Our Volunteers.
The French nation has indisputably the most warlike propensities of any in the world. Other countries make warlike preparations in self-defence, for the maintenance of their own rights and possessions, and to prevent any other power, or combination of powers, obtaining a position menacing to their safety, or injurious to their liberties. Their governments, when there are valid grounds for alarm, instil these apprehensions into the minds of the people, who are soon roused to meet the threatened danger. But the unremitting pursuit of the French nation is military glory: no government of that country can exist without ministering to it. France is now armed to the teeth, and ready to do battle for any cause—even “for an idea.”
England is the nation which, perhaps sooner than any other, may be called upon to check her in the indulgence of this propensity; and this country also offers more points against which aggressive operations can be carried out. Hence it is natural that the preparations of France should be made chiefly with reference to a contest with Great Britain; and these preparations have now arrived at such formidable proportions that it would be infatuation in us to neglect the means of resistance.
The strongest evidence in support of this hypothesis is to be found in the fact that the most extraordinary preparations which have been gradually but rapidly made by the French Government, at a vast expense—namely, its naval and coast armaments—can be directed against no other power but England. It does not necessarily follow that any aggressive measures are positively contemplated; but it is not the less essential for us to maintain a corresponding force, available not only against invasion, should it be attempted, but strong enough to protect our commerce by securing the freedom of the seas, and thus preventing this country from being reduced to a subordinate power.
British statesmen know and declare, and the nation feels, that it is essential to the maintenance of our possessions, our commerce, and our influence, that we should have a preponderating naval force. Other governments may demur to this, and may even be disposed to dispute the point, as France appears to be now preparing to do. It then becomes a question of national power and resources. This is an unfortunate alternative, but it is one which will not admit of compromise or arbitration:weconsider an absolute superiority on the seas essential to the safety of our shores, the prosperity of our commerce, and the security of our colonies;theymanifest a determination to contest our maritime supremacy, and to create a force which shall give them even a preponderating influence.
Let us put the case in what may be deemed the legitimate view, repudiating altogether any feeling of national animosity or prejudice. Whatevermay be the result of the impending struggle for naval superiority—which does not altogether depend upon numerical force, but may be greatly influenced by the proficiency of either side in employing the newly-invented implements and modes of warfare—it must be conceded that we cannot expect our superiority will be so absolute as to enable us to trust entirely to our “wooden walls,” or to defensive armaments afloat: we must have an ample array of land forces to protect our homes, if menaced by the vast armies of France, which are constantly maintained in a state of full equipment and readiness.
Large armaments maintained during times of peace are repugnant to the feelings and good sense of the English nation; and yet if other nations, less strongly animated by industrial impulses and the principles of political economy, will accumulate immense powers of aggression, we must, in self-defence, maintain efficient means of resisting them. Patriotic feeling and high spirit in the population, even though aided by abundance of arms and ammunition, will not now, as in olden times, suffice. Soldiership is become a scientific profession; and an apprenticeship to the art of war, with skill and experience in every branch of it, are absolutely necessary to oppose with success a well-trained and disciplined force.
Our difficulties in the way of self-preservation are materially increased by the nature of our institutions and our feelings of personal independence. All other great nations in Europe have a power of compulsory enlistment; we have not: if we had, our standing forces for army and navy might be more moderate,—if we only retained efficacious means of rapid organization and equipment. According to our system, however, it is so long before we can procure the necessary number of men for the war establishment, that our only safety must consist in a much greater amount of permanent forces. In short, our purse must pay for our pride.
The volunteer system, however, tends, in some degree, to remedy this disadvantage, and will become more and more valuable in proportion as it shall conform itself gradually to such arrangements as will make our volunteers efficient for acting with our regular forces.
The first and prevalent idea from which the volunteer system sprang was of alevée en masse; that every man animated by British pluck and spirit (and they would number hundreds of thousands) should be well practised in the use of the rifle, and, in case of invasion, should turn out to oppose the enemy, to line the hedges, hang upon the flank and rear of the invading force, and cut it to pieces.
That our volunteers, who have nobly come forward spontaneously, without any prompting from government, would be ready to devote their lives, as they are devoting their time and energies, to the defence of their country against invasion, no one who appreciates the English character will doubt; but that such a heterogeneous body of men, if opposed to a highly-trained and disciplined force of veteran soldiers, would be able to repel the attack of an army, is now generally admitted to be a fallacy; and it would be doing injustice to the intelligence and good sense of Englishmen to blinkthe truth, which must be obvious to every soldier who has had experience of actual warfare.
Bodies of civilians, however courageous and well drilled, would be ill calculated to bear the hardships and fatigues of a soldier’s life; nor could they be relied upon, even as a matter of numbers: a rainy night or two in the open fields, and occasional short supplies of food, would thin their ranks prodigiously. It cannot be supposed that men of any class or nation, however brave, suddenly leaving comfortable homes and in-door pursuits, could endure that exposure and privation which is required of soldiers—men selected for their hardy constitutions and well-knit frames, and trained to implicit obedience, and habituated to act together. Composed of men of different descriptions and habits, without military discipline and organization, they would be wanting in cohesion and unity of action; or if each man or small party acted on individual impulse, their efforts would be unavailing to arrest the progress of an army advancing in solid masses, like some vast and complex machine animated by life and motion. Panics would be rife amongst them, and but few of the bravest even would stand when they heard the action gaining on their flanks and rear. Moreover, no general would know how to deal with numbers of them under his command, for fear of his dispositions being deranged by their proceedings; nor could any commissariat or other department be prepared to provide for so uncertain and fluctuating a body.
A confidence in the efficiency of an armed population to resist the invasion of their country by regular armies has been created by reference to history; and the examples of the United States, of the Tyrol, of Spain, and others, have been triumphantly quoted; but an investigation into the circumstances of each case will show how greatly they all differ from such circumstances as would attend an attack upon England. In the cases cited, either the country was wild and mountainous, without communications and resources, the invading army small, or the contest greatly prolonged: rarely, if ever, has the invader been thoroughly checkedin his first progress; but when forced to break into detachments and to act in small bodies, he has, by a spirited and energetic population, been harassed beyond his strength, and thuseventuallyforced to abandon the attempt.
It being evident, then, that a mere rising in mass of the population would be unavailing, and even mischievous, leading to a lamentable waste of life, and encouraging the invaders in proportion as the defenders were discomfited, we have now to consider the best means of utilizing the present volunteer movement, which assumes for its basis some degree of organization and training.
Government prudently abstained from any interference with the movement, or from involving itself in any undertaking to organize the volunteers; for that would have led, not only to great and indefinite expenses, but to the abstracting of available resources from the established forces of the country, and also to other inconveniences, without, as yet, any reliable and adequate advantages in prospect. The movement being thus left to its ownimpulses, a large number of gentlemen, and others in sufficiently easy circumstances, determined to enrol themselves, in different localities, into self-supporting corps of riflemen. Their determination was most spirited and praiseworthy, and government, without pledging itself to any fixed or great amount of support, now affords, in many ways, aid and direction to the movement, without too minute an interference in its essentially voluntary arrangements.
Thus we have already many thousands of stout hearts, constituting animpromptuarmed force, at little cost to government, advancing in organization and exercises, having arms and accoutrements, and above all, making preparation for thoroughly practising with the rifle—their strongest desire being to become first-rate shots. Here is a mass of most superb material; but we would earnestly impress upon the volunteers, and upon the country, not to rely too much upon stout hearts and good shots: much else is needful. It is quite a mistake to suppose that mere perfection in firing at a mark will make a good rifleman for the field. Volunteers, to be efficient in action, must form a component part of an army. Every part of an army in the field must be well in hand of the generals in command—light infantry and riflemen must be equal to all movements, in compact as well as dispersed order, and in the several combinations of the two. By this alone will they be really formidable, and by this alone will they acquire a confidence and steadiness which mere innate courage can never give.
In order to act as riflemen and light infantry conjointly with regular troops, volunteers will require the highest possible training as soldiers. Ordinary infantry are put together and kept together, and—unlike those who must act more independently and with greater skill—are always under the eye and hand of the officer who directs the movement. In the confusion of action, and amidst inequalities of ground and varying circumstances, light troops are very much at a loss, until, by practice, they acquire a steadiness which is the result of a thorough knowledge of the business and of active exercise in it. By the term “acting as light infantry and riflemen” is not meant a system of irregular or guerilla warfare, for which it may be readily conceived that a volunteer force of citizens is entirely unfit.
It is to be hoped that our volunteers will not listen to their flatterers who would persuade them that they will make efficient irregulars. No one who considers the composition of these bodies, and the habits and pursuits of the classes from which they spring, can seriously suppose that they would make anything of the kind. Neither the nature of this country, nor the occupations of its inhabitants, are favourable for an irregular system of warfare; nor would the rapid field operations consequent upon an invasion afford much opportunity for bringing irregular forces into play, even if we possessed the best in the world.
In opposition to these views, it will be said that the universal employment of the rifle has effected a revolution in warfare, and that our riflemen, sheltered at a distance behind hedges and trees, would annihilate the enemy’sartillery and paralyze his operations. To this it may be answered that the enemy will employ riflemen for the same purpose, who will cover his artillery and produce an equal effect upon our own; that new systems of warfare are met with new systems of tactics, and that the advantage is always left with the highest-trained troops. In whatever order numbers of men may be brought into action, success will always attend that party which,cæteris paribus, brings the greatest number to bear upon a given point; and this can be effected only by the organization and discipline of regular troops.
Let us hope, then, that the volunteers will earnestly practise those more complicated exercises which render light infantry the highest-trained body in an army. For this purpose they should, after being pretty well grounded in their business, give themselves up for a few weeks’ consecutive service at one of the great camps; this would give them a much better insight into the nature of the service, by which men of their intelligence would greatly profit. It is probable that many individuals in each corps would not be able to attend for such a long period; still, if there were a large party present, a tone of information on the real duties of a campaign would be instilled into the body as a whole, which would be most serviceable.
Another advantage which would attend this occasional service of the volunteers at the camps would consist in their gradually habituating themselves to long marches, and to carrying a knapsack; both of which are matters of deep importance for rendering efficient service in the field: for, as Marshal Saxe truly remarks, the success of an army depends more upon the judicious use made of the legs than of the arms of the soldiers.
Apprehensions have been entertained that our volunteers, composed, as they will be, of men accustomed to the comforts and conveniences of life, would, however animated by daring for fight, be disgusted not merely with the hardships, but (as compared with their usual habits) the indignities of a common soldier’s life, such as the hard fare, the necessary but menial occupations of cooking, the care and cleaning of their clothes and arms, and the discomfort of being huddled together in masses in tents, or houses, if they have the good fortune to obtain either. But they will, it is to be hoped, have well considered that such disagreeables are inevitable, and have made up their minds to bear with what will be, probably, the hardest task for them; considering, also, that it would hardly be for any long duration. They will recollect that on many parts of the Continent, young men of the easiest circumstances, and of rank and station in society, serve an apprenticeship in the regular army as privates, and submit to many of the discomforts of a private soldier’s life, even without the excitement of a state of warfare. There is more danger of the volunteers failing through want of physical hardihood to endure the fatigue of long marches, exposure to the weather, and the casualties of service in the field; and, therefore, preparatory service in a camp would be needful, not only to make them good soldiers, but to test their powers of endurance: for it should be borne inmind that a robust frame and strong constitution are essential to the efficiency of the soldier; and wanting these physical requisites, the best shot would soon become incapacitated, and consequently an incumbrance to the service.
In some districts, the subscriptions raised for the general expenses of the volunteer corps are allowed to extend to aid the equipment of men of insufficient means to provide for themselves. This will have a most beneficial effect; for such men will mostly be of a hardy class and accustomed to muscular activity or out-door occupations; they will be selected because they possess the proper qualifications; and many of them subsequently, with all their military acquirements, may join the established army. In proportion as this system shall be extended, will the advantages resulting from the volunteer system be increased.
Another very beneficial effect might be produced—and will probably arise out of the spirit of the rifle corps—in the establishment of rifle clubs for the practice of rifle-shooting as a recreation, with other out-door sports and games; more especially if these can be encouraged, so as to become general among that class of young men from which recruits are obtained for the army. Whatever may have been said against too much faith being placed in good marksmen, as theonlyessential attribute for our defenders, most indisputably that army which, equally well regulated in other points, shall be much superior generally in the art of rifle-shooting, will have an enormous advantage over its opponent; and even in a greater degree than is usually supposed.
There is one class of volunteers, the formation of which will be attended with unexceptionable advantages; and that is localized bodies on the coast for service near their own homes. These may be either artillery or infantry, or better still, both combined: that is, infantry accustomed to exercise in the service of guns in battery. They will be always at their homes, and at their habitual occupations, till the period of action shall arrive; and a very few hours of occasional evening exercise will be sufficient, particularly during peace time, to afford a basis of organization for bodies which may be then rapidly made very efficient during war. As their service will be chiefly in batteries, or in fortified posts—or if in the open field, only in greatly superior numbers, and within confined limits, to oppose desultory landings—they will not need the field equipment, nor that refined knowledge and practice so necessary in every part of an army in a campaign. Their dress may be of a plain description, such as an artisan’s or gamekeeper’s jacket, and a foraging cap, which, though of some uniform pattern, may be suitable for ordinary wear. By such means, our coasts may be powerfully protected from any but very formidable efforts against them, at the smallest expense and waste of resources; and at the same time, these bodies will supply the place of regular troops, for which they will form an efficient substitute.
In advocating the expediency of rendering the volunteer system attractive among the labouring classes, as, generally speaking, the most robustand hardy portion of the population, we must not be considered as implying any doubt of their thorough good feeling in the cause; it is absolutely necessary to stimulate, by some substantial recompence or boon, the exertions of those who are living, as it were, from hand to mouth, and on the smallest means. The inducement may be very moderate; still it should be such as to make the service in some degree popular and advantageous, and cause men who may be rejected or discharged to feel it as a punishment or misfortune.
Whatever may be said in the way of general considerations affecting the volunteer system, will admit of exceptions. Thus many of the difficulties in the way of the efficiency of volunteer corps for service in the field will be greatly lessened in the case of those which may be chiefly composed of young men of active habits, and not yet settled in life: such as university corps, who would, without doubt, display a degree of hardihood, spirit, and intelligence not to be surpassed by any troops. And so with regard to the local bodies. Such corps as the dockyard volunteers, at all those great establishments, public and private, should be replaced on an improved system;—a system which should avoid expense and encroachment on a valuable part of their time, which were the failings of their original organization, and occasioned their being broken up.
The noble spirit which originated the volunteer movement is one of which the nation may justly feel proud; it exhibits and fosters a patriotic and military spirit in the country, which will render us more fit than any other people to cope with a powerful enemy. The moral effect of this national movement will influence other countries; it will dissipate the erroneous idea that the English are only a trading, and not a warlike people, and make them more cautious of attacking us.
In actual service, the volunteers will be valuable behind works; thus releasing a corresponding number of the regular troops from garrison service: but it cannot be too strongly impressed upon them, that unless they will submit to the necessary training as soldiers, and are complete in organization as infantry, no general in the world will have any confidence in them as a field force. The occasional embodiment of our volunteers at some of the great camps, as before recommended, would appear the most available means of training them for general service. It would also have another good effect, by demonstrating to many who are now carried away by their enthusiasm, how far they may be really calculated or prepared for the necessary trials and sacrifices incidental upon taking the field in the emergency. It will then be perceived by many that their age, want of physical stamina, or inability to dispense with habitual comforts which may be absolutely necessary to them, would render them totally unequal to the task they would willingly undertake. It would be far better that these should be weeded from the field corps of volunteers, and not remain to give a false appearance of their strength for actual service.
Lastly, there may be some who, on reflection, must be aware thatcertain family ties, or private concerns, may imperatively forbid their joining the service at the last moment, and it would be far better that they should withdraw betimes from the engagement. For it should be borne in mind that these bodies arevolunteers, in the strictest sense of the term; their presence or continuance in the field cannot be constrained. The effort to bear all the trials and hardships of a campaign requires a patience and endurance which will yield, even where there is thorough ardour in the cause, and great personal courage, unless supported by physical strength. The Volunteer Corps is a service in which the country must trust entirely to the honour of the individuals composing it; and certainly, those who shall stand the test will be peculiarly entitled to the gratitude of the nation.
But while deprecating the employment in the field of any volunteers who are not hardy and trained soldiers, or who have households to protect and business to attend to, we must not be supposed to recommend the withdrawal from the ranks of all who are not available for actual service with regular troops: far from it. There is not a man who has been drilled as a volunteer but may be serviceable to the community in a variety of ways at home, by supplying the place of regular soldiers in mounting guard as sentries, acting as “orderlies” for transmitting orders between the government officers and head-quarters, as assistants in the hospital service, as extra clerks in the commissariat and other departments, and in serving as a military police. Indeed good service might be rendered to the country by gentlemen of character, ability, and intelligence, sufficientlyau faitto the business of a soldier to execute with military precision and promptitude such duties as would not involve any greater amount of fatigue and exposure than a man of average health and strength could sustain without injury: they would form a bodyguard, composed of fathers of families and the younger and less robust of the volunteers, for the protection of their homes and maintaining the peace of cities and towns; and competent to fill offices of trust in connection with the military and civil authorities. The country would thus derive the full benefit of the services of every volunteer in the kingdom; and no man who had entered the ranks but would have the satisfaction of knowing that he was serving his Queen and Country in the most effective way.