CHAPTER XXIV.

Compelling, non-compelling; restrained, non-restrained.

Compelling, non-compelling; restrained, non-restrained.

Compelling, non-compelling; restrained, non-restrained.

"Theego, with reference to thenon-ego, is apt, thinking of himself, to propound the alternative, 'Shall I compel, or shall I leave him to do as he likes?' so that, thinking of the other, the alternative is, 'shall he be restrained, or shall he be left to his own will?' Accordingly, the express introduction of his own will is likely to have reference to compulsion, in case of opposition: the express introduction of the will of another, is likely to mean no more than the gracious permission of theegoto letnon-egodo as he likes. Correlatively, the suppression of reference to his own will, and the adoption of a simply predictive form on the part of theego, is likely to be the mode with which, when the person is changed, he will associate the idea of another having his own way; while the suppression of reference to the will of thenon-egois likely to infer restraint produced by the predominant will of theego.

"Occasionally, the will of thenon-egois referred to as under restraint in modern times. ToI will not, the answer is sometimesyou shall, meaning, in spite of the will—sometimesyou will, meaning that the will will be changed by fear or sense of the inutility of resistance."[62]

§ 591.I am beaten.—This is a present combination, and it is present on the strength of the verbam, not on the strength of the participlebeaten, which is præterite.

The following table exhibits theexpedientson the part of the different languages of the Gothic stock, since the loss of the proper passive form of the Mœso-Gothic.

Deutsche Grammatik, iv. 19.

Deutsche Grammatik, iv. 19.

Deutsche Grammatik, iv. 19.

§ 592.Ought, would, &c., used as presents.—These words are not in the predicament ofshall.

They arepresentin power, andpastin form. So, perhaps, isshall.

But they are not, likeshall, perfect forms;i. e., they have no natural present element in them.

They areaoristpræterites. Nevertheless, they have a present sense.

So had their equivalents in Greek:ἐχρῆν=χρὴ,ἔδει=δεῖ,προσῆκεν=προσήκει.

In Latin, too,wouldwas often not represented by eithervoloorvolebam, but byvelim.

I believe that theusus ethicusis at the bottom of this construction.

The assertion ofdutyorobligationis one of those assertions which men like to soften in the expression:should,ought.

So is the expression of power, as denoted bymayorcan—might,could.

Very often when we sayyou should(orought to)do this, we leave to be added by implication—but you do not.

Very often when we sayI could(ormight)do this, we leave to be added by implication—but I do not exert my power.

Now, if what is left undone be thepresentelement in this assertion, the duty to do it, or the power of doing it, constitutes a past element in it; since the power (or duty) is, in relation to the performance, a cause—insufficient, indeed, but still antecedent. This hypothesis is suggested rather than asserted.

§ 593. By substituting the wordsI am boundforI ought,we may see the expedients to which this present use of the præterite forces us.

Iam boundto do thisnow =Ioweto do thisnow. However, we do not sayowe, butought.

Hence, when we wish to sayIwas boundto do thistwo years ago, we cannot sayI ought(owed)to do this, &c., sinceoughtis already used in a present sense.

We therefore say, instead,Iought to have donethistwo years ago; which has a similar, but by no means an identical meaning.

I was bound to pay two years ago,meanstwo years ago I was under an obligation to make a payment, either then or at some future time.

I was bound to have paid,&c., meansI was under an obligation to have made a payment.

If we use the wordought, this difference cannot be expressed.

Common people sometimes say,you had not ought to do so and so; and they have a reason for saying it.

The Latin language is more logical. It says notdebet factum fuisse, butdebuit fieri.

THE SYNTAX OF ADVERBS.

§ 594. The syntax of the adverb is simpler than that of any other part of speech, excepting, perhaps, that of the adjective.

Adverbs have no concord.

Neither have they any government. Theyseem, indeed, to have it, when they are in the comparative or superlative degree; but it is merely apparent. Inthis is better than that, the wordthatis governed neither bybetternor bythan. It is not governed at all. It is a nominative case; the subject of a separate proposition.This is better(i. e.,more good)than that is good. Even if we admit such an expression ashe is stronger than meto be good English, there is no adverbial government.Than, if it governmeat all, governs it as a preposition.

The position of an adverb is, in respect to matters of syntax, pre-eminently parenthetic;i. e., it may be omitted without injuring the construction.He is fighting—now;he was fighting—then;he fights—bravely;I am—almost—tired, &c.

§ 595. By referring to the Chapter on the Adverbs, we shall find that the neuter adjective is frequently converted into an adverb by deflection. As any neuter adjective may be so deflected, we may justify such expressions asfull(forfully)as conspicuous, andpeculiar(forpeculiarly)bad grace, &c. We are not, however, bound to imitate everything that we can justify.

§ 596. The termination-lywas originally adjectival. At present it is a derivational syllable by which we can convert an adjective into an adverb:brave,brave-ly.When, however, the adjective ends in-lyalready, the formation is awkward.I eat my daily breadis unexceptionable English;I eat my bread dailyis exceptionable. One of two things must here take place: the two syllables-lyare packed into one (the full expression beingdai-li-ly), or else the construction is that of a neuter adjective deflected.

Adverbs are convertible.The then men=οἱ νῦν βρότοι, &c. This will be seen more clearly in the Chapter on Conjunctions.

§ 597. It has been remarked that in expressions likehe sleeps the sleep of the righteous, the construction is adverbial. So it is in expressions likehe walked a mile,it weighs a pound. The ideas expressed bymileandpoundare not the names of anything that serves as either object or instrument to the verb. They only denote themannerof the action, and define the meaning of the verb.

§ 598.From whence, from thence.—This is an expression which, if it have not taken root in our language, is likely to do so. It is an instance of excess of expression in the way of syntax; the-cedenoting directionfroma place, and the preposition doing the same. It is not so important to determine what this constructionis, as to suggest what it isnot. It isnotan instance of an adverb governed by a preposition. If the two words be dealt with as logically separate,whence(orthence) must be a noun=which place(orthat place); just asfrom then till now=from that time to this. But if (which is the better view) the two words be dealt with as one (i. e., as an improper compound) the prepositionfromhas lost its natural power, and become the element of an adverb.

ON PREPOSITIONS.

§ 599. All prepositions govern an oblique case. If a word cease to do this, it ceases to be a preposition. In the first of the two following sentences the wordupis a preposition, in the second an adverb.

1.I climbed up the tree.2.I climbed up.

1.I climbed up the tree.2.I climbed up.

1.I climbed up the tree.

2.I climbed up.

All prepositions in English precede the noun which they govern.I climbed up the tree, neverI climbed the tree up. This is a matter not of government, but of collocation. It is the case in most languages; and, from the frequency of its occurrence, the termpre-position(orprefix) has originated. Nevertheless, it is by no means a philological necessity. In many languages the prepositions arepost-positive, following their noun.

§ 600. No preposition, in the present English, governs a genitive case. This remark is made, because expressions like thepart of the body=pars corporis,—a piece of the bread=portio panis, make it appear as if the prepositionofdid so. The true expression is, that the prepositionoffollowed by an objective case, is equivalent, in many instances, to the genitive case of the classical languages.

§ 601. The writer, however, of a paper on English preterites and genitives, in the Philological Museum (II.261) objects to the current doctrine concerning such constructions as,this is a picture of the king's. Instead of considering the sentence elliptic, and equivalent tothis is a picture ofor (from)the king's pictures, he entertains the following view,—"I confess, however, that I feel some doubt whether this phrase isindeed to be regarded as elliptical, that is, whether the phrase in room of which it is said to stand, was ever actually in use. It has sometimes struck me that this may be a relict of the old practice of using the genitive after nouns as well as before them, only with the insertion of the prepositionof. One of the passages quoted above from 'Arnold's Chronicle,' supplies an instance of a genitive so situated; and one cannot help thinking that it was the notion thatofgoverned the genitive, that led the old translators of Virgil to call his poemThe Booke of Eneidos, as it is termed by Phaer, and Gawin Douglas, and in the translation printed by Caxton. Hence it may be that we put the genitive after the noun in such cases, in order to express those relations which are most appropriately expressed by the genitive preceding it.A picture of the king'sis something very different fromthe king's picture: and so many other relations are designated byofwith the objective noun, that if we wish to denote possession thereby, it leaves an ambiguity: so, for this purpose, when we want to subjoin the name of the possessor to the thing possest, we have recourse to the genitive, by prefixing which we are wont to express the same idea. At all events as, if we were askt whose castle Alnwick is, we should answer,The Duke of Northumberland's; so we should also say,What a grand castle that is of the Duke of Northumberland's!without at all taking into account whether he had other castles besides: and our expression would be equally appropriate, whether he had or not."

Again, Mr. Guest quotes, amongst other passages, the following:—

Suffice this hillof ours—They fought two houresof the nightes—

Suffice this hillof ours—They fought two houresof the nightes—

Suffice this hillof ours—

They fought two houresof the nightes—

Yet neither class of examples is conclusive.

Oursdoes not necessarily meanof us. It may also mean ofour hills,i. e., ofthe hills of our choice.Nightesmay meanof the night's hours. In the expression,what a grand castle, &c., it is submitted to the reader that wedotake into our account other castles, which the Duke of Northumberlandmay or may not have.The Booke of Eneidosis a mistaken Latinism. As it does not seem to have been sufficiently considered that the real case governed byof(as bydein Latin) is the ablative, it is the opinion of the present writer that no instance has yet been produced ofofeither governing, or having governed a genitive case.

§ 602. It is not so safe to say in the present English that no preposition governs a dative. The expressiongive it himis good English; and it is also equivalent to the Latinda ei. But we may also saygive it to him. Now the Germanzu=togoverns a dative case, and in Anglo-Saxon, the prepositionto, when prefixed to the infinitive mood, required the case that followed it to be a dative.

§ 603. When the infinitive mood is used as the subject of a proposition,i.e., as a nominative case, it is impossible to allow to the prepositionto, by which it is preceded, any separate existence whatever,—to rise=rising;to err=error. Here the preposition must, for the purposes of syntax, be considered as incorporated with the noun, just like an inseparable inflection. As such it may be preceded by another preposition. The following example, although a Grecism, illustrates this:—

Yet not to have been dipt in Lethe's lake,Could save the son of Thetisfrom to die.

Yet not to have been dipt in Lethe's lake,Could save the son of Thetisfrom to die.

Yet not to have been dipt in Lethe's lake,

Could save the son of Thetisfrom to die.

§ 604. Akin to this, but not the same, is the so-called vulgarism, consisting of the use of the prepositionfor.I am ready to go=I am ready for going=the so-called vulgarism,I am readyforto go. Now, this expression differs from the last in exhibiting, not only averbalaccumulation of prepositions, but alogicalaccumulation as well: inasmuch asforandtoexpress like ideas.

§ 605. Composition converts prepositions into adverbs. Whether we sayupstandingorstanding-up, we express themannerin which an action takes place, and not the relation between two substantives. The so-called prepositional compounds in Greek (ἀναβαίνω, ἀποθνήσκω, &c.) are all adverbial.

ON CONJUNCTIONS.

§ 606. ACONJUNCTIONis a part of speech which connectspropositions,—the day is bright, is one proposition.The sun shines, is another.The day is brightbecausethe sun shinesis a pair ofpropositionsconnected by the conjunction,because.

From this it follows, that whenever there is a conjunction, there are two subjects, two copulas, and two predicates:i.e., two propositions in all their parts.

But this may be expressed compendiously.The sun shines,and the moon shines, may be expressed by thesun and moon shine.

Nevertheless, however compendious may be the expression, there are always two propositions wherever there is one conjunction. A part of speech that merely combines two words is a preposition—the sun along with the moon shines.

It is highly important to remember that conjunctions connect propositions.

It is also highly important to remember that many double propositions may be expressed so compendiously as to look like one. When this takes place, and any question arises as to the construction, they must be exhibited in their fully expanded form;i.e., the second subject, the second predicate, and the second copula must be supplied. This can always be done from the first proposition,—he likes you better than me=he likes you better than he likes me. The compendious expression of the second proposition is the first point of note in the syntax of conjunctions.

§ 607. The second point in the syntax of conjunctions is the fact of their great convertibility. Most conjunctions have been developed out of some other part of speech.

The conjunction of comparison,than, is derived from the adverb of time,then; which is derived from the accusative singular of the demonstrative pronoun.

The conjunction,that, is derived also from a demonstrative pronoun.

The conjunction,therefore, is a demonstrative pronoun + a preposition.

The conjunction,because, is a substantive governed by a preposition.

One and the same word, in one and the same sentence, may be a conjunction or preposition, as the case may be.

All fled but John.—If this meanall fledexceptJohn, the wordbutis a preposition, the wordJohnis an accusative case, and the proposition is single. If, instead ofJohn, we had a personal pronoun, we should sayall fled buthim.

All fled but John.—If this meanall fled, but John did not fly, the wordbutis a conjunction, the wordJohnis a nominative case, and the propositions are two in number. If, instead ofJohn, we had a personal pronoun, we should say,all fled buthe.

From the fact of the great convertibility of conjunctions it is often necessary to determine whether a word be a conjunction or not.If it be a conjunction, it cannot govern a case. If it govern a case, it is no conjunction but a preposition.A conjunction cannot govern a case, for the following reason,—the word that follows itmustbe the subject of the second proposition, and, as such, a nominative case.

§ 608. The third point to determine in the syntax of conjunctions is the certainty or uncertainty in the mind of the speaker as to the facts expressed by the propositions which they serve to connect.

1. Each proposition may contain a certain, definite, absolute fact—the day is clearbecausethe sun shines. Here, there is neither doubt nor contingency of either theday being clear, or of thesun shining.

2. Of two propositions one may be the condition of the other—the day will be clearifthe sun shine. Here, although it is certain thatif the sun shine the day will be clear, there isno certainty ofthe sun shining. Of the two propositions one only embodies a certain fact, and that is certain only conditionally.

Now an action, wherein there enters any notion of uncertainty, or indefinitude, and is at the same time connected with another action, is expressed, not by the indicative mood, but by the subjunctive.If the sunshine (notshines)the day will be clear.

Simple uncertainty will not constitute a subjunctive construction,—I am, perhaps,in the wrong.

Neither will simple connection,—I am wrongbecauseyou are right.

But, the two combined constitute the construction in question,—if Ibewrong,you are right.

Now, a conjunction that connects two certain propositions may be said to govern an indicative mood.

And a conjunction that connects an uncertain proposition with a certain one, may be said to govern a subjunctive mood.

The government of mood is the only form of government of which conjunctions are capable.

§ 609. Previous to the question of the government of conjunctions in the way of mood, it is necessary to notice certain points of agreement between them and the relative pronouns; inasmuch as, in many cases, the relative pronoun exerts the same government, in the way of determining the mood of the verb, as the conjunction.

Between the relative pronouns and conjunctions in general there is this point of connection,—both join propositions. Wherever there is a relative, there is a second proposition. So there is wherever there is a conjunction.

Between certain relative pronouns and those particular conjunctions that govern a subjunctive mood there is also a point of connection. Both suggest an element of uncertainty or indefinitude. This the relative pronouns do, through the logical elements common to them and to the interrogatives: these latter essentially suggesting the idea of doubt. Wherever the person, or thing, connected with an action, and expressed by a relative be indefinite, there is room for the usea subjunctive mood. Thus—he that troubled you shall bear his judgment,whosoeverhebe.

§ 610. By considering the nature of such words aswhen, their origin as relatives on the one hand, and their conjunctional character on the other hand, we are prepared for finding a relative element in words liketill,until,before,as long as, &c. These can all be expanded into expressions likeuntil the time when,during the time when, &c. Hence, in an expression likeseek out his wickedness till thoufind (notfindest)none, the principle of the construction is nearly the same as inhe that troubled you, &c., orvice versâ.[63]

§ 611. In most conditional expressions the subjunctive mood should follow the conjunction. All the following expressions are conditional.

1.ExceptIbeby Silvia in the night,There is no music in the nightingale.Shakspeare.

1.ExceptIbeby Silvia in the night,There is no music in the nightingale.

1.ExceptIbeby Silvia in the night,

There is no music in the nightingale.

Shakspeare.

Shakspeare.

2. Let us go and sacrifice to the Lord our God,lesthefallupon us with pestilence.—Old Testament.

2. Let us go and sacrifice to the Lord our God,lesthefallupon us with pestilence.—Old Testament.

3.—— Revenge back on itself recoils.Let it. I reck not,soitlightwell aimed.J. Milton.

3.—— Revenge back on itself recoils.Let it. I reck not,soitlightwell aimed.

3.—— Revenge back on itself recoils.

Let it. I reck not,soitlightwell aimed.

J. Milton.

J. Milton.

4.Ifthisbethe case.5.Althoughmy housebenot so with God.—Old Testament.6. He shall not eat of the holy thingunlesshewashhis flesh with water.—Old Testament.

4.Ifthisbethe case.

5.Althoughmy housebenot so with God.—Old Testament.

6. He shall not eat of the holy thingunlesshewashhis flesh with water.—Old Testament.

Expressions likeexceptandunlessare equally conditional with words likeifandprovided that, since they are equivalent toif—not.

Expressions likethoughandalthoughare peculiar. They join propositions, of which the one is aprimâ faciereason against the existence of the other: and this is the conditional element. In the sentence,if the children be so badly brought up, they are not to be trusted, thebad bringing-upis the reasonfor theirbeing unfit to be trusted; and, as far as the expression is concerned,is admitted to be so. The only uncertainty lies in the question as to the degree of the badness of the education. The inference from it is unequivocal.

But if, instead of sayingif, we sayalthough, and omit the wordnot, so that the sentence runalthough the children be so badly brought up they are to be trusted, we do two things: we indicate the general relation of cause and effect that exists betweenbad bringing-upandunfitness for being trusted, but we also, at the same time, take an exception to it in the particular instance before us. These remarks have been made for the sake of showing the extent to which words likethough, &c., are conditional.

It must be remembered, however, that conjunctions, like the ones lately quoted, do not govern subjunctive moods because they are conditional, but because, in the particular condition which they accompany, there is an element of uncertainty.

§ 612. This introduces a fresh question. Conditional conjunctions are of two sorts:—

1. Those which express a condition as an actual fact, and one admitted as such by the speaker.

2. Those which express a condition as a possible fact, and one which the speaker either does not admit, or admits only in a qualified manner.

Sincethe childrenareso badly brought up, &c.—This is an instance of the first construction. The speaker admits as an actual fact thebad bringing-up of the children.

Ifthe childrenbeso badly brought-up, &c.—This is an instance of the second construction. The speaker admits as a possible (perhaps, as a probable) fact thebad bringing-up of the children: but he does not adopt it as an indubitable one.

§ 613. Now, if every conjunction had a fixed unvariable meaning, there would be no difficulty in determining whether a condition was absolute, and beyond doubt, or possible, and liable to doubt. But such is not the case.

Althoughmay precede a proposition which is admitted as well as one which is doubted.

a.Althoughthe childrenare, &c.b.Althoughthe childrenbe, &c.

a.Althoughthe childrenare, &c.

b.Althoughthe childrenbe, &c.

If, too, may precede propositions wherein there is no doubt whatever implied: in other words it may be used instead ofsince.

In some languages this interchange goes farther than in others; in the Greek, for instance, such is the case withεἰ, to a very great extent indeed.

Hence we must look to the meaning of the sentence in general, rather than to the particular conjunction used.

It is a philological fact (probably referable to theusus ethicus) thatifmay stand instead ofsince.

It is also a philological fact that when it does so it should be followed by the indicative mood.

This is written in the way of illustration. What applies toifapplies to other conjunctions as well.

§ 614. As a point of practice, the following method of determining the amount of doubt expressed in a conditional proposition is useful:—

Insert, immediately after the conjunction, one of the two following phrases,—(1.)as is the case; (2.)as may or may not be the case. By ascertaining which of these two supplements expresses the meaning of the speaker, we ascertain the mood of the verb which follows.

When the first formula is one required, there is no element of doubt, and the verb should be in the indicative mood.If(as is the case),heisgone, I must follow him.

When the second formula is the one required, thereisan element of doubt, and the verb should be in the subjunctive mood.If(as may or may not be the case)hebegone, I must follow him.

§ 615. The use of the wordthatin expressions likeI eat that I may live, &c., is a modification of the subjunctive construction, that is conveniently calledpotential. It denotes that one act is done for the sake of supplying thepoweror opportunity for the performance of another.

In English the wordthat, so used, cannot be said to govern a mood, although generally followed by eithermayormight.It should rather be said to require a certain combination to follow it. The most important point connected with the powers ofthatis the so-calledsuccession of tenses.

§ 616.The succession of tenses.—Whenever the conjunctionthatexpresses intention, and consequently connects two verbs, the second of which takes placeafterthe first, the verbs in question must be in the same tense.

IdothisthatImaygain by it.IdidthisthatImightgain by it.

IdothisthatImaygain by it.

IdidthisthatImightgain by it.

In the Greek language this is expressed by a difference of mood; the subjunctive being the construction equivalent tomay, the optative tomight. The Latin idiom coincides with the English.

A little consideration will show that this rule is absolute. For a manto be doingone action (in present time) in order that some other action mayfollowit (in past time) is to reverse the order of cause and effect. To do anything inA.D.1851, that something may result from it in 1850 is a contradiction; and so it is to sayIdothisthatImightgain by it.

The reasons against the converse construction are nearly, if not equally cogent. To have done anything at anyprevioustime in order that apresenteffect may follow, is,ipso facto, to convert a past act into a present one, or, to speak in the language of the grammarian, to convert an aorist into a perfect. To sayIdidthisthatI may gain by it, is to make, by the very effect of the expression, eithermayequivalent tomight, ordidequivalent tohave done.

IdidthisthatImightgain.Ihave donethisthatImaygain.

IdidthisthatImightgain.

Ihave donethisthatImaygain.

A clear perception of the logical necessity of the law of the succession of tenses, is necessary for understanding the nature of several anomalous passages in the classical writers. In the following, an aorist is followed not by an optative, but by a subjunctive.

Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· ἑῖς κοίρανος ἔστω,Ἑῖς βασιλεὺς, ᾧ ἔδωκε Κρόνου παῖς ἀγκυλομήτεωΣκῆπτρόν τ' ἠδὲ θέμιστας, ἵνα σφίσιν ἐμβασιλεύῃ.

Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· ἑῖς κοίρανος ἔστω,Ἑῖς βασιλεὺς, ᾧ ἔδωκε Κρόνου παῖς ἀγκυλομήτεωΣκῆπτρόν τ' ἠδὲ θέμιστας, ἵνα σφίσιν ἐμβασιλεύῃ.

Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· ἑῖς κοίρανος ἔστω,

Ἑῖς βασιλεὺς, ᾧ ἔδωκε Κρόνου παῖς ἀγκυλομήτεω

Σκῆπτρόν τ' ἠδὲ θέμιστας, ἵνα σφίσιν ἐμβασιλεύῃ.

Here it is necessary to construeἔδωκε,has given and continues to allow, which is to construe it like aperfect[64]tense. Upon similar passages Mathiæ writes, "but frequently the conjunctive is used, although the preceding word be in the time past, viz., when the verb which depends upon the conjunction shows an action continued to the present time." That means when the verb is really a perfect.

In Latin, where the same form is both aorist and perfect, the succession of tenses is a means of determining which of the two meanings it conveys.Veni ut videam=I have come that I may see.Veni ut viderem=I came that I might see.

Arnold states, from Krüger and Zumpt, that even where the præterite was clearly a perfect (i. e., =to havewith the participle), the Roman ear was so accustomed to theimperfectsubjunctive, that it preferred such an expressionas diu dubitavi num melius esset to diu dubitavi num melius sit. The latter part of the statement is sure enough; but it is by no means so sure thatdubitavi, and similar forms in similar constructions are perfects. There is no reason for considering this to be the case in the present instance. It seems to be so, because it is connected withdiu; but an action may last a long time, and yet not last up to the time of speaking.Diu dubitaviprobably expresses,I doubted a long time, and leaves it to be inferred thatnow I do not doubt.

§ 617. It has been stated above that whilst the Latin and English have a succession oftenses, the Greek languageexhibits what may be called a succession ofmoods. This suggests inquiry. Is the difference real? If so, how is it explained? If not, which of the two grammatical systems is right?—the English and Latin on the one side, or the Greek on the other? Shouldτύπτοιμιbe reduced to a past tense, orverberarembe considered an optative mood.

The present writer has no hesitation in stating his belief, that all the phænomena explicable by the assumption of an optative mood are equally explicable by an expansion of the subjunctive, and a different distribution of its tenses.

1. Letτύψωbe considered a subjunctivefutureinstead of a subjunctive aorist.

2. Letτύῶτοιμιbe considered animperfect subjunctive.

3. Letτετύφοιμιbe considered apluperfect subjunctive.

4. Letτύψαιμιbe consideredanaoristsubjunctive.

Against this view there are two reasons:

1. The double formsτύψαιμιandτύψοιμι, one of which would remain unplaced.

2. The use of the optative and conjunctive in simple propositions, as—

ὦ παῖ, γένοιο πατρὸς εὐτυχέστερος.

ὦ παῖ, γένοιο πατρὸς εὐτυχέστερος.

ὦ παῖ, γένοιο πατρὸς εὐτυχέστερος.

The first reason I am not prepared to impugn.Valeat quantum, &c. The second indicates a class of expressions which tense willnotexplain, and which moodwill. Yet this is not conclusive.Would that thou wertis thoroughly optative: yet it is expressed by a tense.

Theformof the so-called optatives proves nothing. Neither the subjunctive nor the optative has any signs ofmoodat all, except the negative one of the absence of the augment. Their signs are the signs oftense.

In favour of the view are the following reasons:—

1. The analogy of other languages. The imperfect has a subjunctive in Latin. So has the future.

2. The undoubtedly future character of the so-called aorist imperative. To give an order to do a thing inpasttime is a philological contradiction. Forms likeβλέψονmustbe future. Thoughθὲςandτίθειdiffer in power, they both mean anaction subsequent to, or, at any rate, simultaneous with the order given; certainly not one anterior to it.

§ 618.Bemay stand formay be. In this case the preterite is notwerebutmight be. The sentence,whatcareI how fair the ladybe,if she be not fair to her admirer? is accurate. Herebe=may be. But,whatcaredI how fair the ladywere,if she were not fair to her admirer? is inaccurate. It ought to run thus,—whatcaredI how fair the ladymight be,if she were not fair to her admirer?[65]

§ 619.Disjunctives.—Disjunctives (or,nor) are of two sorts, real, and nominal.

A king or queen always rules in England.Here the disjunction is real;kingorqueenbeing different names for different objects. In allrealdisjunctions the inference is, that if one out of two (or more) individuals (or classes) do not perform a certain action, the other does.

A sovereign or supreme ruler always rules in England.Here the disjunction is nominal;sovereignandsupreme governorbeing different names for the same object. In all nominal disjunctives the inference is, that if an agent (or agents) do not perform a certain action under one name, he does (or they do) it under another.

Nominal disjunctives are called by Harris,subdisjunctives.

In the English language there is no separate word to distinguish the nominal from the real disjunctive. In Latin,velis considered by Harris to be disjunctive,sivesubdisjunctive. As a periphrasis the combinationin other wordsis subdisjunctive.

Both nominal and real disjunctives agree in this,—whatever may be the number of nouns which they connect, the construction of the verb is the same as if there were but one—HenryorJohn,orThomas,walks(notwalk); the sun,orsolar luminary,shines(notshine). The disjunctiveisolatesthe subject however much it may be placed in juxtaposition with other nouns.

§ 620.Either, neither.—Many disjunctives imply an alternative. If it be not this person (or thing) that performs a certain action (or exists in a certain state) it is some other. If a person (or thing) do not perform a certain action (or exist in a certain state), under one name, he (or it) does so under another. This alternative is expressed by the wordeither.

When the wordeitheris connected immediately with the copula of a proposition, it is, if not a true conjunction, at leasta part of a conjunctional periphrasis.—This either is or is not so.

When it belongs more to one of the terms of a proposition than to the copula, it is a pronoun,—Either I or you is in the wrong.It is either you or I.

I use the words,part of a conjunctional periphrasis, because the full conjunction iseither+or(orneither+nor); the essential conjunctions being the latter words. To these,either(orneither) is superadded, indicating themannerin which the disjunction expressed byor(ornor) takes place;i. e., they show that it takes place in the manner of an alternative. Now, this superadded power is rather adverbial than conjunctional.

§ 621. From the pronominal character of the wordeither, when it forms part of a term, and from the power of the disjunctive,or, inisolatingthe subject of the verb, combined with an assumption which will be explained hereafter, we get at the principle of certain rules for doubtful constructions.

In expressions likeeither you or I is in the wrong, we mustconsidereithernot only asapronoun, but asthe leadingpronoun of the proposition; a pronoun of whichor Iis an explanation; and, finally, as the pronoun which determines the person of the verb.Either you or I is wrong=one of us(you or I)is wrong.

Then, as to expressions likeI, or you, am in the wrong. Here,Iis the leading pronoun, which determines the person of the verbs; the words,or you, being parenthetic, and subordinate. These statements bear upon the rules of p. 457.

§ 622. Will this principle justify such expressions aseither they or we is in the wrong?

Or will it justify such expressions aseither he or they is in the wrong?

Or will it justify such expressions asI or they am in the wrong? In all which sentences one pronoun is plural.

Perhaps not. The assumption that has been just alluded to, as helping to explain certain doubtful constructions, is the following,viz., that in cases of apposition, disjunction, and complex terms, thefirstword is the one which determines the character of the sentence wherein it occurs. This is a practice of the English language, which, in the opinion of the present writer, nothing but a very decided preponderance of a difference in person, gender, or number, can overrule. Such may fairly be considered to be the case in the three examples just adduced; especially as there is also the secondary influence of the conjunctional character of the wordeither. Thus, although we say,—

One of two parties, they or we, is in the wrong.

One of two parties, they or we, is in the wrong.

We also say,—

Either they or we are in the wrong.

Either they or we are in the wrong.

As for the other two expressions, they are in the same predicament, with an additional reason for the use of the plural. Itcontainsthe singular. The chief object of the present remarks has been less to explain details than to give due prominence to the following leading principles.

1. Thateither(orneither) is[66]essentially singular in number.

2. That it is, like any common noun, of the third person.

3. That it is pronominal where it is in apposition with another noun.

4. That when it is the first word of the proposition it determines the concord of the verb, unless its character of a noun of the singular number and third person be disguised by the prominence of some plural form, or some pronoun of the first or second person in the latter part of the term.

5. That in a simple disjunctive proposition (i.e., one whereeitherdoes not occur) all nouns are subordinate to the first.

§ 623. I believe that the use ofeitheris limited torealdisjunctives; in other words, that we can sayeither a king or a queen always reigns in England, but that we cannot sayeither a sovereign or a supreme ruler always reigns in England.

THE SYNTAX OF THE NEGATIVE.

§ 624. When the verb is in the infinitive mood, the negative precedes it.—Not to advance is to retreat.

When the verb is not in the infinitive mood, the negative follows it.—He advanced not. I cannot.

This rule is absolute. It onlyseemsto precede the verb in such expressions asI do not advance,I cannot advance,I have not advanced, &c. However, the wordsdo,can, andhave, are no infinitives; and it consequently follows them. The wordadvanceis an infinitive, and it consequently precedes it. Wallis's rule makes an equivalent statement, although differently. "Adverbium negandinot(non) verbo postponitur (nempe auxiliari primo si adsit; aut si non adsit auxiliare, verbo principali): aliis tamen orationis partibus præfigi solet."—P. 113.

That the negative is rarely used, except with an auxiliary, in other words, that the presence of a negative converts a simple form likeit burneth notinto the circumlocution itdoes not burn, is a fact in the practice of the English language. The syntax is the same in either expression.

§ 625. What may be called thedistributionof the negative is pretty regular in English. Thus, when the wordnotcomes between an indicative, imperative, or subjunctive mood and an infinitive verb, it almost always is taken with the word which itfollows—I can not eatmay mean eitherI can—not eat(i.e.,I can abstain), orI can not—eat(i.e.,I am unable to eat); but, as stated above, italmostalways has the latter signification.

But notalways. In Byron's "Deformed Transformed" we find the following lines:—


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