A magnified repetition of experiences in Canton—Chinese unchanged—International usages inapplicable.
A magnified repetition of experiences in Canton—Chinese unchanged—International usages inapplicable.
Since the foregoing chapters were put into the printer's hands the Far Eastern Question has reached a crisis in which its ruling factors have been suddenly exposed in their nakedness. But the searchlight now thrown upon them casts a blacker shadow on the unilluminated portions of the field. The events of 1900, while revealing the landmarks of past foreign relations with China, have deepened the obscurity of all that concerns the future of the Chinese State itself, as well as of the position of the foreign Powers in relation to it and to one another. International comity is seen to have made no progress in sixty years; on the contrary, the gulf that divides China from the world yawns wider than ever, of which a striking example is afforded by the telegrams lately exchanged between the Chinese and the German Emperors. They speak in tongues unknown to one another and are mutually unintelligible, so that they have no commonground but that of brute force. Intercourse imposed on them against their will and conscience has resulted, naturally enough, in exhibiting the Chinese as the enemies of the human family.
The capture of the Taku forts and the occupation of Peking by foreign troops were but a repetition of similar incidents forty years before; and it is instructive to observe how closely the lines of the old precedents have been followed. Prisoners taken treacherously, or envoys held as hostages; the threat to kill them if foreign troops menaced the capital; the devices to arrest the advance of the Allied forces; the proposal to negotiate only when the Chinese case became desperate; the ineradicable belief in the credulity of foreigners; and the flight of the Court when all other expedients failed,—were but another rehearsal, with variations, of previous performances at Canton, Nanking, and Peking. The parallel is completed by the efforts of foreign Powers to coax the emperor back to his capital. Nothing has been changed, only the scale has been magnified, and the civilised world, instead of one or two Powers, has become directly interested in the catastrophe. Official intercourse with China has thus continued on the lines on which it began. The first British envoy was treated as a malefactor, imprisoned, his letters were intercepted, his communications cut off, his servants withdrawn; he was guarded and threatened by armed men posted at his door, and reduced to dangerous subterfuges in order to get a message conveyed to his countrymen outside. Canton in 1834 was simply Peking in 1900, in embryo. A naval force was required to relieve Lord Napier from hisperilous situation then,[33]as a combined naval and military force has been required to relieve the foreign Ministers in Peking now. The cycle has been completed. Every link in the chain connecting the opening with the closing incidents of diplomatic intercourse has been, on one side at least, homogeneous. Whatever and whoever may have altered, the Chinese certainly have not. Commissioner Lin, Viceroy Yeh, Prince Tuan, the empress-dowager, and all wielding authority, whether in name or not, have been true to the Chinese ideal. They have all alike been blind to the consequences of their acts, which have throughout been characterised by the strategy of fools—momentary success followed by overwhelming reverses, resulting at each succeeding encounter in a further invasion of the frontiers of their political independence.
The crisis has been sufficiently prolonged to enable the world to perceive what the Chinese mean by the term negotiation. To them it signifies what it has always done, a palaver to gain time, to hoodwink an opponent, to escape from a threatened danger, to purchase immunity by promises; a device to manage, or, as they themselves express it, "to soothe and bridle barbarians." As little now as at any former period can they conceive the idea of a fair bargain between equals. They but temporise as with a savage or a dangerous beast. "Get rid of the barbarians" is their unvaryingmot d'ordre, and it matters but little to them what instruments are employed in carrying it out. The office is one from which every statesman instinctively shrinks, since if he fails in taming the barbarians his case is referred to the Board of Punishments,and if he succeeds he incurs the contempt of all classes for the concessions by which he has purchased peace. It is hardly possible for him in any case to escape degradation. Be it therefore Lin, Kishen, Kiying, Yeh, Kweiliang, Wênsiang, Chunghou, Li Hung-chang, or any one else, Chinese negotiators, whatever their apparent success in averting a danger, are morally certain to come to a bad end; and for the reason which caused the failure of Lord Napier in 1834, the impossibility of reconciling two principles which are wholly incompatible. As negotiation under such conditions can only be nugatory, a lengthened experience has made it clear that neither the negotiator nor the negotiation avails anything, but solely the manner in which the Chinese are held to their engagements, even when imposed on them by force, and the strictness with which the common duties of civilised nations are exacted from them, with or without written agreements.
One feature in the recent Peking episode distinguishes it from previous experiences. A Government communicating with foreign Powers through its own envoys, doling out through them garbled information, while isolating the envoys of those same Powers within its capital, and planning, and if not doing its best to effect, their extermination, at least openly approving the attempt, is surely unexampled in human history. The proposal of such a Government, on the failure of its plans to "negotiate for peace," would be the most sardonic of practical jokes if we could disconnect it from the evidence implied in the proposal of the estimate of foreign nations which is ingrained in the Chinese moral constitution. Obviously, however, such a Governmenthas placed itself beyond the pale of international relations, and it is hardly possible to conceive any restoration of the old or evolution of a newrégimewhich can place China in the rank of civilised Powers.
We are, in fact, thrust back on the conclusion arrived at by Lord Napier in 1834: "That Government is not in a position to be dealt with or treated by civilised nations according to the same rules as are acknowledged and practised among themselves." Yet, instead of being treated with less, the Chinese Government has received greater consideration than is accorded by one Western State to another. Prerogatives implying superiority have been conceded to it by consent of all the foreign Powers—a false principle which has now produced its natural result.
The usages of Western Courts, therefore, being wholly inapplicable in China, no matter what Government may rule there, international relations of the European type must be, as they have hitherto been, an illusory ideal, and some new form of intercourse, corresponding more closely to the realities of the case, must take the place of that which has proved so totally unworkable. Should foreign nations, by reason of differences among themselves or the magnitude of the problem, hesitate to act up to this view of the situation, the continuance of a status which is essentially false to the facts must lead to some still more tragic catastrophe than any that has yet taken place.
Hostility of Government and people—Fostered by immunity—Cause of animosity as set forth by Chinese—Incitements to outrage—Chinese press calumnies—Compared with European—Effect on the Chinese of international vituperation.
Hostility of Government and people—Fostered by immunity—Cause of animosity as set forth by Chinese—Incitements to outrage—Chinese press calumnies—Compared with European—Effect on the Chinese of international vituperation.
It must be admitted that the attitude of the Chinese has been quite consistent: from first to last they have resisted the foreign impactper fas et nefas, using such weapons as they could command, while avoiding, according to their lights, the risk of reprisals. Their lights have indeed deceived them, their resistance has failed, and their methods stand condemned. But it is beside the question to inveigh against their barbarity, for "what is bred in the bone comes out in the flesh," and in human relations there are permanent facts which have to be accepted, like the skin of the Ethiopian and the spots of the leopard. Since foreigners have, for their own purposes, broken into a hornet's nest, it is idle for them to prescribe the manner of retaliation unless they are prepared to go through with their aggression and to enforce obedience to their own canon.
The constant feature in all Chinese attacks on foreigners has been the immunity from punishment of the real instigators. Massacres of foreigners have been condoned, for the blood-money exacted for them was no punishment to criminals who did not contribute to the payment. All attempts on the part of foreign agents to make guilty officials responsible for their outrages have been frustrated by the Government, who have invariably held the persons ofofficials exempt from punishment at the instance of, or for injuries done to, foreigners. In Chinese eyes injury to foreigners is meritorious in the abstract, and to be rewarded rather than punished. Foreign Powers have in practice acquiesced in this fatal principle, for though on rare occasions they have successfully insisted on the removal of some obnoxious official, the Government have taken care to nullify the penalty by promoting him to a better post. The various attempts that have been made by foreign representatives to collect evidence to support a legal charge against the instigators of outrages have been baffled by the inflexible determination of the Government to shield the official as well as the non-official leaders of riots. The foreign method of seeking redress, being thus foredoomed to failure, is obviously not suited to the circumstances.
But while foreigners were pursuing their object by a hopeless path, the Chinese administration itself provided the simpler and more efficacious remedy of holding the chief authority of every province responsible for misgovernment, as well as for crimes and misdemeanours committed within his district. In the words of Sir Rutherford Alcock, "Each province constitutes a separate state in its administration; to compensate for this the emperor can appoint and remove every official, from the Governor-General downwards, at his pleasure. And they are each and all individually and collectively held responsible for all that may happen in the limits of their jurisdiction." By the custom of the country, therefore, the guilt of the highest official is assumed whenever any disturbance of the peace takes place or crime is committedwithin his government. He may transfer it, if he can, and ferret out evidence in his own exculpation; but errors of judgment, pleas of good intentions, and palliatives of that kind are not admitted, and not offered. Why foreigners have never appealed to this fundamental principle of Chinese administration, and have preferred relying on their own crude procedure and strange methods of collecting evidence while practically acquiescing in the immunity of Chinese officials, has never been satisfactorily explained. For it is only in matters concerning foreigners that the persons of Chinese officials are held sacred. The Government have no scruples with regard even to the highest in rank when they make themselves obnoxious to the powers that be. Degradation, deprivation, chains, imprisonment, and the headsman's broadsword, are ever ready to vindicate the majesty of the law when the Court awards the penalty. But foreigners are treated as outside the law, which is the gravamen of the Chinese offence against them. The constitution of the country afforded them a clear ground for demanding that the traditional principle of responsibility should be put in force for their protection. It was, in fact, applied spontaneously by Li Hung-chang in the province of which he was viceroy, with the result that Chihli was exempt from outrages on foreigners for nearly a quarter of a century. Why was the system not extended to all the provinces of the empire? Had not the foreign representatives the natural right of demanding the benefit of Chinese institutions, or did they consider their exotic substitute as preferable?
A wrong road can never lead to a right destination; sins of omission and commission have alike to be atonedfor, and the cost accumulates at compound interest. The result of sparing prefects and governors the consequences of the evil deeds permitted within their jurisdiction is that the Western Powers are now confronted with the more serious dilemma of sparing the throne itself and tolerating the continuance of anti-foreign outrages, or of doing stern justice towards the guilty even though the heavens should fall. A retrospective glance over the history of sixty years might help towards a solution even of this momentous problem. Have the sacrifices of principle that have hitherto been made in order to save the empire, or the dynasty, been efficacious to these ends? The answer of history is No; on the contrary, they have accelerated the ruin of both.
The provoking cause of recent outbreaks against foreigners in all parts of the Chinese empire may be gathered from the proceedings of the conspirators, from their placards and lampoons, and from their secret correspondence. The keynote of all these is general detestation of foreigners, special enmity to Christianity and its accessories, and aversion to the symbols of material progress. Hatred of foreigners now shows itself as a passion which binds the provinces together as nothing else has ever been known to do. Their expulsion is a cause which is held to justify the vilest deeds done in its name. Nor is the present state of things a growth of yesterday. The ferment has been working for forty years—to go no further back—with many sporadic outbreaks to mark its progress. It was not nipped in the bud, as it might perhaps have been. Exhibitions of ill-feeling had been habitually disregarded by foreigners,who in their readiness to blame each other for provoking them, were accustomed to repel obvious explanations, and to go far afield for theories which would exonerate themselves at the expense of their neighbours. If stones were thrown or abusive epithets shouted, "It was only the children." Only the children! As if more conclusive testimony to any prevailing sentiment were possible.[34]In Peking itself the foreign Ministers set the example of palliating these abuses, and the only wonder is that the fire has smouldered so long without bursting into flame. During thirty years—to speak only of the recent period—missionaries in the interior have encountered the growing hostility of the people, which they have ascribed, perhaps too exclusively, to the machinations of "literati and gentry," forgetting that the torch would be applied in vain to a substance that was not inflammable.
Not that the machinations of the official and literary classes of the country are by any means to be held of little account, for they have been the most potent factor in fomenting and directing the passions of the people. What corresponds in China to a newspaper press has been constantly employed in vilifying the character and execrating the designs of foreigners, andholding them up continually to the contempt and hatred of the Chinese people. There was no effective means of contradicting the calumnies which were daily poured forth from every centre of population. Attempts have, indeed, been made by special counterblasts in the form of missionary publications in the chief citadel of hostility, and in a less polemic form in the periodicals in the Chinese language conducted by foreigners, yet these have had little more effect on the popular beliefs than a leading article in the 'Times' has upon the flood of anti-English literature that is poured out every day from Continental journals. From an observation of the calumnies which are so unquestioningly accepted by European populations we may partly judge of the effect of a constant stream of the same class of vituperative literature among the still more ignorant people of China. The features of both are the same. In Europe, as in China, there is no crime that the lowest savages have ever committed which is not attributed, with impassioned eloquence and with the finest literary skill, to those who are held up to the popular animosity. In Europe, as in China, the ruling powers encourage the virulence of the press. In countries where the Government exercises direct control, and in others where the connection is less official, extravagances are permitted which can serve no other purpose than that of making the objects of the invective so odious that a quarrel with them is rendered popular in advance. European Governments thus play with fire, as the Chinese have done, but in the case of the latter the incendiary policy has worked out its logical result.
Nor should it be forgotten that since, in these days,the Chinese have the fullest access to European literature, the calumnies of one nation by another are calculated to confirm their conviction of the turpitude of all. Neither is their armoury confined to the international amenities of the Western press. The charges habitually, and as a matter of course, made against their own countrymen by British writers and speakers would justify a stranger people, already predisposed thereto, in forming the worst opinion of English character. During the saturnalia of a general election, when the fountains of the great deep are broken up, no baseness, no falsity, no treachery, is too gross to be attributed, not to the rabble, but to the chosen leaders of the people. Such things being circulated throughout the world, preserved in indelible ink, can the enemies of the British nation, or at least the prejudiced Chinese, be greatly blamed for accepting the character of our people on such unimpeachable evidence? Should we not judge them on analogous testimony? From whatever sources they gather their ideas, however,—whether from the study of foreign newspapers, from their own observation of the ways of foreign men and women, or from the gross libels published by their literati,—there is no reason to doubt that the unfavourable opinion which the Chinese entertain of foreigners is held by them in good faith.
Shock of the Japanese war—European spoliation of China—Anarchy apprehended therefrom—Reminiscence of Taiping rebellion—Proposals for moderating foreign inroads—Lawlessness of foreign Powers—Chinese yield to force but nurse resentment—The missionary irritant.
Shock of the Japanese war—European spoliation of China—Anarchy apprehended therefrom—Reminiscence of Taiping rebellion—Proposals for moderating foreign inroads—Lawlessness of foreign Powers—Chinese yield to force but nurse resentment—The missionary irritant.
What has caused the chronic anti-foreign movement to swell suddenly to imperial dimensions, and to explode simultaneously in the capital and in distant provinces, is a larger question than we can attempt to answer. As contributory causes, however, there are certain facts lying on the surface of foreign relations which are too suggestive to be passed over. The Japanese war of 1894-95, and the train of events following it, noted in a previous chapter, struck at the vital centre of the Chinese empire. Foreigners of all nations applied force to China, not to defend person or property, but to divide up the empire in disregard of the Government and the people, both assumed to be moribund. The partition of China was discussed in the Western press as a matter in which the Government and natives of the country had no concern. Open doors, spheres of influence, concessions, protectorates—the various modes in which the Chinese oyster was to be cooked and served—were treated solely as questions of rivalry and preponderance between the Western Powers. The people were not indeed ignored, for the aggressors reckoned on them as their most valuable asset, the raw material of prospective armies, the source of labour supply for excavations and earthworks, and of the payable traffic for railways and other exotic enterprises. But there is more in human nature than acapacity to dig or obey a drill-sergeant, and it is precisely the elements which were disregarded by political, financial, and industrial adventurers which have risen up in judgment against them. The grandiose pronouncements of the foreign press during the last two or three years were by no means lost on the Chinese Government. These writings showed that the ambitions of foreign countries had no limits, while the gratification of them was absolutely incompatible with the retention of any semblance of independent authority by the rulers of the country.
Reasoning after the fact, and from effect to cause, is apt to be fallacious, but when the circuit is completed by the joining of prediction with realisation, some confidence may be felt in the soundness of the conclusion. Those who have observed the condition of China with a sympathetic eye have been for years labouring under the deepest apprehension for the peace of the country. The Japanese war accentuated this feeling, and the subsequent ruthless proceedings of the Western Powers deepened the apprehension. As the forces of aggression could in nowise be restrained, anxious, but inadequate and altogether ineffectual, attempts were made to avert their worst effects. Warnings were not wanting that "dangers which might have slept for generations to come had been suddenly brought within the range of practical politics, and that unless measures of precaution were taken in time, what happened in 1894-95 would sooner or later happen again, ... that the Chinese Empire would be brought to the verge of disruption; for all the forces, external and internal, which make for anarchy would be let loose, and the empire would be powerlessalike to resist dismemberment by the aggressive Powers or the subversion of authority by internal upheaval." The paper from which we quote, doubtless one of many such drawn up in 1896, goes on to say: "However desirous some, or even all, of the Great Powers might be of saving China from dissolution, they would be paralysed by their own jealousies, and they would perhaps be more concerned to avert a general war among themselves than to prevent calamity in China. A crisis might thus arise more direful in its consequences than the chronic crisis in the Ottoman Empire, and a reign of havoc would follow in which millions would perish where the loss of thousands now excites the indignation of the civilised world.[35]No circumstances would be wanting to intensify the horror, for it would not be even civil war, but promiscuous rapine as aimless and as uncontrollable as a forest fire. A generation has scarcely passed since China was desolated by the scourge of the Taiping rebellion, which is thought to have destroyed a population equal to that of a first-class European State; and a new outbreak of the like kind would be more hopeless, inasmuch as the factors which were eventually brought into play to extinguish the conflagration in 1862-64 would now be wanting, or would be rendered inoperative by the complex circumstances above indicated."
The spectre was anarchy, the provocatives aggression and dismemberment; and the permanent interests of international commerce were appealed to to avert thecalamities foreshadowed. "Dismemberment, from the point of view of the general interests of trade, would be little better than anarchy." Severe pressure was being put on the Chinese Government—even in 1896, when these and similar forebodings were uttered—to permit free communication by steam and rail, and the development of the mineral resources of their country. It was from such sources that the immediate danger to the integrity of the territory and the peace of the State was apprehended, while, on the other hand, the need for the innovations was freely granted. "The Chinese having neither men nor appliances capable of undertaking either the construction or management of railways, must be wholly dependent on foreigners for their inauguration. This state of things, fully recognised on all sides, has led speculators and promoters of all nations to besiege the Chinese authorities with offers of the means of construction and with demands for concessions. But considering the relative positions of China and the Western nations, it cannot but be admitted that the Chinese have done well to refuse to listen to such proposals. Rival concessionaires working under the ægis of extra-territoriality in the interior would be the axe at the root of the tree of China's integrity."
The problem of preserving the independence and integrity of China, while permitting the opening of the interior of the country to foreign enterprise, was felt to be one of the gravest importance, not to be settled by the clamour either of rival concession-hunters or the intrigue of rival States. "Inland residence," wrote Sir Rutherford Alcock, in 1868, "will bring weakness to the nation and death to theGovernment, and must eventuate in greater anarchy than has yet been seen.... Right of residence in the interior is hardly compatible with an extra-territorial clause."
The essential condition of safety for the country was evidently, therefore, to bar the acquisition of territorial rights by any foreign Government or company. With this view it was urged that at least the ownership and control of railways and mines should be retained in the hands of the Government itself, under a competent organisation in which foreign skill and experience should be effectively represented. As the then existing railway line of 200 miles was of such a character, a development of the same system was recommended for the larger schemes which were thought to be impending. The foreign Powers were urged to assist China in putting her house in order and in adapting her administration to the exigencies of the time.
Such were among the proposals made in 1896, and not disapproved by the Powers to which they were addressed. But common action thereon by foreigners was hindered by mutual rivalry and distrust, while the Chinese Government on its part showed neither inclination nor capacity—any more than it had ever done—to meet its difficulties by comprehensive measures. It preferred the ancient system of resisting, in detail and in secret, the advances of foreigners,—a policy of traps and snares and entanglements. Possibly the paralysis of despair had already reached the nerve centres of Chinese statesmanship, or the desperate scheme of a general expulsion of foreigners had begun to fascinate the leading spirits. Certain it is nopracticalrapprochementwas effected, or even seriously attempted, between the contending forces.
Meantime, however, the invaders would brook no delay,—they had no time for temporising tactics. The "ugly rush" began—syndicate rivalled syndicate, and Government Government, in dividing up thecorpus vile. Within twelve months of the period just referred to Germany led the way in the dismemberment of China by cutting off a slice of Shantung; Russia promptly followed in Liaotung; then Great Britain took Weihai-wei as a set-off, and assumed an interest in the central zone keener than that of the Chinese Government itself. Other Powers followed with imperious demands for portions of Chinese territory, on no ground whatever except that China was weak. Every law save the law of the strongest was suspended. Justice and mercy were thrown to the winds. And yet the orgies of spoliation were followed by no change in the outward forms of diplomatic relations with the Chinese Government. Foreign representatives continued to negotiate as if the power of that Government remained intact, though to assume, for one purpose, that there was neither sentient organism nor sovereign authority in China, and for another, that the Government retained its full competence,[36]was obviously to bring chaos into their intercourse. As a consequence, diplomatic correspondence with China since 1898—the British share of which, so far as has been published, extends to a thousand pages—is but a harvest of Dead Sea Fruit.
But Chinese relations being a compound of courtesy and force on the part of foreign Powers, it is not difficult to divine which of the two must be the dominant factor. Though they bowed their heads in morose silence before their conquerors, Chinese statesmen retained sufficient vitality to discriminate between platonic diplomacy and the "mailed fist," yielding in all things to menace, in nothing to argument. To seize territory, under thisrégime, presented less difficulty than to obtain redress for trivial injuries. Aggressive Powers were respected according to the measure of their aggression, while those who concerned themselves with the preservation of the empire met with no recognition whatever. British schemes were thwarted at every point, while other Powers ran riot throughout the territory. For this reason the Chinese Government collectively, and individual mandarins, have been stigmatised as anti-British, as if to be so were a blot upon their escutcheons. No doubt they are; but to assume on that account that the Chinese rulers are pro-Russian, pro-French, or pro-German is more than the premisses seem to warrant. History and tradition are alike opposed to such an idea. That peculiar kind of patriot, the friend of every country but his own, is not much in evidence in China. The vainest and most jealous nation on earth was not likely in a moment to suppress its self-love, invert its whole character, and welcome an army of foreign adventurers, no matter of what nationality, who came in the guise not of servants but masters. And, setting sentiment aside, the Chinese were not blind to the material consequences of the foreign schemes which were pressed on them, but were askeenly alive to the danger of intrusting railway and mining enterprises to foreigners as they had always shown themselves to be when their military and naval armaments were concerned. The memorials of provincial authorities clearly prove this. If, therefore, they admitted the disruptive agency into their country, it was from no love of the interlopers, but solely by way of submission to superior force, and under the same mental reservation with which they had subscribed to all their previous treaty engagements.
The chronic missionary irritant mentioned in previous chapters had been steadily spreading, and the hostility evoked by it as steadily increasing. Christianity being the only character in which foreigners had presented themselves to the view of the masses, the extirpation of it stood in the forefront of the anti-foreign programme. The disasters which the governing classes had always apprehended from the extension of foreign missions had suddenly assumed the form of a concrete reality. All that its opponents had for generations foretold became fact: their administration was being undermined, their traditions set at nought, their very territory wrenched from them in the name of the foreign religion. Propagandism was finally unmasked by the German Emperor in the uncompromising manner characteristic of that potentate. The Name that is above every name was openly made subservient to the lust of conquest. China saw at last that she was really doomed through the instrumentality of the religion which she had engaged herself to tolerate.
Irregularity of the succession—Defensive position of the empress-dowager—Cantonese reformers influence emperor—Regent's alarm, vengeance and reaction—The new heir-apparent.
Irregularity of the succession—Defensive position of the empress-dowager—Cantonese reformers influence emperor—Regent's alarm, vengeance and reaction—The new heir-apparent.
Ever since thecoup d'étatin January 1875, whereby the empress-regent by her own fiat placed her infant nephew on the throne of her deceased son, to the exclusion of more legitimate heirs, the dynastic question has been regarded by Chinese patriots as a certain source of future trouble.[37]The imperial dignity was not the only matter involved in the succession, but a vast amount of property also, and so many members of the imperial clan were interested in the result that it was deemed certain that the partisans of legitimacy would lie in wait for an opportunity of enforcing the claims of the rightful heir. As it is customary to attribute the acts of statesmen to personal motives, it has never been doubted that the interest of the empress-regent in setting the reigning emperor on the throne was sufficiently explained by her own lust of power. We know what is done, but do not always know what is prevented, and in the case of the families of both the elder brothers who were passed over, theremay have been practical as well as judicial reasons to justify even acoup d'étatwhich supplanted them. From what has recently been revealed of the character of Prince Tuan, for example, the exclusion of his progeny may possibly have been a providential deliverance.
Be these things as they may, however, and be her ulterior motives what they may, the solicitude of the empress-regent has been constantly directed to protecting the weak point in her dynastic defences. The childlessness of the present emperor, as well as the misfortunes of the empire since he assumed the reins of power in 1889, of course added indefinitely to her anxiety, while at the same time serving to keep alive the pretensions of the elder branches.
Speaking, as we have done throughout, only of what is apparent, the succession question was brought to the point of incandescence by certain events in 1898. Great and justifiable discontent had arisen in the provinces with the manner in which the affairs of the empire had been conducted, resulting in humiliation and calamity. The idea of doing something to stem the tide of misgovernment by enforcing the lessons of recent misfortune was freely discussed. But the Chinese have not discovered any method of remedying grievances except insurrections in one form or another, on a small or on a large scale. A movement of this character has been on foot in the Canton province ever since the Japanese war. These revolutionary conspiracies have indeed been so well organised, and so powerfully supported, that once, if not oftener, the provincial city of Canton has narrowly escaped capture. The agitation has been directed nominallyagainst the Manchu Government. Whether directly associated with the insurrectionary propaganda or not, another body afterwards challenged public notice under the name of Reformers. As in the case of the insurrectionary movement, many Government officials secretly gave their adhesion to the cause, and inspired the leaders with confidence in the ultimate success of their schemes.
Reform had been preached continuously to China from every foreign pulpit for forty years. "Reform or perish" was the regular formula—words so easily written that no resident, tourist, publicist, foreign official, or any one with a pen or a tongue, refrained from reiterating them continually. Individually every Chinese official with whom foreigners came in contact joined in the cry. But though the general demand was unanimous, there was diversity in the details, and in such a case the details were everything. A dozen writers, each insisting on the necessity of thorough reform, would postulate separately some indispensable preliminary to any reform whatsoever. These indispensable preliminaries, added together, would have left nothing for the substantive portion of the programme; by them Chinese administration would have been renovated from top to bottom. Such was the difficulty which friends and critics experienced in knowing where to begin in their efforts to reduce the general to the particular.
In 1898, however, a bold attempt was made to launch a comprehensive scheme of reform by imperial fiat. A Cantonese named Kang Yu-wei, backed by a body of opinion,—of the extent and value of which different estimates may be formed, "financed," ofcourse, as popular leaders must be,—obtained the ear of the emperor, and induced him to promulgate a budget of edicts of startling novelty. Being deemed revolutionary, they excited alarm in the Imperial Court. What were the specific grounds of alarm may be easily surmised. Foreigners who refer it exclusively to the question of reform may possibly take as partial a view of this as they have done of other Court movements. What is known is, that the empress-regent, always ready to strike when her interest or her schemes have been threatened, pounced on the unfortunate emperor, and by force of will and the parental authority which counts for so much in China, and in virtue of the Great Seal which she had reserved when handing over her trust, made him revoke his revolutionary edicts, hunted out his dangerous counsellors and punished them as traitors. The embers of reform were thus for the time ruthlessly stamped out. Of the ethics of these proceedings it is needless to speak: not ethics but strength decided the issue; nature's primeval law was not suspended in favour of the adventurous spirits who flew at such high game. A reaction against all reform naturally set in, and the old struggle was renewed: between conservation and revolution, viewed from the Chinese Court side; between purity and corruption, viewed from that of the Reformers.
But the quarrel cannot be restricted to so simple an issue as either of these. The question between the Reformers and the Court was complicated by sundry important considerations. In the first place, the capture of the Emperor by Kang Yu-wei was directly inspired by the teaching of foreign missionaries.In the second place, the movement originated in the same southern provinces whence the Taiping rebellion itself had sprung, and where conspiracies against the Government had been active since 1895. And thirdly, the reform agitation was ostentatiously patronised by the foreign, or at least by the English, press, while the leaders of the insurgents found a safe asylum, if not an effective base of operations, in Hongkong and in foreign countries. Taking these circumstances together, therefore, whatever may be thought of the intrinsic merits of the double agitation, it could scarcely be expected that the Powers which saw themselves so seriously menaced should draw any such fine distinction between the ostensible objects of the reformers and of the revolutionaries, as to regard the one with complacency while suppressing the other. The most abject of governments and the most timid of animals will resist to the death an attack which threatens their existence. There would be nothing unnatural, therefore, in the resentment of the Imperial Government against its disaffected people being, by the process which is so familiar to us in family quarrels, temporarily diverted from the domestic to the foreign enemy, against whom the combined hostility of all parties in the Chinese State might, for the time being, be concentrated.
Without, however, attempting to assign their relative values to all or any of these factors in the question, it seems evident that the events of 1898 revealed the elements of a drama in which the contending factions in the Court were forced to show their colours. The course of the conflict during the year and a half followingthe autumn of 1898 has probably been obscured rather than elucidated by the contradictory reports and fluctuating comments which have been so freely disseminated with but slight regard to the authenticity of their origin. But the nomination of a grandson of Prince Tun as heir-apparent, which was decreed in January 1900, looks like a belated, if not compulsory, recognition of the prior claims of that Princes family, and a confession that the Emperor Kwanghsu has kept the rightful heir twenty-five years out of his inheritance; for the grandson now selected possesses no right which the grandson set aside in 1875 did not possess. The relations of Prince Tuan, the father of the emperor designate, with the empress-regent are as obscure as the intricacies of palace politics usually are to contemporary foreign observers. Fortunately, however (in one sense), the cross-currents and undercurrents of the Court, the question who are confederates and who rivals, who betrayers and who betrayed, in the imperial camp, are matters which have to a great extent been deprived of their significance. Under normal conditions the dynastic imbroglio might have had a perturbing influence on the policy of foreign Powers, but the explosion of last summer has relegated all such domestic questions to a secondary place. When the correspondent of the 'Times' could report that there was "no Government" in Peking, thepersonnelof that Government lost its practical interest. The old order, with its sins and sorrows, has indeed passed away, but to find a substitute for it is a problem that will tax the wisdom as well as the forbearance of the world. The anarchy which has been so long dreaded is actually upon us,and the prospective horrors of it are assuredly not lessened by the outbreak being signalised in the capital rather than in the provinces.
Chinese methods of expelling foreigners—Secret societies—The Boxers.
Chinese methods of expelling foreigners—Secret societies—The Boxers.
Considering as a whole, therefore, the succession of crushing blows which during the past six years have been dealt against the integrity of China by open enemies and dissimulating friends, we may conceive, at least partially, the hatred of foreigners which exists in the country. In this case we are not driven to assume any wide difference between the Chinese and races more nearly allied to ourselves, nor need we seek to account for their demonstrations by defects in their moral or religious training. Had even the whole population of China been miraculously converted to Christianity, as suggested by Sir Robert Hart ('Fortnightly Review,' November 1900), it is not permissible to assume that they would have continued turning the other cheek to so many smiters. If we suppose the case of any Western nation subjected to the experiences through which the Chinese have had to pass at the hands of foreign dictators, the mode in which it would act may afford us some measure by which to gauge the excesses of the Chinese.
The origin and organisation of the recent outbreak will no doubt be a topic of discussion for sometime to come, and it is not within our province to anticipate the final verdict on it. But, as in certain contagious diseases which become constitutional, the angry symptoms first show themselves at the point of infection, it is interesting to note that the German sphere in Shantung enjoys the distinction of being the cradle of the principal agency producing the cataclysm. The prominence suddenly attained by the Boxer movement is probably fortuitous, due to its casual connection with high personages. Secret societies are nothing new, nor societies of divers sorts which have scarcely the pretence of secrecy. As weeds spring up where cultivation is neglected, these social growths may be considered in the light of spontaneous efforts to occupy ground left vacant by the constituted Government,—a sort of excrescence of autonomy rising and falling according as the administration is less or more efficient. The members of these societies may be ascetics who follow strict rules of living, defenders of popular rights, or mere "bullies" who may be hired. They bear virtuous titles, but it is safe to assume that the ostensible object of the associations is in practice invariably lost in schemes of a different complexion. Sometimes in collision, at other times in collusion, with the established Government, these societies are a mobile factor, a sort of shifting ballast, always to be reckoned with in the Chinese economy.
As the Boxers are an athletic corps, drilled and exercised, it was natural to inquire, when their imposing force stood revealed, how such a formidable movement could have been organised among the Chinese people without the fact becoming known tothe foreign residents in the country. One answer is, that those who saw what was going on and warned their countrymen were decried as alarmists, and then held their peace. The wisest were but little wiser than their neighbours, for as weather prophets easily forecast the character of the following season, while they are at fault as regards that of the next twenty-four hours, so those who are able to predict with confidence the remote future in China are often the most blind to the nearer future which is reckoned by days or months. But incredulity was excusable in the present case, for the extent and apparent suddenness of the movement were really unprecedented. Such a force has not been mobilised and kept in the field in a militant condition without immense effort and liberal supplies, for though pillage might go far, it would not go all the way in supporting so large a body for any length of time. The junction of the Boxers with imperial troops, the relations of the commanders to members of the imperial family, and the influence of the movement on the question of the dynastic succession, are all matters on which light will be welcome; for as no military invasion of the territory has ever called forth such a general enthusiasm of resistance, interesting, indeed, will be the discovery of the real genesis of a rising at once spontaneous and aggressive.
The most practical observation, however, that foreign nations have been forced to make during the crisis is that, whatever might have been the separate designs of those who presided over the general movement, the rallying flag of the combination was the extermination of foreigners. That was the pretextwhich, for the time being at least, reconciled all antagonisms and satisfied all consciences. It seemed as if the long-accumulated hatred of the Chinese had gathered to a head, and its whole force had been concentrated in one supreme effort to sweep the aliens throughout the empire into the sea. That elaborate preparation had been made to carry this into effect seems to be placed beyond doubt, the rulers of China evidently conceiving that the effort would be successful.
The excuse put forward in palliation of an anti-crusade headed by the highest personages in the empire bears an interesting family resemblance to the apology usually made for rebels. Being beguiled by false prophets, they believed they would succeed;[38]and success would have justified the venture. The facts are such as no subsequent negotiations, no treaties, no modifications of government, no reform, no professions of any kind, can ever explain away.