"Khartoum all right, can hold on for years.—C. G. Gordon, 29: 12: '84," was the cheering message, written on a tiny slip of paper, which reached Sir Charles Wilson by Gordon's steamers.
With this writing came Gordon's journals, containing a narrative of events from the 10th September to the 14th December, some private letters and also some despatches addressed by him to "the Officer Commanding H.M.'s troops," to Sir Evelyn Baring, and others.
In one of the despatches, dated 20th October, 1884, Gordon informs the officer in command of the British troops of the sending to him of the steamers, and advises the removal from them of all Egyptians, whether pashas, beys, or privates, all of whom Gordon terms "hens." The letterconcludes:—
"If you do not use the steamers, at least take out the hens and send them back empty. If you choose to put black troops on board, they will be welcome, but not those heroes of Tel-el-Kebir."
"If you do not use the steamers, at least take out the hens and send them back empty. If you choose to put black troops on board, they will be welcome, but not those heroes of Tel-el-Kebir."
In another letter, dated 21st October, addressed to "the Chief of the Staff, Soudan Expeditionary Force," Gordon wrote that he had tendered the resignation of his commission in the British Army, and requested that the General commanding Her Majesty's troops advancing for the relief of the garrison might be informed of this fact.
The letter addressed to Sir Evelyn Baring was dated the 12th December. In it Gordon stated that, having been sent to Khartoum to draw up a report on the state of the Soudan, and for this purpose having been placed under the orders of Her Majesty's Minister in Egypt, he now informed him that Colonel Stewart took down this report, and that consequently Gordon's connection with the Foreign Office and Baring had ceased.
The latest letter was dated the 14th December, and was addressed to the Chief of the Staff. Its contents were as follows:—
"I send down the steamerBordeinto-morrow with Vol. 6 of my private journal containing account of the events in Khartoum from 5th November to 14th December. The state of affairs is such that one cannot foresee further than five to seven days, after which the town may at any time fall. I have done all in my power to hold out, but I own I consider the position is extremely critical, almost desperate; and I say this without any feeling of bitterness with respect to Her Majesty's Government, but merely as a matter of fact. Should the town fall, it will be questionable whether it will be worth the while of Her Majesty's Government to continue its expedition, for it is certain that the fall of Khartoum will insure that of Kassala and Sennar."
"I send down the steamerBordeinto-morrow with Vol. 6 of my private journal containing account of the events in Khartoum from 5th November to 14th December. The state of affairs is such that one cannot foresee further than five to seven days, after which the town may at any time fall. I have done all in my power to hold out, but I own I consider the position is extremely critical, almost desperate; and I say this without any feeling of bitterness with respect to Her Majesty's Government, but merely as a matter of fact. Should the town fall, it will be questionable whether it will be worth the while of Her Majesty's Government to continue its expedition, for it is certain that the fall of Khartoum will insure that of Kassala and Sennar."
The writing dated 29th December, 1884, containing the expression, "Khartoum all right, can hold on for years," wasprobably intended, like Gordon's previous message to the like effect, merely to convey the information that he was still holding out.
The wording of the document was simply arusein the event of the capture of the person who brought the message, on foot, to the steamer after she left Khartoum. This is apparent from the letter of the 14th December, as well as from the statements of the Egyptian officers who accompanied the steamers. They reported that they had been for some weeks stationed a short distance above Metammeh waiting for the arrival of the British column. They had assisted in getting messages into and out of Khartoum, where the situation was altogether most gloomy. Gordon himself was well, they said, but his soldiers were despairing of relief, and it was necessary that some Europeans should proceed with the utmost alacrity to Khartoum, in order to reassure the population and the troops.
Abdul Hamid Bey, who commanded one of the steamers, theBordein, informed Sir Charles Wilson that he left Khartoum on the 14th in that vessel, and Gordon then told him that if he (Abdul Hamid) did not return with English troops within ten days it would be too late; and that in that case he had better not attempt to return at all.
The other three steamers had quitted Khartoum in September, and had been down to Shendy and other places looking for the expeditionary force.
On the 22nd January, 1885, it was decided to construct two forts—a village fort to be held by the Guards, and a river fort, containing the hospital, to be held by the remainder of the force. The three small guns of the column, together with some from the steamers, were put in position.
The same day, the steamers were utilized by Sir Charles Wilson for the purposes of another reconnaissance, this time towards Shendy, a town opposite to Metammeh on the right bank of the Nile. Only a small force, consisting for the most part of a detachment of the Mounted Infantry, was embarked. Shendy was found to be in the possession of the enemy, though they were not in overwhelming force. One Krupp gun was mounted there. The steamers contented themselves with throwing a few shells into the place and then retired.
It was found that a portion of the enemy had occupied asmall island in the Nile just opposite the British camp. The guns of the steamers were speedily brought to bear on them, and the infantry opening a steady fire drove the intruders out of the island and across the river.
The whole of the 23rd was occupied in changing the crews and soldiers on board the steamers, fitting them up and loading them with supplies for Khartoum, and preparing for a start. Owing to the absence of coal, wood had to be substituted, and the latter commodity was scarce. It was only obtained by landing parties from the steamers carrying off the timber of which the sakheas or waterwheels were constructed. A convoy of camels under Colonel Talbot was sent back to Gakdul after dark with despatches for Lord Wolseley, and instructions to bring up provisions. The escort of 400 men accompanying the convoy reduced the little garrison at Gubat to a total of 922 all told.
The original plan was for Lord Charles Beresford to man two of the steamers with his naval brigade and, after putting fifty of the Sussex Regiment on board, to take them with Sir Charles Wilson to Khartoum. Unfortunately it was impossible to carry out this programme. All the naval officers were killed or wounded except Beresford, who was so ill as to be unable to walk, and many of the best petty officers and seamen were also gone. Beresford indeed offered to accompany the expedition, but, as he was clearly not in a fit condition, Wilson felt bound to decline the offer. After consultation with him Khasm-el-Mus was placed in command of the steamerBordein, and Abdul Hamid Bey in command of theTala Hawiyeh. It was Lord Wolseley's idea that the military escort should enter Khartoum in red coats. There was some difficulty in finding a sufficient number of coats for the purpose, but at the last moment they were obtained from the Guards, and the Sussex men were enabled to appear in tunics which were sadly wanting in point of fit, though correct in colour.
At 8 a.m. on the 24th Sir C. Wilson left for Khartoum in theBordein, with Captain Gascoigne, Yorkshire Hussars, ten non-commissioned officers and men of the Sussex Regiment, and one petty officer, artificer, Royal Navy; theTala Hawiyehfollowed with Captain Trafford and ten non-commissioned officers and men of the Sussex, Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley, King's Rifles,and one petty officer, artificer, Royal Navy. Captain Trafford commanded the escort, and Captain Gascoigne and Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley accompanied Wilson for service with Gordon, at Khartoum.
No information has been given why only two of the four vessels were despatched, nor why only twenty British soldiers were embarked. Of course little more than a "demonstration" could have been made with any force such as the steamers could have carried, even if all of them had been employed. Still the singular reduction from 14,000, the total of the British Army in Egypt, to 7,000, the force told off for the expedition, then to 1,800, the number of Sir Herbert Stewart's column, and finally to twenty, the number of Sir Charles Wilson's forlorn hope, cannot fail to strike the reader.
Colonel Boscawen was left in command of the force which remained at Gubat.
When near Sheikeih, on the left bank, a portion of the force under Fiki-Mustapha, which, it had been reported, was marching on Metammeh, was seen in the distance. It was ascertained afterwards that this force, about 3,000 men, had halted on receiving news of the fight at Metammeh, and then retired to Wad-Habeshi.
On the 26th two Shukriyehs came on board and reported that for the last fifteen days there had been fighting at Khartoum, and on the 27th a man shouted out from the left bank, that a camel-man had just passed with the news that Khartoum had fallen, and that Gordon had been killed.
On the 28th, a Shukriyeh on the right bank stated that Khartoum had fallen two days previously, and that Gordon had been killed. The news was generally discredited, and the vessels prepared to force their way past the enemy's batteries into Khartoum, theBordeinleading and theTala Hawiyehfollowing close astern. The orders to the detachment of the Royal Sussex were to fire volleys at the embrasures of the batteries, whilst the Soudanese troops kept up an independent fire and the four guns on the steamers replied to the fire of the batteries.
On approaching Halfiyeh it was noticed that the palm-grove there had been burned, and that three or four large nuggers were lying alongside the bank. On the attention of Khasm-el-Mus being called to this, he at once replied, "Gordon's troops must be there,as the Mahdi has no boats." Directly afterwards a heavy fire was opened upon the steamers from four guns, and from rifles at from 600 to 900 yards range. One gun was in a sakhea pit at the water's edge, two in an earthwork a little above the sakhea, and one in the village. After passing Shamba, two guns on the right bank opened on the steamers while a heavy rifle-fire came from both banks, and this was sustained until they came within range of the guns of Omdurman. When abreast of Tuti Island, which it was expected to find in Gordon's possession, the vessels were received by a sharp musketry fire at from 75 to 200 yards range; three or four guns, of which one was a Krupp, opened fire from the upper end of Tuti, or from Khartoum, two guns from the fort at Omdurman, and a well-sustained rifle-fire from the left bank. The steamers returned the fire both with guns and rifles.
On reaching a point beyond Tuti, Wilson came to the conclusion that Khartoum was in the hands of the enemy, and that it would be a useless sacrifice of life to attempt to land or try to force a passage to the town itself; he therefore ordered theBordeinto turn and run down the river at full speed. TheTala Hawiyeh, which had grounded for a few minutes, near the upper end of Tuti Island, followed, and the steamers drew up for the night near Tamaniat.
Here Wilson sent out two messengers, one to go to Khartoum to ascertain the fate of Gordon, the other to collect information. The latter, on his return, stated he had met a Jaalin Arab, who told him that Khartoum had fallen on the night of the 26th, and that Gordon was dead. He also said that on the 27th the Mahdi had entered Khartoum, prayed in the principal mosque, and then retired to Omdurman, leaving the town to three days' pillage.
The reasons which led Wilson to the conclusion that Khartoum had fallenwere:—The heavy fire brought to bear from Tuti Island; the absence of any fire from Khartoum in his support; the fact that no Egyptian flag was flying from any place in or near the town, though Government and other houses were plainly visible; the presence of a large number of dervishes with their banners on a sandspit; and the fact that a number of Gordon's troop boats and nuggers were lying along the left bank of the White Nile under Omdurman Fort.
On the 29th theTala Hawiyehran at full speed on a sunken rock in open water opposite Jeb-el-Royan and rapidly filled. TheBordeinwas brought up at a small island below the wreck, and before sunset Captain Trafford and Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley came down with a large nugger, in which they placed every one on board the steamer, the two guns, and such of the ammunition as had not been damaged.
Fiki-Abd-Er-Rahman, who had come down to the river with a flag of truce at Omdurman, and followed down to the scene of the wreck, came on board with a letter from the Mahdi, which was addressed to the party. The letter stated that Khartoum had been taken and Gordon killed, and offered a safe-conduct to any one sent to verify the facts. The Mahdi enjoined the English to become Moslems if they wished for peace, and promised protection to Khasm-el-Mus and his followers if they submitted. The messenger, on the other hand, stated that Gordon was with the Mahdi at Omdurman, and that the garrison of Tuti having refused to submit had been put to the sword.
Wilson made no reply to the Mahdi's letter, but, to secure a safe passage through the cataracts, where the slightest opposition would have been fatal to every one on board the steamers, Khasm-el-Mus, with Wilson's cognizance, answered that he would never give himself up unless the Mahdi sent him a special safe-conduct and promise of safety. If this were sent he would surrender to Fiki-Mustapha at Wad-Habeshi, where guns had been mounted to oppose the passage of the steamers.
On the 30th they passed the most difficult portion of the cataract without opposition (the result of Khasm-el-Mus' answer, for during several hours the soldiers and men on the steamer and nugger were at the mercy of a few sharpshooters).
The same day two Shukriyehs came on board with information that Gordon was shut up in the mission church at Khartoum with some faithful followers.
On the 31st, after theBordeinhad been lowered down a difficult fall with great care, she was run on a sunken rock off the island of Mernat between two and three miles above the enemy's position at Wad-Habeshi. The steamer was beached on the sandspit of a small island, and everything landed. The island of Mernat, about forty yards distant, was occupied by a picket of the Royal Sussex and the crew and soldiers of theTala Hawiyeh,and at nightfall the picket of the Sussex was withdrawn to the smaller island.
Stuart-Wortley was directed to proceed as soon as it was dark to Gubat, with information of the position of the expedition, and a request for assistance.
Wilson at first intended to cross to the right bank of the Nile and march as soon as the moon rose, but finding it impossible to move the Soudanese troops, he bivouacked with Khasm-el-Mus on Mernat, whilst Captains Trafford and Gascoigne remained on the smaller island to guard the stores.
On the 1st February a zeriba was made on Mernat Island; the four guns from the steamers were mounted, and all the ammunition and stores which had been saved were collected. Some Shukriyehs from the mainland visited the party, and said that since the fall of Khartoum they had determined to throw in their lot with the Mahdi; they advised Khasm-el-Mus to do the same, but he replied he would never surrender without a letter from the Mahdi promising safety.
When the zeriba was finished, Wilson called the men to arms and, during the inspection which followed, was able to assure himself that a large proportion of the soldiers would remain loyal and fight to the last. One soldier deserted during the day. Two messengers were sent to Halfiyeh to obtain news from Khartoum.
On the 2nd Fiki-Mustapha, from Wad-Habeshi, crossed to the island and tried to persuade Khasm-el-Mus to submit, but he returned the same answer as before. A friendly Shukriyeh brought news that a steamer had left Gubat for the relief of the force at noon the previous day. A sister of Khasm-el-Mus, who had followed the steamers down the river, also arrived, with news that the families of all the officers on board the steamers had been killed at Khartoum, and that Gordon was killed whilst coming out of his room in Government House. Khasm-el-Mus' sister was sent back to Khartoum to obtain further information, and to purchase back any of the family sold into slavery. During the afternoon Abdul Hamid Bey (who had brought a strong letter of recommendation from Gordon to Lord Wolseley) deserted, as well as some of the "Reises" (pilots) and four soldiers. As soon as Wilson was aware of this, he placed the remaining Reises, who were all Dongolawis, and friendly to the Mahdi, under a guard ofthe Sussex, with orders that they were to be shot if they attempted to escape.
On the 3rd, Wilson ordered all the troops to be confined to the zeriba, and, in the event of the non-arrival of the steamer, made arrangements to seize Fiki-Mustapha, who was again to visit the island, and keep him as hostage.
To return to Stuart-Wortley: he left the island at 6.45 p.m. in a small rowing-boat with four English soldiers and eight natives, and floated past the enemy's works, who did not see him until opposite their last bonfire, when they fired several shots without effect. He then ordered the men to row hard, and reached the camp at Gubat at 3 a.m. on the 1st February without any further opposition.
The news he brought placed the force at Gubat in a state of consternation. The first necessity was, of course, to get Wilson's party off the island. It was decided that Lord Charles Beresford should start early in the afternoon in one of the remaining steamers. It was also resolved to send off a convoy across the desert to bring up reinforcements in view of a probable advance of the Mahdi with the force which the capture of Khartoum had set free.115
Stuart-Wortley left Gubat at 2 p.m. on board theSafiyeh, with Lord Charles Beresford in command; a portion of the Naval Brigade, under Lieutenant Van Koughnet; twenty non-commissioned officers and privates of the Mounted Infantry, under Lieutenant Bower, King's Royal Rifles; two Gardner guns; and two 4-pounder brass mountain-guns.
On the 2nd a few shots were fired from the west bank. The vessel stopped for the night just past Gebel-Fangur. On the 3rd she started at 6.30 a.m. At 8 a.m. she came in sight of the enemy's works at Wad-Habeshi, where the Arabs could be seen running into the rifle-trench; fire was opened with the bow gun at about 1,000 yards range. On nearing the position, the enemy opened a heavy rifle-fire, and a gun, in an embrasure facing down the river, also opened fire. The steamer replied with the Gardners and rifles, and also with a 4-pounder. When opposite the central embrasure, the enemy moved their gun and fired, their shot passing over the steamer. The latter's fire was so rapid and well-directedthat the enemy were shy of putting their heads over the parapet to take aim. Having passed the embrasure facing up the river, where the enemy had their second gun, a round shot passed through the vessel's boiler and caused the steam to escape in a huge volume. She proceeded about 300 yards further, while the steam lasted, and then dropped anchor at 500 yards from the enemy's position. Van Koughnet was shot through the thigh when serving the Gardner, one bluejacket was mortally wounded, and two more were severely scalded. The Gardners had to be moved abaft the battery, and a hole made in it to allow the gun and the Gardners to play upon the enemy's works. The boiler was found to be repairable. Firing continued very brisk until 10.30 a.m., when the enemy's fire was silenced.
Wilson's party heard theSafiyehcoming into action with the enemy's battery at Wad-Habeshi; but shortly afterwards Trafford, who was on the "look-out" at the end of the island, reported that he had seen the steamer enveloped in smoke, and feared she had met with a serious accident. As the steamer continued to fire on the battery, and could be seen swinging at anchor, it was determined to break up the zeriba at once and march down to her.
As soon as the order was given a scene of wild confusion arose, as it was impossible to keep the Soudanese soldiers under control, and the enemy opened a heavy rifle-fire when they noticed the movement. Eventually the guns, ammunition, stores, wounded, and women, were placed in a nugger, and the troops assembled on the island. Gascoigne, with a small guard of the Sussex, was put in charge of the nugger with instructions to stop at the nearest point he could reach on the right bank.
Wilson then marched the rest of the British and Soudanese troops to the end of the island, whence they crossed to the right bank in a small boat. The crossing was covered by the detachment of the Sussex.
On reaching the nugger Gascoigne proceeded down the river until he reached the right bank opposite theSafiyeh, whilst Wilson marched to the same place. Finding it difficult to communicate with Beresford by signal, he sent Gascoigne, who volunteered for the service, in a small boat to theSafiyehwith the two naval artificers, and a native crew; the boat was received with a sharp rifle-fire from the enemy going and returning, butfortunately no one was hit. In the meantime, Wilson had got one of the guns out of the nugger and brought it into action against the centre embrasure of the battery; whilst three marksmen of the Sussex made good practice at 1,100 yards range, and the remainder of the Sussex and the Soudanese were drawn up behind a sakhea channel.
Lord Charles Beresford having sent a message to say that his boiler, which had been pierced by a shot, would be ready by the evening, and that he would pick the party up at a more convenient place about three miles lower down next morning, Wilson directed Trafford to proceed down the river with the Sussex and a portion of the Soudanese under Khasm-el-Mus to form a zeriba at the selected point.
Wilson remained behind to cover the passage of the nugger with the gun and a detachment of Soudanese, but she unfortunately ran on a sandbank, and did not get off before sunset. In dragging the gun down through the tangled vegetation after dark, the men, who had had no food, became exhausted, and it was found necessary to abandon the gun, which was spiked and thrown into the river. After sunset Gascoigne endeavoured to run past the battery in the nugger, but she again grounded on two rocks opposite to and about 200 yards from the centre embrasure. Here she remained all night and until about 8 a.m. next morning, under fire from the battery and rifle-pits, but by most extraordinary good fortune no one was wounded.
On the 4th Beresford, having got up steam, ran past the battery, which now reopened on him, and brought to a short distance below; he then sent a party of bluejackets under Lieutenant Keppel, in a boat, to Gascoigne's assistance. For more than an hour the work of lightening the nugger had to be carried on under fire, and nothing could exceed the coolness and gallantry shown by Gascoigne and by Keppel, who was struck by a spent ball during this trying time. When the nugger was clear of the rocks Beresford proceeded down stream, and embarked the soldiers and crews of the steamers by 11 a.m. The camp at Gubat was reached at 5.30 p.m.
Though the members of Wilson's expedition were repeatedly under fire, their losses were only two Soudanese killed and twenty-five wounded. This was due to the excellent manner in which the steamers were protected, as well as to the enemy's badshooting. The casualties on board Beresford's steamer have been already mentioned, and they also were comparatively small for the same reason.
It only remains to add that there are probably few more gallant achievements recorded than the successful rescue effected by Lord Charles Beresford in the face of difficulties.116
Gordon's Diaries bring the history of the siege of Khartoum down to the 14th December, 1884. The relative positions of the besiegers and besieged at that date may be seen from the accompanying plan.
It will be observed that Khartoum was protected on the north and west sides by the Blue and White Niles respectively, and on the south and east by a line of intrenched fortifications, with intervening redoubts, running from Fort Buri, on the Blue Nile, almost to the White Nile. Unfortunately, at this time, the late high Nile had washed away portions of the parapet for a considerable distance from the western end, and, now that the river had fallen, there was a serious gap in this part of the defences. To remedy this, Gordon had for some time employed working parties to repair the demolished parapets, but as the work had to be conducted under fire from the enemy's troops at Omdurman, on the opposite bank, but little progress had been made. The ditch at this point was also more or less damaged by the action of the river, and was never completely restored. To guard this, the weak part of the position, Gordon stationed armed barges and native boats on the river close by. He also placed mines there, but these were destroyed by the Nile. In the rear of the line of ramparts, and between them and the town, extended an open plain, a little more than a mile in breadth, on which stood barracks and slaughter-houses, and here and there an Arab cemetery. On the south and eastsides, fronting the fortifications, were the camps of the besieging armies of Wad en Nejumi and Abu Girgeh.117
map: Rough Plan of Khartoum, January, 1885
The army under the immediate command of the Mahdi was encamped on the west of Omdurman, where Mohamed Faragallah Bey, with some Egyptian soldiers, was still holding out, in a work called Fort Omdurman. A large force of Dervishes,118under Sheikh-el-Obeid, occupied a position atKhojali, on the north side of the Blue Nile, where Gordon also had a fort called "the North Fort," at a point named "Ras-el-Rasek," as well as a battery on Tuti Island, nearly opposite.
On the 14th December Gordon wrote, "In ten days the town may fall." There were then in store 83,525 okes (or 227,000 lbs.) of biscuit, and 546 ardebs (or 2,700 bushels) of dhoora (Indian corn), representing approximately eighteen days' rations for the troops alone. But Gordon had already, on the 22nd November, found it necessary to issue 9,600 lbs. of biscuit to the poor in the town, so great was the destitution which prevailed. As the siege progressed this state of things became more and more aggravated, and the Government supplies had to be further drawn on for the benefit of the civil population.
Ever since the 3rd of November the Fort of Omdurman had been cut off from communication with Khartoum. It was then provisioned only for a month and a half, and at the end of the year the garrison was in great straits from want of food. Gordon made one or two efforts to relieve the garrison, but, having no longer his steamers, four of which had gone to meet the British expedition, and the fifth having been lost with Colonel Stewart, he was unable to open communication.
On the 5th January, 1885, Faragallah signalled that his provisions and ammunition were alike exhausted, and Gordon was compelled to reply that there was nothing for it but to surrender. Faragallah and the whole of the force at Fort Omdurman then capitulated, and were transferred to the Mahdi's camp, where they were well treated, as an encouragement to others to join the Dervish ranks.
On the 6th January, seeing that the garrison of Khartoum was becoming daily more and more reduced by want of food, and that existence for many of the inhabitants was almost impossible, Gordon issued a Proclamation authorizing as many of the civil population as liked to leave the town and go over to the Mahdi. Some thousands of natives took advantage of the offer, and Gordon sent with them a letter to the Mahdi, asking him "to feed and protect these poor Moslem people as he (Gordon) had done for the last nine months." After the fugitives had left, it was estimated that only about 14,000 remained in the town, out of a population shown by the census taken in the September previous as 34,000.
The fall of Omdurman was a great blow to the garrison of Khartoum, who thus lost the only position they had on the west bank of the White Nile. The Dervishes were thenceforth able to close the river to Gordon's two remaining steamers, and to establish ferries south of Khartoum, giving easy communication between the camps at Omdurman and those of Wad en Nejumi and Abu Girgeh. Khartoum was practically hemmed in on three sides.
The food difficulty became daily more serious. To make matters worse, those in charge of the biscuit and dhoora stole quantities of both, as occasion offered. The officer in charge of the stores was arrested and brought before a court of inquiry, but Gordon, realizing the emergency of the situation, had to point out to those conducting the investigation the necessity of not inquiring too critically into the matter.
The Island of Tuti was still held by Gordon's forces, and the crops there were reaped under the fire of the forts, and stored in the Commissariat. This produced about 1,600 bushels of corn altogether, which, with the remaining biscuits, were served out to the soldiers. When this was finished, Gordon ordered a search to be made in the town, with the result that further quantities (32 bushels only) were discovered in some of the houses, and also buried in the ground. These also were taken to the Government store, the owners being given, in every case, receipts for the quantities carried off. The search was conducted daily until there was nothing left in possession of the inhabitants.
Soon all that had been collected in the Commissariat was finished, and then the soldiers and inhabitants were reduced to eating dogs, donkeys, skins of animals, gum, and palm-fibre. Then an actual famine prevailed. The gum produced diarrhœa, and the soldiers became so weak that they could scarcely man the fortifications.119The situation of the civil inhabitants was even worse. Many died of actual starvation, and corpses lay about the streets, no one having sufficient strength or energy to bury them.
All this time the enemy kept up a fusillade on the garrison,occasionally killing a few of their number. The soldiers were also harassed by repeated night attacks.120
Although it must have been evident to Gordon that the end could not be far off, he continued to encourage the people by Proclamations announcing the near approach of the British Relief Expedition, and even went so far as to hire some of the principal houses on the river for the reception of the men belonging to it. Day by day he watched from the roof of his Palace, in the hope of seeing them arrive. After awhile many of the inhabitants began to lose faith in him, and commenced opening communications with the Mahdi.
On the 20th January, the news of the battle of Abu Klea reached the Mahdi's camp, where it caused the greatest consternation. A Council of Emirs was thereupon held, at which there were great divergencies of opinion. The Mahdi himself was strongly in favour of raising the siege. He told the Emirs that he had been warned in a vision that he was to make a "Hegira," or flight, to Obeid, whither he proposed to withdraw with his forces. He said, "If one Englishman had been able to keep us at bay for a year, what chance shall we have against thousands of Englishmen who have defeated our best men at Abu Klea?" All agreed except one Emir, named Mohammed Abd el Kerim, who said that an attempt should be made to take Khartoum by assault, adding, rightly enough, that if it succeeded the English would not dare to come on, and that, if it failed, there would always be time to retreat. Abd el Kerim's views, for the time being, prevailed, and there was no longer any talk of raising the siege.
Before the meeting terminated it was decided to announce a great victory. Accordingly a salute of 101 guns was fired, the war drums were beaten, and every demonstration was made, as if in celebration of some great triumph. The stratagem failed to impose on Gordon, who had seen, through his glass, thousands of women in the camp, weepingand indulging in signs of despair. The actual news of the battle was conveyed to him shortly after by a female spy from Omdurman.
A Council, composed of Farag Pasha, the Military Commandant, the chief Government officials, the Greek Consul, and other leading members of the Greek colony, was hurriedly summoned to the Palace. The meeting was then informed of the victory at Abu Klea, and that the English were approaching, and would arrive in two or three days. This intelligence inspired everybody with fresh hope, only, however, to give place to deeper despair when the next few days passed away without any signs of the relieving force. Gordon still struggled to keep up the spirits of his men, constantly saying, "They must come to-morrow," though few believed in him, and people began to say that, after all, the great battle which had taken place must have been a Dervish victory.
It is said that Gordon at this time took no sleep, but spent his days in watching the river from the roof of the Palace, and his nights in visiting the various posts.
On the 23rd, he had a stormy interview with Farag Pasha, whom he reproached with having left one of the forts insufficiently guarded. It seems that Farag, on this occasion, proposed to surrender Khartoum to the Mahdi, and stated the terms which the latter was willing to accept. Gordon indignantly refused to listen to the proposition, and is even said to have struck Farag.
There is no doubt that, at this period, not only Farag, but many of the other officers and Government officials, as well as some of the leading merchants, were in correspondence with the Mahdi, who was also kept posted up in the condition of the garrison by the deserters who, from time to time, left Khartoum. On one night alone, Omar Agha Ibrahim, a lieutenant of infantry, after taking the precaution of drawing half a month's pay for himself and his men, went over to the enemy with thirty of his comrades.
By the way of final preparations, Gordon had all the ammunition and powder not required for daily use removed from the Arsenal and placed in the Catholic Church, a strong stone building near the Palace, and commenced to lay a slow match train between the two buildings, so as to enable him to explodethe whole supply, in the event of the Mahdists entering the town.121
To provide for the safety of the Europeans, he stationed the small steamerIsmailiajust beyond the Palace walls, with orders to the engineer to get up steam on a signal being made. The arrangement was kept secret, being communicated only to the principal Greek residents, who, it was proposed, should go on board with their families at the last moment and save themselves by the river.122
Meantime the Mahdi had full information of the movements of the British expeditionary force. The delay in the advance from Metammeh inspired both him and his followers with fresh courage. It also gave support to Mohammed el Kerim's arguments, and when, on the 24th, intelligence was received that two steamers had started from Metammeh, a Council was held at which it was determined to act on his advice and make the attack before the vessels should arrive.
This decision was, to some extent, influenced by the circumstance that the Mahdi had opportunely had another vision, in which, this time, the Prophet had assured him "that Allah had put the lives of the garrison into the Mahdi's hands, and that the attack should be made early on the morning of Monday, the 26th."
On the 25th Gordon was slightly ill, and, it being Sunday, he did not appear in public. Through mental strain and trouble his hair had grown completely white. Although he appeared to realize that the end could not be much longer postponed, he was repeatedly heard to say that, if he had only a couple of English soldiers to parade on the ramparts, he should not fear the enemy's attack.
In the morning he observed a great movement in the hostile lines, and called many of his officers, and the leading men of the town, to the Palace. After telling them that he thought the attack was impending, he appealed to them to make a last effort, as he believed that the British troops would arrive in twenty-four hours. He called upon every male inhabitant—even the old men—to assist in manning the fortifications. It was agloomy Sunday in Khartoum, and as the day went by without any signs of the relieving force, despair settled down over all. When night came many of the famished soldiers left their posts on the ramparts and wandered into the town in search of food. Others were too weak, from want of nourishment, to go to their stations. Although this was not an unusual occurrence of late, the number of defaulters that night was so great as to cause the most serious alarm in the town, and many of the principal inhabitants armed themselves and their servants and went to the fortifications in place of the soldiers.
Gordon, who had established a complete system of telegraphic communication with all the posts along the lines, sat up alone writing in the Palace till after midnight, and then, worn out with anxiety and fatigue, fell asleep.
In the early part of the night, which, after the moon had set, was dark and cloudy, the Mahdi crossed over from Omdurman with a huge mass of his followers and joined the armies of Wad en Nejumi and Abu Girgeh, drawn up on the south and east faces of the fortifications. After addressing the combined forces and giving his final orders, the Mahdi then returned to Omdurman, leaving Wad en Nejumi to conduct the attack.
At about 2 a.m. on the 26th, the entire force, under Wad en Nejumi, numbering from 40,000 to 50,000 men, began its advance. It moved in two divisions. The foremost was told off to attack the lines to the westward at the point between the Messalamieh Gate and the White Nile, where the defences had been partially destroyed by the river. The other division was to attack towards Buri, at the opposite, or eastern, extremity of the lines, or in the event of the attack on the White Nile side proving successful, to follow in the track of the foremost division and thus enter Khartoum. The instructions were to march as silently as possible, and not to fire until fired upon by the defenders.
Carrying "angaribs," or couches of palm boughs, and bundles of brushwood, to throw into the trenches, under cover of the darkness the Dervishes marched noiselessly close up to the lines till the ditch was reached. This they found partly filled with mud and the parapet broken away. A few of the Dervishes fired in reply to the fire from the lines; the remainder, charging with spears, dashed into the trench and up the opposite side,shouted their war cries, and, meeting but little resistance, effected an entrance into the works.
The defenders only perceived the advance a few minutes before the actual attack, when the alarm sounded. The greater part of the troops were so tired and worn out that it was not till the sentries fired that the rest of the garrison started up, to find the enemy swarming across the ditch and up the broken parapet. When once the Dervishes were upon them, Gordon's soldiers made but little fight. Too feeble to withstand the rush, some were killed, and still more broke and fled. In a few minutes all resistance at this part of the position was over, and whilst a stream of Dervishes from behind, pouring in through the place where the entry had been effected, pushed on and entered Khartoum, those in front rushed along inside the parapets and attacked the defenders in the rear. These last, stationed at distances of from three to four paces apart, and hopelessly outnumbered, could do but little. They fired a few shots and were then either killed or dispersed—leaving the enemy in undisputed possession of the fortifications. Over 150 soldiers' bodies were afterwards counted on the parapets alone.
The Commandant, Farag Pasha, was at Buri, at the further end of the fortifications, when the assault was made, and at once rode down the lines, encouraging his men. When he reached the Messalamieh Gate, the Dervish horde had already crossed the ditch and were rolling up the line of the defenders on the parapets. Farag, seeing that resistance was useless, opened the Messalamieh Gate and surrendered himself prisoner. A great many of his followers also rushed out through the gate and threw down their arms. Charges of treachery have been brought against Farag for his conduct on this occasion, but, seeing that the enemy were well within the position when the gate was opened, this act could not have affected the issue one way or another. Farag's having been put to death in the enemy's camp three days later also tends to rebut the accusation of having betrayed his trust.
Mohamed Bey Ibrahim, who commanded at the same gate, formed his men, consisting of two companies, into a square, and, taking up a position on the plain between the lines and the town, fought courageously till he and nearly all his men were killed.
Bakhit Betraki was in charge at Buri, and held his ground till, seeing that the enemy had carried the works at the other end, andwere inside the lines, he abandoned the fortifications. Then, rallying his men, he fought as long as any of them were left alive.
Notwithstanding the resistance offered in this and other instances, the Dervish loss was but trifling, only from 80 to 100 being killed in the whole operations, which, from the time the first gun was fired till Khartoum was taken, are said to have lasted three hours.123
The soldiers who had been placed on board the barges and armed boats on the White Nile, as already stated, made but very slight resistance. They did a little firing at the moment of the first assault, after which they forsook the boats and fled.
The garrisons at Tuti Island and at "the North Fort" were, from the nature of their positions, unable to take any active part in the fight; they fired occasionally from their guns, but when Khartoum fell they all surrendered without further opposition.
The party of Dervishes who, when the first attack succeeded, pushed on to Khartoum, at once took possession of the town and began massacring, pillaging and looting everywhere.
Their first thought was to rush for the Palace, where they expected to find the treasure, as well as Gordon, the man who had so long and so successfully resisted them.
Gordon, who had with him a company of black troops as a guard, on being aroused by the noise of the attack, went on the roof of the Palace, which stood on the northern side of the town facing the Blue Nile, and, finding that the enemy had entered the works for upwards of an hour, kept up a hot fire in the direction of the attack. As dawn approached he could see the Dervish banners in the town. Soon the gun which he had mounted on the roof became useless, as it could not be depressed sufficiently to fire down upon the Dervishes, who were by this time crowding in thousands round the Palace. Gordon, seeing that resistance was useless, then quitted the roof, put on his Pasha's white uniform, and, with his sword by his side and his revolver in hand, placed himself at the door of his divan just at the top of the grand staircase. Here he stood and calmly awaited his fate.
A small band of Wad en Nejumi's followers forced their way into the building and dashed up the steps. Gordon asked themwho was their leader. The only reply that he got was a curse, and one of the band plunged his spear into Gordon's body. Gordon made no attempt to defend himself, but turned away with a disdainful gesture, when he was again stabbed from behind and fell forward on the ground. Others of the party then rushed up and cut and hacked at the prostrate body until life was extinct. This was shortly before sunrise—whilst hundreds of Dervishes swarmed up to the Palace roof and slaughtered the soldiers there. Gordon's body was dragged down the steps to the garden, where the head was cut off, wrapped in a handkerchief, and taken to the Mahdi. The Mahdi is said to have been very angry at Gordon's death. His idea had been to convert him to Mahdism, and afterwards to hand him over to the Government in exchange for Arabi Pasha. Gordon's head, after being shown to Slatin Pasha, then a captive in the camp, was hung on a tree at Omdurman, where multitudes of the Mahdi's followers cursed and insulted it. His body was left in the garden the whole day, and thousands of the Dervishes came up and plunged their spears into it. Later on it was thrown, with many others, into one of the wells adjoining.124
The steamer which Gordon had placed near the Palace was of no assistance at the critical moment. The captain saw the mob rushing to surround the building, and waited for Gordon to arrive. Later on, probably at the moment when Gordon met his end, a crowd of Dervishes made for the vessel, which, to escape being captured, steamed out into mid stream and moved backwards and forwards until the captain received a message from the Mahdi, offering him pardon if he would give up the steamer, which was thereupon surrendered.
After the Palace had been taken the Catholic mission building and church were the next objects on which the mob directed themselves. The guards in the grounds outside were at once killed, and the assailants then broke into the building, killing and looting everywhere.
The massacre in the town lasted six hours, and 4,000 persons at least were killed. The black troops were spared, except such as resisted. The Bashi-Bazouks, fellaheen regulars, and the Shaggiah irregulars were mostly killed in cold blood after they had surrendered and been disarmed. Large numbers of the townspeople and slaves were either killed or wounded.
At 10 a.m. the Mahdi sent orders to stop the massacre, which then ceased, and the Dervishes devoted themselves exclusively to looting. The Mahdi had promised his followers as much gold and silver as they could carry when Khartoum fell, and immense disappointment was expressed when they failed to find the expected treasure, for which Gordon's bank notes formed but a poor substitute.125
The bloodshed and cruelty which attended the massacre are said to be such as defy description. Nicola Leontides, the Greek Consul, had his hands first cut off and was then murdered. Martin Hansel, the Austrian Consul, and the oldest member of the European colony, was alive up to 2 p.m., when a party of Arabs, headed by his own janissary, entered his house and beheaded him, together with a man named Mulatte Skander, who lived with him. The two bodies were then taken outside, covered with petroleum and set fire to. The Austrian tailor, Klein, on making the sign of the cross, had his throat cut fromear to ear before the eyes of his wife and children. The savages then buried their lances in the body of his son, aged seventeen, who fell lifeless. The mother, a Venetian by birth, seized her son of five years old with one hand, and, holding her baby to her breast with the other, struggled heroically to prevent their taking her children from her. Eventually they seized her daughter, a girl of eighteen, who was carried off to add to the other booty taken.
Numbers of women, and even children, perished in the general slaughter. Of the survivors, all the young and good looking women and girls were taken off to the "Beit el Mal," the Mahdi's treasury, where the loot was ordered to be collected. There they lay exposed like cattle in a pen, awaiting their turn to be selected to fill the harems of the conquerors. The first choice lay with the Mahdi himself, then followed the various Emirs, each in order of his rank. The women who were not chosen were distributed among the soldiers. The old women were given a few rags with which to cover themselves, and then sent to the Dervish camp to eke out a miserable existence by begging.
The number of Europeans made prisoners is stated to have been about ninety altogether, besides several thousands of natives. Most of these were removed to Omdurman, where they were left to get on as best they could, and exposed to many privations.
Only two days later, on the 28th, whilst the Mahdi's army was still engaged in celebrating the victory, Wilson's two steamers were observed slowly making their way up stream in the direction of the north end of Tuti Island, firing as they advanced both from guns and rifles. It was at once decided to oppose the landing of the red-coated soldiers who could be seen on board. All rushed to the river's bank, the women shouting "Môt lil Inglesi" ("Death to the English").
After reaching a point mid-way between Tuti Island and the left bank of the White Nile, and apparently looking for indications as to the fate of Khartoum and Gordon, the steamers were seen to turn round and proceed down the river under a hail of bullets from the shore.
The news of the fall of Khartoum, after a siege of 317 days, or only nine days less than that of Sebastopol, reached the War Office in London at a quarter of an hour before midnight on the4th February. It was communicated by a despatch from Lord Wolseley, sent from Korti, at 9.10 p.m. on the same day.
The War Office officials, many of whom were summoned on the receipt of the despatch, hesitated to believe the news it contained, until it should be confirmed by later intelligence, and the representatives of the Press Association were informed that nothing would be published till the following day. On the 5th the despatch appeared in the second edition of several of the morning papers, and England realized to the fullest extent the bitterness of a great national disappointment. All the gallantry and devotion of her officers and men had been unavailing; the costly Nile Expedition had proved a dismal failure; and Gordon had been allowed to perish.
The general feeling on the subject was intensified by the reflection that but two days elapsed between the fall of Khartoum and the arrival of the British troops before the town. The Government of Mr. Gladstone was severely reproached with having been once more "too late."
As to the part taken by Sir Charles Wilson, there was a strong tendency to censure the delay which had occurred in the departure of the steamers for Khartoum. Sir Charles, in a letter to Lord Wolseley, gave full explanations on this subject. He based his reasons for not starting sooner on the following considerations:—
1st. The military situation. The force had been much weakened by its losses in the fighting on the 17th and 18th January, and would be further reduced by the convoy and escort which it was necessary to send back to Gakdul. The horses and camels were so "done up" from fatigue and want of food, as to be unable to reconnoitre any distance. Reinforcements for the enemy were reported as advancing both from Omdurman and Berber, and it was necessary for him, before leaving, to ascertain that the small British force at Gubat was not liable to attack.
2ndly. The necessity of changing the men in the steamers (in accordance with Gordon's advice) and replacing them by Soudanese.
3rdly. The steamers' engines required to be overhauled, and the vessels themselves had to be prepared for resisting the batteries which it was known they would have to fight on their way to Khartoum.
4thly. Gordon was known to be still holding out, and there was nothing to show that the expected crisis, so long delayed, would take place in the next few days.
As a fact, the steamers from Khartoum reached Gubat on the 21st January, whilst the British were engaged with the enemy at Metammeh; and Wilson received the letters which General Gordon had sent down between three and four p.m. on that day. The earliest possible date for starting would, therefore, be on the morning of the 22nd, and Sir Charles pointed out that, if the steamers had left at that time and travelled at the same rate as they subsequently did, they would then only have reached Khartoum at mid-day on the 26th, when it had already fallen.
Sir Charles might, without exaggeration, have enlarged on the condition of his forces, which were so utterly used up—both men and animals—that a short interval of comparative repose was indispensable before anything further was attempted. That in spite of their condition they should have been able to undertake the abortive attack on Metammeh on the 21st, speaks volumes for their pluck and endurance.
Even if Wilson had disregarded all other considerations and pushed on at once with his handful of soldiers, there is every reason to suppose that the result would have been the same. From what has subsequently been ascertained, it is clear that for weeks previously the Mahdi had Khartoum at his mercy, and could have taken it at any moment, though he preferred that it should fall by the slower process of starvation.
He had full information of Wilson's movements, and had the latter started two days earlier, the only result would have been that the capture of the town would have been accelerated by precisely that period of time.
It would be too much to imagine that if the subaltern's guard which Wilson had at his disposal had reached Khartoum whilst it still held out, it could (notwithstanding Gordon's expectations to the contrary) have changed the fortunes of the day, or have induced the Mahdi to carry out his idea of raising the siege and retiring to Obeid. For this, the presence, or at least the advance, of the whole force at Gubat was necessary.
As it happened, the column at Gubat was not in a condition to advance, and the Mahdi, knowing that at the worst he hadonly the two steamers to reckon with, determined to risk an assault.
The responsibility for the disaster may be traced partly to the insufficient supply of camels to the Desert Column, owing to which Stewart, instead of pushing on at first straight across the Bayuda desert, was compelled to return from Gakdul Wells to Korti, and then make a fresh start, thus losing twelve days' valuable time. But after all, the main responsibility will always rest with the Government which so long delayed despatching the Relief Expedition, and then, as if to make its failure the more certain, sent it by the wrong route.
The result of the taking of Khartoum was naturally to increase the renown of the Mahdi to a greater extent than ever in the Moslem world. His fame as a conqueror spread not only throughout the Soudan, but also in the towns and villages of Upper and Lower Egypt. Many of those who before had disbelieved in him, now became fully assured of his holy mission. Had he at once followed up his success by an advance down the Nile, the consequences to the British forces at Gubat and elsewhere might have been disastrous. As it was, he contented himself with staying with his followers in the neighbourhood of Khartoum, the pillaging of which no doubt afforded an agreeable relaxation after a long and arduous siege.
With Khartoum in the Mahdi's power, the whole situation was changed. His army instead of being concentrated before Khartoum, was set free to strike a blow at any point which he might think opportune for attack.
Not merely was the small force at Gubat in danger, but Wolseley's entire army was at this period divided and split up in fragments. One of these was at Gubat, in immediate proximity to the fortified town of Metammeh held by a superior force. Another was isolated near Kirbekan, where the enemy were reported to be in considerable strength; whilst a third remainedwith Wolseley at the head-quarters at Korti. In addition detachments were scattered across the Bayuda desert at the different points of communication.
Though at first the capture of Metammeh and operations against Berber were contemplated, the question of the relief of Khartoum gradually resolved itself into the problem of extricating "The Relief Expedition" itself. Opinions differed greatly how this was to be effected. Some were in favour of the immediate retreat of the desert column to Korti. Others considered a march across the desert of so small a force, with the prospect of encountering hordes of Mahdists from Khartoum, anything but a safe operation. Other advisers were in favour of concentrating the whole of the expeditionary force on the capture of Berber and holding that place until the arrival of reinforcements from India or from home landed at Souakim, should either insure the safe retreat of the force, or allow of the recapture of Khartoum. That which was done will appear later.
During the absence of Sir Charles Wilson, the British force in the neighbourhood of Gubat, under Colonel Boscawen, was employed in improving and strengthening the works there. A triangular fort was erected, and earthworks with flanking trenches and parapets were thrown up both on the land side and towards Metammeh. Brushwood and wire entanglements were placed outside to impede the enemy in the event of their attempting to storm the position, and, in fact, every preparation was made to stand a siege.
Although an attack was constantly expected, the enemy, beyond beating tom-toms all night and making a parade every day, did nothing.
The force from time to time sent convoys of sick and wounded back across the desert to Abu Klea and Korti. To facilitate and guard the line of communications, the garrisons at the Wells were strengthened from time to time by detachments from Korti.
The whole country round Metammeh, except the village itself, where 2,000 to 3,000 of the enemy were quartered, remained quiet. At Metammeh, on the 28th January, there was a great firing of guns, with other signs of rejoicing over the news from Khartoum.
On intelligence of General Stewart's condition reaching head-quarters, Sir Redvers Buller was appointed to succeed to the command of the Desert column, Sir Evelyn Wood becomingLord Wolseley's Chief of the Staff, and Brigadier-General Grenfell succeeding Sir Evelyn Wood as "Sirdar" (Commander-in-Chief) of the Egyptian army.
Buller left Korti on the 29th January for Gakdul by the Desert route. The Royal Irish and West Kent Regiments left at the same time to strengthen the garrisons at the Wells and reinforce Gubat.
On the 11th February, Buller, with six companies of the Royal Irish Regiment, which had marched on foot the whole way from Korti, reached Gubat. His instructions were to seize Metammeh and march on Berber, but on no account to let himself be hemmed in at Metammeh.
The programme was suddenly altered, and in lieu thereof a retreat was decided on. One reason for this change was the loss likely to be incurred in the taking of Metammeh, another consideration was the insufficiency of Buller's column to operate against Berber in the face of the large force, which, set free by the fall of Khartoum, the Mahdi would now have at his disposal.
Buller deemed it unwise even to attempt to hold the position at Gubat against the Mahdi's army reinforced by Gordon's captured soldiers, and supplied with the arms and ammunition taken at Khartoum. Reports of the Mahdi having commenced an advance with 50,000 men were received, and it was judged best to retire, and so avoid the risk of having the retreat cut off.
Under these circumstances preparations were made for the march back across the Bayuda desert.126
Before leaving, Gordon's two remaining steamers were rendered useless by removal of parts of the machinery.
On the 13th Buller evacuated Gubat. His force numbered nearly 1,600 rank and file, and consisted of the followingcorps:—Squadron of 19th Hussars, Naval Brigade with two Gardner guns, detachment of Royal Artillery with two guns, a portion of the Mounted Infantry, a portion of the Guards Camel Corps, a wing of the Heavy Cavalry Camel Corps, portions of the Sussex and Royal Irish Regiments, details from departmental corps, and 300 Soudanese.
The wounded were the first sent off, the escort of 300 men being placed under the command of Colonel Talbot. The badcases were carried in litters by the Egyptians. Sir Herbert Stewart, by this time much changed for the worse, was among the sick.
On the march to Abu Klea, Buller met with no opposition beyond a skirmish which the advance guard had on the day of starting.
On the 16th the column arrived at Abu Klea, and at once set to work to strengthen the position against attack.
About thirty of the enemy's cavalry were seen scouting round the place all day. About an hour before sunset these were reinforced by some 400 infantry armed with rifles. They crossed the hills to the north-east and eastward, and having made a cover by throwing up a series of low stone walls, opened a well-directed fire at long range on the camp. The bullets fell all round and over the position. No lights or fires were allowed after dark, as the enemy kept up a dropping fire throughout the night. The British force made no reply. Up to the morning of the 17th, two men had been killed, and four officers and ten men wounded. On the 17th the guns of the Royal Artillery opened fire on the enemy's position with shrapnel. The Gardners were also turned on, but as the supply of ammunition was limited the fire had to be restricted. Still, slow as was the fire, it sufficed to check that of the enemy until eight a.m., when the cover they had been throwing up being completed, their fire became as heavy as before. Fortunately, the aim was somewhat interfered with by the high wind blowing, and by clouds of sand. Still, as Buller in his despatch to Lord Wolseley observed, to remain stationary subject to this unceasing pelting by bullets "was annoying."
The fire of the enemy did not interfere with the work of strengthening the camp. Three new forts mutually supporting one another were constructed. Buller placed the command of the principal and largest of them in the hands of Lord Charles Beresford, with his naval men and guns. The Royal Irish were ordered to hold the fort on the west of the camp, while the Sussex men garrisoned the fort on the east. The Engineers guarded the zeriba itself, in which the hospital was erected.
About noon a steady shelling of the enemy's position was commenced. The Gardner guns were at the same time again brought into use, and the Mounted Infantry also opened fire withtheir Martinis. After about two hours of this long range fighting, the enemy's fire showed signs of slackening. Major Wardrop was then sent out to reconnoitre, and endeavoured to ascertain the actual strength and position of the enemy, up to this time unknown.
With one officer and three troopers the Major crept round the enemy's right, under cover of some rising ground. Ascending a slight rise, he looked cautiously over, and observed that the enemy's riflemen on the hill were not numerous, and had no supports. He dismounted his men, and made them, without showing more than their heads, fire a volley. He then remounted and galloped off and repeated his tactics two or three times in different places, leaving one man in each place to fire as rapidly as possible, but without exposing himself to view. The Arabs were completely deceived by this manœuvre, and imagining that large reinforcements of British troops had come up, became demoralized, broke off the fight, and retreated towards Metammeh, carrying with them their killed and wounded, and leaving only a few mounted scouts to watch the camp.
Buller's loss in this skirmish amounted to three men killed, and four officers and twenty-three men wounded. The enemy's losses were more severe. They were seen to carry off several bodies, and they left six on the field of battle. Owing to the nature of the ground it was impossible to form an estimate as to the strength of the enemy. Equally difficult was it to understand what their object was, but the better opinion seems to be that it was intended to try and engage Buller until the Mahdi should come up with his whole army.
Buller then sent off a detachment of the Light Camel Corps, with despatches for Gakdul, requesting that more transport camels with ammunition might be sent to him. His reasons for thus weakening his forces were twofold. In the first place, the water supply at Abu Klea was not sufficient for the whole force for many days. In the second, his means of transport were insufficient for the requirements of the marching column, in addition to those of the garrison at the Wells.
The night of the 17th was passed quietly at the camp. On the morning of the 18th Buller detached a party of infantry which moved southwards towards the hills which had been occupied by the enemy. Their position was found to be completelyabandoned, and was taken possession of by the British force. A strong post was established on the principal hill, and scouting-parties were sent out, but nothing more could be seen of the enemy.
Sir Evelyn Wood, with three companies of the West Kent Regiment, was despatched from Korti to strengthen the force at Gakdul Wells, which they reached on the 17th, and from Gakdul a supply of transport camels with stores was sent on to Buller at Abu Klea.
During the march of the convoy from Gakdul nothing had been seen of the enemy until the neighbourhood of Abu Klea was reached, when suddenly a small body of armed men was observed watching the movements of the party. Some of the Camel Corps forthwith went in chase, and captured a half-dozen. These made no attempt to resist capture, but threw down their Remingtons, and begged for mercy. When interrogated the prisoners declared that there was no strong force of rebels anywhere near. There was, they said, a rebel camp on rising ground some two miles distant, but there were only 600 fighting men there, all of whom had recently come from Metammeh. The prisoners agreed in stating that none of the Mahdi's forces from Khartoum had yet reached Metammeh.
On the arrival of the camels and stores, Buller made his preparations for evacuating Abu Klea. His original intentions were merely to destroy the forts, and leave the wells untouched. But on the forenoon of the 23rd, he got information to the effect that the enemy had received a strong reinforcement, estimated at not less than 8,000 men. This compelled him to modify his plans, and he resolved to leave the forts standing, but to fill up all the larger wells.
The latter step was afterwards much criticized, and can only be justified by the extreme peril in which Buller's force might otherwise have been placed. To stop up a desert well is to the Oriental mind about the blackest crime that could be committed; and is a measure which is never adopted even in savage warfare. Buller, however, had no alternative. The absence of water in his rear was the sole thing that could check pursuit by the supposed force in his rear. It was, in short, the only method of covering his retreat. Accordingly, regardless of Eastern traditions, heaps of stones and rubbish were piled into all the principal wells beforeleaving. It was foreseen that before the enemy could advance he must lose several hours, and perhaps days, in restoring the wells to their former state. This time Buller calculated on employing in getting a start over his pursuers.
At two p.m. all the baggage was sent on under convoy to camp on the Omit Handel plain out of gunshot range of the Abu Klea hills. At six the outposts were withdrawn, and an hour later the whole force, including thirty-two sick and wounded, was in retreat towards Gakdul. As they marched out, the troops were not interfered with by the enemy. The enemy's scouts appeared about midday on the 24th, and fired a few shots. After this they retired, and the column was no more molested, reaching Gakdul on the 26th.
There being barely sufficient camels for the supplies, all the men and officers had to march on foot. This, as Buller observed in his despatch, in the weather which prevailed, with an allowance of only three quarts of water per man a-day, was most exhausting. He adds, "Nothing could have been better than the spirit shown by all ranks."
At Gakdul Buller's force learned the news of the death on the 16th of their former leader, General Stewart, who, with the other wounded, had been sent on in advance. The latest accounts of his condition had been such as to lead to hope of his recovery. It subsequently transpired that the nature of the wound he had received rendered this impossible, and after supporting the hardships of the desert march he finally succumbed the day before the convoy reached the wells of Gakdul, where a small force was left to bring on the stores.127
The column remained but a brief period at Gakdul, and on the 27th set out for Korti, which was reached on the 1st March, the last of the troops arriving on the 15th.
Of the march of Stewart's column across the Bayuda desert to Metammeh and back, it is unnecessary to say anything more. The highest military authority in Europe, Count Von Moltke, said of the men who took part in it, "They were not soldiers but heroes."