Now it seems almost incredible that Mr Swett should have made the hard remarks upon me he has, pp. 14, 15, for selecting, of this entry, theparagraph in italicsrelative to General Putnam's personal service in the battle; and even ascribe to me a motive for quoting it that I did not dream of! One more extract from Stiles must suffice. "In June 30, Rev. Mr Martin visited me and gave me an account of the battle of Charlestown." "Mr Martin was in the whole affair from first to last." "He says that about 1500 went on Friday night and took possession of Bunker Hill,under the command of Colonel Prescott." And this is the first mention of Prescott's name there is in such extracts of this journal as I have. Then follows several pages of details, some of which are interwoven in the narrative in the Siege of Boston. All I have to add is, that those who rely on such rumors from the camp as Stiles' first chronicles,—which however have their value as the life-like talk of the day—will be liable to frame just such an account of this battle as Humphries in his life of Putnam has, where (in the beginning) the original detachment is put under Warren, and in the end, the British pursues to Winter Hill, Putnam there makes a stand, and drives them back under cover of their ships!
In connection with this testimony in favor of General Putnam, Mr Swett finds what he calls "the most astonishing inadvertence of the author, though (bless the charitable admission) mere inadvertence we believe," p. 25. It consists in "never hinting" that in Rivington's New York Gazette, June 29, 1775, it is stated that 'Putnam on the evening of June 16, took possession of Bunker Hill, and began an entrenchment,' and this extract from Rivington was mentioned in a publication of ours, which he had among our documents," p. 25. I am not indebted to Mr Swett for a single contemporary document; and as for Rivington's paper, I examined the fine file of it in the rooms of the New York Historical Society, and made the extract, but found the same sentence in other newspapers, for they copied from each other. What an "astonishing inadvertence" it was in "never hinting" this, the reader may easily see by looking at page 124 of the Siege of Boston, for there the fact of such a statement being in the papers is given to show that Putnam was on the hill at night; and once more at page 164, where it isa secondtimenamed among the facts bearing in his favor, in the evidence on the question of command! Is Mr Swett's remark, however, "mereinadvertence?"
Theonly new piece of evidenceadduced is an extract from John Boyle's manuscript annals. Mr Swett says, He "writes in his diary, 16th of June, 1775, General Putnam, with a detachment of about a thousand American forces, went from Cambridge and began an entrenchment on an eminence below Bunker Hill." This MS., which I did not hear of until after the publication of the Siege of Boston, is not a diary written at the time. Certainly, Mr Swett must, at least, have known that the record about Bunker Hill battle could not possibly have been put there on the day it was dated, for it contains Gage's official account of the killed and wounded, and the American account from the Providence Gazette, which did not appear tillmonths afterwards, and could not have been then known! And it requires but a moderate acquaintance with the newspapers of this period to see, at a glance, that this interesting MS. is a compilation mostly from them, and often, as in this case, in their language. Yet Mr Swett quotes this in a diarywritten at the time! The fact stated by Boyle is taken from the newspapers, and is given on p. 164 of the Siege!
To supply the place of this diary, thus struck away, I cheerfully quote arealdiary, which I did not see until the Siege was in type, and which will answer Mr Swett's purpose as well as Boyle's, if not better. It is the account of Samuel Bixby, at the time of the battle a soldier at Roxbury. It begins:—"June 17, Saturday, Colonel Putnam, with a large party, went on to a hill in Charlestown, called Bunker Hill, last night to entrench"—and all through the relation, no officer is even named but "Colonel Putnam." The simple explanation of the whole of these early rumors, or reports, is, that from General Putnam's being so active during the day of the battle, thereportwent abroad, that the entrenching party went on under him; when thefactwas that it went on under the orders of Colonel Prescott.
Mr Swett's statements about Putnam, Warren, Prescott, and the question of command, when brought together, make a singular medley.
1. He represents (p. 22,) that Putnam at last persuaded "the prudent Ward" "to grant him a detachment" "to meet the enemy;" and went to Breed's Hill under "an express agreement" that he was "to have the direction and superintendence of the whole expedition" (p. 23,): and he proves that Putnam was the commander by the nature of the army, by his rank, and a third and fourth time, by his conduct in the battle, during which "there was scarcely a regiment, corps, or individual of the army that Putnam did not personally command, direct, or encourage" (p. 28,):for "he was galloping from end to end of the line, encouraging, directing, commanding every body." In fact "no military despot was ever obeyed with more implicit subjection." He was "the bright particular star, to which, during all the storm and tempest of the battle every eye was turned for guidance and for victory," p. 29. This is exclusive enough, dogmatic enough, and general enough, to satisfy any body. Here General Putnam, if words mean anything, is from first to last, and by special agreement, the authorized, sole general commander.
2. Mr Swett, however, states (p. 7,) that Gen. Warren "was on the field, vested with all the rights and authority of a major general;" and (p. 29,) "notwithstanding he declined to issue any orders, was authorized to do so whenever he pleased," and "thus was the authorized, and for many years the supposed commander." Knowing this, Ward, (p. 7,) "probably intended to say that he was the conductor or commander" in his letter. But (p. 29,) General Putnam was the actual, andon Warren's declining, the "authorized commander." Ward was (p. 7,) "doubtless ignorant of the fact that Warren refused to exercise any command on the occasion"!! But what becomes of the "express agreement" between Ward and Putnam? Was this contingency of Warren's declination in it? Was Putnam to have the whole direction only in case Warren did not choose to assume it? Is it for a moment admissible that General Ward did not know when he wrote his letter, who was detached to the command, who exercised it, or who conducted the battle? Is it not a direct attack on Ward's reputation to impute to him such disgraceful ignorance?
3. Mr Swett states (p. 30,) "Colonel Prescott was commander at Bunker (Breed's) Hill the night before the battle, and the next day till Gen. Putnam came on with the reinforcements; and during the battle, the commander at the redoubt." What is the authority for such a statement? If Dr Whitney, Mr Lowell, and Mr Daniel Putnam are exact in giving General Putnam's conversation, he stated that the original detachment was placed under his command, and that Colonel Prescott acted under his orders. This indeed must have been so, if General Putnam, according to Mr Swett, by express agreement, had the superintendence of the whole expedition. How then could Prescott have been the commander the night before the battle and up to noon the next day? If Putnam and Prescott had differed any time previous to noon on the 17th, then, according to this last theory, the responsibility of decision rested on Prescott. Was this in the agreement? Did a general agree to be commanded by a colonel? There could have been no such incongruity.
4. Mr Swett viewing General Ward as, in one sense, the commander, comes to the conclusion, (p. 30,) that, "There were then four who in some sense participated in the command of Bunker Hill battle"—not theexact truth, but nearer to it than any theory of the pamphlet. And he says, "It may be impossible to demonstrate who was exclusively the commander as to discover the author of Junius or the birth place of Homer."Et tu Brute!And alter so much "incontrovertible," "perfectly decisive proof," "express agreement," despotic command, and "implicit subjection" relative to Putnam? After charging me with treating his character with candor only to sacrifice it at last—with robbing him of the command and not enriching any one? Who is doing sacrifice here? Who is committing robbery here? Who is enriching any one here? However, Mr Swett is correct if he means that it is impossible, from the known evidence, to demonstrate who was exclusively the commander, for it all tends to show that there was on the field no general officer who exercised a general command. Such at least is the view that will be found to be taken in the Siege of Boston!
5. Mr Swett (p. 10,) says: "All the world knows that he (Putnam) did come forward and exercise the command most effectually from the beginning to the end of the engagement:" on p. 29, Mr Swett says: "Seventy-five years ago the battle of Bunker Hill was fought. Who the commander was has ever since remained a mystery." Now these two things cannot be. What "all the world knows" certainly cannot be a "mystery," i. e. a profound secret, (see Webster) on something wholly unknown. If Mr Swett clings to the mystery he must give up the knowledge.
Such are the conclusions on the subject of command in the Bunker Hill battle, of "an author in spite of himself," who "thirty-two years ago consented to write an account" of it, and who this year considered it his "duty to enter into a thorough investigation" of this question. History cannot be worth much that resolves itself into such a mass of absurdity and contradiction.
But there is something more serious than inconsistency to allege against Mr Swett's conclusions. What is the authority for the following, I think,newstatement?—"Maj. Gen. Ward was the commander in chief of the army at Cambridge; Maj. Gen. Warren, the next; Brig. Gen. Putnam the third in command; and Col. Prescott, another officer of the army," p. 29. This is neither correct,first, as to thegeneralarmy, even if it were "consolidated;" for General Thomas was the second in command; General Whitcomb ranked above General Warren; General Pomeroy probably (for he was an older officer) ranked above General Spencer, and Spencer certainly ranked Putnam. It is difficult to say who would have ranked as between Brigadier General Putnam and Brigadier General Greene. Norsecond, as to that portion of the army stationed immediately at Cambridge, for Major General Whitcomb ranked above Major General Warren, and General Pomeroy ranked above General Putnam. Nor was GeneralWard, in either case, at the date of the battle, the regular commander-in-chief, excepting of the Massachusetts forces. But more about these officers in another place. The only strictly accurate thing in the statement is, that Col. Prescott was another officer of the army! Mr Swett's facts being taken from him his theory falls.
I have done with Mr Swett's pamphlet. A remark relative to his History needs justification.
It has been stated that the narrative of the organization of the army and of the battle of Bunker Hill in the Siege of Boston, differs materially in details from the account of the same events in Mr Swett's History. As an instance of this, as to the former, take the two statements of the action of Rhode Island,—selected because they are the shortest:—
From the Siege of Boston."The Rhode Island assembly, April 25, voted to raise fifteen hundred men, to constitute 'an army of observation,' and ordered it to 'join and coöperate with the forces of the neighboring colonies.' This force was organized intothree regiments, of eight companies each, under Colonels Varnum, Hitchcock, and Church, and placed under the command ofNathaniel Greene, with the rank ofbrigadier-general. One of the companies was a train of artillery, and had the colony's field pieces. General Greene, on arriving at the camp, Jamaica Plains, found his command in great disorder: and it was only by his judicious labors, and great personal influence, that it was kept together. In the rules and regulations for the government of this force, it is called 'The Rhode Island army.' They provide that 'all public stores, taken in the enemy's camp or magazines,' should be 'secured for the use of the colony of Rhode Island.' It was not until June 28 that this colony passed an act putting its troops under the orders of the general of the combined army."From Mr Swett's History."Rhode Island had senta regimentto Massachusetts imbued with the determined spirit of civil and religious liberty, which the founder of their state maintained through every peril.ColonelGreene was their commander, one of the most prominent heroes of the revolution. The elements of a soldier were so mixed in him, that his elevated rank among distinguished warriors was already anticipated. Under him were Lieut. Col. Olney, and Maj. Box, an experienced English soldier. An artillery company with four field pieces was attached to the corps."
From the Siege of Boston.
"The Rhode Island assembly, April 25, voted to raise fifteen hundred men, to constitute 'an army of observation,' and ordered it to 'join and coöperate with the forces of the neighboring colonies.' This force was organized intothree regiments, of eight companies each, under Colonels Varnum, Hitchcock, and Church, and placed under the command ofNathaniel Greene, with the rank ofbrigadier-general. One of the companies was a train of artillery, and had the colony's field pieces. General Greene, on arriving at the camp, Jamaica Plains, found his command in great disorder: and it was only by his judicious labors, and great personal influence, that it was kept together. In the rules and regulations for the government of this force, it is called 'The Rhode Island army.' They provide that 'all public stores, taken in the enemy's camp or magazines,' should be 'secured for the use of the colony of Rhode Island.' It was not until June 28 that this colony passed an act putting its troops under the orders of the general of the combined army."
From Mr Swett's History.
"Rhode Island had senta regimentto Massachusetts imbued with the determined spirit of civil and religious liberty, which the founder of their state maintained through every peril.ColonelGreene was their commander, one of the most prominent heroes of the revolution. The elements of a soldier were so mixed in him, that his elevated rank among distinguished warriors was already anticipated. Under him were Lieut. Col. Olney, and Maj. Box, an experienced English soldier. An artillery company with four field pieces was attached to the corps."
And the variations, as to the details of the action of the other three colonies, are still greater.
The same thing will be found to prevail as to the battle. Take, as an illustration, the two first paragraphs of the two accounts.
From the Siege of Boston."On Friday, the sixteenth of June, the commanders of the army, in accordance with the recommendation of the committee of safety, took measures to fortify Bunker Hill. Orders were issued for Prescott's, Frye's, and Bridge's regiments, and a fatigue party of two hundred Connecticut troops, to parade at six o'clock in the evening, with all the entrenching tools in the Cambridge camp. They were also ordered to furnish themselves with packs and blankets, and with provisions for twenty-four hours. Also, Captain Samuel Gridley's company of artillery, of forty-nine men and two field-pieces, was ordered to parade. The Connecticut men, draughted from several companies, were putunder the command of the gallant Captain Knowlton, a captain in General Putnam's regiment." p. 122.From Mr Swett's History."On the 16th of June, 75, the sun fell with its full force on the American camp, the earth was parched up, but the vigorous frames and patriotic spirit of the soldiers were proof against its influence. With the advice of the council of war General Ward issued orders to Col. William Prescott, Col. Bridge, and the commandant of Frye's regiment, to be prepared for an expedition, with all their men fit for service, and one day's provisions. The same order issued for one hundred and twentyof Gen. Putnam's regiment, and Capt. Gridley's company of artillery with two field pieces." p. 18.
From the Siege of Boston.
"On Friday, the sixteenth of June, the commanders of the army, in accordance with the recommendation of the committee of safety, took measures to fortify Bunker Hill. Orders were issued for Prescott's, Frye's, and Bridge's regiments, and a fatigue party of two hundred Connecticut troops, to parade at six o'clock in the evening, with all the entrenching tools in the Cambridge camp. They were also ordered to furnish themselves with packs and blankets, and with provisions for twenty-four hours. Also, Captain Samuel Gridley's company of artillery, of forty-nine men and two field-pieces, was ordered to parade. The Connecticut men, draughted from several companies, were putunder the command of the gallant Captain Knowlton, a captain in General Putnam's regiment." p. 122.
From Mr Swett's History.
"On the 16th of June, 75, the sun fell with its full force on the American camp, the earth was parched up, but the vigorous frames and patriotic spirit of the soldiers were proof against its influence. With the advice of the council of war General Ward issued orders to Col. William Prescott, Col. Bridge, and the commandant of Frye's regiment, to be prepared for an expedition, with all their men fit for service, and one day's provisions. The same order issued for one hundred and twentyof Gen. Putnam's regiment, and Capt. Gridley's company of artillery with two field pieces." p. 18.
These extracts will serve to show the character of such variations between the two narratives of the battle, as will be found to run through them. Other paragraphs might be quoted containing things of far more consequence. The variations as to the parts individuals bore, are also important. To do justice to the actors, they should be named in connection with the service they rendered. With this in view, let the critical reader, as an illustration, compare the notices in the two accounts, of what the brave Knowlton did. Mr Swett's first and last mention of him, in describing the battle, is on p. 26, as follows: "While the enemy were landing, Putnam ordered Knowlton with the Connecticut troops, to take post behind a rail fence." Passing the correctness of this, it is every syllable there is about Knowlton, until p. 56 of the supplementary chapter, where there is, so far as this battle is concerned, only a general, but deserved, compliment to him. In the whole, the reader is not told that he had the command of the Connecticut fatigue party of two hundred, one fifth of the whole, or even went on at night. In the "Notes" of Mr Swett, his name will be found to occur twice in depositions. Now is not Knowlton's well won reputation as dear as Putnam's or Prescott's? With this, compare the notices of him on pp. 122, 134, 136, 151, 189, 190, of the Siege of Boston, which rest on authorities that are named. Before these details, or others that may differin totofrom Mr Swett's History, be unceremoniously shovelled aside as a "chaos of mistakes," I have a right to demand that the authorities on which they rest, shall go through the process first.
It is then frankly admitted that the two histories, as far as they go on together, will not harmonize in their details. All that need be said on my part is, that an endeavor was made to frame the account in the Siege of Boston with care and with a partiality only for well directed effort, and lofty patriotism, and noble self-sacrifice, by whomsoever manifested, going directly to original authorities in all cases where it was practicable; and at a risk of being charged with pedantry, references are made in notes to authorities, especially where this battle is described, that will justify every line of the text. It is these that are to decide who is most in error. The appeal is cheerfully and confidently made to the candid and unprejudiced. But whatever the judgment may be as to my selection of authorities, I feel incapable of manufacturing facts, or of intentionally disparaging the services, or of doing injustice to the reputation, of any of the patriots who took a part in the great work of the Revolution.
Having thus done with Mr Swett, who really deserves much credit for his patriotic and indefatigable pioneer labors, and done, it is hoped, finally with controversy on this subject, this opportunity is embraced of making a few remarks on the character of the army and the commandingofficers of the battle of Bunker Hill. This is done the more readily, as it will serve as an occasion to-weave in additional contemporary matter, not in print, that may afford aid to a future enquirer in settling this question.
The organization of the American army besieging the British army in Boston at the time of the Battle of Bunker Hill, was peculiar. The Massachusetts forces, though all of them had enlisted either as minute men, or as part of the quota of this colony, were less regularly organized, perhaps, than the troops of at least two of the other colonies. Several of the colonels, and other officers, had not been commissioned, and their rank had not been determined. Up to this time, and all through the records and the documents of the Provincial Congress, the forces of this province are called "The Massachusetts Army." General Ward's commission terms him the commander-in-chief of the Massachusetts forces, and he signs his name, June 4, as such. The troops of Rhode Island, under Brigadier General Greene, were also termed "The Rhode Island Army"—and "The Army of Observation," and all the captures by it were to enure to the benefit of the colony of Rhode Island. In like manner the Connecticut forces, under Brigadier General Spencer, (the senior officer,) and Putnam, were controlled by a Connecticut "committee of war" and all captures were to enure to the benefit of that colony. Rhode Island and Connecticut had not instructed their generals—June 17, 1775—to put themselves under General Ward. The troops of New Hampshire were differently situated from those of the two other colonies. The minute men who flocked to the neighborhood of Boston on the Lexington alarm, were advised by the New Hampshire officers to enlist in the service of the Massachusetts colony, until their colony could have time to act. These troops, then under Colonel Stark, were adopted by the New Hampshire Provincial Congress, (May 20th) and put under the command of Brigadier General Folsom. He did not arrive at camp until just after the battle, but he gave an order to Colonel Reed, whom the congress had also appointed colonel, to collect his regiment, a part of which was under Stark at Medford, and put himself under General Ward. The latter ordered him (June 15) to take post at Charlestown Neck.
The facts relative to the army, whatever bearing they may have on the question of command, show that it was an army of allies. The four New England colonies came together as equals, respecting each other's equality, and with no idea in one of claiming precedence over the others. The description of President John Adams is strictly correct, and is borne out by contemporary documents. "Massachusetts had her army, Connecticut her army, New Hampshire her army, and Rhode Island her army. These four armies met together and imprisoned the British army in Boston. But who was the sovereign of this united, or rather congregatedarmy? It had none." And he goes on to remark, that the commanding officers of each colony were independent of each other. Hence Elbridge Gerry (June 4, 1775) writes "We want a regular general to assist us in disciplining the army." Hence the "committee of war" of the colony of Connecticut, to remedy this evil of the want of a commander-in-chief, on June 19th, 1775, considered the following important votes:—
"On motion of the difficulties the army are and must be under for the want of a general and commander-in-chief of the whole body, raised by different colonies &c., and a due subordination, in consideration, &c.
"Voted, That his honor the governor be advised to give orders to our officers and soldiers to be subordinate and yield obedience to the general and commanding officer of the troops of the Massachusetts Bay, while they act in that province, and until the governor, with advice, shall see fit to order otherwise."
On the next day (June 20, 1775) the committee passed this order, when the votes were as follows:—
"An order subjecting our officers and soldiers to the command of the Massachusetts commander-in-chief, during their continuance in that province, or until further orders, was read and agreed to.
A letter to General Ward, informing him thereof, and endorsing a copy of said order, read and approved.
A letter to Deputy Governor Cook, of Rhode Island, informing him of the same, and moving him to do the same respecting the troops of that colony, read and approved.
A letter to the New Hampshire Congress of the like tenor and for the same purpose, also read and approved.
A letter to General Spencer enclosing a copy of said order of subordination, &c., read and approved.
And another letter to the same purpose, and copy, to General Putnam."
These facts certainly warrant the important inference, that there was noregularcommander-in-chief; that the evil of not having one had been felt; and that it had been determined to apply the needed remedy, even as it regarded the four New England colonies. Besides this, the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts (May 3) hadsuggested to the Continental Congress(convened May 10) the expediency of raising "a powerful army:" and on the 15th it had sent an express advising that body to assume the general direction and regulation of the forces besieging Boston. Thus it was before the army had been consolidated, before there was a commander-in-chief "of the whole body," before the ranks of its officers had been determined, and while it was in a transition state, that the Battle of Bunker Hill was fought. It was while the troops were underthe control of the several colonies that had raised them, and before they had become as Washington's first order (July 4, 1775) terms them, "the troops of the United Provinces of North America." There was great want of discipline, and there were many irregularities, but it gives a very erroneous idea of the army to term it a mob; for even the hastily assembled bands that fought the British troops from Concord, on the Nineteenth of April, cannot justly be called an armed mob, but they were an organized power, set apart, and trained, to do the thorough and immortal work that was done that day. It also gives an idea quite as erroneous to term the army regularly organized and consolidated.
The operations of this army were decided by its general officers,—Ward, Thomas, Whitcomb, Pomeroy, Heath, Spencer, Putnam, Greene, and perhaps others,—convened in council, and hence called "The council of war." The Massachusetts committee of safety had no power over it as a whole, though it was clothed with ample authority to control the Massachusetts generals. Thus when it acted in the important matter of occupying Bunker Hill, it passed but an advisory vote. The ultimate, directing power was in the council of war. It is however stated, that the orders of the day were copied by all the troops, and that a voluntary obedience was yielded to General Ward as the commander-in-chief.
The immediate occasion of this battle hardly needs a passing remark. "The commanders of the New England Army" (the words of the committee of safety account,) received authentic advice that the British intended to penetrate into the country; when the Massachusetts committee of safety (June 15) unanimously recommended to the council of war to occupy Bunker Hill. This recommendation was complied with. Hence the building of the memorable redoubt. The object of the British was to drive the Americans from it.
The remarks that follow are not designed to present a narrative of the battle, but as suggestions that may aid in showing more precisely its character, and the agency that general officers exercised in it.
Artemas Ward, the commander of the Massachusetts army, graduated, at Harvard University in 1748, had been a firm and useful member of the general court and provincial congress, and had also seen service in the military line. He was major in the Canada expedition of 1758, and the next year was appointed colonel, but he had the honor of having it revoked by the royal governor on account of his prominence in the patriot cause. When forcible resistance had been resolved on, and the first provincial congress, (October 1774) took such admirable measures to keep the patriot cause free from any thing like mob action, it appointed him (Oct. 27, 1774) one of the generals to command, what then was very properly called "the constitutional army," or minute men, or militia,whenever the committee of safety should call them out to defend the colony. He was reëlected Feb. 9, 1775, and in a long resolve commencing as follows:—"That the Honorable Jedediah Preble, Esq., Honorable Artemas Ward, Esq., Colonel Seth Pomeroy, Colonel John Thomas, and Colonel William Heath, be and they are, hereby appointed general officers," &c. Preble declined, which left Ward the highest officer, and accordingly when the minute men were summoned to the field on the nineteenth of April, he on the next day took the command. But his commission was not delivered to him until May 20, 1775, and it constituted him general and commander-in-chief of all the forces raised by the Massachusetts provincial congress; and it instructed him to obey the directions of the committee of safety. General Ward had gained distinction in Canada, was of great integrity of character, was a calm, cool, intrepid man, and ranked high in public estimation; but he was thought to be a better civilian than general.
General Ward's headquarters were at Cambridge on the day of the battle. It is represented that, in the council of war, his opinion was decidedly adverse to the measure of occupying so exposed a post as Bunker Hill, and this would be in keeping with his cautious character. At any rate, so thought the majority of this council, until the resolution was suddenly taken (June 15) to occupy this hill. Few contemporary allusions occur as to Ward's personal agency in the battle. Dr Belknap's Diary (Oct. 20, 1775) supplies one:—"In conversation with Mr Ward at Roxbury, I learned that the reason of our throwing up the entrenchment at Charlestown, on the night of the 16th June, was, that there had been intelligence received, such as could be depended on, that the regulars had determined to make a push for Cambridge after the arrival of their three generals and reinforcements, who landed a few days before." There is nothing satisfactory to show that General Ward did not concur with this decision of the council of war.
His orderly book contains no orders relative to the expedition; but Fenno's, contains a copy of the order issued to the Massachusetts forces to parade. It was as follows: "June 16. Frye's, Bridge's and William Prescott's regiments to parade this evening at six o'clock, with all the entrenching tools in this encampment." This order, it will be noticed, did not include the Connecticut forces, which were also ordered to parade at this time. Now depositions say, that General Putnam ordered these to parade. They did not consist of a company under the command of Captain Knowlton, and were not all from one regiment, but were ordered by Putnam to be draughted out of several companies; and the next day, when more Connecticut troops were ordered on, the fact is given by Chester, that Putnam also ordered them on. But contemporary authoritiesand depositions, unite in the fact, that the orders for the troops of New Hampshire and Massachusetts to go on, went directly from General Ward. Thus Colonel Stark, (June 20, 1775) states that he "was required by the General" to send a party to Bunker Hill. So Prescott received his orders from Ward, and when he applied for reinforcements, it was directly to him. The orders of Ward to the forces of these two colonies, therefore, did notgo through any other officer, as they would have done had one been specially detached to exercise a general command.
Throughout the action Gen. Ward had constant and frequent communications with Charlestown. Henry Knox, afterward General Knox, and Samuel Osgood, acted as his aids. Col. Joseph Gilbert is named in the newspapers as having "at the request of General Ward" freely exposed his life on this day by crossing the Neck several times "in the time of action and under a galling fire to carry intelligence to and from headquarters." But Ward remained at Cambridge. He considered the attack on the redoubt as only a part of the object of the British general, but that his main object was to march out of Boston, attack his stores, break up his army, and then proceed to Charlestown Neck, and enclose the Americans in the peninsula. It was not until the intentions of the British general were clearly revealed, that he detached large reinforcements to Charlestown. Such is the statement made by General Ward's friends. And had the valor of the patriot band on Breed's Hill been less, the greater might have been the estimate placed on Ward's judgment.
The circumstances already stated, with others that might be named, would seem to indicate that General Ward controlled the movements in such a way, that he may be regarded as the general commander, if any one can be so regarded. This view is supported by several allusions that occur to him in contemporary letters. It should be borne in mind that the result of the battle, the loss of the ground, occasioned great indignation, and naturally gave rise to much unfavorable comment. In some of this comment General Ward is spoken ofas the direct commanderof the battle. I will name here as one instance, a letter of James Warren, (June 20, 1775) who was elected president of the Massachusetts provincial congress, in the place of Joseph Warren. He regards him and writes of him as the commander.
General Ward was in long and important service subsequently to the battle. He was appointed by the continental congress first major general, commanded the right wing of the army during the Siege of Boston, and was left in command of the eastern department on the removal of Washington to New York. He soon resigned his commission, but at the request of congress, continued in service until the close of the year. He subsequently filled most responsible offices, being in 1777 president of theexecutive council of the colony, in 1779 a member of the continental congress, in 1786 speaker of the Massachusetts house of representatives, and sixteen years a representative of the town of Shrewsbury. He died October 27, 1800, age 73, leaving behind him an unblemished character, and a name "precious among the friends of liberty and religion."
John Whitcomb was the officer next in rank who gave orders on the day of the battle. He was chosen general by the provincial congress, Feb. 15, 1775. He was an old veteran—took the field promptly on the nineteenth of April, and, according to the orderly books, was one of the three generals who formed the first council of war convened on the 20th of April, at Cambridge. He was one of the sterling, disinterested, uneducated patriot officers of the early revolution, and appears to have enjoyed to a great degree the respect and confidence of his contemporaries; and so valuable were his services considered that when the provincial congress resolved, June 12, to elect two major generals, on the next day (13th,) they elected him the "first major general." He expressed an unwillingness to accept this appointment, but on a "complaisant letter," dated June 16, being sent to him by order of congress, strongly urging his acceptance, the brave patriot replied, that "as the circumstances of the army were so difficult and the enemy so near" he would accept. He was not commissioned, however, until the 23d of June. But if Warren is to be considered a major general—and his commission is to date from the day of his appointment—so is Whitcomb. Indeed the evidence in Scammans's trial shows that he was on duty on the 17th, and gave orders in the afternoon. A letter of Samuel Gray, July 12, 1775, states that two generals and the engineer went on to Breed's Hill on the night of June 16, and reconnoitred the ground. One of them, certainly, was General Putnam, and the other might have been General Whitcomb. There is no mention, however, of his having been in the battle, and no special service appears in connection with his name. He was certainly in the field that day, gave orders, and was also the officer next in rank to General Ward at Cambridge.
Joseph Warren was the officer next in rank, having been on 14th of June elected the second major general of the Massachusetts army. It is not necessary here to recount his history; but no one represented more completely the fine enthusiasm and the self-sacrificing patriotism that rallied to the support of the revolution, and no one saw more clearly the great principle involved in this contest. If he was of a high, chivalrous spirit, and of fascinating social qualities, he had also a judgment beyond his years, and wielded surprising influence with his contemporaries. He had been an active and most efficient working patriot, in the civil line, and as such he acted, as president of the Massachusetts provincial congress andmember of the committee of safety up to the day, and almost to the hour of his death. He had twice exposed his life in the battle field, once on the Lexington day, when he is said to have been the most active man on the field, and again at Noddle's Island in May, under General Putnam, yet it was as a volunteer and without a command; and there is nothing on the records of the provincial congress, or among its documents, to indicate that a commission as major general had been made out for him, or that he had accepted this appointment; nor does his name appear on such orderly books, as I have seen; neither is it stated that General Ward ordered him, on the 17th of June, to Charlestown, but on the contrary, his friends were urgent in their entreaties that his valuable life should not be exposed in battle. He went voluntarily, deaf to the most affectionate remonstrances, listening only to the call of patriotic duty, in his own lofty spirit of self-sacrifice, and to give the patriot band when it was in peril the benefit of his presence. He went on, in his own simple words, uttered after he got to the redoubt, "To encourage a good cause." On his way from Cambridge he armed himself with a musket, took position in the redoubt, and declined to give orders to Colonel Prescott. Here I quote an entire note in Judge Prescott's MS. Memoir. It indicates the cautious manner in which that eminent man wrote on this interesting subject:—"General Warren came to the redoubt a short time before the action commenced with a musket in his hand. Col. Prescott went to him and proposed that he should take the command, observing, he understood he had been appointed a major general a day or two before, by the provincial congress. General Warren replied, 'I shall take no command here, I have not yet received my commission; I came as a volunteer with my musket to serve under you, and shall be happy to learn from a soldier of your experience.' General Warren fought gallantly with his musket, and unfortunately for his country, fell; but, whether killed during the battle or on the retreat, is made a question. I believe it was just after he left the redoubt, but am not positive that I ever heard my father state it."
Deacon Samuel Lawrence, of Groton—the father of the Hon. Abbott Lawrence—who went on under Colonel Prescott, aided in raising the redoubt, was in it during the whole battle until the retreat, and whose subsequent life was marked by great usefulness, integrity, and public spirit, says of General Warren—"Just before the battle commenced Gen. Warren came to the redoubt. He had on a blue coat and white waistcoat, and, I think, a cocked hat, but of this I am not certain. Colonel Prescott advanced to him, said 'He was glad to see him, and hoped he would take the command.' General Warren replied—'No, he came to see the action, but not to take the command; that he was only a volunteer on that day.'" He further states—"I knew General Warren well by sight, and recollected him perfectly when Colonel Prescott offered him the command, and wassorry to see him so dangerously situated, as I knew him to be a distinguished character, and thought he ought not to have risked his life without command on that occasion."
The determined spirit with which the leading officers went into this battle could hardly have been exceeded. Putnam, Pomeroy, and Stark were veterans beyond fear, and their names had become associated with daring enterprise. Prescott went on to the hill on the night of June 16th, with the resolution not to be taken alive—"I will never be taken alive," he had remarked. "The tories shall never have the satisfaction of seeing me hanged." Warren's high spirit had been often stirred by the taunts which the British officers were wont to indulge against the colonists. Indeed he felt them as keenly as though they had been personal insults. It was only a few weeks before the battle, that he remarked to William Eustis, afterwards governor, at a moment when his spirit was galled by such insolence: "These fellows say we won't fight! By heavens, I hope I shall die up to my knees in blood." The report at first was that he disdained to fly. Mr Bancroft, during his late residence abroad, got the account of the battle which the French ambassador in London sent to Vergennes, the French minister, which gives, with much particularity, an account of the battle. It says—"Il (Warren) a refusé de le (Putnam) suivre dans sa retraite; il est resté lui septième dans les entrenchments de Charlestown et n'a pas voulu accepter de quartier." "He (Warren) refused to follow him (Putnam) in the retreat; he remained one of seven in the entrenchments at Charlestown and would not accept quarter." General Ward (October 20, 1775) told Dr Belknap—"That Dr Warren was the last man in the trenches after they were forced, and died on the breastwork with his sword in his hand. That his body was stripped naked, and buried so; his coat was sold in Boston by a soldier for eight dollars. His body was dug up several times, and buried again, to gratify the curiosity of those who came to see it." In connection with the death of Warren is the chivalric act attributed to the British Major Small, (which figures so largely in Trumbull's picture,) who, in return for a similar service which General Putnam had rendered him in the battle, it is said, endeavored to save Warren's life. The whole relation, however, about Major Small, bears too much the aspect of romance to be relied upon.
The most probable account, of the many accounts of his fall, is, that he was killed early in the retreat, just outside the trenches. As the contemporary notices of his death are interesting, a few more of them are here quoted:—
The Remembrancer, (British) vol. 1, p. 250, says—"When the provincials were retreating, of the three concurring circumstances, Charlestown being on fire, the ships cannonading, and the regulars advancing, the Doctor, with that intrepidity and contempt of danger which peculiarlymarked his character, stood alone for some time, endeavoring to rally the troops and animate them by his example. He was observed in this situation, and known by an officer in the regulars, who, wresting a musket out of the hands of one of his men, took aim, and lodged a bullet in his breast, of which he expired without a pang."
A British lieutenant in the battle, John Clarke, in his pamphlet account, printed in London, 1775, writes as follows of Dr Warren:—
"A report having prevailed that Dr Warren was not killed, I think it necessary to contradict it, as I saw a soldier, after the Doctor was wounded and lying in the trenches, going to run him through the body with his bayonet; on which the Doctor desired he would not kill him, for he was much wounded and could not live a great while longer; on which the soldier swore that he would, for that he had done more mischief than any one else, and immediately run him through the body. The Doctor's dress was a light-colored coat, with a white satin waistcoat laced with silver, and white breeches with silver loops; which I saw the soldier soon after strip off his body. He was supposed to be the commander of the American army that day; for General Putnam was about three miles distant, and formed an ambuscade with about three thousand men."
If John Clarke could stand idle and see this barbarity, he must have been a fiend in human form. Both of these British accounts cannot be true.
James Warren, MS. letter, June 20, 1775, says: "Here fell our worthy and much lamented friend Dr Warren, with as much glory as Wolfe on the plains of Abraham, alter performing many feats of bravery, and exhibiting a coolness and conduct which did honor to the judgment of his country in appointing him a few days before one of their major generals; at once admired and lamented in such a manner as to make it difficult to determine whether regret or envy predominates."
J. Palmer, Cambridge, MS., June 19, 1775, says: "We yet have about 60 or 70 killed and missing; but—among these, is—what shall I say? How shall I write the name of our worthy friend, the great and good Dr W——. You will hear by others who will write to-morrow, such particulars as I am not possessed of."
William Tudor, MS., June 26, 1775, writes:—"The loss of Dr Warren is irreparable—his death is generally and greatly lamented. But
'Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.'
This is a day of heroes. The fall of one will inspire the surviving glorious band to emulate his virtues and revenge his death on the foes of liberty and our country."[B]
Immediately after the battle it was reported in Boston that Dr Warren had the command during the action, and statements to this effect were written to England. Hence, in nearly all the British accounts, thishonor is awarded to him. The same thing is stated in some of the almanacks of 1776. George's Cambridge Almanack, or the Essex Calendar for 1776, says that he was the "commander in chief on the occasion." The same account was printed in a handbill, with a parcel of wretched rhyme, some of which also appeared in the newspapers. Governor Trumbull, of Connecticut, in his Historical Letter, printed in vol. VI. of the Massachusetts Historical Collection, dated August 31, 1779, gives an account of the action, and states that "the brave General Warren" was the "commanding officer." The same thing is stated in a History of the War in America, published by Coverly & Hodge in Boston in 1781, and is repeated in an account in the Analectic Magazine, (1818,) where it is stated that "General Putnam directed the whole on the fall of General Warren."
That General Warren, in being present, and behaving so heroically, exerted great influence in the battle by infusing his own spirit into the patriot band, cannot be doubted. He acted, however, only as a volunteer. There is no reliable account which states that he assumed any command—that he performed any military duty in the army previous to the battle, or that he gave an order during the engagement. He was in the redoubt, and Colonel Prescott's letter makes it certain that here he (Prescott) commanded throughout the action.
Seth Pomeroy was the next officer in rank, as he was the oldest officer, being one of the first generals elected. He was one of the intrepid veterans of the French wars, having commanded a company under Sir William Johnson, when he defeated the army under Baron Dieskau. He exerted large influence in Hampshire county, and had a marked character for intrepidity, generosity, frankness and patriotism. He was a delegate in the first and second provincial congress from Northampton, and a colleague with the celebrated Major Hawley. His name often appears on important committees. He was elected a general officer Oct. 27, 1774, and again Feb. 9, 1775; and probably preferring military service, was not returned a delegate to the third provincial congress, which met on the 31st of May, 1775. He aided in organizing the army that assembled at Cambridge to besiege the British army, and was in service at the time of the battle. It is stated that he had not received a commission in the Massachusetts army, as Ward and Thomas had, but served under "his old commission;" but the authority for this is not given. I have met with but few authentic notices of him in connection with the battle. But it is admitted that he went on to the field as a volunteer, and though he ranked above Putnam, there is no evidence that he gave him an order. He is said to have borrowed a horse of General Ward to carry him on; but on arriving at Charlestown Neck, and seeing the severe fire that raked it, he refused to risk the borrowed animal, but walked across. He fought witha musket at the rail fence breastwork. He behaved bravely during the battle, and in some accounts, figures as the commander of a brigade. But he appears to have had no special command. He was elected a brigadier general by the continental congress, but declined on account of his age.
Israel Putnam, of Connecticut, was the general next in rank stationed at Cambridge. Not an officer of the army, if Warren be excepted, had a larger measure of popularity. His daring exploits at home, and on the Canada frontier, had established his character for bravery, while his public spirit and efficient political action, on trying occasions during the ten years controversy from 1764 to 1775, had made him widely known as a decided and bold patriot. But it is unnecessary to relate his history. The Connecticut assembly, in April, made him a brigadier general, and he was second in command of the forces of that colony. At the time of the battle of Bunker Hill, the greater part of these forces was stationed at Cambridge—the remainder, under General Spencer, the senior officer, was at Roxbury. It was not, I think, until subsequently to the battle, that Patterson's, Sargent's, and other regiments (Mass.) were placed under his command.
No reliable contemporary account states that the detachment which was detailed to take possession of Bunker Hill, was placed under the orders of General Putnam, or gives him by express agreement the superintendence of the whole expedition, or puts Col. Prescott under him. On the other hand, the negative evidence is decisive and conclusive. Scammans writes as though it were well known that there was no general officer in command; James Thatcher states that though several general officers came on to the field, no one assumed the command; William Tudor says there was no authorised general command; and Judge Prescott says that neither General Putnam nor any other officer claimed or exercised any command over Prescott. It is also a singular fact, that the patriot governor of Connecticut, Governor Trumbull, the head of the committee of war of that colony, under whose direct orders Spencer and Putnam acted, who speaks in the most friendly manner of Putnam in his letters, who would be likely to know the fact if he had commanded, and to claim the honor for his colony if he justly could, yet in his historical letter (Aug. 31, 1779) names General Warren as the commanding officer. General Putnam, too, in a letter dated May 22, 1776, speaks of venturing "his life in the high places of the field," and of "taking possession of Prospect Hill the very night after the fight on Bunker Hill,without having any orders from any person." This does not indicate that he was the commander in this fight, or had entrusted to him the whole direction of the expedition. Nor does the relation that Stiles has given—already quoted—indicate such a responsibility; but if it indicates any thing, it is that he was not responsible for the result. To all this must be added thedecisive negative testimony of the letter of General Ward, which is clearly to the point, that a Massachusetts officer conducted the battle.
In order to show how decided is the denial that General Putnam was detached to exercise a general command, or that the original detachment was put under his orders, or that he gave an order to Col. Prescott, I now add the following extract of a letter of the late Judge William Prescott, the son of Colonel Prescott, which has not before been printed. It is appended to his MS. memoir of the battle. After remarking on Mr. Swett's history, he says (October 30, 1838)—
"There is one (fact) however, in which I cannot concur with the statement in the history. This, as I understand it, represents that General Putnam had the command of all the troops engaged in the action. I have not the smallest disposition to disparage Gen. P. or his services, but I believe no authority or reason can be found for this supposition, other than his rank, and that he was on the heights during the battle.
The detachment that marched from Cambridge the night before, including the one hundred and twenty Connecticut men, was placed under the command of Colonel Prescott, by an order in writing from the commander-in-chief, with instructions to proceed to Bunker Hill and fortify it till relieved. Colonel Prescott conferred with his officers and Colonel Gridley (General Putnam might be present) as to the place intended for the fortification; but Colonel Prescott took on himself the responsibility of deciding, as well he might, for on him it would rest.
I know from evidence that with me is conclusive, that General Putnam never exercised any authority over this detachment, or any part of it; and that he never at any time, before, during, or after the battle, gave an order or command to Colonel Prescott."
These authorities andfactsin the case are put together without the slightest disposition to do injustice to this brave old general. Still, if there be any authority,in manuscript or in print, between June 1775 and May 1790, which assigns to him the command of the original detachment, or of the battle of Bunker Hill, let it be produced.
But General Putnam had been an efficient officer since the rustic army gathered at Cambridge, was one of the council of war, is understood to have been in favor of fortifying Bunker Hill, and was the last to shrink from a perilous enterprise. His patriotic zeal carried him to the heights during the watches of the memorable night when the redoubt was built, and also early on the next day, to give the entrenching party the benefit of his presence and council; and this carried him also into the heat of the fight, at the commencement, at the rail fence—at its conclusion, on the brow of Bunker Hill. The contemporary accounts that name him in connection with the battle, harmonize as to the nature of his service. Chester gives the fact that about noon he ordered on all the Connecticuttroops at Cambridge; Martin states that he came on with a reinforcement; Gordon states that he was employed in aiding and encouraging the troops here and there, as the case required; Pitts states that he was employed in collecting the men; and Williams (secretary of the Connecticut committee of war) states he received it that he commanded the troops, perhaps not in chief. And thus, while the negative testimony is against the idea of his being detached to exercise a general command, that of a positive cast is that as a general officer he acted the part of an aid, an assistant, a volunteer.
And in such capacity he did his duty fearlessly, faithfully, well. He was on horseback, and rode quickly from place to place.[C]His main service was in connection with the reinforcements. He gave orders to them, not in the redoubt, not, I think, near the redoubt, but at the rail fence, and on Bunker Hill, and in the rear of this. He stated himself—so Stiles says—that there was "a reinforcement within half a mile" that ought to have gone on to the hill, but the heavy fire at "the open causeway" deterred it, and that "in the heat of the action he went away to fetch acrossthis reinforcement." Now this service is consistent with the duty of a patriotic volunteer "collecting men," but is it consistent with the duty of a responsible commander, ordering a battle? What would be thought of a general, who, in the heat of an action, should leave the field, and go half a mile after a reinforcement, and not get back until a retreat had commenced? Is it not at considerable hazard to General Putnam's reputation that, with such contemporary evidence to meet as there is in this case—the authenticity of which cannot be successfully impugned—the position is maintained that he was the immediate and responsible commander of this battle? But to return: General Putnam most probably left the hill after the first attack. He next is seen braving the balls at Charlestown Neck, and, in the rear of it, urging on the backward troops. Thus Samuel Bassett says he came in full gallop to Ploughed Hill (Mount Benedict) from the neck, (which, probably, wasafterthe first attack) exclaiming, "Up my brave boys, for God's sake!We drive them;" and Sargent and Cooke say that he was at Prospect Hill, at an hour and under circumstances, which must have been while the battle was going on. Here the contemporary evidence (Stiles and Pitts) and the soldiers' statements (Bassett, Sargent and Cooke) harmonize. The retreat (Stiles says) had commenced before he got back. But he must soon have rode to Bunker Hill, for he is found here by a messenger Col. Scammans sent; and when his regiment got to this hill he ordered it forward. On the brow of this hill, where there was hot fighting, he put himself between the retreating throng and the advancing enemy; and, regardless of personal danger, he urged the flying troops to stop. "Make a stand here!" he exclaimed, "We can stop them yet! In God's name form! and give them one shot more!" There are other circumstances that will harmonize with this detail; and if it will not furnish a stage on which to act the Major Small romance—where Putnam saves Small's life—all that need be said is, that it is time to ignoresomeof the romance that has accumulated about the battle of Bunker Hill.
In all this, General Putnam acted as a general officer would have acted. He gave orders, undoubtedly, not only to the Connecticut officers and troops, over whom he had a specific command, but to others over whom he had no special command. If it be true that even in an army of allies the oldest or highest officer ranks, still it is also true there must be the requisite discipline, regularity and subordination, to allow this principle to operate, and that the officer who appears on a field of battle to take the command from an inferior officer, must beordered on by his superior. Such in either particular is not the case here. Every thing was in an irregular, half-organized, transition state, and there is no more evidence that Ward ordered Putnam on than that he ordered Pomeroy (his senior) or Warren on. Besides: he was neither the highest nor oldest allied officer, for Whitcomb, Warren, and Pomeroy ranked him. Indeed it has been stated, by those defending Putnam, that Ward could not order him on. Thus Hon. John Lowell remarks: "It is certainly true that there could not in the nature of the case have been any authorized commander." General Putnam might give orders, even accompany them with threats, and yet not be detached to supercede Prescott. In so trying a scene, an officer so popular on being seen in the field, would naturally be looked up to for advice and applied to for orders. A case in point is that of Arnold at Saratoga. He was only not ordered by Gates on to the field, but was actually under arrest, yet seeing the necessity of prompt and decisive action, he galloped about, giving orders, leading on the troops, and was obeyed as though he were ordered on. So with General Putnam during the Bunker Hill battle. He rode about from place to place, cheering all with whom he came in contact, "aiding and encouraging where the case required." Some of the officers and troops not under his immediate commandrespected his authority, while others refused to obey him. Some of the Connecticut forces whom he ordered to the field, did a brilliant service, and indeed no service was more brilliant; but some of the Massachusetts forces, whom he labored hard to get into the battle, behaved badly. Indeed in the afternoon, during the battle, and in the rear of Bunker Hill, there was great confusion, as Captain Chester's excellent and life-like letter (July 12, 1775) firmly establishes. That Gen. Putnam was not successful in getting these backward troops into action, in sheer justice, ought to be ascribed neither to his lack of energy nor of conduct, but to the hesitancy of inexperienced troops, to the want of spirit in some of their officers, and to the general lack of discipline and subordination in the army. General Putnam was not blamed for this at the time, but on the contrary, his services as an officer throughout the siege are spoken of in letters in terms of lively approbation. Indeed among all the documents of the time—I mean those I have seen—in print or in manuscript, there is not a disparaging remark on his services this day; and none occur until the unjust comments made by General Wilkinson in his memoirs, printed in 1816. Still, to represent that the detachment sent to Bunker Hill was under his command, and that Colonel Prescott acted under his orders, is to contradict the most positive evidence and violate the integrity of history.
William Prescott was one of the French war veterans. He served as a lieutenant of a company under General Winslow at the capture of Cape Breton, and so decided was the military talent he displayed, that he attracted the particular notice of the British commander-in-chief, who urged him to accept a commission of a lieutenancy in the regular army. This he declined, as he was unwilling to adopt a military profession and leave his native country. He was born in Groton, but he lived in that part of it which was set off, and became Pepperell. Here he took a prominent part in the questions that arose between the colonies and the mother country, and on the popular side. He represented Pepperell in the celebrated convention of committees held in Boston in 1768, in the convention of Middlesex county Aug. 30, 1774, when the boldest measures were determined upon, and in the provincial congress of October. He is called on the records of this congress Captain William Prescott. He was not a member at the time of the battle. He had been also chairman of the Pepperell committee of safety. He was chosen colonel of the minute men, when they organized agreeably to the advice of the provincial congress, and it was in this capacity that, on the "Lexington Alarm," he hastened at the head of his men to Cambridge, and acted as one of the members of the first council of war. To him were assigned some of the earliest duties of the campaign. On the 27th of May he received a colonel's commission in "the Massachusetts army," being then about fifty years of age.
Among the Massachusetts colonels there was, at that time, no one moredistinguished, both in the civil and military line, than Colonel Prescott. And when the resolution to occupy Bunker Hill, so unanimously advised by the Massachusetts committee of safety, was so suddenly taken by the council of war, the selection of an officer to perform this service could not have fallen upon a patriot of greater decision of character, or a soldier of more dauntless resolution. His established reputation furnishes a sufficient reason for his being selected for so dangerous and trying a duty. Though in the afternoon of June 16, his regiment, with Frye's and Bridge's, was required to parade at six o'clock, yet it was not until evening that he received orders in writing to take the command of a detachment. He received them directly from General Ward. They required him to proceed, at the head of his detachment, to Bunker Hill, and there erect such fortifications as he and Colonel Gridley—the chief engineer of the Massachusetts army—should judge proper for its defence; and he was instructed not to communicate his orders until after he had passed Charlestown Neck. Thus he was regularly detached for a special service, and as such marched at the head of his troops. "General Putnam"—so Judge Prescott expressly states from information from his father—"did not head the detachment from Cambridge to Bunker Hill,nor march with it." It was under the entire command of Colonel Prescott.
In all the evidence, it is only twice that Colonel Prescott, up to about the time of the attack, appears in consultation with general officers: once in the night, in reference to the place to be fortified, and once just before the enemy made his first landing, in reference to the removal of the entrenching tools. It may be well to look at both these cases.
When Colonel Prescott, in the evening of June 16th, arrived at Charlestown Neck, he halted, and sent a small party, under Captain Nutting, to the lower part of the town, to serve as a guard. He soon marched over to Bunker Hill, and again halted. It was here, probably, that he communicated his orders to his officers, and held a consultation as to the place to be fortified. Other officers, who did not march with the detachment, were present, and took part in the discussion. Samuel Gray (Letter July 12, 1775,) gives the best account of what took place. He states that "the engineer and two generals went on to the hill at night, and reconnoitred the ground; that one general and the engineer were of opinion we ought not to entrench on Charlestown Hill (Breed's Hill) till we had thrown up some works on the north and south ends of Bunker Hill, to cover our men in their retreat, if that should happen; but on the pressing importunity of the other general officer it was consented to begin as was done." One of these generals was General Putnam. There is no data to determine who the other was, but rather from the estimation which Gen. Whitcomb's character was held, his recent appointment as major general, and the fact he was on active duty, than from anything else, it may be inferredthat he was the general. No account states that Colonel Prescott here received an order; but Judge Prescott does say that the responsibility of the decision rested with him. When the troops got to the spot, so Prescott states, "the lines were drawn by the engineer." After the men were at labor General Putnam, and probably the other general, returned to Cambridge.
The other instance, which was before the British landed, occurred between eleven and twelve o'clock in the forenoon. The men had mostly ceased to labor on the entrenchments, and the entrenching tools had been piled in the rear of them. General Putnam rode on horseback to the redoubt, and consulted Colonel Prescott relative to beginning works on Bunker Hill; he also remarked to the colonel that the entrenching tools ought to be sent off or they might be lost. General Heath first relates this circumstance, and he is supported by the depositions of several soldiers. Col. Prescott replied that if he (Prescott) sent any of the men away not one of them would return. To this Putnam replied, "they shall every man return." "A large party," Heath says, "was then sent off with the tools, and not one of them returned. In this instance the colonel was the best judge of human nature." No order was given to Colonel Prescott, and the collision of opinion was merely as to whether the men would return to the redoubt. It is probable, by the way, that this affair of the tools is the kernel of truth there is in the stories told of Putnam's riding off the field with parcels of "pickaxes," "spades," "tents," or "tent-poles," on his horse. As though an officer with his reins in one hand and his sword in the other, would or could have, in the thick fight of such a retreat as that of Bunker Hill, such gear about him. These stories are neither consistent with a general's duty nor with a coward's fear.
Such are the only two occasions where mention is made of any thing done when Colonel Prescott, up to about the hour of the attack, was in consultation with general officers. It is, however, now admitted, that he was the commander during the night of June 16th, and until the next day about two o'clock in the afternoon. He detached guards to the shores, convened his officers in council, applied directly to General Ward for reinforcements, and no general officer gave him an order. It is at the precise time when Generals Warren, Pomeroy and Putnam came on to the field that the command is said to have changed. But no authority states that General Wardordered on one of these generals to supercede Prescott; and that their volunteer presence, so far as thefactis concerned, changed the command, is expressly denied by contemporary testimony. Besides, it is thoroughly refuted by Colonel Prescott's admirable letter giving an account of the action. This letter throws great light on the battle; for it specifies, for the first time, important dispositions that were made, and important orders that were given, and who gave them. Itindicates any thing rather than a change of command at this precise time. If this letter is characterised by directness and modesty, it has also a soldier's frankness.
But there may be said to have been, in the action, a divided command. Colonel Prescott's letter, in connection with another contemporary letter (July 22, 1775,) of almost equal interest and authority, written by Captain John Chester, an accomplished Connecticut officer in the battle, clearly shows this; and, in fact, it is only necessary to put together a few passages from these two letters, which have so long lain in manuscript, to show minutely how it originated. At the time the British first landed, between one and two o'clock, there had beenbut one position taken, (the small parties stationed in Charlestown, and, possibly, slight works just began on Bunker Hill, excepted)—namely, that of the first entrenchments, close together, on Breed's Hill. Here were the Massachusetts troops and the two hundred Connecticut men,—the New Hampshire forces not having arrived. The enemy, on landing at Moulton's Point, immediately formed in three solid columns; but soon there were indications that he intended to surround the redoubt. It might have been as General Howe, with a party, reconnoitered the entrenchments, or on the appearance of a flanking party. Colonel Prescott saw the necessity of a counteracting movement. But let the two letters tell the story. Chester says: "They (the British) were very near Mystic River, and, by their movements, had determined to outflank our men and surround them and their fort. But our officers in command, soon perceiving their intention, ordered a large party of men (chiefly Connecticut) to leave the fort, and march down and oppose the enemy's right wing." That is, the enemy appeared determined to move his right wing along the shore of Mystic River and surround the fort, and this "large party" was detached to take a position to prevent him. Now Prescott says: "I ordered the train, with two field pieces, to go and oppose them (the British) and the Connecticut forces to support them." The train did not do the required service, but it was otherwise with the Connecticut forces. Chester adds: "This they did, and had time to form somewhat regularly behind a fence half of stone and two rails of wood. Here nature had formed something of a breastwork, or else there had been a ditch many years agone. They grounded arms, and went to a neighboring parallel fence and brought rails, and made a slight fortification against musket ball." Now Samuel Gray, (July 12, 1775,) states that this party was under the command of Captain Thomas Knowlton. Here, then, is a clear, circumstantial and authentic contemporary account, which cannot be set aside.It was Colonel Prescott, not General Putnam, who gave the important order for Captain Knowlton to leave the fort and "oppose the enemy's right wing," which occasioned the construction of the rail fence breastwork that ran down to Mystic River; andto this gallant and noble soldier, of keen military eye, who had admirable discretion as well as marked bravery, belongs the honor of beginning this celebrated defence. In a short time after it had been commenced, and while his men were thus occupied, Colonel Stark, and, closely following him, Colonel Reed, each at the head of a New Hampshire regiment, came on, took position here, and went on extending this work. General Putnam also came here, and what more like him than that, as the companies were falling into line, and the British were slowly marching to the attack, he should ride about, and speak cheering words, and give them orders, and tell them how to place the rails, and exclaim, "Man the rail fence, for the enemy is flanking on us fast!" "Men, you are all marksmen; don't any of you fire until you see the white of their eyes." Such facts are stated by several of the soldiers in their depositions. Indeed the evidence, with few exceptions, will agree well in fixing Putnam, on the first attack, at the rail fence. This attack was made about half past three.
In this way, there had beentwo positionstaken, when the British made their assault, the last one—the rail fence—being at the base of Bunker Hill, some six hundred feet in the rear of the first one at Breed's Hill; the diagonal line between the two being but slightly protected, if protected at all. It was General Howe's plan first to turn this last position, "to penetrate" the rail fence by his light infantry, surround the fort, and cut off a retreat. Lieut. Page's plan of the battle, which has been accurately engraved for the Siege of Boston, by far the best plan, (so correct that its ground work finely agrees with Felton & Parker's excellent plan of Charlestown, taken in 1848,) has named on it the order in which it was intended the British troops should advance upon the redoubt, after this part of the defence had been forced. "But," says a British letter, July 5, 1775, "how could we penetrate? Most of our grenadiers and light infantry, the moment of presenting themselves, lost three fourths, and many nine-tenths of their men; some had only eight and nine men a company left; some only three, four, five." Another British letter says it "was found to be the strongest post ever occupied by any set of men." The noble service done here is universally acknowledged. General Putnam was here during the first attack, but after it he rode to the rear to urge on the reinforcements. Pomeroy, Stark, Reed, McClary and Knowlton, however, remained here during the battle, and towards the close they were joined by others. This brave band did not retreat until the main body under Prescott was obliged to leave the hill. Where all behaved so gallantly, it is delicate to name the most active officer. After Putnam left, Colonel Stark was the senior officer, who had a special command. But there was little military order, or general command here. Hence Colonel Stark, his son Major Stark, General Dearborn, and others, were in the habit of stating that there was no generalcommand, and even no efficient command at all, but that every one fought pretty much on his own hook.
But Colonel Prescott did not go to the rail fence. His letter clearly warrants the inference that, after he ordered Captain Knowlton out of the fort, he had no intercourse with him or with the forces that took position there. Of Knowlton's party he says, they went "I suppose to Bunker Hill." (The rail fence was at the base of this hill.) Of the New Hampshire troops he says—"There was a party of Hampshire, in conjunction with some other forces, lined a fence at a distance of threescore rods back of the fort, partly to the north." The committee of safety account also indicates that this was a separate party. Other authorities are to the same point. Wilkinson, for instance, states that there was no concert or coöperation between the party at the fence and the main position at the redoubt. Pomeroy, Putnam, Stark, Knowlton, and other officers, named as being at the fence, are not named as being, during the battle, in the redoubt. But Colonel Prescott remained at the original entrenchments. Soon after he detached Captain Knowlton to the important duty assigned to him, he detached the lieutenant colonel and major of his own regiment for other duty. He says—"I commanded my Lieut. Col. Robinson and Major Woods, each with a detachment, to flank the enemy, who, I have reason to think, behaved with prudence and courage." The depositions of the soldiers are too confused to admit of a satisfactory detail of the movements of these two parties. The service performed by the brave Captain Walker, of Chelmsford, so far from being a reckless volunteer dash, was probably done by Prescott's order, and under one of those higher officers. The letter of Prescott mentions other particulars, indicating independent command, and states that he kept "the fort about one hour and twenty minutes after the attack with small arms." He then gave the order to retreat. The first position was the important post of the day, the main object of the enemy; and here Prescott remained certainly the regular, responsible, authorized commander—"the proper commanding officer," Heath writes, "during the whole action." Dr Eliot, I think, of all the contemporary authorities who name the officers, observes this distinction between the two positions. He says—"Colonel Prescott commanded the party within the lines, and Colonel Stark the men who were without, behind a rail fence."