THE SECOND PART.
1.Introduction.2.A multitude before their union, &c.3.Express consent of every particular, &c.4.Democratical, aristocratical, and monarchical union may be instituted for ever, or, &c.5.Without security no private right relinquished.6.Covenants of government, without power of coercion, are no security.7.Power coercive, &c.8.The sword of war, &c.9.Decision in all debates, &c. annexed to the sword.10.Laws civil, &c.11.Appointment of magistrates, &c.12.Sovereign power includeth impunity.13.A supposed commonwealth, where laws are made first, and the commonwealth after.14.The same refelled.15.Mixed forms of government supposed in sovereignty.16.That refelled.17.Mixed government, &c.18.Reason and experience to prove absolute sovereignty somewhere in all commonwealths.19.Some principal, &c. marks of sovereignty.
Introduction.
1. ThatTreatise of Human Nature, which was formerly printed, hath been wholly spent in the consideration of the natural power, and the natural estate of man, namely, of his cognition and passions in the first eleven chapters, and how from thence proceed his actions; in the twelfth, how men know one another’s minds: in the last, in what estate men’s passions set them. In the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth chapters of the former Part of this Treatise is showed, what estate they are directed unto by the dictates of reason, that is to say, what be the principal articles of the law of nature.And lastly, how a multitude of persons natural, are united by covenants into one person civil, or body politic. In this part therefore shall be considered, the nature of a body politic, and the laws thereof, otherwise called civil laws. And whereas it hath been said in the last chapter, andlast sectionof the former part, that there be two ways of erecting a body politic; one by arbitrary institution of many men assembled together, which is like a creation out of nothing by human wit; the other by compulsion, which is as it were a generation thereof out of natural force; I shall first speak of such erection of a body politic, as proceedeth from the assembly and consent of a multitude.
A multitude before their union, &c.
2. Having in this place to consider, a multitude of men about to unite themselves into a body politic, for their security, both against one another, and against common enemies, and that by covenants; the knowledge of what covenants they must needs make, dependeth on the knowledge of the persons, and the knowledge of their end. First, for their persons they are many, and (as yet) not one; nor can any action done in a multitude of people met together, be attributed to the multitude, or truly called the action of the multitude, unless every man’s hand, and every man’s will, (not so much as one excepted) have concurred thereto. For multitude, though in their persons they run together, yet they concur not always in their designs. For even at that time when men are in tumult, though they agree a number of them to one mischief, and a number of them to another; yet, in the whole, they are amongst themselves in the state of hostility, and not of peace;like the seditious Jews besieged in Jerusalem, that could join against their enemies, and fight amongst themselves. Whensoever therefore any man saith, that a number of men hath done any act, it is to be understood, that every particular man in that number hath consented thereunto, and not the greatest part only. Secondly, though thus assembled with intention to unite themselves, they are yet in that estate in which every man hath right to everything, and consequently, as hath been said, chapterI.section 10, in an estate of enjoying nothing. And thereforemeumandtuumhath no place amongst them.
Express consent of every particular, &c.
3. The first thing therefore they are to do, is expressly every man to consent to something, by which they may come near to their ends, which can be nothing else imaginable, but this, that they allow the wills of the major part of their whole number, or the wills of the major part of some certain number of men by them determined and named; or lastly, the will of some one man, to involve and be taken for the wills of every man. And this done, they are united, and abody politic. And if the major part of their whole number be supposed to involve the wills of all the particulars, then are they said to be ademocracy, that is to say, a government wherein the whole number, or so many of them as please, being assembled together, are the sovereign, and every particular man a subject. If the major part of a certain number of men named or distinguished from the rest, be supposed to involve the wills of every one of the particulars, then are they said to be anoligarchy, oraristocracy, which two words signify the same thing,together with the divers passions of those that use them. For when the men that be in that office please, they are called an aristocracy, or otherwise an oligarchy, wherein those, the major part of which declare the wills of the whole multitude being assembled, are the sovereign, and every man severally a subject. Lastly, if their consent be such, that the will of one man, whom they name, shall stand for the wills of them all, then is their government or union called amonarchy, and that one man a sovereign, and every of the rest a subject.
Democratical, aristocratical, and monarchical union may be instituted for ever.
4. And those several sorts of unions, governments, and subjections of man’s will, may be understood to be made, either absolutely, that is to say, for all future time, or for a time limited only. But forasmuch as we speak here of a body politic, instituted for the perpetual benefit and defence of them that make it; which therefore men desire should last for ever, I will omit to speak of those that be temporary, and consider of those that be for ever.
Without security no private right relinquished.
5. The end for which one man giveth up, and relinquisheth to another, or others, the right of protecting and defending himself by his own power, is the security which he expecteth thereby, of protection and defence from those to whom he doth so relinquish it; and a man may then account himself in the estate of security, when he can foresee no violence to be done unto him, from which the doer may not be deterred by the power of that sovereign, to whom they have every one subjected themselves: and without that security, there is no reason for a man to deprive himself of his own advantages, and make himself a prey to others. Andtherefore when there is not such a sovereign power erected, as may afford this security, it is to be understood, that every man’s right of doing whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, remaineth still with him; and contrariwise, where any subject hath right by his own judgment and discretion, to make use of his force, it is to be understood, that every man hath the like, and consequently, that there is no commonwealth at all established. How far therefore in the making of a commonwealth, man subjecteth his will to the power of others, must appear from the end, namely, security. For whatsoever is necessary to be by covenant transferred, for the attaining thereof, so much is transferred, or else every man is in his natural liberty to secure himself.
Covenants of government without power of coercion, are no security.
6. Covenants agreed upon by every man assembled for the making of a commonwealth, and put in writing without erecting of a power of coercion, are no reasonable security for any of them that so covenant, nor are to be called laws, and leave men still in the estate of nature and hostility. For seeing the wills of most men are governed only by fear, and where there is no power of coercion, there is no fear, the wills of most men will follow their passions of covetousness, lust, anger, and the like, to the breaking of those covenants, whereby the rest, also, who otherwise would keep them, are set at liberty, and have no law, but from themselves.
Power coercive, &c.
7. This power of coercion, as hath been said, chap.II.sect. 3, of the former part, consisteth in the transferring of every man’s right of resistance against him, to whom he hath transferred the power of coercion. It followeth therefore, that noman in any commonwealth whatsoever, hath right to resist him, or them, to whom they have transferred this power coercive, or (as men use to call it) the sword of justice, supposing the not-resistance possible. For, Part I. chapterII.sect. 18, covenants bind but to the utmost of our endeavour.
The sword of war, &c.
8. And forasmuch as they who are amongst themselves in security, by the means of this sword of justice, that keeps them all in awe, are nevertheless in danger of enemies from without, if there be not some means found, to unite their strengths and natural forces, in the resistance of such enemies, their peace amongst themselves is but in vain. And therefore it is to be understood as a covenant of every member to contribute their several forces for the defence of the whole, whereby to make one power as sufficient, as is possible for their defence. Now seeing that every man hath already transferred the use of his strength to him, or them, that have the sword of justice, it followeth, that the power of defence, that is to say, the sword of war, be in the same hands wherein is the sword of justice; and consequently those two swords are but one, and that inseparably and essentially annexed to the sovereign power.
Decision in all debates, &c. annexed to the sword.
9. Moreover, seeing to have the right of the sword, is nothing else but to have the use thereof depending only on the judgment and discretion of him or them that have it, it followeth, that the power of indenture in all controversies, wherein the sword of justice is to be used; and in all deliberations concerning war, wherein the use of that sword is required, the right of resolving and determining what is to be done, belong to the same sovereign.
Laws civil, &c.
10. Further, considering it is no less, but much more necessary to prevent violence and rapine, than to punish the same when it is committed, and all violence proceedeth from controversies that arise between men concerningmeumandtuum, right and wrong, good and bad, and the like, which men use every one to measure by their own judgments, it belongeth also to the judgment of the same sovereign power, to set forth and make known the common measure by which every man is to know what is his, and what another’s; what is good, and what bad, and what he ought to do, and what not, and to command the same to be observed. And these measures of the actions of the subjects are those, which men calllaws politic, or civil: the making whereof, must of right belong to him that hath the power of the sword, by which men are compelled to observe them; for otherwise they should be made in vain.
Appointment of magistrates, &c.
11. Furthermore, seeing it is impossible that any one man that hath such sovereign power, can be able, in person, to hear and determine all controversies, to be present at all deliberations concerning common good, and to execute and perform all those common actions that belong thereunto, whereby there will be necessity of magistrates and ministers of public affairs; it is consequent, that the appointment, nomination, and limitation of the same be understood, as an inseparable part of the same sovereignty, to which the sum of all judicature, and execution, hath been already annexed.
Sovereign power includeth impunity.
12. And forasmuch, as the right to use the forces of every particular member, is transferred from themselves, to their sovereign, a man will easilyfall upon this conclusion of himself, that to sovereign power, whatsoever it doth, there belongeth impunity.
A supposed commonwealth where laws are made first, and the commonwealth after.
13. The sum of these rights of sovereignty; namely, the absolute use of the sword in peace and war, the making and abrogating of laws,supreme judicature, and decision, in all debates judicial and deliberative, the nomination of all magistrates and ministers, with other rights contained in the same, make the sovereign power no less absolute in the commonwealth, than before commonwealth every man was absolute in himself, to do, or not to do, what he thought good; which men, that have not had the experience of that miserable estate, to which men are reduced by long war, think so hard a condition, that they cannot easily acknowledge such covenants, and subjection on their parts, as are here set down, to have been ever necessary to their peace. And therefore some have imagined, that a commonwealth may be constituted in such manner, as the sovereign power may be so limited, and moderated, as they shall think fit themselves. For example: they suppose a multitude of men to have agreed upon certain articles, which they presently call laws, declaring how they will be governed, and that done, to agree further upon some man, or number of men, to see the same articles performed, and put in execution; and to enable him, or them, thereunto, they allot unto them a provision limited, as of certain lands, taxes, penalties, and the like, than which, if mispent, they shall have no more, without a new consent of the same men that allowed the former. And thus they think they have made a commonwealth, inwhich it is unlawful for any private man to make use of his own sword for his security; wherein they deceive themselves.
The same refelled.
14. For first, if to the revenue, it did necessarily follow, that there might be forces raised and procured at the will of him that hath such revenue; yet since the revenue is limited, so must also the forces: but limited forces against the power of an enemy, which we cannot limit, are unsufficient. Whensoever therefore there happeneth an invasion greater than those forces are able to resist, and there be no other right to levy more, then is every man, by necessity of nature, allowed to make the best provision he can for himself; and thus is the private sword, and the estate of war again reduced. But seeing revenue, without the right of commanding men, is of no use, neither in peace, nor war, it is necessary to be supposed, that he that hath the administration of those articles, which are in the former section supposed, must have also right to make use of the strengths of particular men. And what reason soever giveth him that right over any one, giveth him the same over all. And then is his right absolute. For he that hath right to all their forces, hath right to dispose of the same. Again, supposing those limited forces and revenue, either by the necessary, or negligent use of them, to fail, and that for a supply, the same multitude be again to be assembled, who shall have power to assemble them, that is to compel them to come together? If he that demandeth the supply hath that right, to wit, the right to compel them all, then is his sovereignty absolute; if not, then is every particular man at liberty to come or not; toframe a new commonwealth, or not, and so the right of the private sword returneth. But suppose them willingly, and of their own accord, assembled to consider of this supply, if now it be still in their choice, whether they shall give it, or not, it is also in their choice, whether the commonwealth shall stand or not. And therefore there lieth not upon any of them any civil obligation that may hinder them from using force, in case they think it tend to their defence. This device therefore of them that will make civil laws first, and then a civil body afterwards, (as if policy made a body politic, and not a body politic made policy) is of no effect.
Mixed forms of government supposed in sovereignty.
15. Others, to avoid the hard condition, as they take it, of absolute subjection, which, in hatred thereto, they also call slavery, have devised a government, as they think, mixed of the three sorts of sovereignty. As for example: they suppose the power of making laws, given to some great assembly democratical, the power of judicature to some other assembly, and the administration of the laws to a third, or to some one man; and this policy they call mixed monarchy, or mixed aristocracy, or mixed democracy, according as any of these three sorts do most visibly predominate. And in this estate of government, they think the use of the private sword excluded.
That refelled.
16. And supposing it were so, how were this condition, which they callslavery, eased thereby. For in this estate they would have no man allowed, either to be his own judge, or own carver, or to make any laws unto himself; and as long as these three agree, they are as absolutely subject to them,as is a child to the father, or a slave to the master, in the state of nature. The ease therefore of this subjection, must consist in the disagreement of those amongst whom they have distributed the rights of sovereign power. But the same disagreement is war. The division therefore of the sovereignty, either worketh no effect to the taking away of simple subjection, or introduceth war, wherein the private sword hath place again. But the truth is, as hath been already showed in theseventh,eighth,ninth,tenth,eleventh, andtwelfthprecedent sections, the sovereignty is indivisible. And that seeming mixture of several kinds of government, is not mixture of the things themselves, but confusion in our understandings, that cannot find out readily to whom we have subjected ourselves.
Mixed government, &c.
17. But though the sovereignty be not mixed, but be always either simple democracy, or simple aristocracy, or pure monarchy, nevertheless in the administration thereof, all those sorts of government may have place subordinate. For suppose the sovereign power be democracy, as it was sometimes in Rome, yet at the same time they may have a council aristocratical, such as was the senate; and at the same time they may have a subordinate monarch, such as was their dictator, who had, for a time, the exercise of the whole sovereignty, and such as are all generals in war. So also in monarchy there may be a council aristocratical of men, chosen by the monarch; or democratical of men, chosen by the consent, the monarch permitting, of all the particular men of the commonwealth. And this mixture is it that imposeth, as if it were the mixture of sovereignty. As if aman should think, because the great council of Venice doth nothing ordinarily but choose magistrates, ministers of state, captains, and governors of towns, ambassadors, counsellors, and the like, that therefore their part of the sovereignty is only choosing of magistrates; and that the making of war, and peace, and laws, were not theirs, but the part of such counsellors as they appointed thereto: whereas it is the part oftheseto do it but subordinately, the supreme authority thereof being in the great council that choose them.
Reason and experience to prove absolute sovereignty somewhere in all commonwealths.
18. And as reason teacheth us, that a man, considered out of subjection to laws, and out of all covenants obligatory to others, is free to do and undo, and deliberate as long as he listeth, every member being obedient to the will of the whole man, that liberty being nothing else but his natural power, without which he is no better than an inanimate creature, not able to help himself; so also it teacheth us, that a body politic, of what kind soever, not subject to another, nor obliged by covenants, ought to be free, and in all actions to be assisted by the members, every one in their place, or at least, not resisted by them. For otherwise, the power of a body politic, the essence whereof is the not-resistance of the members, is none, nor a body politic of any benefit. And the same is confirmed by the use of all nations and commonwealths, wherein that man or council, which is virtually the whole, hath any absolute power over every particular member; or what nation or commonwealth is there, that hath not power and right to constitute a general in their wars? But the power of a general is absolute; and consequentlythere was absolute power in the commonwealth, from whom it was derived. For no person, natural or civil, can transfer unto another more power than himself hath.
Some principal, &c. marks of sovereignty.
19. In every commonwealth, where particular men are deprived of their right to protect themselves, there resideth an absolute sovereignty, as I have already showed. But in what man, or in what assembly of men the same is placed, is not so manifest, as not to need some marks, whereby it may be discerned. And first, it is an infallible mark of absolute sovereignty in a man, or in an assembly of men, if there be no right in any other person, natural or civil, to punish that man, or to dissolve that assembly. For he that cannot of right be punished, cannot of right be resisted; and he that cannot of right be resisted, hath coercive power over all the rest, and thereby can frame and govern their actions at his pleasure, which is absolute sovereignty. Contrariwise, he that in a commonwealth is punishable by any, or that assembly that is dissolvable, is not sovereign. For a greater power is always required to punish and dissolve, than theirs who are punished or dissolved; and that power cannot be called sovereign, than which there is a greater. Secondly, that man or assembly, that by their own right not derived from the present right of any other, may make laws, or abrogate them at his or their pleasure, have the sovereignty absolute. For seeing the laws they make, are supposed to be made by right, the members of the commonwealth, to whom they are made, are obliged to obey them, and consequently not resist the execution of them; which not-resistance,maketh the power absolute of him that ordaineth them. It is likewise a mark of this sovereignty, to have the right original of appointing magistrates, judges, counsellors, and ministers of state. For without that power, no act of sovereignty, or government, can be performed. Lastly, and generally, whosoever by his own authority independent, can do any act, which another of the same commonwealth may not, must needs be understood to have the sovereign power. For by nature men have equal right. This inequality therefore must proceed from the power of the commonwealth. He therefore that doth any act lawfully by his own authority, which another may not, doth it by the power of the commonwealth in himself, which is absolute sovereignty.
1.Democracy precedeth all other, &c.2.. The sovereign people covenanteth not with the subjects.3.The sovereign, &c. cannot, &c. do injury, &c.4.The faults of the sovereign people, &c.5.Democracy, &c. an aristocracy of orators.6.Aristocracy how made.7.The body of theoptimatesnot properly said to injure the subjects.8.The election of theoptimates, &c.9.An elective king, &c.10.A conditional king, &c.11.The word people equivocal.12.Obedience discharged by release, &c.13.How such releases are to be understood.14.Obedience discharged by exile:15.By conquest:16.By ignorance of the right of succession.
Democracy precedeth all other, &c.
1. Having spoken in general concerning instituted policy in the former chapter, I come in this, to speak of the sorts thereof in special, how every of them is instituted. The first in order of time ofthese three sorts, is democracy; and it must be so of necessity, because an aristocracy and a monarchy, require nomination of persons agreed upon, which agreement in a great multitude of men, must consist in the consent of the major part; and where the votes of the major part involve the votes of the rest, there is actually a democracy.
The sovereign people covenanteth not with the subjects.
2. In the making of a democracy, there passeth no covenant between the sovereign, and any subject. For while the democracy is a making, there is no sovereign with whom to contract. For it cannot be imagined, that the multitude should contract with itself, or with any one man, or number of men, parcel of itself, to make itself sovereign; nor that a multitude, considered as one aggregate, can give itself anything which before it had not. Seeing then that sovereignty democratical is not conferred by the covenant of any multitude, which supposeth union and sovereignty already made, it resteth, that the same be conferred by the particular covenants of every several man; that is to say, every man with every man, for and in consideration of the benefit of his own peace and defence, covenanteth to stand to and obey whatsoever the major part of their whole number, or the major part of such a number of them, as shall be pleased to assemble at a certain time and place, shall determine and command. And this is that which giveth being to a democracy, wherein the sovereign assembly was called of the Greeks, by the name ofDemus, that is, the people, from whence cometh democracy. So that, where to the supreme and independent court, every man may come that will, and give his vote, there the sovereign is called the people.
The sovereign, &c. cannot, &c. do injury, &c.
3. Out of this that hath been said, may readily be drawn, that whatsoever the people doth to any one particular member or subject of the commonwealth, the same by him ought not to be styled injury. For first, injury, by the definition, Part I. chap.III.sect. 2, is breach of covenant; but covenants, as hath been said in the precedent section, there passed none from the people to any private man; and consequently it, to wit, the people, can do him no injury. Secondly, how unjust soever the action be, that this sovereigndemusshall do, is done by the will of every particular man subject to him, who are therefore guilty of the same. If therefore they style itinjury, they but accuse themselves. And it is against reason for the same man, both to do and complain; implying this contradiction, that whereas he first ratified the people’s acts in general, he now disalloweth the same of them in particular. It is therefore said truly,volenti non fit injuria. Nevertheless nothing doth hinder, but that divers actions done by the people, may be unjust before God Almighty, as breaches of the laws of nature.
The faults of the sovereign people, &c.
4. And when it happeneth, that the people by plurality of voices, decree or command anything contrary to the law of God or nature, though the decree and command be the act of every man, not only present in the assembly, but also absent from it; yet is not the injustice of the decree, the injustice of every particular man, but only of those men, by whose express suffrages, the decree or command was passed. For a body politic, as it is a fictitious body, so are the faculties and will thereof fictitious also. But to make a particularman unjust, which consisteth of a body and soul natural, there is required a natural and very will.
Democracy, &c. an aristocracy of orators.
5. In all democracies, though the right of sovereignty be in the assembly, which is virtually the whole body; yet the use thereof is always in one, or a few particular men. For in such great assemblies, as those must be, whereinto every man may enter at his pleasure, there is no means any ways to deliberate and give counsel what to do, but by long and set orations, whereby to every man there is more or less hope given, to incline and sway the assembly to their own ends. In a multitude of speakers therefore, where always either one is eminent alone, or a few being equal amongst themselves, are eminent above the rest, that one or few must of necessity sway the whole. Insomuch, that a democracy, in effect, is no more than an aristocracy of orators, interrupted sometimes with the temporary monarchy of one orator.
Aristocracy how made.
6. And seeing a democracy is by institution, the beginning both of aristocracy and monarchy, we are to consider next, how aristocracy is derived from it. When the particular members of the commonwealth growing weary of attendance at public courts, as dwelling far off, or being attentive to their private businesses, and withal, displeased with the government of the people, assemble themselves to make an aristocracy, there is no more required to the making thereof but putting to the question one by one, the names of such men as it shall consist of, and assenting to their election; and by plurality of vote, to transfer that power, which before the people had, to the number of men so named and chosen.
The body of theoptimatesnot properly said to injure the subjects.
7. And from this manner of erecting an aristocracy, it is manifest, that the few, oroptimates, have entered into no covenant with any of the particular members of the commonwealth, whereof they are sovereign; and consequently cannot do any thing to any private man, that can be calledinjuryto him, howsoever their act be wicked before Almighty God, according to that which hath been said before,section 3. Further, it is impossible, that the people, as one body politic, should covenant with the aristocracy oroptimates, on whom they intend to transfer their sovereignty. For no sooner is the aristocracy erected, but the democracy is annihilated, and the covenants made unto them void.
The election of theoptimates, &c.
8. In all aristocracies, the admission of such, as are from time to time to have vote in the sovereign assembly, dependeth on the will and decree of the presentoptimates. For they being the sovereign, have the nomination, by theeleventh sectionof the former chapter, of all magistrates, ministers, and counsellors of state whatsoever, and may therefore choose either to make them elective, or hereditary, at their pleasure.
An elective king, &c.
9. Out of the same democracy, the institution of a political monarch proceedeth in the same manner, as did the institution of the aristocracy, to wit, by a decree of the sovereign people, to pass the sovereignty to one man named and approved by plurality of suffrage. And if this sovereignty be truly and indeed transferred, the estate or commonwealth is an absolute monarchy, wherein the monarch is at liberty, to dispose as well of the succession, as of the possession, and not an electivekingdom. For suppose a decree be made first in this manner, that such a one shall have the sovereignty for his life, and that afterward they will choose a-new. In this case, the power of the people is dissolved, or not; if dissolved, then after the death of him that is chosen, there is no man bound to stand to the decrees of them that shall, as private men, run together to make a new election; and consequently, if there be any man, who by the advantage of the reign of him that is dead, hath strength enough to hold the multitude in peace and obedience, he may lawfully, or rather is by the law of nature obliged so to do: if this power of the people were not dissolved at the choosing of their king for life, then is the people sovereign still, and the king a minister thereof only, but so, as to put the whole sovereignty in execution; a great minister, but no otherwise for his time, than a dictator was in Rome. In this case, at the death of him that was chosen, they that meet for a new election, have no new, but their old authority for the same. For they were the sovereign all the time, as appeareth by the acts of those elective kings, that have procured from the people, that their children might succeed them. For it is to be understood, when a man receiveth any thing from the authority of the people, he receiveth it not from the people his subjects, but from the people his sovereign. And further, though in the election of a king for his life, the people grant him the exercise of their sovereignty for that time; yet if they see cause, they may recall the same before the time. As a prince that conferreth an office for life, may nevertheless, upon suspicion of abusethereof, recall it at his pleasure; inasmuch as offices that require labour and care, are understood to pass from him that giveth them, asonera,burthens, to them that have them; the recalling whereof are therefore notinjury, butfavour. Nevertheless, if in making an elective king, with intention to reserve the sovereignty, they reserve not a power at certain known and determined times and places to assemble themselves, the reservation of their sovereignty is of no effect, inasmuch as no man is bound to stand to the decrees and determinations of those that assemble themselves without the sovereign authority.
A conditional king, &c.
10. In the formersectionis showed, that elective kings that exercise their sovereignty for a time, which determines with their life, either are subjects, or not sovereigns; and that it is, when the people in election of them, reserve unto themselves the right of assembling at certain times and places limited and made known; or else absolute sovereigns, to dispose of the succession at their pleasure, and that is, when the people in their election have declared no time nor place of their meeting, or have left it to the power of the elected king, to assemble and dissolve them at such times, as he himself shall think good. There is another kind of limitation of time, to him that shall be elected to use the sovereign power, which whether it hath been practised anywhere, or not, I know not, but it may be imagined, and hath been objected against the rigour of sovereign power; and it is this, that the people transfer their sovereignty upon conditions. As for example, for so long as he shall observe such and such laws, as they then prescribehim. And here as before in elected kings, the question is to be made, whether in the electing of such a sovereign, they reserved to themselves a right of assembling at times and places limited and known, or not; if not, then is the sovereignty of the people dissolved, and they have neither power to judge of the breach of the conditions given him, nor to command any forces for the deposing of him, whom on that condition they had set up, but are in the estate of war amongst themselves, as they were before they made themselves a democracy: and consequently, if he that is elected by the advantage of the possession he hath of the public means, be able to compel them to unity and obedience, he hath not only the right of nature to warrant him, but the law of nature to oblige him thereunto. But if in electing him, they reserved to themselves a right of assembling, and appointed certain times and places to that purpose, then are they sovereign still, and may call their conditional king to account at their pleasure, and deprive him of his government, if they judge he deserve it, either by breach of the condition set him, or otherwise. For the sovereign power can by no covenant with a subject be bound to continue him in the charge he undergoeth by their command, as a burden imposed not particularly for his good, but for the good of the sovereign people.
The word people equivocal
11. The controversies that arise concerning the right of the people, proceed from the equivocation of the word. For the word people hath a double signification. In one sense it signifieth only a number of men, distinguished by the place of their habitation; as thepeopleof England, or thepeopleof France, which is no more, but the multitude of those particular persons that inhabit those regions, without consideration of any contracts or covenants amongst them, by which any one of them is obliged to the rest. In another sense, it signifieth a person civil, that is to say, either one man, or one council, in the will whereof, is included and involved the will of every one in particular. As for example, in this latter sense, the lower house of parliament is all the commons, as long as they sit there with authority and right thereto; but after they be dissolved, though they remain, they be no more the people, nor the commons, but only the aggregate, or multitude of the particular men there sitting, how well soever they agree, or concur, in opinions amongst themselves; whereupon, they that do not distinguish between these two significations, do usually attribute such rights to a dissolved multitude, as belong only to the people virtually contained in the body of the commonwealth or sovereignty. And when a great number of their own authority flock together in any nation, they usually give them the name of the whole nation. In which sense they say the people rebelleth, or the people demandeth, when it is no more than a dissolved multitude, of which though any one man may be said to demand or have right to something, yet the heap, or multitude, cannot be said to demand or have right to anything. For where every man hath his right distinct, there is nothing left for the multitude to have right unto: and when the particulars say, this is mine, this is thine, and this is his, and have shared all amongst them, there can be nothing whereof the multitudecan say, this is mine; nor are they one body, as behoveth them to be, that demand anything under the name of mine, or his: and when they say ours, every man is understood to pretend in several, and not the multitude. On the other side, when the multitude is united into a body politic, and thereby are a people in the other signification, and their wills virtually in the sovereign, there the rights and demands of the particulars do cease; and he or they that have the sovereign power, doth for them all, demand, and vindicate under the name of his, that which before they called in the plural, theirs.
Obedience discharged by release, &c.
12. We have seen how particular men enter into subjection, by transferring their rights; it followeth to consider, how such subjection may be discharged. And first, if he or they that have the sovereign power, shall relinquish the same voluntarily, there is no doubt, but every man is again at liberty to obey, or not. Likewise, if he or they retaining the sovereignty over the rest, do nevertheless exempt some one or more, from their subjection, every man so exempted, is discharged. For he or they to whom any man is obliged, hath the power to release him.