The Project Gutenberg eBook ofThe Civil War

The Project Gutenberg eBook ofThe Civil WarThis ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online atwww.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.Title: The Civil WarAuthor: James I. RobertsonRelease date: December 26, 2018 [eBook #58549]Language: EnglishCredits: Produced by Stephen Hutcheson and the Online DistributedProofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CIVIL WAR ***

This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online atwww.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.

Title: The Civil WarAuthor: James I. RobertsonRelease date: December 26, 2018 [eBook #58549]Language: EnglishCredits: Produced by Stephen Hutcheson and the Online DistributedProofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net

Title: The Civil War

Author: James I. Robertson

Release date: December 26, 2018 [eBook #58549]

Language: English

Credits: Produced by Stephen Hutcheson and the Online DistributedProofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CIVIL WAR ***

THE CIVIL WARbyJAMES I. ROBERTSON, JR.THE CIVIL WAR CENTENNIAL COMMISSION 1961-1965Washington 25, D. C.U. S. Civil War Centennial Commission1963

byJAMES I. ROBERTSON, JR.

THE CIVIL WAR CENTENNIAL COMMISSION 1961-1965

Washington 25, D. C.U. S. Civil War Centennial Commission1963

Thousands of student requests for information on the Civil War prompted the publication of this booklet. Its purpose is to present in simple language a survey of the eleven most popular aspects of the 1861-1865 conflict. This guide is intended as a supplement, not a substitute, for American history textbooks.

Space limitations prevented mention of each of the 6,000 engagements of the Civil War. Thus, while such actions as the battle of Picacho Pass, Ariz., and Quantrill’s sacking of Lawrence, Kan., had import for their particular locales, they of necessity had to be omitted. In those battles herein discussed, statistics for armies and losses are those generally accepted. The map midway in the booklet may help familiarize the student with the various theaters of military operations. After each section is a list of works recommended for those who desire more detailed information on the subject.

Relatively little consideration of the political, economic, and social history of the period was possible within the limits of this small work. However, the Commission can supply upon request and without charge the following pamphlets treating in part of those subjects:Emancipation Centennial, 1962: A Brief Anthology of the Preliminary Proclamation;Free Homesteads for All Americans: The Homestead Act of 1862, by Paul W. Gates;The Origins of the Land-Grant Colleges and State Universities, by Allan Nevins; andOur Women of the Sixties, by Sylvia G. L. Dannett and Katharine M. Jones.

The Commission is deeply indebted to the Editorial Advisory Board members, each of whom rendered valuable assistance toward the final draft of the narrative.

James I. Robertson, Jr.,Executive DirectorU. S. Civil War Centennial Commission

Construction of the U. S. Capitol was still in progress when civil war began.

Historians past and present disagree sharply over the major cause of the Civil War.

Some writers have viewed the struggle of the 1860’s as a “war of rebellion” brought on by a “slavepower conspiracy.” To them it was a conflict between Northern “humanity” and Southern “barbarism.” James Ford Rhodes, who dealt more generously with the South than did many other Northern writers of his time, stated in 1913: “Of the American Civil War it may safely be asserted that there was a single cause, slavery.”

Other historians, such as Charles A. Beard and Harold U. Faulkner, have argued that slavery was only the surface issue. The real cause, these men state, was “the economic forces let loose by the Industrial Revolution” then taking place in the North. These economic forces were strong, powerful, and “beating irresistibly upon a one-sided and rather static” Southern way of life. Therefore, the 1860’s produced a “second American Revolution,” fought between the “capitalists, laborers, and farmers of the North and West” on the one hand, and the “planting aristocracy of the South” on the other.

A third theory advanced by historians is that the threat to states’ rights led to war. The conflict of the 1860’s was thus a “War between the States.” Many in this group believe that the U. S. Constitution of 1787 was but a compact, or agreement, between the independent states. Therefore, when a state did not like the policies of the central government, it had the right to withdraw—or secede—from this compact.

Still other writers believe “Southern nationalism” to have been the basic cause of the war. Southerners, they assert, had so strong a desire to preserve their particular way of life that they were willing to fight. This then became a struggle between rival sections whose differencescould not be settled peacefully. The result was a “War for Southern Independence.”

Slaves working in a field across the river from Montgomery, Ala., first capital of the Confederacy.

A recent group of historians, known as “revisionists,” rejects these earlier theories. Leader of the revisionist school was the late James G. Randall, who once stated: “If one word or phrase were selected to account for the war, that word would not be slavery, or economic grievances, or states rights, or diverse civilizations. It would have to be such a word as fanaticism.” Another revisionist, Avery O. Craven, agrees. The Civil War, he wrote, resulted because the great mass of American people “permitted their short-sighted politicians, their overzealous editors, and their pious reformers” to control public opinion and action. Primarily through the slavery issue, these radicals created more and more hatred between North and South. In the end, and as a result of these radicals, the differences between the sections, swelled by “a blundering generation,” burst into a war.

Fort Sumter in 1865, as viewed from a sandbar. The fort’s battered walls are clearly visible.

Few nations have been as unprepared for a full-scale war as was the United States in 1861. The U. S. Army consisted of barely 17,000 men. Most of the soldiers were stationed at remote outposts on the western frontier. To make matters worse for the Union, a large number of army officers who had been born in the South and educated at West Point resigned from the army and offered their services to the Confederacy.

The U. S. Navy was in an equally bad state. It had performed little duty since the War of 1812. The Navy had a total of 90 ships, but only 42 of them were in active service at the outbreak of civil war. Of this number, 11 fell into Confederate hands with the capture of the naval base at Norfolk, Va., in April, 1861. The remaining vessels were scattered around the world. Moreover, 230 of 1,400 naval officers joined the forces of the Confederacy.

At the beginning of the Civil War, the North seemed to possess every advantage:

(1) 23 Northern states aligned against only 11 Southern states. (Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri were slave states, but they remained in the Union. Also, the western counties of Virginia revolted and formed their own state when the Old Dominion cast her lot with the Confederacy.)

(2) The population of the Northern states was approximately 22,000,000 people. The Southern states had only 9,105,000 people, and one-third of them (3,654,000) were slaves. The great difference in population, plus a steady flow of European immigrants into the Northern states, gave the Union tremendous manpower. Over 2,000,000 men served in the Federal armies, while no more than half that number fought for the South.

The “General Haupt” was one of several locomotives seized by Federals on the Orange & Alexandria (now Southern) Railroad.

(3) The North had 110,000 manufacturing plants, as compared with 18,000 in the Confederate States. The North produced 97% of all firearms in America, and it manufactured 96% of the nation’s railroad equipment.

Although the South possessed few manufacturing plants in 1861, Richmond’s Tredegar Iron Works produced such items as machinery, cannon, submarines, torpedoes, and plates for ironclad ships.

(4) Most of the country’s financial resources were in the North.

In view of the North’s statistical superiority in so many areas, people often do not understand how the Civil War lasted four long years. Many reasons account for this:

(1) Both North and South needed many months of preparation before they were ready for full-scale war.

(2) For at least the first eighteen months of the war, the Confederacy was able to obtain many supplies from sympathetic nations in Europe. Not until late in 1862 did the Federals have enough ships to blockade effectively the major Southern ports.

(3) Southern armies generally fought on the defensive. It does not require as many men to hold a position as it does to attack and seize that position.

(4) Moreover, every time the Federals captured a city, bridge, road junction, or other important point, men had to be left behind to guard these places. To the Northern armies also went the task of sheltering, feeding, and to some extent training thousands of freed or runaway slaves. Therefore, even though the Federal armies greatly outnumbered the Confederate forces, the North needed more men to fight the war.

(5) In that age armies rarely fought in wintertime, a season of cold weather and deep mud. Most of the military campaigns took placebetween April and October. Hence, little activity occurred for about half of each year.

Before surveying the military campaigns, the student should bear in mind two more important, but somewhat confusing, points: each side named its armies by different systems, and each side used different methods for identifying battles.

The North named its armies for large rivers, while the South designated its forces by large areas of land. For example, the Federal Army of the Potomac fought against the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. This difference of names could and did sometimes become perplexing. An illustration of this occurred in the Western theater, where the Federal Army of the Tennessee (river) campaigned against the Confederate Army of Tennessee (state).

Likewise, both sides used different methods in naming battles. The North referred to a battle by the closest stream, river, run, or creek in the area. The South designated a battle by the name of the nearest town. Thus, the bloodiest one-day engagement of the Civil War is known in the North as the battle of Antietam Creek, and in the South as the battle of Sharpsburg, Maryland. In some cases, such as the battles of Gettysburg and Wilson’s Creek, both sides adopted the same name.

Now let us turn to the war itself and “follow the armies.”

CHART OF CIVIL WAR ARMY ORGANIZATION

CHART OF CIVIL WAR ARMY ORGANIZATIONARMYGeneral (CSA)Major General (USA)CORPSLieutenant General (CSA)Major General (USA)DIVISIONMajor GeneralBRIGADEBrigadier GeneralBATTALION (less than 10 companies)Lieutenant Colonel or MajorCOMPANYCaptainREGIMENT (10 companies)Colonel or Lieutenant ColonelCOMPANY75-100 men

CHART OF CIVIL WAR ARMY ORGANIZATION

ARMY

General (CSA)

Major General (USA)

CORPS

Lieutenant General (CSA)

Major General (USA)

DIVISION

Major General

BRIGADE

Brigadier General

BATTALION (less than 10 companies)

Lieutenant Colonel or Major

COMPANY

Captain

REGIMENT (10 companies)

Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel

COMPANY

75-100 men

Late in April, 1861, the Confederate government moved its capital from Montgomery, Ala., to Richmond, Va. This transfer was intended to bind Virginia closer to the other Southern states and to put the Confederate government nearer Washington when the time came to discuss the peace treaty. In reality the move backfired. It made Richmond the primary Federal target and Virginia the major battleground of the Civil War.

Few engagements occurred in 1861, when neither North nor South had a highly organized, efficient army. What both sides in 1861 called armies were more like armed and unruly mobs. Yet President Lincoln and the Congress, hoping to end the war quickly, were anxious to capture Richmond.

As a result, Federal forces made three thrusts into Virginia. They first moved from Ohio into the pro-Northern counties of western Virginia, where Confederate regiments as “green” as the Federal units were stationed. In a series of small battles, including Philippi (June 3), Rich Mountain (July 11), and Corrick’s Ford (July 13), the Federals were victorious. In 1863 this region entered the Union as the loyal state of West Virginia.

The other two Federal invasions were less successful. The main Virginia defenses stretched from Norfolk northward to the Potomac River, thence westward to Harpers Ferry. Early in June, Gen. Benjamin F. Butler left Fort Monroe with a Federal force and struck at Richmond by way of the peninsula between the James and York rivers. At Big Bethel Church, just west of Yorktown, Confederates attacked and sent Butler’s men stampeding back to their base at Fort Monroe.

Benjamin F. Butler, a politician with little military experience, led two ill-fated campaigns against Richmond.

The third and main Federal push into Virginia resulted in the largest battle fought in 1861. In mid-July, Gen. Irvin McDowell moved from Washington with some 35,000 recruits. McDowell’s ultimate target was Richmond, but first he had to capture the important railroad junction of Manassas. Through espionage agents the Confederateslearned of McDowell’s advance. Quickly Gens. P. G. T. Beauregard and Joseph E. Johnston concentrated 30,000 Southern troops near Manassas to block the Federal move. On a very hot Sunday, July 21, McDowell attacked Beauregard and Johnston near a stream known as Bull Run. As in the case of many Civil War battles, the main attack was against the flank (or end) of the line, while for deception a lesser assault force struck at the center of the defending force’s position.

A great-nephew of Patrick Henry, “Uncle Joe” Johnston proved a superb army commander. Yet he and President Davis had too many personal and official differences during the war.

The Federals might have won a smashing victory that day but for a stubborn brigade of Virginians under Gen. Thomas J. Jackson. The refusal of Jackson and his men to give ground not only helped save the day for the South but also earned for that general and his brigade the name “Stonewall.”

Losses in the battle of First Manassas, or First Bull Run, were much less than those in the larger battles to come. The Federals lost 2,896 men killed, wounded, and missing. The Confederates suffered 1,982 casualties.

This battle at Manassas had several important effects. Southerners were convinced that Yankees were poor fighters, and that the war would be brief. On the other hand, Northerners realized that defeating the Confederacy would take longer than anticipated. Thus, while Southerners celebrated a great victory, the North began raising and equipping large armies for full-scale war.

A month later occurred an engagement in the West. On August 10, a Federal army sought out and attacked a Confederate force at Wilson’s Creek, near Springfield, Mo. In this battle, often called “Bull Run of the West,” the Federals met defeat. The Union commander, Gen. Nathaniel Lyon, was killed in the midst of the fighting.

On October 21, the North suffered another costly setback. Near Ball’s Bluff, Va., Confederate defenders all but annihilated a Federal scouting force. The “Ball’s Bluff disaster” spurred into action the “Committee on the Conduct of the War.” Seven U. S. congressmen made up this investigating body. Although not one had had army training, they continually inquired into the military affairs of every Federal army and often embarrassed generals in the field.

While Confederates in 1861 won most of the battles, Lincoln and his government by no means felt defeated. Gen. George B. McClellanwas building an army at Washington that would soon number 100,000 volunteer troops. This force would be the largest ever amassed in the Western Hemisphere up to that time. Moreover, the North had won a few victories. On November 7, a Federal amphibious force had captured Port Royal, S. C., thus gaining a beachhead on the South Atlantic coast. Yet on that same day, another Federal army suffered defeat at Belmont, Mo. The losing general was an unknown officer from Illinois, and this was his first Civil War battle. His name was Ulysses S. Grant.

War’s full fury struck in 1862. To understand the complicated movements of many armies, bear in mind two points:

(1) Not one, buttwo, separate areas of military operations existed. The Appalachian Mountains, extending in an almost unbroken line from Pennsylvania to Alabama, prevented armies from moving freely from eastern states (Virginia, the Carolinas, etc.) to western or trans-Appalachian states (Tennessee, Kentucky, etc.), andvice versa. As a result, different armies in the East (east of the mountains) and in the West fought practically two almost independent wars. Only in 1864 were the campaigns of the two areas effectively coordinated.

(2) In the 1800’s, in contrast to modern military tactics, an invading army did not always move directly against an enemy force. Rather, its primary target was usually an important city. Once the invading army was in motion, the defending force then tried to place itself between the invader and his target. This set the stage for battle. Five such Confederate cities became principal Federal targets. In the East was Richmond; in the West were New Orleans and Vicksburg, both strongholds on the all-important Mississippi River, and Chattanooga and Atlanta, vital railroad centers.

Bearing these two points in mind, let us turn to the Western campaigns of 1862.

At the beginning of 1862 some 48,000 Confederate soldiers guarded a 600-mile line extending from the Appalachian Mountains westward to the Mississippi River. Obviously the Southern defenses were thinly manned. Early in February, Gen. Ulysses S. Grant left Cairo, Ill., with 15,000 men to attack the center of this line. His goal was to gain control of two important rivers, the Tennessee and the Cumberland.

To protect these streams, the Confederates had constructed twin forts in Tennessee just south of the Kentucky border. Fort Henry guarded the Tennessee; Fort Donelson stood menacingly on the banksof the Cumberland. On February 6 a Federal river fleet cooperating with Grant battered Fort Henry into submission. Ten days later Grant had surrounded Fort Donelson and its 12,000 defenders. Answering the Confederate commander’s request for surrender terms, Grant replied: “No terms but unconditional surrender.” Thereafter, U. S. Grant was “Unconditional Surrender” Grant.

Grant’s victories brought great rejoicing in the North. Some writers consider the Henry-Donelson campaign as “the critical operation” of the Civil War. Capture of these forts assured Union control of Kentucky and Tennessee and opened Mississippi and Alabama to Federal invasion. The loss of the forts was a severe blow to Southern morale. With these successes the North had also demonstrated its ability and willingness to fight.

Meanwhile, an important battle occurred farther to the west for control of Arkansas and Missouri. On March 7-8, at Pea Ridge (or Elkhorn Tavern), Ark., a Confederate army of 16,000 men attacked 12,000 Federals under Gen. Samuel R. Curtis. Most of the Confederates lacked uniforms and were armed with shotguns and squirrel rifles. This force also included 3,500 Indians of the Creek, Choctaw, Cherokee, Chickasaw and Seminole tribes. After two days of fighting, a Federal counterattack broke the Confederate “army.” With the defeat at Pea Ridge the Confederates permanently lost Missouri and northern Arkansas.

Gunfire and fighting at Shiloh was so intense that one area of the battlefield became known as the “Hornet’s Nest.” This drawing depicts the stubborn resistance of two Federal divisions in that area.

By the end of March Grant’s army was near the Mississippi border. Just across the line Gens. Albert Sidney Johnston and Beauregard had collected a force of 40,000 Confederates. Even though most of histroops were ill-equipped, Johnston attacked Grant’s encamped forces in an effort to destroy the Federal invaders. The battle of Shiloh (April 6-7), one of the war’s most costly engagements, followed.

The initial Confederate attack caught Grant by surprise, bent his line, but never broke it. Several events then swung the battle to the North’s favor. Gen. Johnston bled to death from a leg wound. Exhaustion and disorganization blunted the drive of the Southerners, and Federal artillery posted in great strength near the Tennessee River proved an effective barrier to the Confederate advance. Heavy Federal reinforcements under Gen. Don C. Buell arrived during the night. The next morning Grant counterattacked. The Confederates retreated grudgingly to Corinth, thus ending the battle. Grant’s hard-won victory cost him 13,047 casualties. The Confederates lost 10,694 soldiers, roughly one-fourth of Johnston’s forces.

For the next four months the armies of Grant and Bragg (who eventually succeeded to command) did not meet in battle. However, three significant events took place elsewhere in the Western theater.

One was the Federal capture of the mouth of the Mississippi River. In April a fleet under Flag Officer David G. Farragut blasted its way upriver past Forts Jackson and St. Philip. By the end of May the strategic river cities of New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Natchez were under Federal control. Yet a river attack on Vicksburg failed.

The second event was one of the boldest raids in American history. In April James J. Andrews, a Federal espionage agent, and twenty-one Northern soldiers sneaked through Confederate territory to Big Shanty Station, Ga., only thirty miles from Atlanta. There they stole the engine “General” and two cars of a Western & Atlantic passenger train. The Federals’ plan was to race up the tracks to Chattanooga, removing rails, burning bridges, and thus ruining this important line.

The coup might have succeeded but for the perseverance of a handful of citizens and soldiers, who gave immediate pursuit on foot, by handcar, and eventually on an engine (“The Texas”) running in reverse. All of the raiders were soon captured. Andrews and seven of his men were subsequently hanged in Atlanta.

Southern raiders soon gained a measure of revenge. In July, 1862, Col. John Hunt Morgan led his Confederate cavalrymen on a two-week slash through Kentucky. Morgan won four small battles, captured 1,200 Federals, and returned safely to Tennessee with less than 100 casualties. In December Morgan again struck into Kentucky. This “Christmas Raid” netted 1,900 prisoners and large quantities of horses and military stores.

Shortly after Morgan’s First Kentucky Raid, Gen. Bragg invaded the same state. Bragg hoped to occupy the chief cities and, by “militarypersuasion,” to bring Kentucky into the Confederacy. Yet caution eventually got the better of Bragg. He retreated, even after winning a tactical victory over Gen. Don C. Buell at Perryville on October 8. This invasion marked the end of Confederate efforts to wrest Kentucky from the Union.

Braxton Bragg is one of the most controversial generals of the Civil War. Although a devoted soldier and skillful organizer, he lacked that necessary spark of leadership.

William S. Rosecrans was a tireless, conscientious officer whom the men affectionately called “Old Rosy.”

Bragg returned to Tennessee. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, who had gained fame in two Mississippi campaigns, assumed command of the Federal army opposing Bragg. Then in November Grant started southward from Tennessee through Mississippi toward Vicksburg, the chief Confederate stronghold on the “Father of Waters.” Grant’s strategy called for a two-pronged attack: he and Gen. William T. Sherman would deliver simultaneous assaults on Vicksburg from different directions. The plan was a costly failure. Confederate cavalry under Gen. Earl Van Dorn destroyed Grant’s main supply base at Holly Springs. Grant was forced to fall back to Memphis. Sherman’s assaults on December 28-29 at Chickasaw Bayou were repulsed with heavy losses. Grant then moved his entire army down the Mississippi and prepared to take Vicksburg by attack or siege.

The final Western engagement of 1862 began on the last day of the year near Murfreesboro, Tenn. For the better part of four days Bragg’s Confederate army waged a desperate fight along the banks of Stone’s River with Rosecrans’s Federal forces. Tactically the battle was a draw. Yet the Federals lost 31% in killed, wounded, and missing, while the Confederates suffered 25% casualties.

For seven months McClellan’s large army lay inactive around Washington. Finally Lincoln, his patience exhausted, ordered McClellan to advance into Virginia. McClellan dismissed the dangerous overland route to Richmond. Rather, he proposed to transport his forces by water to Fort Monroe. Thence he would advance westward on Richmond by way of the same peninsula where Butler had met defeat the preceding year. This was the framework of the Peninsular Campaign.

The creation of the Army of the Potomac was the work largely of George B. McClellan. In 1864 he ran unsuccessfully as Democratic candidate for President.

Lincoln finally agreed to the plan. To protect Washington, however, he ordered McDowell’s corps of 37,000 soldiers to remain in the Fredericksburg-Manassas area.

By April McClellan was on the Virginia peninsula with 105,000 men. In the meantime, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate forces in Virginia, had concentrated his small army on the peninsula between McClellan and Richmond. McClellan slowly advanced westward; Johnston, with only 60,000 men, had no choice but to fall back and fight delaying actions. Driving rains turned the country into a vast sea of mud. By the end of May McClellan’s army had reached Seven Pines. The spires of Richmond were visible, nine miles away.

But Seven Pines was as close as McClellan ever got to the Confederate capital. Johnston noticed that the Federal army had been divided into two parts by the flooded Chickahominy River. He then launched attacks against McClellan’s left (southern) flank. The muddy battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks (May 31-June 1) permanently halted McClellan’s advance. Johnston was seriously wounded in the fighting, and Gen. Robert E. Lee assumed command of the Confederate forces on the Peninsula.

Elsewhere in Virginia, in the Shenandoah Valley, Gen. “Stonewall” Jackson was performing brilliantly in what became known as the Valley Campaign. Control of the Valley was vital to both sides. This narrow slit of land between two ranges of mountains is a direct avenue into both North and South. Neither side could move safely between themountains and the seacoast unless the Valley’s northern door—the region around Winchester—was shut.

Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson was a man of both military genius and peculiar habits. Known as “Old Jack” to his men, he was probably one of the most devout soldiers of the war.

When McClellan moved up the Peninsula, Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks and another Federal army advanced southward into the Valley. Jackson had only 8,500 men at his command. Yet he was determined to hold Banks at Winchester and McDowell at Fredericksburg so as to prevent them from reinforcing McClellan. On March 23 Jackson attacked part of Banks’s army at Kernstown. The wily Confederate was repulsed, but his daring prevented Banks and McDowell from marching to the aid of McClellan.

Soon three separate Federal armies entered the Valley for the sole purpose of destroying Jackson. Reinforced by Gen. Richard S. Ewell’s division, Jackson and his “foot cavalry” then swung into high gear. The full impact of “Stonewall’s” successes in the Valley Campaign can be seen from statistics. Between March 22 and June 9 the Confederates marched 630 miles, fought 4 major battles and numerous skirmishes, defeated 3 Federal armies totaling over 60,000 troops, inflicted 7,000 casualties, and captured 10,000 muskets and 9 cannon. Jackson’s army, never exceeding 17,000 men, accomplished all this at a cost of 3 cannon and 3,100 casualties. And all the while, Jackson kept Washington under threat of attack.

After a week of rest, Jackson moved rapidly to Richmond to assist Lee in a new campaign against McClellan. By then Lee had verified that McClellan’s army was still dangerously astride the swollen Chickahominy. The Confederate commander obtained this information from his colorful cavalry chief, Gen. J. E. B. “Jeb” Stuart, who in mid-June boldly rode all the way around McClellan’s huge army. On the basis of Stuart’s report, Lee attacked McClellan’s exposed right flank north of the river in the first of a series of battles known as the Seven Days Campaign.

A full beard concealed the fact that “Jeb” Stuart at the time of the Peninsular Campaign was only twenty-nine years old.

On June 26 the Confederates launched their offensive at Mechanicsville, northeast of Richmond. They suffered defeat from Federal troops under Gen. FitzJohn Porter. Lee struck again on June 27 and finally broke the Federal lines at Gaines’s Mill after an all-day fight. McClellan then ordered his army to retire to Harrison’s Landing, the Federal supply base on the James River. Lee’s troops tried again and again to destroy the Federal army. But after hard fighting at Savage Station (June 29), Frayser’s Farm (June 30), White Oak Swamp (June 30), and Malvern Hill (July 1), McClellan safely reached Harrison’s Landing and the protection of a Federal river fleet. His dream of capturing Richmond had ended.

In a few weeks another Federal threat confronted Lee. Gen. John Pope moved overland from Washington with a newly formed army. His target was also Richmond. Lee shifted his army northward to block the advance. On August 9 Jackson checked Pope’s lead elements at Cedar Run, a few miles south of Culpeper. Then, while Pope warily eyed Lee’s main force, Jackson’s men swept around the Federal right flank and captured Pope’s all-important supply base at Manassas. An angry Pope turned around and started in pursuit of Jackson.

Pope soon found Jackson. But Gen. James Longstreet, commanding the other half of Lee’s army, found Pope. The August 28-30 campaign of Second Manassas—or Second Bull Run—resulted. As in the first battle in that area, the Federals met defeat. Pope managed to check a thrust by Lee at Chantilly (September 1), then retired to Washington.

Virginia was now clear of Federal forces. The time was ripe, Lee thought, to invade the North. Success might secure Maryland for the Confederacy and bring official recognition to the Southern nation from England and France. Then both foreign powers would send supplies, and possibly troops, to aid the Southern cause.

Lee’s grayclad regiments waded across the Potomac River on September 5, 1862. At Frederick, Md., Lee divided his army. Jackson marched southward to capture Harpers Ferry and keep the Valley avenue open, while Lee proceeded westward to Sharpsburg.

Harpers Ferry first gained prominence in history with John Brown’s 1859 raid. During the Civil War it was a key point in Eastern military operations.

Meanwhile, Lincoln assigned what was left of Pope’s force to McClellan and sent “Little Mac” in pursuit of the Confederate invaders. On September 14 McClellan fought his way through the passes of South Mountain, Maryland. The next day, as McClellan’s troops converged on Lee, Jackson seized Harpers Ferry. Jackson then hastened northward and rejoined Lee at Sharpsburg late on September 16.

Wednesday, September 17, produced the largest one-day bloodbath on American soil. From sunrise until dusk Federal units made repeated assaults on Lee’s lines. Had McClellan thrown his entire army against Lee’s position, the weight of numbers probably would have destroyed the Army of Northern Virginia. Instead, the Federal commander shifted his attacks from one sector to another. Casualties mounted frightfully in such areas as the East Wood, West Wood, Dunker Church, Sunken Road, and around Burnside’s Bridge. By nightfall Lee’s battered army still held its position. McClellan had lost 12,000 men, the Confederates 9,000.

The battle of Antietam Creek ended Lee’s invasion, and he retired to Virginia. Five days after the engagement, Lincoln issued his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. This document promised freedom to all slaves in Confederate-held territory after January 1, 1863. As such, it converted the war into a struggle for human freedom and deterred European nations from granting aid or recognition to the Confederacy. Many historians therefore maintain that Antietam Creek and its aftermath were the turning points of the Civil War.

For six weeks after Antietam, McClellan seemed to make little effort to resume the campaign against Lee. Lincoln tired of waiting; on November 5 he replaced McClellan with Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside.

Fredericksburg, viewed from Federal gun emplacements north of the city. The battle occurred on the heights in the left background.

“I am not competent to command such a large army,” Burnside stated. He demonstrated this truth in his one battle at the head of the Army of the Potomac. On December 13, a freezing Saturday, Burnsideordered six grand assaults against Lee’s entrenched army on the heights overlooking Fredericksburg, Va. The result was a useless slaughter, and a defeated Burnside wept over the killing and wounding of 10,000 of his men. Confederate losses were less than half that number.

A few weeks later Burnside attempted a secret march around Lee’s left (western) flank. The Federal army bogged down in winter mud and made barely a mile a day. This “Mud March” finished Burnside. He soon relinquished command to Gen. Joseph Hooker, a strong-willed officer known to the soldiers as “Fighting Joe.”

Cavalry raids by both sides occupied the early months of this third year of conflict. One of the longest was that of Col. Benjamin H. Grierson and 17,000 Federal horsemen. Leaving La Grange, Tenn., in April, Grierson’s troopers wrecked railroads and supply depots all the way to Baton Rouge, La. The raid lasted two weeks and helped clear the way for Grant’s campaign against Vicksburg.

Two of the Confederacy’s celebrated cavalry leaders were Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Hunt Morgan. Forrest was a semi-illiterate with no prior military training. But he became a fearless fighter and an unequalled cavalry commander.

Morgan led an independent group of horsemen known popularly as “Kentucky Cavaliers.” He was ambushed and killed at Greenville, Tenn., in 1864.

On the other hand, Gen. Bedford Forrest and his Confederate cavalry made a series of quick attacks in Tennessee throughout March and April. Gen. John Hunt Morgan followed this with a summer foray through Kentucky, southern Indiana, and across Ohio.

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