Admiration and curiosity.
18. Forasmuch as allknowledgebeginneth fromexperience, therefore alsonew experienceis the beginning ofnew knowledge, and the increase of experience the beginning of the increase of knowledge. Whatsoever therefore happeneth new to a man, giveth him matter ofhopeofknowingsomewhat that he knewnot before. And this hope and expectation of future knowledge from anything that happeneth new and strange, is that passion which we commonly calladmiration; and the same considered as appetite, is calledcuriosity, which is appetite of knowledge. As in the discerning of faculties,man leavethall community withbeastsat the faculty ofimposing names; so also doth he surmount their nature at thispassionofcuriosity. For when a beast seeth anything new and strange to him, he considereth it so far only as to discern whether it be likely to serve his turn, or hurt him, and accordingly approacheth nearer to it, or fleeth from it: whereas man, who in most events remembereth in what manner theywere caused and begun, looketh for the cause and beginning of everything that ariseth new unto him. And from this passion of admiration and curiosity, have arisen not only the invention of names, but also supposition of such causes of all things as they thought might produce them. And from this beginning is derived allphilosophy; asastronomyfrom the admiration of the course of heaven;natural philosophyfrom the strange effects of the elements and other bodies. And from the degrees of curiosity, proceed also the degrees of knowledge amongst men: for, to a man in the chase of riches or authority, (which in respect of knowledge are but sensuality) it is a diversity of little pleasure, whether it be the motion of the sun or the earth that maketh the day, or to enter into other contemplations of any strange accident, otherwise than whether it conduce or not to the end he pursueth. Becausecuriosityisdelight, therefore alsonoveltyis so, but especially that novelty from which a man conceiveth anopiniontrue or false ofbetteringhis own estate; for, in such case, they stand affected with the hope that all gamesters have while the cards are shuffling.
Of the passion of them that flock to see danger.
19. Divers other passions there be, but they want names: whereof some nevertheless have been by most men observed: for example; from what passion proceedeth it, that men takepleasuretobeholdfrom the shore thedangerof them that are at sea in a tempest, or in fight, or from a safe castle to behold two armies charge one another in the field? It is certainly, in the whole sum,joy; else men would never flock to such a spectacle. Nevertheless there is in it bothjoyandgrief: for asthere is novelty and remembrance of our own security present, which isdelight; so there is alsopity, which is grief; but the delight is so far predominant, that men usually are content in such a case to be spectators of the misery of their friends.
Of magnanimity and pusillanimity.
20.Magnanimityis no more thanglory, of the which I have spoken in the first section; butglory well groundedupon certain experience of a power sufficient to attain his end in open manner. Andpusillanimityis thedoubtof that. Whatsoever therefore is a sign ofvain glory, the same is also a sign ofpusillanimity: for sufficient power maketh glory a spur to one’s end. To bepleasedordispleasedwithfame trueorfalse, is asignof that same, because he that relieth on fame hath not his success in his own power. Likewiseartandfallacyare signs of pusillanimity, because they depend not upon our own power, but the ignorance of others. Alsopronenesstoanger, because it argueth difficulty of proceeding. Alsoostentationofancestors, because all men are more inclined to make shew of their own power when they have it, than of another’s. To be atenmityand contention withinferiors, is a sign of the same, because it proceedeth from want of power to end the war. Tolaughat others, because it is an affectation of glory from other men’s infirmities, and not from any ability of their own. Alsoirresolution, which proceedeth from want of power enough to contemn the little difficulties that make deliberations hard.
A view of the passions represented in a race.
21. The comparison of the life of man to a race, though it hold not in every part, yet it holdeth so well for this our purpose, that we may thereby both see and remember almost all the passions beforementioned. But thisracewe must suppose to have no othergoal, nor othergarland, but being foremost, and in it:
1. Having shewed in the precedent chapters, that sense proceedeth from the action of external objects upon thebrain, or some internalsubstanceof thehead; and that thepassionsproceed from the alteration there made, and continued to theheart: it is consequent in the next place, seeing the diversity of degrees in knowledge in divers men, to be greater than may be ascribed to the diverstempersof their brain, to declarewhat other causesmay produce suchodds, and excess ofcapacity, as we daily observe in one man above another. As for that difference which ariseth fromsickness, and such accidental distempers, I omit the same, as impertinent to this place, and consider it only in such as have theirhealth, andorganswell disposed. If the difference were in the natural temper of the brain, I can imagine no reason why the same should not appear first and most of all in the senses, which being equal both in the wise and less wise, infer an equal temper in the common organ (namely the brain) of all the senses.
2. But we see by experience, thatjoyandgriefproceednotinallmen from the samecauses, and that men differ very much in the constitution of the body; whereby, that which helpeth and furtherethvital constitutionin one, and is therefore delightful, hindereth it and crosseth it in another, and therefore causeth grief. Thedifferencetherefore ofwitshath its originalfromthedifferent passions, and from theendsto which the appetite leadeth them.
3. And first, those men whose ends aresensualdelight, and generally are addicted toease,food,onerationsandexonerationsof the body, must needs be thelessthereby delighted with thoseimaginationsthatconduce notto those ends, such as are imaginations ofhonourandglory, which, as I have said before, have respect to the future: for sensuality consisteth in the pleasure of the senses, which please only for the present, and take away the inclination to observe such things as conduce to honour, and consequently maketh men less curious, and less ambitious, whereby they less consider the way either to knowledge or other power; in which two consisteth all the excellency of power cognitive. And this is it which men calldulness, and proceedeth from the appetite of sensual or bodily delight. And it may well be conjectured, that such passion hath its beginning from agrossnessanddifficultyof themotionof thespiritabout theheart.
4. The contrary hereunto, is thatquick rangingof mind described, chapterIV.section 3, which is joined withcuriosityof comparing the things that come into the mind, one with another: in which comparison, a man delighteth himself either with finding unexpectedsimilitudeof things, otherwise much unlike, in which men place the excellency offancy, and from whence proceed those grateful similies, metaphors, and other tropes, by which bothpoetsandoratorshave it in their power to make things please or displease, and shew well or ill to others, as they like themselves; or else in discerning suddenlydissimilitudein things that otherwise appear the same. And this virtue of themind is that by which men attain to exact and perfectknowledge; and the pleasure thereof consisteth in continual instruction, and in distinction of places, persons, and seasons, and is commonly termed by the name ofjudgment: for, to judge is nothing else, but to distinguish or discern: and bothfancyandjudgmentare commonly comprehended under the name ofwit, which seemeth to be a tenuity and agility of spirits, contrary to that restiness of the spirits supposed in those that are dull.
5. There is another defect of the mind, which men calllevity, which betrayeth alsomobilityin the spirits, but in excess. An example whereof is in them that in the midst of any serious discourse, have their minds diverted to every little jest or witty observation; which maketh them depart from their discourse by a parenthesis, and from that parenthesis by another, till at length they either lose themselves, or make their narration like a dream, or some studied nonsense. The passion from whence this proceedeth, iscuriosity, but withtoo much equalityand indifference: for when all things make equal impression and delight, they equally throng to be expressed.
6. The virtue opposite to this defect isgravity, or steadiness; in which the end being the great and master-delight, directeth and keepeth in the way thereto all other thoughts.
7. Theextremityof dullness is thatnatural follywhich may be calledstolidity: but the extreme oflevity, though it be natural folly distinct from the other, and obvious to every man’s observation, I knownothow to call it.
8. There is a fault of the mind called by the Greeks Ἀμαϑια, which isindocibility, ordifficultyof being taught; the which must needs arise from afalse opinionthat theyknow alreadythe truth of that is called in question: for certainly men are not otherwise so unequal in capacity as theevidenceis unequal between what is taught by the mathematicians, and what is commonly discoursed of in other books: and therefore if the minds of men were all of white paper, they would almost equally be disposed to acknowledge whatsoever should be in right method, and by right ratiocination delivered to them: but when men have once acquiesced in untrue opinions, and registered them as authentical records in their minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such men, than to write legibly upon a paper already scribbled over. The immediatecausetherefore ofindocibility, isprejudice; and of prejudice, false opinion of our own knowledge.
9. Another, and a principal defect of the mind, is that which men callmadness, which appeareth to be nothing else but someimaginationof some suchpredominancyabove therest, that we haveno passion but from it; and this conception is nothing else but excessivevain glory, orvain dejection; which is most probable by these examples following, which proceed in appearance every one of them frompride, or somedejectionof mind. As first, we have had the example of one that preached in Cheapside from a cart there, instead of a pulpit, that he himself was Christ, which wasspiritualpride or madness. We have had also divers examples of learned madness, in which menhave manifestly been distracted upon any occasion that hath put them in remembrance of their own ability. Amongst the learned men, may be remembered, I think also, those that determine of the time of the world’s end, and other such the points of prophecy. And the gallant madness of Don Quixote is nothing else but an expression of such height of vain glory as reading ofromancemay produce in pusillanimous men. Also rage and madness of love, are but great indignations of them in whose brains is predominant contempt from their enemies, or their mistresses. And thepridetaken informandbehaviour, hath made divers men run mad, and to be so accounted, under the name of fantastic.
10. And as these are the examples of extremities, so also are there examples too many of the degrees, which may therefore be well accounted follies; as it is a degree of thefirst, for a man, without certain evidence, to think himself to beinspired, or to have any other effect of God’s holy spirit than other godly men have. Of thesecond, for a man continually to speak his mind in acentoof other men’s Greek or Latin sentences. Of thethird, much of the present gallantry in love and duel. Ofrage, a degree ismalice; and offantasticmadness,affectation.
11. As the former examples exhibit to us madness, and the degrees thereof, proceeding from the excess of self-opinion; so also there be other examples of madness, and the degrees thereof, proceeding fromtoo much vain fearanddejection; as in those melancholy men that have imagined themselves brittle as glass, or have had some otherlike imagination: and degrees hereof are all those exorbitant and causeless fears, which we commonly observe in melancholy persons.
1. Hitherto of the knowledge of thingsnatural, and of the passions that arise naturally from them. Now forasmuch as we give names not only to things natural, but also tosupernatural; and by all names we ought to have some meaning and conception: it followeth in the next place, to consider what thoughts and imaginations of the mind we have, when we take into our mouths the most blessed name ofGod, and the names of thosevirtueswe attribute unto him; as also, whatimagecometh into the mind at hearing the name ofspirit, or the name ofangel, good or bad.
2. And forasmuch as God Almighty isincomprehensible, it followeth, that we can havenoconception orimageof theDeity, and consequently, allhis attributessignify ourinabilityand defect of power toconceiveany thing concerning his nature, and not any conception of the same, excepting only this, thatthere is a God: for the effects we acknowledge naturally, do include a power of their producing, before they were produced; and that power presupposeth something existent that hath such power: and the thing so existing with power to produce, if it were not eternal, must needs have been produced by somewhat before it, and that again by something else before that, till we come to an eternal, that is to say, the first power of allpowers, and first cause of all causes: and this is it which all men conceive by the name ofGod, implying eternity, incomprehensibility, and omnipotency. And thus all that will consider, may knowthatGod is, though notwhathe is: even a man that is born blind, though it be not possible for him to have any imagination what kind of thing fire is; yet he cannot but know that somewhat there is that men call fire, because it warmeth him.
3. And whereas we attribute to God Almighty,seeing,hearing,speaking,knowing,loving, and the like, by which names we understand something inmento whom we attribute them, we understandnothingby them in the nature of God: for, as it is well reasoned,Shall not the God that made theeye, see; and the ear, hear?So it is also, if we say, shall God, which made the eye, not see without the eye; or that made the ear, not hear without the ear; or that made the brain, not know without the brain; or that made the heart, not love without the heart? Theattributestherefore given unto theDeity, are such assignifyeitherour incapacityor ourreverence: our incapacity, when we say incomprehensible and infinite; our reverence, when we give him those names, which amongst us are the names of those things we most magnify and commend, as omnipotent, omniscient, just, merciful, &c. And when God Almighty giveth those names to himself in the Scriptures, it is but ἀνϑρωποπαθῶς, that is to say, by descending to our manner of speaking; without which we are not capable of understanding him.
4. By the name ofspirit, we understand abody natural, but of suchsubtilty, that it worketh notupon the senses; but that filleth up the place which the image of a visible body might fill up. Our conception therefore of spirit consisteth offigure without colour; and in figure is understood dimension, and consequently, to conceive a spirit, is to conceive something that hath dimension. Butspirits supernaturalcommonly signify somesubstance withoutdimension; which two words do flatly contradict one another: and therefore when we attribute the name of spirit unto God, we attribute it not as the name of anything we conceive, no more than we ascribe unto him sense and understanding; but as a signification of our reverence, we desire to abstract from him all corporal grossness.
5. Concerning other things, which some men callspirits incorporeal, and somecorporeal, it is notpossiblebynaturalmeans only, to come toknowledgeof so much, as thatthere are suchthings. We that are Christiansacknowledgethat there be angels good and evil, and that there are spirits, and that the soul of a man is a spirit, and that those spirits are immortal:but, toknowit, that is to say, to have natural evidence of the same, it isimpossible: for, allevidenceisconception, as it is said, chap.VI.sect. 3, and all conception is imagination, and proceedeth fromsense, chap.III.sect. 1. Andspiritswe suppose to be those substances which worknotupon thesense, and therefore not conceptible. But though the Scripture acknowledges spirits, yet doth it nowhere say, that they are incorporeal, meaning thereby, without dimension and quality; nor, I think, is that word incorporeal at all in the Bible; but it is said of the spirit, that it abideth in men; sometimes thatit dwelleth in them, sometimes that it cometh on them, that it descendeth, and goeth, and cometh; and that spirits are angels, that is to say messengers: all which words do implylocality; and locality isdimension; and whatsoever hath dimension, isbody, be it never so subtile. To me therefore it seemeth, that the Scripture favoureth them more, that hold angels and spirits corporeal, than them that hold the contrary. And it is a plaincontradictionin natural discourse, to say of the soul of man, that it istota in toto, et tota in qualibet parte corporis, grounded neither upon reason nor revelation, but proceeding from the ignorance of what those things are which are calledspectra, images, that appear in the dark to children, and such as have strong fears, and other strange imaginations, as hath been said, chapterIII.sect. 5, where I call them phantasms: for, taking them to be things real, without us, like bodies, and seeing them to come and vanish so strangely as they do, unlike tobodies; what could they call them else, butincorporeal bodies? which is not a name, but an absurdity of speech.
6. It is true, that the heathens, and all nations of the world, have acknowledged that there bespirits, which for the most part they hold to be incorporeal; whereby it might be thought, that a man by natural reason, may arrive, without the Scriptures, to the knowledge of this,that spirits are: but the erroneous collection thereof by the heathens, may proceed, as I have said before, from the ignorance of the cause of ghosts and phantasms, and such other apparitions. And from thence had the Grecians their number of gods, their numberofdæmonsgood or bad, and for every man hisgenius; which is not the acknowledging of this truth,that spirits are; but a false opinion concerning the force of imagination.
7. And seeing theknowledgewe have ofspirits, isnot naturalknowledge, butfaithfrom supernatural revelation given to the holy writers of the Scriptures; it followeth, that of inspirations also, which is the operation of spirit in us, the knowledge which we have, must all proceed from Scripture. Thesignsthere set down ofinspiration, aremiracles, when they be great, and manifestly above the power of men to do by imposture: as for example, the inspiration of Elias was known by the miraculous burning of the sacrifice. But thesignstodistinguishwhether aspiritbegoodorevil, are the same by which we distinguish whether a man or a tree be good or evil, namely,actionsandfruit: for there arelyingspirits, wherewith men are inspired sometimes, as well as withspiritsoftruth. And we are commanded in Scripture, to judge of the spirits by their doctrine, and not of the doctrine by the spirits. For miracles, our Saviour (Matth.xxiv. 24) hath forbidden us to rule our faith by them. And Saint Paul saith, (Gal.i. 8):Though an angel from heaven preach to you otherwise, &c.let him be accursed. Where it is plain, that we are not to judge whether the doctrine be true or not, by the angel; but whether the angel say true or no, by the doctrine. So likewise, (1 Joh.iv. 1):Believe not every spirit: for false prophets are gone out into the world. Verse 2:Hereby shall ye know the spirit of God. Verse 3:Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christis come in the flesh, is not of God: and this is the spirit of Antichrist. Verse 15:Whosoever confesseth that Jesus is the Son of God, in him dwelleth God, and he in God. Theknowledgetherefore we have ofgoodandevilinspiration, comethnotbyvisionof an angel that may teach it,norby amiraclethat may seem to confirm it;butbyconformityof doctrine with this article and fundamental point of Christian faith, which also Saint Paul (1 Cor.iii. 11) saith is the sole foundation,That Jesus Christ is come in the flesh.
8. But ifinspirationbe discerned bythispoint, andthispoint be acknowledged and believed upon theauthorityof theScriptures;how(may some men ask) know we that theScripture deservethso greatauthority, which must be no less than that of the lively voice of God; that is, how do we know theScripturesto be theword of God? And first, it is manifest, that if by knowledge we understand science infallible and natural, as is defined, chap.VI.sect. 4, proceeding from sense, we cannot be said to know it, because it proceedeth not from the conceptions engendered by sense. And if we understand knowledge as supernatural, we cannot have it but by inspiration: and of thatinspirationwe cannot judge, but by thedoctrine: it followeth, that we have not any way, natural or supernatural, of theknowledgethereof, which can properly be calledinfallible scienceandevidence. It remaineth, that the knowledge that we have that the Scriptures are the word of God, is onlyfaith, which faith therefore is also by Saint Paul (Heb.xi. 1) defined to bethe evidence of things not seen; that is to say, not otherwise evident but by faith: for, whatsoever either is evident by natural reason,or revelation supernatural, is not called faith; else should not faith cease, no more than charity, when we are in heaven; which is contrary to the doctrine of the Scripture. And, we arenotsaid tobelieve,buttoknowthose things that beevident.
9. Seeing then the acknowledgment of Scriptures to be the word of God, is not evidence, but faith, and faith (chapterVI.sect. 7) consisteth in the trust we have of other men, it appeareth plain, that the men so trusted, are the holy men of God’s church succeeding one another from the time of those that saw the wondrous works of God Almighty in the flesh. Nor doth this imply that God is not the worker or efficient cause of faith, or that faith is begotten in man without the spirit of God: for, all those good opinions which we admit and believe, though they proceed from hearing, and hearing from teaching, both which are natural, yet they are the work of God: for, all the works of nature are his, and they are attributed to the Spirit of God: as for example,Exod.xxviii. 3:Thou shalt speak unto all cunning men, whom I have filled with theSPIRITof wisdom, that they may make Aaron’s garments for his consecration, that he may serve me in the priest’s office. Faith therefore, wherewith we believe, is the work of the Spirit of God in that sense, by which the Spirit of God giveth to one man wisdom and cunning in workmanship more than another; and by which he effecteth also in other points pertaining to our ordinary life, that one man believeth that, which, upon the same grounds, another doth not; and one man reverenceth the opinion, and obeyeth the commands of his superior, and others not.
10. And seeing our faith, that the Scriptures are the word of God, began from the confidence and trust we repose in thechurch; there can be no doubt but that theirinterpretationof the same Scriptures (when any doubt or controversy shall arise, by which this fundamental point,that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, may be called in question) issaferfor any man to trust to, than hisown, whetherreasoningorspirit, that is to say, his ownopinion.
11. Now concerning men’saffectionstoGodward, they are not the same always that are described in the chapter concerning passions. There, for to love, is to be delighted with the image or conception of the thing loved; but God is unconceivable:to love Godtherefore, in the Scripture, is toobey his commandments, and tolove one another. Also totrust God, is different from ourtrustingoneanother: for, when a man trusteth a man, (chap.IX.sect. 9) he layeth aside his own endeavours: but if we do so in our trust to God Almighty, we disobey him; and how shall we trust to him whom we know we disobey? TotrusttoGod Almightytherefore, is toreferto hisgood pleasureall that isabove ourown power to effect: and this isall onewithacknowledging oneonly God, which is the first commandment. And to trustin Christ, is no more but to acknowledge him for God; which is the fundamental article of our Christian faith: and consequently, to trust, rely, or, as some express it, to cast and roll ourselves on Christ, is the same thing with the fundamental point of faith, namely, thatJesus Christ is the son of the living God.
12. TohonourGod internally in the heart, is the same thing with that we ordinarily call honour amongst men: for it is nothing but theacknowledgingof hispower; and the signs thereof, the same with the signs of the honour due to our superiors, mentioned chapterVIII.section 6, viz. topraise, tomagnify, tobless, to pray to him, to thank him, to give oblations and sacrifices to him, to give attention to his word, to speak to him in prayer with consideration, to come into his presence with humble gesture, and in decent manner, and to adorn his worship with magnificence and cost: and these are natural signs of our honouring him internally: and therefore the contrary hereof, to neglect prayer, to speak to himextempore, to come to church slovenly, to adorn the place of his worship worse than our own houses, to take up his name in every idle discourse, are the manifest signs of contempt of the Divine Majesty. There be other signs which are arbitrary; as, to be uncovered, as we be here, to put off their shoes, as Moses at the fiery bush, and some other of that kind, which in their own nature are indifferent, till, to avoid indecency and discord, it be otherwise determined by common consent.
1. It hath been declared already, howexternalobjects causeconceptions, and conceptions,appetiteandfear, which are thefirst unperceived beginnings of our actions: foreitherthe actions immediately follow the first appetite, as when we do anything upon a sudden;or elseto our firstappetite there succeedeth some conception of evil to happen to us by such actions, which is fear, and which holdeth us from proceeding. And to that fear may succeed a new appetite, and to that appetite another fear alternately, till the action be either done, or some accident come between, to make it impossible; and so this alternate appetite and fear ceaseth. Thisalternate succession of appetite and fearduring all the time the action is in our power to do or not to do, is that we calldeliberation; which name hath been given it for that part of the definition wherein it is said that it lasteth so long as the action, whereof we deliberate, is in our power: for, so long we have liberty to do or not to do; and deliberation signifieth a taking away of our own liberty.
2.Deliberationtherefore requireth in the action deliberatedtwo conditions; one, that it befuture; the other, that there behopeof doing it, or possibility of not doing it; for,appetiteandfearareexpectationsof the future; and there is no expectation of good, without hope; or of evil, without possibility: ofnecessariestherefore there isno deliberation. In deliberation, the last appetite, as also the last fear, is calledwill, viz. the last appetite, will to do, or will to omit. It is all one therefore to saywillandlast will: for, though a man express his present inclination and appetite concerning the disposing of his goods, by words or writings; yet shall it not be counted his will, because he hath still liberty to dispose of them otherways: but when death taketh away that liberty, then it is his will.
3.Voluntaryactions and omissions are such ashave beginning in thewill; all other areinvoluntary, ormixed voluntary;involuntary, such as he doth by necessity of nature, as when he is pushed, or falleth, and thereby doth good or hurt to another:mixed, such as participate of both; as when a man is carried to prison, going is voluntary, to the prison, is involuntary: the example of him that throweth his goods out of a ship into the sea, to save his person, is of an action altogether voluntary: for, there is nothing therein involuntary, but the hardness of the choice, which is not his action, but the action of the winds: what he himself doth, is no more against his will, than to flee from danger is against the will of him that seeth no other means to preserve himself.
4.Voluntaryalso are the actions that proceed from suddenanger, orothersuddenappetitein such men as can discern good or evil: for, in them the time precedentisto be judged deliberation: for then also he deliberateth in what cases it is good to strike, deride, or do any other action proceeding from anger or other such sudden passion.
5.Appetite,fear,hope, and the rest of the passions arenotcalledvoluntary; for they proceednot from, but are the will; and the will is not voluntary: for, a man can no more say he will will, than he will will will, and so make an infinite repetition of the word [will]; which is absurd, and insignificant.
6. Forasmuch aswill to doisappetite, andwill to omit,fear; thecauseofappetiteandfearis thecausealso of ourwill: but the propounding of the benefits and of harms, that is to say, of reward and punishment, is the cause of our appetite, andof our fears, and therefore also of our wills, so far forth as we believe that such rewards and benefits as are propounded, shall arrive unto us; and consequently, ourwillsfollow ouropinions, as ouractionsfollow ourwills; in which sense they say truly, and properly, that say the world is governed by opinion.
7. When the wills of many concur to one and the same action and effect, thisconcourseof theirwillsis calledconsent; by which we must not understand one will of many men, for every man hath his several will, but many wills to the producing of one effect: but when thewillsof two divers menproducesuch actions as are reciprocallyresistantone to the other, this is calledcontention; and, being upon the persons one of another,battle: whereas actions proceeding fromconsent, are mutualaid.
8. When many wills are involved or included in the will of one or more consenting, (which how it may be, shall be hereafter declared) then is that involving of many wills in one or more, calledunion.
9. Indeliberationsinterrupted, as they may be bydiversionof other business, or bysleep, the lastappetiteof such part of the deliberation is calledintention, orpurpose.
1. Having spoken of the powers and acts of the mind, both cognitive and motive, considered in every man byhimself, without relation to others; it will fall fitly intothischapter, to speak of the effects of the same powerone upon another; whicheffects are also the signs, by which one taketh notice what another conceiveth and intendeth. Of these signs,someare such ascannoteasily becounterfeited; as actions and gestures, especially if they be sudden, whereof I have mentioned some; (for example, look in chapterIX.) with the several passions whereof they are signs:othersthere are whichmaybecounterfeited; and those arewordsorspeech; of the use and effects whereof, I am to speak in this place.
2. The first use of language, is theexpressionof ourconceptions, that is, the begetting in one another the same conceptions that we have in ourselves; and this is calledteaching; wherein, if theconceptionof him that teacheth continually accompany his words,beginningat something true inexperience, then it begetteth the like evidence in the hearer that understandeth them, and maketh him toknowsomething, which he is therefore said tolearn: but if there benot such evidence, then such teaching is calledpersuasion, and begetteth no more in the hearer, than what is in the speaker’s bareopinion. And thesignsof two opinions contradictory one to another; namely,affirmationandnegationof the same thing, is calledcontroversy: butboth affirmations, or bothnegations, consent in opinion.
3. Theinfalliblesign ofteaching exactly, and without error, is this, thatno manhathever taughtthecontrary: not that few, how few soever, if any; for commonly truth is on the side of a few, rather than of the multitude: but when in opinions and questions considered and discussed by many, it happeneth that not any one of the men that so discussed them differ from another, then it may bejustly inferred, they know what they teach, and that otherwise they do not. And this appears most manifestly to them that have considered the divers subjects wherein they have exercised their pens, and the divers ways in which they have proceeded, together with the diversity of the success thereof: for, those men who have taken in hand to consider nothing else but the comparison ofmagnitudes,numbers,times, andmotions, and how their proportions are to one another, have thereby been the authors of all those excellencies by which we differ from such savage people as now inhabit divers places in America; and as have been the inhabitants heretofore of those countries where at this day arts and sciences do most flourish: for, from the studies of these men, have proceeded whatsoever cometh to us for ornament bynavigation, and whatsover we have beneficial to human society by thedivision,distinction, andportraiting the face of the earth; whatsoever also we have by theaccount of times, andforesight of the course of heaven; whatsoever bymeasuring distances,planes, andsolidsof all sorts; and whatsoever eitherelegantordefensibleinbuilding: all which supposed away, what do we differ from the wildest of the Indians? Yet to this day was it never heard of, that there was anycontroversyconcerning any conclusion in this subject; the science whereof hath nevertheless been continually amplified and enriched by the conclusions of most difficult and profound speculation. Thereasonwhereof is apparent to every man that looketh into their writings; for they proceed from mostlowandhumbleprinciples, evident even to the meanest capacity; going onslowly, and with mostscrupulous ratiocination;viz. from the imposition of names, they infer the truth of theirfirstpropositions; and from two of the first, athird; and from any two of the three, afourth; and so on, according to the steps of science, mentioned chapterVI.section 4. On the other side, those men who have written concerning the faculties, passions, and manners of men, that is to say, ofmoral philosophy, and ofpolicy,government, andlaws, whereof there be infinite volumes, have been sofar from removing doubtand controversy in the questions they have handled,thatthey have very muchmultiplied the same:nordoth any man at this day so much as pretend toknowmore than hath been delivered two thousand years ago by Aristotle: and yet every man thinks that in this subject he knoweth as much as any other; supposing there needeth thereunto no study but that accrueth unto them by natural wit; though they play, or employ their mind otherwise in the purchase of wealth or place. The reason whereof is no other, than that in their writings and discourses they take for principles those opinions which are already vulgarly received, whether true or false; being for the most part false. There is therefore a great deal ofdifferencebetweenteachingandpersuading; the sign ofthisbeingcontroversy; the sign of theformer,no controversy.
4. There betwo sortsof men that commonly be calledlearned: one is that sort that proceedethevidentlyfrom humble principles, as is described in the last section; and those men are calledmathematici:the otherare they thattake upmaxims from theireducation, and from theauthorityof men, or of custom, andtake the habitual discourse of the tongue for ratiocination; and these arecalleddogmatici. Now seeing in the last section those we callmathematiciare absolved of the crime of breeding controversy, and they that pretend not to learning cannot be accused, the fault lieth altogether in thedogmatics, that is to say, those that are imperfectly learned, and with passion press to have their opinions pass everywhere for truth, without any evident demonstration either from experience, or from places of Scripture of uncontroverted interpretation.
5. The expression of those conceptions whichcausein us theexperienceof good while we deliberate, as also of those which cause our expectation of evil, is that which we callcounselling, and is the internal deliberation of the mind concerning what we ourselves are to do or not to do. Theconsequencesof our actions are ourcounsellors, byalternate successionin the mind. So in the counsel which a man taketh fromothermen, thecounsellors alternatelydomake appear the consequencesof the action, and do not any of them deliberate, but furnish among them all, him that is counselled with arguments whereupon to deliberate with himself.
6. Another use of speech isexpressionofappetite,intention, andwill; as the appetite of knowledge byinterrogation; appetite to have a thing done by another, asrequest,prayer,petition: expressions of our purpose or intention, aspromise, which is the affirmation or negation of some action to be done in the future:threatening, which is the promise of evil; andcommanding, which is that speech by which we signify to another ourappetiteor desireto haveanything done, orleft undone, for reasons contained in the will itself: for it isnot properly said,Sic volo, sic jubeo, without that other clause,Stet pro ratione voluntas: and when the command is a sufficient reason to move us to action, then is that command called alaw.
7. Another use of speech isinstigationand appeasing, by which we increase or diminish one another’s passion: it is the same thing withpersuasion; the difference not being real; for, the begetting ofopinionandpassionis thesame. But whereas inpersuasionwe aim atgetting opinion from passion;here, the end is,to raise passion from opinion. And as in raising an opinion from passion, any premises are good enough to enforce the desired conclusion; so, in raising passion from opinion, it is no matter whether the opinion be true or false, or the narration historical or fabulous; for,notthetruth, but theimage, maketh passion: and a tragedy, well acted, affecteth no less than a murder.
8. Though words be thesignswe have of one another’sopinionsand intentions, because theequivocationof them is sofrequent accordingto thediversity of contexture, and of the company wherewith they go, which, the presence of him that speaketh, oursightof hisactions, andconjectureof hisintentions, must help to discharge us of; it must therefore beextremely hardto find theopinionsand meaning of thosementhat aregone from us long ago, and have left us no other signification thereof than their books, which cannot possibly be understood withouthistory, to discover those aforementioned circumstances, and also without great prudence toobservethem.
9. When it happeneth that a man signifieth unto twocontradictoryopinions, whereof theoneisclearlyand directlysignified, and theothereitherdrawnfrom that byconsequence, or not known to be contradictory to it; then, when he is not present to explicate himself better, we are to take theformerfor his opinion; for that is clearly signified to be his, and directly; whereas the other might proceed from error in the deduction, or ignorance of the repugnancy. The like also is to be held in two contradictory expressions of a man’s intention and will, for the same reason.
10. Forasmuch as whosoeverspeakethto another, intendeth thereby tomakehimunderstandwhat he saith, if he speak unto him either in a language which he that heareth understandeth not, or use any word in other sense than he believeth is the sense of him that heareth, heintendeth also notto make him understand what he saith; which is acontradictionof himself. It is therefore always to be supposed, that he which intendeth not to deceive, alloweth the private interpretation of his speech to him to whom it is addressed.
11.Silence, in him thatbelieveththat the same shall be taken for asign of his intent,isa sign thereof indeed: for, if he did not consent, the labour of speaking so much as to declare the same, is so little, as it is to be presumed he would have done it.
Thus have we considered the nature of man so far as was requisite for the finding out the first and most simple elements wherein the compositions of politic rules and laws are lastly resolved; which was my present purpose.