NOTE ON BENTHAM'S WRITINGS

NOTES:[434]Works, v. 97, etc.[435]See preface toConstitutional Codein vol. ix.[436]Bentham's nephew, George, who died when approaching his eighty-fourth birthday, devoted the last twenty-five years of his life with equal assiduity to hisGenera Plantarum. See a curious anecdote of his persistence in theDictionary of National Biography.[437]Works, iii. 573.[438]Works, ix. 5, 8.[439]The theory, as Mill reminds us, had been very pointedly anticipated by Helvétius. Bentham's practical experience, however, had forced it upon his attention.[440]Works, ix. 141. The general principle, however, is confirmed by the case of GeorgeIII.[441]Ibid.ix. 45.[442]Ibid.ix. 98.[443]Works, ix. 98.[444]e.g.Ibid.ix. 38, 50, 63, 99, etc.[445]Ibid.('Plan of Parliamentary Reform,') iii. 463.[446]Works, ix. 594.[447]Ibid.ix. 62.[448]Ibid.ix. 24.[449]Ibid.ix. 48.[450]Dissertations, i. 377.[451]Works, ii. 497.[452]Ibid.ii. 501.[453]Ibid.ii. 503.[454]Justice, p. 264; so Price, in hisObservations on Liberty, lays it down that government is never to entrench upon private liberty, 'except so far as private liberty entrenches on the liberty of others.'[455]Works, ii. 506.[456]Works, ii. 401.[457]Autobiography, p. 274.[458]Hobbes, in theLeviathan(chap. xiii.), has in the same way to argue for thede factoequality of men.[459]Dissertations, i. 375.[460]I remark by anticipation that this expression implies a reference to Mill'sEthology, of which I shall have to speak.[461]Works, ix. 96, 113.[462]Dissertations, i. 376.

[434]Works, v. 97, etc.

[435]See preface toConstitutional Codein vol. ix.

[436]Bentham's nephew, George, who died when approaching his eighty-fourth birthday, devoted the last twenty-five years of his life with equal assiduity to hisGenera Plantarum. See a curious anecdote of his persistence in theDictionary of National Biography.

[437]Works, iii. 573.

[438]Works, ix. 5, 8.

[439]The theory, as Mill reminds us, had been very pointedly anticipated by Helvétius. Bentham's practical experience, however, had forced it upon his attention.

[440]Works, ix. 141. The general principle, however, is confirmed by the case of GeorgeIII.

[441]Ibid.ix. 45.

[442]Ibid.ix. 98.

[443]Works, ix. 98.

[444]e.g.Ibid.ix. 38, 50, 63, 99, etc.

[445]Ibid.('Plan of Parliamentary Reform,') iii. 463.

[446]Works, ix. 594.

[447]Ibid.ix. 62.

[448]Ibid.ix. 24.

[449]Ibid.ix. 48.

[450]Dissertations, i. 377.

[451]Works, ii. 497.

[452]Ibid.ii. 501.

[453]Ibid.ii. 503.

[454]Justice, p. 264; so Price, in hisObservations on Liberty, lays it down that government is never to entrench upon private liberty, 'except so far as private liberty entrenches on the liberty of others.'

[455]Works, ii. 506.

[456]Works, ii. 401.

[457]Autobiography, p. 274.

[458]Hobbes, in theLeviathan(chap. xiii.), has in the same way to argue for thede factoequality of men.

[459]Dissertations, i. 375.

[460]I remark by anticipation that this expression implies a reference to Mill'sEthology, of which I shall have to speak.

[461]Works, ix. 96, 113.

[462]Dissertations, i. 376.

VII.INDIVIDUALISM

'Individualism' in the first place is generally mentioned in a different connection. The 'ready-made' man of whom I have spoken becomes the 'economic man.' Bentham himself contributed little to economic theory. His most important writing was theDefence of Usury, and in this, as we have seen, he was simply adding a corollary to theWealth of Nations. TheWealth of Nationsitself represented the spirit of business; the revolt of men who were building up a vast industrial system against the fetters imposed by traditional legislation and by rulers who regarded industry in general, as Telford is said to have regarded rivers. Rivers were meant to supply canals, and trade to supply tax-gatherers. With this revolt, of course, Bentham was in full sympathy, but here I shall only speak of one doctrine of great interest, which occurs both in his political treatises and his few economical remarks. Bentham objected, as we have seen, to the abstract theory of equality; yet it was to the mode of deduction rather than to the doctrine itself which he objected. He gave, in fact, his own defence; and it is one worth notice.[463]The principle of equality is derivative, not ultimate. Equality is goodbecause equality increases the sum of happiness. Thus, as he says,[464]if two men have £1000, and you transfer £500 from one to the other, you increase the recipient's wealth by one-third, and diminish the loser's wealth by one-half. You therefore add less pleasure than you subtract. The principle is given less mathematically[465]by the more significant argument that 'felicity' depends not simply on the 'matter of felicity' or the stimulus, but also on the sensibility to felicity which is necessarily limited. Therefore by adding wealth—taking, for example, from a thousand labourers to give to one king—you are supersaturating a sensibility already glutted by taking away from others a great amount of real happiness. With this argument, which has of late years become conspicuous in economics, he connects another of primary importance. The first condition of happiness, he says, is not 'equality' but 'security.' Now you can only equalise at the expense of security. If I am to have my property taken away whenever it is greater than my neighbour's, I can have no security.[466]Hence, if the two principles conflict, equality should give way. Security is the primary, which must override the secondary, aim. Must the two principles, then, always conflict? No; but 'time is the only mediator.'[467]The law may help to accumulate inequalities; but in a prosperous state there is a 'continual progress towards equality.' The law has to stand aside; not to maintain monopolies; not to restrain trade; not to permit entails; and then property will diffuse itself by a natural process, already exemplified in the growth of Europe. The 'pyramids'heaped up in feudal times have been lowered, and their 'débrisspread abroad' among the industrious. Here again we see how Bentham virtually diverges from thea priorischool. Their absolute tendencies would introduce 'equality' by force; he would leave it to the spontaneous progress of security. Hence Bentham is in the main an adherent of what he calls[468]the 'laissez-nous faire' principle. He advocates it most explicitly in the so-calledManual of Political Economy—a short essay first printed in 1798.[469]The tract, however, such as it is, is less upon political economy proper than upon economic legislation; and its chief conclusion is that almost all legislation is improper. His main principle is 'Be quiet' (the equivalent of the French phrase, which surely should have been excluded from so English a theory). Security and freedom are all that industry requires; and industry should say to government only what Diogenes said to Alexander, 'Stand out of my sunshine.'[470]

Once more, however, Bentham will not lay down the 'let alone' principle absolutely. His adherence to the empirical method is too decided. The doctrine 'be quiet,' though generally true, rests upon utility, and may, therefore, always be qualified by proving that in a particular case the balance of utility is the other way. In fact, some of Bentham's favourite projects would be condemned by an absolute adherent of the doctrine. The Panopticon, for example, though a 'mill to grind rogues honest' could be applied to others than rogues, and Bentham hoped to make his machinery equally effective in the case of pauperism. A system of national education is also included in his ideal constitution. It is, infact, important to remember that the 'individualism' of Benthamism does not necessarily coincide with an absolute restriction of government interference. The general tendency was in that direction; and in purely economical questions, scarcely any exception was admitted to the rule. Men are the best judges, it was said, of their own interest; and the interference of rulers in a commercial transaction is the interference of people inferior in knowledge of the facts, and whose interests are 'sinister' or inconsistent with those of the persons really concerned. Utility, therefore, will, as a rule, forbid the action of government: but, as utility is always the ultimate principle, and there may be cases in which it does not coincide with the 'let alone' principle, we must always admit the possibility that in special cases government can interfere usefully, and, in that case, approve the interference.

Hence we have the ethical application of these theories. The individualist position naturally tends to take the form of egoism. The moral sentiments, whatever they may be, are clearly an intrinsic part of the organic social instincts. They are intimately involved in the whole process of social evolution. But this view corresponds precisely to the conditions which Bentham overlooks. The individual is already there. The moral and the legal sanctions are 'external'; something imposed by the action of others; corresponding to 'coercion,' whether by physical force or the dread of public opinion; and, in any case, an accretion or addition, not a profound modification of his whole nature. The Utilitarian 'man' therefore inclines to consider other people as merely parts of the necessary machinery. Their feelingsare relevant only as influencing their outward conduct. If a man gives me a certain 'lot' of pain or pleasure, it does not matter what may be his motives. The 'motive' for all conduct corresponds in all cases to the pain or pleasure accruing to the agent. It is true that his happiness will be more or less affected by his relations to others. But as conduct is ruled by a calculation of the balance of pains or pleasures dependent upon any course of action, it simplifies matters materially, if each man regards his neighbour's feelings simply as instrumental, not intrinsically interesting. And thus the coincidence between that conduct which maximises my happiness and that conduct which maximises happiness in general, must be regarded as more or less accidental or liable in special cases to disappear. If I am made happier by action which makes others miserable, the rule of utility will lead to my preference of myself.

Here we have the question whether the Utilitarian system be essentially a selfish system. Bentham, with his vague psychology, does not lay down the doctrine absolutely. After giving this list of self-regarding 'springs of action,' he proceeds to add the pleasures and pains of 'sympathy' and 'antipathy' which, he says, are not self-regarding. Moreover, as we have seen, he has some difficulty in denying that 'benevolence' is a necessarily moral motive: it is only capable of prompting to bad conduct in so far as it is insufficiently enlightened; and it is clear that a moralist who makes the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' his universal test, has some reason for admitting as an elementary pleasure the desire for the greatest happiness. This comes out curiously in theConstitutional Code. He there lays down the 'self-preference principle'—the principle,namely, that 'every human being' is determined in every action by his judgment of what will produce the greatest happiness to himself, 'whatsoever be the effect ... in relation to the happiness of other similar beings, any or all of them taken together.'[471]Afterwards, however, he observes that it is 'the constant and arduous task of every moralist' and of every legislator who deserves the name to 'increase the influence of sympathy at the expense of that of self-regard and of sympathy for the greater number at the expense of sympathy for the lesser number.'[472]He tries to reconcile these views by the remark 'that even sympathy has its root in self-regard,' and he argues, as Mr. Herbert Spencer has done more fully, that if Adam cared only for Eve and Eve only for Adam—neither caring at all for himself or herself—both would perish in less than a year. Self-regard, that is, is essential, and sympathy supposes its existence. Hence Bentham puts himself through a catechism.[473]What is the 'best' government? That which causes the greatest happiness of the given community. What community? 'Any community, which is as much as to say, every community.' Butwhydo you desire this happiness? Because the establishment of that happiness would contribute tomygreatest happiness. Andhowdo you prove that you desire this result? By my labours to obtain it, replies Bentham. This oddly omits the more obvious question, how can you be sure that your happiness will be promoted by the greatest happiness of all? What if the two criteria differ? I desire the general happiness, he might have replied, because my benevolence is an original or elementary instinct which can override myself-love; or I desire it, he would perhaps have said, because I know as a fact that the happiness of others will incidentally contribute to my own. The first answer would fall in with some of his statements; but the second is, as I think must be admitted, more in harmony with his system. Perhaps, indeed, the most characteristic thing is Bentham's failure to discuss explicitly the question whether human action is or is not necessarily 'selfish.' He tells us in regard to the 'springs of action' that all human action is always 'interested,' but explains that the word properly includes actions in which the motive is not 'self-regarding.'[474]It merely means, in fact, that all conduct has motives. The statement, which I have quoted about the 'self-preference' principle may only mean a doctrine which is perfectly compatible with a belief in 'altruism'—the doctrine, namely, that as a fact most people are chiefly interested by their own affairs. The legislator, he tells us, should try to increase sympathy, but the less he takes sympathy for the 'basis of his arrangements'—that is, the less call he makes upon purely unselfish motives—the greater will be his success.[475]This is a shrewd and, I should say, a very sound remark, but it implies—not that all motives are selfish in the last analysis, but—that the legislation should not assume too exalted a level of ordinary morality. The utterances in the very unsatisfactoryDeontologyare of little value, and seem to imply a moral sentiment corresponding to a petty form of commonplace prudence.[476]

Leaving this point, however, the problem necessarily presented itself to Bentham in a form in which selfishness is the predominating force, and any recognition of independent benevolence rather an incumbrance than a help. If we take the 'self-preference principle' absolutely, the question becomes how a multitude of individuals, each separately pursuing his own happiness, can so arrange matters that their joint action may secure the happiness of all. Clearly a man, however selfish, has an interest generally in putting down theft and murder. He is already provided with a number of interests to which security, at least, and therefore a regular administration of justice, is essential. His shop could not be carried on without the police; and he may agree to pay the expenses, even if others reap the benefit in greater proportion. A theory of legislation, therefore, which supposes ready formed all the instincts which make a decent commercial society possible can do without much reference to sympathy or altruism. Bentham's man is not the colourless unit ofa prioriwriting, nor the noble savage of Rousseau, but the respectable citizen with a policeman round the corner. Such a man may well hold that honesty is the best policy; he has enough sympathy to be kind to his old mother, and help a friend in distress; but the need of romantic and elevatedconduct rarely occurs to him; and the heroic, if he meets it, appears to him as an exception, not far removed from the silly. He does not reflect—especially if he cares nothing for history—how even the society in which he is a contented unit has been built up, and how much loyalty and heroism has been needed for the work; nor even, to do him justice, what unsuspected capacities may lurk in his own commonplace character. The really characteristic point is, however, that Bentham does not clearly face the problem. He is content to take for granted as an ultimate fact that the self-interest principle in the long run coincides with the greatest 'happiness' principle, and leaves the problem to his successors. There we shall meet it again.

Finally, Bentham's view of religion requires a word. The short reply, however, would be sufficient, that he did not believe in any theology, and was in the main indifferent to the whole question till it encountered him in political matters. His first interest apparently was roused by the educational questions which I have noticed, and the proposal to teach the catechism. Bentham, remembering the early bullying at Oxford, examines the catechism; and argues in his usual style that to enforce it is to compel children to tell lies. But this leads him to assail the church generally; and he regards the church simply as a part of the huge corrupt machinery which elsewhere had created Judge and Co. He states many facts about non-residence and bloated bishoprics which had a very serious importance; and he then asks how the work might be done more cheaply. As a clergyman's only duty is to read weekly services and preach sermons, he suggests (whether seriously maybe doubted) that this might be done as well by teaching a parish boy to read properly, and provide him with the prayer-book and the homilies.[477]A great deal of expense would be saved. This, again, seems to have led him to attack St. Paul, whom he took to be responsible for dogmatic theology, and therefore for the catechism; and he cross-examines the apostle, and confronts his various accounts of the conversion with a keenness worthy of a professional lawyer. In one of theMSS.at University College the same method is applied to the gospels. Bentham was clearly not capable of anticipating Renan. From these studies he was led to the far more interesting book, published under the name ofPhilip Beauchamp. Bentham supplied the argument in part; but to me it seems clear that it owes so much to the editor, Grote, that it may more fitly be discussed hereafter.

The limitations and defects of Bentham's doctrine have been made abundantly evident by later criticism. They were due partly to his personal character, and partly to the intellectual and special atmosphere in which he was brought up. But it is more important to recognise the immense real value of his doctrine. Briefly, I should say, that there is hardly an argument in Bentham's voluminous writings which is not to the purpose so far as it goes. Given his point of view, he is invariably cogent and relevant. And, moreover, that is a point of view which has to be taken. No ethical or political doctrine can, as I hold, be satisfactory which does not find a place for Bentham, though he was far, indeed, from giving a complete theory of his subject. And the main reason of this is that which I have alreadyindicated. Bentham's whole life was spent in the attempt to create a science of legislation. Even where he is most tiresome, there is a certain interest in his unflagging working out of every argument, and its application to all conceivable cases. It is all genuine reasoning; and throughout it is dominated by a respect for good solid facts. His hatred of 'vague generalities'[478]means that he will be content with no formula which cannot be interpreted in terms of definite facts. The resolution to insist upon this should really be characteristic of every writer upon similar subjects, and no one ever surpassed Bentham in attention to it. Classify and re-classify, to make sure that at every point your classes correspond to realities. In the effort to carry out these principles, Bentham at least brought innumerable questions to a sound test, and exploded many pestilent fallacies. If he did not succeed further, if whole spheres of thought remained outside of his vision, it was because in his day there was not only no science of 'sociology' or psychology—there are no such sciences now—but no adequate perception of the vast variety of investigation which would be necessary to lay a basis for them. But the effort to frame a science is itself valuable, indeed of surpassing value, so far as it is combined with a genuine respect for facts. It is common enough to attempt to create a science by inventing technical terminology. Bentham tried the far wider and far more fruitful method of a minute investigation of particular facts. His work, therefore, will stand, however different some of the results may appear when fitted into a different framework. And, therefore, however crudely and imperfectly, Bentham did, as I believe, help to turn speculation into a true and profitable channel. Of that, more will appear hereafter; but, if any one doubts Bentham's services, I will only suggest to him to compare Bentham with any of his British contemporaries, and to ask where he can find anything at all comparable to his resolute attempt to bring light and order into a chaotic infusion of compromise and prejudice.

NOTES:[463]Works, 'Civil Code' (from Dumont), i. 302, 305;Ibid.('Principles of Constitutional Code') ii. 271;Ibid.('Constitutional Code') ix. 15-18.[464]Works, i. 306n.[465]Ibid.ix. 15.[466]Ibid.('Principles of Penal Code') i. 311.[467]Ibid.i. 312.[468]Works, x. 440.[469]Ibid.iii. 33, etc.[470]Ibid.iii. 35.[471]Works, ix. 5.[472]Ibid.ix. 192.[473]Ibid.ix. 7.[474]Works, i. 212.[475]Ibid.ix. 192.[476]See,e.g., i. 83, where sympathy seems to be taken as an ultimate pleasure; and ii. 133, where he says 'dream not that men will move their little finger to serve you unless their advantage in so doing be obvious to them.' See also the apologue of 'Walter Wise,' who becomes Lord Mayor, and 'Timothy Thoughtless,' who ends at Botany Bay (i. 118), giving the lowest kind of prudential morality. The manuscript of theDeontology, now in University College, London, seems to prove that Bentham was substantially the author, though the Mills seem to have suspected Bowring of adulterating the true doctrine. He appears to have been an honest if not very intelligent editor; though the rewriting, necessary in all Bentham's works, was damaging in this case; and he is probably responsible for some rhetorical amplification, especially in the later part.[477]Church of Englandism(Catechism examined), p. 207.[478]See this phrase expounded inWorks('Book of Fallacies'), ii. 440, etc.

[463]Works, 'Civil Code' (from Dumont), i. 302, 305;Ibid.('Principles of Constitutional Code') ii. 271;Ibid.('Constitutional Code') ix. 15-18.

[464]Works, i. 306n.

[465]Ibid.ix. 15.

[466]Ibid.('Principles of Penal Code') i. 311.

[467]Ibid.i. 312.

[468]Works, x. 440.

[469]Ibid.iii. 33, etc.

[470]Ibid.iii. 35.

[471]Works, ix. 5.

[472]Ibid.ix. 192.

[473]Ibid.ix. 7.

[474]Works, i. 212.

[475]Ibid.ix. 192.

[476]See,e.g., i. 83, where sympathy seems to be taken as an ultimate pleasure; and ii. 133, where he says 'dream not that men will move their little finger to serve you unless their advantage in so doing be obvious to them.' See also the apologue of 'Walter Wise,' who becomes Lord Mayor, and 'Timothy Thoughtless,' who ends at Botany Bay (i. 118), giving the lowest kind of prudential morality. The manuscript of theDeontology, now in University College, London, seems to prove that Bentham was substantially the author, though the Mills seem to have suspected Bowring of adulterating the true doctrine. He appears to have been an honest if not very intelligent editor; though the rewriting, necessary in all Bentham's works, was damaging in this case; and he is probably responsible for some rhetorical amplification, especially in the later part.

[477]Church of Englandism(Catechism examined), p. 207.

[478]See this phrase expounded inWorks('Book of Fallacies'), ii. 440, etc.

END OF VOL. I

The following account of Bentham's writings may be of some use. The arrangement is intended to show what were the topics which attracted his attention at successive periods.

The collectedWorks, edited by Bowring, appeared from 1838 to 1843 in eleven volumes, the last two containing the life and an elaborate index. The first nine volumes consist partly of the works already published; partly of works published for the first time from Bentham'sMSS.; and partly of versions of Dumont's redactions of Bentham. Dumont's publications were (1)Traités de Legislation civile et pénale(1802; second edition, revised, 1820): [vol. i. containsPrincipes généraux de LegislationandPrincipes du Code civil; vol. ii.Principes du Code pénal; and vol. iii.Mémoire sur le Panoptique,De la Promulgation des Lois,De l'Influence du Temps et des Lieux, andVue générale d'un Corps complet des Lois]; (2)Théorie des Peines et des Récompenses, 1811, 1818, 1825; (3)Tactiques des Assemblées déliberantes et Traité des Sophismes politiques, 1816; (4)Traité des Preuves judiciaires, 1823; and (5)De l'Organisation judiciaire et de la Codification, 1823.

In the following I give references to the place of each work in Bowring's edition.

Bentham's first book was theFragment on Government, 1776 (i. 221-295). An interesting 'historical preface,' intended for a second edition (i. 240-259), was first printed in 1828. TheFragment, edited by Mr. F. C. Montague, was republished in 1891.

TheIntroduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislationwas published in 1789, in one vol. 4to (i. 1-154). It had beenprinted in 1780. A second edition, in two vols. 8vo, appeared in 1823. It was intended as an introduction to the plan of a penal code. Bentham says in his preface that his scheme would be completed by a series of works applying his principles to (1) civil law; (2) penal law; (3) procedure; (4) reward; (5) constitutional law; (6) political tactics; (7) international law; (8) finance; and (9) political economy, and by a tenth treatise giving a plan of a body of law 'considered in respect of its form,' that is, upon 'nomography.' He wrote more or less in the course of his life upon all these topics. Dumont'sTraitésof 1802 were based partly upon theIntroductionand partly upon Bentham'sMSS.corresponding to unfinished parts of this general scheme.

The two first sections of this scheme are represented in theWorksbyPrinciples of the Civil Code(i. 297-364) andPrinciples of Penal Law(i. 365-580). ThePrinciples of the Civil Codeis translated from Dumont'sTraités, where it follows a condensed statement of 'general principles' taken from the opening chapters of theIntroduction. An appendix 'on the levelling system' is added in theWorksfrom Bentham'sMSS.ThePrinciples of Penal Lawconsists of three parts: the first and third (on 'political remedies for the evil of offences' and on 'indirect means of preventing crimes') are translated from parts 2 and 4 of Dumont'sPrincipes du Code pénal(parts 1 and 3 of Dumont being adaptations from theIntroduction to Morals and Legislation). The second part of thePenal Law, orThe Rationale of Punishmentis from Dumont'sThéorie des Peines et des Récompenses. Dumont took it from aMS.written by Bentham in 1775. (See Bentham'sWorks, i. 388.) An appendix on 'Death Punishment,' addressed by Bentham to the French people in 1830, is added to Part II. in theWorks(i. 525-532). No. 4 of Bentham's general scheme corresponds to theRationale of Reward, founded upon twoMSS., one in French and one in English, used by Dumont in theThéorie des Peines et des Récompenses. The English version in theWorks, chiefly translated from Dumont and compared with the originalmanuscript, was first published in 1825 (ii. 189-266). Richard Smith 'of the Stamps and Taxes' was the editor of this and of an edition of theRationale of Punishmentin 1831, and of various minor treatises. (Bentham'sWorks, x. 548n.)

TheTable of the Springs of Action(i. 195-220), written at an early period, was printed in 1815, and published, with modifications, in 1817. TheVue généraleincluded in theTraitésof 1802 was intended by Bentham as a sketch for his own guidance, and is translated asView of a Complete Code of Lawsin theWorks(iii. 154-210). The two essays in the 1802Traitéson 'the promulgation of laws' and the 'influence of time and place in matters of legislation' are translated inWorks(i. 157-194). A fragment onInternational Law—a phrase invented by Bentham—written between 1786 and 1789, first appeared in theWorks(ii. 535-571), withJunctiana proposal—a plan for a canal between the Atlantic and the Pacific—written in 1822, as an appendix.

Besides the above, all written before 1789 in pursuance of his scheme, Bentham had published in 1778 hisView of the Hard Labour Bill(iv. 1-36); and in 1787 hisDefence of Usury(iii. 1-29). A third edition of the last (with the 'protest against law taxes') was published in 1816.

During the following period (1789-1802) Bentham wrote various books, more or less suggested by the French revolution. TheEssay on Political Tactics(ii. 299-373), (corresponding to No. 6 of the scheme), was sent to Morellet in 1789, but first published by Dumont in 1816. With it Dumont also published the substance of theAnarchical Fallacies(ii. 489-534), written about 1791. ADraught of a Code for the Organisation of the Judicial Establishment of France, dated March 1790, is reprinted inWorksiv. 285-406.Truth v. Ashhurst, written in 1792 (v. 231-237), was first published in 1823. AManual of Political Economy, written by 1793 (seeWorks, iii. 73n.), corresponds to No. 9 of his scheme. A chapter appeared in theBibliothèque Britanniquein 1798. It was partly used in Dumont'sThéorie des Récompenses, and first published in English inWorks(iii.31-84).Emancipate your Colonies(iv. 407-481) was privately printed in 1793, and first published for sale in 1830. AProtest against Law Taxes, printed in 1793, was published in 1795 together withSupply without Burthen, or Escheat vice Taxation, written in 1794. To them is appended a short paper calledTax with Monopoly(ii. 573-600).A Plan for saving all Trouble and Expense in the Transfer of Stock, written and partly printed in 1800, was first published inWorks(iii. 105-153).

During this period Bentham was also occupied with the Panopticon, and some writings refer to it.The Panopticon, or the Inspection House(iv. 37-172), written in 1787, was published in 1791.The Panopticon versus New South Wales(iv. 173-248) appeared in 1802; andA Plea for the Constitution(on transportation to New South Wales) (iv. 249-284), in 1803. Closely connected with these arePoor-laws and Pauper Management(viii. 358-461), reprinted from Arthur Young'sAnnalsof September 1797 and following months; andObservations on the Poor Bill(viii. 440-459), written in February 1797, privately printed in 1838, and first published in theWorks.

About 1802 Bentham returned to jurisprudence. James Mill prepared from the papers then written anIntroductory View of the Rationale of Evidence, finished and partly printed in 1812 (seeWorks, x. 468n.and Bain'sJames Mill, 105, 120). Dumont'sTraité des Preuves judiciaires(1823) was a redaction of the original papers, and an English translation of this appeared in 1825. The parts referring to English Law were omitted. TheRationale of Evidence(5 vols. 8vo, 1827), edited by J. S. Mill, represents a different and fuller redaction of the same papers. It is reprinted in vols. vi. and vii. of theWorkswith theIntroductory View(now first published) prefixed. To the same period belongsScotch Reform, with aSummary View of a Plan for a Judicatory, 1808 (second edition 1811, v. 1-60).

After 1808 Bentham's attention was especially drawn to political questions. HisCatechism of Parliamentary Reform(iii. 433-557), written in 1809, was first published with a long 'introduction' in thePamphleteerfor January 1817. Bentham'sRadical Reform Bill, with explanations(iii. 558-597) followed in December 1819.Radicalism not dangerous(iii. 598-622), written at the same time, first appeared in theWorks(iii. 398-622).Elements of the Art of Packing as applied to Special Juries, especially in Cases of Libel Law(v. 61-186), written in 1809, was published in 1821.Swear not at all(v. 188-229) (referring chiefly to Oxford tests), written in 1813, was published in 1817.The King against EdmondsandThe King against Wolseley(v. 239-261) were published in 1820.Official Aptitude minimized; Official Expense limited(v. 263-286), is a series of papers, first collected in 1831. It contains aDefence of Economy against Burke, and aDefence of Economy against George Rose, both written in 1810, and published in thePamphleteerin 1817, withObservationson a speech by Peel in 1825, andIndications respecting Lord Eldon. The two last appeared in 1825. Connected with these political writings is theBook of Fallacies(ii. 375-488), edited by Bingham in 1824, from the 'most unfinished of all Bentham's writings.' Allusions seem to show that the originalMSS.were written from 1810 to 1819. It was partly published by Dumont with theTactique, etc.

Bentham, during this period (1808-1820), was also led into various outlying questions.The Pannomial Fragments,Nomography, andAppendix on Logical Arrangements employed by Jeremy Bentham(iii. 211-295) were first published in theWorksfromMSS.written from 1813 to 1831. With theChrestomathia(viii. 1-192), first published in 1816, are connected fragments upon 'Ontology,' 'Language,' and 'Universal Grammar' (viii. 193-358), first published inWorksfrom fragments ofMSS.of 1813 and later. George Bentham'sOutline of a New System of Logicwas partly founded upon his uncle's papers. Bentham at the Ford Abbey time (1814-1818) was also writing hisChurch of Englandism and its Catechism examined, 1818. TheAnalysis of the Influence of Natural Religion upon the Temporal Happiness of Mankind, by Philip Beauchamp, edited by George Grote, appeared in 1822; andNot Paul but Jesus, by GamalielSmith, in 1823. Francis Place helped in preparing this at Ford Abbey in 1817 (Mr. Wallas'sLife of Place, p. 83).Mother Church of England relieved by Bleeding(1823) and theBook of Church Reform(1831) are extracted fromChurch of Englandism. Bowring did not admit these works to his collection.

In his later years (1820-1832) Bentham began to be specially occupied with codification.Papers upon Codification and Public Instruction(iv. 451-534) consist chiefly of letters, written from 1811 to 1815, offering himself for employment in codification in America and Russia, and first published in 1817. In 1821 appearedThree Tracts relating to Spanish and Portuguese Affairs, with a Continual Eye to English ones; and in 1822Three Letters to Count Toreno on the proposed Penal Code(in Spain) (viii. 460-554). A short tract onLiberty of the Presswas addressed to the Spanish people in 1821 (ii. 275-299).Codification Proposals(iv. 535-594) appeared in 1823, offering to prepare an 'all-comprehensive code of law' for 'any nation professing liberal opinions.'Securities against Misrule addressed to a Mahommedan State, and prepared with a special Reference to Tripoli, written in 1822-23, was first published in theWorks(viii. 551-600). A tract on theLeading Principles of a Constitutional Code(ii. 267-274) appeared in thePamphleteerin 1823. The first volume of theConstitutional Code, printed in 1827, was published with the first chapter of the second volume in 1830. The whole book, edited by R. Doane from papers written between 1818 and 1832, was published in 1841, and forms volume ix. of theWorks. Doane also editedPrinciples of Judicial Procedure(ii. 1-188) from papers written chiefly from 1820 to 1827, though part had been written in 1802. Several thousand pages upon this subject—the third part of the original scheme—were left by Bentham at his death.

During his last years Bentham also wrote aCommentary on Mr. Humphrey's Real Property Code, published in theWestminster Reviewfor October 1826 (v. 387-416);Justice and Codification Petitions(v. 437-548), printed in 1829;Jeremy Bentham to his Fellow-Citizens in France on Houses of Peers and Senates(iv. 419-450), dated 15th October 1830;Equity Dispatch Court Proposals(iii. 297-432), first published inWorksand written from 1829 to 1831;Outline of a Plan of a General Register of Real Property(v. 417-435), published in the Report of the Real Property Commission in 1832; andLord Brougham Displayed(v. 549-612), 1832.

TheDeontologyorScience of Moralitywas published by Bowring in two vols. 8vo in 1834, but omitted from theWorks, as the original edition was not exhausted. TheMS.preserved at University College, London, shows that a substantial beginning had been made in 1814; most of the remainder about 1820. The second volume, made, as Bowring says, from a number of scraps, is probably more 'Bowringised' than the first.

Dumont'sTraitéswere translated into Spanish in 1821, and theWorksin 1841-43. There are also Russian and Italian translations. In 1830 a translation from Dumont, edited by F. E. Beneke, asGrundsätze der Civil- und Criminal-Gesetzgebung, etc., was published at Berlin. Beneke observes that Bentham had hitherto received little attention in Germany, though well known in other countries. He reports a saying attributed to Mme. de Staël that the age was that of Bentham, not of Byron or Buonaparte. The neglect of Bentham in Germany was due, as Beneke says, to the prevalence of the Kantian philosophy. Bentham, however, had been favourably noticed in theHermesfor 1822, and his merits since acknowledged by Mittermaier and Warnkönig in theZeitschrift für Rechtswissenschaft. Beneke (1798-1854) was opposed to the Hegelian tendencies of his time, and much influenced by Herbart. See Ueberweg'sHistory of Philosophy(English translation, 1874, ii. 281, etc.) and the account of Bentham in Robert von Mohl'sStaatswissenschaften, etc. (1853), iii. 595-635.

A great mass of BenthamMSS.belongs to University College, London. They are contained in 148 boxes, which were examined and catalogued by Mr. T. Whittaker in 1892. Afew of these contain correspondence, part of which was printed by Bowring. Others are the manuscripts of published works. Some are upon the same subjects as the published works, and others refer to topics not included in his publications. Besides theDeontologymanuscripts and a fragment upon 'Political Deontology,' there is a discussion of the means of suppressing duels, an argument against the legal punishment of certain offences against decency, and a criticism of the gospel narrative similar toNot Paul, etc. I have not thought it necessary to examine these fragments after reading Mr. Whittaker's report. Bentham's principles are sufficiently stated in his published works; and the papers which have been reposing in the cellars of University College can have had no influence upon the world. There is another large collection ofMSS.in the British Museum from the papers of Bentham and his brother, Sir Samuel. Ten folio volumes contain correspondence, much of it referring only to Sir Samuel. A long correspondence upon the acquisition of the 'Panopticon' land is included. Another volume contains many of Bentham's school and college exercises. There are also the manuscripts of theNomography,Logical Arrangements, etc. This collection was used by Bowring and by Lady Bentham in the life of her husband.

Printed by T. and A.Constable, Printers to Her Majesty at the Edinburgh University Press

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