FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[80]Bain'sJames Mill, p. 215.[81]Autobiography, p. 104.[82]Miscellaneous Works(Popular Edition), p. 131.[83]The articles from theEncyclopædiaupon Government, Jurisprudence, Liberty of the Press, Prisons and Prison Discipline, Colonies, Law of Nations, Education, were reprinted in a volume 'not for sale,' in 1825 and 1828. I quote from a reprint not dated.[84]'Government,' pp. 3-5.[85]'Government,' p. 8.[86]'Government,' p. 9.[87]Ibid.p. 11.[88]Ibid.p. 9.[89]Ibid.p. 12.[90]'Government,' p. 9.[91]C'est une expérience éternelle que tout homme qui a du pouvoir est porté à en abuser; il va jusqu'à ce qu'il trouve des limites.—Esprit des Lois, Bk. xi. chap 4.[92]'Government,' p. 15.[93]'Government,' p. 7.[94]Ibid.p. 18.[95]'Government,' p. 21.[96]Ibid.p. 22[97]Autobiography, p. 104.[98]'Government,' p. 28.[99]Ibid.p. 30. Mill especially refers to the exposure of clerical artifices in Father Paul'sCouncil of Trent.[100]'Education,' p. 20[101]Ibid.p. 45.[102]Autobiography, p. 106.[103]'Government,' p. 31.[104]Bain'sJames Mill, p. 392.[105]They were reprinted in theMiscellaneous Worksafter Macaulay's death. I quote from the 'popular edition' of that work (1875).[106]Miscellaneous Works, p. 166.[107]Miscellaneous Works, p. 132.[108]Mill'sAutobiography, p. 158.[109]'Government,' p. 12.[110]Miscellaneous Works, p. 169.[111]Fragment on Mackintosh(1870), pp. 275-94.[112]Essay on the 'Independency of Parliament.'[113]Fragment, p. 292.[114]Ibid.p. 276.[115]Miscellaneous Works, p. 170.[116]Miscellaneous Works, p. 173.[117]Miscellaneous Works, p. 138.[118]Miscellaneous Works, pp. 135-40.[119]Miscellaneous Works, p. 158, and see pp. 143-47.[120]Speeches(Popular Edition), p. 125.[121]Ibid.p. 128.[122]Miscellaneous Works, p. 146.[123]Miscellaneous Works, p. 183.[124]A full analysis of this article is in Bain'sJames Mill, pp. 265-75.[125]Article upon Sheridan, reprinted in Jeffrey'sEssays, iv. (1844).[126]Table-Talk, 27th April 1823.[127]Vindiciæ Gallicæ, inMiscellaneous Works, iii. (1846), p. 57.[128]Mackintosh thinks it necessary to add that this parallel was suggested to him by William Thomson (1746-1837), a literary gentleman who continued Watson'sPhilip III., and may, for anything I know, deserve Mackintosh's warm eulogy.[129]Vindiciæ Gallicæ, p. 59.[130]Ibid.p. 51.[131]Ibid.p. 148.[132]Ibid.p. 68.[133]Ibid.p. 72.[134]Ibid.p. 125.[135]Vindiciæ Gallicæ, p. 128.[136]Ibid.p. 84.[137]Ibid.p. 30.[138]Life of Mackintosh, i. 125.[139]Miscellaneous Works, iii. 261-65.[140]Life, i. 309-16.[141]SeeMiscellaneous Works, iii. 3.[142]Ibid.iii. 203-38 (an article highly praised by Bagehot in hisParliamentary Reform).[143]Miscellaneous Works, iii. 215-16.[144]Ibid.iii. 226. Mackintosh in this article mentions the 'caucus,' and observes that the name implies that combinations have been already formed upon 'which the future government of the confederacy may depend more than on the forms of election, or the letter of the present laws.' He inclines to approve the system as essential to party government.[145]Essays(1844), i. 84-106.[146]The famous 'Cevallos' article of 1808, said to be written by Jeffrey and Brougham (Macvey Napier'sCorrespondence, p. 308), gave the immediate cause of starting theQuarterly; and, according to Brougham, first gave a distinctly Liberal character to theEdinburgh. For Jeffrey's desire to avoid 'party politics,' see Lockhart'sLife of Scott, M. Napier'sCorrespondence, p. 435, and Homer'sMemoirs(1853), i. 464.[147]April 1805; reprinted inEssays, ii. 38, etc., to show, as he says, how early he had taken up his view of the French revolution.[148]Sydney Smith complains in his correspondence of this article as exaggerating the power of the aristocracy.[149]Essays, iv. 29.[150]I need not speak of Brougham, then the most conspicuous advocate of Whiggism. He published in 1843 aPolitical Philosophy, which, according to Lord Campbell, killed the 'Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge.' No such hypothesis is necessary to account for the death of a society encumbered by a 'Dictionary of Universal Biography.' But the book was bad enough to kill, if a collection of outworn platitudes can produce that effect.[151]Bentham'sWorks, x. 536.[152]Colloquies, i. 253.[153]Colloquies, i. 171.[154]Ibid.i. 178.[155]Ibid.i. 169.[156]Ibid.i. 167.[157]Ibid.i. 170.[158]Ibid.i. 194.[159]Ibid.ii. 247.[160]Colloquies, ii. 259.[161]Ibid.i. 109.[162]Ibid.ii. 105-7.[163]Ibid.i. 106.[164]Ibid.i. 47.[165]Life and Correspondence, iv. 195;Selections, iii. 45.[166]Colloquies, i. 62.[167]Colloquies, i. 135.[168]Ibid.ii. 147. Southey is here almost verbally following Burke'sReflections.[169]Life and Correspondence, v. 4-6.[170]Colloquies, i. 105.[171]On the Constitution of Church and State, according to the idea of each, 1852 (fourth edition).[172]Church and State, p. 100.[173]Ibid.p. 97.[174]Church and State, p. 85.[175]Ibid.p. 67.[176]Church and State, p. 142.[177]Ibid.pp. 75-79.[178]Colloquies, i. 37.[179]See an early account of Dale (in 1798) in Sydney Smith'sLife and Letters, i. 35, and another in Wilberforce'sCorrespondence(1840), i. 137 (in 1796).[180]Printed inPolitical Works, i. 302.[181]Political Works, v. 313; vi. 579.[182]Political Works, i. 473; v. 319.[183]Ibid.ii. 285.[184]Political Works, ii. 28; iv. 388.[185]Ibid.i. 443.[186]Rural Rides(1853), p. 311.[187]Rural Rides, p. 386.[188]Political Works, v. 436 (22nd July 1819).[189]Even M'Culloch had recommended a partial repudiation.[190]Political Works, iv. 237.[191]Ibid.ii. 19, 107, 250, 346; and iii. 423. SeeParliamentary History, xxx., where the first use of the phrase by Hardinge is reported.[192]Political Works, vi. 176.[193]Ibid.395.[194]Rural Rides, p. 446.[195]He complains bitterly that Ruggles had suppressed this in a second edition.Protestant Reformation(1850), ii., Introduction.[196]Political Register, 29th Jan. 1825.[197]Protestant Reformation, p. 13.[198]Ibid.p. 262.[199]Advice to Young Men, p. 8.[200]Political Works, v. 405. If our census be not a lie, there were twenty-seven million Englishmen in 1891.[201]Protestant Reformation, i. 311.[202]Coleridge in a letter to Allsop (Conversations, etc., i. 20) approves one of Cobbett's articles, because it popularises the weighty truth of the 'hollowness of commercial wealth.' Cobbett, he sadly reflects, is an overmatch for Liverpool. See Cobbett'sPolitical Works, v. 466n.

[80]Bain'sJames Mill, p. 215.

[81]Autobiography, p. 104.

[82]Miscellaneous Works(Popular Edition), p. 131.

[83]The articles from theEncyclopædiaupon Government, Jurisprudence, Liberty of the Press, Prisons and Prison Discipline, Colonies, Law of Nations, Education, were reprinted in a volume 'not for sale,' in 1825 and 1828. I quote from a reprint not dated.

[84]'Government,' pp. 3-5.

[85]'Government,' p. 8.

[86]'Government,' p. 9.

[87]Ibid.p. 11.

[88]Ibid.p. 9.

[89]Ibid.p. 12.

[90]'Government,' p. 9.

[91]C'est une expérience éternelle que tout homme qui a du pouvoir est porté à en abuser; il va jusqu'à ce qu'il trouve des limites.—Esprit des Lois, Bk. xi. chap 4.

[92]'Government,' p. 15.

[93]'Government,' p. 7.

[94]Ibid.p. 18.

[95]'Government,' p. 21.

[96]Ibid.p. 22

[97]Autobiography, p. 104.

[98]'Government,' p. 28.

[99]Ibid.p. 30. Mill especially refers to the exposure of clerical artifices in Father Paul'sCouncil of Trent.

[100]'Education,' p. 20

[101]Ibid.p. 45.

[102]Autobiography, p. 106.

[103]'Government,' p. 31.

[104]Bain'sJames Mill, p. 392.

[105]They were reprinted in theMiscellaneous Worksafter Macaulay's death. I quote from the 'popular edition' of that work (1875).

[106]Miscellaneous Works, p. 166.

[107]Miscellaneous Works, p. 132.

[108]Mill'sAutobiography, p. 158.

[109]'Government,' p. 12.

[110]Miscellaneous Works, p. 169.

[111]Fragment on Mackintosh(1870), pp. 275-94.

[112]Essay on the 'Independency of Parliament.'

[113]Fragment, p. 292.

[114]Ibid.p. 276.

[115]Miscellaneous Works, p. 170.

[116]Miscellaneous Works, p. 173.

[117]Miscellaneous Works, p. 138.

[118]Miscellaneous Works, pp. 135-40.

[119]Miscellaneous Works, p. 158, and see pp. 143-47.

[120]Speeches(Popular Edition), p. 125.

[121]Ibid.p. 128.

[122]Miscellaneous Works, p. 146.

[123]Miscellaneous Works, p. 183.

[124]A full analysis of this article is in Bain'sJames Mill, pp. 265-75.

[125]Article upon Sheridan, reprinted in Jeffrey'sEssays, iv. (1844).

[126]Table-Talk, 27th April 1823.

[127]Vindiciæ Gallicæ, inMiscellaneous Works, iii. (1846), p. 57.

[128]Mackintosh thinks it necessary to add that this parallel was suggested to him by William Thomson (1746-1837), a literary gentleman who continued Watson'sPhilip III., and may, for anything I know, deserve Mackintosh's warm eulogy.

[129]Vindiciæ Gallicæ, p. 59.

[130]Ibid.p. 51.

[131]Ibid.p. 148.

[132]Ibid.p. 68.

[133]Ibid.p. 72.

[134]Ibid.p. 125.

[135]Vindiciæ Gallicæ, p. 128.

[136]Ibid.p. 84.

[137]Ibid.p. 30.

[138]Life of Mackintosh, i. 125.

[139]Miscellaneous Works, iii. 261-65.

[140]Life, i. 309-16.

[141]SeeMiscellaneous Works, iii. 3.

[142]Ibid.iii. 203-38 (an article highly praised by Bagehot in hisParliamentary Reform).

[143]Miscellaneous Works, iii. 215-16.

[144]Ibid.iii. 226. Mackintosh in this article mentions the 'caucus,' and observes that the name implies that combinations have been already formed upon 'which the future government of the confederacy may depend more than on the forms of election, or the letter of the present laws.' He inclines to approve the system as essential to party government.

[145]Essays(1844), i. 84-106.

[146]The famous 'Cevallos' article of 1808, said to be written by Jeffrey and Brougham (Macvey Napier'sCorrespondence, p. 308), gave the immediate cause of starting theQuarterly; and, according to Brougham, first gave a distinctly Liberal character to theEdinburgh. For Jeffrey's desire to avoid 'party politics,' see Lockhart'sLife of Scott, M. Napier'sCorrespondence, p. 435, and Homer'sMemoirs(1853), i. 464.

[147]April 1805; reprinted inEssays, ii. 38, etc., to show, as he says, how early he had taken up his view of the French revolution.

[148]Sydney Smith complains in his correspondence of this article as exaggerating the power of the aristocracy.

[149]Essays, iv. 29.

[150]I need not speak of Brougham, then the most conspicuous advocate of Whiggism. He published in 1843 aPolitical Philosophy, which, according to Lord Campbell, killed the 'Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge.' No such hypothesis is necessary to account for the death of a society encumbered by a 'Dictionary of Universal Biography.' But the book was bad enough to kill, if a collection of outworn platitudes can produce that effect.

[151]Bentham'sWorks, x. 536.

[152]Colloquies, i. 253.

[153]Colloquies, i. 171.

[154]Ibid.i. 178.

[155]Ibid.i. 169.

[156]Ibid.i. 167.

[157]Ibid.i. 170.

[158]Ibid.i. 194.

[159]Ibid.ii. 247.

[160]Colloquies, ii. 259.

[161]Ibid.i. 109.

[162]Ibid.ii. 105-7.

[163]Ibid.i. 106.

[164]Ibid.i. 47.

[165]Life and Correspondence, iv. 195;Selections, iii. 45.

[166]Colloquies, i. 62.

[167]Colloquies, i. 135.

[168]Ibid.ii. 147. Southey is here almost verbally following Burke'sReflections.

[169]Life and Correspondence, v. 4-6.

[170]Colloquies, i. 105.

[171]On the Constitution of Church and State, according to the idea of each, 1852 (fourth edition).

[172]Church and State, p. 100.

[173]Ibid.p. 97.

[174]Church and State, p. 85.

[175]Ibid.p. 67.

[176]Church and State, p. 142.

[177]Ibid.pp. 75-79.

[178]Colloquies, i. 37.

[179]See an early account of Dale (in 1798) in Sydney Smith'sLife and Letters, i. 35, and another in Wilberforce'sCorrespondence(1840), i. 137 (in 1796).

[180]Printed inPolitical Works, i. 302.

[181]Political Works, v. 313; vi. 579.

[182]Political Works, i. 473; v. 319.

[183]Ibid.ii. 285.

[184]Political Works, ii. 28; iv. 388.

[185]Ibid.i. 443.

[186]Rural Rides(1853), p. 311.

[187]Rural Rides, p. 386.

[188]Political Works, v. 436 (22nd July 1819).

[189]Even M'Culloch had recommended a partial repudiation.

[190]Political Works, iv. 237.

[191]Ibid.ii. 19, 107, 250, 346; and iii. 423. SeeParliamentary History, xxx., where the first use of the phrase by Hardinge is reported.

[192]Political Works, vi. 176.

[193]Ibid.395.

[194]Rural Rides, p. 446.

[195]He complains bitterly that Ruggles had suppressed this in a second edition.Protestant Reformation(1850), ii., Introduction.

[196]Political Register, 29th Jan. 1825.

[197]Protestant Reformation, p. 13.

[198]Ibid.p. 262.

[199]Advice to Young Men, p. 8.

[200]Political Works, v. 405. If our census be not a lie, there were twenty-seven million Englishmen in 1891.

[201]Protestant Reformation, i. 311.

[202]Coleridge in a letter to Allsop (Conversations, etc., i. 20) approves one of Cobbett's articles, because it popularises the weighty truth of the 'hollowness of commercial wealth.' Cobbett, he sadly reflects, is an overmatch for Liverpool. See Cobbett'sPolitical Works, v. 466n.

MALTHUS

I. MALTHUS'S STARTING-POINT

The political movement represented the confluence of many different streams of agitation. Enormous social changes had generated multifarious discontent. New wants and the new strains and stresses between the various parts of the political mechanism required new adaptations. But, if it were inquired what was the precise nature of the evils, and how the reform of parliament was to operate, the most various answers might be given. A most important line of division did not coincide with the line between the recognised parties. One wing of the Radicals agreed with many Conservatives in attributing the great evils of the day to the industrial movement and the growth of competition. The middle-class Whigs and the Utilitarians were, on the contrary, in thorough sympathy with the industrial movement, and desired to limit the functions of government, and trust to self-help and free competition. The Socialistic movement appeared for the present to be confined to a few dreamers and demagogues. The Utilitarians might approve the spirit of the Owenites, but held their schemes to be chimerical. Beneath the political controversies there was therefore a set of problems to beanswered; and the Utilitarian answer defines their distinction from Radicals of a different and, as they would have said, unphilosophical school.

What, then, was the view really taken by the Utilitarians of these underlying problems? They not only had a very definite theory in regard to them, but in working it out achieved perhaps their most important contribution to speculation. Beneath a political theory lies, or ought to lie, what we now call a 'sociology'—a theory of that structure of society which really determines the character and the working of political institutions. The Utilitarian theory was embodied in their political economy. I must try to define as well as I can what were the essential first principles implied, without going into the special problems which would be relevant in a history of political economy.

The two leading names in the literature of political economy during the first quarter of this century were undoubtedly Malthus and Ricardo. Thomas Robert Malthus[203](1766-1834) was not one of the Utilitarian band. As a clergyman, he could not share their opinion of the Thirty-nine Articles. Moreover, he was a Whig, not a Radical; and he was even tainted with some economic heresy. Still, he became one of the prophets, if not the leading prophet, of the Utilitarians. Belief in the Malthusian theory of population was the most essential article of their faith, and marked the line of cleavage between the two wings of the Radical party.

Malthus was the son of a country gentleman in Surrey.His father was a man of studious habits, and one of the enthusiastic admirers of Rousseau. His study ofÉmileprobably led to the rather desultory education of his son. The boy, after being taught at home, was for a time a pupil of R. Graves (1715-1804), author of theSpiritual Quixote, a Whig clergyman who was at least orthodox enough to ridicule Methodism. Malthus was next sent to attend Gilbert Wakefield's lectures at the Warrington 'Academy,' the Unitarian place of education, and in 1784 went to Jesus College, Cambridge, of which Wakefield had been a fellow. For Wakefield, who had become a Unitarian, and who was afterwards a martyr to political Radicalism, he appears to have retained a strong respect. At Jesus, again, Malthus was under Frend, who also was to join the Unitarians. Malthus was thus brought up under the influences of the modified rationalism which was represented by the Unitarians outside the establishment and by Paley within. Coleridge was at Jesus while Malthus was still a fellow, and there became an ardent admirer of Priestley, Malthus remained within the borders of the church. Its yoke was light enough, and he was essentially predisposed to moderate views. He took his degree as ninth wrangler in 1788, became a fellow of his college in 1793, took orders, and in 1798 was curate of Albury, near his father's house in Surrey. Malthus's home was within a walk of Farnham, where Cobbett had been born and passed his childhood. He had, therefore, before his eyes the same agricultural labourer whose degradation excited Cobbett to Radicalism. Very different views were suggested to Malthus. The revolutionary doctrine was represented in England by the writings of Godwin, whosePolitical Justiceappeared in 1793 andEnquirerin 1797. These books naturally afforded topics for discussion between Malthus and his father. The usual relations between senior and junior were inverted; the elder Malthus, as became a follower of Rousseau, was an enthusiast; and the younger took the part of suggesting doubts and difficulties. He resolved to put down his arguments upon paper, in order to clear his mind; and the result was theEssay upon Population, of which the first edition appeared anonymously in 1798.

The argument upon which Malthus relied was already prepared for him. The dreams of the revolutionary enthusiasts supposed either a neglect of the actual conditions of human life or a belief that those conditions could be radically altered by the proposed political changes. The cooler reasoner was entitled to remind them that they were living upon solid earth, not in dreamland. The difficulty of realising Utopia may be presented in various ways. Malthus took a point which had been noticed by Godwin. In the conclusion of hisPolitical Justice,[204]while taking a final glance at the coming millennium, Godwin refers to a difficulty suggested by Robert Wallace. Wallace had[205]said that all the evils under which mankind suffers might be removed by a community of property, were it not that such a state of things would lead to an 'excessive population.' Godwin makes light of the difficulty. He thinks that there is some 'principle in human society by means of which everything tends to find its own level and proceed inthe most auspicious way, when least interfered with by the mode of regulation.' Anyhow, there is plenty of room on the earth, at present. Population may increase for 'myriads of centuries.' Mind, as Franklin has said, may become 'omnipotent over matter';[206]life may be indefinitely prolonged; our remote descendants who have filled the earth 'will probably cease to propagate';[207]they will not have the trouble of making a fresh start at every generation; and in those days there will be 'no war, no crimes, no administration of justice'; and moreover, 'no disease, anguish, melancholy, or resentment.' Briefly, we shall be like the angels, only without the needless addition of a supreme ruler. Similar ideas were expressed in Condorcet's famousTableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain,[208]written while he was in daily fear of death by the guillotine, and so giving the most striking instance on record of the invincibility of an idealist conviction under the hardest pressure of facts.

The argument of Malthus is a product of the whole previous course of speculation. The question of population had occupied the French economists. The profound social evils of France gave the starting-point of their speculations; and one of the gravest symptoms had been the decay of population under the last years of Louis XIV. Their great aim was to meet this evil by encouraging agriculture. It could not escape the notice of the simplest observer that if you would have more mouths you must provide more food, unless, as some pious people assumed, that task might be left to Providence.Quesnay had laid it down as one of his axioms that the statesman should aim at providing sustenance before aiming simply at stimulating population. It follows, according to Gulliver's famous maxim, that the man who makes two blades of grass grow where one grew before deserves better of his country than the 'whole race of politicians put together.' Other writers, in developing this thesis, had dwelt upon the elasticity of population. The elder Mirabeau, for example, published hisAmi des hommes ou traité de la populationin 1756. He observes that, given the means of subsistence, men will multiply like rats in a barn.[209]The great axiom, he says,[210]is 'la mesure de la subsistance est celle de la population.' Cultivate your fields, and you will raise men. Mirabeau replies to Hume's essay upon the 'Populousness of ancient nations' (1752), of which Wallace's first treatise was a criticism. The problem discussed by Hume and Wallace had been comparatively academical; but by Malthus's time the question had taken a more practical shape. The sentimentalists denounced luxury as leading to a decay of the population. Their prevailing doctrine is embodied in Goldsmith's famous passage in theDeserted Village(1770):

'Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,Where wealth accumulates and men decay.'

The poetical version only reflected the serious belief of Radical politicians. Although, as we are now aware, the population was in fact increasing rapidly, the belief prevailed among political writers that it was actually declining. Trustworthy statistics did not exist. In 1753 John Potter, son of the archbishop, proposed to theHouse of Commons a plan for a census. A violent discussion arose,[211]in the course of which it was pointed out that the plan would inevitably lead to the adoption of the 'canvas frock and wooden shoes.' Englishmen would lose their liberty, become French slaves, and, when counted, would no doubt be taxed and forcibly enlisted. The bill passed the House of Commons in spite of such reasoning, but was thrown out by the House of Lords. Till the first census was taken in 1801—a period at which the absolute necessity of such knowledge had become obvious—the most elementary facts remained uncertain. Was population increasing or decreasing? That surely might be ascertainable.

Richard Price (1723-1791) was not only a distinguished moralist and a leading politician, but perhaps the best known writer of his time upon statistical questions. He had the credit of suggesting Pitt's sinking fund,[212]and spoke with the highest authority upon facts and figures. Price argued in 1780[213]that the population of England had diminished by one-fourth since the revolution of 1688. A sharp controversy followed upon the few ascertainable data. The vagueness of the results shows curiously how much economists had to argue in the dark. Malthusobserves in his first edition that he had been convinced by reading Price that population was restrained by 'vice and misery,' as results, not of political institutions, but of 'our own creation.'[214]This gives the essential point of difference. Mirabeau had declared that the population of all Europe was decaying. Hume's essay, which he criticises, had been in answer to a similar statement of Montesquieu. Price had learned that other countries were increasing in number, though England, he held, was still declining. What, then, was the cause? The cause, replied both Price and Mirabeau, was 'luxury,' to which Price adds the specially English evils of the 'engrossment of farms' and the enclosure of open fields. Price had to admit that the English towns had increased; but this was an additional evil. The towns increased simply by draining the country; and in the towns themselves the deaths exceeded the births. The great cities were the graves of mankind. This opinion was strongly held, too, by Arthur Young, who ridiculed the general fear of depopulation, and declared that if money were provided, you could always get labour, but who looked upon the towns as destructive cancers in the body politic.

The prevalence of this view explains Malthus's position. To attribute depopulation to luxury was to say that it was caused by the inequality of property. The rich man wasted the substance of the country, became demoralised himself, and both corrupted and plundered his neighbours. The return to a 'state of nature,' in Rousseau's phrase, meant the return to a state of things in which this misappropriation should become impossible. The whole industry of the nation would then be devoted to supportingmillions of honest, simple peasants and labourers, whereas it now went to increasing the splendour of the great at the expense of the poor. Price enlarges upon this theme, which was, in fact, the contemporary version of the later formula that the rich are growing richer and the poor poorer. The immediate effect of equalising property, then, would be an increase of population. It was the natural retort, adopted by Malthus, that such an increase would soon make everybody poor, instead of making every one comfortable. Population, the French economists had said, follows subsistence. Will it not multiply indefinitely? The rapid growth of population in America was noticed by Price and Godwin; and the theory had been long before expanded by Franklin, in a paper which Malthus quotes in his later editions. 'There is no bound,' said Franklin in 1751,[215]'to the prolific nature of plants and animals but what is made by their crowding and interfering with each other's means of subsistence.' The whole earth, he infers, might be overspread with fennel, for example, or, if empty of men, replenished in a few ages with Englishmen. There were supposed to be already one million of Englishmen in North America. If they doubled once in twenty-five years, they would in a century exceed the number of Englishmen at home. This is identical with Mirabeau's principle of the multiplying of rats in a barn. Population treads closely on the heels of subsistence. Work out your figures and see the results.[216]

Malthus's essay in the first edition was mainly an application of this retort, and though the logic was effective as against Godwin, he made no elaborate appeal to facts. Malthus soon came to see that a more precise application was desirable. It was clearly desirable to know whether population was or was not actually increasing, and under what conditions. I have spoken of the contemporary labours of Sinclair, Young, Sir F. Eden, and others. To collect statistics was plainly one of the essential conditions of settling the controversy. Malthus in 1799 travelled on the continent to gather information, and visited Sweden, Norway, Russia, and Germany. The peace of Amiens enabled him in 1802 to visit France and Switzerland. He inquired everywhere into the condition of the people, collected such statistical knowledge as was then possible, and returned to digest it into a elaborate treatise. Meanwhile, the condition of England was giving a fresh significance to the argument. The first edition had been published at the critical time when the poor-law was being relaxed, and disastrous results were following war and famine. The old complaint that the poor-law was causing depopulation was being changed for the complaint that it was stimulating pauperism. The first edition already discussed this subject, which was occupying all serious thinkers; it was now to receive a fuller treatment. The second edition, greatly altered,appeared in 1803, and made Malthus a man of authority. His merits were recognised by his appointment in 1805 to the professorship of history and political economy at the newly founded East India College at Haileybury. There he remained till the end of his life, which was placid, uneventful, and happy. He made a happy marriage in 1804; and his calm temperament enabled him to bear an amount of abuse which might have broken the health of a more irritable man. Cobbett's epithet, 'parson Malthus,' strikes the keynote. He was pictured as a Christian priest denouncing charity, and proclaiming the necessity of vice and misery. He had the ill luck to be the centre upon which the antipathies of Jacobin and anti-Jacobin converged. Cobbett's language was rougher than Southey's; but the poet-laureate and the author of 'two-penny trash' were equally vehement in sentiment. Malthus, on the other hand, was accepted by the political economists, both Whig and Utilitarian. Horner and Mackintosh, lights of the Whigs, were his warm friends as well as his disciples. He became intimate with Ricardo, and he was one of the original members of the Political Economy Club. He took abuse imperturbably; was never vexed 'after the first fortnight' by the most unfair attack; and went on developing his theories, lecturing his students, and improving later editions of his treatise. Malthus died on 23rd December 1834.

II. THE RATIOS

The doctrine marks a critical point in political economy. Malthus's opponents, as Mr. Bonar remarks,[217]attacked him alternately for propounding a truism andfor maintaining a paradox. A 'truism' is not useless so long as its truth is not admitted. It would be the greatest of achievements to enunciate a law self-evident as soon as formulated, and yet previously ignored or denied. Was this the case of Malthus? Or did he really startle the world by clothing a commonplace in paradox, and then explain away the paradox till nothing but the commonplace was left?

Malthus laid down in his first edition a proposition which continued to be worried by all his assailants. Population, he said, when unchecked, increases in the geometrical ratio; the means of subsistence increase only in an arithmetical ratio. Geometrical ratios were just then in fashion.[218]Price had appealed to their wonderful ways in his arguments about the sinking fund; and had pointed out that a penny put out to 5 per cent. compound interest at the birth of Christ would, in the days of Pitt, have been worth some millions of globes of solid gold, each as big as the earth. Both Price and Malthus lay down a proposition which can easily be verified by the multiplication-table. If, as Malthus said, population doubles in twenty-five years, the number in two centuries would be to the present number as 256 to 1, and in three as 4096 to 1. If, meanwhile, the quantity of subsistence increased in 'arithmetical progression,' the multipliers for it would be only 9 and 13. It follows that, in the year 2003, two hundred and fifty-six persons will have to live upon what now supports nine. So far,the case is clear. But how does the argument apply to facts? For obvious reasons, Price's penny could not become even one solid planet of gold. Malthus's population is also clearly impossible. That is just his case. The population of British North America was actually, when he wrote, multiplying at the assigned rate. What he pointed out was that such a rate must somehow be stopped; and his question was, how precisely will it be stopped? The first proposition, he says[219](that is, that population increased geometrically), 'I considered as proved the moment that the American increase was related; and the second as soon as enunciated.' To say that a population increases geometrically, in fact, is simply to say that it increases at a fixed rate. The arithmetical increase corresponds to a statement which Malthus, at any rate, might regard as undeniable; namely, that in a country already fully occupied, the possibility of increasing produce is restricted within much narrower limits. In a 'new country,' as in the American colonies, the increase of food might proceed as rapidly as the increase of population. Improved methods of cultivation, or the virtual addition of vast tracts of fertile territory by improved means of communication, may of course add indefinitely to the resources of a population. But Malthus was contemplating a state of things in which the actual conditions limited the people to an extraction of greater supplies from a strictly limited area. Whether Malthus assumed too easily that this represented the normal case may be questionable. At any rate, it was not only possible butactual in the England of the time. His problem was very much to the purpose. His aim was to trace the way in which the population of a limited region is prevented from increasing geometrically. If the descendants of Englishmen increase at a certain rate in America, why do they not increase equally in England? That, it must be admitted, is a fair scientific problem. Finding that two races of similar origin, and presumably like qualities, increase at different rates, we have to investigate the causes of the difference.

Malthus answered the problem in the simplest and most consistent way in his first edition. What are the checks? The ultimate check would clearly be starvation. A population might multiply till it had not food. But before this limit is actually reached, it will suffer in various ways from scarcity. Briefly, the checks may be distinguished into the positive, that is, actual distress, and the preventive, or 'foresight.' We shall actually suffer unless we are restrained by the anticipation of suffering. As a fact, however, he thinks that men are but little influenced by the prudence which foresees sufferings. They go on multiplying till the consequences are realised. You may be confined in a room, to use one of his illustrations,[220]though the walls do not touch you; but human beings are seldom satisfied till they have actually knocked their heads against the wall. He sums up his argument in the first edition in three propositions.[221]Population is limited by the means of subsistence; that is obvious; population invariably increases when the means of subsistence are increased; that is shown by experience to be practically true; and therefore, finally,the proportion is maintained by 'misery and vice.' That is the main conclusion which not unnaturally startled the world. Malthus always adhered in some sense to the main doctrine, though he stated explicitly some reserves already implicitly involved. A writer must not be surprised if popular readers remember the unguarded and dogmatic utterances which give piquancy to a theory, and overlook the latent qualifications which, when fully expressed, make it approximate to a commonplace. The political bearing of his reasoning is significant. The application of Godwin's theories of equality would necessarily, as he urges, stimulate an excessive population. To meet the consequent evils, two measures would be obviously necessary; private property must be instituted in order to stimulate prudence; and marriage must be instituted to make men responsible for the increase of the population. These institutions are necessary, and they make equality impossible. Weak, then, as foresight may be with most men, the essential social institutions have been developed by the necessity of enabling foresight to exercise some influence; and thus indirectly societies have in fact grown in wealth and numbers through arrangements which have by one and the same action strengthened prudence and created inequality. Although this is clearly implied, the main impression produced upon Malthus's readers was that he held 'vice and misery' to be essential to society; nay, that in some sense he regarded them as blessings. He was accused, as he tells us,[222]of objecting to vaccination, because it tended to prevent deaths from small-pox, and has to protest against some one who had declared his principlesto be favourable to the slave trade.[223]He was represented, that is, as holding depopulation to be good in itself. These perversions were grotesque, but partly explain the horror with which Malthus was constantly regarded; and we must consider what made them plausible.

I must first notice the maturer form of his doctrine. In the second edition he turns to account the result of his later reading, his personal observations, and the statistical results which were beginning to accumulate. The remodelled book opens with a survey of the observed action of the checks; and it concludes with a discussion of the 'moral restraint' which is now added to 'vice and misery.' Although considerable fragments of the old treatise remained to the last, the whole book was altered both in style and character. The style certainly suffers, for Malthus was not a master of the literary art; he inserts his additions with little care for the general effect. He tones down some of the more vivid phrases which had given offence, though he does not retract the substance. A famous passage[224]in the second edition, in which he speaks of 'nature's mighty feast,' where, unluckily, the 'table is already full,' and therefore unbidden guests are left to starve, was suppressed in the later editions. Yet the principle that no man has a claim to subsistence as of right remains unaltered. The omission injures the literary effect without altering the logic; and I think that, where the argument is amended, the new element is scarcely worked into the old so as to gain thorough consistency.

Malthus's survey of different countries showed how various are the 'checks' by which population is limited in various countries. We take a glance at all nations through all epochs of history. In the South Sea we find a delicious climate and a fertile soil, where population is mainly limited by vice, infanticide, and war; and where, in spite of these influences, the population multiplies at intervals till it is killed off by famine. In China, a vast and fertile territory, inhabited by an industrious race, in which agriculture has always been encouraged, marriage stimulated, and property widely diffused, has facilitated the production of a vast population in the most abject state of poverty, driven to expose children by want, and liable at intervals to destructive famines. In modern Europe, the checks appear in the most various forms; in Switzerland and Norway a frugal population in small villages sometimes instinctively understands the principle of population, and exhibits the 'moral restraint,' while in England the poor-laws are producing a mass of hopeless and inert pauperism. Consideration of these various cases, and a comparison of such records as are obtainable of the old savage races, of the classical states of antiquity, of the Northern barbarians and of the modern European nations, suggests a natural doubt. Malthus abundantly proves what can hardly be denied, that population has everywhere been found to press upon the means of subsistence, and that vice and misery are painfully abundant. But does he establish or abandon his main proposition? He now asserts the 'tendency' of population to outrun the means of subsistence. Yet he holds unequivocally that the increase of population has been accompanied by an increased comfort; that want has diminished althoughpopulation has increased; and that the 'preventive' check is stronger than of old in proportion to the positive check. Scotland, he says,[225]is 'still overpeopled, but not so much as when it contained fewer inhabitants.' Many nations, as he points out in general terms, have been most prosperous when most populous.[226]They could export food when crowded, and have ceased to import it when thinned. This, indeed, expresses his permanent views, though the facts were often alleged by his critics as a disproof of them. Was not the disproof real? Does not a real evasion lurk under the phrase 'tendency'? You may say that the earth has a tendency to fall into the sun, and another 'tendency' to move away from the sun. But it would be absurd to argue that we were therefore in danger of being burnt or of being frozen. To explain the law of a vital process, we may have to analyse it, and therefore to regard it as due to conflicting forces; but the forces do not really exist separately, and in considering the whole concrete phenomenon we must take them as mutually implied. A man has a 'tendency' to grow too fat; and another 'tendency' to grow too thin. That surely means that on the whole he has a 'tendency' to preserve the desirable mean. The phrase, then, can only have a distinct meaning when the conflicting forces represent two independent or really separable forces. To use an illustration given by Malthus, we might say that a man had a 'tendency' to grow upwards; but was restrained by a weight on his head. The man has the 'tendency,' because we may regard the weight as a separable accident. When both forces are ofthe essence, the separate 'tendencies' correspond merely to our way of analysing the fact. But if one can be properly regarded as relatively accidental, the 'tendency' means the way in which the other will manifest itself in actual cases.

In 1829, Senior put this point to Malthus.[227]What, he asked, do you understand by a 'tendency' when you admit that the tendency is normally overbalanced by others? Malthus explains his meaning to be that every nation suffers from evils 'specifically arising from the pressure of population against food.' The wages of the labourer in old countries have never been sufficient to enable him to maintain a large family at ease. There is overcrowding, we may say, in England now as there was in England at the Conquest; though food has increased in a greater proportion than population; and the pressure has therefore taken a milder form. This, again, is proved by the fact that, whenever a relaxation of the pressure has occurred, when plagues have diminished population, or improvements in agriculture increased their supply of food, the gap has been at once filled up. The people have not taken advantage of the temporary relaxation of the check to preserve the new equilibrium, but have taken out the improvement by a multiplication of numbers. The statement then appears to be that at any given time the population is in excess. Men would be better off if they were less numerous. But, on the other hand, the tendency to multiply does not represent a constant force, an irresistible instinct which will always bring men down to the same level, but something which, in fact, may vary materially. Malthus admits, in fact, thatthe 'elasticity' is continually changing; and therefore repudiates the interpretation which seemed to make all improvement hopeless. Why, then, distinguish the 'check' as something apart from the instinct? If, in any case, we accept this explanation, does not the theory become a 'truism,' or at least a commonplace, inoffensive but hardly instructive? Does it amount to more than the obvious statement that prudence and foresight are desirable and are unfortunately scarce?

III. MORAL RESTRAINT

The change in the theory of 'checks' raises another important question. Malthus now introduced a modification upon which his supporters laid great stress. In the new version the 'checks' which proportion population to means of subsistence are not simply 'vice and misery,' but 'moral restraint, vice, and misery.'[228]How, precisely, does this modify the theory? How are the different 'checks' related? What especially is meant by 'moral' in this connection? Malthus takes his ethical philosophy pretty much for granted, but is clearly a Utilitarian according to the version of Paley.[229]He agrees with Paley that 'virtue evidently consists in educing from the materials which the Creator has placed under our guidance the greatest sum of human happiness.'[230]He adds to this that our 'natural impulses are, abstractedly considered, good, and only to be distinguished by their consequences.'Hunger, he says, as Bentham had said, is the same in itself, whether it leads to stealing a loaf or to eating your own loaf. He agrees with Godwin that morality means the 'calculation of consequences,'[231]or, as he says with Paley, implies the discovery of the will of God by observing the effect of actions upon happiness. Reason then regulates certain innate and practically unalterable instincts by enabling us to foretell their consequences. The reasonable man is influenced not simply by the immediate gratification, but by a forecast of all the results which it will entail. In these matters Malthus was entirely at one with the Utilitarians proper, and seems to regard their doctrine as self-evident.

He notices briefly one logical difficulty thus introduced. The 'checks' are vice, misery, and moral restraint. But why distinguish vice from misery? Is not conduct vicious which causes misery,[232]and precisely because it causes misery? He replies that to omit 'vice' would confuse our language. Vicious conduct may cause happiness in particular cases; though its general tendency would be pernicious. The answer is not very clear; and Malthus, I think, would have been more logical if he had stuck to his first theory, and regarded vice as simply one form of imprudence. Misery, that is, or the fear of misery, and the indulgence in conduct which produces misery are the 'checks' which limit population; and the whole problem is to make the ultimate sanction more operative upon the immediate conduct. Man becomes more virtuous simply as he becomes more prudent, and is therefore governed in his conduct by recognising the wider and more remote series of consequences. Thereis, indeed, the essential difference that the virtuous man acts (on whatever motives) from a regard to the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number,' and not simply from self-regard. Still the ultimate and decisive criterion is the tendency of conduct to produce misery; and if Malthus had carried this through as rigorously as Bentham, he would have been more consistent. The 'moral check' would then have been simply a department of the prudential; including prudence for others as well as for ourselves. One reason for the change is obvious. His assumption enables him to avoid coming into conflict with the accepted morality of the time. On his exposition 'vice' occasionally seems not to be productive of misery but an alternative to misery; and yet something bad in itself. Is this consistent with his Utilitarianism? The vices of the South Sea Islanders, according to him, made famine less necessary; and, if they gave pleasure at the moment, were they not on the whole beneficial? Malthus again reckons among vices practices which limit the population without causing 'misery' directly.[233]Could he logically call them vicious? He wishes to avoid the imputation of sanctioning such practices, and therefore condemns them by his moral check; but it would be hard to prove that he was consistent in condemning them. Or, again, there is another familiar difficulty. The Catholic church encourages marriage as a remedy for vice; and thereby stimulates both population and poverty. How would Malthus solve the problem: is it better to encourage chastity and a superabundance of people, or to restrict marriage at the cost of increasing temptation to vice? Heseems to evade the point by saying that he recommends both chastity and abstinence from marriage. By 'moral restraint,' as he explains, he means 'restraint from marriage from prudential motives, with a conduct strictly moral during the period of this restraint.' 'I have never,' he adds, 'intentionally deviated from this sense.'[234]A man, that is, should postpone taking a wife, and should not console himself by taking a mistress. He is to refrain from increasing the illegitimate as well as from increasing the legitimate population. It is not surprising that Malthus admits that this check has 'in past ages operated with inconsiderable force.'[235]In fact Malthus, as a thoroughly respectable and decent clergyman, manages by talking about the 'moral restraint' rather to evade than to answer some awkward problems of conduct; but at the cost of some inconsequence.

But another result of this mode of patching up his argument is more important. The 'vices of mankind,' he says in an unusually rhetorical summary of his historical inquiry,[236]'are active and able ministers of depopulation. They are the precursors in the great army of destruction, and often finish the dreadful work themselves. But should they fail in the war of extermination, sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague advance in terrific array, and sweep off their thousands and ten thousands. Should success still be incomplete, gigantic inevitable famine stalks in the rear, and at one mighty blow levels the population with the food of the world.' The life of the race, then, is a struggle with misery; itsexpansion is constantly forcing it upon this array of evils; and in proportion to the elasticity is the severity of the evils which follow. This is not only a 'gloomy view,' but again seems to suggest that 'vice' is an alternative to 'misery.' Vices are bad, it would seem, but at least they obviate the necessity for disease and famine. Malthus probably suppressed the passage because he thought it liable to this interpretation. It indicates, however, a real awkwardness, if not something more, in his exposition. He here speaks as if there was room for a fixed number of guests at his banquet. Whatever, therefore, keeps the population to that limit must be so far good. If he had considered his 'moral check' more thoroughly, he might have seen that this does not correspond to his real meaning. The 'moral' and the prudential checks are not really to be contrasted as alternative, but co-operative. Every population, vicious or virtuous, must of course proportion its numbers to its means of support. That gives the prudential check. But the moral check operates by altering the character of the population itself. From the purely economic point of view, vice is bad because it lowers efficiency. A lazy, drunken, and profligate people would starve where an industrious, sober, and honest people would thrive. The check of vice thus brings the check of misery into play at an earlier stage. It limits by lowering the vitality and substituting degeneration for progress. The check, therefore, is essentially mischievous. Though it does not make the fields barren, it lowers the power of cultivation. Malthus had recognised this when he pointed out, as we have seen, that emergence from the savage state meant the institution of marriage and property and,we may infer, the correlative virtues of chastity, industry, and honesty. If men can form large societies, and millions can be supported where once a few thousands were at starvation point, it is due to the civilisation which at every stage implies 'moral restraint' in a wider sense than Malthus used the phrase. An increase of population by such means was, of course, to be desired. If Malthus emphasises this inadequately, it is partly, no doubt, because the Utilitarian view of morality tended to emphasise the external consequences rather than the alteration of the man himself. Yet the wider and sounder view is logically implied in his reasoning—so much so that he might have expressed his real aim more clearly if he had altered the order of his argument. He might have consistently taken the same line as earlier writers and declared that he desired, above all things, the increase of population. He would have had indeed to explain that he desired the increase of a sound and virtuous population; and that hasty and imprudent increase led to misery and to a demoralisation which would ultimately limit numbers in the worst way. We shall see directly how nearly he accepts this view. Meanwhile, by insisting upon the need of limitation, he was led to speak often as if limitation by any means was good and the one thing needful, and the polemic against Godwin in the first edition had given prominence to this side of the question. Had he put his views in a different shape, he would perhaps have been so edifying that he would have been disregarded. He certainly avoided that risk, and had whatever advantage is gained by stating sound doctrine paradoxically.

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