Ridiculous is he who, while fellows of his tribe, family, nation, etc., rank high, is—nothing but "puffed up" over the merit of his fellows; butblinded too is he who wants only to be "man." Neither of them puts his worth inexclusiveness, but inconnectedness, or in the "tie" that conjoins him with others, in the ties of blood, of nationality, of humanity.
Through the "Nationals" of to-day the conflict has again been stirred up between those who think themselves to have merely human blood and human ties of blood, and the others who brag of their special blood and the special ties of blood.
If we disregard the fact that pride may mean conceit, and take it for consciousness alone, there is found to be a vast difference between pride in "belonging to" a nation and therefore being its property, and that in calling a nationality one's property. Nationality is my quality, but the nation my owner and mistress. If you have bodily strength, you can apply it at a suitable place and have a self-consciousness or pride of it; if, on the contrary, your strong body has you, then it pricks you everywhere, and at the most unsuitable place, to show its strength: you can give nobody your hand without squeezing his.
The perception that one is more than a member of the family, more than a fellow of the tribe, more than an individual of the people, etc., has finally led to saying, one is more than all this because one is man, or, the man is more than the Jew, German, etc. "Therefore be every one wholly and solely—man!" Could one not rather say: Because we are more than what has been stated, therefore we will be this, as well as that "more" also? Man and German, then, man and Guelph, etc.? The Nationals are in the right;one cannot deny his nationality: and the humanitarians are in the right; one must not remain in the narrowness of the national. Inuniqueness[176]the contradiction is solved; the national is my quality. But I am not swallowed up in my quality,—as the human too is my quality, but I give to man his existence first through my uniqueness.
History seeks for Man: but he is I, you, we. Sought as a mysteriousessence, as the divine, first asGod, then asMan(humanity, humaneness, and mankind), he is found as the individual, the finite, the unique one.
I am owner of humanity, am humanity, and do nothing for the good of another humanity. Fool, you who are a unique humanity, that you make a merit of wanting to live for another than you are.
The hitherto-considered relation of me to theworld of menoffers such a wealth of phenomena that it will have to be taken up again and again on other occasions, but here, where it was only to have its chief outlines made clear to the eye, it must be broken off to make place for an apprehension of two other sides toward which it radiates. For, as I find myself in relation not merely to men so far as they present in themselves the concept "man" or are children of men (children ofMan, as children of God are spoken of), but also to that which they have of man and call their own, and as therefore I relate myself not only to that which theyarethrough man, but also to their humanpossessions: so, besides the world of men, the world ofthe senses and of ideas will have to be included in our survey, and somewhat said of what men call their own of sensuous goods, and of spiritual as well.
According as one had developed and clearly grasped the concept of man, he gave it to us to respect as this or thatperson of respect, and from the broadest understanding of this concept there proceeded at last the command "to respect Man in every one." But, if I respect Man, my respect must likewise extend to the human, or what is Man's.
Men have somewhat of theirown, andIam to recognize this own and hold it sacred. Their own consists partly in outward, partly in inwardpossessions. The former are things, the latter spiritualities, thoughts, convictions, noble feelings, etc. But I am always to respect onlyrightfulorhumanpossessions; the wrongful and unhuman I need not spare, for onlyMan'sown is men's real own. An inward possession of this sort is,e. g., religion; becausereligionis free,i. e.is Man's,Imust not strike at it. Just sohonoris an inward possession; it is free and must not be struck at by me. (Action for insult, caricatures, etc.) Religion and honor are "spiritual property." In tangible property the person stands foremost: my person is my first property. Hence freedom of the person; but only therightfulor human person is free, the other is locked up. Your life is your property; but it is sacred for men only if it is not that of an inhuman monster.
What a man as such cannot defend of bodily goods, we may take from him: this is the meaning of competition, of freedom of occupation. What hecannot defend of spiritual goods falls a prey to us likewise: so far goes the liberty of discussion, of science, of criticism.
Butconsecratedgoods are inviolable. Consecrated and guaranteed by whom? Proximately by the State, society, but properly by man or the "concept," the "concept of the thing": for the concept of consecrated goods is this, that they are truly human, or rather that the holder possesses them as man and not as un-man.[177]
On the spiritual side man's faith is such goods, his honor, his moral feeling,—yes, his feeling of decency, modesty, etc. Actions (speeches, writings) that touch honor are punishable; attacks on "the foundation of all religion"; attacks on political faith; in short, attacks on everything that a man "rightly" has.
How far critical liberalism would extend, the sanctity of goods,—on this point it has not yet made any pronouncement, and doubtless fancies itself to be ill-disposed toward all sanctity; but, as it combats egoism, it must set limits to it, and must not let the un-man pounce on the human. To its theoretical contempt for the "masses" there must correspond a practical snub if it should get into power.
What extension the concept "man" receives, and what comes to the individual man through it,—what, therefore, man and the human are,—on this point the various grades of liberalism differ, and the political, the social, the humane man are each always claimingmore than the other for "man." He who has best grasped this concept knows best what is "man's." The State still grasps this concept in political restriction, society in social; mankind, so it is said, is the first to comprehend it entirely, or "the history of mankind develops it." But, if "man is discovered," then we know also what pertains to man as his own, man's property, the human.
But let the individual man lay claim to ever so many rights because Man or the concept man "entitles" him to them,i. e.because his being man does it: what doIcare for his right and his claim? If he has his right only from Man and does not have it fromme, then formehe has no right. His life,e. g., counts tomeonly for what it isworth to me. I respect neither a so-called right of property (or his claim to tangible goods) nor yet his right to the "sanctuary of his inner nature" (or his right to have the spiritual goods and divinities, his gods, remain unaggrieved). His goods, the sensuous as well as the spiritual, aremine, and I dispose of them as proprietor, in the measure of my—might.
In theproperty questionlies a broader meaning than the limited statement of the question allows to be brought out. Referred solely to what men call our possessions, it is capable of no solution; the decision is to be found only in him "from whom we have everything." Property depends on theowner.
The Revolution directed its weapons against everything which came "from the grace of God,"e. g., against divine right, in whose place the human was confirmed. To that which is granted by the grace ofGod, there is opposed that which is derived "from the essence of man."
Now, as men's relation to each other, in opposition to the religious dogma which commands a "Love one another for God's sake," had to receive its human position by a "Love each other for man's sake," so the revolutionary teaching could not do otherwise than, first as to what concerns the relation of men to the things of this world, settle it that the world, which hitherto was arranged according to God's ordinance, henceforth belongs to "Man."
The world belongs to "Man," and is to be respected by me as his property.
Property is what is mine!
Property in the civic sense meanssacredproperty, such that I mustrespectyour property. "Respect for property!" Hence the politicians would like to have every one possess his little bit of property, and they have in part brought about an incredible parcellation by this effort. Each must have his bone on which he may find something to bite.
The position of affairs is different in the egoistic sense. I do not step shyly back from your property, but look upon it always asmyproperty, in which I need to "respect" nothing. Pray do the like with what you call my property!
With this view we shall most easily come to an understanding with each other.
The political liberals are anxious that, if possible, all servitudes be dissolved, and every one be free lord on his ground, even if this ground has only so much area as can have its requirements adequately filled bythe manure of one person. (The farmer in the story married even in his old age "that he might profit by his wife's dung.") Be it ever so little, if one only has somewhat of his own,—to wit, arespectedproperty! The more such owners, such cotters,[178]the more "free people and good patriots" has the State.
Political liberalism, like everything religious, counts onrespect, humaneness, the virtues of love. Therefore does it live in incessant vexation. For in practice people respect nothing, and every day the small possessions are bought up again by greater proprietors, and the "free people" change into day-laborers.
If, on the contrary, the "small proprietors" had reflected that the great property was also theirs, they would not have respectfully shut themselves out from it, and would not have been shut out.
Property as the civic liberals understand it deserves the attacks of the Communists and Proudhon: it is untenable, because the civic proprietor is in truth nothing but a propertyless man, one who is everywhereshut out. Instead of owning the world, as he might, he does not own even the paltry point on which he turns around.
Proudhon wants not thepropriétairebut thepossesseurorusufruitier.[179]What does that mean? He wants no one to own the land; but the benefit of it—even though one were allowed only the hundredth part of this benefit, this fruit—is at any rate one's property, which he can dispose of at will. He who hasonly the benefit of a field is assuredly not the proprietor of it; still less he who, as Proudhon would have it, must give up so much of this benefit as is not required for his wants; but he is the proprietor of the share that is left him. Proudhon, therefore, denies only such and such property, notpropertyitself. If we want no longer to leave the land to the landed proprietors, but to appropriate it toourselves, we unite ourselves to this end, form a union, asociété, that makesitselfproprietor; if we have good luck in this, then those persons cease to be landed proprietors. And, as from the land, so we can drive them out of many another property yet, in order to make itourproperty, the property of the—conquerors. The conquerors form a society which one may imagine so great that it by degrees embraces all humanity; but so-called humanity too is as such only a thought (spook); the individuals are its reality. And these individuals as a collective mass will treat land and earth not less arbitrarily than an isolated individual or so-calledpropriétaire. Even so, therefore,propertyremains standing, and that as "exclusive" too, in thathumanity, this great society, excludes theindividualfrom its property (perhaps only leases to him, gives him as a fief, a piece of it) as it besides excludes everything that is not humanity,e. g.does not allow animals to have property.—So too it will remain, and will grow to be. That in whichallwant to have asharewill be withdrawn from that individual who wants to have it for himself alone: it is made acommon estate. As acommon estateevery one has hissharein it, and this share is hisproperty. Why, so in our old relations ahouse which belongs to five heirs is their common estate; but the fifth part of the revenue is each one's property. Proudhon might spare his prolix pathos if he said: "There are some things that belong only to a few, and to which we others will from now on lay claim or—siege. Let us take them, because one comes to property by taking, and the property of which for the present we are still deprived came to the proprietors likewise only by taking. It can be utilized better if it is in the hands ofus allthan if the few control it. Let us therefore associate ourselves for the purpose of this robbery (vol)."—Instead of this, he tries to get us to believe that society is the original possessor and the sole proprietor, of imprescriptible right; against it the so-called proprietors have become thieves (La propriété c'est le vol); if it now deprives of his property the present proprietor, it robs him of nothing, as it is only availing itself of its imprescriptible right.—So far one comes with the spook of society as amoral person. On the contrary, what man can obtain belongs to him: the world belongs tome. Do you say anything else by your opposite proposition, "The world belongs toall"? All are I and again I, etc. But you make out of the "all" a spook, and make it sacred, so that then the "all" become the individual's fearfulmaster. Then the ghost of "right" places itself on their side.
Proudhon, like the Communists, fights againstegoism. Therefore they are continuations and consistent carryings-out of the Christian principle, the principle of love, of sacrifice for something general, something alien. They complete in property,e. g., onlywhat has long been extant as a matter of fact,—viz., the propertylessness of the individual. When the law says,Ad reges potestas omnium pertinet, ad singulos proprietas; omnia rex imperio possidet, singuli dominio, this means: The king is proprietor, for he alone can control and dispose of "everything," he haspotestasandimperiumover it. The Communists make this clearer, transferring thatimperiumto the "society of all." Therefore: Because enemies of egoism, they are on that account—Christians, or, more generally speaking, religious men, believers in ghosts, dependents, servants of some generality (God, society, etc.). In this too Proudhon is like the Christians, that he ascribes to God that which he denies to men. He names him (e. g., page 90) the Propriétaire of the earth. Herewith he proves that he cannot think away theproprietor as such; he comes to a proprietor at last, but removes him to the other world.
Neither God nor Man ("human society") is proprietor, but the individual.
Proudhon (Weitling too) thinks he is telling the worst about property when he calls it theft (vol). Passing quite over the embarrassing question, what well-founded objection could be made against theft, we only ask: Is the concept "theft" at all possible unless one allows validity to the concept "property"? How can one steal if property is not already extant? What belongs to no one cannot bestolen; the water that one draws out of the sea he doesnot steal. Accordingly property is not theft, but a theft becomes possible only through property. Weitling has tocome to this too, as he does regard everything as theproperty of all: if something is "the property of all," then indeed the individual who appropriates it to himself steals.
Private property lives by grace of thelaw. Only in the law has it its warrant—for possession is not yet property, it becomes "mine" only by assent of the law—; it is not a fact, notun faitas Proudhon thinks, but a fiction, a thought. This is legal property, legitimate property, guaranteed property. It is mine not throughmebut through the—law.
Nevertheless, property is the expression forunlimited dominionover somewhat (thing, beast, man) which "I can judge and dispose of as seems good to me." According to Roman law, indeed,jus utendi et abutendi re sua, quatenus juris ratio patitur, anexclusiveandunlimited right; but property is conditioned by might. What I have in my power, that is my own. So long as I assert myself as holder, I am the proprietor of the thing; if it gets away from me again, no matter by what power,e. g.through my recognition of a title of others to the thing,—then the property is extinct. Thus property and possession coincide. It is not a right lying outside my might that legitimizes me, but solely my might: if I no longer have this, the thing vanishes away from me. When the Romans no longer had any might against the Germans, the world-empire of Romebelongedto the latter, and it would sound ridiculous to insist that the Romans had nevertheless remained properly the proprietors. Whoever knows how to take and to defend the thing, to him it belongs till it is again takenfrom him, as liberty belongs to him whotakesit.—
Only might decides about property, and, as the State (no matter whether State of well-to-do citizens or of ragamuffins or of men in the absolute) is the sole mighty one, it alone is proprietor; I, the unique,[180]have nothing, and am only enfeoffed, am vassal and, as such, servitor. Under the dominion of the State there is no property ofmine.
I want to raise the value of myself, the value of ownness, and should I cheapen property? No, as I was not respected hitherto because people, mankind, and a thousand other generalities were put higher, so property too has to this day not yet been recognized in its full value. Property too was only the property of a ghost,e. g.the people's property; my whole existence "belonged to the fatherland":Ibelonged to the fatherland, the people, the State, and therefore also everything that I calledmy own. It is demanded of States that they make away with pauperism. It seems to me this is asking that the State should cut off its own head and lay it at its feet; for so long as the State is the ego the individual ego must remain a poor devil, a non-ego. The State has an interest only in being itself rich; whether Michael is rich and Peter poor is alike to it; Peter might also be rich and Michael poor. It looks on indifferently as one grows poor and the other rich, unruffled by this alternation. Asindividualsthey are really equal before its face; in this it is just: before it both of them are—nothing, as we "are altogether sinners before God"; on theother hand, it has a very great interest in this, that those individuals who make it their ego should have a part in its wealth; it makes them partakers inits property. Through property, with which it rewards the individuals, it tames them; but this remainsitsproperty, and every one has the usufruct of it only so long as he bears in himself the ego of the State, or is a "loyal member of society"; in the opposite case the property is confiscated, or made to melt away by vexatious lawsuits. The property, then, is and remainsState property, not property of the ego. That the State does not arbitrarily deprive the individual of what he has from the State means simply that the State does not rob itself. He who is a State-ego,i. e.a good citizen or subject, holds his fief undisturbed assuch an ego, not as being an ego of his own. According to the code, property is what I call mine "by virtue of God and law." But it is mine by virtue of God and law only so long as—the State has nothing against it.
In expropriations, disarmaments, and the like (as,e. g., the exchequer confiscates inheritances if the heirs do not put in an appearance early enough) how plainly the else-veiled principle that only thepeople, "the State," is proprietor, while the individual is feoffee, strikes the eye!
The State, I mean to say, cannot intend that anybody shouldfor his own sakehave property or actually be rich, nay, even well-to-do; it can acknowledge nothing, grant nothing to me as me. The State cannot check pauperism, because the poverty of possession is a poverty of me. He whoisnothingbut what chance or another—to wit, the State—makes out of him alsohasquite rightly nothing but what another gives him. And this other will give him only what hedeserves,i. e.what he is worth byservice. It is not he that realizes a value from himself; the State realizes a value from him.
National economy busies itself much with this subject. It lies far out beyond the "national," however, and goes beyond the concepts and horizon of the State, which knows only State property and can distribute nothing else. For this reason it binds the possession of property toconditions,—as it binds everything to them,e. g.marriage, allowing validity only to the marriage sanctioned by it, and wresting this out of my power. But property ismyproperty only when I hold itunconditionally: only I, asunconditionedego, have property, enter a relation of love, carry on free trade.
The State has no anxiety about me and mine, but about itself and its: I count for something to it only asits child, as "a son of the country"; asegoI am nothing at all for it. For the State's understanding, what befalls me as ego is something accidental, my wealth as well as my impoverishment. But, if I with all that is mine am an accident in the State's eyes, this proves that it cannot comprehendme:Igo beyond its concepts, or, its understanding is too limited to comprehend me. Therefore it cannot do anything for me either.
Pauperism is thevaluelessness of me, the phenomenon that I cannot realize value from myself. For this reason State and pauperism are one and the same.The State does not let me come to my value, and continues in existence only through my valuelessness: it is forever intent ongetting benefitfrom me,i. e.exploiting me, turning me to account, using me up, even if the use it gets from me consists only in my supplying aproles(prolétariat); it wants me to be "its creature."
Pauperism can be removed only when I as egorealize valuefrom myself, when I give my own self value, and make my price myself. I must rise in revolt to rise in the world.
What I produce, flour, linen, or iron and coal, which I toilsomely win from the earth, etc., ismywork that I want to realize value from. But then I may long complain that I am not paid for my work according to its value: the payer will not listen to me, and the State likewise will maintain an apathetic attitude so long as it does not think it must "appease" me thatImay not break out with my dreaded might. But this "appeasing" will be all, and, if it comes into my head to ask for more, the State turns against me with all the force of its lion-paws and eagle-claws: for it is the king of beasts, it is lion and eagle. If I refuse to be content with the price that it fixes for my ware and labor, if I rather aspire to determine the price of my ware myself,i. e."to pay myself," in the first place I come into a conflict with the buyers of the ware. If this were stilled by a mutual understanding, the State would not readily make objections; for how individuals get along with each other troubles it little, so long as therein they do not get in its way. Its damage and its danger begin onlywhen they do not agree, but, in the absence of a settlement, take each other by the hair. The State cannot endure that man stand in a direct relation to man; it must step between as—mediator, must—intervene. What Christ was, what the saints, the Church were, the State has become,—to wit, "mediator." It tears man from man to put itself between them as "spirit." The laborers who ask for higher pay are treated as criminals as soon as they want tocompelit. What are they to do? Without compulsion they don't get it, and in compulsion the State sees a self-help, a determination of price by the ego, a genuine, free realization of value from his property, which it cannot admit of. What then are the laborers to do? Look to themselves and ask nothing about the State?— —
But, as is the situation with regard to my material work, so it is with my intellectual too. The State allows me to realize value from all my thoughts and to find customers for them (I do realize value from them,e. g., in the very fact that they bring me honor from the listeners, and the like); but only so long as my thoughts are—itsthoughts. If, on the other hand, I harbor thoughts that it cannot approve (i. e.make its own), then it does not allow me at all to realize value from them, to bring them intoexchange, intocommerce.Mythoughts are free only if they are granted to me by the State'sgrace,i. e.if they are the State's thoughts. It lets me philosophize freely only so far as I approve myself a "philosopher of State";againstthe State I must not philosophize, gladly as it tolerates my helping it out of its "deficiencies," "furthering" it.—Therefore, as I may behave only as an ego most graciously permitted by the State, provided with its testimonial of legitimacy and police pass, so too it is not granted me to realize value from what is mine, unless this proves to be its, which I hold as fief from it. My ways must be its ways, else it distrains me; my thoughts its thoughts, else it stops my mouth.
The State has nothing to be more afraid of than the value of me, and nothing must it more carefully guard against than every occasion that offers itself to me forrealizing valuefrom myself.Iam the deadly enemy of the State, which always hovers between the alternatives, it or I. Therefore it strictly insists not only on not lettingmehave a standing, but also on keeping down what ismine. In the State there is no—property,i. e.no property of the individual, but only State property. Only through the State have I what I have, as I am only through it what I am. My private property is only that which the State leaves to me ofits, cutting offothers from it (depriving them, making it private); it is State property.
But, in opposition to the State, I feel more and more clearly that there is still left me a great might, the might over myself,i. e.over everything that pertains only to me and thatexistsonly in being my own.
What do I do if my ways are no longer its ways, my thoughts no longer its thoughts? I look to myself, and ask nothing about it! Inmythoughts, which I get sanctioned by no assent, grant, or grace, I have my real property, a property with which I can trade. For as mine they are mycreatures, and I amin a position to give them away in return forotherthoughts: I give them up and take in exchange for them others, which then are my new purchased property.
What then ismyproperty? Nothing but what is in mypower! To what property am I entitled? To every property to which I—empowermyself.[181]I give myself the right of property in taking property to myself, or giving myself the proprietor'spower, full power, empowerment.
Everything over which I have might that cannot be torn from me remains my property; well, then let might decide about property, and I will expect everything from my might! Alien might, might that I leave to another, makes me an owned slave: then let my own might make me an owner. Let me then withdraw the might that I have conceded to others out of ignorance regarding the strength of myownmight! Let me say to myself, what my might reaches to is my property; and let me claim as property everything that I feel myself strong enough to attain, and let me extend my actual property as far asIentitle,i. e.—empower, myself to take.
Here egoism, selfishness, must decide; not the principle oflove,not love-motives like mercy, gentleness, good-nature, or even justice and equity (forjustitiatoo is a phenomenon of—love, a product of love): love knows onlysacrificesand demands "self-sacrifice."
Egoism does not think of sacrificing anything, giving away anything that it wants; it simply decides,What I want I must have and will procure.
All attempts to enact rational laws about property have put out from the bay ofloveinto a desolate sea of regulations. Even Socialism and Communism cannot be excepted from this. Every one is to be provided with adequate means, for which it is little to the point whether one socialistically finds them still in a personal property, or communistically draws them from the community of goods. The individual's mind in this remains the same; it remains a mind of dependence. The distributingboard of equitylets me have only what the sense of equity, itslovingcare for all, prescribes. For me, the individual, there lies no less of a check incollective wealththan in that ofindividual others; neither that is mine, nor this: whether the wealth belongs to the collectivity, which confers part of it on me, or to individual possessors, is for me the same constraint, as I cannot decide about either of the two. On the contrary, Communism, by the abolition of all personal property, only presses me back still more into dependence on another,viz., on the generality or collectivity; and, loudly as it always attacks the "State," what it intends is itself again a State, astatus, a condition hindering my free movement, a sovereign power over me. Communism rightly revolts against the pressure that I experience from individual proprietors; but still more horrible is the might that it puts in the hands of the collectivity.
Egoism takes another way to root out the non-possessing rabble. It does not say: Wait for what the board of equity will—bestow on you in the name of the collectivity (for such bestowal took place in"States" from the most ancient times, each receiving "according to his desert," and therefore according to the measure in which each was able todeserveit, to acquire it byservice), but: Take hold, and take what you require! With this the war of all against all is declared.Ialone decide what I will have.
"Now, that is truly no new wisdom, for self-seekers have acted so at all times!" Not at all necessary either that the thing be new, if onlyconsciousnessof it is present. But this latter will not be able to claim great age, unless perhaps one counts in the Egyptian and Spartan law; for how little current it is appears even from the stricture above, which speaks with contempt of "self-seekers." One is to know just this, that the procedure of taking hold is not contemptible, but manifests the pure deed of the egoist at one with himself.
Only when I expect neither from individuals nor from a collectivity what I can give to myself, only then do I slip out of the snares of—love; the rabble ceases to be rabble only when ittakes hold. Only the dread of taking hold, and the corresponding punishment thereof, makes it a rabble. Only that taking hold issin, crime,—only this dogma creates a rabble. For the fact that the rabble remains what it is, it (because it allows validity to that dogma) is to blame as well as, more especially, those who "self-seekingly" (to give them back their favorite word) demand that the dogma be respected. In short, the lack ofconsciousnessof that "new wisdom," the old consciousness of sin, alone bears the blame.
If men reach the point of losing respect for property, every one will have property, as all slaves become free men as soon as they no longer respect the master as master.Unionswill then, in this matter too, multiply the individual's means and secure his assailed property.
According to the Communists' opinion the commune should be proprietor. On the contrary,Iam proprietor, and I only come to an understanding with others about my property. If the commune does not do what suits me, I rise against it and defend my property. I am proprietor, but property isnot sacred. I should be merely possessor? No, hitherto one was only possessor, secured in the possession of a parcel by leaving others also in possession of a parcel; but noweverythingbelongs to me, I am proprietor ofeverything that I requireand can get possession of. If it is said socialistically, society gives me what I require,—then the egoist says, I take what I require. If the Communists conduct themselves as ragamuffins, the egoist behaves as proprietor.
All swan-fraternities,[182]and attempts at making the rabble happy, that spring from the principle of love, must miscarry. Only from egoism can the rabble get help, and this help it must give to itself and—will give to itself. If it does not let itself be coerced into fear, it is a power. "People would lose all respect if one did not coerce them so into fear," says bugbear Law in "Der gestiefelte Kater."
Property, therefore, should not and cannot be abolished; it must rather be torn from ghostly handsand becomemyproperty; then the erroneous consciousness, that I cannot entitle myself to as much as I require, will vanish.—
"But what cannot man require!" Well, whoever requires much, and understands how to get it, has at all times helped himself to it, as Napoleon did with the Continent and France with Algiers. Hence the exact point is that the respectful "rabble" should learn at last to help itself to what it requires. If it reaches out too far for you, why, then defend yourselves. You have no need at all to good-heartedly—bestow anything on it; and, when it learns to know itself, it—or rather: whoever of the rabble learns to know himself, he—casts off the rabble-quality in refusing your alms with thanks. But it remains ridiculous that you declare the rabble "sinful and criminal" if it is not pleased to live from your favors because it can do something in its own favor. Your bestowals cheat it and put it off. Defend your property, then you will be strong; if, on the other hand, you want to retain your ability to bestow, and perhaps actually have the more political rights the more alms (poor-rates) you can give, this will work just as long as the recipients let you work it.[183]
In short, the property question cannot be solved so amicably as the Socialists, yes, even the Communists, dream. It is solved only by the war of all against all. The poor become free and proprietors only when they—rise. Bestow ever so much on them, they will still always want more; for they want nothing less than that at last—nothing more be bestowed.
It will be asked, But how then will it be when the have-nots take heart? Of what sort is the settlement to be? One might as well ask that I cast a child's nativity. What a slave will do as soon as he has broken his fetters, one must—await.
In Kaiser's pamphlet, worthless for lack of form as well as substance ("Die Persoenlichkeit des Eigentuemers in Bezug auf den Socialismus und Communismus," etc.), he hopes from theStatethat it will bring about a leveling of property. Always the State! Herr Papa! As the Church was proclaimed and looked upon as the "mother" of believers, so the State has altogether the face of the provident father.
Competitionshows itself most strictly connected with the principle of civism. Is it anything else thanequality(égalité)? And is not equality a product of that same Revolution which was brought on by the commonalty, the middle classes? As no one is barred from competing with all in the State (except the prince, because he represents the State itself) and working himself up to their height, yes, overthrowing or exploiting them for his own advantage, soaring above them and by stronger exertion depriving them of their favorable circumstances,—this serves as a clear proof that before the State's judgment-seat every one has only the value of a "simple individual" and may not count on any favoritism. Outrun and outbid each other as much as you like and can; that shallnot trouble me, the State! Among yourselves you are free in competing, you are competitors; that is yoursocialposition. But before me, the State, you are nothing but "simple individuals"![184]
What in the form of principle or theory was propounded as the equality of all has found here in competition its realization and practical carrying out; forégalitéis—free competition. All are, before the State,—simple individuals; in society, or in relation to each other,—competitors.
I need be nothing further than a simple individual to be able to compete with all others aside from the prince and his family: a freedom which formerly was made impossible by the fact that only by means of one's corporation, and within it, did one enjoy any freedom of effort.
In the guild and feudality the State is in an intolerant and fastidious attitude, grantingprivileges; in competition and liberalism it is in a tolerant and indulgent attitude, granting onlypatents(letters assuring the applicant that the business stands open [patent] to him) or "concessions." Now, as the State has thus left everything to theapplicants, it must come in conflict withall, because each and all are entitled to make application. It will be "stormed," and will go down in this storm.
Is "free competition" then really "free"? nay, is itreally a "competition,"—to wit, one ofpersons,—as it gives itself out to be because on this title it bases its right? It originated, you know, in persons becoming free of all personal rule. Is a competition "free" which the State, this ruler in the civic principle, hems in by a thousand barriers? There is a rich manufacturer doing a brilliant business, and I should like to compete with him. "Go ahead," says the State, "I have no objection to make to yourpersonas competitor." Yes, I reply, but for that I need a space for buildings, I need money! "That's bad; but, if you have no money, you cannot compete. You must not take anything from anybody, for I protect property and grant it privileges." Free competition is not "free," because I lack theTHINGSfor competition. Against mypersonno objection can be made, but because I have not the things my person too must step to the rear. And who has the necessary things? Perhaps that manufacturer? Why, from him I could take them away! No, the State has them as property, the manufacturer only as fief, as possession.
But, since it is no use trying it with the manufacturer, I will compete with that professor of jurisprudence; the man is a booby, and I, who know a hundred times more than he, shall make his class-room empty. "Have you studied and graduated, friend?" No, but what of that? I understand abundantly what is necessary for instruction in that department. "Sorry, but competition is not 'free' here. Against your person there is nothing to be said, but thething, the doctor's diploma, is lacking. And this diploma I, the State, demand. Ask me for it respectfullyfirst; then we will see what is to be done."
This, therefore, is the "freedom" of competition. The State,my lord, first qualifies me to compete.
But dopersonsreally compete? No, againthingsonly! Moneys in the first place, etc.
In the rivalry one will always be left behind another (e. g.a poetaster behind a poet). But it makes a difference whether the means that the unlucky competitor lacks are personal or material, and likewise whether the material means can be won bypersonal energyor are to be obtained only bygrace, only as a present; as when,e. g., the poorer man must leave,i. e.present, to the rich man his riches. But, if I must all along wait for theState's approvalto obtain or to use (e. g.in the case of graduation) the means, I have the means by thegrace of the State.[185]
Free competition, therefore, has only the following meaning: To the State all rank as its equal children, and every one can scud and run toearn the State's goods and largess. Therefore all do chase after havings, holdings, possessions (be it of money or offices, titles of honor, etc.), after thethings.
In the mind of the commonalty every one is possessor or "owner." Now, whence comes it that the most have in fact next to nothing? From this, that the most are already joyful over being possessors at all, even though it be of some rags, as childrenare joyful in their first trousers or even the first penny that is presented to them. More precisely, however, the matter is to be taken as follows. Liberalism came forward at once with the declaration that it belonged to man's essence not to be property, but proprietor. As the consideration here was about "man," not about the individual, the how-much (which formed exactly the point of the individual's special interest) was left to him. Hence the individual's egoism retained room for the freest play in this how-much, and carried on an indefatigable competition.
However, the lucky egoism had to become a snag in the way of the less fortunate, and the latter, still keeping its feet planted on the principle of humanity, put forward the question as to the how-much of possession, and answered it to the effect that "man must have as much as he requires."
Will it be possible formyegoism to let itself be satisfied with that? What "man" requires furnishes by no means a scale for measuring me and my needs; for I may have use for less or more. I must rather have so much as I am competent to appropriate.
Competition suffers from the unfavorable circumstance that themeansfor competing are not at every one's command, because they are not taken from personality, but from accident. Most arewithout means, and for this reasonwithout goods.
Hence the Socialists demand themeansfor all, and aim at a society that shall offer means. Your money value, say they, we no longer recognize as your "competence"; you must show another competence,—to wit, yourworking force. In the possession of a property, or as "possessor," man does certainly show himself as man; it was for this reason that we let the possessor, whom we called "proprietor," keep his standing so long. Yet you possess the things only so long as you are not "put out of this property."
The possessor is competent, but only so far as the others are incompetent. Since your ware forms your competence only so long as you are competent to defend it (i. e., asweare not competent to do anything with it), look about you for another competence; for we now, by our might, surpass your alleged competence.
It was an extraordinarily large gain made, when the point of being regarded as possessors was put through. Therein bondservice was abolished, and every one who till then had been bound to the lord's service, and more or less had been his property, now became a "lord." But henceforth your having, and what you have, are no longer adequate and no longer recognized;per contra, your working and your work rise in value. We now respect yoursubduingthings, as we formerly did your possessing them. Your work is your competence! You are lord or possessor only of what comes bywork, not byinheritance. But as at the time everything has come by inheritance, and every copper that you possess bears not a labor-stamp but an inheritance stamp, everything must be melted over.
But is my work then really, as the Communists suppose, my sole competence? or does not this consist rather in everything that I am competent for? And does not the workers society itself have to concede this,e. g.in supporting also the sick, children, old men,—in short, those who are incapable of work? These are still competent for a good deal,e. g.to preserve their life instead of taking it. If they are competent to cause you to desire their continued existence, they have a power over you. To him who exercised utterly no power over you, you would vouchsafe nothing; he might perish.
Therefore, what you arecompetentfor is yourcompetence! If you are competent to furnish pleasure to thousands, then thousands will pay you an honorarium for it; for it would stand in your power to forbear doing it, hence they must purchase your deed. If you are not competent tocaptivateany one, you may simply starve.
Now am I, who am competent for much, perchance to have no advantage over the less competent?
We are all in the midst of abundance; now shall I not help myself as well as I can, but only wait and see how much is left me in an equal division?
Against competition there rises up the principle of ragamuffin society,—partition.
To be looked upon as a merepart, part of society, the individual cannot bear—because he ismore; his uniqueness puts from it this limited conception.
Hence he does not await his competence from the I sharing of others, and even in the workers' society there arises the misgiving that in an equal partition the strong will be exploited by the weak; he awaits his competence rather from himself, and says now, What I am competent to have, that is my competence. What competence does not the child possess in itssmiling, its playing, its screaming! in short, in its mere existence! Are you capable of resisting its desire? or do you not hold out to it, as mother, your breast; as father, as much of your possessions as it needs? It compels you, therefore it possesses what you call yours.
If your person is of consequence to me, you pay me with your very existence; if I am concerned only with one of your qualities, then your compliance, perhaps, or your aid, has a value (a money value) for me, and Ipurchaseit.
If you do not know how to give yourself any other than a money value in my estimation, there may arise the case of which history tells us, that Germans, sons of the fatherland, were sold to America. Should those who let themselves be traded in be worth more to the seller? He preferred the cash to this living ware that did not understand how to make itself precious to him. That he discovered nothing more valuable in it was assuredly a defect of his competence; but it takes a rogue to give more than he has. How should he show respect when he did not have it, nay, hardly could have it for such a pack!
You behave egoistically when you respect each other neither as possessors nor as ragamuffins or workers, but as a part of your competence, as "useful bodies." Then you will neither give anything to the possessor ("proprietor") for his possessions, nor to him who works, but only to him whomyou require. The North Americans ask themselves, Do we require a king? and answer, Not a farthing are he and his work worth to us.
If it is said that competition throws every thing open to all, the expression is not accurate, and it is better put thus: competition makes everything purchasable. Inabandoning[186]it to them, competition leaves it to their appraisal[187]or their estimation, and demands a price[188]for it.
But the would-be buyers mostly lack the means to make themselves buyers: they have no money. For money, then, the purchasable things are indeed to be had ("For money everything is to be had!"), but it is exactly money that is lacking. Where is one to get money, this current or circulating property? Know then, you have as much money[189]as you have—might; for you count[190]for as much as you make yourself count for.
One pays not with money, of which there may come a lack, but with his competence, by which alone we are "competent";[191]for one is proprietor only so far as the arm of our power reaches.
Weitling has thought out a new means of payment,—work. But the true means of payment remains, as always,competence. With what you have "within your competence" you pay. Therefore think on the enlargement of your competence.
This being admitted, they are nevertheless right on hand again with the motto, "To each according to his competence!" Who is togiveto me according to my competence? Society? Then I should have to put up with its estimation. Rather, I shalltakeaccording to my competence.
"All belongs to all!" This proposition springs from the same unsubstantial theory. To each belongs only what he is competent for. If I say, The world belongs to me, properly that too is empty talk, which has a meaning only in so far as I respect no alien property. But to me belongs only as much as I am competent for, or have within my competence.
One is not worthy to have what one, through weakness, lets be taken from him; one is not worthy of it because one is not capable of it.
They raise a mighty uproar over the "wrong of a thousand years" which is being committed by the rich against the poor. As if the rich were to blame for poverty, and the poor were not in like manner responsible for riches! Is there another difference between the two than that of competence and incompetence, of the competent and incompetent? Wherein, pray, does the crime of the rich consist? "In their hardheartedness." But who then have maintained the poor? who have cared for their nourishment? who have given alms, those alms that have even their name from mercy (eleemosyne)? Have not the rich been "merciful" at all times? are they not to this day "tender-hearted," as poor-taxes, hospitals, foundations of all sorts, etc., prove?
But all this does not satisfy you! Doubtless, then, they are tosharewith the poor? Now you are demanding that they shall abolish poverty. Aside from the point that there might be hardly one among you who would act so, and that this one would be a fool for it, do ask yourselves: why should the rich let gotheir fleeces and give upthemselves, thereby pursuing the advantage of the poor rather than their own? You, who have your thaler daily, are rich above thousands who live on four groschen. Is it for your interest to share with the thousands, or is it not rather for theirs?— —
With competition is connected less the intention to do the thingbestthan the intention to make it asprofitable, as productive, as possible. Hence people study to get into the civil service (pot-boiling study), study cringing and flattery, routine and "acquaintance with business," work "for appearances." Hence, while it is apparently a matter of doing "good service," in truth only a "good business" and earning of money are looked out for. The job is done only ostensibly for the job's sake, but in fact on account of the gain that it yields. One would indeed prefer not to be censor, but one wants to be—advanced; one would like to judge, administer, etc., according to his best convictions, but one is afraid of transference or even dismissal; one must, above all things,—live.
Thus these goings-on are a fight fordear life, and, in gradation upward, for more or less of a "good living."
And yet, withal, their whole round of toil and care brings in for most only "bitter life" and "bitter poverty." All the bitter painstaking for this!
Restless acquisition does not let us take breath, take a calmenjoyment: we do not get the comfort of our possessions.
But the organization of labor touches only such labors as others can do for us,e. g.slaughtering, tillage, etc.; the rest remain egoistic, because,e. g., no one can in your stead elaborate your musical compositions, carry out your projects of painting, etc.; nobody can replace Raphael's labors. The latter are labors of a unique person,[192]which only he is competent to achieve, while the former deserved to be called "human," since what is anybody'sownin them is of slight account, and almost "any man" can be trained to it.
Now, as society can regard only labors for the common benefit,humanlabors, he who does anythinguniqueremains without its care; nay, he may find himself disturbed by its intervention. The unique person will work himself forth out of society all right, but society brings forth no unique person.
Hence it is at any rate helpful that we come to an agreement abouthumanlabors, that they may not, as under competition, claim all our time and toil. So far Communism will bear its fruits. For before the dominion of the commonalty even that for which all men are qualified, or can be qualified, was tied up to a few and withheld from the rest: it was a privilege. To the commonalty it looked equitable to leave free all that seemed to exist for every "man." But, because left[193]free, it was yet given to no one, but rather left to each to be got hold of by hishumanpower. By this the mind was turned to the acquisition of the human, which henceforth beckoned to every one; and there arose a movement which one hears so loudly bemoaned under the name of "materialism."
Communism seeks to check its course, spreading the belief that the human is not worth so much discomfort, and, with sensible arrangements, could be gained without the great expense of time and powers which has hitherto seemed requisite.
But for whom is time to be gained? For what does man require more time than is necessary to refresh his wearied powers of labor? Here Communism is silent.
For what? To take comfort in himself as the unique, after he has done his part as man!
In the first joy over being allowed to stretch out their hands toward everything human, people forgot to want anything else; and they competed away vigorously, as if the possession of the human were the goal of all our wishes.
But they have run themselves tired, and are gradually noticing that "possession does not give happiness." Therefore they are thinking of obtaining the necessary by an easier bargain, and spending on it only so much time and toil as its indispensableness exacts. Riches fall in price, and contented poverty, the care-free ragamuffin, becomes the seductive ideal.
Should such human activities, that every one is confident of his capacity for, be highly salaried, and sought for with toil and expenditure of all life-forces? Even in the every-day form of speech, "If I were minister, or even the ..., then it should go quite otherwise," that confidence expresses itself,—that one holds himself capable of playing the part of such a dignitary; one does get a perception that to things of this sort there belongs not uniqueness, but only aculture which is attainable, even if not exactly by all, at any rate by many;i. e.that for such a thing one need only be an ordinary man.
If we assume that, asorderbelongs to the essence of the State, sosubordinationtoo is founded in its nature, then we see that the subordinates, or those who have received preferment, disproportionatelyoverchargeandoverreachthose who are put in the lower ranks. But the latter take heart (first from the Socialist standpoint, but certainly with egoistic consciousness later, of which we will therefore at once give their speech some coloring) for the question, By what then is your property secure, you creatures of preferment?—and give themselves the answer, By our refraining from interference! And so byourprotection! And what do you give us for it? Kicks and disdain you give to the "common people"; police supervision, and a catechism with the chief sentence "Respect what isnot yours, what belongs toothers! respect others, and especially your superiors!" But we reply, "If you want our respect,buyit for a price agreeable to us. We will leave you your property, if you give a due equivalent for this leaving." Really, what equivalent does the general in time of peace give for the many thousands of his yearly income? another for the sheer hundred-thousands and millions yearly? What equivalent do you give for our chewing potatoes and looking calmly on while you swallow oysters? Only buy the oysters of us as dear as we have to buy the potatoes of you, then you may go on eating them. Or do you suppose the oysters do not belong to us as much as to you? You will make anoutcry overviolenceif we reach out our hands and help consume them, and you are right. Without violence we do not get them, as you no less have them by doing violence to us.
But take the oysters and have done with it, and let us consider our nearer property, labor; for the other is only possession. We distress ourselves twelve hours in the sweat of our face, and you offer us a few groschen for it. Then take the like for your labor too. Are you not willing? You fancy that our labor is richly repaid with that wage, while yours on the other hand is worth a wage of many thousands. But, if you did not rate yours so high, and gave us a better chance to realize value from ours, then we might well, if the case demanded it, bring to pass still more important things than you do for the many thousand thalers; and, if you got only such wages as we, you would soon grow more industrious in order to receive more. But, if you render any service that seems to us worth ten and a hundred times more than our own labor, why, then you shall get a hundred times more for it too; we, on the other hand, think also to produce for you things for which you will requite us more highly than with the ordinary day's wages. We shall be willing to get along with each other all right, if only we have first agreed on this,—that neither any longer needs to—presentanything to the other. Then we may perhaps actually go so far as to pay even the cripples and sick and old an appropriate price for not parting from us by hunger and want; for, if we want them to live, it is fitting also that we—purchase the fulfilment of our will. I say "purchase,"and therefore do not mean a wretched "alms." For their life is the property even of those who cannot work; if we (no matter for what reason) want them not to withdraw this life from us, we can mean to bring this to pass only by purchase; nay, we shall perhaps (maybe because we like to have friendly faces about us) even want a life of comfort for them. In short, we want nothing presented by you, but neither will we present you with anything. For centuries we have handed alms to you from good-hearted—stupidity, have doled out the mite of the poor and given to the masters the things that are—not the masters'; now just open your wallet, for henceforth our ware rises in price quite enormously. We do not want to take from you anything, anything at all, only you are to pay better for what you want to have. What then have you? "I have an estate of a thousand acres." And I am your plowman, and will henceforth attend to your fields only for one thaler a day wages. "Then I'll take another." You won't find any, for we plowmen are no longer doing otherwise, and, if one puts in an appearance who takes less, then let him beware of us. There is the housemaid, she too is now demanding as much, and you will no longer find one below this price. "Why, then it is all over with me." Not so fast! You will doubtless take in as much as we; and, if it should not be so, we will take off so much that you shall have wherewith to live like us. "But I am accustomed to live better." We have nothing against that, but it is not our lookout; if you can clear more, go ahead. Are we to hire out under rates, that you may have a good living? Therich man always puts off the poor with the words, "What does your want concern me? See to it how you make your way through the world; that isyour affair, not mine." Well, let us let it be our affair, then, and let us not let the means that we have to realize value from ourselves be pilfered from us by the rich. "But you uncultured people really do not need so much." Well, we are taking somewhat more in order that for it we may procure the culture that we perhaps need. "But, if you thus bring down the rich, who is then to support the arts and sciences hereafter?" Oh, well, we must make it up by numbers; we club together, that gives a nice little sum,—besides, you rich men now buy only the most tasteless books and the most lamentable Madonnas or a pair of lively dancer's legs. "O ill-starred equality!" No, my good old sir, nothing of equality. We only want to count for what we are worth, and, if you are worth more, you shall count for more right along. We only want to beworth our price, and think to show ourselves worth the price that you will pay.
Is the State likely to be able to awaken so secure a temper and so forceful a self-consciousness in the menial? Can it make man feel himself? nay, may it even do so much as set this goal for itself? Can it want the individual to recognize his value and realize this value from himself? Let us keep the parts of the double question separate, and see first whether the State can bring about such a thing. As the unanimity of the plowmen is required, only this unanimity can bring it to pass, and a State law would be evaded in a thousand ways by competition and in secret.But can the State bear with it? The State cannot possibly bear with people's suffering coercion from another than it; it could not, therefore, admit the self-help of the unanimous plowmen against those who want to engage for lower wages. Suppose, however, that the State made the law, and all the plowmen were in accord with it: could the State bear with it then?
In the isolated case—yes; but the isolated case is more than that, it is a case ofprinciple. The question therein is of the whole range ofthe ego's self-realization of value from himself, and therefore also of his self-consciousnessagainstthe State. So far the Communists keep company; but, as self-realization of value from self necessarily directs itself against the State, so it does againstsocietytoo, and therewith reaches out beyond the commune and the communistic—out of egoism.
Communism makes the maxim of the commonalty, that every one is a possessor ("proprietor"), into an irrefragable truth, into a reality, since the anxiety aboutobtainingnow ceases and every onehasfrom the start what he requires. In his labor-force hehashis competence, and, if he makes no use of it, that is his fault. The grasping and hounding is at an end, and no competition is left (as so often now) without fruit, because with every stroke of labor an adequate supply of the needful is brought into the house. Now for the first time one is areal possessor, because what one has in his labor-force can no longer escape from him as it was continually threatening to do under the system of competition. One is acare-freeand assuredpossessor. And one is this precisely by seeking his competence no longer in a ware, but in his own labor, his competence for labor; and therefore by being aragamuffin, a man of only ideal wealth.I, however, cannot content myself with the little that I scrape up by my competence for labor, because my competence does not consist merely in my labor.
By labor I can perform the official functions of a president, a minister, etc.; these offices demand only a general culture,—to wit, such a culture as is generally attainable (for general culture is not merely that which every one has attained, but broadly that which every one can attain, and therefore every special culture,e. g.medical, military, philological, of which no "cultivated man" believes that they surpass his powers), or, broadly, only a skill possible to all.
But, even if these offices may vest in every one, yet it is only the individual's unique force, peculiar to him alone, that gives them, so to speak, life and significance. That he does not manage his office like an "ordinary man," but puts in the competence of his uniqueness, this he is not yet paid for when he is paid only in general as an official or a minister. If he has done it so as to earn your thanks, and you wish to retain this thankworthy force of the unique one, you must not pay him like a mere man who performed only what was human, but as one who accomplishes what is unique. Do the like with your labor, do!
There cannot be a general schedule-price fixed for my uniqueness as there can for what I do as man. Only for the latter can a schedule-price be set.
Go right on, then, setting up a general appraisalfor human labors, but do not deprive your uniqueness of its desert.
Humanorgeneralneeds can be satisfied through society; for satisfaction ofuniqueneeds you must do some seeking. A friend and a friendly service, or even an individual's service, society cannot procure you. And yet you will every moment be in need of such a service, and on the slightest occasions require somebody who is helpful to you. Therefore do not rely on society, but see to it that you have the wherewithal to—purchase the fulfiment of your wishes.
Whether money is to be retained among egoists?—To the old stamp an inherited possession adheres. If you no longer let yourselves be paid with it, it is ruined: if you do nothing for this money, it loses all power. Cancel theinheritance, and you have broken off the executor's court-seal. For now everything is an inheritance, whether it be already inherited or await its heir. If it is yours, wherefore do you let it be sealed up from you? why do you respect the seal?
But why should you not create a new money? Do you then annihilate the ware in taking from it the hereditary stamp? Now, money is a ware, and an essentialmeansor competence. For it protects against the ossification of resources, keeps them in flux and brings to pass their exchange. If you know a better medium of exchange, go ahead; yet it will be a "money" again. It is not the money that does you damage, but your incompetence to take it. Let your competence take effect, collect yourselves, and there will be no lack of money—of your money, the money ofyourstamp. But working I do not call "lettingyour competence take effect." Those who are only "looking for work" and "willing to work hard" are preparing for their own selves the infallible upshot—to be out of work.
Good and bad luck depend on money. It is a power in thebourgeoisperiod for this reason, that it is only wooed on all hands like a girl, indissolubly wedded by nobody. All the romance and chivalry ofwooingfor a dear object come to life again in competition. Money, an object of longing, is carried off by the bold "knights of industry."[194]
He who has luck takes home the bride. The ragamuffin has luck; he takes her into his household, "society," and destroys the virgin. In his house she is no longer bride, but wife; and with her virginity her family name is also lost. As housewife the maiden Money is called "Labor," for "Labor" is her husband's name. She is a possession of her husband's.