FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[1][Chiang K'ai-shek],Ch'üeh-ting Hsien Ko-chi Tsu-chih Wên-t'i(Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization of the Various Classifications ofHsien), [Chungking], 1939, p. 43 and chart.[2]For explanation of such local government terms ashsiang,pao,ch'ü, see the text, p.107.[3]Heretofore translated as "director of thehsiang."

[1][Chiang K'ai-shek],Ch'üeh-ting Hsien Ko-chi Tsu-chih Wên-t'i(Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization of the Various Classifications ofHsien), [Chungking], 1939, p. 43 and chart.

[2]For explanation of such local government terms ashsiang,pao,ch'ü, see the text, p.107.

[3]Heretofore translated as "director of thehsiang."

The following article, expressing the general Kuomintang view, but written and published unofficially, illustrates debate on foreign policy, and the type of discussion between Nationalists and Communists. Written in the autumn of 1939, it was reprinted in 1940 as a part of a symposium, forming a critique of Chinese Communist views. Mao Tsê-tung (see above, p.166) is the outstanding Chinese Communist leader.

As the Central Government has already formulated correct principles of action, the recent German-Soviet Pact hasno influence upon our National policies. If we follow these policies, that Pact does not compel our attention. But it is not so with the Chinese Communists and their external organs. They are confounded and struck dumb by this unexpected blow so much that they can only keep their grief to themselves.

In all propaganda literature of the Communist Party, we can easily discern the great confusion resulting from this coup. For example, Hitler was the "Fascist Robber" or the "mad dog," but within these days, he becomes the Führer, with all due respects. The word "Fascist" is still being used, but whether they are planning to discard it altogether, we do not know. For instance, on the day previous to the announcement of the Pact, the Communists were saying, dreamily, that a clause prohibiting Germany's seizure of other countries was included in the Pact. Again, when Germany attacked Poland, the Communists cleverly said that this was caused by Great Britain's playing Judas against Poland, and they decisively said that Great Britain and France would not aid her, and some even said that the two antagonistic fronts were still there, though without giving any reason. When reports of these momentous international changes arrived in quick succession, they tried every means to make them appear unimportant. They did this perhaps to avoid the too much "heating up" of their followers on one side, and to avoid committing blunders before they could receive orders concerning their future policy. They were afraid of punishment, to be sure. Hence many ridiculed these poor people, saying that they were like a herd of sheep without a shepherd, for they showed their ignorance, their childishness, hesitation, and paradoxical thoughts and actions during this period.

Public opinion as a whole praises the policies we now adopt since they are independent of any outside element. On the other side, these praises show that while the principles of National Defense are still as sound as ever, the ten principles of the Communist Party are now just like ten big stones falling on Communist toes. The Communists are about to be killed by their own weapons. Had the Government of China been formed by the Communists, it would, in that event, have collapsed as easily as any Japanese cabinet since the War. What would become of the country, if under the present crisis foreign policy were to be the speculation of foreigners? These are exactly the ideas expressed by public gossip and in discussions in schools. Itis true that the Chinese Communists cannot hold power because they lack political training and profound learning. This is their inner, incurable trouble. In fact, many young Communists have also spoken with me, and they show their sorrow when they feel the lack of a really efficient central organ.

But speaking with consideration, we can see their good qualities shown by censoring a great part of the news concerning Moscow's abolition of the Anti-Fascist movement, and on the other hand advertising in a special manner the news concerning the will of the French Communists to fight on the first line of defense, and to help the French Government to destroy Fascism. Perhaps this is a true revelation of the editor's faith in the principle "Country and Nation above all," so that unconsciously he showed it in his actions. This point is worthy of our praise and sympathy.

After about ten days of hesitation and aimless probing, Mr. Mao Tsê-tung, as the head of the Party, issued a lengthy talk entitled "On the Present International Situation and the War of National Resistance," in the form of a catechism in which the questions are asked by a news reporter. In the first section, he explained the German-Soviet Pact; in the second, he predicted the future development of international affairs, in the third he discussed the future of China. His aim in publishing this article is to pacify the agitated hearts of his fellow Communists. But since it is made public, we have the liberty of discussing it, especially so since the Communists themselves have the same habit and they also emphasize free speech. I hope they will not be irritated.

Mr. Mao seems to take it for a treaty that has been signed "all of a sudden." Now this is quite untrue if we consider the facts.

Many periodicals and newspapers have published articles proving that the Pact was long-planned. We shall not consider them. We shall not even consider the original friendship between Germany and monarchic Russia. But we must remember how Germany brought Lenin back to Russia in a sealed train, how the formation of the Red Army was based upon German plans, and the fact that Germany established an aviation school in Russia. We see how Germany helped the Russian Soviet Revolution to succeed. I often thinkthat if we trust the words of a country's foreign minister and the slogans the people shout to provide us an outline of the country's foreign policy, we end in the position of buying goods upon reading an advertisement. In the end we will find ourselves cheated. In fact shops which are "liquidating" their goods may sell their goods at an even higher price than in an ordinary sale. A more reliable way of observation is to judge the policy by studying the secret tendencies in the actions of high military and economic organs which are essential in national defense. If we believe in slogans alone, we might as well ask a salesman about the curative power of his patent medicine. In reality, the salesman is a mere hireling. What pharmacist discloses his real formula and method of combinations? Hence, to probe into the real relation between the two countries, we must ask the smaller nations between them; these make the closest observations.

For two years, these small states have been expecting this treaty. The question of "which to side with" gives them sharp suffering which has made them all the more sensitive. They know what the two countries have been planning when they see so many secret delegates coming and going very busily. Within the last two years, observers in Europe and America have also predicted cooperation between Germany and Soviet Russia. Even in China, did not Mr. Chiang Po-li write an essay to this effect, warning the Chinese people? According to them, the slogans shouted in both countries are strange diplomatic weapons; like the masques worn in a Greek play, they do not show the faces of the actors. When the Jewish Litvinoff went off the stage, it was the sign: "First Act Completed." Now the spectators who wear red glasses are still enchanted by the first act. Anyway, Mr. Mao's explanation that the Pact is a sudden one is unreasonable.

In China, many were doubting the National policy of independent struggle. Not until their "Soviet Help," "Single Alliance with Russia" essays had been erased by the recent coup, did the policy of independent struggle begin to shine in its brilliancy. At first our policy of independent foreign relations lost influence to the better-sounding slogan of "A united foreign front." After this lesson, we can perhaps see more clearly. Such a lesson to a political party not in power is a very wholesome admonition; had the party been in power, we know the damage which could have befallen the nation. Speaking with consideration, I also earnestly hopedfor the success in the British-French-Soviet parleys because it would ensure safety in Europe by safeguarding all lesser states. Furthermore, it would help us also by checking Germany and Japan. But this was only a hope, and I seriously doubted its realization. The "united foreign policy front" advocated by the Communists is not too unreasonable; its error lies in stating with certainty the necessity of two international fronts. Some even acknowledged the existence of such a situation two years ago, and they forbade any doubt expressed to fellow-members concerning this point. Even a week prior to the signing of the Pact, they said with certainty that the rumor of such a Pact was a mere invention of Trotskyites and German spies. Such a ban on free speech is not only detrimental to the progress of a nation, but even to the Communists' own welfare. Their members will not only be made to look foolish, but they will even lose their faith by being called upon to change about. For the sake of our national intelligence, for the sake of the Communists themselves, I hope that in the future, such bans will be lifted, thus encouraging freer and more reasonable ideas. I hope this appeal will do some good, even to the editors of their newspapers.

Concerning this Pact, Mao Tsê-tung used words like "reactionary," "Capitalistic," "intrigue," etc., about Great Britain and France. On the other hand, he employed words like "great" (to be added "talented" if Ch'ên Shao-yü were to write it), "increasing the power," "more progressive," etc., about Soviet Russia. In the end, he even used the phrase "have laid the foundation for the world's oppressed people to seek for liberty and emancipation." All right! The term does not sound ugly, and to ensure better Sino-Soviet relations, we may leave it at that. But under the present state of affairs, too many attacks directed against Chamberlain and Daladier are certainly not good. As a matter of fact, all this is like sending congratulations to Soviet Russia, and a letter of condolence to those with whom Soviet Russia is dissatisfied. All these are but social affairs, the only point is that in both the ideas are not too logically expressed. That's all!

Now if you look at the Pact in the same way that you look into a kaleidoscope, you can see as many meanings as you want, while turning the thing around. Basically, Germany'sonly reason for wanting this Pact is, as she has stated, to avoid the British encircling policy. The economic cooperation talked of by politicians can also give further meaning to the Pact. Recently, in the occupation of Danzig and Warsaw, the sound of guns is the wordless explanation. As to the plan of partitioning Poland and absorbing the Eastern European States (enclosed in a secret clause), we do not know yet. Let us for the time being not discuss it.

As to Soviet Russia, her effort at bettering her friendly relationship with China can be no better revealed than in Molotov's own speech. He said: "We have always been trying to increase the amity between the peoples of Germany and Russia. This Pact is important because it means that the two big Powers in Europe have decided to be friends and to live peacefully." Thus we can see that the Pact is not a casual happening. Molotov again says: "There are some who want to take advantage of the strained relationship between Great Britain and Germany.... Such people aim at involving Soviet Russia in a war against Germany by taking sides with Great Britain. How foolish these political speculators for war are!" Hence we know that the Pact was signed according to Soviet Russia's own will, and, unlike what Mao said, it was planned long ago, and not at all after the failure of the British-French-Soviet parleys. Now we only want those who advocate "united foreign policy front" to think of the meaning of words like "foolish" and "war speculators." These words are new compared with "retrograde," "stubborn," "Trotskyites," etc.

Perhaps the greatest part of all in Molotov's speech is: "The Soviet Union will still continue to proceed in her own independent policy which is based upon the welfare of all Soviet Russian citizens." This corresponds exactly with our "Nation and country above all!" Sun Yat-sen also said that the success of the Soviet Russian October Revolution was based upon its ability to apply the laws concerning Nationalism. Leninism corrects Marxism by adding the idea of Nationalism. And Stalinism intensifies Leninism by an even greater emphasis laid on Nationalism. Hence we can say what the Soviet Revolution adopted was Leninism, and that what the Soviet Union is now adopting is Stalinism. The success of Lenin and Stalin is largely due to this reason. This Pact between Germany and Soviet Russia is but the fruit borne out of the principle "national welfare above all." The Soviets believe "The Soviet Government above all." Now what should we in China have?

As for Mr. Mao's reasons concerning the failure of the Three-Power Parley, the explanation he gives is just a reduced and "Chinafied" copy of the Soviet explanation concerning this problem. We can also say it is abridged. Mr. Mao always "Chinafies" things. I am sorry that this article has not been "Chinafied" (much to his distaste, I suppose) so its power must be weaker.

The manner in which Mr. Mao discussed the question resembles that of a Chinese story-teller, though his speech is less vivid. When he spoke of the "future development of the present international situation," it was like talking to a class of naive schoolboys who are always credulous.

He said that the present state of affairs in Europe was caused by the policy of non-intervention. The Second Imperialistic War has already entered the second stage. This is a war of plunder, not a rightful one. Concerning the East, he also made a vain distinction. He said the present state of affairs in China is also a new stage. No other explanation was given. We suppose he is always careful in expressing his ideas, so that if necessary he will have plenty of chances to make a shift. He divided the imperialistic nations into several camps: Germany and Italy belong to the Fascist[2]camp; Great Britain and France belong to the Fascistic[3]camp; the Americas under the U. S. are a capitalistic camp. As to Soviet Russia, she is presumably in another world. Mr. Mao said that she would cooperate with the U. S. to start the world's peace movement. Besides these, there were numerous tales as enchanting as the Arabian Nights. The most important ones: in Europe, a war on the entire front, and the movement planned by English and French Communists and Social Democrats to overthrow the Fascist regime; in the East, British policy was to partition China between herself and Japan. According to him, these are "present" situations, and if we take into consideration his manner of speaking, we can almost say that they meant the "actual" position at present.

His chess-board analysis of international situations resembles his former "front" theory—perhaps it is his new front theory. His aim, we believe, is to cheat his spectators.Being ignorant of the real situation, he was at first dumbfounded. Now he tries to move our attention to other things, just like a magician at work, who needs a band to create enough noise to shift the audience's attention. We should be considerate, knowing his difficulties. But I suppose such a manner of doing things does not increase the reputation of the Chinese Communists, does it?

In fact, if any one of the following events occurs, his new front will immediately be shattered: 1. Soviet Russia also adopts a non-intervention policy; 2. Italy keeps herself aloof or joins the side of the Allies; 3. A sufficiently large number of European states remain neutral; 4. America cooperates with Great Britain; America or any country in America declares war against Germany; 5. Great Britain does not help Japan in dividing up China; 6. Soviet inclination to sign treaty with Japan is revealed; etc., etc. I believe anyone who has sufficient knowledge of international relations will know that the error in the old "front" theory lies in its presumption that countries of the same systems of government will tend to unite against those of another system. The new front theory is based upon the presumption that the central motivating ideas of different countries will form the basis of separating them between two hostile fronts. This is an even more mistaken conception than the first. It is built on sand. It is easy to teach such a rigidly formulated doctrine of "hostile fronts" but in case they meet with a really intelligent and well-informed member, they will be certainly at a loss. Hence as a matter of fact, such authoritative articles do more harm than good. Mr. Mao has written a great deal since the war for publication; if we now connect all these articles together for a thorough study, we can find numerous places where he is dropping a stone upon his own toe. In fact such a chess-board analysis of the international situation is based upon materials gotten from the G. P. U. plus some "judgment" derived accidentally. As a matter of fact, such G. P. U. reports are unreliable down to the last word. The work of the G. P. U. is to pay special attention in getting the past record of a man or organ important in a given country.

When required, some high-sounding or bad names are added to the personality so as to strengthen the mood of speech in propaganda literature. So somebody even said: "If you wish to follow the propaganda methods of the Communist Party, observe two dogs barking in the street. After due observation you should analyze their points ofdifference. You should be able to speak like this: This is a dog infused with British, French, American, German or Japanese imperialistic ideas. He is stubborn, retrograde, reactionary, capitalistic, Fascist, and in danger of being a Trotskyite traitor or a person like Wang Ch'ing-wei. Now the other is a Soviet Socialistic dog, talented, progressive, belonging to the world of light, a supporter of world peace, a dog who sides with the poor and oppressed."

In fact how can confused international situations be so simply analyzed by a mere figure drawn on a chess-board? Unless all their members are mechanical men deprived of the power of thinking, they will have their own doubts, especially when Mr. Mao has repeatedly dropped stones on his own toe. The more he shouts the correctness of his views, or the success of his work, the more he will be a laughing-stock to the people. He will be the Don Quixote of China, or Ah-Q,[4]to be ridiculed by all. Yet in fact, there is no necessity for him to make these comments, and such methods of talking without material basis are usually avoided by politicians, especially when they are in service or partly in service. For example, Molotov spoke very cleverly on the Pact: after giving a historical explanation of the necessities for signing the Pact, he concluded, almost carelessly, by saying: "When Germany showed her willingness to improve the friendship between the two countries, Soviet Russia certainly had no reason to refuse. Hence the Pact is made." Besides, he talked of the welfare of the nation, as if to give a further proof of the necessity in signing the Pact. How clever his manipulations are! But the same thing under Mr. Mao's pen becomes a series of hot-faced scoldings, now praising A, then cursing B. And concerning his doctrine that the German-Soviet Pact is caused by the failure of the British-French-Soviet parleys, he expounded and expounded his reasons and proof, only to lead himself into greater confusion, so that fewer will believe him. Now comparing these two events, this will be very detrimental to the Communists, who find it difficult to give a satisfactory explanation. Even from a rhetorical point of view, no matter how Mao curses the British non-intervention policy, no matter how he curses this policy as the reason for Japanese invasion of China, for German occupation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, no matter how he condemns the MunichMeeting, any reader will correspondingly ask: Is Soviet Russia also adopting the policy of non-intervention? How about Poland? What is the difference between the Munich Meeting and the German-Soviet Pact? All these questions will produce the exactly opposite effect in the minds of the readers as that which was wished for by Mao. This is but one point. If we go on to have a closer analysis, we see that Mr. Mao's art of speaking needs more practice. As to his material proof in his article, up to date [September 15, 1939], the Soviet attitude is still the sit-and-look attitude condemned by him, as being the result of non-intervention policy; the countries proclaiming their neutrality are quite numerous; Italian attitude is yet uncertain; the British Communist Party is declaring that full confidence is placed in Chamberlain; the French Communists are on the front to fight for their motherland and the Third International has now no power over them. On the other hand, there are rumors concerning arapprochementbetween Japan and Soviet Russia. All these only tend to disprove the sayings of Mr. Mao.

Everybody knows that our foreign policy during the period of the war is to spot one enemy only. We attack only Japan. We try to be friends with every country other than Japan. This spirit can be seen in the manifestoes and other proclamations of the Government. Hence although Germany and Italy are the allies of our enemy, we still have every wish to bind their friendship, and hope that they will help our enemy the less in her war of aggression, and contribute more materially to our success by selling us armaments. Such a "one-enemy" foreign policy is the basis of our future success. Otherwise, the Nation will easily be led into a path of thorns, if we adopt the policy of allying with one today and cutting another tomorrow. In Molotov's report, there are several sharp sentences: "In foreign policy, the aim is always not to make more enemies, but rather to lessen the number of enemies." This can be jotted down as a note to the "one-enemy" policy.

But what about Mao Tsê-tung's idea? In fact he preaches "one-ally" policy. He has condemned them all, except for the Soviet Union. Now he again places Soviet Russia in another almost intangible world. What does he mean, then? Does he mean that we can satisfy our hunger by looking at a cake? In fact, this was the same old question long beforedisputed. We can all remember that the Communists were the advocates of a military alliance with Soviet Russia. Now it was Soviet Russia, not we, who declined. Those who were boasting of the alliance were Communists; and so were those who stopped it. Soviet Russia said that she alone was too weak and that she hoped China could find more allies. Because of this, the "one-ally" policy did not gain as much support as the British-American-French-Soviet union. When the British-French-Soviet parleys broke off, Mr. Mao found it difficult to give a good explanation, so that he could not but take up the old theory of "one-ally" to ward off attack.

The chief countries helping China in the war are Great Britain, the U. S. A., and Soviet Russia. In the past, at present, and in the future, their central powers of aiding China are economic power from Great Britain, political power from the U. S. A., and military power from Soviet Russia. It is a fact that even if Soviet Russia remains at peace, she can check Japan (unless Soviet Russia proclaims amity with Japan, and makes adequate assurances, in which case it will greatly influence our condition). But the economic power of Great Britain and the political power of the U. S. A. are also absolutely necessary. At present, we are still enjoying these advantages, and the breaking-up of the British-French-Soviet parleys does not influence this situation. We don't know why Mr. Mao is bent upon rejecting the friendly assistance of Great Britain and the U. S. Should we act like this if we believe that "the country and the nation are above all?" Now suppose we follow the Communists and throw ourselves into the bosom of Soviet Russia, are we sure that she will do everything for us? If she signs a treaty with our enemy, what then?

The most unreasonable point in Mao's discussion is his attitude toward Great Britain. He probably wants to please his superiors by guessing their ideas. Perhaps he thinks that the Third International is going back on the policy adopted years ago—the policy of "Anti-Britain" so much sung by Trotsky and his followers. Hence Mao starts this movement in China, and gathers false proofs that Japan and Great Britain will sooner or later be allies so that they can divide up China. Up to now, Mr. Mao's words have not yet become fact. Furthermore, Great Britain has reassured us that her policy towards China will not be changed. To us this is good news—but perhaps unhappy news for Mr. Mao.

Mr. Mao's opinion that we "may approach Germany" does not sound very safe or very natural. Mr. Mao does not adopt the foreign policy of "befriend those who help us and hate those who help our enemy," but rather of "befriend Soviet Russia's friend, attack Soviet Russia's enemies." This is flatly against the principles of independent foreign policy. The old German-Italian line advocated by Wang Ch'ing-wei is wrong because it makes us bend our knees. But we must also know what the new German line amounts to. Japan'srapprochementwith Soviet Russia and Great Britain are rumors scattered out simultaneously, but are things that cannot be possible. According to foreign telegraphic reports, the German foreign minister is now trying to pull together Japan and Soviet Russia, with the hope of forming a future grand alliance among Germany. Italy, Japan, and Soviet Russia. As to the Japan-Soviet line, it is based upon the "double-south policy" of attacking Great Britain. Japan will move south from the Pacific and [Soviet] Russia will move south from Central Asia, so that British interest in all districts lying between the Near and the Far East will be equally divided up by [Soviet] Russia and Japan. Their method of procedure is like this: 1, A treaty will be signed by Soviet Russia, as the protector of Outer Mongolia, and Japan; Soviet Russia will stop enmity against "Manchukuo" and Japan, so that Japan may concentrate her attention on China. 2, A commercial treaty will be signed between them. 3, A final alliance promising mutual non-interference with appended clauses. Of course this is Germany's dream, or may be a flat rumor, since it is unbelievable that Soviet Russia should join Japan. Even from the point of material benefit, why should Soviet Russia act so as to hurt others but remain doubtful that she can derive real benefit? But to insure absolute safety, we must be careful of any German intrigue. We must warn her often. In the past we used to buy munitions from her, so we must have her goodwill. Now with the War, it is unlikely that Germany will still sell us munitions. Hence why must we still follow Germany and "approach her"? After all, what is the difference between this and the German-Italian line advocated by Wang Ch'ing-wei? Now, just a "warning": if [Soviet] Russia and Japan do join up to form an alliance, I must ask the Chinese Communist Party a question: Concerning the name, the Chinese Communist Party, are they going to throw away the word "Chinese" and adopt a Soviet Russian nationality, or, as said in theHsin Min Pao, to beso base as to join Wang Ch'ing-wei's regime, or shall they stick to the word "Chinese" and cancel the word "Communist"? I hope they will reply to my question.

Concerning the theory of a Second Imperialistic War, Mao himself has for two years forbidden his followers to comment, on the charge of being a Rightist, a closed-door Rightest, a childish Rightest, or a Trotskyite who is plotting with Germany. Now we see that he himself has fully adopted a Trotskyite view. In that article he used the words "progressive" and "retrogressive" to suppress any upheaval within his party; but now what he means by "progressive" is exactly "retardation"; what he formerly advocated as "progress" is now a discarded fig. He is just making a circle, like a donkey fastened to turn a grind-stone, pressed onward by whipping and kicking, and when he has turned half a circle, he may be said to have retarded half a circle.

Now Mr. Mao condemns every country as imperialistic. But we must ask, in his opinion, does he think that Poland is imperialistic? Why is the war of national defense on the part of Poland not a rightful war? Under the exactly similar conditions, why did the Communists formerly show sympathy for Abyssinia and Spain, and are now cold toward Poland? He says that Communists always hate wars; then why did he advocate the Help-Abyssinia Movement? This is a paradox. Perhaps the saying that Communists hate war is invented by Mr. Mao himself. So far as we know, the Communists in Poland, Great Britain, and France are absolutely sympathizing with the Poles in their defensive war.

There is another ridiculous point: Mr. Mao also labelled Chamberlain and Daladier as Fascist Reactionaries. Before the German-Soviet Pact, they were hailed as saints, but now they are convicts, as it were. If Mr. Mao is not satisfied with them, then condemn them as he wishes. But why must he put such a "Fascist" hat upon the oldest democratic countries? This spring, one American political commentator predicted jokingly that in the near future Hitler will say that the headquarters of the Communists are located in London and Paris, hence anti-Communist will mean anti-French. Now the direction of this pseudo-prophecy is already established, though Hitler did not give the above reason. But we did not expect that the Chinese Communists would adopt such a belief by calling democratic countries Fascist and by advocating "that we may approach Germany." This is perhaps a conclusion by their special logic.

Concerning the future of China, Mr. Mao made many surface talks, though in general there is no serious fault. But his theories and his conclusions are disjointed. For example, if he makes light of the Polish war, what will be the value of this Oriental war? Besides, is the policy of "single alliance with Soviet Russia" in unison with the principle: "We will befriend those who aid us, and attack those who aid our enemy"? If Soviet Russia aids Japan, what shall then be done? If he opposes the splitting movement, then why not advocate unity? These are but a few of the numerous contradictions that may be found in his article.

Especially strange is his idea that to ally with countries other than Soviet Russia, we should ally with their peoples and not with their governments. But the word "people" is not used in foreign affairs and its meaning is also most indistinct. According to him (I presume) he desires that China fan up revolutions in all countries while carrying on the War of National Resistance. True, the method may apply to Japan, but not to other countries. Otherwise, all world Powers will begin to hate China who is still fighting the War of National Resistance. What will we think of this? Now to speak frankly, the Communists in various countries have not succeeded in fanning up revolutions in their countries, and on the contrary, with their force weakening year after year, what shall we help them for? When we ourselves have not yet stood up firmly, we are already thinking of shouldering a weight of a thousand pounds. Is there a reason in such an attempt? In reality, we know the force of the Chinese proletarian classes. They amount to about two million people, mostly in Shanghai and Tientsin. Now the puppet regimes of Yin Ju-keng and Wang Ch'ing-wei are all formed in these districts. Ch'ên Shao-yü is the chief representative of the Shanghai section of the Communist Party. Has he gone there for an investigation? To whom do those who are performing Anti-Japanese and Anti-Traitor work belong—to the Communist Party, or what? It is better for Communists to moderate their tune and not boast of any more world revolution.

Concerning the present European war, Mr. Mao's attitude is that of a man expressing his joy on seeing others' loss and misfortune. This is not the way of the Chinese people. We always express our sorrow in a war. What GeneralChiang has said concerning his hope for peace in Europe is the natural revelation of the Chinese moral character based upon love and compassion. What Mr. Mao expresses is something like the spirit of "kill-kill-kill" advocated by the notorious robber Chang Shen-chou. This is because Mr. Mao has not yet thoroughly imbibed the idea of "Chinafying" things. I express my sympathy for him in his policy of "Chinafication." This of course does not mean that I believe in the preachings of old-fashioned Chinese that the eight planets were first discovered by the Chinese because a line can be found in theBook of Poetry:[5]"Three and Five stars in the East." What I mean by sympathy is that I like the way he appreciates the Chinese national culture, and wants to be a one hundred per cent Chinese.[6]In this respect he is more worthy than Ch'ên Shao-yü, and hence deserving of greater achievement.

Lastly, I sincerely hope that Mr. Mao can find a better secretary, without considering the question of class. He must not follow the example of Mr. Lu, the Vice-President of the Anti-Japanese University, who never employs a secretary unless she is beautiful. Though he does not consider the question of class, such actions do not befit Mr. Mao. But speaking about this, we can have a comparison. The second wife of Mr. Mao, Miss Ho, is the heroine who marched with the Red Army for a distance of twenty-five thousandlito North Shensi. But why is it that Mr. Mao sends her to Soviet Russia, and lives together with film actress Miss Lan Pin? The reason is quite simple: considering the question of class, Miss Ho stands higher than Miss Lan; considering the question of sexual love, Miss Lan is much more beautiful than Miss Ho. Hence with similar reasoning, I should say that the standard set by Mr. Mao concerning the employment of a secretary will be whether she can write beautifully, and the question of class must not be considered. If so, I can predict that Mr. Mao's articles will be better written, not like his past ones which arouse a great deal of unnecessary argumentation. I hereby humbly present before him my personal ideas.[7]

FOOTNOTES:[1]Min-i Ts'ung-k'an (Popular Opinion Series),Mao Tsê-tung Ch'ên Shao-yü Tsui-chin Yen-lun-ti Tsung Chien-t'ao(A General Review of the Most Recent Utterances of Mao Tsê-tung and Ch'ên Shao-yü), Chungking, 1940; p. 1-17.[2]Fa-hsi-ssŭ.[3]Fa-hsi-ssŭ-hua-ti, i.e., changing to Fascism.[4]The hero of a novella by Lu Hsün, China's outstanding modern writer, Ah-Q is a figure of profound pathos.[5]Shih Ching, one of the Confucian classics.[6]The Americanism,i-pai-fên chih pai-ti Chung-kuo-jen, occurs in the original.[7]The conclusion, couched in billingsgate, is less a violation of the unmentionable in China than it would be in America; but it does strike a note sharply discordant to the gently sardonic tone of the main line of debate. A secretary is germane to the point of literary style, however; ghost-writing is a rarely disturbed tradition of Chinese public life. Mao Tsê-tung, according to Western observers, is, with Chiang K'ai-shek, one of the few leaders to write his own speeches, so that the present charge, while familiar, is certainly unjust.

[1]Min-i Ts'ung-k'an (Popular Opinion Series),Mao Tsê-tung Ch'ên Shao-yü Tsui-chin Yen-lun-ti Tsung Chien-t'ao(A General Review of the Most Recent Utterances of Mao Tsê-tung and Ch'ên Shao-yü), Chungking, 1940; p. 1-17.

[2]Fa-hsi-ssŭ.

[3]Fa-hsi-ssŭ-hua-ti, i.e., changing to Fascism.

[4]The hero of a novella by Lu Hsün, China's outstanding modern writer, Ah-Q is a figure of profound pathos.

[5]Shih Ching, one of the Confucian classics.

[6]The Americanism,i-pai-fên chih pai-ti Chung-kuo-jen, occurs in the original.

[7]The conclusion, couched in billingsgate, is less a violation of the unmentionable in China than it would be in America; but it does strike a note sharply discordant to the gently sardonic tone of the main line of debate. A secretary is germane to the point of literary style, however; ghost-writing is a rarely disturbed tradition of Chinese public life. Mao Tsê-tung, according to Western observers, is, with Chiang K'ai-shek, one of the few leaders to write his own speeches, so that the present charge, while familiar, is certainly unjust.

This memorandum was graciously supplied by Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui.

Since the establishment of the National Government, China's foreign policy has been elucidated from time to time. Following the outbreak of the war, the Extraordinary Session of the Kuomintang National Congress convened in 1938 laid down five principles:

"1. China is prepared to ally herself with all states and nations that sympathize with her and to wage a common struggle for peace and justice."2. China is prepared to safeguard and strengthen the machinery of peace as well as all treaties and conventions that have the maintenance of peace as their ultimate object."3. China is prepared to ally herself with all forces that are opposed to Japanese aggression and to safeguard peace in the Far East."4. China will endeavor not only to preserve but also to enhance the existing friendly relations with other countries."5. China repudiates all bogus organizations which Japan has created and declares all their actions null and void."

"1. China is prepared to ally herself with all states and nations that sympathize with her and to wage a common struggle for peace and justice.

"2. China is prepared to safeguard and strengthen the machinery of peace as well as all treaties and conventions that have the maintenance of peace as their ultimate object.

"3. China is prepared to ally herself with all forces that are opposed to Japanese aggression and to safeguard peace in the Far East.

"4. China will endeavor not only to preserve but also to enhance the existing friendly relations with other countries.

"5. China repudiates all bogus organizations which Japan has created and declares all their actions null and void."

From the above outline it can be clearly seen that China's foreign policy aims at achieving independence internally and co-existence externally.

Shortly before the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident I told a group of Japanese newspapermen in Nanking that "China's diplomatic policy has always been consistent. It aims at self-existence and co-existence.... It is important to harmonize the friendship between the two peoples; but such a task should not rest only upon the shoulders of oneparty.... If any foreign country has any designs on China, the Chinese people are determined to resist.... I hope Japan will respect China's territorial integrity and political sovereignty and will seek to readjust Sino-Japanese relations through diplomatic channels and in accordance with the spirit of reciprocity and equality."

Japan was bent on disturbing peace and order and launched her attack on North China on July 7, 1937. Not only had every effort at conciliation failed, but the hostilities were extended to Shanghai on August 13th. On the following day the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made China's position clear in an official statement, an extract of which follows:

"The Chinese Government now solemnly declares that China's territorial integrity and sovereign rights have been wantonly violated by Japan in glaring violation of such peace instruments as the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Paris Peace Pact. China is in duty bound to defend her territory and her national existence, as well as the sanctity of the above-mentioned treaties. We will never surrender any part of our territory. When confronted with aggression, we cannot but exercise our natural right of self-defense. If Japan did not entertain territorial designs on China, she should use her efforts to seek a rational solution of Sino-Japanese problems and at the same time cease all her aggressions and military movements in China. In the event of such a happy change of heart, China would, in conformity with her traditional policy of peace, continue her efforts to avert a situation pregnant with dangerous possibilities both for East Asia and for the world at large.

"In this our supreme fight not only for a national but for a world cause, not only for the preservation of our own territory and sovereignty, but for the maintenance of international justice, we are confident that all friendly nations, while showing sympathy with us, will be conscious of their obligations under the international treaties to which they have solemnly subscribed."

With regard to Japanese-sponsored puppet regimes in China, the Chinese Government has consistently denounced them as illegal. On December 20, 1937, following the appearance of the so-called "Provisional Government" inPeiping, the National Government solemnly declared that "the establishment of any bogus regime in Peiping or other localities under Japanese military occupation constitutes a violation by Japan of China's sovereignty and administrative integrity. Any action taken by such puppet regimes, whether of an internal or external nature, shallipso factobe null and void."

Following the installation by the Japanese of Wang Ch'ing-wei as the chief puppet of the bogus "National Government" in Nanking, the Foreign Minister reiterated this stand in his identic notes of March 30, 1940 to the various embassies and legations in China to the following effect:

"The Chinese Government desires to take this opportunity to repeat most emphatically the declaration already made on several occasions that any act done by such an unlawful organization as has just been set up in Nanking or any other puppet body that may exist elsewhere in China, isipso factonull and void and shall never be recognized by the Chinese Government and people. The Chinese Government is convinced that all self-respecting States will uphold law and justice in the conduct of international relations and will never accordde jureorde factorecognition to Japan's puppet organization in China. Any manifestation of such recognition, in whatever form or manner, would be a violation of international law and treaties and would be considered as an act most unfriendly to the Chinese nation, for the consequences of which the recognizing party would have to bear full responsibility."

China's foreign policy relating to the Sino-Japanese hostilities is based upon the Nine-Power Treaty, which provides that the contracting Powers, other than China, agreed to the following:

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

Under present conditions, the aggressor is still reluctant to attend any international conference for seeking a just settlement. Therefore, the only alternative is for China to continue her war of resistance until Japan comes to her senses or reaches the point of exhaustion, which can be accomplished through the extension of greater assistance to China and the application of an embargo on military supplies to Japan.

There is no need to elaborate on the well-known fact that the role of the United States in the maintenance of peace in the Pacific area is an important one. We have great confidence in the sense of justice of America, our traditional friend, who realizes the full significance of the so-called "New Order in Greater East Asia," which Japanese spokesmen admit applies to the South Seas region.

World peace and peace between China and Japan are indivisible. An era of prosperity in this part of the world, which cannot but be of benefit to the world in general, can only be ushered in after a just and lasting solution to the Sino-Japanese conflict has been found.

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