Difficulty was at first experienced in getting Cherif Pasha to undertake the formation of a Ministry. His idea was that it was inconsistent with a due regard for his own reputation for him to pose before the world as the accomplice of the mutinous soldiery, and at one time, after an interview with Arabi, Cherif positively declined. Meanwhile, meetings of the officers were held in which the most violent appeared to have the upper hand, and the belief that they had nothing to fear from Turkish intervention emboldened them to reject an ultimatum of Cherif, which was that, on condition of his undertaking the government, and guaranteeing the safety of the leaders, they should withdraw their regiments to certain posts assigned to them.
Public opinion, more particularly amongst the Europeans, became much alarmed, and the Khedive declared himself ready to yield everything in order to save public security.
On the 13th September, however, things took an unexpected turn for the better. Arabi, at the suggestion of Mahmoud Sami, who hoped to render Cherif impossible, and to get himself nominated in his place, summoned to Cairo the members of the Chamber of Notables. Cherif had acquired a good deal of popularity among the class to which the Notables belonged, and at their first meeting he found arguments to induce them to adopt a tone hostile to Arabi and his friends, whom they told to attend to the army, and mind their own business. The Notables went even further, and signed an address to Cherif entreating him to form a Ministry, and giving their personal guarantee that if he consented, the army should yield absolute submission to his orders. Arabi, it will be remembered, had all along professed to act on behalf of the Egyptian people, and the attitude of the Notables was a severe check to him, or rather to Mahmoud Sami, who was pulling the wires. This last individual, seeing that the Notables were playing into the hand of Cherif, at once declared himself the partisan of the latter and of the Chamber, and as a consequence Sami was reappointed Minister of War in the Cabinet which Cherif was eventually persuaded to form.
On the 14th of September the new Ministry was gazetted, and steps were taken for the dispersal of the disaffected regiments in the provinces. On the 6th of October Arabi and his regiment left Cairo for the military station of El Ouady, in the Delta. Before he left he was received by the Khedive, whom he assured of his respect and entire devotion. When one remembers how often Arabi had gone through this ceremony, one can hardly help thinking that Tewfik must, by this time, have begun to get a little tired of it. Before leaving, Arabi made speeches tothe troops, in which he exhorted them "to remain united, and to draw even more tightly, if possible, those bonds of fraternity of which they had already given such striking examples." Finally, after pointing out—it must be presumed by way of a joke—that obedience in a soldier was the first of virtues, he declared that as long as he possessed a drop of blood, or a living breath, both should belong to his beloved sovereign.
Meanwhile the elections for the Chamber of Notables, which had been convoked by the Khedive for the 23rd of December, were proceeding. The Chamber was called together under an old law of Ismail's time, made in 1866, under which the Notables possessed but very limited functions. They were, in fact, simply a consultative body, with power only to discuss such matters as might be brought before them by the advisers of the Government.
There is no doubt that, apart from the military movement, there was a widespread feeling of discontent in the country at this time. Ismail's merciless exactions, and the pressure of foreign money-lenders, had given rise to a desire to limit the power of the Khedive, and, above all, to abolish the Anglo-French Control, which was considered as ruling the country simply for the benefit of the foreign bondholders. The Control was further hated by the large landowners, because the law of liquidation (with which the Controllers in the minds of the people were associated) had in a measure sacrificed their claims for compensation in respect of the cancelling of a forced loan known as the "Moukabeleh," and it was still more detested by the Pashas and native officials, because it interfered with the reckless squandering of public money, and the many opportunities for corruption by which they had so long benefited.
In addition to this, there was a great deal of irritation at the increasing number of highly paid European officials which the reformed regime inaugurated in the latter days of Ismail involved. The people began to suspect that what was occurring was only part of a plan for handing the country over to Europeans. The examples lately set by England with regard to Cyprus, and by France in Tunis, were, it must be owned, but little calculated to inspire confidence in the political morality of either of these two Powers.
The prevailing irritation was kept alive by the native press, which began to indulge in the most violent abuse of Europeans. The army, too, continued to show signs of insubordination in many ways. To add to the difficulties of the situation, the colonels of the regiments which had been expressly sent away into the provinces had acquired the inconvenient habit of coming back to the capital, and joining in the many intrigues on foot.
Next followed a demand by the Minister of War for an augmentation of the War Budget, in order to increase the army to the maximum allowed by the Sultan's Firman.
Under these circumstances the Chamber of Notables assembled on the 25th of December, 1881.
The earliest trouble arose from the demand of the Notables that the law under which they were assembled should be modified so as to give them power to vote the Budget so far as it related to such of the revenues as were not assigned to the Public Debt.
The claim of the Chamber, though plausible enough at first sight, was really, if granted, calculated to infringe all the international arrangements for the Debt. It was obvious that if the Chamber had the power and chose to vote an extravagant Budget so far as related to theunassignedrevenues, the administration of the country could not be carried on, national bankruptcy might ensue, and the collection of the assigned revenues would become impossible.
The Chamber, however, not only refused to give way on the question of the Budget, but it demanded that the law should be further amended by giving the Notables other privileges, namely, the right to control the acts of public functionaries, to initiate legislation, and to hold the Ministers responsible to the Chamber. By getting the Notables to make these demands, which he knewcould not be accepted, Mahmoud Sami's object was to bring about a crisis which could only end in the downfall of Cherif's Cabinet. He had already persuaded Cherif to make Arabi Sub-Minister of War, under the pretext of securing him on the side of the Ministry, and so neutralizing the influence which the army was exercising over the Chamber. In reality the appointment only afforded Mahmoud Sami and Arabi increased facilities for intriguing against Cherif. The result was soon seen.
The amendments to the law giving the Chamber increased power were inadmissible on many grounds. Were there no other objection, there was the insurmountable one that the Sultan had already refused a Constitution to other parts of his dominions, and would certainly oppose its being granted to Egypt. To put it shortly, the amendments after being submitted to the English and French Governments were declared unacceptable.
This at once brought about a crisis, and the Chamber, on the 2nd February, sent a deputation to the Khedive to require him to summon a new Ministry.
At this period it was reported to the English and French Governments that activity was being displayed in putting all the coast fortifications in an efficient state, and that the strength of the army was being augmented under the provisions of the new War Budget.
These circumstances, taken in conjunction with the political events above recorded, led the English and French Governments to conclude that if the Khedive was to be maintained in power, the time was coming for them to think about doing something in Egypt. On the 20th of January, 1882, Sir Edward Malet wrote that "armed intervention had become necessary if the refusal to allow the Chamber to vote the Budget was to be agreed to, and yet it was impossible to do otherwise, as the measure only formed part of a complete scheme of revolution." As far back as December, 1881, M. Gambetta, then at the head of the French Ministry, had suggested that England and France should take "joint action in Egypt to strengthen the authority of the Khedive, and to cut short intrigues at Constantinople, as well as to make the Porte feel that any undue interference on its part would not be tolerated."
This proposal shortly after resulted in the famous Joint Notecommunicated by the English and the French representatives to the Khedive in Cairo, on the 8th January, 1882. The document was to the effect that the English and French Governments considered the maintenance of His Highness upon the throne in the terms laid down by the Sultan's Firmans, and officially recognized by the two Governments, as alone able to guarantee for the present and the future good order and prosperity in Egypt, in which England and France were equally interested. It continued to say that "the two Governments, being closely associated in the resolve to guard by their united efforts against all cause of complication, internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt, did not doubt that the assurance publicly given of their intention in this respect would tend to divert the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed, and which would certainly find England and France united to oppose them."
The parentage of the Joint Note is attributable to the French Government, which, up to this time, seemed bent on retaining the lead which it had from the first taken in regard to Egyptian affairs. The wording of the document had been altered more than once to suit the late Lord Granville, then Foreign Secretary, who appears to have been not quite sure how far he was getting out of his depth in regard to Egyptian matters.
It was under the influence of some such misgiving that Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador in Paris, was instructed on the 6th January, 1882, in communicating to the French Government England's assent to the Note, to make the reservation that she must not be considered as thereby committing herself toany particular mode of action, if action should be found necessary. In reply, M. Gambetta, by a despatch dated the following day, stated that he observed with pleasure "that the only reservation of the Government of the Queen was as to themode of actionto be employed, and that this was a reservation in which he participated."
When one sees how, later on, when action became necessary, the attitude of the two countries became reversed, the extreme reluctance of the English Government to move at this time seems curious enough, especially when it is contrasted with the continued readiness of France to come forward in the interval. The explanation is that M. Gambetta, with his clear statesman-like intellect, foreseeing that some sort of intervention would become necessary, was determined that it should be limited to that of England and France to the exclusion of Turkey, and so long as he remained in power boldly shaped his policy with that object. The English Government, on the other hand, had throughout no real settled policy with regard to Egypt. Their first idea was to have no intervention at all; they hoped that things would mend of themselves. When they found that this was not likely to be the case, the idea of a Turkish intervention found favour. France, however, was resolutely opposed to this, and to allow the latter Power to take isolated action, as indeed she appeared disposed to do if thwarted, was open to seriousobjections. To avoid such a catastrophe the English Government found themselves under the necessity of following, for the time being, the masterly lead of M. Gambetta. However this may have been, England, by taking part in the Joint Note, assumed a definite position relative to Egypt, and, throwing off all hesitation as to "interference with the internal affairs of the country," pledged herself jointly with France to support the Khedive against all enemies from within or without.
The first to take offence at the Joint Note was naturally enough the Sultan, who caused Lord Granville to be informed that the Porte considered that sending the Khedive any such communication except through itself was highly improper. The Sultan added that, "To protect the immunities granted to Egypt, and to preserve the order and prosperity of that province, was the sincere wish and interest of the Porte, whose efforts had till then always been directed to that end, and that there were no circumstances in Egypt which could serve as a motive for any foreign assurances of the kind made." Finally, the Turkish Ambassador requested that the two Powers would give an explanation of what they meant. At the same time the Sultan sent a Circular to the other Powers, protesting against the action of England and France.
Lord Granville now began to doubt whether he had not gone a little too far, and drafted an answer to the Porte of an apologetic character. The tone of the proposed reply was somewhat of the kind that a schoolboy taken to task for an act of impertinence towards his master might be expected to give.Substantially, it was that the two Powers did not mean anything at all.
The despatch, as originally drafted, began by disclaiming any doubt whatever as to the sovereignty of the Sultan over Egypt. It proceeded to declare that there was no change in the policy of Her Majesty's Government, which was as anxious as ever for the continuance of the sovereignty of the Porte, and for the maintenance of the liberties and administrative independence secured to Egypt by the Sultan's Firmans. Having paid the Porte these little compliments, the despatch disclaimed all ambitious views with regard to the country (of which, by the way, the Sultan had been careful never to accuse the two Powers), but said that they could never be indifferent to events which might plunge Egypt into anarchy, and that it was only with a view to warding off such a catastrophe that Her Majesty's Government thought it advisable, in conjunction with the French Government, to forward a declaration showing the accord of the two in carrying out the policy described. The despatch finally pointed out that the form of the Note was not a new one, and that similar declarations had been on special occasions made to the Khedive without calling forth any remonstrance from the Porte.
Gambetta, however, viewed the matter in a different spirit. Having once gone forward he was not disposed to draw back. He had, moreover, the interests of the large body of French bondholders to protect. He at first objected that no explanation of the Joint Note at all was necessary, and that any attempt to explain it would only tend to encourage the military party. Seeing, however, that Lord Granville was determined to send some reply, Gambetta insisted on certain modifications in the despatch. Amongst them he suggested that the assertion of the Porte, that there were no circumstances that could justify the steps taken by England and France, should be answered, and proposed that it should be pointed out, first, that the authority of the Khedive had been modified and diminished; second, that the Chamber of Notables had arrogated to itself the right of interfering with matters expressly exempted from its jurisdiction by the Khedive's Decree; and third, that the Chamber had aimed at setting aside arrangements to which Egypt was bound by international engagements with England and France.
Lord Granville once more yielded to what he had begun to recognize as the superior mind of the French statesman, and Gambetta's amendments were agreed to.
It was not until the 2nd February, however, that the reply to the Porte's remonstrance was actually sent off.
In the meantime the Gambetta Ministry had fallen, and from this moment dates a marked change in the attitude of the French Republic with regard to Egypt. M. de Freycinet, the successor to Gambetta, though agreeing to the amended reply to the Porte, cautiously inquired what meaning was to be attached to the reservation as to "taking action" made by Her Majesty's Government in assenting to the original Note.
Lord Granville, no longer under the influence of Gambetta, and apparently anxious to recede as far as possible from the somewhat bold position which he had been induced to adopt, answered, contrary to the plain words in which the reservation had been expressed, that Her Majesty's Government reserved to themselves the right to determine, not merely theparticular mode of actionto be adopted in Egypt, but whether any action at all was necessary.
De Freycinet, who, it must be admitted, was equally glad to back out, then plainly declared that he was disinclined to any armed intervention in Egypt, whether by France and England together, or by either separately. This announcement must have been a surprise to the British Government, which, after being led by France into sending the Joint Note, now began to discover that in the event of its becoming necessary to take any steps to carry it into effect, England could no longer count on her as an ally.
Under these circumstances, and feeling that the time when action would have to be taken might not be far off, Lord Granville addressed a Circular to the other Powers, requesting them to enter upon an exchange of views as to the best mode of dealing with the Egyptian Question.
The effect of the Joint Note upon the Porte has been stated. It only remains to consider its effect upon the Khedive and the Notables. The Khedive received the assurances of protection given by England and France gratefully enough. It was not so, however, with his Ministers, who, on the Note being communicated on the 8th January, wanted, like the Sultan, to know what it meant. Sir Edward Malet, in reply, assured them thatthe Note was merely intended to convey to the Khedive the assurance of the friendship of the Powers, and that in point of fact it did not really mean much.
It is obvious that to produce any good effect on the Chamber and the National Party it was necessary that the Note should have been backed by the display of force, and this unfortunately was just what was wanting. In short, England and France launched their threat without being prepared to follow it up by immediate action. It created great indignation on the part of the military leaders and in the Chamber; Arabi declared point-blank that any intervention on the part of England and France was inadmissible. Later on, when it was seen that the two Powers were not really to act, but, on the contrary, were busy doing all they could to attenuate the step they had taken, the feeling of indignation gave way to one of contempt, very natural under the circumstances.
Amongst those who misled the chiefs of the National Party none were so conspicuous as two Englishmen, namely, the late Sir William Gregory, an ex-Colonial Governor, and Mr. Wilfred S. Blunt. Both these gentlemen had, whilst spending some months in Egypt, conceived a violent sympathy for the National movement. They had witnessed during their stay in the country numerous instances of misrule and oppression, and they regarded Arabi and his friends as the leaders of a genuine popular effort to secure political liberty and good government.
In addition to the assurances which they received from Sir William Gregory and Mr. Blunt, the leaders of the National Party were led to believe, and as has been seen not without reason, that England and France were not really agreed to do anything, much less to take any decisive step in the way of intervention; that the two Powers were jealous of each other, and that the Joint Note might be safely disregarded. The Arabists further clung to the hope that even were France and England allied, the other Powers would prevent their interference, and the protests which four of them, namely, Germany, Austria, Russia, and Italy, made at the time against any foreign interference in Egypt without their consent, certainly tended to confirm this view.
This was the condition of affairs on the 2nd February, when, as already stated, the deputation from the Chamber requested the Khedive to summon a new Ministry. Tewfik had by thistime become thoroughly alarmed. The tonic effect produced by the Joint Note had quite gone off, and he was beginning to doubt how far he could rely on support from England and France. He realized that by placing himself under the tutelage of the Western Powers he was injuring himself with the Porte, and he had daily proofs afforded him of his growing unpopularity with his subjects. Under these circumstances he saw nothing for it but to yield. At the suggestion of the Chamber, the intriguer Mahmoud Sami was directed to form a new Ministry, which he lost no time in doing, in conjunction with his confederate Arabi, who now filled the important post of Minister of War.
Although the Ministry of Mahmoud Sami was forced upon the Khedive, the position of the latter was at the time so hopeless that one must not be surprised at his endeavouring to make the best of it and put a good face upon the matter. Accordingly, on the 4th of February, 1882, Tewfik, in true Oriental style, wrote to his new Premier that, in accepting the task of forming a Cabinet, he had given a fresh proof of his devotion and patriotism, and the letter ended by approving of the programme which the new Premier had drawn up.
The programme in question referred to the arrangements for the Public Debt, including the Control. It spoke of the necessity for judicial and other reforms, and then passed on to the burning question of the Chamber of Notables, and stated that the first act of the Ministry would be to obtain sanction for the proposed law for the Chamber. This law, it was stated, would respect all rights and obligations, whether private or international, and would wisely determine the responsibility of Ministers towards the Chamber as well as the discussion of laws.
Mahmoud Sami's programme elicited from the English and French Controllers a memorandum, in which they very sensibly observed that it mattered very little whether or not the intention of attacking the Control was asserted, as by the very force of circumstances it became ineffectual when the Controllers foundthemselves no longer in the presence of the Khedive and of Ministers freely appointed by him, but of a Chamber and an army. It added that the Chamber, under the influence of certain military chiefs, did not hesitate to claim rights incompatible with the social condition of the country; it had gone so far as to compel the Khedive to change the Ministry which had his confidence, and, under pressure of certain officers, to impose on him the late Minister of War as Prime Minister, and concluded with the significant words: "The Khedive's power no longer exists."
After this it is not surprising that the Controllers resigned office. Sir Auckland Colvin was requested by the British Government to remain at his post and maintain "an attitude of passive observation." His French colleague was replaced by M. Brédif. There is no doubt that the Controllers' view of the situation was only too just. With Arabi as Minister of War, and his co-conspirator, Mahmoud Sami, President of the Council the country was simply under a military dictatorship.
Meanwhile, the reserves of the Artillery were called in and distributed amongst the coast fortifications, recruiting in the provinces was being actively carried on, ninety Krupp guns were ordered from Europe, and Arabi was created a Pasha by the Sultan.
The National Party had now become complete masters of the situation. Notwithstanding this, a collision might for some little time have been averted but for an incident which occurred shortly after.
The differences between the Circassians and the native-born Egyptians in the army have been already touched upon. One peculiarity of the Arab race is a revengeful disposition. Arabi and his friends had, as already stated, met with rough usage at the hands of the Circassian party. Hence it followed that the first idea of the former on getting into power was to avenge themselves on their old enemies. This was carried out by the wholesale arrest of fifty Circassian officers, and of Osman Pasha Rifki, former Minister of War, on a charge of conspiracy to assassinate Arabi. It was also alleged that the plot comprised the deposition of the Khedive and the restoration of Ismail Pasha.
The prisoners were tried in secret by a court martial appointed by the military leaders, and, of course, found guilty. They were,it is said, subjected to torture to induce them to confess, and persons of respectability testified that they heard at night shrieks of pain coming from the place where the prisoners were confined. The sentence passed on forty of them, including Osman, was that of exile for life to the remotest limits of the Soudan. This was equivalent to a sentence of death as regards most of the prisoners.
It was necessary that the sentences should be confirmed by Decree of the Khedive, and he consulted Sir Edward Malet as to the course to be taken. The story of the plot was, there is reason to believe, purely imaginary.
With some little hesitation, and after conferring with the diplomatic agents of the Powers, the Khedive boldly determined to exercise his prerogative without reference to his Ministers, and signed a Decree commuting the sentences to simple banishment from Egypt, without loss of rank and honours.
This was a defiance of Mahmoud Sami, to which he was not disposed to submit. On the 10th May, the Khedive summoned the Consuls-General, and informed them that the President of the Council had insisted that this Decree should be changed by condemning the prisoners to be struck off the strength of the army, and had threatened that his refusal would be followed by a general massacre of foreigners. The significance of this threat coming from Mahmoud Sami, the Minister who was in power when just a month later—namely, on the 11th June—a massacre of foreignersdidtake place in Alexandria, will probably be remarked.
The Chamber of Notables had ceased to sit on the 26th March, when the session closed; but Mahmoud Sami now announced that since the Khedive and his Ministers could not agree, and as it was impossible for the Ministry to resign, they had determined themselves to convoke the Chamber, and to lay the case before it, and that he did not intend to hold any further communication with the Khedive until the difference between them had been decided by the Chamber. He added that in the meantime the Ministry would answer for the public safety.
The alarm in Cairo now began to be general. It was open warfare between the Khedive, and his Ministry supported by the army. The National Party made no secret of their intention to depose the Khedive as soon as the Chamber assembled.
The Notables, when the day for assembly arrived, began to show a disinclination to support the National Party. They had commenced to realize that they had already gone further than they had intended, and also that they were being merely used as tools by Arabi and his colleagues.
At first they refused to meet at all, on the ground that they had not been convoked by the Khedive, but only by the Ministry. They were, however, induced to assemble, and on the 13th May they met at the house of Sultan Pasha, the President of the Chamber. Here Mahmoud Sami read an indictment against the Khedive, charging him principally with not governing through his Ministers, and with compromising the liberties of Egypt. On the 14th the Ministers were so little sure of the support of the Notables, that Mahmoud Sami and Arabi went to the Palace, and, in the names of themselves and their colleagues, offered to resign if the Khedive would guarantee public order. His Highness answered, that such a condition was a most unusual one, and that it would be the business of the Ministry to see that public order was not troubled; he added that the only persons likely to cause trouble were Arabi and his associates. On the 15th, the English and French Consuls-General gave notice to Arabi that if there was a disturbance of public order, he would find Europe and Turkey, as well as England and France, against him, but that if, on the other hand, he remained loyal to the Khedive, his acts and person would be favourably regarded.
Arabi, in reply, stated that he would guarantee order only as long as he remained Minister, except that in the event of a fleet arriving he could not answer for the public safety. The same day the two Consuls-General announced to the Khedive that an Anglo-French fleet was hourly expected at Alexandria. This was followed by the Ministers going in a body to the Palace and making a complete submission to the Khedive.
A reconciliation of the Khedive with his Ministers was accepted by the former only on the earnest representations of the Notables and the Consuls-General, in order that tranquillity might not be disturbed, the idea was to keep the Ministry in office as a temporary measure, in order that there might be some one to treat with when the fleets should arrive.
Notwithstanding the improved aspect of affairs, the alarm in Cairo continued, and crowds of people daily left the city. To allay the panic, Mahmoud Sami and Arabi declared that they would guarantee the preservation of order on the arrival of the fleets.
On the 19th and 20th of May the much-talked-of "fleets" arrived at Alexandria. They consisted only of the British ironcladInvinciblewith two gunboats, and the French ironcladLa Gallisonière, also accompanied by two gun-vessels. The remainder of the allied squadron was left at Suda Bay, in the island of Crete.
The despatch of the English and French ships to Alexandria by two Powers, each professing to be "disinclined to armed intervention in Egypt," was so important a step that it may be interesting to go back a little to consider the means by which it was brought about. Lord Granville, immediately after the Abdin demonstration of the 9th September, had intimated to the French Government as his idea of a remedy for the military insubordination prevailing the sending of a Turkish General to Egypt. M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Minister for Foreign Affairs, objected that this might lead to further steps, and possibly to the permanent occupation of the country by Turkish troops. The French Minister expressed himself in favour of a "joint military control," consisting of an English and a French General, to restore discipline in the Egyptian Army. Nothing was done to carry out either suggestion.
In March, 1882, when the struggle between the Khedive and the Chamber was at its height, Lord Granville suggested that England and France should send two "technical advisers" to assist the representatives of the two Powers in settling the details of the financial matters then pending. The proposal was so ludicrously absurd under existing circumstances, that it says much for the politeness of the French Minister that he took the trouble to give a serious reply. He objected that the measure would give offence to the other Powers, as an attempt on the part of England and France to effect a separate settlement of Egyptian affairs, and also that it would tend to lower the Consuls-General in their own eyes and in those of the Egyptians.
Again baffled, Lord Granville, in April, 1882, could think ofnothing better than that the Sultan should be asked "to send a General with full powers to restore discipline in the Egyptian Army, with the understanding that he was not to exercise those powers in any way without the concurrence of an English and a French General, who would be associated with him."
This proposal also fell through, the French Government objecting that the sending of a Turkish General at all would tend sooner or later to the sending of Turkish troops, which was not desirable.
The despatch of a Turkish Commissioner of some kind continued to be talked about, when, on the 7th May, 1882, Sir Edward Malet wrote to the Foreign Office that the Khedive's Ministers would certainly resist by force the arrival of any Commissioner from Turkey. After this, Lord Granville was for a time forced to abandon his favourite hobby of Turkish intervention. Sir Edward Malet's despatch contained the following significantpassage:—
"I believe that some complication of an acute nature must supervene before any satisfactory solution of the Egyptian question can be attained, and that it would be wiser to hasten it than to endeavour to retard it, because the longer misgovernment lasts the more difficult it is to remedy the evils which it has caused."
"I believe that some complication of an acute nature must supervene before any satisfactory solution of the Egyptian question can be attained, and that it would be wiser to hasten it than to endeavour to retard it, because the longer misgovernment lasts the more difficult it is to remedy the evils which it has caused."
This very sensible opinion had its effect, for, on the 11th May, Lord Granville was so far able to make up his mind as to say that the English Government were willing to send two ironclads to Alexandria to protect European residents. This announcement, however, was only made after the idea had been suggested by the French Minister. Even at this period, Lord Granville could not help referring regretfully to his original idea of sending the three Generals (an expedient about as hopeful as sending three flower-pots with water to extinguish a fire), and in reply to M. de Freycinet, his Lordship said that he could still think of nothing better.
The French Government, in agreeing to the despatch of the Anglo-French fleet, appeared resolved to abandon the cautious attitude which it had assumed on M. de Freycinet taking office. The French Premier, on the 11th May, informed the Chamber of Deputies that in its Egyptian policy the Ministry had two objects, first, to preserve "the preponderating influence of France in Egypt"; and, second, to maintain the independence ofEgypt, as established by the Firmans; and added that the means which would be employed to carry out this policy would be an intimate alliance with England.
M. de Freycinet, on the 12th May, informed Her Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, that as the Khedive had been acting under the advice of England and France, the French Government considered it the bounden duty of the two Powers to support His Highnessas far as circumstances would allow, and that France would co-operate loyally and withoutarrière penséewith England in that sense. M. de Freycinet, with some sense of humour, added that sending the three Generals would be inopportune.
On the 13th the English Government notified their concurrence in the views of France with regard to the Khedive, and welcomed the co-operation of the French Government. Lord Granville, at the same time, expressed the readiness of himself and his colleagues to defer to the objections raised to the mission of the three Generals.
It now became known that the Notables were assembling in Cairo, and that the Ministry of Mahmoud Sami was about to propose the deposition of the Khedive. It was also reported that Mahmoud Sami proposed to declare himself "Governor-General of Egypt by the national will."
These alarming reports caused the preparations for the departure of the ships to be hastened, and, at the same time, with a view to keep the ground clear, the two Western Powers sent an intimation to the Porte desiring it to abstain for the moment from all intervention in Egypt.
The instructions to the British Admiral were asfollows:—
"Communicate with the British Consul-General on arrival at Alexandria, and in concert with him propose to co-operate with naval forces of France to support the Khedive and protect British subjects and Europeans,landing a force, if required, for latter object, such force not to leave protection of ships' guns without instructions from home."
"Communicate with the British Consul-General on arrival at Alexandria, and in concert with him propose to co-operate with naval forces of France to support the Khedive and protect British subjects and Europeans,landing a force, if required, for latter object, such force not to leave protection of ships' guns without instructions from home."
The French Admiral's instructions were somewhat different, and tend to show that the two Powers were not completely agreed as to the means to be employed to support Tewfik. His instructions were in thesewords:—
"On arrival at Alexandria communicate with the Consul-General, who will, if necessary, indicate to you what you will have to do to give amoralsupport to the Khedive. You will abstain, until you have contrary instructions, from any material act of war, unless you are attacked or have to protect the safety of Europeans."
"On arrival at Alexandria communicate with the Consul-General, who will, if necessary, indicate to you what you will have to do to give amoralsupport to the Khedive. You will abstain, until you have contrary instructions, from any material act of war, unless you are attacked or have to protect the safety of Europeans."
The British and French Consuls-General, on the arrival of the fleets, advised the Khedive to take advantage of the favourable opportunity to dismiss the existing Ministry, and to form a new Cabinet under Cherif Pasha, or any other person inspiring confidence. Negotiations were simultaneously opened with Arabi in order to induce him, with the other rebel leaders, to retire from the country, in return for which they were to be guaranteed their property, rank, and pay.
None of these plans succeeded. The Khedive recognized the futility of dismissing a Ministry that insisted on remaining in power. Mahmoud Sami replied that the Ministry would not retire so long as the squadrons were kept at Alexandria, and Arabi declared that he must refuse either to retire from his position, or to leave the country.
On the 25th May, the representatives of England and France handed to Mahmoud Sami, as President of the Council of Ministers, an ultimatum in the form of a Dual Note, demanding the retirement of Arabi from the country, the withdrawal of "the Colonels" into the interior, and the resignation of Sami's Ministry. The Note added that the two Governments would, if necessary, insist on the fulfilment of these conditions.
The Ministers, on receipt of the "Dual Note," waited on the Khedive to ask his opinion as to the answer that should be given, and His Highness distinctly told them that he accepted its conditions. They urged a reference to the Porte, on which the Khedive told them that it was an internal question, and that it was strange that they, who had complained that he had failed to uphold the privileges of Egypt, should suggest such a course. On the 26th the Ministers resigned, alleging as a reason that the Khedive, in accepting the conditions of England and France, had acquiesced in foreign interference in Egypt.
The Khedive promptly accepted the resignation of the Ministry, and sent for Cherif Pasha to form a new Cabinet. Cherif refused on the ground that no Government was possible while the military chiefs remained.
On the 27th an event occurred in Alexandria which tended to bring matters still more to a crisis. The officers of theregiments and the police force in that city held a secret meeting, and telegraphed to the Khedive direct that they would not accept the resignation of Arabi, and gave the Khedive twelve hours to reply, after which the officers declared that they would not be responsible for public tranquillity.
On receipt of this message, the Khedive summoned to his presence the chief personages of State, the principal members of the Chamber, and the head officers of the Cairo garrison, and placed the situation before them.
Toulba Pasha, one of Arabi's strongest supporters, interrupted the Khedive in his speech, and stated that the army absolutely rejected the Dual Note, and awaited the decision of the Porte, which was the only authority they recognized. On the same day Arabi, at the head of a hundred officers, met the chief persons of Cairo and the Notables, and demanded the deposition of the Khedive, threatening death to the recalcitrant. Nevertheless almost all present, excepting the officers, persisted in supporting their sovereign. Arabi and the officers demanded of the Khedive a decree reinstating Arabi as Minister of War. Amongst those present, Sultan Pasha and some of the Notables warned the Khedive of what had taken place, and told him his life was not safe unless he reinstated Arabi. The Khedive consulted the English and French Consuls-General, who advised him not to comply.
In the afternoon of the same day, a deputation consisting of the Coptic Patriarch, the Chief Rabbi, the Notables, and others, waited on the Khedive, begging him to reinstate Arabi, adding, that though he might be ready to sacrifice his own life, he ought not to sacrifice theirs, and that Arabi had threatened them all with death if they did not obtain the Khedive's assent to his reappointment. In his perplexity, the Khedive, in order to prevent bloodshed, yielded, and issued a memorandum stating that at the repeated requests of the population, and with the desire of maintaining order and the tranquillity of the country, he reinstated Arabi.
Although one may be disposed to blame Tewfik for his conduct on this occasion, it must be owned that his position at the moment was a critical one. The despatch of the fleets on which he had been led to rely had turned out a ridiculous fiasco. Instead of ten vessels, there were only two accompanied by fourgunboats, and no troops for landing. The lamentable weakness of the demonstration only excited the ridicule of the military party. It was beyond doubt that the guard at the Palace had been doubled, and that orders had been given to the sentries not to allow Tewfik to leave the Palace unless the deputation received a favourable reply, and to fire on him if he insisted on going out. All the outlets of the Palace were carefully watched, and a mob was collected for the purpose of rushing into the Palace and ill-treating him, if the prayer of the deputation were refused. It was also announced that there was to be a military demonstration at five in the afternoon, and that it was the intention of the army to depose the Khedive. Under these circumstances, and seeing how little material aid he had from England and France, it is not surprising that he yielded.
One of the first acts of Arabi on resuming office was to publish a declaration that now he had been reinstated, he guaranteed the security of the life and property of all the inhabitants of Egypt irrespective of nationality or religion. This assurance was not made before it was required.
For several days past a feeling of uneasiness had prevailed, especially in Alexandria; when the military and police in that city made their demand for Arabi's reinstatement, Mr. Cookson, the British Consul, asked the Governor, Omar Pasha Loutfi, if he could answer for the safety of Europeans. He replied that he had exhausted every effort to calm the officers and soldiers, but had entirely failed, and that he could not answer for their conduct, although he saw no reason to apprehend any disturbance.
In the prevailing state of things, the Consul thought it his duty to confer with Admiral Seymour as to the best means of protecting British subjects in case of a general attack upon Europeans, and was informed that the Admiral was not prepared to land any force, although he would protect the embarkation of women and children and others who might seek refuge on board ships in the harbour. The Admiral sent an officer with the Consul, and a spot for embarkation was selected.
This arrangement was communicated to the British residents at a meeting held at the Consulate the same day (the 28th).
The European population now became seriously alarmed, and on the 29th a memorial was drawn up by the British residents, calling upon Her Majesty's Government to provide efficient means for the protection of their lives. It pointed out that—
"During the twenty-four hours, from the 26th to the 27th, Alexandria was in continual danger of being stormed by the soldiery, who, it was reported, actually had cartridges served out to them to be used against Europeans." "There was," it said, "every reason to believe that the perils which had come without warning would recur again, and against them," it continued, "Europeans were absolutely defenceless. They had not even the means of flight, as in order to reach the ships in harbour they would have to run the gauntlet through the streets. The small squadron in port could only silence the forts, and when these forts were disabled, then would commence a period of great danger for Europeans, who would be at the mercy of soldiers exasperated by defeat, whilst the English Admiral could not risk his men ashore, as his whole available force for those operations did not exceed 300 men." The memorial concluded by stating that "every day's delay increased the dangerous temper of the soldiery and their growing defiance of discipline."
"During the twenty-four hours, from the 26th to the 27th, Alexandria was in continual danger of being stormed by the soldiery, who, it was reported, actually had cartridges served out to them to be used against Europeans." "There was," it said, "every reason to believe that the perils which had come without warning would recur again, and against them," it continued, "Europeans were absolutely defenceless. They had not even the means of flight, as in order to reach the ships in harbour they would have to run the gauntlet through the streets. The small squadron in port could only silence the forts, and when these forts were disabled, then would commence a period of great danger for Europeans, who would be at the mercy of soldiers exasperated by defeat, whilst the English Admiral could not risk his men ashore, as his whole available force for those operations did not exceed 300 men." The memorial concluded by stating that "every day's delay increased the dangerous temper of the soldiery and their growing defiance of discipline."
Mr. Cookson at once telegraphed the contents of the memorial to the Foreign Office, where it was carefully placed amongst the archives.
The history of events has now been brought down to the 29th May, on which date Admiral Seymour reported that the Egyptians were raising earthworks opposite his flagship, theInvincible, then lying in the inner harbour at Alexandria, and suggested that his squadron should be strengthened by the despatch of three of the ships of war which had been left at Suda Bay.
In a later telegram he added that when the earthworks were armed, the position of the unarmoured vessels of his squadron would be untenable, if fired on without warning. In reply, the Admiral was directed to arrange with the French Admiral to dispose the ironclads so as to silence the batteries if they opened fire.
On the 30th May, the British ironcladMonarch, and two gun-vessels, theCygnetand theCoquette, as well as three French vessels of war—theAlma, theThétisand theHirondelle—were ordered from Suda Bay to Alexandria, where they arrived between the 2nd and 5th June.
The rest of the British Squadron in Suda Bay were directed to cruise off the coast of Egypt, and to communicate with Alexandria for orders from time to time.
Arabi, on being applied to on the subject of the earthworks, answered that repairs only were being effected, and refused to order them to be discontinued. It was useless to remonstrate with the Khedive, whose orders that all warlike preparations should be stopped had already been disregarded. The Sultan was therefore appealed to, and he sent an order to Arabi to desist from further armament. Arabi gave the necessary instructions, and the new works, on which two guns were already mounted, were discontinued.
The Khedive, on his part, applied to the Sultan, and requested that an Imperial Commissioner should be sent to Egypt. On the 3rd June it was known that Dervish Pasha, a Marshal of the Ottoman Empire, had left Constantinople for Alexandria as special Envoy from the Sultan, and his arrival was awaited with anxiety by both the Khedive and the Arabists.
The following observations, taken from one of the highest authorities on Egyptian matters,8throw a light on Dervish Pasha's mission.
"The Sultan's aim naturally was not to reinforce, but to counteract Anglo-French influence in Egypt. By accepting his intervention England and France confessed themselves worsted, and opened the door for a host of intrigues. His Majesty was not slow to take advantage of the opportunity and tried to play a complicated double game. Dervish Pasha, the First Commissioner, was instructed to support the Khedive, and if possible intimidate the leaders of the military party, while Ahmet Essad, the Second Commissioner, was instructed to conciliate Arabi and his friends, and assure them that they had in the Sultan a sure friend and ally. The Third Commissioner's duty was to act as a spy on his two colleagues, and he in his turn was closely watched by a secretary, who sent secret reports direct to Constantinople."
"The Sultan's aim naturally was not to reinforce, but to counteract Anglo-French influence in Egypt. By accepting his intervention England and France confessed themselves worsted, and opened the door for a host of intrigues. His Majesty was not slow to take advantage of the opportunity and tried to play a complicated double game. Dervish Pasha, the First Commissioner, was instructed to support the Khedive, and if possible intimidate the leaders of the military party, while Ahmet Essad, the Second Commissioner, was instructed to conciliate Arabi and his friends, and assure them that they had in the Sultan a sure friend and ally. The Third Commissioner's duty was to act as a spy on his two colleagues, and he in his turn was closely watched by a secretary, who sent secret reports direct to Constantinople."
On Dervish's arrival in Cairo, on the 7th of June, he was greeted by the acclamations of a mob of the lowest class of natives, who shouted before his carriage the praises of Arabi, and denounced the Christians.
"Dervish was known before his arrival to be accessible to Egyptian arguments, and there can be no doubt that they were boldly asked for and liberally given. Upon his arrival he showed marked favour to the Arabi party. Then he had a long interview with the Khedive, and then his conduct suddenly became very satisfactory to the Palace. Mahmoud Sami had arranged that the petitions from all the provinces should be brought to the Commissioner by deputation. Dervish received them graciously, placed the petitions in a pile on the divan, begged the deputation to consider all grievances settled by his arrival, and dismissed them. The Ministers came next. Mahmoud Sami entered with effusion, and introduced his colleagues. Dervish remained seated, continued his conversation with his secretary, and then made a casual remark to Sami on the beautiful situation of the Palace of Ghezireh. The Ministers looked dumfounded, but Dervish, continuing his conversation, begged his secretary to repeat to him the story of the massacre of the Mamelukes by Mehemet Ali at the Citadel,9which he could see from the window where he sat. When the suggestive story was completed, the Envoy, with one of his pleasantest smiles, remarked to Arabi, 'The one man who escaped was a lucky dog,' and with a remark on the weather dismissed them."10
"Dervish was known before his arrival to be accessible to Egyptian arguments, and there can be no doubt that they were boldly asked for and liberally given. Upon his arrival he showed marked favour to the Arabi party. Then he had a long interview with the Khedive, and then his conduct suddenly became very satisfactory to the Palace. Mahmoud Sami had arranged that the petitions from all the provinces should be brought to the Commissioner by deputation. Dervish received them graciously, placed the petitions in a pile on the divan, begged the deputation to consider all grievances settled by his arrival, and dismissed them. The Ministers came next. Mahmoud Sami entered with effusion, and introduced his colleagues. Dervish remained seated, continued his conversation with his secretary, and then made a casual remark to Sami on the beautiful situation of the Palace of Ghezireh. The Ministers looked dumfounded, but Dervish, continuing his conversation, begged his secretary to repeat to him the story of the massacre of the Mamelukes by Mehemet Ali at the Citadel,9which he could see from the window where he sat. When the suggestive story was completed, the Envoy, with one of his pleasantest smiles, remarked to Arabi, 'The one man who escaped was a lucky dog,' and with a remark on the weather dismissed them."10
After this slap in the face the Ministers left, feeling that there was no alternative between complete submission to the Khedive and absolute defiance of the Sultan.
Before two days elapsed, events occurred at Alexandria which demonstrated that Arabi was the only power in Egypt, and brought Dervish to his feet as a suppliant.
What those events were, will be recorded in the next chapter.
For some days previous to Sunday, the 11th June, 1882, the demeanour of the natives towards the European population of Alexandria had been growing more and more unfriendly; and there were many indications that some disturbance, the precise nature of which no one was able to discover, was impending.
The forenoon of the 11th passed off quietly enough and without any unaccustomed incident, and the European population attended the churches and places of worship as usual.
Between two and three in the afternoon the tranquillity of the town was disturbed by shouts and yells from some two thousand natives, who were suddenly seen swarming up the Rue des Sœurs, the Rue Mahmoudieh, and the adjacent streets, crying, "Death to the Christians!" Others came soon after fromthe Attarin and the Ras-el-Tin quarters; and the riot, which appears to have broken out in three places almost at the same time, became general.
The crowd rushed on, striking with their "naboots" all the Europeans whom they could meet, knocking them down and trampling them under foot. Shots were fired; the soldiers and police interfered; but, in most instances, only with the object of making the butchery more complete. Many Europeans, flying for refuge to the police stations, were there slaughtered in cold blood. Shops and houses were broken into and pillaged, and for four and a half hours, until the soldiers arrived on the scene, the usually quiet and prosperous city of Alexandria experienced a fair share of the horrors of war.
The signal for the massacre was a feigned Arab funeral procession, in which natives marched wearing green turbans, and which passed between 10 a.m. and noon through the main streets of Alexandria.11
The next thing which occurred was a disturbance which broke out about 1 p.m. between Europeans and natives in the neighbourhood of a coffee-house called the "Café Crystal," in the Rue des Sœurs.
Of the precise origin of the riot it is difficult to speak with certainty. It has been stated that it originated in a dispute between a Maltese and a native coachman or donkey-boy, in which the Maltese, being beaten with a stick, retaliated with his knife, and, according to one account, killed his adversary. Another version is that two natives attempted to break into the shop of a Maltese with whom they had previously quarrelled, and were violently resisted by the owner. Both accounts are involved in doubt, and the better opinion is that whatever may have been the origin of the alleged quarrel, it was only a pretext for what was to ensue. Anyhow, about the time last mentioned, Mr. Cookson, the British Consul, was summoned by the local police to assist in quelling a disturbance between Maltese and natives in the quarter of the Caracol Labban, a police-station in the Rue des Sœurs. He found there the Governor and Sub-Prefect of Police, and, after waiting more than an hour, under the impression that they had succeeded in calming the excitement,Mr. Cookson returned to the Consulate. This was not, however, until he had been struck by one of the stones which were flying about.
About 3 p.m. he found a messenger, purporting to come from the Governor, to summon him with all the other Consuls to a meeting at the same Caracol as before.
There is good reason to believe that no such request was ever made by Omar Pasha Loutfi, and that the messages sent were part of a preconceived scheme to decoy the Consuls into the streets, where they would be in the power of the mob. It is a singular thing that there were considerable intervals of time between the delivery of the messages, not warranted by the positions of the different Consulates, as if the intention was for the Consuls to arrive separately. Mr. Cookson, accompanied only by a janissary in uniform, drove immediately towards the Caracol. He found marks of recent conflict in the streets and groups of excited natives moving about. On approaching within about ninety yards of the Caracol, at a place where four roads met, he was first assailed with stones and then felled to the ground with a blow from a "naboot." When the Consul recovered consciousness, he was lying in the street surrounded by a crowd, one or two members of which, including a native officer, were trying to protect him, whilst others were striking at him. Fortunately he was able to escape with his life to the Caracol, where he remained till about 4 p.m., when he was brought by a circuitous route to the Consulate.12
It has been stated that the inaction of the police at the different Caracols was due to the fact that the day previous all the officers and sub-officers in charge had been convoked, and told that the men were to remain at their posts under any circumstances, without interfering even in the event of an outbreak happening.
Almost at the same time and place, the other members of the Consular body, as they arrived on the scene, were similarly attacked.
All this time the Governor was at the door of the Caracol, giving orders to the mustaphazin (military police) to dispersethe mob, though his orders were never executed. In fact, the mustaphazin were quite beyond his control, and at times openly cursed and reviled him when he tried to interfere on behalf of the Europeans.
Whilst the fighting went on, the Arabs, the police, and the soldiers occupied their time in breaking open and plundering the shops and houses on the line of route, tearing down doors and shutters, and using the materials as well as the legs of tables and chairs as weapons of offence.
The rioting gradually extended up the Rue des Sœurs, towards the Place Mehemet Ali (the great square), the Europeans here and there firing at times from the terraces and balconies of the houses, and the soldiers and the mob replying with firearms and stones.
At an early period of the fray, one of the mustaphazin was killed by a shot from a house, and his body being taken to an adjoining Caracol, his comrades became so exasperated, that they butchered every European who sought refuge there.
In the streets, the conduct of the mustaphazin was almost equally bad. When they did interfere, they did so in a half-hearted, indifferent manner. In the great majority of cases, where they did not join in the killing themselves, they encouraged their countrymen to do so. There is reason to believe that the mustaphazin did a large proportion of the killing, as they were armed with sword-bayonets. The natives, on the other hand, had in most cases only heavy sticks, with which they stunned and bruised their victims.
A considerable number of Bedouins were observed amongst the mob, which emerged from the Rue des Sœurs by the side streets leading into the adjoining quarters. The Bedouins were armed with their long guns, with which they shot down passing Europeans. One of a group of Bedouins, stationed opposite the European hospital to intercept the fugitives, was seen to shoot a man who was running past, and crouching down, in the hope of escaping observation.
About 4 p.m. a second mob came down from a different part of the town known as the Attarin quarter, and similar fighting went on, the natives attacking every European who came in their path. Amongst other victims was a little boy five years old,apparently a Maltese, who was killed with a naboot in front of the Austrian Post Office.
At half-past five, the portion of the Rue des Sœurs where the disturbance began was almost deserted, the ground being strewn withdébrisof wood and glass, and the windows shattered, many of them by bullets. Further up, and opposite the Lazarist College, in the same street, but nearer the Place Mehemet Ali, the crowd from the Attarin quarter mingled with the other mob were continuing the work of destruction. They hunted down every European they saw; one they fell upon and killed with sticks and pieces of wood at the very door of the college itself. All this while the mustaphazin, some thirty or forty in number, in front of the college, were observed firing off their rifles without any apparent motive. The street at this part was now filled with rioters. A number of Europeans found refuge at the college, the doors of which were bolted and barred by the inmates. From the terrace above these were able to look down on the work of destruction.
About 5.30 a European in black clothes, and apparently of good social position, covered with blood and with his trousers torn to rags, was seen running backwards and forwards, as if distracted. Just as he reached the corner of the Rue des Sœurs, a point guarded by two mustaphazin, a band of natives armed with sticks emerged from the street, rushed at once on him and beat him on the head. The two mustaphazin not only did not prevent the Arabs from ill-treating their victim, but, on the contrary, were seen to seize the wretched man by the arm, and laughing, thrust him into the midst of the band which was assailing him. Whether he subsequently escaped or not is unknown. One of these mustaphazin being remonstrated with, candidly replied, "We are ordered to do it."
In one spot in the Rue des Sœurs the bodies of three Europeans were found lying in a heap. One had a bullet-hole in the head, another was stabbed through the chest, and another with his skull fractured was lying on his face with his shoes and stockings stripped off.
The mob now turned their attention to indiscriminate pillage. The shops in the square itself were broken into and the kiosks wrecked. Next, crowds of looters were observed going back in the direction of Gabari, laden with goods from the neighbouringshops. These the mustaphazin allowed to pass without opposition; indeed, several of their own number were themselves carrying the stolen goods. Soldiers were seen to take from Europeans, whose lives they spared, their watches and such valuables as they had about them.
In the Strada Nuova both police and soldiers were observed encouraging the mob to break open shops, and each time this was done the police and soldiers entered first, and had the first choice.
In another quarter two native policemen were observed attacking even a native, who was carrying gold articles and a quantity of money, when a mounted soldier appeared on the scene, and he and the policemen shared the plunder between them, leaving the thief to go empty away. In their selection of objects of plunder the mob were far from particular. One soldier was seen walking down the street with a glass chandelier on his head. Another was seen riding down the street on a toy horse. The tobacco shops suffered more severely than any others; wherever one of these was seen, it was invariably broken into and the contents distributed among the crowd. Wearing apparel, also, was in great request, and one of the native officers was observed sitting on the pavement exchanging the trousers he was wearing for a new pair stolen from a neighbouring shop. In the few cases where a native had not succeeded in obtaining any plunder for himself, he invariably turned to one of his more fortunate comrades and helped himself to his stock. One man who was carrying off some dozens of slippers was stopped by no less than three of his fellow-countrymen, who made him wait whilst they selected those which fitted them best.
Whilst this was occurring similar scenes of violence were being perpetrated in another part of the town, namely, in the streets leading from the Place Mehemet Ali to the Marina and to Ras-el-Tin.
On that Sunday a considerable number of Europeans had been to visit the ships in the harbour. On their return, between 4 and 5 p.m., they found the Marina Street, Frank Street, and the adjoining thoroughfares in the possession of a mob armed with naboots. What happened may be learned from the case of an English missionary, Mr. H. P. Ribton, one of the victims.Ribton, accompanied by his little daughter and two friends, was amongst those who had been afloat in the afternoon. On landing from the ships they found the city gate, leading from the Marina into the town, closed; but they were allowed to pass through by a door in the police-office. The shops were shut, and the streets were filled with soldiers. Ribton and party were in the rear of some other Europeans who had landed with them. Suddenly the police called out in Arabic, "Quick! quick!" and all the Europeans commenced running. In a moment or two those in front wheeled round, crying that the mob were coming. Mr. Ribton and his friends turned at the same time, but the police with fixed bayonets drove them back, and in an instant they found themselves face to face with the mob, who had already overwhelmed the Europeans in front.
The mob consisted of the lowest class of Arabs in the city; they were armed, like the rest, with clubs, with which they beat their victims to death. As soon as the latter fell the Arabs dragged them out to the back streets, stripped their bodies and flung them into the sea.
The missionary and his two male companions in vain attempted to shield his daughter from the blows. Though Ribton himself was twice felled to the ground he again staggered to his feet, attempting to save his daughter. The third time he fell he rose no more, and when afterwards his body was found his head was so battered as to be unrecognizable.13Ribton's two friends were killed by his side. His daughter was seized by a native soldier, who, throwing her across his shoulders, carried her off to the Arab quarter. Here she was rescued by a friendly Sheikh, who had heard her screams, and who kept her in his house till nightfall, when he sent her home disguised in native clothes.
Some of the most atrocious acts of violence were perpetrated in immediate proximity to the Zaptieh, where is situated the Prefecture of Police. Here soldiers and mob, mixed together, pursued the Europeans who were passing on their way to the Marina in the hope of escaping to the ships. Whenever a European appeared in sight the mob cried out in Arabic, "Oh, Moslems! Kill him! Kill the Christian!"
The master of a Greek merchant ship was forced by the police to descend from his carriage, and bayoneted on the spot. A French subject, who was being pursued by the mob, applied to a soldier for protection. The latter responded by taking deliberate aim at him with his rifle and bringing him to the ground. A mustaphazin was seen holding a young man from behind, whilst a soldier shot him dead; his body was then maltreated and thrown into the sea.
A man on guard at the Zaptieh, or chief police office, was seen to shoot down a European who was running away from the mob, who speedily battered him to death.
Some officers of H.M.S.Superb, Lieutenants Saule and Dyrssen, Dr. Joyce and Mr. Pibworth, engineer, about 6 p.m., seeing the mob rushing towards them, attempted to obtain shelter at the Caracol Midan. The man on duty refused to admit them. They then ran to the Danish Consulate close by, where they were offered an asylum by the Consul. As their ship was going to sea at 7 p.m., the officers were unwilling to stop, and, taking advantage of a carriage which had been secured, they proceeded towards the Marina by Frank Street. When about half-way down they found themselves in the centre of the mob, who, howling and shouting, seized the horses' heads and commenced striking the officers with their sticks; several brandished knives, and one of them stabbed Mr. Pibworth, wounding him mortally, and attempted to stab the others. They then jumped from the carriage and managed to run through the crowd, receiving several blows in doing so. Mr. Pibworth was removed to the police station, where he died half-an-hour afterwards. A fireman of the S.S.Tanjore, who was in a carriage with five of his companions, also on his way to the harbour, was stopped about 4 p.m. by the mob in the open piece of ground near the Zaptieh, and ordered to alight. They were then surrounded and beaten by the natives, some of the party receiving wounds from the swords of the mustaphazin drawn up there. The party tried their best to escape, but the fireman was dragged by the arm into the Zaptieh. Two minutes later he saw one of his companions brought in by a soldier. Almost at the same moment the guard on duty at the gate drew his sword and struck the man twice, splitting his skull with the first stroke, and severing his head from his body with the second. The firemanwas detained for three hours, and, according to his statement, all who were brought in during that time were slaughtered.
Witnesses living near the Zaptieh spoke of the cries and groans which came from the building at this period, and another witness has stated that from a window opposite he counted no less than thirteen bodies of Europeans being dragged out and taken down a side street towards the sea.14
The rioting in the Rue des Sœurs, near the Caracol, was at its height at 4.30 p.m., and that in Frank Street about 5.30 or 6, when the two mobs of rioters marched on until they united in the great square or Place Mehemet Ali.
The brutality of the mob extended even to the Arab children. One of them was seen to go up to the dead body of a European and fire off a toy-gun at his head, and the shoe-blacking boys in the Place Mehemet Ali were observed to beat out the brains of the wounded who lay groaning on the pavement.
Whilst this was going on, the troops, to the number of about 7,000, remained at the different barracks under arms, waiting instructions to act. The Governor, about four in the afternoon, had asked the Military Commandant of the town to place at his disposal a battalion of the regiment at Ras-el-Tin; but the messenger returned, saying the colonel required an order in writing before he could move. The Governor then sent the written order demanded, and also despatched an order to the colonel of the regiment at Rosetta Gate to send a battalion of his troops into the town without delay. He also, to prevent the disorder spreading to the Place Mehemet Ali and the Place de l'Eglise, ordered a company of mustaphazin to each of those places.
The mustaphazin, this time, obeyed, but the soldiers still remained drawn up at the barracks. In spite of the Governor's request, they refused to march without an order from the Minister of War. Much valuable time was thus wasted.
Now came Arabi's opportunity. Arabi, it will be remembered, had, a few days before, been treated by Dervish Pasha as an ignoble rebel against the Sultan, and made to feel his inferiority. When the news of the riot was telegraphed to Cairo the greatEnvoy himself was sent to fetch Arabi, and had, almost on his knees, to beg him to intervene. Arabi consented, and the desired despatch was sent by telegraph from Cairo, and a little after 6 p.m. the soldiers began to march. As they advanced, the mob gradually fell back, and then dispersed as if by magic; and the tramping, shouting, and yelling suddenly ceased, and there was silence in the streets save for the groans of the wounded.
The behaviour of the troops was strictly in accordance with discipline. They had their orders to put an end to the disturbance, and they did so. One of them being asked if the massacre was finished, naively replied, "Yes; the order has come to cease striking."
In the course of the afternoon, hundreds of Europeans rushed for protection to the different Consulates, where they remained with the gates closed and guarded. Every moment increased the number of fugitives. The British Consulate was literally crammed with officers, civilians, ladies and children.
Telephonic communication was open with Admiral Seymour on board theHelicon. The Admiral had himself been on shore that afternoon, and narrowly escaped the rioters. His movements at this critical moment were marked by great indecision. His first idea appears to have been to land an armed force for the protection of the Europeans, for at 5.32 p.m. theHeliconmade the general signal to the fleet, "Prepare to land armed boats." This order, however, was annulled five minutes later. The captains of the English men-of-war were then signalled to assemble on board the Flag-ship, when, after consultation, it was decided, as the only course open, to send boats round to the Eastern Harbour under cover of the guns of H.M.S.Superb, to be in readiness to embark those who had taken refuge in the Consulate; and boats were sent to the Arsenal and other landing-places to bring off the officers who remained on shore.
It had been arranged that theSuperbwas to take up a position off the Eastern Harbour, near the European quarter, and to have a force of seamen and marines ready for immediate service on shore, sending her boats as near as possible to the beach, with a view to the removal from the town of all the women and children whom they might be able to find. The landing party, to be used only in case of need,was, on a signal being made, to clear the streets leading to the English Consulate.