APPENDIX I
Special Orders for the Raid on the Spion
1.Organization of the raiding party—Commander.—Captain Wagener; with him, Bugler Held.Stradtmann’s patrol.—Lieutenant Stradtmann and 10 men.Dumas’ patrol.—Lieutenant Böhlefeld and 10 men.Supports, at my disposal.—Lieutenant Freund and 24 men.In addition to the latter party, at my disposal—Boening, and Assistant-Surgeon Wiser and six stretcher bearers.2.Dress and equipment.—Attack order without greatcoat or cap, belts to be worn without pouches, gas masks to be slung and tucked into tunic.The Stradtmann, Dumas, and Böhlefeld patrols will each be equipped, half with rifles and half with pistols and wire-cutters.The supports will carry rifles, five men will carry pistols, each man will carry two grenades.As a distinguishing mark each man will wear a triangle of white linen sewn on the breast and back.Minutes. O′ The time of starting will be communicated, in good time, on the day of the raid.3.Time table.—The artillerywill open fire with gas shells on the enemy’s trenches on both sides of the point of entry and on the objectives opposite the southwest cornerof La Boisselle, where the feint attack is to take place.For a quarter of an hour, all the enemy’s trenches likely to prove of importance to the raiding party will be brought under fire. At the same time, theclose-range weapons of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion, with the two medium and the light Minenwerfer of the228th Minenwerfer Company, will fire with maximum rapidity on the enemy’s trenches opposite the southwest corner of La Boisselle.7′The one heavy and two medium Minenwerfer of the228th Minenwerfer Companywill open fire with the object of cutting the wire in front of the point of entry.14′45″On the right flank of the minefielda shallow gallery will be fired.15′The artillery, which was firing on the southwest corner of La Boiselle, will increase its range and shell the trenches in rear.The close-range weaponswill cease fire.The machine gunswill sweep communication trenches in this sector and in the Galgen.15′30″In the Blinddarm and just south of the same, isolated groups ofdummieswill be exposed in order to make the enemy think an attack is pending. From now on,artillery and Minenwerferfire will increase to its maximum intensity on the real objective.The “Albrecht-Mörser” of the1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion,in position on the Lehmgrubenhöhe, will bombard the Nordrondell with the utmost intensity.20′The patrolswill leave their dug-outs and take up their positions in readiness, in accordance with direct orders received from me, in the Hohlweg by Sap No. 3.23′Stradtmann’s patrolwill leave the Hohlweg at “a” and crawl forward as far as “b.”Lieutenant Boeningwill post thestretcher bearersas connecting files betweenStradtmann’s patroland myself.25′The artillerywill lift its fire from the objective between Besenhecke and the Windmühle to the targets in rear, and will open a barrage on those of the enemy’s trenches which may prove a source of danger to the raid.The Minenwerferwill cease fire.The machine gunswill open fire on positions in rear and on the communication trenches which lead to the objective from both sides.The “Albrecht-Mörser” of the1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion, on the Lehmgrubenhöhe, will continue to bombard the Nordrondell.All close-range weapons and the artillery, which from 0′ to 15′ had been bombarding the enemy’s position opposite the southwest corner of La Boisselle, will reopen fire on these targets with renewed vigor.25′15″Stradtmann’s patrolwill break into the enemy’s trenches at the Süd Spion and, atpoint 1 (seeSketch No. 1), will defend the point of entry from the direction of the enemy.On orders received from me personally,Dumas’ patrolwill follow Stradtmann’s patrol and advance southwards along the enemy’s trench as far as point 2.On orders received from me personally also,Böhlefeld’s patrolwill follow Dumas’ patrol and, once in the enemy’s trench, will push on towards the Spion.The stretcher bearerswill act as connecting files between Stradtmann’s patrol and myself.The supportswill hold themselves in readiness at 4, so as to be able to push on after the other patrols immediately on receipt of an order from me.If the enemy opens a barrage on our position and on the Hohlweg before the patrols come out of their dug-outs, I shall either lead the patrol to the enemy’s position by another route, or cancel the raid.4.Duty of the patrols.—As many of the enemy as possible must be made prisoners; in addition, rifles, machine guns, rifle grenade stands, trench mortars, etc., as well as filled packs are to be brought back. Should it be found impossible to carry back all the booty owing to the small numbers of the raiding party, but if, as far as regards the enemy’s fire it could be done, report will be passed on to me by Stradtmann’s patrol.5.Return.—On a signal given by Lieutenant Stradtmann, or on the “Charge” being blown by my bugler, the raiding party will make its way back from the Süd Spion to the Hohlweg by the shortest way, and immediately make for the same dug-outs whence it started. In the dug-outs, I shall ascertain whether everyone has returned. Prisoners and booty will be taken into the dug-outs.During the raid, if the enemy should open a heavy barrage on the trenches on the Schwabenhohe and on the Hohlweg, the raiding party will remain in the enemy’s trench and acquaint me of the fact by firing a red flare. I shall then endeavor to reach the party and lead them back by some other way. Should I not arrive, the senior officer present will lead the entire party.6. Assistant-Surgeon Wisser will organize No. 1 Dug-out as a first aid post and will remain there until the conclusion of the raid.7. Until the 15th minute I shall be in the advanced regimental command post; after that time in the Hohlweg, which will be connected by telephone with the advanced regimental command post.(Signed) WAGENER,Captain and Company Commander.Verbally and in writing toparticipants in the raid.Copy to the regiment.W.
1.Organization of the raiding party—
Commander.—Captain Wagener; with him, Bugler Held.
Stradtmann’s patrol.—Lieutenant Stradtmann and 10 men.
Dumas’ patrol.—Lieutenant Böhlefeld and 10 men.
Supports, at my disposal.—Lieutenant Freund and 24 men.
In addition to the latter party, at my disposal—Boening, and Assistant-Surgeon Wiser and six stretcher bearers.
2.Dress and equipment.—Attack order without greatcoat or cap, belts to be worn without pouches, gas masks to be slung and tucked into tunic.
The Stradtmann, Dumas, and Böhlefeld patrols will each be equipped, half with rifles and half with pistols and wire-cutters.
The supports will carry rifles, five men will carry pistols, each man will carry two grenades.
As a distinguishing mark each man will wear a triangle of white linen sewn on the breast and back.
Minutes. O′ The time of starting will be communicated, in good time, on the day of the raid.
3.Time table.—The artillerywill open fire with gas shells on the enemy’s trenches on both sides of the point of entry and on the objectives opposite the southwest cornerof La Boisselle, where the feint attack is to take place.
For a quarter of an hour, all the enemy’s trenches likely to prove of importance to the raiding party will be brought under fire. At the same time, theclose-range weapons of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion, with the two medium and the light Minenwerfer of the228th Minenwerfer Company, will fire with maximum rapidity on the enemy’s trenches opposite the southwest corner of La Boisselle.
7′
The one heavy and two medium Minenwerfer of the228th Minenwerfer Companywill open fire with the object of cutting the wire in front of the point of entry.
14′45″
On the right flank of the minefielda shallow gallery will be fired.
15′
The artillery, which was firing on the southwest corner of La Boiselle, will increase its range and shell the trenches in rear.
The close-range weaponswill cease fire.
The machine gunswill sweep communication trenches in this sector and in the Galgen.
15′30″
In the Blinddarm and just south of the same, isolated groups ofdummieswill be exposed in order to make the enemy think an attack is pending. From now on,artillery and Minenwerferfire will increase to its maximum intensity on the real objective.
The “Albrecht-Mörser” of the1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion,in position on the Lehmgrubenhöhe, will bombard the Nordrondell with the utmost intensity.
20′
The patrolswill leave their dug-outs and take up their positions in readiness, in accordance with direct orders received from me, in the Hohlweg by Sap No. 3.
23′
Stradtmann’s patrolwill leave the Hohlweg at “a” and crawl forward as far as “b.”
Lieutenant Boeningwill post thestretcher bearersas connecting files betweenStradtmann’s patroland myself.
25′
The artillerywill lift its fire from the objective between Besenhecke and the Windmühle to the targets in rear, and will open a barrage on those of the enemy’s trenches which may prove a source of danger to the raid.
The Minenwerferwill cease fire.
The machine gunswill open fire on positions in rear and on the communication trenches which lead to the objective from both sides.
The “Albrecht-Mörser” of the1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion, on the Lehmgrubenhöhe, will continue to bombard the Nordrondell.All close-range weapons and the artillery, which from 0′ to 15′ had been bombarding the enemy’s position opposite the southwest corner of La Boisselle, will reopen fire on these targets with renewed vigor.
25′15″
Stradtmann’s patrolwill break into the enemy’s trenches at the Süd Spion and, atpoint 1 (seeSketch No. 1), will defend the point of entry from the direction of the enemy.
On orders received from me personally,Dumas’ patrolwill follow Stradtmann’s patrol and advance southwards along the enemy’s trench as far as point 2.
On orders received from me personally also,Böhlefeld’s patrolwill follow Dumas’ patrol and, once in the enemy’s trench, will push on towards the Spion.
The stretcher bearerswill act as connecting files between Stradtmann’s patrol and myself.
The supportswill hold themselves in readiness at 4, so as to be able to push on after the other patrols immediately on receipt of an order from me.
If the enemy opens a barrage on our position and on the Hohlweg before the patrols come out of their dug-outs, I shall either lead the patrol to the enemy’s position by another route, or cancel the raid.
4.Duty of the patrols.—As many of the enemy as possible must be made prisoners; in addition, rifles, machine guns, rifle grenade stands, trench mortars, etc., as well as filled packs are to be brought back. Should it be found impossible to carry back all the booty owing to the small numbers of the raiding party, but if, as far as regards the enemy’s fire it could be done, report will be passed on to me by Stradtmann’s patrol.
5.Return.—On a signal given by Lieutenant Stradtmann, or on the “Charge” being blown by my bugler, the raiding party will make its way back from the Süd Spion to the Hohlweg by the shortest way, and immediately make for the same dug-outs whence it started. In the dug-outs, I shall ascertain whether everyone has returned. Prisoners and booty will be taken into the dug-outs.
During the raid, if the enemy should open a heavy barrage on the trenches on the Schwabenhohe and on the Hohlweg, the raiding party will remain in the enemy’s trench and acquaint me of the fact by firing a red flare. I shall then endeavor to reach the party and lead them back by some other way. Should I not arrive, the senior officer present will lead the entire party.
6. Assistant-Surgeon Wisser will organize No. 1 Dug-out as a first aid post and will remain there until the conclusion of the raid.
7. Until the 15th minute I shall be in the advanced regimental command post; after that time in the Hohlweg, which will be connected by telephone with the advanced regimental command post.
(Signed) WAGENER,Captain and Company Commander.
Verbally and in writing toparticipants in the raid.
Copy to the regiment.
W.
To quote Appendices 2, 3, and 4 would take up too much space and would add very little to the purpose of the example. Number 2 consists of a five-page table of the kinds and time of fire, the batteries of fire, and the targets; number 3, of detailed orders for a feint attack; and number 4, for a feint bombardment.
The object of the quotation is to show the accuracy and detail of an operation order. Since the German subject matter and treatment are about the same as our own, we ought to gain from it a conception of the requirements of framing an operation order.
Note.—The meager space devoted to the Operation Order in this course of lessons should in no way reflect on its relative importance among military communications. Only because the treatment of our own examples is forbidden and because our experience is slight, do we leave it without further practice. Those who are armed with the confidential documents of the War Department may look into our own operation order more closely; and those who have conscientiously applied themselves to the work of the preceding lessons ought to have no trouble with its composition.
Our Field Service Regulations state[16]that “ordersin contra-distinction to field, general, and special orders, are used by commanders of divisions and separate brigades for regulating the movements and resupply of the field trains, fixing the position of distributing points (rations and forage), authorizing the use of reserve rations, providing for the refilling of combat trains after combat or a march, providing for ambulance or hospital service in camps, and for furnishing such other similar information or instructions as it is desired to communicate to troops. They alsoinclude such instructions as may be sent to the commander of trains, relative to the movements and disposition of the trains and information with regard to the arrangements made with the line of communication relative to the positions of refilling, rendezvous, and evacuation points.”
Thus, when separate orders are necessary for such conditions as cited, they are called simplyorders. They may be transmitted as field messages between commanders or as more formal documents. In either case they are usually addressed to the person concerned.
Examples ofordersfollow:
51st Division, 9th Corps,Gettysburg,3 June ’19, 6-30 p. m.To Commander of Trains:Have one wagon company small arms ammunition at cross-roads near EPPLEY at 8 p. m.Have one wagon company artillery ammunition at north edge of McPHERSON RIDGE at 8 p. m.Have 1st Section, supply, ready to issue at Central Square in GETTYSBURG at 8 p. m.Have empty wagons return to LITTLESTOWN tonight to refill; have them report en route to Field Hospital No. 1 at the crossing of ROCK CREEK to carry back wounded. Have them well filled with straw or hay.MABIE,Chief of Staff.Telegraphed to Commander of Trains.Copies to Regimental Commanders.
51st Division, 9th Corps,Gettysburg,3 June ’19, 6-30 p. m.
To Commander of Trains:
Have one wagon company small arms ammunition at cross-roads near EPPLEY at 8 p. m.
Have one wagon company artillery ammunition at north edge of McPHERSON RIDGE at 8 p. m.
Have 1st Section, supply, ready to issue at Central Square in GETTYSBURG at 8 p. m.
Have empty wagons return to LITTLESTOWN tonight to refill; have them report en route to Field Hospital No. 1 at the crossing of ROCK CREEK to carry back wounded. Have them well filled with straw or hay.
MABIE,Chief of Staff.
Telegraphed to Commander of Trains.Copies to Regimental Commanders.
19th Division,Marysville,5 Oct. ’22, 6-45 p. m.To Officer in Charge of Trains:You will move with your trains at 3-45 a. m., by corduroy road JEPSOM-SMALLEY-SAINT MARYS.Arrange your columns as follows: one section artillery ammunition, one section small arms ammunition, bridge train, supply column, field hospitals, remainder of ammunition column.On reaching SAINT MARYS have the two sections ammunition turn north and, when they have cleared the road, halt and await orders.Have the remainder of the ammunition columns halt beside the road between SAINT MARYS and ALEXANDER and await orders. Have the field hospitals park off the road near HILLIS.On the march, as you overtake, or are joined by, the field trains of the troops, you will assume command.Hasten your march until you are clear of JEPSOM.SMITH,Chief of Staff.Copies to all Commanders.By Lieut. Jones to officer in charge of trains.
19th Division,Marysville,5 Oct. ’22, 6-45 p. m.
To Officer in Charge of Trains:
You will move with your trains at 3-45 a. m., by corduroy road JEPSOM-SMALLEY-SAINT MARYS.
Arrange your columns as follows: one section artillery ammunition, one section small arms ammunition, bridge train, supply column, field hospitals, remainder of ammunition column.
On reaching SAINT MARYS have the two sections ammunition turn north and, when they have cleared the road, halt and await orders.
Have the remainder of the ammunition columns halt beside the road between SAINT MARYS and ALEXANDER and await orders. Have the field hospitals park off the road near HILLIS.
On the march, as you overtake, or are joined by, the field trains of the troops, you will assume command.
Hasten your march until you are clear of JEPSOM.SMITH,Chief of Staff.
Copies to all Commanders.By Lieut. Jones to officer in charge of trains.
Birmingham,8 Sept. ’25, 9-50 a. m.To Captain Mott, commanding trains:Our advance guard met at 9-30 a. m. two battalions hostile infantry at GARLINGTON.Have trains keep well closed and follow main body without distance.NORTON,Colonel, commanding.
Birmingham,8 Sept. ’25, 9-50 a. m.
To Captain Mott, commanding trains:
Our advance guard met at 9-30 a. m. two battalions hostile infantry at GARLINGTON.
Have trains keep well closed and follow main body without distance.
NORTON,Colonel, commanding.
The first two examples are of the formal type. The third one is less so.
Verbal ordersare usually transmitted by officers. However, if the order consists of a single sentence such as, “The trains will halt two hours at Bingham,” it may be transmitted by an enlisted man.
Although there is more latitude in the form of writtenorderthan in that of the field order, the one should be asbrief and unmistakable in its construction as the other. The paragraph structure and sequence should be as logical and unified as English composition can make them.
With your book open at the extract from Field Service Regulations in regard tothe order, compose enough imaginaryordersto cover all the instances therein given.
Letters of Instructionchiefly differ from orders, operation orders, and field orders in their lack of definition of specific tactical duties. They are truly instructions. They deal mainly with strategic considerations and general plans, because the writer is usually far away from, or not in direct command of, the units which are going to carry out the general plans.
At the beginning of campaignsletters of instructionenumerate the troops of the various commands and the corresponding leaders.
“In armies, combat orders will often be in the form of, or a part of, letters of instruction to the commanding generals in the field armies composing the army. But where the field armies are within supporting distance of each other and can mutually coöperate in the task assigned them, formal combat orders may be issued. Such orders are necessarily general in character and consist of a statement of the objective sought by the army commander, and of the part he expects each field army to play in attaining this objective. The army commander, either by means of letters of instruction or by personal conferences with his field army commanders, fully acquaints them not only with the immediate end in view, but also with so much of his future plans as may be necessary to insure thorough cooperation on their part.”[17]
In the illustration which follows, President Lincoln outlines a general offensive to the various armies. As commander-in-chief he issues the substance of a letter of instructions in the form of an executive order. In it we shall notice that he does not prescribe any specific movement of troops.
Executive Mansion, Washington, Jan. 27, 1862.President’s General War Order, No. 1.Ordered: That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces.That, especially,The army at and about Fortress Monroe,The army of the Potomac,The army of West Virginia,The army near Mumfordsville, Kentucky,The army and flotilla at Cairo,And a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day.That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
Executive Mansion, Washington, Jan. 27, 1862.
President’s General War Order, No. 1.
Ordered: That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces.
That, especially,
The army at and about Fortress Monroe,
The army of the Potomac,
The army of West Virginia,
The army near Mumfordsville, Kentucky,
The army and flotilla at Cairo,
And a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day.
That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.
That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
The following is a more usual form of letter of instructions. This time it goes directly from the commander-in-chief to the general-in-chief:
May 24, 1862.From Washington, 24th.Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan,—I left General McDowell’s camp at dark last evening. Shield’s command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the twenty-sixth (26th). We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places, that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one (1) regiment infantry, two (2) companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril.The enemy’s forces under General Anderson, now opposing General McDowell’s advance, have as their line of supply and retreat the road to Richmond.If, in conjunction with McDowell’s movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy’s supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two (2) forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy’s retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand (15,000) men, and if you succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say you can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to march cautiously and safely.You will have command of McDowell after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the twenty-first (21st).A. LINCOLN,President.
May 24, 1862.From Washington, 24th.
Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan,—
I left General McDowell’s camp at dark last evening. Shield’s command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the twenty-sixth (26th). We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places, that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one (1) regiment infantry, two (2) companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril.
The enemy’s forces under General Anderson, now opposing General McDowell’s advance, have as their line of supply and retreat the road to Richmond.
If, in conjunction with McDowell’s movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy’s supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two (2) forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy’s retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand (15,000) men, and if you succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say you can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to march cautiously and safely.
You will have command of McDowell after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the twenty-first (21st).
A. LINCOLN,President.
As you see, the above example does no more than suggest to General McClellan from a strategic standpoint certaincourses open to him. The general-in-chief on the spot is the one to make the decision.
To progress in our examples, let us take one issued by the general-in-chief to one of his subordinate generals.
Headquarters of the Army,Washington, Feb. 23, 1862.Maj.-Gen. B. F. Butler,U. S. Volunteers,—General:—You are assigned to the command of the land forces destined to coöperate with the navy, in the attack upon New Orleans. You will use every means to keep your destination a profound secret, even from your staff officers, with the exception of your chief-of-staff, and Lieut. Weitzel, of the engineers. The force at your disposal will consist of the first 13 regiments named in your memorandum handed to me in person, the 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan (old and good regiments from Baltimore).The 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and the 6th Michigan, will await your orders at Fort Monroe.Two companies of the 21st Indiana, are well-drilled as heavy artillery. The cavalry force already en route for Ship Island, will be sufficient for your purposes.After full consultation with officers well acquainted with the country in which it is proposed to operate, I have arrived at the conclusion that (2) two light batteries fully equipped and (1) one without horses, will be all that are necessary.This will make your force about 14,400 infantry, 275 cavalry, 680 artillery; total 15,255 men.The commanding general of the Department of Key West, is authorized to loan you, temporarily, 2 regiments; Fort Pickens can probably give you another, which will bring your force to nearly 18,000.The object of your expedition is one of vital importance, the capture of New Orleans. The route selected is up the Mississippi River, and the first obstacle to be encountered (perhaps the only one) is in the resistance of Forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is expected that the navy can reduce these works; in that case, you will, after their capture, leave a sufficient garrison in them to render them perfectly secure; and it is recommended, that on the upward passage, a few heavy guns, and some troops, be left at Pilot Station (at the forks of the river), to cover a retreat in the event of disaster. These troops and guns, will, of course, be removed as soon as the forts are captured.Should the navy fail to reduce the works, you will land your forces and siege train, and endeavor to breach the works, silence their fire, and carry them by assault.The next resistance will be near the English Bend, where there are some earthen batteries; here it may be necessary for you to land your troops and coöperate with the naval attack, although it is more than probable, that the navy, unassisted, can accomplish the result. If these works are taken, the city of New Orleans necessarily falls. In that event, it will probably be best to occupy Algiers with the mass of your troops, also, the eastern bank of the river above the city; it may be necessary to place some troops in the city to preserve order, but if there appears sufficient Union sentiment to control the city, it may be best for purposes of discipline to keep your men out of the city.After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it will be necessary to reduce all the works guarding its approaches from the east, and particularly to gain the Manchac Pass. Baton Rouge, Berwick Bay, and Fort Livingston will next claim your attention.A feint at Galveston may facilitate the objects we have in view. I need not call your attention to the necessity of gaining possession of all the rolling stock you can on the different railways, and of obtaining control of the roads themselves. The occupation of Baton Rouge by a combined naval and land force, should be accomplished as soon as possible after you have gained New Orleans. Then endeavor to open your communication with the northern column by the Mississippi, always bearing in mind the necessity of occupying Jackson, Mississippi, as soon as you can safely do so, either after, or before you have effected the junction. Allow nothing to divert you from obtaining possession of all the approaches to New Orleans. When that object is accomplished to its fullest extent, it will be necessary to make a combined attack on Mobile, in order to gain possession of the harbor and works, as well as to control the railway terminus at the city.In regard to this, I will send more detailed instructions as the operations of the northern column develop themselves.I may briefly state that the general objects of the expedition are:First, The reduction of New Orleans and all its approaches: then Mobile and its defenses: then Pensacola, Galveston, etc. It is probable that by the time New Orleans has been reduced it will be in the power of the government to reinforce the land forces sufficiently to accomplish all these objects; in the meantime you will please give all the assistance in your power to the army and navy commanders in your vicinity, never losing sight of the fact, that the great object to be achieved is the capture and firm retention of New Orleans.I am, etc.,GEO. B. McCLELLAN,Maj.-Gen. Com’g U. S. A.
Headquarters of the Army,Washington, Feb. 23, 1862.
Maj.-Gen. B. F. Butler,U. S. Volunteers,—
General:—You are assigned to the command of the land forces destined to coöperate with the navy, in the attack upon New Orleans. You will use every means to keep your destination a profound secret, even from your staff officers, with the exception of your chief-of-staff, and Lieut. Weitzel, of the engineers. The force at your disposal will consist of the first 13 regiments named in your memorandum handed to me in person, the 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan (old and good regiments from Baltimore).
The 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and the 6th Michigan, will await your orders at Fort Monroe.
Two companies of the 21st Indiana, are well-drilled as heavy artillery. The cavalry force already en route for Ship Island, will be sufficient for your purposes.
After full consultation with officers well acquainted with the country in which it is proposed to operate, I have arrived at the conclusion that (2) two light batteries fully equipped and (1) one without horses, will be all that are necessary.
This will make your force about 14,400 infantry, 275 cavalry, 680 artillery; total 15,255 men.
The commanding general of the Department of Key West, is authorized to loan you, temporarily, 2 regiments; Fort Pickens can probably give you another, which will bring your force to nearly 18,000.
The object of your expedition is one of vital importance, the capture of New Orleans. The route selected is up the Mississippi River, and the first obstacle to be encountered (perhaps the only one) is in the resistance of Forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is expected that the navy can reduce these works; in that case, you will, after their capture, leave a sufficient garrison in them to render them perfectly secure; and it is recommended, that on the upward passage, a few heavy guns, and some troops, be left at Pilot Station (at the forks of the river), to cover a retreat in the event of disaster. These troops and guns, will, of course, be removed as soon as the forts are captured.
Should the navy fail to reduce the works, you will land your forces and siege train, and endeavor to breach the works, silence their fire, and carry them by assault.
The next resistance will be near the English Bend, where there are some earthen batteries; here it may be necessary for you to land your troops and coöperate with the naval attack, although it is more than probable, that the navy, unassisted, can accomplish the result. If these works are taken, the city of New Orleans necessarily falls. In that event, it will probably be best to occupy Algiers with the mass of your troops, also, the eastern bank of the river above the city; it may be necessary to place some troops in the city to preserve order, but if there appears sufficient Union sentiment to control the city, it may be best for purposes of discipline to keep your men out of the city.
After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it will be necessary to reduce all the works guarding its approaches from the east, and particularly to gain the Manchac Pass. Baton Rouge, Berwick Bay, and Fort Livingston will next claim your attention.
A feint at Galveston may facilitate the objects we have in view. I need not call your attention to the necessity of gaining possession of all the rolling stock you can on the different railways, and of obtaining control of the roads themselves. The occupation of Baton Rouge by a combined naval and land force, should be accomplished as soon as possible after you have gained New Orleans. Then endeavor to open your communication with the northern column by the Mississippi, always bearing in mind the necessity of occupying Jackson, Mississippi, as soon as you can safely do so, either after, or before you have effected the junction. Allow nothing to divert you from obtaining possession of all the approaches to New Orleans. When that object is accomplished to its fullest extent, it will be necessary to make a combined attack on Mobile, in order to gain possession of the harbor and works, as well as to control the railway terminus at the city.
In regard to this, I will send more detailed instructions as the operations of the northern column develop themselves.
I may briefly state that the general objects of the expedition are:First, The reduction of New Orleans and all its approaches: then Mobile and its defenses: then Pensacola, Galveston, etc. It is probable that by the time New Orleans has been reduced it will be in the power of the government to reinforce the land forces sufficiently to accomplish all these objects; in the meantime you will please give all the assistance in your power to the army and navy commanders in your vicinity, never losing sight of the fact, that the great object to be achieved is the capture and firm retention of New Orleans.
I am, etc.,GEO. B. McCLELLAN,Maj.-Gen. Com’g U. S. A.
General McClellan goes more into detail than does the President. He is considering the situation on more technical lines. Yet he does not go beyond the limits of strategy in outlining the general plan. He still conforms to the principles of letters of instruction. If we were to follow General Butler in his journey to the Gulf, we should perceive in his orders the disappearance of the strategic and the appearance of the tactical idea. Later we should discover one of his brigade commanders actually issuing a field order.
Notice in the last example how, on account of its length, General McClellan has made a neat summary of the whole. Notice that in all of these letters the writers have adhered to the principles of rhetoric; and that they have given to the recipient a unified and coherent production. Why? Because the will of the commander is transmitted more quickly in that way.
We have now completed the consideration of the expression which directly affects troops in the field. We have written thefield messagewhich brings information to commanders and which helps them to make an estimate of a situation. We have framed thefield orderwhich grows out of that estimate and which transforms the decision into action. We have viewed theoperation orderwhich is no more than a field order made to fit trench warfare. We have seenorderswhich are issued in connection with combat so as to govern the movement of trains. We have read letters ofinstructionwhich are written by higher commanders in order to regulate in a general way extensive movements. All of these communications bear specifically upon the effort of troops toward success in battle—the ultimate object of all military training.
In leaving this most important part of our professional work, we might take with us this one idea. We can bestexpress ourselves in any of the communications we have studied by having all the thoughts of one kind together and the different kinds in an orderly arrangement. Whenever it is possible we should keep the paragraph sequence,
(a) Enemy.(b) Own troops.(c) Plan.