(12) See "Mem." III. xiii. 5.(13) {xusto}—the xystus, "a covered corridor in the gymnasium wherethe athletes exercised in winter." Vitruv. v. 11. 4; vi. 7. 5. SeeRich, "Companion," s.n.; Becker, op. cit. p. 309. Cf. Plat."Phaedr." 227—Phaedrus loq.: "I have come from Lysias the son ofCephalus, and I am going to take a walk outside the wall, for Ihave been sitting with him the whole morning; and our commonfriend Acumenus advises me to walk in the country, which he saysis more invigorating than to walk in the courts."—Jowett.(14) See "Horsemanship," iii. 7 foll.; ib. viii.; "Hipparch," i. 18.(15) "Slanting hillside."(16) See "Horsemanship," v. 3; Aristoph. "Clouds," 32.(17) Lit. "scrape myself clean" (with the {stleggis} or strigil). Cf.Aristoph. "Knights," 580. See Becker, op. cit. p. 150.(18) See "Lac. Pol." ii. 5. Cf. Hor. "Sat." i. 6. 127:
pransus non avide, quantum interpellet inani ventre diem durare.
Then eat a temperate luncheon, just to stay A sinking stomach till the close of day (Conington).
By Hera (I replied), Ischomachus, I cannot say how much your doings take my fancy. How you have contrived, to pack up portably for use—together at the same time—appliances for health and recipes for strength, exercises for war, and pains to promote your wealth! My admiration is raised at every point. That you do study each of these pursuits in the right way, you are yourself a standing proof. Your look of heaven-sent health and general robustness we note with our eyes, while our ears have heard your reputation as a first-rate horseman and the wealthiest of men.
Isch. Yes, Socrates, such is my conduct, in return for which I am rewarded with—the calumnies of half the world. You thought, I daresay, I was going to end my sentence different, and say that a host of people have given me the enviable title "beautiful and good."
I was indeed myself about to ask, Ischomachus (I answered), whether you take pains also to acquire skill in argumentative debate, the cut and thrust and parry of discussion, (19) should occasion call?
(19) Lit. "to give a reason and to get a reason from others." Cf."Cyrop." I. iv. 3.
Isch. Does it not strike you rather, Socrates, that I am engaged in one long practice of this very skill, (20) now pleading as defendant that, as far as I am able, I do good to many and hurt nobody? And then, again, you must admit, I play the part of prosecutor when accusing people whom I recognise to be offenders, as a rule in private life, or possibly against the state, the good-for-nothing fellows?
(20) "The arts of the defendant, the apologist; and of the plaintiff,the prosecutor."
But please explain one other thing, Ischomachus (I answered). Do you put defence and accusation into formal language? (21)
(21) "Does your practice include the art of translating into wordsyour sentiments?" Cf. "Mem." I. ii. 52.
Isch. "Formal language," say you, Socrates? The fact is, I never cease to practise speaking; and on this wise: Some member of my household has some charge to bring, or some defence to make, (22) against some other. I have to listen and examine. I must try to sift the truth. Or there is some one whom I have to blame or praise before my friends, or I must arbitrate between some close connections and endeavour to enforce the lesson that it is to their own interests to be friends not foes. (23)... We are present to assist a general in court; (24) we are called upon to censure some one; or defend some other charged unjustly; or to prosecute a third who has received an honour which he ill deserves. It frequently occurs in our debates (25) that there is some course which we strongly favour: naturally we sound its praises; or some other, which we disapprove of: no less naturally we point out its defects.
(22) Or, "One member of my household appears as plaintiff, another asdefendant. I must listen and cross-question."(23) The "asyndeton" would seem to mark a pause, unless some wordshave dropped out. See the commentators ad loc.(24) The scene is perhaps that of a court-martial (cf. "Anab." V.viii.; Dem. "c. Timocr." 749. 16). (Al. cf. Sturz, "Lex." s.v. "weare present (as advocates) and censure some general"), or moreprobably, I think, that of a civil judicial inquiry of some sort,conducted at a later date by the Minister of Finance ({to strategoto epi tas summorias eremeno}).(25) Or, "Or again, a frequent case, we sit in council" (as members ofthe Boule). See Aristot. "Pol." iv. 15.
He paused, then added: Things have indeed now got so far, Socrates, that several times I have had to stand my trial and have judgment passed upon me in set terms, what I must pay or what requital I must make. (26)
(26) See "Symp." v. 8. Al. {dielemmenos} = "to be taken apart and have..."
And at whose bar (I asked) is the sentence given? That point I failed to catch. (27)
(27) Or, "so dull was I, I failed to catch the point."
Whose but my own wife's? (he answered).
And, pray, how do you conduct your own case? (I asked). (28)
(28) See "Mem." III. vii. 4; Plat. "Euth." 3 E.
Not so ill (he answered), when truth and interest correspond, but when they are opposed, Socrates, I have no skill to make the worse appear the better argument. (29)
(29) See Plat. "Apol." 19-23 D; Aristoph. "Clouds," 114 foll.
Perhaps you have no skill, Ischomachus, to make black white or falsehood truth (said I). (30)
(30) Or, "It may well be, Ischomachus, you cannot manufacturefalsehood into truth." Lit. "Like enough you cannot make anuntruth true."
XII
But (I continued presently), perhaps I am preventing you from going, as you long have wished to do, Ischomachus?
To which he: By no means, Socrates. I should not think of going away until the gathering in the market is dispersed. (1)
(1) Lit. "until the market is quite broken up," i.e. after mid-day.See "Anab." I. viii. 1; II. i. 7; "Mem." I. i. 10. Cf. Herod. ii.173; iii. 104; vii. 223.
Of course, of course (I answered), you are naturally most careful not to forfeit the title they have given you of "honest gentleman"; (2) and yet, I daresay, fifty things at home are asking your attention at this moment; only you undertook to meet your foreign friends, and rather than play them false you go on waiting.
(2) Lit. "beautiful and good."
Isch. Let me so far correct you, Socrates; in no case will the things you speak of be neglected, since I have stewards and bailiffs (3) on the farms.
(3) Cf. Becker, op. cit. p. 363.
Soc. And, pray, what is your system when you need a bailiff? Do you search about, until you light on some one with a natural turn for stewardship; and then try to purchase him?—as, I feel certain, happens when you want a carpenter: first, you discover some one with a turn for carpentry, and then do all you can to get possession of him. (4) Or do you educate your bailiffs yourself?
(4) The steward, like the carpenter, and the labourers in general,would, as a rule, be a slave. See below, xxi. 9.
Isch. Most certainly the latter, Socrates; I try to educate them, as you say, myself; and with good reason. He who is properly to fill my place and manage my affairs when I am absent, my "alter ego," (5) needs but to have my knowledge; and if I am fit myself to stand at the head of my own business, I presume I should be able to put another in possession of my knowledge. (6)
(5) Or, "my other self."(6) Lit. "to teach another what I know myself."
Soc. Well then, the first thing he who is properly to take your place when absent must possess is goodwill towards you and yours; for without goodwill, what advantage will there be in any knowledge whatsoever which your bailiff may possess?
Isch. None, Socrates; and I may tell you that a kindly disposition towards me and mine is precisely what I first endeavour to instil.
Soc. And how, in the name of all that is holy, do you pick out whom you will and teach him to have kindly feeling towards yourself and yours?
Isch. By kindly treatment of him, to be sure, whenever the gods bestow abundance of good things upon us.
Soc. If I take your meaning rightly, you would say that those who enjoy your good things grow well disposed to you and seek to render you some good?
Isch. Yes, for of all instruments to promote good feeling this I see to be the best.
Soc. Well, granted the man is well disposed to you does it therefore follow, Ischomachus, that he is fit to be your bailiff? It cannot have escaped your observation that albeit human beings, as a rule, are kindly disposed towards themselves, yet a large number of them will not apply the attention requisite to secure for themselves those good things which they fain would have.
Isch. Yes, but believe me, Socrates, when I seek to appoint such men as bailiffs, I teach them also carefulness and application. (7)
(7) {epimeleia} is a cardinal virtue with the Greeks, or at any ratewith Xenophon, but it has no single name in English.
Soc. Nay, now in Heaven's name, once more, how can that be? I always thought it was beyond the power of any teacher to teach these virtues. (8)
(8) For the Socratic problem {ei arete didakte} see Grote, "H. G."viii. 599.
Isch. Nor is it possible, you are right so far, to teach such excellences to every single soul in order as simply as a man might number off his fingers.
Soc. Pray, then, what sort of people have the privilege? (9) Should you mind pointing them out to me with some distinctness?
(9) Lit. "what kind of people can be taught them? By all means signifythe sort to me distinctly."
Ishc. Well, in the first place, you would have some difficulty in making intemperate people diligent—I speak of intemperance with regard to wine, for drunkenness creates forgetfulness of everything which needs to be done.
Soc. And are persons devoid of self-control in this respect the only people incapable of diligence and carefulness? or are there others in like case?
Isch. Certainly, people who are intemperate with regard to sleep, seeing that the sluggard with his eyes shut cannot do himself or see that others do what is right.
Soc. What then? (10) Are we to regard these as the only people incapable of being taught this virtue of carefulness? or are there others in a like condition?
(10) Or, "What then—is the list exhausted? Are we to suppose thatthese are the sole people..."
Isch. Surely we must include the slave to amorous affection. (11) Your woeful lover (12) is incapable of being taught attention to anything beyond one single object. (13) No light task, I take it, to discover any hope or occupation sweeter to him than that which now employs him, his care for his beloved, nor, when the call for action comes, (14) will it be easy to invent worse punishment than that he now endures in separation from the object of his passion. (15) Accordingly, I am in no great hurry to appoint a person of this sort to manage (16) my affairs; the very attempt to do so I regard as futile.
(11) See "Mem." I. iii. 8 foll.; II. vi. 22.(12) {duserotes}. Cf. Thuc. vi. 13, "a desperate craving" (Jowett).(13) Cf. "Symp." iv. 21 foll.; "Cyrop." V. i. 7-18.(14) Or, "where demands of business present themselves, and somethingmust be done."(15) Cf. Shakesp. "Sonnets," passim.(16) Or, "I never dream of appointing as superintendent." See above,iv. 7.
Soc. Well, and what of those addicted to another passion, that of gain? Are they, too, incapable of being trained to give attention to field and farming operations?
Isch. On the contrary, there are no people easier to train, none so susceptible of carefulness in these same matters. One needs only to point out to them that the pursuit is gainful, and their interest is aroused.
Soc. But for ordinary people? Given they are self-controlled to suit your bidding, (17) given they possess a wholesome appetite for gain, how will you lesson them in carefulness? how teach them growth in diligence to meet your wishes?
(17) Or, "in matters such as you insist on."
Isch. By a simple method, Socrates. When I see a man intent on carefulness, I praise and do my best to honour him. When, on the other hand, I see a man neglectful of his duties, I do not spare him: I try in every way, by word and deed, to wound him.
Soc. Come now, Ischomachus, kindly permit a turn in the discussion, which has hitherto concerned the persons being trained to carefulness themselves, and explain a point in reference to the training process. Is it possible for a man devoid of carefulness himself to render others more careful?
No more possible (he answered) than for a man who knows no music to make others musical. (18) If the teacher sets but an ill example, the pupil can hardly learn to do the thing aright. (19) And if the master's conduct is suggestive of laxity, how hardly shall his followers attain to carefulness! Or to put the matter concisely, "like master like man." I do not think I ever knew or heard tell of a bad master blessed with good servants. The converse I certainly have seen ere now, a good master and bad servants; but they were the sufferers, not he. (20) No, he who would create a spirit of carefulness in others (21) must have the skill himself to supervise the field of labour; to test, examine, scrutinise. (22) He must be ready to requite where due the favour of a service well performed, nor hesitate to visit the penalty of their deserts upon those neglectful of their duty. (23) Indeed (he added), the answer of the barbarian to the king seems aposite. You know the story, (24) how the king had met with a good horse, but wished to give the creature flesh and that without delay, and so asked some one reputed to be clever about horses: "What will give him flesh most quickly?" To which the other: "The master's eye." So, too, it strikes me, Socrates, there is nothing like "the master's eye" to call forth latent qualities, and turn the same to beautiful and good effect. (25)
(18) Or, "to give others skill in 'music.'" See Plat. "Rep." 455 E;"Laws," 802 B. Al. "a man devoid of letters to make othersscholarly." See Plat. "Phaedr." 248 D.(19) Lit. "when the teacher traces the outline of the thing to copybadly." For {upodeiknuontos} see "Mem." IV. iii. 13; "Horsem." ii.2. Cf. Aristot. "Oecon." i. 6; "Ath. Pol." 41. 17; and Dr. Sandys'note ad loc.(20) Or, "but they did not go scot-free"; "punishments then wererife."(21) Cf. Plat. "Polit." 275 E: "If we say either tending the herds, ormanaging the herds, or having the care of them, that will includeall, and then we may wrap up the statesman with the rest, as theargument seems to require."—Jowett.(22) Or, "he must have skill to over-eye the field of labour, and bescrutinous."(23) "For every boon of service well performed he must be eager tomake requital to the author of it, nor hesitate to visit on theheads of those neglectful of their duty a just recompense." (Thelanguage is poetical.)(24) See Aristot. "Oecon." i. 6; Aesch. "Pers." 165; Cato ap. Plin."H. N." xviii. 5. Cic. ap. Colum. iv. 18; ib. vi. 21; La Fontaine,"L'Oeil du Maitre."(25) Or, "so, too, in general it seems to me 'the master's eye' isaptest to elicit energy to issue beautiful and good."
XIII
But now (I ventured), suppose you have presented strongly to the mind of some one (1) the need of carefulness to execute your wishes, is a person so qualified to be regarded as fit at once to be your bailiff? or is there aught else which he must learn in order to play the part of an efficient bailiff?
(1) Breit. cf. "Pol. Lac." xv. 8. Holden cf. Plat. "Rep." 600 C.
Most certainly there is (he answered): it still remains for him to learn particulars—to know, that is, what things he has to do, and when and how to do them; or else, if ignorant of these details, the profit of this bailiff in the abstract may prove no greater than the doctor's who pays a most precise attention to a sick man, visiting him late and early, but what will serve to ease his patient's pains (2) he knows not.
(2) Lit. "what it is to the advantage of his patient to do, is beyondhis ken."
Soc. But suppose him to have learnt the whole routine of business, will he need aught else, or have we found at last your bailiff absolute? (3)
(3) Cf. Plat. "Rep." 566 D. Or, "the perfect and consummate type ofbailiff."
Isch. He must learn at any rate, I think, to rule his fellow-workmen.
What! (I exclaimed): you mean to say you educate your bailiffs to that extent? Actually you make them capable of rule?
At any rate I try to do so (he replied).
And how, in Heaven's name (I asked), do you contrive to educate another in the skill to govern human beings?
Isch. I have a very simple system, Socrates; so simple, I daresay, you will simply laugh at me.
Soc. The matter, I protest, is hardly one for laughter. The man who can make another capable of rule, clearly can teach him how to play the master; and if can make him play the master, he can make him what is grander still, a kingly being. (4) Once more, therefore, I protest: A man possessed of such creative power is worthy, not of ridicule, far from it, but of the highest praise.
(4) i.e. {arkhikos} includes (1) {despotikos}, i.e. an arbitrary headof any sort, from the master of one's own family to the {turannoskai despotes} (Plat. "Laws," 859 A), despotic lord or owner; (2){basilikos}, the king or monarch gifted with regal qualities.
Thus, then, I reason, (5) Socrates (he answered): The lower animals are taught obedience by two methods chiefly, partly through being punished when they make attempts to disobey, partly by experiencing some kindness when they cheerfully submit. This is the principle at any rate adopted in the breaking of young horses. The animal obeys its trainer, and something sweet is sure to follow; or it disobeys, and in place of something sweet it finds a peck of trouble; and so on, until it comes at last to yield obedience to the trainer's every wish. Or to take another instance: Young dogs, (6) however far inferior to man in thought and language, (7) can still be taught to run on errands and turn somersaults, (8) and do a host of other clever things, precisely on this same principle of training. Every time the animal obeys it gets something or other which it wanted, and every time it misbehaves it gets a whipping. But when it comes to human beings: in man you have a creature still more open to persuasion through appeals to reason; (9) only make it plain to him "it is his interest to obey." Or if they happen to be slaves, (10) the more ignoble training of wild animals tamed to the lure will serve to teach obedience. Only gratify their bellies in the matter of appetite, and you will succeed in winning much from them. (11) But ambitious, emulous natures feel the spur of praise, (12) since some natures hunger after praise no less than others crave for meats and drinks. My practice then is to instruct those whom I desire to appoint as my bailiffs in the various methods which I have found myself to be successful in gaining the obedience of my fellows. To take an instance: There are clothes and shows and so forth, with which I must provide my workfolk. (13) Well, then, I see to it that these are not all alike in make; (14) but some will be of better, some of less good quality: my object being that these articles for use shall vary with the service of the wearer; the worse man will receive the worse things as a gift, the better man the better as a mark of honour. For I ask you, Socrates, how can the good avoid despondency seeing that the work is wrought by their own hands alone, in spite of which these villains who will neither labour nor face danger when occasion calls are to receive an equal guerdon with themselves? And just as I cannot bring myself in any sort of way to look upon the better sort as worthy to receive no greater honour than the baser, so, too, I praise my bailiffs when I know they have apportioned the best things among the most deserving. And if I see that some one is receiving preference by dint of flatteries or like unworthy means, I do not let the matter pass; I reprimand my bailiff roundly, and so teach him that such conduct is not even to his interest.
(5) {oukoun}. "This, then, is my major premiss: the dumb animal..."(lit. "the rest of animals").(6) {ta kunidia} possibly implies "performing poodles."(7) {te gnome... te glotte}, i.e. mental impression and expression,"mind and tongue."(8) Or, "to run round and round and turn heels over head." Al. "divefor objects."(9) "Logic, argument." Or, "a creature more compliant; merely by aword demonstrate to him..."(10) Cf. Plat. "Rep." 591 C.(11) See Pater, "Plato and Platonism," "Lacedaemon," p. 196 foll.(12) See "Cyrop." passim.(13) {ergastersi}, Xenophontic for the common Attic {ergatais}. SeeHold. ad loc. for similar forms, and cf. Rutherford, "NewPhrynichus," 59.(14) Cf. Aristot. "Oecon." i. 5 (where the thesis is developedfurther).
XIV
Soc. Well, then, Ischomachus, supposing the man is now so fit to rule that he can compel obedience, (1) is he, I ask once more, your bailiff absolute? or even though possessed of all the qualifications you have named, does he still lack something? (2)
(1) Or, "that discipline flows from him;" al. "he presents you withobedient servants."(2) Lit. "will he still need something further to complete him?"
Most certainly (replied Ischomachus). One thing is still required of him, and that is to hold aloof from property and goods which are his master's; he must not steal. Consider, this is the very person through whose hands the fruits and produce pass, and he has the audacity to make away with them! perhaps he does not leave enough to cover the expenses of the farming operations! Where would be the use of farming the land by help of such an overseer?
What (I exclaimed), can I believe my ears? You actually undertake to teach them virtue! What really, justice!
Isch. To be sure, I do. but it does not follow therefore that I find all equally apt to lend an ear to my instruction. However, what I do is this. I take a leaf now out of the laws of Draco and again another out of the laws of Solon, (3) and so essay to start my household on the path of uprightness. And indeed, if I mistake not (he proceeded), both those legislators enacted many of their laws expressly with a view to teaching this branch of justice. (4) It is written, "Let a man be punished for a deed of theft"; "Let whosoever is detected in the act be bound and thrown in prison"; "If he offer violence, (5) let him be put to death." It is clear that the intention of the lawgivers in framing these enactments was to render the sordid love of gain (6) devoid of profit to the unjust person. What I do, therefore, is to cull a sample of their precepts, which I supplement with others from the royal code (7) where applicable; and so I do my best to shape the members of my household into the likeness of just men concerning that which passes through their hands. And now observe—the laws first mentioned act as penalties, deterrent to transgressors only; whereas the royal code aims higher: by it not only is the malefactor punished, but the righteous and just person is rewarded. (8) The result is, that many a man, beholding how the just grow ever wealthier than the unjust, albeit harbouring in his heart some covetous desires, is constant still to virtue. To abstain from unjust dealing is engrained in him. (9)
(3) Cobet, "Pros. Xen." cf. Plut. "Solon," xvii. {proton men oun tousDrakontos nomous aneile k.t.l.} "First, then, he repealed allDraco's laws, except those concerning homicide, because they weretoo severe and the punishments too great; for death was appointedfor almost all offences, insomuch that those that were convictedof idleness were to die, and those that stole a cabbage or anapple to suffer even as villains that committed sacrilege ormurder" (Clough, i. 184). See Aul. Gell. "N. A." xi. 13.(4) "The branch of justice which concerns us, viz. righteous dealingbetween man and man."(5) For this sense of {tous egkheirountas} cf. Thuc. iv. 121; "Hell."IV. v. 16. Al. {dedesthai tous egkheirountas kai thanatousthai entis alo poion} (Weiske), "let the attempt be punished withimprisonment"; "let him who is caught in the act be put to death."(6) Cf. Plat. "Laws," 754 E.(7) Or, "the royal laws," i.e. of Persia. Cf. "Anab." I. ix. 16;"Cyrop." I. ii. 2, 3. Or possibly = "regal"; cf. Plat. "Minos,"317 C; {to men orthon nomos esti basilikos}.(8) Lit. "benefited."(9) Lit. "Whereby, beholding the just becoming wealthier than theunjust, many albeit covetous at heart themselves most constantlyabide by abstinence from evil-doing."
Those of my household (he proceeded) whom, in spite of kindly treatment, I perceive to be persistently bent on evil-doing, in the end I treat as desperate cases. Incurable self-seekers, (10) plain enough to see, whose aspiration lifts them from earth, so eager are they to be reckoned just men, not by reason only of the gain derivable from justice, but through passionate desire to deserve my praise—these in the end I treat as free-born men. I make them wealthy, and not with riches only, but in honour, as befits their gentle manliness. (11) For if, Socrates, there be one point in which the man who thirsts for honour differs from him who thirsts for gain, it is, I think, in willingness to toil, face danger, and abstain from shameful gains—for the sake of honour only and fair fame. (12)
(10) Lit. "Those, on the other hand, whom I discover to be roused" (tohonesty—not solely because honesty is the best policy).(11) Or, "men of fair and noble type"; "true gentlemen." This passagesuggests the "silver lining to the cloud" of slavery.(12) Cf. Hom. "Il." ix. 413, {oleto men moi nostos, atar kleosaphthiton estai}, "but my fame shall be imperishable."
XV
Soc. But now, suppose, Ischomachus, you have created in the soul of some one a desire for your welfare; have inspired in him not a mere passive interest, but a deep concern to help you to achieve prosperity; further, you have obtained for him a knowledge of the methods needed to give the operations of the field some measure of success; you have, moreover, made him capable of ruling; and, as the crowning point of all your efforts, this same trusty person shows no less delight, than you might take yourself, in laying at your feet (1) earth's products, each in due season richly harvested—I need hardly ask concerning such an one, whether aught else is lacking to him. It is clear to me (2) an overseer of this sort would be worth his weight in gold. But now, Ischomachus, I would have you not omit a topic somewhat lightly handled by us in the previous argument. (3)
(1) {apodeiknuon}, i.e. in presenting the inventory of products forthe year. Cf. "Hell." V. iii. 17; "Revenues," ii. 7.(2) {ede}, at this stage of the discussion.(3) Or, "that part of the discussion which we ran over in a light andairy fashion," in reference to xiii. 2.
What topic, pray, was that? (he asked).
Soc. You said, if I mistake not, that it was most important to learn the methods of conducting the several processes of husbandry; for, you added, unless a man knows what things he has to do and how to do them, all the care and diligence in the world will stand him in no stead.
At this point (4) he took me up, observing: So what you now command me is to teach the art itself of tillage, Socrates?
(4) Keeping the vulg. order of SS. 3-9, which many commentators wouldrearrange in various ways. See Breit. ad loc.; Lincke, op. cit. p.111 foll.
Yes (I replied), for now it looks as if this art were one which made the wise and skilled possessor of it wealthy, whilst the unskilled, in spite of all the pains he takes, must live in indigence.
Isch. Now shall you hear, then, (5) Socrates, the generous nature of this human art. For is it not a proof of something noble in it, that being of supreme utility, so sweet a craft to exercise, so rich in beauty, so acceptable alike to gods and men, the art of husbandry may further fairly claim to be the easiest of all the arts to learn? Noble I name it! this, at any rate, the epithet we give to animals which, being beautiful and large and useful, are also gentle towards the race of man. (6)
(5) Or, "Listen, then, and whilst I recount to you at once theloving-kindness of this art, to man the friendliest."(6) Schenkl regards this sentence as an interpolation. For the epithet{gennaios} applied to the dog see "Cyrop." I. iv. 15, 21;"Hunting," iv. 7.
Allow me to explain, Ischomachus (I interposed). Up to a certain point I fully followed what you said. I understand, according to your theory, how a bailiff must be taught. In other words, I follow your descriptions both as to how you make him kindly disposed towards yourself; and how, again, you make him careful, capable of rule, and upright. But at that point you made the statement that, in order to apply this diligence to tillage rightly, the careful husbandman must further learn what are the different things he has to do, and not alone what things he has to do, but how and when to do them. These are the topics which, in my opinion, have hitherto been somewhat lightly handled in the argument. Let me make my meaning clearer by an instance: it is as if you were to tell me that, in order to be able to take down a speech in writing, (7) or to read a written statement, a man must know his letters. Of course, if not stone deaf, I must have garnered that for a certain object knowledge of letters was important to me, but the bare recognition of the fact, I fear, would not enable me in any deeper sense to know my letters. So, too, at present I am easily persuaded that if I am to direct my care aright in tillage I must have a knowledge of the art of tillage. But the bare recognition of the fact does not one whit provide me with the knowledge how I ought to till. And if I resolved without ado to set about the work of tilling, I imagine, I should soon resemble your physician going on his rounds and visiting his patients without knowing what to prescribe or what to do to ease their sufferings. To save me from the like predicaments, please teach me the actual work and processes of tillage.
(7) Or, "something from dictation."
Isch. But truly, (8) Socrates, it is not with tillage as with the other arts, where the learner must be well-nigh crushed (9) beneath a load of study before his prentice-hand can turn out work of worth sufficient merely to support him. (10) The art of husbandry, I say, is not so ill to learn and cross-grained; but by watching labourers in the field, by listening to what they say, you will have straightway knowledge enough to teach another, should the humour take you. I imagine, Socrates (he added), that you yourself, albeit quite unconscious of the fact, already know a vast amount about the subject. The fact is, other craftsmen (the race, I mean, in general of artists) are each and all disposed to keep the most important (11) features of their several arts concealed: with husbandry it is different. Here the man who has the most skill in planting will take most pleasure in being watched by others; and so too the most skilful sower. Ask any question you may choose about results thus beautifully wrought, and not one feature in the whole performance will the doer of it seek to keep concealed. To such height of nobleness (he added), Socrates, does husbandry appear, like some fair mistress, to conform the soul and disposition of those concerned with it.
(8) "Nay, if you will but listen, Socrates, with husbandry it is notthe same as with the other arts."(9) {katatribenai}, "worn out." See "Mem." III. iv. 1; IV. vii. 5. Al."bored to death."(10) Or, "before the products of his pupilage are worth his keep."(11) Or, "critical and crucial."
The proem (12) to the speech is beautiful at any rate (I answered), but hardly calculated to divert the hearer from the previous question. A thing so easy to be learnt, you say? then, if so, do you be all the readier for that reason to explain its details to me. No shame on you who teach, to teach these easy matters; but for me to lack the knowledge of them, and most of all if highly useful to the learner, worse than shame, a scandal.
(12) Or, "the prelude to the piece."
XVI
Isch. First then, Socrates, I wish to demonstrate to you that what is called (1) "the intricate variety in husbandry" (2) presents no difficulty. I use a phrase of those who, whatever the nicety with which they treat the art in theory, (3) have but the faintest practical experience of tillage. What they assert is, that "he who would rightly till the soil must first be made acquainted with the nature of the earth."
(1) "They term"; in reference to the author of some treatise.(2) Or, "the riddling subtlety of tillage." See "Mem." II. iii. 10;Plat. "Symp." 182 B; "Phileb." 53 E.(3) Theophr. "De Caus." ii. 4, 12, mentions Leophanes amongst otherwriters on agriculture preceding himself.
And they are surely right in their assertion (I replied); for he who does not know what the soil is capable of bearing, can hardly know, I fancy, what he has to plant or what to sow.
But he has only to look at his neighbour's land (he answered), at his crops and trees, in order to learn what the soil can bear and what it cannot. (4) After which discovery, it is ill work fighting against heaven. Certainly not by dint of sowing and planting what he himself desires will he meet the needs of life more fully than by planting and sowing what the earth herself rejoices to bear and nourish on her bosom. Or if, as well may be the case, through the idleness of those who occupy it, the land itself cannot display its native faculty, (5) it is often possible to derive a truer notion from some neighbouring district that ever you will learn about it from your neighbour's lips. (6) Nay, even though the earth lie waste and barren, it may still declare its nature; since a soil productive of beautiful wild fruits can by careful tending be made to yield fruits of the cultivated kind as beautiful. And on this wise, he who has the barest knowledge (7) of the art of tillage can still discern the nature of the soil.
(4) Holden cf. Virg. "Georg." i. 53; iv. 109. According to thecommentator Servius, the poet drew largely upon Xenophon'streatise.(5) Or, "cannot prove its natural aptitude."(6) Or, "from a neighbouring mortal."(7) Or, "a mere empiric in the art of husbandry."
Thank you (I said), Ischomachus, my courage needs no further fanning upon that score. I am bold enough now to believe that no one need abstain from agriculture for fear he will not recognise the nature of the soil. Indeed, I now recall to mind a fact concerning fishermen, how as they ply their business on the seas, not crawling lazily along, nor bringing to, for prospect's sake, but in the act of scudding past the flying farmsteads, (8) these brave mariners have only to set eyes upon crops on land, and they will boldly pronounce opinion on the nature of the soil itself, whether good or bad: this they blame and that they praise. And these opinions for the most part coincide, I notice, with the verdict of the skilful farmer as to quality of soil. (9)
(8) Or, "the flying coastland, fields and farmyards."(9) Lit. "And indeed the opinions they pronounce about 'a good soil'mostly tally with the verdict of the expert farmer."
Isch. At what point shall I begin then, Socrates, to revive your recollection (10) of the art of husbandry? since to explain to you the processes employed in husbandry means the statement of a hundred details which you know yourself full well already.
(10) Or, "begin recalling to your mind." See Plat. "Meno," for thedoctrine of Anamensis here apparently referred to.
Soc. The first thing I should like to learn, Ischomachus, I think, if only as a point befitting a philosopher, is this: how to proceed and how to work the soil, did I desire to extract the largest crops of wheat and barley.
Isch. Good, then! you are aware that fallow must be broken up in readiness (11) for sowing?
(11) Or, "ploughed up." Cf. Theophr. "Hist. Pl." iii. i. 6; Dion. Hal."Ant." x. 17.
Soc. Yes, I am aware of that.
Isch. Well then, supposing we begin to plough our land in winter?
Soc. It would not do. There would be too much mud.
Isch. Well then, what would you say to summer?
Soc. The soil will be too hard in summer for a plough and a pair of oxen to break up.
Isch. It looks as if spring-time were the season to begin this work, then? What do you say?
Soc. I say, one may expect the soil broken up at that season of the year to crumble (12) best.
(12) {kheisthai} = laxari, dissolvi, to be most friable, to scatterreadily.
Isch. Yes, and grasses (13) turned over at that season, Socrates, serve to supply the soil already with manure; while as they have not shed their seed as yet, they cannot vegetate. (14) I am supposing that you recognise a further fact: to form good land, a fallow must be clean and clear of undergrowth and weeds, (15) and baked as much as possible by exposure to the sun. (16)
(13) "Herbage," whether grass or other plants, "grass," "clover," etc;Theophr. "Hist. Pl." i. 3. 1; Holden, "green crops."(14) Lit. "and not as yet have shed their seed so as to spring intoblade."(15) Or, "quitch."(16) Holden cf. Virg. "Georg." i. 65, coquat; ii. 260, excoquere. SoLucr. vi. 962.
Soc. Yes, that is quite a proper state of things, I should imagine.
Isch. And to bring about this proper state of things, do you maintain there can be any other better system than that of turning the soil over as many times as possible in summer?
Soc. On the contrary, I know precisely that for either object, whether to bring the weeds and quitch grass to the surface and to wither them by scorching heat, or to expose the earth itself to the sun's baking rays, there can be nothing better than to plough the soil up with a pair of oxen during mid-day in midsummer.
Isch. And if a gang of men set to, to break and make this fallow with the mattock, it is transparent that their business is to separate the quitch grass from the soil and keep them parted?
Soc. Just so!—to throw the quitch grass down to wither on the surface, and to turn the soil up, so that the crude earth may have its turn of baking.
XVII
You see, Socrates (he said, continuing the conversation), we hold the same opinion, both of us, concerning fallow.
Why, so it seems (I said)—the same opinion.
Isch. But when it comes to sowing, what is your opinion? Can you suggest a better time for sowing than that which the long experience of former generations, combined with that of men now living, recognises as the best? See, so soon as autumn time has come, the faces of all men everywhere turn with a wistful gaze towards high heaven. "When will God moisten the earth," they ask, "and suffer men to sow their seed?" (1)