FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[28]Snow lay on the ground in the Baalbek-Rayak area for a considerable part of the winter, and on the western side of the Lebanon, in the Beirût-Tripoli area, for short periods from time to time.[29]Brigadier-General P.J.V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O., commanded 5th Mounted Brigade in 1917 operations and 13th Cavalry Brigade in 1918.[30]See p. 94.

[28]Snow lay on the ground in the Baalbek-Rayak area for a considerable part of the winter, and on the western side of the Lebanon, in the Beirût-Tripoli area, for short periods from time to time.

[29]Brigadier-General P.J.V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O., commanded 5th Mounted Brigade in 1917 operations and 13th Cavalry Brigade in 1918.

[30]See p. 94.

CHAPTER XXVI

TRANSPORT AND AMMUNITION SUPPLY

Theadvance to Damascus and Aleppo in September and October 1918 proved with what a small amount of transport cavalry can operate, when local supplies are available. As already explained, during this advance no transport accompanied the divisions, except ammunition wagons and a few motor ambulance cars.

The opportunities for cavalry making a raid such a great distance into enemy country have seldom occurred in the past, and are likely to become even more rare in the future. When they do occur, however, the experience of this campaign points to the conclusion that there can be few countries in which cavalry can operate as such effectively, where they would not be able to dispense almost entirely with transport. The fact that mounted troops can move freely, denotes that the country is not excessively mountainous, and is, therefore (excluding desert land), more or less cultivated, thus providing food for man and horse. It must be remembered that much of the country through which the cavalry passed between the 25th of September and the 28th of October is poorly cultivated, and all of it had been mercilessly laid under requisition by the Turks and Germans for the supply of their armies. Yet it was found possible to secure food and forage for three cavalry divisions, a total of nearly 20,000 men anda similar number of horses, without extreme difficulty, and without in any way depriving the inhabitants of essential food.

If, however, the country through which it is proposed to advance is incapable of supporting the force, sufficient transport must be taken to carry supplies for such a number of days as may be requisite. The pace of the cavalry will then be, to a great extent, limited by the pace of their transport, and for this reason every effort should be made to increase the mobility of cavalry transport vehicles.

Vehicles.—At the beginning of the 1917 operations the cavalry ammunition columns and supply trains were equipped partly with G.S. and partly with limbered G.S. wagons. During the subsequent operations, both at the beginning, when movement took place over a sandy or dusty plain, and later on, when the whole country was a sea of mud, and vast areas were under water, the G.S. wagons were constantly in trouble. The experience of the whole campaign was overwhelmingly in favour of the L.G.S. wagon. The sole advantage of the G.S. wagon lies in its greater capacity for carrying bulky loads. For this reason it is very suitable for use in barracks or standing camps, where such stuff as hay, straw, etc., have to be carried. As regards weight, however, the L.G.S. wagon holds its own against the G.S. on roads, and is superior in roadless or hilly country. That is to say, the L.G.S. wagon, with two men and four horses, can, in such country, carry more than two-thirds of the load possible for the G.S. wagon, with its three drivers and six horses. Further, the lower centre of gravity, four large wheels and much greater lock angle of the former, enables it to cross country over which the latter cannot move at all. One advantage claimed for the G.S. type is that the wagon bodyis supposed to be capable of being used as a pontoon. The writer has tried it as such, in peace time, and his experience has decided him that he would rather swim.

The above remarks are, of course, to be taken as applying to cavalry transport only.

There is one weakness in the L.G.S. wagon which is commended to the notice of the Royal Ordnance Corps. The bolt which fastens the wagon body on to the carriage passes through the axle. Towards the end of the campaign, after several years' hard and continuous work, a number of these axles began to break, and always at the place where the bolt passed through them. It is suggested that, in future manufacture, the fastening might consist of a steel collar over the axle, instead of a bolt through it.

Horses.—The remarks on type, which have been made with regard to the cavalry riding horse, apply with equal force to the cavalry draught horse. Many of our English draught animals were of far too heavy a type, either for horse artillery or for cavalry transport. It is sometimes argued that a proportion of heavy horses is very useful when wagons begin to get stuck in boggy places. But it is not much use having these equine Samsons at all, if they are not available at the time their services are required. And this is what invariably happens. Nothing in the nature of a cart horse can live with cavalry in a march of forty miles, and, in this campaign, there was one of over ninety miles on end, and marches of forty, fifty and sixty miles were comparatively common. If heavy horses are forced to keep up with cavalry over such distances, they very soon give up the unequal fight and die; if they are allowed to go their own pace, they are a day's march in rearat the end of twenty-four hours, and the transport thus requires an escort of a size that can ill be spared from the fighting forces.

Another advantage of having a lighter-built, better-bred type of horse for transport, is that they then form a reserve for the cavalry. In the artillery it is the rule for riding and draught horses to change places frequently, thus resting both kinds in turn. This custom might profitably be employed occasionally in the cavalry.

The Australians have an admirable type of cavalry draught horse: 15 to 15.2 hands high, short-backed, well-coupled, and showing a good deal of breeding. The disappearance from our English roads first of the coaches and then of the horse-drawn buses, has deprived us almost entirely of our once fine type of light draught horse, and it seems as if we shall, in the future, have to depend more and more on the Dominions for our supply of such horses. There were a certain number of Canadian horses in the Corps transport. They were hard and sound, but of a coarser type, with heavier shoulders and less handy than those from Australia.

Other transport animals.—At different times, camels, mules, and donkeys were used by the cavalry for transport purposes. The first named are, of course, entirely unsuitable, except for work in the desert, but, as we had some 30,000 of them in our possession in 1917, a legacy from Sinai, and there was a shortage of other transport, they were largely used during the 1917 operations. No attempt was made to keep up, or even near, the cavalry on the march, but the camels worked in a system of convoys along defined routes, forming dumps behind the advancing line of cavalry, from which the divisional trains drew supplies. The uselessness and danger of camels inmountainous country was convincingly demonstrated in the mountains of Judæa and in the two trans-Jordan raids, and, after the second of these, the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade was disbanded, and the cavalry saw no more of the patient but unlovable beasts that had worked for them for more than two years.

Mules were in use in the transport to a certain extent all through the campaign, but the experience of the 1917 operations led to their being replaced by horses in all transport that was required to keep up with the cavalry. Their hardihood, soundness, and remarkable freedom from disease, no less than their patience and docility, render them admirable for infantry transport, and even, possibly, for field artillery, but they suffer from the serious disability, from the cavalry or horse artillery point of view, that they cannot go the pace. Left to themselves, they can march indefinitely, but, if pushed along faster than their natural gait, they rapidly lose condition, and soon become so debilitated as to be well-nigh useless. As this natural pace is slower than that of horses, they must always be pushed when acting with cavalry, and this fact renders them unsuitable for use with mounted troops.

Donkeys were first used in supply convoys in the Judæan Hills in the winter of 1917, some 400 being sent up from Egypt for this purpose. They did most excellent work, supplying the troops in the line at a time when there were no roads available. They are admirably adapted for such special work, being small, hardy, and easily handled, and requiring no attention. For any other purpose they are, of course, not to be seriously considered. Owing to the chronic shortage of horses in the country, those details of regiments who did not usually accompanytheir units into action were, in 1917, given donkeys to ride. There were about half a dozen in each cavalry regiment or similar unit. Most of these were gradually exchanged for Arab ponies captured from the enemy, but a few carried on right through the campaign, up to the capture of Aleppo. How they kept up through some of the long marches of1918, carrying a heavy man and all his kit, is a mystery, but they contrived to do so somehow.

map

Ammunition.—Prior to the commencement of the 1917 operations in Palestine, the amount of small arm ammunition laid down to be carried in a cavalry divisional ammunition column was 250,000 rounds per brigade, or 1,000,000 in the column for the four-brigade divisions of that time. This was a ridiculously over-large amount. On the other hand, the amount of gun ammunition was very small. Indeed the divisional column commander who said that he carried in his column three weeks' supply for the small arms and three hours' for the guns, can scarcely be accused of hyperbole.

After the second battle of Gaza, during which the cavalry were engaged all day long dismounted, in a very heavy fire fight, it was found that, after replenishing the regimental reserves, only about one-sixth of the small arm ammunition in the divisional ammunition columns had been issued. The guns, on the other hand, had expended nearly three times the total quantity of ammunition carried in the column.

As a result of this action, the whole question of ammunition supply was considered afresh, and the columns were reorganised with an establishment of 200 rounds of shell per gun, and 120,000 of small arm ammunition per brigade, calculated as to 84,000 rounds for the machine gun squadron and 12,000 rounds for each regiment. These proportions worked satisfactorily, though the gun ammunition might still be somewhat increased, even at the expense of the small arms. The result of the whole series of operations seems to point to the fact that an establishment of 100,000 rounds of small arm ammunition per brigade, or 300,000 per division, and 250 rounds of gun ammunition per gun, or 4500 for a division,would form the best proportion. This would give a total of 442 rounds of shell per gun, carried in the field, not an unduly large amount for a modern, quick-firing gun, when it is remembered that Napoleon considered that the muzzle-loading, slow-firing field pieces of his day should be supplied with not less than 300 rounds apiece.

Loads.—The weights laid down in the 1914 War Establishments to be carried both in G.S. and L.G.S. wagons were found to be only suitable for transport accompanying infantry along well-metalled roads. After the second battle of Gaza, a new load table was drawn up empirically. A series of experiments, carried out just prior to the commencement of the Beersheba operations, demonstrated that even these reduced loads were far too heavy for G.S. wagons in such country. Unfortunately these experiments were ignored, and the G.S. wagons started the operations with the loads as laid down in the new tables. The result was that, during the march from the Shellal area to Khalasa, the G.S. wagons were strewn over twenty miles of country, and some 200 camels had to be requisitioned at short notice from the supply columns to lighten the wagons.

After the fall of Beersheba, the G.S. wagons of the divisional ammunition column were taken over by the Corps, as already narrated, and they took no further part in the operations until they rejoined their respective divisions on the 19th November.

As a result of the 1917 series of operations, the load question was again reviewed, and the following loads were decided upon.

G.S. wagons, 23 boxes of 13-pounder gun ammunition or 26 boxes of small arm ammunition, a total load behind the 6 horses of about 35 cwt.

L.G.S. wagons, 16 boxes of gun or 18 boxes ofsmall arm ammunition, a total load behind the 4 horses of about 24 cwt.

These loads were proved by considerable subsequent experience to be the maximum with which wagons could operate efficiently with cavalry in such country. It is to be remarked that practically no sandy country was encountered after the fall of Beersheba, but the unmetalled tracks along which the transport had to march were, in the winters of 1917 and 1918, often almost impassable owing to the mud.

Before leaving the subject of ammunition supply, attention should be drawn to the vital necessity of cavalry regiments replenishing their regimental reserve of small arm ammunition from the ammunition columnevery day. Obvious as this duty may appear, it is one that is frequently neglected, especially during a time of long marches. It frequently happened that, in spite of repeated applications, the ammunition column commanders could not get indents from the regiments for days at a time. Such delays were often followed by sudden demands for the immediate supply of a large quantity of ammunition, which, perhaps, was not all available at the moment. There ensued mutual recriminations, and much extra work for the tired horses of both the columns and the regimental ammunition wagons, all of which might have been avoided by more forethought and attention to detail.

APPENDIX I

(a)THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS

Whenthe Desert Mounted Corps officially came into being, it was constituted as follows:—

Commander: Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Chauvel, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Australian Imperial Forces.

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION (ANZAC).

Commander: Major-General Sir E.W.C. Chaytor, K.C.M.G., C.B., p.s.c., A.D.C., New Zealand Imperial Forces.

1st Australian Light Horse Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General C.F. Cox, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.I.F.1st, 2nd, and 3rd Regiments Australian Light Horse.

Commander: Brigadier-General C.F. Cox, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.I.F.

1st, 2nd, and 3rd Regiments Australian Light Horse.

2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General G. de L. Ryrie, C.B., C.M.G., A.I.F.5th, 6th, and 7th Regiments Australian Light Horse.

Commander: Brigadier-General G. de L. Ryrie, C.B., C.M.G., A.I.F.

5th, 6th, and 7th Regiments Australian Light Horse.

New Zealand Mounted Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General W. Meldrum, C.M.G., D.S.O., N.Z.I.F.Auckland, Canterbury, and Wellington Regiments of Mounted Rifles.

Commander: Brigadier-General W. Meldrum, C.M.G., D.S.O., N.Z.I.F.

Auckland, Canterbury, and Wellington Regiments of Mounted Rifles.

ARTILLERY.

18th Brigade R.H.A. (Inverness, Ayrshire, and Somerset Batteries) and Divisional Ammunition Column.

YEOMANRY DIVISION.

Commander: Major-General Sir G. de S. Barrow, K.C.M.G., C.B., p.s.c., Indian Army.

6th Mounted Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General C.A.C. Godwin, D.S.O.,I.A. Dorset, Bucks, and Berks Yeomanry Regiments.

Commander: Brigadier-General C.A.C. Godwin, D.S.O.,

I.A. Dorset, Bucks, and Berks Yeomanry Regiments.

8th Mounted Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General C.S. Rome, D.S.O.1st City of London and 1st and 3rd County of London Yeomanry Regiments.

Commander: Brigadier-General C.S. Rome, D.S.O.

1st City of London and 1st and 3rd County of London Yeomanry Regiments.

22nd Mounted Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General F.A.B. Fryer (relinquished command December 1917).Brigadier-General P.D. FitzGerald, D.S.O., p.s.c.Stafford, Lincoln, and East Riding Yeomanry Regiments.

Commander: Brigadier-General F.A.B. Fryer (relinquished command December 1917).

Brigadier-General P.D. FitzGerald, D.S.O., p.s.c.

Stafford, Lincoln, and East Riding Yeomanry Regiments.

ARTILLERY.

20th Brigade R.H.A. (Berks, Hants, and Leicester Batteries) and Divisional Ammunition Column.

AUSTRALIAN MOUNTED DIVISION.

Commander: Major-General Sir H.W. Hodgson, K.C.M.G., C.V.O., C.B.

3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General L.C. Wilson, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.I.F.8th, 9th, and 10th Regiments Australian Light Horse.

Commander: Brigadier-General L.C. Wilson, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.I.F.

8th, 9th, and 10th Regiments Australian Light Horse.

4th Australian Light Horse Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General W. Grant, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.I.F.4th, 11th, and 12th Regiments Australian Light Horse.

Commander: Brigadier-General W. Grant, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.I.F.

4th, 11th, and 12th Regiments Australian Light Horse.

5th Mounted Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General P.D. Fitzgerald, D.S.O., p.s.c. (relinquished command November 1917).Brigadier-General P.J.V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O.

Commander: Brigadier-General P.D. Fitzgerald, D.S.O., p.s.c. (relinquished command November 1917).

Brigadier-General P.J.V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O.

ARTILLERY.

19th Brigade R.H.A. ('A' and 'B' Batteries Honourable Artillery Company, and Notts Battery R.H.A.) and Divisional Ammunition Column.

CORPS RESERVE.

7th Mounted Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General J.T. Wigan, C.M.G., D.S.O., (relinquished command December 1917).Brigadier-General G.V. Clarke, D.S.O.Sherwood Rangers, South Notts and Herts Yeomanry Regiments, with Essex Battery R.H.A., and Brigade Ammunition Column.

Commander: Brigadier-General J.T. Wigan, C.M.G., D.S.O., (relinquished command December 1917).

Brigadier-General G.V. Clarke, D.S.O.

Sherwood Rangers, South Notts and Herts Yeomanry Regiments, with Essex Battery R.H.A., and Brigade Ammunition Column.

Imperial Camel Corps Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General S. Smith, V.C., D.S.O.Two Australian and one British Camel Battalions, with the Hongkong and Singapore Mountain Battery R.G.A.

Commander: Brigadier-General S. Smith, V.C., D.S.O.

Two Australian and one British Camel Battalions, with the Hongkong and Singapore Mountain Battery R.G.A.

After the reorganisation consequent on the despatch of many of the Yeomanry regiments to France, in April and May 1918, and the arrival of Indian Cavalry Regiments from Europe, the Corps was expanded into four divisions as follows:—

4th CAVALRY DIVISION.

Commander: Major-General Sir G. de S. Barrow, K.C.M.G., etc.

10th Cavalry Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General W.G.K. Green, D.S.O., I.A.Dorset Yeomanry, 2nd Lancers, 38th Central India Horse.

Commander: Brigadier-General W.G.K. Green, D.S.O., I.A.

Dorset Yeomanry, 2nd Lancers, 38th Central India Horse.

11th Cavalry Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General C.L. Gregory, C.B., p.s.c., I.A.1st County of London Yeomanry, 29th Lancers, 36th Jacob's Horse.

Commander: Brigadier-General C.L. Gregory, C.B., p.s.c., I.A.

1st County of London Yeomanry, 29th Lancers, 36th Jacob's Horse.

12th Cavalry Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General J.T. Wigan, C.M.G., D.S.O.Stafford Yeomanry, 6th Cavalry, 19th Lancers.

Commander: Brigadier-General J.T. Wigan, C.M.G., D.S.O.

Stafford Yeomanry, 6th Cavalry, 19th Lancers.

ARTILLERY.

20th Brigade R.H.A. and Divisional Ammunition Column.

5th CAVALRY DIVISION.

Commander: Major-General Sir H.J.M. MacAndrew, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., Indian Army.

13th Cavalry Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General P.J.V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O. (relinquished command September 1918).Brigadier-General G.A. Weir, D.S.O.Gloucester Yeomanry, 9th Hodson's Horse, 18th Lancers.

Commander: Brigadier-General P.J.V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O. (relinquished command September 1918).

Brigadier-General G.A. Weir, D.S.O.

Gloucester Yeomanry, 9th Hodson's Horse, 18th Lancers.

14th Cavalry Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General G.V. Clarke, D.S.O.Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry, 20th Deccan Horse, 34th Poona Horse.

Commander: Brigadier-General G.V. Clarke, D.S.O.

Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry, 20th Deccan Horse, 34th Poona Horse.

15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade.Commander: Brigadier-General C.R. Harbord, D.S.O., I.A.Jodhpur, Mysore and 1st Hyderabad Lancers.[31]

15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade.

Commander: Brigadier-General C.R. Harbord, D.S.O., I.A.

Jodhpur, Mysore and 1st Hyderabad Lancers.[31]

ARTILLERY.

'B' Battery H.A.C. and Essex Battery R.H.A., with Divisional Ammunition Column.

The Anzac and the Australian Mounted Divisions remained the same, except that the 5th MountedBrigade was replaced in the latter by the 5th A.L.H. Brigade, which consisted of the 14th and 15th Regiments A.L.H. (composed of men of the Camel Corps Brigade, which had been disbanded after the second trans-Jordan raid), and the French Régiment Mixte de Cavalerie. Swords were issued to the Australian Mounted Division at the beginning of August 1918, and the men had about six weeks' training in the use of them before the operations commenced. The Australian troopers took to their new weapon enthusiastically, and showed, later on, that they knew how to use it.

(b)INFANTRY

During the 1917 operations, the infantry were organised as follows:—

20th CORPS.

Commander: Lieutenant-General Sir Philip Chetwode, Bart., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

10th Division.

Commander: Major-General J.R. Longley, C.B., C.M.G.

53rd Division.

Commander: Major-General S.F. Mott, C.B., p.s.c.

60th Division.

Commander: Major-General Sir J.S.M. Shea, K.C.M.G., D.S.O., p.s.c., I.A.

74th Division.

Commander: Major-General E.S. Girdwood, C.B.

21st CORPS.

Commander: Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Bulfin, K.C.B., C.V.O.

52nd Division.

Commander: Major-General J. Hill, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., I.A.

54th Division.

Commander: Major-General S.W. Hare, C.B.

75th Division.

Commander: Major-General P.C. Palin, C.B., C.M.G., I.A.

On the reorganisation of the infantry in the spring of 1918, the 3rd (Lahore) and 7th (Meerut) Divisions replaced the 52nd and 74th Divisions, which were sent to France. The 3rd was commanded by Major-General A.R. Hoskins, C.M.G., D.S.O., p.s.c., and the 7th by Major-General Sir V.B. Fane, K.C.I.E., C.B.

Three-quarters of the British troops in all divisions except the 54th were replaced by Indians.

FOOTNOTES:[31]These regiments were all maintained by the Ruling Princes of their respective States in India.

[31]These regiments were all maintained by the Ruling Princes of their respective States in India.

APPENDIX II

NOTE ON THE ARAB MOVEMENT

A SHERIF(plur. Ashraf) is one who claims descent direct from the Prophet Mohammed, through his daughter Fatima, wife of Ali, the third Khalif. These Ashraf are found all over the Arabic-speaking world, but only those whose pedigrees are inscribed in the Register of Mecca are universally accepted as true descendants of the Prophet. This register has been kept with extraordinary care, and it is probable that it dates back to the time of Mohammed himself. There are in the Hedjaz several families of these true Ashraf, who form the aristocracy of the Arab world, live under a law of their own, and enjoy a number of special privileges.

For the first four centuries after the death of the Prophet, the Ashraf, though regarded with veneration and respect by the Arabs, held no temporal power. At the end of the tenth century, however, a Sherif of Mecca proclaimed himself Emir of the Ashraf, and succeeded in establishing his dynasty as the temporal chiefs (under the Khalif) of the Hedjaz. The ruling prince of the Ashraf of Mecca was known for centuries in Europe as 'The Grand Sherif of Mecca,' and, in former times, when the city was not as jealously guarded as it now is, more than one Christian sovereign sent an embassy to him there.

During the succeeding five hundred years, internecine strife, resulting in frequent changes of dynasty, weakened the temporal power of the Emirs of Mecca, and correspondingly increased the ascendancy of the Turks. In the sixteenth century, however, the Emir Katada, by a series of conquests of rival claimants, possessed himself of the chief power in the Hedjaz,and established his own family as the head of the Ashraf.

Sherif Hussein, a lineal descendant of Katada, succeeded to the Emirate in 1908. A man of powerful will and strong ambitions, Hussein began almost at once to consider the possibility of securing the independence of the Hedjaz, and possibly even of all the Arabs, from Turkish dominion. His task was an exceedingly difficult one. The Sultan of Turkey, as Khalif of Islam, was regarded as the spiritual head of all Moslems, and any open action against him would be likely to meet with strong opposition in all Moslem countries outside Arabia. A Turkish Army Corps, with its headquarters at Sanah, near Aden, garrisoned and controlled the country; and the Emir's own people, split up into innumerable tribes and clans, were torn by bitter inter-tribal feuds, many of which dated back for centuries.

The ease with which the Sultan Abdul Hamid was overthrown by the Committee of Union and Progress at the time of the Turkish Revolution, encouraged the Sherif in his dream of establishing an independent Arab State. He became the representative of the Hedjaz in the Turkish Parliament, and for a time lived in Constantinople. Very soon, however, disgusted with the intrigues and jealousies of the C.U.P., and realising that he had nothing to hope for from this body of needy adventurers, he retired from his position, and went back into the desert, where for the next four or five years he lived the rigorous life of a patriarchal desert Sheikh, preparing his four sons for the struggle to come, and gathering round him a small number of chiefs pledged to the cause of Arabian independence.

The declaration of war by Turkey on Great Britain furnished the Emir with the chance which he had long awaited, and the atrocities committed by the Turks in Syria at the beginning of the war caused the oppressed Arabs to turn to him as their national champion. He at once threw in his lot with theBritish, though not openly at first, and set to work, with the fierce energy characteristic of him, to stir up the tribes of the Hedjaz against the Turks.

The outbreak of the rebellion was precipitated by the arrival at Medina in May 1916 of a large Turkish force, charged with the task of re-establishing the waning authority of the Sultan in the Hedjaz. The Emir himself, though as full of energy and determination as ever, was now too old to bear the rigours of a desert campaign, and accordingly placed the command of his Bedouin followers in the hands of his three eldest sons Ali, Abdullah, and Feisal. Of Ali we know little, though he was active in the summer of 1918 and in the early part of 1917. Abdullah, the second son, was of a retiring disposition, a theologian and philosopher, and a deep student of the Koran. Feisal alone inherited his father's energy and power of command, without, however, the old man's ungovernable temper. The youngest son, Zeid, was still only a boy.

A line of Arab pickets was established round Medina, under the command of Feisal, and the railway north of the town was cut in several places. But the Arabs, not being provided at this time with explosives, and being ignorant of modern methods of demolition, did not effect enough before being driven off by relief parties with machine guns, to interrupt seriously the communication of Medina with the north, and the besieging force, short of arms and supplies, and without artillery, could do little more than watch the city from afar. Jiddah, however, the port of Mecca, which was attacked on June 9th, held out barely a week. Cut off from Mecca by the loss of the military block-houses on the road, and bombarded by British warships and aeroplanes, the Turkish garrison surrendered on the 16th June. The fall of Mecca followed a month later, and an Arab force under Sherif Abdullah then proceeded to blockade the hill town of Taif, where the bulk of the Turkish forces, outside Medina, was established insummer quarters. This place held out till near the end of September, when Ghalib Pasha, the G.O.C., despairing of help, and cut off by the Arabs from all sources of supply, surrendered with the garrison of 2000 men.

By the end of the year all the small Turkish posts scattered throughout the Hedjaz had fallen to the Arabs. Medina still held out, and it was clear that the Arab forces, indifferently armed, and inexperienced in modern siege warfare, could not hope to reduce this city. The Turkish garrison, with the lines of communication troops along the railway to the north, numbered some 15,000 men, well-armed and equipped, and in all respects capable of prolonged resistance.

Acting on the advice of the British officers with them, the Arabs, therefore, abandoned for the time being all attempts on Medina, and concentrated all their efforts on a systematic attack on the Hedjaz Railway north of the town. During the first six months of 1917 a constant succession of raids so interrupted the traffic on the railway that the Turks could with difficulty keep open their communications between Medina and Damascus.

In July 1917 the Emir Feisal seized Akaba, at the north end of the Red Sea, and made this place his base for further raiding operations on the railway as far north as Maan.

In January 1918 he succeeded in destroying the branch line to the Hish Forest, from which the Turkish locomotives were drawing their fuel, and then attacked Maan itself (see p. 153.) Though unable to capture the town, the Arabs established themselves across the railway two miles farther south, and, in the course of the succeeding three months, destroyed seventy miles of the line. Medina was thus finally isolated, and the garrison was faced with the two alternatives of holding out in the town till the end of the war, or of attempting to cut a way out to the north. As the latter alternativemeant almost certain destruction, the Turks decided to stay where they were. They remained in Medina till they were compelled to surrender, under the terms of the Armistice of the 31st October 1918.

The strong position taken up by the Turkish IVth Army east of the Jordan during the summer of 1918, prevented the Emir from making any further move northwards. He remained about Maan, collecting his resources for the coming struggle, and carrying on a vigorous propaganda among the surrounding tribes, till the British advance in September caused the IVth Army to retire, and gave the Arabs the opportunity of completing the task to which they had set themselves in 1916.

APPENDIX III

SUMMARY OF TERMS OF THE TURKISH ARMISTICE

which came into force on October 31, 1918.

Art. 1.—Opening of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and access to the Black Sea. The Allied occupation of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.

Art. 2.—The position of all minefields, torpedo tubes, and other obstructions in Turkish waters to be indicated, and assistance to be given to sweep or remove them as may be required.

Art. 3.—All available information regarding the mines in the Black Sea to be communicated.

Art. 4.—All Allied prisoners and Armenians interned to be collected in Constantinople, and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.

Art. 5.—The immediate demobilisation of the army except troops required for the surveillance of the frontier and maintenance of internal order, their number and disposal to be determined later by the Allies, after consultation with the Turkish Government.

Art. 6.—The surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters or the waters occupied by Turkey. These ships to be interned at such Turkish port or ports, as may be directed, except such small vessels as are required for police or similar purposes in Turkish territorial waters.

Art. 7.—The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points, in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.

Art. 8.—The free use by Allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation, and the denial of their use to the enemy. Similar conditions to apply toTurkish mercantile shipping in Turkish waters, for the purposes of trade and the demobilisation of the army.

Art. 9.—The use of all ship-repairing facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals.

Art. 10.—Allied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.

Art. 11.—Withdrawal of Turkish troops from north-western Persia. Part of Trans-Caucasia to be evacuated; the remainder to be evacuated if the Allies require, after they study the situation there.

Art. 12.—Wireless and cable stations to be under Allied control; Turkish Government messages excepted.

Art. 13.—Prohibition of the destruction of any naval, military, or commercial material by the Turks.

Art. 14.—Facilities to be given for the purchase of coal, oil-fuel, and naval material from Turkish sources, after the requirements of the country have been met. None of the above material to be exported.

Art. 15.—Allied control of all railways, and Allied occupation of Batoum. Turkey not to object to the Allied occupation of Baku.

Art. 16.—The surrender of the garrisons of the Hedjaz, Asir, Yemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia, and the withdrawal of troops from Cilicia, except those maintaining order, as determined under Clause 5. The surrender of all ports in Cilicia.

Art. 17.—The surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the nearest Italian garrison. Turkey to guarantee to stop supplies to, and communication with, these officers, if they do not obey the order of surrender.

Art. 18.—The surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata, to the nearest Allied garrison.

Art. 19.—All Germans and Austrians, naval, military, and civilian, to quit Turkey within a month. Those in remote districts to do so as soon as possible thereafter.

Art. 20.—Compliance with the Allies' orders as regards the disposal of arms and the transport of the demobilised, under Clause 5.

Art. 21.—An Allied representative to be attached to the Turkish Ministry of Supplies, to safeguard Allied interests.

Art. 22.—Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of the Allies. The release of Turkish civilian prisoners and prisoners over military age to be considered.

Art. 23.—Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.

Art. 24.—In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets the Allies reserve the right to occupy any of them.

INDEX

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