FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[1]On the Manchu constitutional programs, seeColumbia University Studies in Political Science, Vol. XL, No. 1: Yen, Hawkling L., "A Survey of Constitutional Development in China"; Vinacke, Harold Monk,Modern Constitutional Development in China, Princeton, 1920; Cameron, Meribeth,The Reform Movement in China, 1898-1912, Stanford University, 1931; and Hsieh, Pao Chao,The Government of China (1644-1911), Baltimore, 1925. The earlier constitutional developments under the Republic are summarized in Escarra, Jean,Le DroitChinois, Paris and Peiping, 1936, which includes excellent bibliographies; Tsêng Yu-hao,Modern Chinese Legal and Political Philosophy, Shanghai, 1934, Ch. VI, "The Law of Modern Chinese Constitutions"; a characteristic proposal for a pre-Kuomintang constitution is Bau, Mingchien Joshua,Modern Democracy in China, Shanghai, 1927; and the works of Lum, Wu, and Linebarger, cited above.[2]The text of theYüeh Fais to be found inThe China Year Book, 1932, Shanghai, 1932, and in Lum, work cited, p. 161ff., and Wu Chih-fang, work cited, p. 410ff.The Chinese texts of all outstanding Chinese constitutions, from the Imperial programs down to the Double Five Draft of theHsien Faare to be found in Wang Shih-chieh,Pi-chiao Hsien-fa, Shanghai, 1937, p. 699-796.[3]I.e., Sun Yat-sen; Chung-shan was a revolutionary alias, which became a ceremonial posthumous name.[4]The term "Chinese Kuomintang" is not a redundancy; the original isChung-kuo Kuo-min-tang, "Central-Realm Realm-people-association," and could be translated as the Chinese Nationalist Populist Party, National Democratic Party, the Nation's People's Party, etc. Several Japanese organizations have had exceedingly similar names; hence the formal style for the Kuomintang is always prefaced byChina.[5]Wang Shih-chieh, work cited, p. 649-50.[6]The Double Five Draft Constitution is to be found in Chinese in Wang Shih-chieh, work cited, and in English in Council of International Affairs,Information Bulletin, Vol. III, No. 10 (April 11, 1937), Nanking; Hsia, C. L., "Background and Features of the Draft Constitution of China"; in LegislativeYüan, "Draft of the Constitution of the Republic of China," Nanking, 1937; inThe China Year Book, Shanghai, andThe Chinese Year Book, Shanghai and Hong Kong,v.i.andv.d.The latest version of the Draft Constitution is reprinted below. Appendix I (A), p.283; the latest Chinese annotated version of this is the LegislativeYüan,Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an Shuo-ming-shu(An Elucidation of the Draft Permanent Constitution of the Chinese Republic), [Chungking], XXIX (1940).[7]For a critique and appreciation of the final Draft Constitution, see Wu, John C. H., "Notes on the Final Draft Constitution" inTien Hsia Monthly, Vol. X, No. 5 (May 1940), p. 409-26. (Dr. Wu is one of the most extraordinary personages of the modern world; he has taken all knowledge—East Asiatic and Western—for his province. He writes a spirited, graceful English and is capable of discussing anything from modern politics or abstruse points of Anglo-American law to ancient Chinese hedonism or the philosophical implications of theAutobiographyof St. Thérèse of Lisieux. Dr. Wu, in a bomb-shelter, possesses much of the moral poise and profound personal assurance for which such Westerners as T. S. Eliot seek in vain.) See also Hsia, C. L., "A Comparative Study of China's Draft Constitution with That of Other Modern States," inThe China Quarterly, Vol. 2, 1936-7, No. 1 (Summer), p. 89-101 and Hoh Chih-hsiang, "A History of Constitution Making in China," the same, Vol. 1, 1935-6, No. 4 (Summer), p. 105-117.[8]For a more extended discussion of this point, see the author'sThe Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the San Min Chu I, Baltimore, 1937, p. 218ff., and also p. 96ff.[9]See Sun Fo [President of the LegislativeYüan, and son of Sun Yat-sen], "The Spirit of the Draft Permanent Constitution," inThe China Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 3 (April 1940), Shanghai, p. 377-84.[10]See Appendix I (F), p.318-24, below.[11]See below, p.106ff., and Appendix I (G), p.324.[12]This constitution is available in Yakhontoff, Victor A.,The Chinese Soviets, New York, 1934, p. 217-21, and in Kun, Bela [prefator],Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic, New York, 1934, p. 17-24. The writer has been unable to secure the Chinese text of this document.[13]China Information Committee, Chungking,News Release, No. 351 (February 25, 1939), p. 2269-71.[14][Chiang K'ai-shek],Tsung-ts'ai Chien-kuo Yen-lun Hsüan-chi(The Party Chief's Utterances on Reconstruction), Chungking, 1940, p. 237-43. The Generalissimo concluded his speech with a homiletic touch which is so characteristic that it may be included here; it also explains his relative lack of interest in the Constitution: "Lastly, I have another point to tell you gentlemen. I have already repeated this, again and again, many times. Desiring to complete our revolutionary work and national reconstruction, and to have a constitutional government as seen in many modern states as soon as possible, I often study the causes of the weakness and disorder which exist in our country.... [He cites the traditional political vigor and excellence of the centuries before the time of Christ, with the "degeneration" and "departure from order" of the following centuries.] The departure is not simply due to the failures in politics and education and to the deprivation of the popular rights by a few tyrannical kings and lords since the Ch'in and Han periods. It is due to the fact that before the Chou, we had government by law [fa chih] as a mere supplement to government by social standards [li chih, also translatable as ideological control, or control through moral indoctrination]. We had social organization as the foundation of political organization. Everything was then well-organized and well-trained. Everywhere, in schools, in armies, in families, in society, order and the forms of propriety [i.e., social standards] were regarded as most important. No citizen could evade his duty and obligation."[15]Thomas Hobbes,Leviathan, New York and London, 1934 (Everyman's Edition), p. 49.[16]The writer is indebted for much of the material in this chapter to Dr. Djang Chu, of the New Life Movement Headquarters, Chungking, who supplied it to him in the form of a lecture and other memoranda. Dr. Djang is, of course, not responsible for any reinterpretations here made.[17]See Appendix I (D), p.309.[18]Liu Shih, "Chung-kuo Hsien-chêng Yün-tung-ti Chi-ko Chieh-tuan" (Stages of the Chinese Constitutional Movement) inLi-lun yü Hsien-shih(Theory and Reality), Vol. 1, No. 3, November 15, 1939, p. 13ff.[19]From Tso Tao-fen, "A Few Questions Regarding the Constitution" in Ch'üan-min K'ang-chan Shê [The United Front Club],Hsien-chêng Yün-tung Lun-wên Hsüan-chi(A Symposium on the Constitutional Movement), Chungking, 1940, p. 1ff.[20]Statement of Col. Ch'in Po-k'u at the Chungking office of the 18th [Communist] Army Corps Headquarters, on July 29, 1940, to the author.[21]China at War, Vol. IV, No. 5 (June 1940), p. 79ff.

[1]On the Manchu constitutional programs, seeColumbia University Studies in Political Science, Vol. XL, No. 1: Yen, Hawkling L., "A Survey of Constitutional Development in China"; Vinacke, Harold Monk,Modern Constitutional Development in China, Princeton, 1920; Cameron, Meribeth,The Reform Movement in China, 1898-1912, Stanford University, 1931; and Hsieh, Pao Chao,The Government of China (1644-1911), Baltimore, 1925. The earlier constitutional developments under the Republic are summarized in Escarra, Jean,Le DroitChinois, Paris and Peiping, 1936, which includes excellent bibliographies; Tsêng Yu-hao,Modern Chinese Legal and Political Philosophy, Shanghai, 1934, Ch. VI, "The Law of Modern Chinese Constitutions"; a characteristic proposal for a pre-Kuomintang constitution is Bau, Mingchien Joshua,Modern Democracy in China, Shanghai, 1927; and the works of Lum, Wu, and Linebarger, cited above.

[2]The text of theYüeh Fais to be found inThe China Year Book, 1932, Shanghai, 1932, and in Lum, work cited, p. 161ff., and Wu Chih-fang, work cited, p. 410ff.The Chinese texts of all outstanding Chinese constitutions, from the Imperial programs down to the Double Five Draft of theHsien Faare to be found in Wang Shih-chieh,Pi-chiao Hsien-fa, Shanghai, 1937, p. 699-796.

[3]I.e., Sun Yat-sen; Chung-shan was a revolutionary alias, which became a ceremonial posthumous name.

[4]The term "Chinese Kuomintang" is not a redundancy; the original isChung-kuo Kuo-min-tang, "Central-Realm Realm-people-association," and could be translated as the Chinese Nationalist Populist Party, National Democratic Party, the Nation's People's Party, etc. Several Japanese organizations have had exceedingly similar names; hence the formal style for the Kuomintang is always prefaced byChina.

[5]Wang Shih-chieh, work cited, p. 649-50.

[6]The Double Five Draft Constitution is to be found in Chinese in Wang Shih-chieh, work cited, and in English in Council of International Affairs,Information Bulletin, Vol. III, No. 10 (April 11, 1937), Nanking; Hsia, C. L., "Background and Features of the Draft Constitution of China"; in LegislativeYüan, "Draft of the Constitution of the Republic of China," Nanking, 1937; inThe China Year Book, Shanghai, andThe Chinese Year Book, Shanghai and Hong Kong,v.i.andv.d.The latest version of the Draft Constitution is reprinted below. Appendix I (A), p.283; the latest Chinese annotated version of this is the LegislativeYüan,Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an Shuo-ming-shu(An Elucidation of the Draft Permanent Constitution of the Chinese Republic), [Chungking], XXIX (1940).

[7]For a critique and appreciation of the final Draft Constitution, see Wu, John C. H., "Notes on the Final Draft Constitution" inTien Hsia Monthly, Vol. X, No. 5 (May 1940), p. 409-26. (Dr. Wu is one of the most extraordinary personages of the modern world; he has taken all knowledge—East Asiatic and Western—for his province. He writes a spirited, graceful English and is capable of discussing anything from modern politics or abstruse points of Anglo-American law to ancient Chinese hedonism or the philosophical implications of theAutobiographyof St. Thérèse of Lisieux. Dr. Wu, in a bomb-shelter, possesses much of the moral poise and profound personal assurance for which such Westerners as T. S. Eliot seek in vain.) See also Hsia, C. L., "A Comparative Study of China's Draft Constitution with That of Other Modern States," inThe China Quarterly, Vol. 2, 1936-7, No. 1 (Summer), p. 89-101 and Hoh Chih-hsiang, "A History of Constitution Making in China," the same, Vol. 1, 1935-6, No. 4 (Summer), p. 105-117.

[8]For a more extended discussion of this point, see the author'sThe Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the San Min Chu I, Baltimore, 1937, p. 218ff., and also p. 96ff.

[9]See Sun Fo [President of the LegislativeYüan, and son of Sun Yat-sen], "The Spirit of the Draft Permanent Constitution," inThe China Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 3 (April 1940), Shanghai, p. 377-84.

[10]See Appendix I (F), p.318-24, below.

[11]See below, p.106ff., and Appendix I (G), p.324.

[12]This constitution is available in Yakhontoff, Victor A.,The Chinese Soviets, New York, 1934, p. 217-21, and in Kun, Bela [prefator],Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic, New York, 1934, p. 17-24. The writer has been unable to secure the Chinese text of this document.

[13]China Information Committee, Chungking,News Release, No. 351 (February 25, 1939), p. 2269-71.

[14][Chiang K'ai-shek],Tsung-ts'ai Chien-kuo Yen-lun Hsüan-chi(The Party Chief's Utterances on Reconstruction), Chungking, 1940, p. 237-43. The Generalissimo concluded his speech with a homiletic touch which is so characteristic that it may be included here; it also explains his relative lack of interest in the Constitution: "Lastly, I have another point to tell you gentlemen. I have already repeated this, again and again, many times. Desiring to complete our revolutionary work and national reconstruction, and to have a constitutional government as seen in many modern states as soon as possible, I often study the causes of the weakness and disorder which exist in our country.... [He cites the traditional political vigor and excellence of the centuries before the time of Christ, with the "degeneration" and "departure from order" of the following centuries.] The departure is not simply due to the failures in politics and education and to the deprivation of the popular rights by a few tyrannical kings and lords since the Ch'in and Han periods. It is due to the fact that before the Chou, we had government by law [fa chih] as a mere supplement to government by social standards [li chih, also translatable as ideological control, or control through moral indoctrination]. We had social organization as the foundation of political organization. Everything was then well-organized and well-trained. Everywhere, in schools, in armies, in families, in society, order and the forms of propriety [i.e., social standards] were regarded as most important. No citizen could evade his duty and obligation."

[15]Thomas Hobbes,Leviathan, New York and London, 1934 (Everyman's Edition), p. 49.

[16]The writer is indebted for much of the material in this chapter to Dr. Djang Chu, of the New Life Movement Headquarters, Chungking, who supplied it to him in the form of a lecture and other memoranda. Dr. Djang is, of course, not responsible for any reinterpretations here made.

[17]See Appendix I (D), p.309.

[18]Liu Shih, "Chung-kuo Hsien-chêng Yün-tung-ti Chi-ko Chieh-tuan" (Stages of the Chinese Constitutional Movement) inLi-lun yü Hsien-shih(Theory and Reality), Vol. 1, No. 3, November 15, 1939, p. 13ff.

[19]From Tso Tao-fen, "A Few Questions Regarding the Constitution" in Ch'üan-min K'ang-chan Shê [The United Front Club],Hsien-chêng Yün-tung Lun-wên Hsüan-chi(A Symposium on the Constitutional Movement), Chungking, 1940, p. 1ff.

[20]Statement of Col. Ch'in Po-k'u at the Chungking office of the 18th [Communist] Army Corps Headquarters, on July 29, 1940, to the author.

[21]China at War, Vol. IV, No. 5 (June 1940), p. 79ff.

By constitutional stipulation, and by dogma legally established, the National Government of the Chinese Republic is a Kuomintang Party-dictatorship over the Chinese nation. This rule is formally dictatorship by a minority democracy over the absolutely governed majority, since the Party constitution requires intra-Party democracy. No pretense is made of further formal democracy. Actual experience of the past ten years has shown the government to be a broad, loosely organized oligarchy in which the Party, the Government, the Army and regional military, and independent leaders (such as bankers, college professors and presidents, secret society chiefs, community spokesmen) have shared power. The center of gravity has stayed somewhere near Chiang K'ai-shek, who as co-leader and then formal Chief (Tsung-ts'ai, "general ruler") of the Party and creator of the central army has combined two of the chief sources of influence. Variety in the sources, nature, and incidence of political power in recent Chinese affairs has, however, not destroyed the constitutional theory: Party-dictatorship pledged to national democracy.

The state machinery—as it has been since promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, 1931—is among the most elaborate in the modern world, but is nevertheless effective. One may justly regard the present government as the most efficacious, generally powerful, and growing Chinese government since the mid-eighteenthcentury. This government is pre-eminently the creation of the Kuomintang, and of Kuomintang leaders. A war which threatens China's national existence accordingly threatens the leaders as government officers, as Party members, as patriotic citizens, and as members of the Chinese race. At the time that they fight an alien enemy, they must simultaneously increase state power and diffuse it so that a democracy may emerge and survive.

China's leadership is therefore posed a two-fold problem: to perpetuate a regime, successful in one period of relative peace, through years of invasion to a period of even deeper peace; and to permit popular access to policy-forming agencies, allowing freer operation of pressures, without endangering resistance and reconstruction thereby. To the Western political scientist, it is amazing that they have carried into the years of catastrophic war a unique, complex constitutional system, treasuring it like an ark of the covenant. This is the five-power system.

The five-power constitution (wu-ch'üan hsien-fa) is a legacy of Sun Yat-sen, and is one of the cardinal dogmas of theSan Min Chu I. Distinctively, two new powers are added to the familiar three: namely, the examinative and the control powers. Westerners might question the importance of segregating the impeaching, auditing and critical powers, unifying them into a new agency of government, along with a glorified, independent civil service system. Yet the five-fold division is to China a key point of governmental development.

The five-power system is based on the notions Sun Yat-sen had of democracy. He anticipated by a generation the need of strengthening democratic machinery to compete with Caesarian techniques. Merely to have qualified the suffrage, or to have narrowed the limits of popular action, would not have sufficed, for it wasauthentic democracy—government both representative and popular—which he desired, not an empty shell of nominal republicanism. In an effort to solve this dilemma, he employed the conceptsch'üanandnêng,[1]which may be translated "power" and "capacity," although the rendering would necessarily vary in accordance with the connotations to be encompassed.[2]He felt that it was a major discovery to apply in modern politics a distinction between the power which the people should have over government and the capability they had of operating the machine of state. Abandoning the state to the vagaries of public opinion, allowing the citizens free access to the powerful, complex controls of modern governance, or assuming that anyone and everyone had an expert's qualifications on all political subjects—this would, in Sun Yat-sen's opinion, wreck the government. Nevertheless, the people had to reserve a final power over policies and personnel of government, although they are themselves unqualified to operate the state mechanism. Hence the people were to exercisethe four powersover the government: initiative, referendum, election, and recall. Compensatingly, the government was to possess thefive rightsover the people, based on the new separation of powers. To Sun, as a Chinese, the state was not the hand of the people; it was a separate institution above other institutions, democratic only in allowing access to itself and in justifying its authority by the ultimate sanction of popular vote. The new government could not be kept clean, prompt, and high-minded by the freak, casual operation of popular censure, nor staffed by whomever a mass fancy threw intooffice. It was, instead, to be a traditionally Chinese self-perpetuating bureaucracy, differing from the past only in being controlled and revised by popular instead of imperial will.

Accordingly, the ideal toward which the Chungking government strives may be epitomized asperfect bureaucracy subject to complete popular control. The two powers new to the West—examination and control—are to replace public opinion at levels of obscurity, technicality, and persistence where outside criticism could not reach; the plan of Sun Yat-sen provides for as much use of power through voting as is found in any Western state. This attempted solution strikes near the core problems of any modern government, wherever it may operate and whatever its conditions.

The five-power constitution posits a government of educated, expert men, in which qualifying examinations will precede election for administrative posts, and in which the examination and controlyüanwill—professionally, officially—replace the haphazard play of sentiment, anger, fancy, envy upon which Western peoples count to keep their democracy healthy and intact. The United States Government is the most complex and important institution in the United States, possessing inquisitorial powers wider and deeper than those of any private person or institution. Yet the Americans have no unceasing, professional, expert investigation of their government by their government, nor does a merit system extend to offices where it might have the drastic effect of thwarting operation of public opinion locally or temporarily debased.

This function, specializing power to strengthen it, explains the war-time survival of the five-power system as a fundamental theory of state. The Chinese have suffered from weak government for decades. Absence of dictatorship was largely owing to an inability to designate a dictator. The five-power system was preceded bya Nationalist government which employed the soviet form of organization—the one instance outside the Soviet Union of such application.[3]This had been set up for rapid, decisive action; thirteen years' preliminary application of the five-power system has shown this to be no less swift and effectual. Even the Communist leaders in China today are reconciled to the retention of the five-power system, although they would certainly like to modify its present organization.[4]

Reference to the general chart of government organization (see p.330) shows the intricate pre-democratic system of government now applied. Consideration of the sources of policy in such a structure have, therefore, to appraise not merely two agencies—executive and legislative, with only a glance at the judiciary—as in America, but to examine a whole hierarchy of Party, general governmental, military-governmental, and autonomous policy-making agencies. Were it not for the thousands of miles, the unrelatedness in cultures, the complexities of language, and the inescapable awareness of race, Americans might long since have looked to China as the decisive, fresh political experiment of our times.

One further trait of the Chinese, which in Japan has been carried to the point of a national mania, is the respect for the constitutional (or Imperial) system as a symbol of purity and order. Western governments are like machines in common use; they operate for the general convenience and subject to the criticism of their members. Even dictatorships try to seem practical. The Confucian traditions of government by indoctrination, and particularly that of government indoctrinatingthrough conspicuous example, motivated heavy ceremonialization of state functions. This often led a Chinese Emperor to become more and more majestic and aloof, to strive for archetypal perfection, until he became so much a model that he disappeared from public sight altogether, swilling and carousing himself to death in the gardens of the Forbidden City; his successors, if they came from the people, would seem practical and workable for a few generations, until they too succumbed to their own majesty. Some atrophy through majesty occurs even in the relatively new Chinese National Government, arrested but not eradicated by war-time vigor.

The highest political agency in China is the Supreme National Defense Council (Kuo-fang Tsui-kao Wei-yüan-hui).[5]This is not a part of the government,de jure, since it is the war-time replacement of the Kuomintang Central Political Council (Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui), the high Party organ charged with exercise of the Party's sovereign powers ingovernment. The liberalization of the policy-framing agencies in war-time cannot be better illustrated than by the fact that this new Supreme National Defense Council reportedly includes non-Party members, and acts in fact as a central board or council of government, superseding not only the Kuomintang Central Political Council but its governmental counterpart, the Council of State (Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui) as well. Reference to the chart below will clarify the relationship of these agencies:

The KUOMINTANG, as a Party,exercises sovereign powers through[The CENTRAL POLITICAL COUNCIL, superseded in war-time by]The SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL,which transmits commandstoThe COUNCIL OF STATE, highest governmental agency, which transforms these commands into government orders applicabletoNATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, or LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES,in the form ofORDERS, ORDINANCES, and LAWS

The power of the Kuomintang is exercised by its Chief [Tsung-ts'ai] and its Central Executive Committee, Central Committee, and their respective Standing Committees (discussed below, p.125ff.).

Secretiveness in a nation's highest policy-making organ is somewhat unusual in the modern world. In most states the invisible government of practical acquaintance and association between leaders provides a meeting ground, and traditions require a formal, open exercise of public authority. As a matter of fact, a few generally accepted data concerning the Supreme National Defense Council are readily apparent to the observer inChungking. In the first place, it is what its title implies—the highest agency of political control. Its meetings are the constant source of new policy and tangible control. Secondly, one finds a universal belief that the Generalissimo, who attends these meetings in the multiple capacity of Chairman of the Council, Party Chief of the Kuomintang, President of the ExecutiveYüan, Chairman of the People's Political Council, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, etc., faithfully employs Council meetings for very real debate and discussion of government and Party policy, and for the conduct of the war. He is not believed to take any important step arbitrarily, without consulting the Council. (In the past, he has been known to act with dramatic and concealed swiftness, opening his mind to no one before the crucial consummation of his plans, but at the present time this has apparently disappeared.[6])

Third, the Council, while extending beyond the men who are primarily Party leaders and including military and political figures who (irrespective of nominal Party membership) are independent, has transformed the arcanum of Party power into a body more representative of the entire nation. Fourth, significant in connection with the Japanese charge of Chungking Bolshevization, the Communists and other Leftists, while fairly represented in advisory and even in military bodies, are presumed to have no representation whatever on the Supreme National Defense Council, nor is such representation regarded as probable in the near future. Chiang K'ai-shek has at hand a counselling and co-governing body whose fundamental purposes are completely one with his own.

A nice consistency would demand that the Supreme National Defense Council (as a Party agency) should transmit its commands to the Council of State (its government counterpart) for transformation into law. This is actually done, whenever possible, but the frequency of crises and of needs for immediate action have—in the period of hostilities—led to the occasional issuance of commands direct to the Ministry or other governmental organ concerned.[7]To the degree that the Supreme National Defense Council does so, it becomes a directly governing authority, and instead of perpetuating Party authorityovergovernment, it is itself government.

Since a cloud of military secrecy covers the functions of the Council, some notion of its operation and working authority may be found by analogy with the role of the Central Political Council, which it has displaced. According to the leading Chinese constitutional writer on the subject, the Central Political Council (also called [Central] Political Committee)—for which read Supreme National Defense Council today—acted as follows:

According to Article IV of thePrinciples Governing the Organization of the C. E. C.[of the Kuomintang] passed ... December 6, XXIV (1935), "the Central Executive Committee organizes a Political Committee, composed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, and nineteen to twenty-five members, appointed by the Central Executive Committee, from among the members of the Central Executive Committee and the Control Committee." ... "During a session of the Political Committee, the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Central Standing Committees, the President of the National Government, the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the FiveYüan, and the President and Vice-President of the Military Affairs Commission should be present, while the leading members of the special technicalcommittees under the [control] Political Committee, and other higher officials of the National Government may be notified if necessary to attend the sessions." [The author explains that, on the basis of actual experience, "may be notified" signifies "shall attend if matters relevant to their functions arise."] ...It was originally fixed that the Political Committee should meet once every week, but since December XXIV (1935), it holds meetings either weekly or fortnightly. The number of members required to constitute a forum is not fixed, and resolutions have never been put in the form of motions requiring formal vote. Regarding the proposition of a motion, and the discussion of motions proposedex-tempore, the Political Committee has never fixed any rigid regulations; moreover, even if a rule had been established at one time, it has not been followed closely later. Before being put to a decision, a motion is either studied and examined beforehand, or it is not. There is no definite rule as to whether every motion should be so studied or not, but the Committee possesses the power to decide this pointad hoc. The entire wording of a motion passed in a meeting is rarely fully read, and is then read in the following session as the minutes of the previous session.Hence the Chairman and the Secretary-General have a certain liberty in the framing of the wording of resolutions. Judging from above circumstances, important resolutions passed in the Political Committee must actually represent the opinions of the Chairman and a small number of influential members....[Italics added in translation.][8]

It was originally fixed that the Political Committee should meet once every week, but since December XXIV (1935), it holds meetings either weekly or fortnightly. The number of members required to constitute a forum is not fixed, and resolutions have never been put in the form of motions requiring formal vote. Regarding the proposition of a motion, and the discussion of motions proposedex-tempore, the Political Committee has never fixed any rigid regulations; moreover, even if a rule had been established at one time, it has not been followed closely later. Before being put to a decision, a motion is either studied and examined beforehand, or it is not. There is no definite rule as to whether every motion should be so studied or not, but the Committee possesses the power to decide this pointad hoc. The entire wording of a motion passed in a meeting is rarely fully read, and is then read in the following session as the minutes of the previous session.Hence the Chairman and the Secretary-General have a certain liberty in the framing of the wording of resolutions. Judging from above circumstances, important resolutions passed in the Political Committee must actually represent the opinions of the Chairman and a small number of influential members....[Italics added in translation.][8]

Many of these features may reasonably be conjectured to have continued in the Supreme National Defense Council, although the regular meetings—whatever others there may be—seem to be considerably less frequent, occurring presumably about once in five weeks.[9]In the matter of authority, again, some continuity may be supposed between the earlier agency and the later. Wang Shih-chieh continues:

The authority of the Political Committee (or the Political Council) has undergone very few changes since its establishment. To speak concisely, the Political Committee is the highest directing organ of all governmental policies. Putting it in more detail, we may say that this Committee has the power to decide the basic principles of legislation, of governmental policies and their execution, and has also the power to appoint and dismiss governmental officials.... [A footnote adds the following detail.] According to the outlines of organization now being enforced, there are still five kinds of affairs that should be discussed and decided by the Political Committee: (1) the basic principles of legislation, (2) the general plans of executing government policies, (3) important plans concerning military affairs, (4) financial plans, (5) the appointment of officials of the Especially Appointed category and of other governmental officials, and (6) [sic] cases submitted for discussion by the Central Executive Committee. The first four may be collectively classified under the two names of execution and legislation.[10]

Only from such description by analogy may the foreigner penetrate to the inmost source of Chinese policy. This ambiguous and all-powerful agency, a Party organ which controls government, a committee constellated about its charismatic Chairman, is the heir both of the Grand Council of the Manchu Empire and of the soviets established by Nationalists during the entente with Soviet Russia. Should the fortune of war remove the Generalissimo from the scene, this Council would become the storm center of power; under his guidance and leadership, this agency above all others distinguishes China from an outright dictatorship. Chiang, unlike many other national leaders, has consistently shrunk from the regalia of arbitrary power. In the highest matters, and at the ultimate control, his action is veiled inthe Supreme National Defense Council. The actual play of personalities and power is hidden from us, his contemporaries. Only the future may discover the exact degrees andmodus operandiof his authority.

The term National Government (Kuo-min Chêng-fu) is employed in two senses. In the broad sense, it refers to the entire central government of China. In the narrow sense, it is a synonym for National Government Committee (Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui), commonly translated as Council of State. The highest governmental officer of China is theKuo-min Chêng-fu Chu-hsi—literally, the Chairman of the National Government. Since this officer is the formal head of the National Government in both senses of the term, his office may with equal appropriateness be described as Chairmanship of the Council of State and as Presidency of the National Government. The latter has been most commonly accepted, although it obscured the clarity of the Chinese governmental pattern. It is essential to note, however, that in the National Government period there has been noPresident of the Chinese Republic; the highest officer has been thePresident of the National Government of the Chinese Republic, and as such the titular head of the Chinese state for international purposes. This officer possesses prestige rather than power, and is roughly analogous to the President of the Third French Republic.

In his official capacity, the President acts as chairman of the meetings of the Council of State, performs the ceremonial functions entailed by his office, and serves as the custodian of the symbols of continuity and legitimacy. Wang Shih-chieh writes: "... the Chairman more or less occupies a nominal position. At most, he can give occasional advice, only within certain limits, to the Executive or otherYüan, with no power at all todecide or to reject the policies adopted by theYüan. As a matter of fact, from the end of the Year XXI (1932) down to the present, since the man filling the office of Chairman [President] of the National Government is very calm and law-abiding, he has never interfered in the activities or policies of the variousYüan."[11]This officer has been the veteran Kuomintang leader, Lin Shên, long a resident of the United States, a key man in overseas affairs of the Party, and a person of much dignity, charm, poise and prestige. With a long beard and a humane, scholarly demeanor, President Lin has fulfilled most admirably the requirements of his office.

Generalissimo Chiang regularly reports on government activities to LinChu-hsi, addressing him attentively and respectfully. This is no perfunctory sham, but appears to be a very real search for advice and guidance. The two men are close associates and have been such for many years; the Generalissimo gives every indication of regarding his venerable colleague with affectionate esteem. During the Chungking bombings, the President has commonly resided in a secure place outside the city. He is not needed for the daily prosecution of the war, but both the office and its incumbent are strongly stabilizing factors in the National Government. (The Japanophile Wang Ch'ing-wei, establishing his duplicate regime in Nanking, left the Presidency open for many months, pirating Lin Shên's name. Finally Wang gave himself the title, although he patently would have preferred Lin.)

The Council of State (Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui, National Government Committee) is the formal governmental core of the Chinese Republic. Even in peacetime, however, its importance was seriously undermined by the vigorous activity of the Central PoliticalCouncil. The members of the State Council are commonly persons who do not hold other important office; hence the Council does not include the most effective leaders. Although its sphere of activity is wide, its role as ratifier of the decisions of the Supreme National Defense Council reduces its plenary powers to a shadow. Amnesties, general appropriation bills, appointments and removals, solemnification of legislation adopted by the LegislativeYüan, and inter-Yüanproblems are all within the scope of the State Council's authority, but except for the power of organizing and supervising the central independent agencies, subordinate only to itself, there has been little practical power for it to exercise.[12]

The independent agencies under the Council of State, together with the latter's relation to theYüanand the Military Affairs Commission, are best shown on the chart on p. 55.[13]

Minor agencies are thus attached directly to the Council of State, which also serves as a link and common formal superior to the fiveYüanand the Military Affairs Commission. Authority of the Council is directed primarily upon these agencies which, while minor, serve useful needs. The Offices of Military (Tsan-chün Ch'u) and of Civil Affairs (Wên-kuan Ch'u) are transmission and ceremonial agencies, charged with theformal correctness of state documents and ceremonies; the military office was originally designed to carry on more important functions, including an independent inspectorate of troops, but now seems to be restricted to matters of protocol. Chinese government has for centuries operated on the basis of a two-way current of written materials: memorials, petitions, and other communications come from the provinces and dominions to the metropolis; orders, laws and other commands flow outward in response.[14]

The Supreme National Defense Council

The other four agencies directly dependent on the Council of State are all of important character, but likely to be impaired by a period of crisis. The Academia Sinica (Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan) serves scientific and educational work through its own research bureaus, through systems of extended aid, and through a program of publications; despite war, it has continued, making heroic efforts to preserve the national cultural vitality and continuity. The three remaining agencies are of less importance, although the Planning Committee for the Western Capital (Hsi-ching Ch'ou-pei Wei-yüan-hui) found its work considerably extended when, on October 1, 1940, Chungking was formally denominated an auxiliary capital of the Chinese Republic, and a long-standing anomaly—that of the city's uncertain status—was removed.

The Council of State could be regarded, therefore, as a mere excrescence upon the design of government were it not that ceremonial and formal functions, indispensable to any government but particularly salient in China, can be delegated to it, and the actual policy-making agencies thereby stripped down to maximal utility and efficacy.

The ExecutiveYüanis the political organ which includes the ministries, and is therefore roughly analogous to a cabinet, just as the Council of State is in loose parallel to a Privy Council. Together with the Supreme National Defense Council and the Military Affairs Commission, it exercises actual control over the National Government in war time. Its growth involves executive giantism, and atrophy for the remainingYüan. The President (Yüan-chang) of the ExecutiveYüan(Hsing-chêng Yüan) is the highest executive officer of the government. This post has not always been held by Chiang K'ai-shek. At various times Wang Ch'ing-wei (now inNanking) and H. H. K'ung (now Minister of Finance and Vice-President [Fu-yüan-chang] of theYüan) have held this office.

The ExecutiveYüanmay be compared to a parliamentary cabinet in respect to its relations to the President of the National Government, but it possesses no authority whatever over the Supreme National Defense Council, nor over the Kuomintang C. E. C. and the Kuomintang Congress. It cannot ask for its own dissolution, nor demand the dissolution of the higher policy-making agency whose will it executes.[15]It resembles a cabinet, therefore, in its service as a consultative and unifying agency for the entire executive, but differs in its lack of controlling interdependence with a broad parliament. Again, theYüanis unique among national executive agencies in the modern world with respect to its division of the task of policy-making and policy-supervising. Most cabinets consist of meetings of the heads of executive ministries or departments, with the chief executive officer presiding, but have no elaborate secretarial or administrative machinery interposed between the cabinet and its direct subordinates (departments or ministries). The ExecutiveYüanis peculiar in possessing two elaborate staff agencies which handle as much routine work as possible, act as a clearing house for policy and general administration, and pre-digest a maximum of problems. The outline on p. 58 illustrates the difference.

All matters short of the most critical moment are referred to one or the other of the two staff organs (Mi-shu Ch'uor Secretariat, under a Secretary-General; andChêng-wu Ch'u, or Office of Political Affairs,[16]under a Director of Political Affairs), which are nominally separate but actually almost fused, with the Directorserving as a sort of assistant Secretary-General. All official business (other than crucial matters raised by the members of the Meeting) comes to these agencies, where it is studied, assorted, and usually settled provisionally, pending only formal ratification by the Meeting of the ExecutiveYüan.

The Cabinet

The ExecutiveYüanMeeting occurs once weekly, most commonly on Tuesday.[17]Each Meeting is presented with a formidable agenda, prepared by the Secretary-General, and divided into three categories: reports, matters for discussion, and appointments. The membership of the Meeting consists of theYüanPresident and Vice-President, the Ministers heading the executive Ministries, and the Chairmen of Commissions having the rank of Ministry.[18]The work of the Meeting iscarried on in a business-like fashion. The Generalissimo, as incumbentYüanPresident, takes great interest in the work of theYüan, and makes faithfulness and punctuality in attendance a matter of high importance. Because of the Japanese air raids over the capital, the exact place and hour of the weekly meeting are not announced, nor are the proceedings public.

In giving effect to the decisions reached by theYüanMeeting, theYüanitself issues orders in its own name for matters which are of general interest, or which cannot be handled by any single Ministry or Commission. If the problem is within the province of a particular agency, theYüan—through its Secretariat—addresses the appropriate form of intragovernmental communication, and the decision is then set forth as the order or act of the agency involved. The following subjects are within the jurisdiction of the ExecutiveYüan:

(1) laws or legal problems submitted for promulgation by the LegislativeYüan;(2) the budget, also passedpro formaby the Council of State and put into legal form by the LegislativeYüan;(3) declarations of war and peace, on the motion of the LegislativeYüan;(4) appointment and discharge of the higher ranks of officials;(5) matters which cannot be settled by a single Ministry or Commission;(6) other matters which theYüanPresident sees fit to introduce for discussion or decision.

(1) laws or legal problems submitted for promulgation by the LegislativeYüan;

(2) the budget, also passedpro formaby the Council of State and put into legal form by the LegislativeYüan;

(3) declarations of war and peace, on the motion of the LegislativeYüan;

(4) appointment and discharge of the higher ranks of officials;

(5) matters which cannot be settled by a single Ministry or Commission;

(6) other matters which theYüanPresident sees fit to introduce for discussion or decision.

The ExecutiveYüanhas far outstripped all otherYüanin war-time growth. Its central position, the urgency of most government business, and the need for speed have led to this. Executive exercise of the ordinance-making power has led to the gradual desuetude of the LegislativeYüan, which has found ample work in the preparation of the Draft Permanent Constitutionand the attempt to systematize legislation in view of rapid territorial and administrative change. The ExecutiveYüan, by controlling personnel, usually short-circuits the functions of the Examination and ControlYüan; and the JudicialYüanhas never had practical political parity. Hence, the five-power system must be regarded as a system with strong executive, weaker legislative, examinative, and censoral, and dependent judicial divisions. Above the five powers, the Supreme National Defense Council exercises its august authority; within them, the Executive stands forth; and to them, in the course of the war, a new agency, almost comparable to a sixthyüan, has sprung forth with an elaborate bureaucracy of its own: the Military Affairs Commission.

Some sense of the perpetual urgencies underlying Chinese government in the past decade may be obtained by consideration of the Military Affairs Commission.[19]A similar agency was one of the political wheels on which the Nationalist-Communist machine rolled victoriously North in the Great Revolution of 1925-27. After the organization of a relatively stable government at Nanking, the separate military commission was due for absorption into the coordinate pattern of government; instead, it has lingered under one form or another for almost twenty years, growing great in recurrent crises, while the Ministry of War (which was to have absorbed it) has become its adjunct. War led tosudden distension of the Commission, and the creation of an agency comparable to a sixthyüan, if not to a duplicate, shogunal government in the Japanese sense. The Commission had its own head, its ownPu(Ministries or Departments), its own staff and field services. Duplicating the regular government on the one side, and the party administration on the other, it flowered into bureaucracy so lavishly that a fourth agency—co-ordinator for the first three—began to be needed.

Simplicity of government structure has not been a part of the Chinese tradition; the quasi-state of the Empire had been as elaborate as its more potent European counterparts; and the foliation of government at war cannot be taken asprima facieproof of inefficiency. Personnel is provided by giving each officer two, five, even ten jobs; the work is done—delegation and counter-delegation frequently cancel out—and the creation of new agencies does not inescapably involve confusion.

The Military Affairs Commission consists of a Chairman—the Generalissimo (Tsung-ssŭ-ling), who is Chiang K'ai-shek—and seven to nine other members, all appointed by the Council of State upon designation by the Supreme National Defense Council.[20]The key officers of the armed forces areex officiomembers, and the Commission is charged with the military side of the prosecution of the war. Its power has been liberally interpreted. New agencies have been attached to it as they arose; now it deals with social work, relief, education, agitation, propaganda, espionage,government-sponsored "social revolution," and many economic matters in addition to its narrowly military affairs.

The work of the Commission falls into two parts. On the one hand, it is the supreme directing agency for all the armies; on the other, the managing agency for a variegated war effort away from the combat lines. The Commission's work in theory covers all armies, but in practice confines its supervisory powers to the forces in Free China and—less clearly—to the major guerrilla units in the occupied areas.

The Commission's governmental structure coordinates military and political functions. The Chief of the General Staff serves as assistant to the Chairman of the Commission. The Main Office serves to smooth interdepartmental affairs and to act as a central clearing point for orders and other transmissions. Beneath the Commission and the main office, there are twelve divisions with the rank ofPu. The Department of Military Operations (Chün-ling-pu) serves as a military planning and strategic agency. The Department of Military Training (Chün-hsün-pu) supervises training facilities, military schools, and in-service training.[21]The Directorate-General of Courts-Martial (Chün-fa Chih-hsing Tsung-chien-pu) and Pensions Commission (Fu-hsüeh Wei-yüan-hui) are explained by their titles; the pension program is probably behind that of every Western power, and the personal grants made by the Generalissimo under his own extra-governmental arrangements are more effective than governmental pensions. The Military Advisory Council (Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan) acts as a research and consultative body, in no sense cameral. An Administration of Personnel (Ch'uan-hsü T'ing) applies some principles of the merit system. AService Department (Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu) is in charge of transportation, supplies, and sanitation. The National Aviation Commission (Hang-k'ung Wei-yüan-hui) has won world-wide fame for its spectacular work in procuring a Chinese air arm, and in keeping Chinese air power alive against tremendous odds of finance, transportation, equipment, and personnel; Mme. Chiang's association with and interest in its success has been of material aid. Finally, on the strictly military side, there is the Office of the Naval Commander-in-Chief (Hai-chün Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu), formerly the Naval Ministry, controlling the up-river remnants of the navy. The War Ministry (Chün-chêng-pu) occupies an anomalous position in this scheme. Subordinate to the ExecutiveYüan, it is also subordinate to the Commission, so that in effect it is a Ministry twice over, and is even shown as two ministries on occasion.[22]General Ho Ying-chin, as Minister of War, is subordinate to the Generalissimo asWei-yüan-chang(Chairman) of the Commission.

The two remaining agencies of the Commission are of considerable interest. A system of having political commissars in the army, a Soviet device, was adopted by the Kuomintang forces when first organized under Chiang K'ai-shek, and political training accounted for much of that success of the Northward drive (1926-27). After the Nationalist-Communist split, political training as such fell into considerable disuse, and was replaced by ethical training provided by the Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps.[23]With the renewed entente,and war of national union for defense, a Political Department (Chêng-chih-pu) was established. A graceful tribute to Communist skill in combining war and agitation was paid when Chou En-lai, the celebrated Red general, was designated Vice-Minister of this Department. One of the Generalissimo's most orthodox and able subordinates was made Minister. The Political Department extends its function in an enormous sweep across China, and renders aid in military education within the armies, in civilian organization, and in war propaganda. Active and omnipresent, it is an excellent instance of functioning national unity.

The Party and Government War Area Commission (Chan-ti Tang-chêng Wei-yüan-hui) is a coordinate agency for propaganda, relief, and social, economic and military counter-attack within the war area (the occupied zone), rather unusual in being a formal amalgamation of Kuomintang and government administration. Through this agency most of the guerrilla aid is extended, and the Nationalists seek to rival the Communists and independents in the number of Japanesethey can destroy, or the amount of damage they can do. The more active branches of this Commission are a part of the Party structure, but the dual function of the Commission enables it to coordinate Party and Army work. The very role of the Commission is indicative of the fact that the Kuomintang is trying to meet rivalry by patriotic competition and not by suppression. Its integration with the military makes it a perfect example of the triune force which Nationalist China is bringing to bear on the enemy—army, government, and Party all seek to reach into the occupied zone, to articulate spontaneous mass resistance, to maintain the authority of the central government pending therévanche, and to uphold the existing political system, canalizing social change into evolutionary rather than class-war lines.[24]

The appearance of an actual three-power administration—army, government, Party—has led to the sharp relative decrease in importance of the four furtherYüan. The JudicialYüan(Ssŭ-fa Yüan) was even in peace time the least important of the five divisions of the government, failing to display—as an American might expect—a tendency toward effective judicial independence to counterweight the executive and legislative. The LegislativeYüan(Li-fa Yüan), while exceedingly active in the years between the Mukden and Loukouchiao incidents, has been reduced in importance by the coming of hostilities. Its work has been confined largely to drafting the Permanent Constitution, and continued codification of administrative law—particularlyfor coordination of central government and war area (occupied China) affairs.[25]The ExaminationYüan(K'ao-shih Yüan) has attempted to continue in the field of civil service reform, and the ControlYüan(Chien-ch'a Yüan) has maintained war-time efforts.

The LegislativeYüan, under theYüeh Faof 1931, consists of aYüan-chang, aFu-yüan-chang, and forty-nine to ninety-nine members (Li-fa Wei-yüan), appointed by the Supreme National Defense Council for a two-year term upon nomination by theYüanPresident. The term's shortness increases the dependence of members upon the President, and transforms theYüanto a legislative study institute. Furthermore, the newly-developed People's Political Council has assumed the function of representation. The President of theYüanretains sole and arbitrary power over the agenda, the final decision, and the allocation of personnel, although the incumbent, Dr. Sun K'ê, is one of China's leading moderates and an exponent of constitutional process, not likely to exercise arbitrary power.

Apart from its significant constitutional powers, which remain unimpaired, theYüanfinds much of its work performed at present through ordinances of the Supreme National Defense Council, administrative action of the ExecutiveYüan, or commands by the Military Affairs Commission. The jurisdiction retained includes:

(1) general legislation;(2) the budget;(3) general amnesty;(4) declaration of war (never exercised);(5) declaration of peace;(6) "other important matters" (which, in practice, has referred to the more open and solemn aspects of treaty-making, and whatever topic may be assigned theYüanby the highest Party agency).[26]

(1) general legislation;

(2) the budget;

(3) general amnesty;

(4) declaration of war (never exercised);

(5) declaration of peace;

(6) "other important matters" (which, in practice, has referred to the more open and solemn aspects of treaty-making, and whatever topic may be assigned theYüanby the highest Party agency).[26]

The JudicialYüanserves as an administrative and budgetary agency for four agencies. The Ministry of Justice (Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng-pu) is, obviously, the prosecuting agency, attached to the executive in the United States, but made a part of the general judicial system in China. The Administrative Court (Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan) is an agency only potentially important; so is the Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public Officers (Kung-wu-yüan Ch'êng-chieh Wei-yüan-hui). TheYüanPresident isex officiochief magistrate of the Supreme Court (Tsui-kao Fa-yüan). Wang Shih-chieh says of thisYüan:

Because of the fact that the JudicialYüanis itself not an organ of adjudication, and since all affairs concerning prosecution at law are handled by the Ministry of Justice, the actual work to be performed by the JudicialYüanis very simple and light. In addition to framing the budget for theYüanitself and approving the general estimates of the organs under it, the JudicialYüanhas only three further duties to perform: (1) to bring before the LegislativeYüanlegislative measures connected with the JudicialYüanand its sub-organs; (2) to petition the President of the National Government with respect to such cases as special pardon, commutation of sentence, and the restoration of civil rights; and (3) to unify the interpretation of laws and orders, and changes in judicial procedure.[27]

With peace, reconstruction and prosperity, the JudicialYüanmight acquire importance through its control of the administrative and technical aspects of the court system. Meanwhile, courts are more closely associated with their respective levels or areas of government than with one another in a unified judicial system.

The ExaminationYüan, with a President and Vice-President, is composed of a centralYüanoffice, which supervises two organs: the Ministry of Personnel (Ch'uan-hsü Pu), operating a selective promotion system, and the Examinations Commission (K'ao-hsüan Wei-yüan-hui). In absolute numbers, few examinations have been held. In practice, standard recruitment technique continues to involve introduction, influence, or family connections. The familiarity of such devices in China at least gives them a high polish, and precludes utter inefficiency. Under the circumstances, the ExaminationYüanfinds scope for valuable, creative work in the preparation of administrative studies and analyses of very considerable importance.

The ControlYüanis of interest to Westerners, because of the novelty of its functions. Through the courtesy of theYüanPresident, a full official memorandum on the structure and procedure was prepared, surveying the work of theYüanduring the course of the war. This is reproduced as AppendicesI (E)andI (F)below.[28]Some of the unofficial observers, both Western and Chinese, felt that theYüanpossessed further enormous possibilities of activity, and that the need for controlment was very great indeed. In general, theYüanresembles its legislative, judicial and examination coordinates, in that the war-time executive growth has relegated it to a secondary position.

Decrease in the importance of theyüansystem during hostilities cannot be taken, by a too simple cause-and-effect argument, as proof of the unwieldy or impractical character of this five-power system. Measured on a scale of other world governments, success is slow; but it is enormous in contrast to other Chinese central political institutions. At present, it is most improbable that the form of government will be changed, save in the event of catastrophe beyond all reckoning

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