ruler.
(3) Or, "stone walls," "dykes."
VII
If prudence may be spoken of as the one quality distinctive of true generalship, there are two respects in which a general of cavalry at Athens should pre-eminently excel. Not only must he show a dutiful submission to the gods; but he must possess great fighting qualities, seeing that he has on his borders a rival cavalry equal to his own in number and backed by a large force of heavy infantry. (1) So that, if he undertake to invade the enemy's territory unsupported by the other forces of the city (2)—in dealing with two descriptions of forces single-handed, he and his cavalry must look for a desperate adventure; or to take the converse case, that the enemy invades the soil of Attica, to begin with, he will not invade at all, unless supported by other cavalry besides his own and an infantry force sufficient to warrant the supposition that no force on our side can cope with him.
(1) The reference is doubtless to the Thebans. Unfortunately we do notknow, on good authority, how many troops of either arm they had inthe field at Leuctra or at Mantinea.(2) Lit. "without the rest of the city," i.e. the hoplites, etc.
Now, to deal with this vast hostile array, if only the city will determine to sally out en masse to protect her rural districts, the prospect is fair. Under God, our troopers, if properly cared for, are the finer men; our infantry of the line are no less numerous, and as regards physique, if it comes to that, not one whit inferior, while in reference to moral qualities, they are more susceptible to the spur of a noble ambition, if only under God's will they be correctly trained. Or again, as touching pride of ancestry, what have Athenians to fear as against Boeotians on that score? (3)
(3) See "Mem." III. v. 3, where it is contended that in pride ofancestry Athenians can hold their own against Boeotians.
But suppose the city of Athens determine to betake herself to her navy, as in the old days when the Lacedaemonians, leagued with the rest of Hellas, brought invasion; (4) and is content once more simply to protect her walls through thick and thin. As to protecting what lies outside the city wall she looks to her cavalry for that; and single-handed her troopers must do desperate encounter against the united forces of the enemy. I say, under these circumstances, we shall need in the first place the strong support of Heaven; and in the second place, well will it be for us if our cavalry commander prove himself a consummate officer. (5) Indeed, he will have need of large wisdom to deal with a force so vastly superior in numbers, and of enterprise to strike when the critical moment comes.
(4) See Thuc. ii. 13, 14, 22, etc., and in particular iv. 95,Hippocrates' speech before the battle of Delium, 424 B.C.(5) A "parfait marechal."
He must also, as it appears to me, be capable of great physical endurance; (6) since clearly, if he has to run full tilt against an armament present, as we picture, in such force that not even our whole state cares to cope with it, it is plain he must accept whatever fate is due, where might is right, himself unable to retaliate.
(6) So Jason, "Hell." VI. i. 4.
If, on the contrary, he elect to guard the territory outside the walls (7) with a number just sufficient to keep a look-out on the enemy, and to withdraw into safe quarters from a distance whatever needs protection—a small number, be it observed, is just as capable of vedette duty, as well able, say, to scan the distant horizon, as a large; and by the same token men with no great confidence in themselves or in their horses are not ill-qualified to guard, or withdraw within shelter (8) the property of friends; since fear, as the proverb has it, makes a shrewd watchman. The proposal, therefore, to select from these a corps of observation will most likely prove true strategy. But what then of the residue not needed for outpost duty? If any one imagines he has got an armament, he will find it miserably small, and lacking in every qualification necessary to risk an open encounter.
(7) Or, "His better plan would be to."(8) Reading {anakhorizein}. Cf. "Cyrop." II. ii. 8; "Anab." V. ii. 10;or if {anakhorein eis}, transl. "or retire into safe quarters."See "Hell." IV. vi. 44.
But let him make up his mind to employ it in guerilla war, and he will find the force quite competent for that, I warrant. His business, so at least it seems to me, will be to keep his men perpetually in readiness to strike a blow, and without exposing himself, to play sentinel, waiting for any false move on the part of the hostile armament. And it is a way with soldiers, bear in mind, the more numerous they are, the more blunders they commit. They must needs scatter of set purpose (9) in search of provisions; or through the disorder incidental to a march, some will advance and others lag behind, beyond a proper limit. Blunders like these, then, our hipparch must not let pass unpunished (unless he wishes the whole of Attica to become a gigantic camp); (10) keeping his single point steadily in view, that when he strikes a blow he must be expeditious and retire before the main body has time to rally to the rescue.
(9) {epimeleia}. Cf. "Cyrop." V. iii. 47.(10) Lit. "or else the whole of Attica will be one encampment." As atthe date of the fortification of Decelea (413 B.C.), whichpermanently commanded the whole country. See Thuc. vii. 27. Al.Courier, "autrement vous n'avez plus de camp, ou pour mieux dire,tout le pays devient votre camp."
Again, it frequently happens on the march, that an army will get into roads where numbers are no advantage. Again, in the passage of rivers, defiles, and the like, it is possible for a general with a head on his shoulders to hang on the heels of an enemy in security, and to determine with precision (11) the exact number of the enemy he will care to deal with. Occasionally the fine chance occurs to attack the foe while encamping or breakfasting or supping, or as the men turn out of bed: seasons at which the soldier is apt to be unharnessed—the hoplite for a shorter, the cavalry trooper for a longer period. (12)
(11) See "Anab." II. v. 18; "Cyrop." III. iii. 47; IV. i. 18.{tamieusasthai}, "with the precision of a controller."(12) Cf. "Hell." II. iv. 6; VII. i. 16.
As to vedettes and advanced outposts, you should never cease planning and plotting against them. For these in their turn, as a rule, are apt to consist of small numbers, and are sometimes posted at a great distance from their own main body. But if after all it turns out that the enemy are well on their guard against all such attempts, then, God helping, it would be a feat of arms to steal into the enemy's country, first making it your business to ascertain (13) his defences, the number of men at this, that, and the other point, and how they are distributed throughout the country. For there is no booty so splendid as an outpost so overmastered; and these frontier outposts are especially prone to be deceived, with their propensity to give chase to any small body they set eyes on, regarding that as their peculiar function. You will have to see, however, in retiring that your line of retreat is not right into the jaws of the enemy's reliefs hastening to the scene of action.
(13) Or, "having first studied." Cf. "Mem." III. vi. 10.
VIII
It stands to reason, however, that in order to be able to inflict real damage upon a greatly superior force, the weaker combatant must possess such a moral superiority over the other as shall enable him to appear in the position of an expert, trained in all the feats of cavalry performance in the field, and leave his enemy to play the part of raw recruits or amateurs. (1)
(1) Cf. "Cyrop." I. v. 11; "Mem." III. vii. 7.
And this end may be secured primarily on this wise: those who are to form your guerilla bands (2) must be so hardened and inured to the saddle that they are capable of undergoing all the toils of a campaign. (3) That a squadron (and I speak of horse and man alike) should enter these lists in careless, disorderly fashion suggests the idea of a troop of women stepping into the arena to cope with male antagonists.
(2) Or, add, "for buccaneers and free-lances you must be."(3) Lit. "every toil a soldier can encounter."
But reverse the picture. Suppose men and horses to have been taught and trained to leap trenches and scale dykes, to spring up banks, and plunge from heights without scathe, to gallop headlong at full speed adown a steep: they will tower over unpractised opponents as the birds of the air tower over creatures that crawl and walk. (4) Their feet are case-hardened by constant training, and, when it comes to tramping over rough ground, must differ from the uninitiated as the sound man from the lame. And so again, when it comes to charging and retiring, the onward-dashing gallop, the well-skilled, timely retreat, expert knowledge of the ground and scenery will assert superiority over inexpertness like that of eyesight over blindness.
(4) See "Horse." viii. 6; cf. "Hunting," xii. 2; "Cyrop." I. vi. 28foll.
Nor should it be forgotten, that in order to be in thorough efficiency the horses must not only be well fed and in good condition, but at the same time so seasoned by toil that they will go through their work without the risk of becoming broken-winded. And lastly, as bits and saddle-cloths (to be efficient) (5) need to be attached by straps, a cavalry general should never be without a good supply, whereby at a trifling expense he may convert a number of nonplussed troopers into serviceable fighting men. (6)
(5) ({khresima}) L.D. For the {upomnema} itself cf. "Cyrop." VI. ii.32.(6) Or, "thus at a trifling outlay he will be able to render so manynon-efficients useful." Al. "make the articles as good as new."
But if any one is disposed to dwell on the amount of trouble it will cost him, if he is required to devote himself to horsemanship so assiduously, let him console himself with the reflection that the pains and labours undergone by any man in training for a gymnastic contest are far larger and more formidable than any which the severest training of the horseman will involve; and for this reason, that the greater part of gymnastic exercises are performed "in the sweat of the brow," while equestrian exercise is performed with pleasure. Indeed, there is no accomplishment which so nearly realises the aspiration of a man to have the wings of a bird than this of horsemanship. (7) But further, to a victory obtained in war attaches a far greater weight of glory than belongs to the noblest contest of the arena. (8) Of these the state indeed will share her meed of glory, (9) but in honour of victory in war the very gods are wont to crown whole states with happiness. (10) So that, for my part, I know not if there be aught else which has a higher claim to be practised than the arts of war.
(7) Cf. "Cyrop." IV. iii. 15; Herod. iv. 132; Plat. "Rep." v. 467 D.(8) Cf. Eur. "Autolycus," fr. 1, trans. by J. A. Symonds, "GreekPoets," 2nd series, p. 283.(9) Cf. Plut. "Pelop." 34 (Clough, ii. p. 235): "And yet who wouldcompare all the victories in the Pythian and Olympian games puttogether, with one of these enterprises of Pelopidas, of which hesuccessfully performed so many?"(10) "To bind about the brows of states happiness as a coronal."
And this, too, is worth noting: that the buccaneer by sea, the privateersman, through long practice in endurance, is able to live at the expense of far superior powers. Yes, and the life of the freebooter is no less natural and appropriate to landsmen—I do not say, to those who can till and gather in the fruit of their fields, but to those who find themselves deprived of sustenance; since there is no alternative—either men must till their fields or live on the tillage of others, otherwise how will they find the means either of living or of obtaining peace? (11)
(11) Cf. "Econ." v. 7.
Here, too, is a maxim to engrave upon the memory: in charging a superior force, never to leave a difficult tract of ground in the rear of your attack, since there is all the difference in the world between a stumble in flight and a stumble in pursuit.
There is another precaution which I feel called upon to note. Some generals, (12) in attacking a force which they imagine to be inferior to their own, will advance with a ridiculously insufficient force, (13) so that it is the merest accident if they do not experience the injury they were minded to inflict. Conversely, in attacking any enemy whose superiority is a well-known fact, they will bring the whole of their force into action.
(12) Or, "one knows of generals," e.g. Iphicrates at Oneion, 369 B.C.Cf. "Hell." VI. v. 51.(13) Lit. "an absolutely weak force."
Now, my maxim would be precisely converse: if you attack with a prospect of superiority, do not grudge employing all the power at your command; excess of victory (14) never yet caused any conqueror one pang of remorse.
(14) Or, "a great and decided victory." Cf. "Hiero," ii. 16.
But in any attempt to attack superior forces, in full certainty that, do what you can, you must eventually retire, it is far better, say I, under these circumstances to bring a fraction only of your whole force into action, which fraction should be the pick and flower of the troops at your command, both horses and men. A body of that size and quality will be able to strike a blow and to fall back with greater security. Whereas, if a general brings all his troops into action against a superior force, when he wishes to retire, certain things must happen: those of his men who are worse mounted will be captured, others through lack of skill in horsemanship will be thrown, and a third set be cut off owing to mere difficulties of ground; since it is impossible to find any large tract of country exactly what you would desire. If for no other reason, through sheer stress of numbers there will be collisions, and much damage done by kicks through mutual entanglement; whereas a pick of horse and men will be able to escape offhand, (15) especially if you have invention to create a scare in the minds of the pursuers by help of the moiety of troops who are out of action. (16) For this purpose false ambuscades will be of use.
(15) Or, "by themselves," reading {ex auton}, as L. Dind. suggests.Cf. Polyb. x. 40. 6, or if as vulg. {ex auton} (sub. {kheiron},Weiske), transl. "to slip through their fingers."(16) Zeune and other commentators cf Liv. v. 38 (Diod. xiv. 114), butthe part played by the Roman subsidiarii at the battle of theAllia, if indeed "una salus fugientibus," was scarcely happy.Would not "Hell." VII. v. 26 be more to the point? The detachmentof cavalry and infantry placed by Epaminondas "on certain crests,to create an apprehension in the minds of the Athenians" in thatquarter of the field at Mantinea was a {mekhanema} of the kindhere contemplated.
Another serviceable expedient will be to discover on which side a friendly force may suddenly appear and without risk to itself put a drag on the wheels of the pursuer. Nay, it is self-evident, I think, that, as far as work and speed are concerned, it is the small body which will assert its superiority more rapidly over the larger, and not vice versa—not of course that the mere fact of being a small body will enable them to endure toil or give them wings; but simply it is easier to find five men than five hundred, who will take the requisite care and pains with their horses, and personally practise of their own accord the art of horsemanship.
But suppose the chance should occur of entering the lists against an equal number of the enemy's cavalry, according to my judgment it were no bad plan to split the squadron into divisions, (17) the first of which should be commanded by the squadron-leader, and the other by the ablest officer to be found. This second-officer will for the time being follow in rear of the leading division with the squadron leader; and by and by, when the antagonist is in near proximity, and when the word of command is passed, form squadron to the front and charge the hostile ranks (18)—a maneuver calculated, as I conceive, to bring the whole mass down upon the enemy with paralysing force, and to cause him some trouble to extricate himself. Ideally speaking, both divisions (19) will be backed by infantry kept in rear of the cavalry; these will suddenly disclose themselves, and rushing to close quarters, in all probability clench the nail of victory. (20) So at any rate it strikes me, seeing as I do the effects of what is unexpected—how, in the case of good things, the soul of man is filled to overflowing with joy, and again, in the case of things terrible, paralysed with amazement. In proof of what I say, let any one reflect on the stupor into which a body of men with all the weight of numerical advantage on their side will be betrayed by falling into an ambuscade; or again, on the exaggerated terror mutually inspired in belligerents during the first few days, of finding themselves posted in face of one another.
(17) Or, "troops."(18) Possibly on flank. See Courier, p. 35, on Spanish cavalrytactics.(19) Lit. "supposing both divisions to be backed by footmen," etc.(20) Or, "achieve a much more decisive victory." Cf. "Cyrop." III.iii. 28.
To make these dispositions is not hard; the difficulty is to discover a body of men who will dash forward (21) and charge an enemy as above described intelligently and loyally, with an eager spirit and unfailing courage. That is a problem for a good cavalry general to solve. I mean an officer who must be competent to so assert himself in speech or action (22) that those under him will no longer hesitate. They will recognise of themselves that it is a good thing and a right to obey, (23) to follow their leader, to rush to close quarters with the foe. A desire will consume them to achieve some deed of glory and renown. A capacity will be given them patiently to abide by the resolution of their souls.
(21) {parelontas}, in reference to S. 18 above, {parelaunoi}, "formsquadron to the front."(22) "To be this, he must be able as an orator as well as a man ofaction." Cf. "Mem." II. ii. 11.(23) Cf. Tennyson's "The Charge of the Light Brigade":Their's not to make reply,Their's not to reason why,Their's but to do and die.
To turn to another matter, take the case in which you have two armeis facing one another in battle order, or a pair of fortresses (24) belonging to rival powers, and in the space between all kinds of cavalry manouvres are enacted, wheelings and charges and retreats. (25) Under such circumstances the custom usually is for either party after wheeling to set off at a slow pace and to gallop full speed only in the middle of the course. But now suppose that a commander, after making feint (26) in this style, presently on wheeling quickens for the charge and quickens to retire—he will be able to hit the enemy far harder, and pull through absolutely without scathe himself most likely; through charging at full speed whilst in proximity to his own stronghold (or main body), and quickening to a gallop as he retires from the stronghold (or main body) of the enemy. If further, he could secretly contrive to leave behind four or five troopers, the bravest and best mounted of the squadron, it would give them an immense advantage in falling upon the enemy whilst wheeling to return to the charge. (27)
(24) Al. "fields and farmsteads between."(25) Or, "retirements," see "Horsemanship," viii. 12; "Cyrop." V. iv.8; "Hell." IV. ii. 6; "Ages." ii. 3.(26) Or, "having precluded in this fashion." See Theocr. xxii. 102:{ton men anax ataraxen etosia khersi prodeiknus Pantothen},"feinting on every side" (A. Lang). Al. "having given due warningof his intention." Cf. Aristot. "H. A." ix. 37.(27) Cf. Aristoph. "Knights," 244 (Demosthenes calls to thehipparchs (?)):{andres eggus. all' amunou, kapanastrephou palin}.
IX
To read these observations over a few times will be sufficient, but for giving them effect the officer will need perpetually to act as circumstances require. (1) He must take in the situation at a glance, and carry out unflinchingly whatever is expedient for the moment. To set down in writing everything that he must do, is not a whit more possible than to know the future as a whole. (2) But of all hints and suggestions the most important to my mind is this: whatever you determine to be right, with diligence endeavour to perform. For be it tillage of the soil, or trading, or seafaring, or the art of ruling, without pains applied to bring the matter to perfection, the best theories in the world, the most correct conclusions, will be fruitless.
(1) {pros to paratugkhanon}, lit. "to meet emergencies." Cf. Thuc. i.122: "For war, least of all things, conforms to prescribed rules;it strikes out a path for itself when the moment comes" (Jowett).(2) Or, "is about as feasible as to foretell each contingency hid inthe womb of futurity."
One thing I am prepared to insist on: it is clear to myself that by Heaven's help our total cavalry force might be much more quickly raised to the full quota of a thousand troopers, (3) and with far less friction to the mass of citizens, by the enrolment of two hundred foreign cavalry. Their acquisition will be doubly helpful, as intensifying the loyalty of the entire force and as kindling a mutual ambition to excel in manly virtue.
(3) See Schneid. ad loc.; Boeckh, "P. E. A." pp. 263, 264; Herod. vi.112; Thuc. vi. 31; Aristoph. "Knights," 223; Aeschin. "De F. L."334-337. See for this reform, Martin, op. cit. 343, 368.
I can state on my own knowledge that the Lacedaemonian cavalry only began to be famous (4) with the introduction of foreign troopers; and in the other states of Hellas everywhere the foreign brigades stand in high esteem, as I perceive. Need, in fact, contributes greatly to enthusiasm. Towards the necessary cost of the horses I hold that an ample fund will be provided, (5) partly out of the pockets of those who are only too glad to escape cavalry service (in other words, those on whom the service devolves prefer to pay a sum of money down and be quit of the duty), (6) and from wealthy men who are physically incompetent; and I do not see why orphans possessed of large estates should not contribute. (7) Another belief I hold is that amongst our resident aliens (8) there are some who will show a laudable ambition if incorporated with the cavalry. I argue from the fact, apparent to myself, that amongst this class persons are to be found most zealously disposed to carry out the part assigned to them, in every other branch of honourable service which the citizens may choose to share with them. Again, it strikes me that if you seek for an energetic infantry to support your cavalry, you will find it in a corps composed of individuals whose hatred to the foe is naturally intense. (9) But the success of the above suggestions will depend doubtless on the consenting will of Heaven. (10)
(4) "Entered on an era of prestige with the incorporation of," afterLeuctra, 371 B.C., when the force was at its worst. See "Hell."VI. iv. 10.(5) Or, "money will be forthcoming for them." Cf. Lys. "AgainstPhilon," xxxi. 15; Martin, op. cit. 319.(6) Cf. "Hell." III. iv. 15; "Ages." i. 23. Courier brackets thissentence ({oti... ippeuein}) as a gloss; Martin, p. 323,emends.(7) As to the legal exemption of orphans Schneid. cf. Dem. "Symm."182. 15; Lys. "Against Diogeit." 24.(8) Lit. "metoecs." See "Revenues," ii.(9) Lit. "men the most antagonistic to the enemy." Is the authorthinking of Boeotian emigres? Cf. "Hell." VI. iii. 1, 5; Diod. xv.46. 6.(10) Lit. "with the consenting will of the gods these things all maycome to pass."
And now if the repetition of the phrase throughout this treatise "act with God," surprises any one, he may take my word for it that with the daily or hourly occurrence of perils which must betide him, his wonderment will diminish; as also with the clearer recognition of the fact that in time of war the antagonists are full of designs against each other, but the precise issue of these plots and counterplots is rarely known. To what counsellor, then, can a man apply for advice in his extremity save only to the gods, who know all things and forewarn whomsoever they will by victims or by omens, by voice or vision? Is it not rational to suppose that they will prefer to help in their need, not those who only seek them in time of momentary stress and trouble, but those rather who in the halcyon days of their prosperity make a practice of rendering to Heaven the service of heart and soul?