Builder : Shoemaker : : 1 pr. shoes : 1 house—wrong.—— —— 100 pr. shoes : 1 house—right—— —— 10 (100 pr. shoes) : 1 house—wrong.[19][Greek] Compare a similar use of [Greek]. De Interpretatione, II. 2. [Greek].[20]Every unjust act embodies [Greek: to adikon], which is a violation of [Greek: to ison], and so implies a greater and a less share, the former being said to fall to the doer, the latter to the sufferer, of injury.[21]This passage certainly occurs awkwardly here. If attached to the close of the preceding Chapter it would leave that Chapter incomplete, for the question is not gone into, but only stated. As the commencement of this Chapter it is yet more out of place; I should propose to insert it at the commencement of the following Chapter, to which it forms an appropriate introduction.[22]In a pure democracy men are absolutely,i.e.numerically, equal, in other forms only proportionately equal. Thus the meanest British subject is proportionately equal to the Sovereign, that is to say, is as fully secured in his rights as the Sovereign in hers.[23]Or, according to Cardwell’s reading ([Greek: kineton ou mentoi pan]) “but amongst ourselves there is Just, which is naturally variable, but certainly all Just is not such.” The sense of the passage is not affected by the reading. In Bekker’s text we must take [Greek: kineton] to mean the same as [Greek: kinoumenon],i.e.“we admit there is no Just which has not been sometimes disallowed, still,” etc. With Cardwell’s, [Greek: kineton] will mean “which not onlydoesbut naturallymayvary.”[24]Murder is unjust by the law of nature, Smuggling by enactment. Therefore any act which can be referred to either of these heads is an unjust act, or, as Bishop Butler phrases it, an actmateriallyunjust. Thus much may be decided without reference to the agent. See the note on page 32, l. 16.[25]“As distinct from pain or loss.” Bishop Butler’s Sermon on Resentment. See also, Rhet. 11. 2 Def. of [Greek: orgae].[26]This method of reading the passage is taken from Zell as quoted in Cardwell’s Notes, and seems to yield the best sense. The Paraphrast gives it as follows:“But the aggressor is not ignorant that he began, and so he feels himself to be wrong [and will not acknowledge that he is the aggressor], but the other does not.”[27]As when a man is “justifiedat the Grass Market,”i.e.hung.[28]Where the stock of good is limited, if any individual takes more than his share some one else must have less than his share; where it is infinite, or where there is no good at all this cannot happen.[29]The reference is to chap. vii. where it was said that the law views the parties in a case of particular injustice as originally equal, but now unequal, the wrong doer the gainer and the sufferer the loser by the wrong, but in the case above supposed there is butoneparty.[30]So in the Politics, 1. 2.Hae men gar psuchae tou somatos archei despotikaen archaen, o de nous taes orexeos politikaen kai despotikaev.Compare also Bishop Butler’s account of human nature as a system—of the different authority of certain principles, and specially the supremacy of Conscience.BOOK VI[1]I understand the illustration to be taken from the process of lowering a weight into its place; a block of marble or stone, for instance, in a building.[2]Called for convenience sake Necessary and Contingent matter.[3]One man learns Mathematics more easily than another, in common language,he has a turn forMathematics,i esomething in his mental conformation answers to that science The Phrenologist shows the bump denoting this aptitude.[4]And therefore the question resolves itself into this, “What is the work of the Speculative, and what of the Practical, faculty of Reason.” See the description ofapetaeII. 5.[5]praxisis here used in its strict and proper meaning.[6]That is to say, the Will waits upon deliberation in which Reason is the judge; when the decision is pronounced, the Will must act accordingly.The question at issue always is,Is this Good?because the Will is only moved by an impression of Good; the Decision then will be alwaysAye or No, and the mental hand is put forth to grasp in the former case, and retracted in the later.So far as what must take place ineveryMoral Action, right or wrong, the Machinery of the mind being supposed uninjured but to constitute a good Moral Choice,i e.. a good Action, the Reason must have said Aye when it ought.The cases of faulty action will be, either when the Machinery is perfect but wrongly directed, as in the case of a deliberate crime, or when the direction given by the Reason is right but the Will does not move in accordance with that direction, in other words, when the Machinery is out of order; as in the case of the [Greek: akrates]—video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.[7]See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.[8]The cobbler is at his last, why? to make shoes, which are to clothe the feet of someone and the price to be paid,i.e.the produce of his industry, is to enable him to support his wife and children; thus his production is subordinate to Moral Action.[9]It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus have varied his phrase without some real difference of meaning. That difference is founded, I think, on the two senses of [Greek: orexis] before alluded to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the mind towards Action may be given either by a vague desire or by the suggestion of Reason. The vague desire passing through the deliberate stage would issue in Moral Choice. Reason must enlist the Will before any Action can take place.Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler observes that Conscience should be. If this were so, every act of Moral Choice would be [Greek: orektikos nous].But one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our composite nature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselves do not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general, fairly described as [Greek: orexis dianoetike]. See Bishop Butler’s Sermon II. and the First upon Compassion.[10]The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truth itself ([Greek: aplos]), or for the sake of something further ([Greek: eneka tinos]). If the first then either syllogistically ([Greek: episteme]), non-syllogistically ([Greek: nous]), or by union of the two methods ([Greek: sophla]). If the second, either with a view toact([Greek: phronesis]), or with a view tomake([Greek: techne]).Otherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. If necessary, Principles ([Greek: nous]), Deductions ([Greek: episteme]), or Mixed ([Greek: sophla]). If Contingent, Action ([Greek: phronesis]), Production ([Greek: techen]). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell’s notes.)[11]It is the opening statement of the Post Analytics.[12]Aristotle in his logical analysis of Induction, Prior. Analytics II. 25, defines it to be “the proving the inherence of the major term in the middle (i.e.proving the truth of the major premiss in fig. 1) through the minor term.” He presupposes a Syllogism in the first Figure with an universal affirmative conclusion, which reasons, of course, from an universal, which universal is to be taken as proved by Induction. His doctrine turns upon a canon which he there quotes. “If of one and the same term two others be predicated, one of which is coextensive with that one and the same, the other may be predicated of that which is thus coextensive.” The fact of this coextensiveness must be ascertained by [Greek: nous], in other words, by the Inductive Faculty. We will take Aldrich’s instance.All Magnets attract ironA B C are MagnetsA B C attract iron.Presupposed Syllogism reasoning from an universal.A B C attract iron (Matter of observation and experiment)All Magnets are A B C (Assumed by [Greek: nous], i.e. the Inductive faculty)All Magnets attract iron (Major premiss of the last Syllogism proved by taking the minor term of that for the middle term of this.)Or, according to the canon quoted above: A B C are Magnets. A B C attract iron.But [Greek: nous] tells me that the term Magnets is coextensive with the term A B C, therefore of all Magnets I may predicate that they attract iron.Induction is said by Aristotle to be [Greek: hoia phanton], but he says in the same place that for this reason we mustconceive([Greek: noehin]) the term containing the particular Instances (as A B C above) as composed of all the Individuals.If Induction implied actual examination of all particular instances it would cease to be Reasoning at all and sink into repeated acts of Simple Apprehension it is really the bridging over of a chasm, not the steps cut in the rock on either side to enable us to walk down into and again out of it. It is a branch of probable Reasoning, and its validity dependsentirelyupon the quality of the particular mind which performs it. Rapid Induction has always been a distinguishing mark of Genius the certainty produced by it is Subjective and not Objective. It may be useful to exhibit it Syllogistically, but the Syllogism which exhibits it is either nugatory, or contains a premissliterallyfalse. It will be found useful to compare on the subject of Inductionas the term is used by Aristotle, Analytica Prior. II 25 26 Analytica Post. I. 1, 3, and I. Topics VI I and X.[13]The reference is made to the Post Analyt I II and it is impossible to understand the account of [Greek: epistaemae] without a perusal of the chapter, the additions to the definition referred to relate to the nature of the premisses from which [Greek: epistaemae] draws its conclusions they are to be “true, first principles incapable of any syllogistic proof, better known than the conclusion, prior to it, and causes of it.” (See the appendix to this Book.)[14]This is the test of correct logical division, that themembra dividentiashall be opposed,i.e.not included the one by the other.[15]The meaning of the [Greek: hepehi] appears to be this: the appeal is made in the first instance to popular language, just as it the case of [Greek: epistaemae], and will be in those of [Greek: phronaesis] and [Greek: sophia]. We commonly call Architecture an Art, and it is so and so, therefore the name Art and this so and so are somehow connected to prove that connection to be “coextensiveness,” we predicate one of the other and then simply convert the proposition, which is the proper test of any logical definition, or of any specific property. See the Topics, 1. vi.[16]See the parable of the unjust Steward, in which the popular sense of [Greek: phronaesis] is strongly brought out; [Greek: ephaenesen ho kurios ton oikonomon taes adikias oti phronimos epoiaesen hoti ohi viohi tou aionos toutou phronimoteroi, k.t.l.]—Luke xvi. 8.[17]Compare the [Greek: aplos] and [Greek: kath’ ekasta pepaideumenos] of Book I. chap. 1.[18]The two aspects under which Virtue may be considered as claiming the allegiance of moral agents are, that of being right, and that of being truly expedient, because Conscience and Reasonable Self-Love are the two Principles of our moral constitution naturally supreme and “Conscience and Self-Love,if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way.” Bishop Butler, end of Sermon III.And again:“If bya sense of interestis meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our Happiness this is not only coincident with the principle of Virtue or Moral Rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this Reasonable Self-Love wants to be improved as really as any principle in our nature. So little cause is there for Moralists to disclaim this principle.” From the note on sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral Discipline, Analogy, part I chap. v.[19]See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.The student will find it worth while to compare this passage with the following—Chap. xiii. of this book beginning [Greek: e d’ exis to ommati touto k. t. l]—vii. 4. [Greek: eti kai ode physikos. k.t.l.] vii. 9.—[Greek: ae gar arethae kai ae mochthaeria. k.t.l.]—iii. 7ad finem. [Greek: ei de tis legoi. k.t.l.][20]This is not quite fair. Used in its strict sense, Art does not admit of degrees of excellence any more than Practical Wisdom. In popular language we use the term “wiser man,” as readily as “better artist” really denoting in each case different degrees of approximation to Practical Wisdom and Art respectively, [Greek: dia to ginesthai tous epainous di anaphoras]. I. 12.[21]He would be abetter Chymistwho should poison intentionally, than he on whose mind the prevailing impression was that “Epsom Salts mean Oxalic Acid, and Syrup of Senna Laudanum.”[22]The term Wisdom is used in our English Translation of the Old Testament in the sense first given to [Greek:——] here. “Then wrought Bezaleel and Ahohab, and everywise-hearted man, in whom the Lord put wisdom and understandingto know how to work all manner of work for the service of the Sanctuary” Exodus xxxvi. i.[23][Greek:——] and [Greek:——], (in the strict sense, for it is used in many different senses in this book) are different parts of the whole function [Greek:——], [Greek:——] takes in conclusions, drawn by strict reasoning from Principles of a certain kind which [Greek: ——] supplies. It is conceivable that a man might go on gaining these principles by Intuition and never reasoning from them, and so [Greek: ——] might exist independent of [Greek:——], but not this without that. Put the two together, the head to the trunk, and you form the living being [Greek:——]. There are three branches of [Greek:——] according to Greek Philosophy, [Greek:——], [Greek:——], [Greek:——]. Science is perhaps the nearest English term, but we have none really equivalent.[24][Greek:——] is here used in its most extensive sense, [Greek:——] would be its chief Instrument.[25]The faculty concerned with which is [Greek:——].[26]In every branch of Moral Action in which Practical Wisdom is employed there will be general principles, and the application of them, but in some branches there are distinct names appropriated to the operations of Practical Wisdom, in others there are not.Thus Practical Wisdom, when employed on the general principles of Civil Government, is called Legislation, as administering its particular functions it is called simply Government. In Domestic Management, there are of course general Rules, and also the particular application of them; but here the faculty is called only by one name. So too when Self-Interest is the object of Practical Wisdom.[27][Greek:——], “our mere Operatives in Public business.” (Chalmers.)[28]Practical Wisdom may be employed either respecting Self, (which is [Greek:——] proper) or not-Self,i.e.either one’s family=[Greek:——], or one’s community=[Greek:——], but here the supreme and subordinate are distinguished, the former is [Greek:——], the latter [Greek:——] proper, whose functions are deliberation and the administration of justice.[29]But where can this be done, if there be no community? see Horace’s account of the way in which his father made him reap instruction from the examples in the society around him. 1. Sat. iv. 105, etc. See also Bishop Butler, Analogy, part I. chap. v. sect. iii.The whole question of the Selfish Morality is treated in Bishop Butler’s first three and the eleventh Sermons, in which he shows the coincidence infactof enlightened Self-Love and Benevolencei.e.love of others. Compare also what is said in the first Book of this treatise, chap. v., about [Greek: autarkeia].[30]More truly “implied,” namely, that Practical Wisdom results from experience.[31]This observation seems to be introduced, simply because suggested by the last, and not because at all relevant to the matter in hand.[32]An instance of Principles gained [Greek: aisthesei]. (Book 1. chap. viii.)[33]Particulars are called [Greek: eschata] because they are last arrived at in the deliberative process, but a little further on we have the term applied to first principles, because they stand at one extremity, and facts at the other, of the line of action.[34]I prefer the reading [Greek: e phronesis], which gives this sense, “Well, as I have said, Practical Wisdom is this kind of sense, and the other we mentioned is different in kind.” In a passage so utterly unimportant, and thrown in almost colloquially, it is not worth while to take much trouble about such a point.[35]The definition of it in the Organon (Post Analyt. 1. xxiv.), “a happy conjecture of the middle term without time to consider of it.”The quaestio states the phenomena, and the middle term the causation the rapid ascertaining of which constitutes [Greek: anchinoia].All that receives light from the sun is bright on the side next to the sun.The moon receives light from the sun,The moon is bright on the side next the sun.The [Greek: anchinoia] consists in rapidly and correctly accounting for the observed fact, that the moon is bright on the side next to the sun.[36]Opinion is a complete, deliberation an incomplete, mental act.[37]The End does not sanctify the Means.[38]The meaning is, there is one End including all others; and in this sense [Greek: phronesis] is concerned with means, not Ends but there are also many subordinate Ends which are in fact Means to the Great End of all. Good counsel has reference not merely to the grand End, but to the subordinate Ends which [Greek: phronesis] selects as being right means to the Grand End of all.[39]The relative [Greek: on] might be referred to [Greek: sumpheron], but that [Greek: eubonlia] has been already divided into two kinds, and this construction would restrict the name to one of them, namely that [Greek: pros ti telos] as opposed to that [Greek: pros to telos aplos].[40]We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning of this word, much less will our language admit of the play upon it which connects it with [Greek: suggnomae].[41]Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action. [Greek: psronaesis ] is equivalent to [Greek: euboulia, ounesis, gnomae, and nous] (in the new sense here given to it).The faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is [Greek: phronaesis], i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodness informed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is not actually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, so proper names are given to the various Functions of Practical Wisdom.Is the [Greek: phronimos] forming plans to attain some particular End? he is then [Greek: euboulos]—is he passing under review the suggestions of others? he is [Greek: sunetos]—is he judging of the acts of others? he admits [Greek: gnomae] to temper the strictness of justness—is he applying general Rules to particular cases? he is exercising [Greek: nous praktikos] or [Greek: agsthaesis]—while in each and all he is [Greek: phronimos]?[42]See note, on p. 140.[43]There are cases where we must simply accept or reject without proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to all reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are simply matters of [Greek: agsthaesis]. Aristotle here brings both these cases within the province of [Greek: nous],i.e.he calls by this name the Faculty which attains Truth in each.[44]i.e.of the [Greek: syllogisimai ton prakton].[45]See the note on [Greek: Archae] on p. 4,1 30. As a matter of fact and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practica Syllogism is wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss (i.e.by [Greek: ethismos]).All that is pleasant is to be done,This is pleasant,This is to be doneBy habitually acting on the Minor Premiss,i.e.on the suggestions of [Greek: epithymia], a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss. Aristotle says of the man destitute of all self-control that he is firmly persuaded that it is his proper line to pursue the gratification of his bodily appetites, [Greek: dia to toioytos einai oios diokein aytas]. And his analysis of [Greek: akrasia] (the state of progress towards this utter abandonment to passion) shows that each case of previous good resolution succumbing to temptation is attributable to [Greek: epithymia] suggesting its own Minor Premiss in place of the right one. Book VII. 8 and 5.[46]Theconsequentiais this:There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of reasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by [Greek: nous]. What makes [Greek: nous] to be a true guide? only practice, i.e. Experience, andtherefore, etc.[47]This is a note to explain [Greek: hygieina] and [Greek: euektika], he gives these three uses of the term [Greek: hygieinon] in the Topics, I. xiii. 10,{ [Greek: to men hygieias poiætikon], [Greek: hygieinon legetai]{ [Greek: to de phylaktikon],{ [Greek: to de sæmantikon].Of course the same will apply to [Greek: euektikon].[48]Healthiness is the formal cause of health.Medicine is the efficient cause of health.See Book X. chap. iv. [Greek: hosper oud hæ hygieia kai ho iatros homoios aitia esti tou ugiainein].[49][Greek: phronæsis] is here used in a partial sense to signify the Intellectual, as distinct from the Moral, element of Practical Wisdom.[50]This is another case of an observation being thrown inobiter, not relevant to, but suggested by, the matter in hand.[51]See Book II. chap. iii. and V. xiii.[52]The article is supplied at [Greek: panourgous], because the abstract word has just been used expressly in a bad sense. “Up to anything” is the nearest equivalent to [Greek: panourgos], but too nearly approaches to a colloquial vulgarism.[53]See the note on [Greek: Archæ] on page 4, l. 30.[54]And for the Minor, of course,“This particular action is———.”We may paraphrase [Greek: to telos] by [Greek: ti dei prattein—ti gar dei prattein hæ mæ, to telos autæs estin] i.e. [Greek: tæs phronæseos].—(Chap. xi. of this Book.)[55]“Look asquint on the face of truth.” Sir T. Browne, Religio Medici.[56]The term [Greek: sophronikoi] must be understood as governing the signification of the other two terms, there being no single Greek term to denote in either case mere dispositions towards these Virtues.[57]Compare the passage at the commencement of Book X. [Greek: nun de phainontai] [Greek: katokochimon ek tæs aretæs].[58]It must be remembered, that [Greek: phronæsis] is used throughout this chapter in two senses, its proper and complete sense of Practical Wisdom, and its incomplete one of merely the Intellectual Element of it.BOOK VII[1]The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto given represents rather what menmay bethan what theyare. In this book we take a practical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary, every day development.[2]This illustrates the expression, “Deceitsof the Flesh.”[3]Another reading omits the [Greek:——]; the meaning of the whole passage would be exactly the same—it would then run, “if he had been convinced of the rightness of what he does,i.e.if he were now acting on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change of conviction.”[4]Major and minor Premises of the [Greek:——] [Greek——][5]Some necessarily implying knowledge of the particular, others not.[6]As a modern parallel, take old Trumbull in Scott’s “Red Gauntlet.”[7]That is, as I understand it, either the major or the minor premise, it is true, that “all that is sweet is pleasant,” it is true also, that “this is sweet,” what is contrary to Right Reason is the bringing in this minor to the majori.e.the universal maxim, forbidding to taste. Thus, a man goes to a convivial meeting with the maxim in his mind “All excess is to be avoided,” at a certain time his [Greek:——] tells him “This glass is excess.” As a matter of mere reasoning, he cannot help receiving the conclusion “This glass is to be avoided,” and supposing him to be morally sound he would accordingly abstain. But [Greek:——], being a simple tendency towards indulgence suggests, in place of the minor premise “This is excess,” its own premise “This is sweet,” this again suggests the self-indulgent maxim or principle (‘[Greek:——]), “All that is sweet is to be tasted,” and so, by strict logical sequence, proves “This glass is to be tasted.”The solution then of the phænomenon of [Greek:——] is this that [Greek:——], by its direct action on the animal nature, swamps the suggestions of Right Reason.On the high ground of Universals, [Greek:——] i.e. [Greek:——] easily defeats [Greek:——]. The [Greek:——], an hour before he is in temptation, would never deliberately prefer the maxim “All that is sweet is to be tasted” to “All excess is to be avoided.” The [Greek:——] would.Horace has a good comment upon this (II Sat 2):Quæ virtus et quanta, bom, sit vivere parvoDiscite,non inter lances mensasque nitentesVerum hicimpransimecum disquiriteCompare also Proverbs XXIII. 31. “Look not thou upon the wine when it is red,” etc.[8]As we commonly speak, Metaphysicians. Physiology of course includes Metaphysics.[9][Greek: oron]. Aristotle’s own account of this word (Prior Analyt ii. 1) is [Greek: eis on dialuetai hae protasis], but both in the account of [Greek: nous] and here it seems that the proposition itself is really indicated by it.[10]The Greek would give “avoids excessive pain,” but this is not true, for the excess of pain would be ground for excuse the warrant for translating as in the text, is the passage occurring just below [Greek: diokei tas uperbolas kai pheugei metrias lupas].[11]Compare Bishop Butler on Particular Propensions, Analogy, Part I chap v sect. iv.[12]That is, they are to the right states as Vice to Virtue.[13]See the letter of Sabina Rentfree. Spectator, 431.[14]Consult in connection with this Chapter the Chapter on [Greek: orgae] in the Rhetoric, II. 2, and Bishop Butler’s Sermon on Resentment.[15]The reasoning here being somewhat obscure from the concisement of expression, the following exposition of it is subjoined.Actions of Lust are wrong actions done with pleasure,Wrong actions done with pleasure are more justly objects of wrath,[*]Such as are more justly objects of wrath are more unjust,Actions of Lust are more unjust[*][Greek: hubpis] is introduced as the single instance from which this premiss is proved inductively. See the account of it in the Chapter of the Rhetoric referred to in the preceding note.[16][Greek: ton dae lechthenton]. Considerable difference of opinion exists as to the proper meaning of these words. The emendation which substitutes [Greek: akrataes] for [Greek: akolastos] removes all difficulty, as the clause would then naturally refer to [Greek: ton mae proairoumenon] but Zell adheres to the reading in the text of Bekker, because the authority of MSS and old editions is all on this side.I understand [Greek: mallon] as meant to modify the word [Greek: malakias], which properly denotes that phase of [Greek: akrasia] (not [Greek: akolasia]) which is caused by pain.The [Greek: akolastos]deliberatelypursues pleasure and declines pain if there is to be a distinct name for the latter phase, it comes under [Greek: malakia] more nearly than any other term, though perhaps not quite properly.Or the words may be understood as referring to the class of wrong acts caused by avoidance of pain, whether deliberate or otherwise, and then of course the names of [Greek: malakia] and [Greek: akolasia] may be fitly given respectively.[17]“If we went into a hospital where all were sick or dying, we should think those least ill who were insensible to pain; a physician who knew the whole, would behold them with despair. And there is a mortification of the soul as well as of the body, in which the first symptoms of returning hope are pain and anguish” Sewell, Sermons to Young Men (Sermon xii.)[18]Before the time of trial comes the man deliberately makes his Moral Choice to act rightly, but, at the moment of acting, the powerful strain of desire makes him contravene this choice his Will does not act in accordance with the affirmation or negation of his Reason. His actions are therefore of the mixed kind. See Book III. chap. i, and note on page 128.[19]Let a man be punctualon principleto any one engagement in the day, and he must, as a matter of course, keep all his others in their due places relatively to this one; and so will often wear an appearance of being needlessly punctilious in trifles.[20]Because he is destitute of these minor springs of action, which are intended to supply the defects of the higher principle.See Bishop Butler’s first Sermon on Compassion, and the conclusion of note on p. 129.BOOK VIII[1]“Owe no man anything, but toloveone another for he that loveth anotherhath fulfilled the Law.” Romans XIII. 8.[2][Greek: kerameis]. The Proverb in full is a line from Hesiod, [Greek: kahi keramehus keramei koteei kai tektoni tekton].[3]In this sense, therefore, is it sung of Mrs. Gilpin that she“two stone bottles found,To hold the liquor that sheloved,And keep it safe and sound.”[4]Cardwell’s reading, [Greek: tautae gar omoioi, kai ta loipa] is here adopted, as yielding a better sense than Bekker’s.[5]The Great man will have a right to look for more Friendship than he bestows, but the Good mancanfeel Friendship only for, and in proportion to, the goodness of the other.[6]See note on page 68, 1. 8.[7]See I. Topics, Chap. v. on the various senses of [Greek: tauton].[8]“For the mutual society, help, and comfort that the one ought to have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity.”[9]Which one would be assuming he was, if one declined to recognise the obligation to requite the favour or kindness.BOOK IX[1]“Neither the Son of man, that He shouldrepent.” Numbers xxiii. 19.“In a few instances the Second Intention, or Philosophical employment of a Term, is more extensive than the First Intention, or popular use.” Whately, Logic, iii. 10.[2]“I have sometimes considered in what troublesome case is that Chamberlain in an Inn who being but one is to give attendance to many guests. For suppose them all in one chamber, yet, if one shall command him to come to the window, and the other to the table, and another to the bed, and another to the chimney, and another to come upstairs, and another to go downstairs, and all in the same instant, how would he be distracted to please them all? And yet such is the sad condition of nay soul by nature, not only a servant but a slave unto sin. Pride calls me to the window, gluttony to the table, wantonness to the bed, laziness to the chimney, ambition commands me to go upstairs, and covetousness to come down. Vices, I see, are as well contrary to themselves as to Virtue.” (Fuller’s Good Thoughts in Bad Times. Mix’t Contemplations, viii.)BOOK X[1]See note, p. 43.[2]See Book II. chap. ix.[3]See Book I. chap. v. ad finem.[4]The notion alluded to is that of the [greek: idea]: that there is no real substantial good except the [greek: auto agathon], and therefore whatever is so called is so named in right of its participation in that.[5]See note on page 136, 1. 15.[6]Movement is, according to Aristotle, of six kinds:From not being to being . . . . GenerationFrom being to not being . . . . DestructionFrom being to being more . . . . IncreaseFrom being to being less . . . . DiminutionFrom being here to being there . . Change of PlaceFrom being in this way to being in that Alteration[7]Amay go to sleep quicker thanB, but cannotdo more sleepin a given time.[8]Compare Book III. chap. vi. [Greek: osper kai epi ton somaton, k. t. l.][9]Which is of course a [Greek: genesis].[10]That is, subordinate Movements are complete before the whole Movement is.[11]Pleasure is so instantaneous a sensation, that it cannot be conceived divisible or incomplete; the longest continued Pleasure is only a succession of single sparks, so rapid as to give the appearance of a stream, of light.[12]A man is as effectually hindered from taking a walk by the [Greek: allotria haedouae] of reading a novel, as by the [Greek: oikeia lupae] of gout in the feet.[13]I have thus rendered [Greek: spoudae (ouk agnoon to hamartanomenon)]; but, though the English term does not represent the depth of the Greek one, it is some approximation to the truth to connect an earnest serious purpose with Happiness.[14]Bishop Butler,contra(Sermon XV.).“Knowledge is not our proper Happiness. Whoever will in the least attend to the thing will see that it is the gaining, not the having, of it, which is the entertainment of the mind.” The two statements may however be reconciled. Aristotle may be well understood only to mean, that the pursuit of knowledge will be the pleasanter, the freer it is from the minor hindrances which attend onlearning.[15]The clause immediately following indicates that Aristotle felt this statement to be at first sight startling, Happiness having been all the way through connected with [Greek: energeia], but the statement illustrates and confirms what was said in note on page 6, 1. 15.[16]That is to say, he aims at producing not merely a happy aggregate, but an aggregate of happy individuals. Compare what is said of Legislators in the last chapter of Book I and the first of Book II.[17]See note, page 146, 1. 17.
Builder : Shoemaker : : 1 pr. shoes : 1 house—wrong.—— —— 100 pr. shoes : 1 house—right—— —— 10 (100 pr. shoes) : 1 house—wrong.
[19][Greek] Compare a similar use of [Greek]. De Interpretatione, II. 2. [Greek].
[20]Every unjust act embodies [Greek: to adikon], which is a violation of [Greek: to ison], and so implies a greater and a less share, the former being said to fall to the doer, the latter to the sufferer, of injury.
[21]This passage certainly occurs awkwardly here. If attached to the close of the preceding Chapter it would leave that Chapter incomplete, for the question is not gone into, but only stated. As the commencement of this Chapter it is yet more out of place; I should propose to insert it at the commencement of the following Chapter, to which it forms an appropriate introduction.
[22]In a pure democracy men are absolutely,i.e.numerically, equal, in other forms only proportionately equal. Thus the meanest British subject is proportionately equal to the Sovereign, that is to say, is as fully secured in his rights as the Sovereign in hers.
[23]Or, according to Cardwell’s reading ([Greek: kineton ou mentoi pan]) “but amongst ourselves there is Just, which is naturally variable, but certainly all Just is not such.” The sense of the passage is not affected by the reading. In Bekker’s text we must take [Greek: kineton] to mean the same as [Greek: kinoumenon],i.e.“we admit there is no Just which has not been sometimes disallowed, still,” etc. With Cardwell’s, [Greek: kineton] will mean “which not onlydoesbut naturallymayvary.”
[24]Murder is unjust by the law of nature, Smuggling by enactment. Therefore any act which can be referred to either of these heads is an unjust act, or, as Bishop Butler phrases it, an actmateriallyunjust. Thus much may be decided without reference to the agent. See the note on page 32, l. 16.
[25]“As distinct from pain or loss.” Bishop Butler’s Sermon on Resentment. See also, Rhet. 11. 2 Def. of [Greek: orgae].
[26]This method of reading the passage is taken from Zell as quoted in Cardwell’s Notes, and seems to yield the best sense. The Paraphrast gives it as follows:“But the aggressor is not ignorant that he began, and so he feels himself to be wrong [and will not acknowledge that he is the aggressor], but the other does not.”
[27]As when a man is “justifiedat the Grass Market,”i.e.hung.
[28]Where the stock of good is limited, if any individual takes more than his share some one else must have less than his share; where it is infinite, or where there is no good at all this cannot happen.
[29]The reference is to chap. vii. where it was said that the law views the parties in a case of particular injustice as originally equal, but now unequal, the wrong doer the gainer and the sufferer the loser by the wrong, but in the case above supposed there is butoneparty.
[30]So in the Politics, 1. 2.Hae men gar psuchae tou somatos archei despotikaen archaen, o de nous taes orexeos politikaen kai despotikaev.Compare also Bishop Butler’s account of human nature as a system—of the different authority of certain principles, and specially the supremacy of Conscience.
[1]I understand the illustration to be taken from the process of lowering a weight into its place; a block of marble or stone, for instance, in a building.
[2]Called for convenience sake Necessary and Contingent matter.
[3]One man learns Mathematics more easily than another, in common language,he has a turn forMathematics,i esomething in his mental conformation answers to that science The Phrenologist shows the bump denoting this aptitude.
[4]And therefore the question resolves itself into this, “What is the work of the Speculative, and what of the Practical, faculty of Reason.” See the description ofapetaeII. 5.
[5]praxisis here used in its strict and proper meaning.
[6]That is to say, the Will waits upon deliberation in which Reason is the judge; when the decision is pronounced, the Will must act accordingly.The question at issue always is,Is this Good?because the Will is only moved by an impression of Good; the Decision then will be alwaysAye or No, and the mental hand is put forth to grasp in the former case, and retracted in the later.So far as what must take place ineveryMoral Action, right or wrong, the Machinery of the mind being supposed uninjured but to constitute a good Moral Choice,i e.. a good Action, the Reason must have said Aye when it ought.The cases of faulty action will be, either when the Machinery is perfect but wrongly directed, as in the case of a deliberate crime, or when the direction given by the Reason is right but the Will does not move in accordance with that direction, in other words, when the Machinery is out of order; as in the case of the [Greek: akrates]—video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.
[7]See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.
[8]The cobbler is at his last, why? to make shoes, which are to clothe the feet of someone and the price to be paid,i.e.the produce of his industry, is to enable him to support his wife and children; thus his production is subordinate to Moral Action.
[9]It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus have varied his phrase without some real difference of meaning. That difference is founded, I think, on the two senses of [Greek: orexis] before alluded to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the mind towards Action may be given either by a vague desire or by the suggestion of Reason. The vague desire passing through the deliberate stage would issue in Moral Choice. Reason must enlist the Will before any Action can take place.Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler observes that Conscience should be. If this were so, every act of Moral Choice would be [Greek: orektikos nous].But one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our composite nature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselves do not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general, fairly described as [Greek: orexis dianoetike]. See Bishop Butler’s Sermon II. and the First upon Compassion.
[10]The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truth itself ([Greek: aplos]), or for the sake of something further ([Greek: eneka tinos]). If the first then either syllogistically ([Greek: episteme]), non-syllogistically ([Greek: nous]), or by union of the two methods ([Greek: sophla]). If the second, either with a view toact([Greek: phronesis]), or with a view tomake([Greek: techne]).Otherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. If necessary, Principles ([Greek: nous]), Deductions ([Greek: episteme]), or Mixed ([Greek: sophla]). If Contingent, Action ([Greek: phronesis]), Production ([Greek: techen]). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell’s notes.)
[11]It is the opening statement of the Post Analytics.
[12]Aristotle in his logical analysis of Induction, Prior. Analytics II. 25, defines it to be “the proving the inherence of the major term in the middle (i.e.proving the truth of the major premiss in fig. 1) through the minor term.” He presupposes a Syllogism in the first Figure with an universal affirmative conclusion, which reasons, of course, from an universal, which universal is to be taken as proved by Induction. His doctrine turns upon a canon which he there quotes. “If of one and the same term two others be predicated, one of which is coextensive with that one and the same, the other may be predicated of that which is thus coextensive.” The fact of this coextensiveness must be ascertained by [Greek: nous], in other words, by the Inductive Faculty. We will take Aldrich’s instance.All Magnets attract ironA B C are MagnetsA B C attract iron.Presupposed Syllogism reasoning from an universal.A B C attract iron (Matter of observation and experiment)All Magnets are A B C (Assumed by [Greek: nous], i.e. the Inductive faculty)All Magnets attract iron (Major premiss of the last Syllogism proved by taking the minor term of that for the middle term of this.)Or, according to the canon quoted above: A B C are Magnets. A B C attract iron.But [Greek: nous] tells me that the term Magnets is coextensive with the term A B C, therefore of all Magnets I may predicate that they attract iron.Induction is said by Aristotle to be [Greek: hoia phanton], but he says in the same place that for this reason we mustconceive([Greek: noehin]) the term containing the particular Instances (as A B C above) as composed of all the Individuals.If Induction implied actual examination of all particular instances it would cease to be Reasoning at all and sink into repeated acts of Simple Apprehension it is really the bridging over of a chasm, not the steps cut in the rock on either side to enable us to walk down into and again out of it. It is a branch of probable Reasoning, and its validity dependsentirelyupon the quality of the particular mind which performs it. Rapid Induction has always been a distinguishing mark of Genius the certainty produced by it is Subjective and not Objective. It may be useful to exhibit it Syllogistically, but the Syllogism which exhibits it is either nugatory, or contains a premissliterallyfalse. It will be found useful to compare on the subject of Inductionas the term is used by Aristotle, Analytica Prior. II 25 26 Analytica Post. I. 1, 3, and I. Topics VI I and X.
[13]The reference is made to the Post Analyt I II and it is impossible to understand the account of [Greek: epistaemae] without a perusal of the chapter, the additions to the definition referred to relate to the nature of the premisses from which [Greek: epistaemae] draws its conclusions they are to be “true, first principles incapable of any syllogistic proof, better known than the conclusion, prior to it, and causes of it.” (See the appendix to this Book.)
[14]This is the test of correct logical division, that themembra dividentiashall be opposed,i.e.not included the one by the other.
[15]The meaning of the [Greek: hepehi] appears to be this: the appeal is made in the first instance to popular language, just as it the case of [Greek: epistaemae], and will be in those of [Greek: phronaesis] and [Greek: sophia]. We commonly call Architecture an Art, and it is so and so, therefore the name Art and this so and so are somehow connected to prove that connection to be “coextensiveness,” we predicate one of the other and then simply convert the proposition, which is the proper test of any logical definition, or of any specific property. See the Topics, 1. vi.
[16]See the parable of the unjust Steward, in which the popular sense of [Greek: phronaesis] is strongly brought out; [Greek: ephaenesen ho kurios ton oikonomon taes adikias oti phronimos epoiaesen hoti ohi viohi tou aionos toutou phronimoteroi, k.t.l.]—Luke xvi. 8.
[17]Compare the [Greek: aplos] and [Greek: kath’ ekasta pepaideumenos] of Book I. chap. 1.
[18]The two aspects under which Virtue may be considered as claiming the allegiance of moral agents are, that of being right, and that of being truly expedient, because Conscience and Reasonable Self-Love are the two Principles of our moral constitution naturally supreme and “Conscience and Self-Love,if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way.” Bishop Butler, end of Sermon III.And again:“If bya sense of interestis meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our Happiness this is not only coincident with the principle of Virtue or Moral Rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this Reasonable Self-Love wants to be improved as really as any principle in our nature. So little cause is there for Moralists to disclaim this principle.” From the note on sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral Discipline, Analogy, part I chap. v.
[19]See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.The student will find it worth while to compare this passage with the following—Chap. xiii. of this book beginning [Greek: e d’ exis to ommati touto k. t. l]—vii. 4. [Greek: eti kai ode physikos. k.t.l.] vii. 9.—[Greek: ae gar arethae kai ae mochthaeria. k.t.l.]—iii. 7ad finem. [Greek: ei de tis legoi. k.t.l.]
[20]This is not quite fair. Used in its strict sense, Art does not admit of degrees of excellence any more than Practical Wisdom. In popular language we use the term “wiser man,” as readily as “better artist” really denoting in each case different degrees of approximation to Practical Wisdom and Art respectively, [Greek: dia to ginesthai tous epainous di anaphoras]. I. 12.
[21]He would be abetter Chymistwho should poison intentionally, than he on whose mind the prevailing impression was that “Epsom Salts mean Oxalic Acid, and Syrup of Senna Laudanum.”
[22]The term Wisdom is used in our English Translation of the Old Testament in the sense first given to [Greek:——] here. “Then wrought Bezaleel and Ahohab, and everywise-hearted man, in whom the Lord put wisdom and understandingto know how to work all manner of work for the service of the Sanctuary” Exodus xxxvi. i.
[23][Greek:——] and [Greek:——], (in the strict sense, for it is used in many different senses in this book) are different parts of the whole function [Greek:——], [Greek:——] takes in conclusions, drawn by strict reasoning from Principles of a certain kind which [Greek: ——] supplies. It is conceivable that a man might go on gaining these principles by Intuition and never reasoning from them, and so [Greek: ——] might exist independent of [Greek:——], but not this without that. Put the two together, the head to the trunk, and you form the living being [Greek:——]. There are three branches of [Greek:——] according to Greek Philosophy, [Greek:——], [Greek:——], [Greek:——]. Science is perhaps the nearest English term, but we have none really equivalent.
[24][Greek:——] is here used in its most extensive sense, [Greek:——] would be its chief Instrument.
[25]The faculty concerned with which is [Greek:——].
[26]In every branch of Moral Action in which Practical Wisdom is employed there will be general principles, and the application of them, but in some branches there are distinct names appropriated to the operations of Practical Wisdom, in others there are not.Thus Practical Wisdom, when employed on the general principles of Civil Government, is called Legislation, as administering its particular functions it is called simply Government. In Domestic Management, there are of course general Rules, and also the particular application of them; but here the faculty is called only by one name. So too when Self-Interest is the object of Practical Wisdom.
[27][Greek:——], “our mere Operatives in Public business.” (Chalmers.)
[28]Practical Wisdom may be employed either respecting Self, (which is [Greek:——] proper) or not-Self,i.e.either one’s family=[Greek:——], or one’s community=[Greek:——], but here the supreme and subordinate are distinguished, the former is [Greek:——], the latter [Greek:——] proper, whose functions are deliberation and the administration of justice.
[29]But where can this be done, if there be no community? see Horace’s account of the way in which his father made him reap instruction from the examples in the society around him. 1. Sat. iv. 105, etc. See also Bishop Butler, Analogy, part I. chap. v. sect. iii.The whole question of the Selfish Morality is treated in Bishop Butler’s first three and the eleventh Sermons, in which he shows the coincidence infactof enlightened Self-Love and Benevolencei.e.love of others. Compare also what is said in the first Book of this treatise, chap. v., about [Greek: autarkeia].
[30]More truly “implied,” namely, that Practical Wisdom results from experience.
[31]This observation seems to be introduced, simply because suggested by the last, and not because at all relevant to the matter in hand.
[32]An instance of Principles gained [Greek: aisthesei]. (Book 1. chap. viii.)
[33]Particulars are called [Greek: eschata] because they are last arrived at in the deliberative process, but a little further on we have the term applied to first principles, because they stand at one extremity, and facts at the other, of the line of action.
[34]I prefer the reading [Greek: e phronesis], which gives this sense, “Well, as I have said, Practical Wisdom is this kind of sense, and the other we mentioned is different in kind.” In a passage so utterly unimportant, and thrown in almost colloquially, it is not worth while to take much trouble about such a point.
[35]The definition of it in the Organon (Post Analyt. 1. xxiv.), “a happy conjecture of the middle term without time to consider of it.”The quaestio states the phenomena, and the middle term the causation the rapid ascertaining of which constitutes [Greek: anchinoia].All that receives light from the sun is bright on the side next to the sun.The moon receives light from the sun,The moon is bright on the side next the sun.The [Greek: anchinoia] consists in rapidly and correctly accounting for the observed fact, that the moon is bright on the side next to the sun.
[36]Opinion is a complete, deliberation an incomplete, mental act.
[37]The End does not sanctify the Means.
[38]The meaning is, there is one End including all others; and in this sense [Greek: phronesis] is concerned with means, not Ends but there are also many subordinate Ends which are in fact Means to the Great End of all. Good counsel has reference not merely to the grand End, but to the subordinate Ends which [Greek: phronesis] selects as being right means to the Grand End of all.
[39]The relative [Greek: on] might be referred to [Greek: sumpheron], but that [Greek: eubonlia] has been already divided into two kinds, and this construction would restrict the name to one of them, namely that [Greek: pros ti telos] as opposed to that [Greek: pros to telos aplos].
[40]We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning of this word, much less will our language admit of the play upon it which connects it with [Greek: suggnomae].
[41]Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action. [Greek: psronaesis ] is equivalent to [Greek: euboulia, ounesis, gnomae, and nous] (in the new sense here given to it).The faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is [Greek: phronaesis], i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodness informed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is not actually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, so proper names are given to the various Functions of Practical Wisdom.Is the [Greek: phronimos] forming plans to attain some particular End? he is then [Greek: euboulos]—is he passing under review the suggestions of others? he is [Greek: sunetos]—is he judging of the acts of others? he admits [Greek: gnomae] to temper the strictness of justness—is he applying general Rules to particular cases? he is exercising [Greek: nous praktikos] or [Greek: agsthaesis]—while in each and all he is [Greek: phronimos]?
[42]See note, on p. 140.
[43]There are cases where we must simply accept or reject without proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to all reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are simply matters of [Greek: agsthaesis]. Aristotle here brings both these cases within the province of [Greek: nous],i.e.he calls by this name the Faculty which attains Truth in each.
[44]i.e.of the [Greek: syllogisimai ton prakton].
[45]See the note on [Greek: Archae] on p. 4,1 30. As a matter of fact and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practica Syllogism is wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss (i.e.by [Greek: ethismos]).
All that is pleasant is to be done,This is pleasant,This is to be done
By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss,i.e.on the suggestions of [Greek: epithymia], a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss. Aristotle says of the man destitute of all self-control that he is firmly persuaded that it is his proper line to pursue the gratification of his bodily appetites, [Greek: dia to toioytos einai oios diokein aytas]. And his analysis of [Greek: akrasia] (the state of progress towards this utter abandonment to passion) shows that each case of previous good resolution succumbing to temptation is attributable to [Greek: epithymia] suggesting its own Minor Premiss in place of the right one. Book VII. 8 and 5.
[46]Theconsequentiais this:There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of reasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by [Greek: nous]. What makes [Greek: nous] to be a true guide? only practice, i.e. Experience, andtherefore, etc.
[47]This is a note to explain [Greek: hygieina] and [Greek: euektika], he gives these three uses of the term [Greek: hygieinon] in the Topics, I. xiii. 10,
{ [Greek: to men hygieias poiætikon], [Greek: hygieinon legetai]{ [Greek: to de phylaktikon],{ [Greek: to de sæmantikon].
Of course the same will apply to [Greek: euektikon].
[48]Healthiness is the formal cause of health.Medicine is the efficient cause of health.See Book X. chap. iv. [Greek: hosper oud hæ hygieia kai ho iatros homoios aitia esti tou ugiainein].
[49][Greek: phronæsis] is here used in a partial sense to signify the Intellectual, as distinct from the Moral, element of Practical Wisdom.
[50]This is another case of an observation being thrown inobiter, not relevant to, but suggested by, the matter in hand.
[51]See Book II. chap. iii. and V. xiii.
[52]The article is supplied at [Greek: panourgous], because the abstract word has just been used expressly in a bad sense. “Up to anything” is the nearest equivalent to [Greek: panourgos], but too nearly approaches to a colloquial vulgarism.
[53]See the note on [Greek: Archæ] on page 4, l. 30.
[54]And for the Minor, of course,
“This particular action is———.”
We may paraphrase [Greek: to telos] by [Greek: ti dei prattein—ti gar dei prattein hæ mæ, to telos autæs estin] i.e. [Greek: tæs phronæseos].—(Chap. xi. of this Book.)
[55]“Look asquint on the face of truth.” Sir T. Browne, Religio Medici.
[56]The term [Greek: sophronikoi] must be understood as governing the signification of the other two terms, there being no single Greek term to denote in either case mere dispositions towards these Virtues.
[57]Compare the passage at the commencement of Book X. [Greek: nun de phainontai] [Greek: katokochimon ek tæs aretæs].
[58]It must be remembered, that [Greek: phronæsis] is used throughout this chapter in two senses, its proper and complete sense of Practical Wisdom, and its incomplete one of merely the Intellectual Element of it.
[1]The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto given represents rather what menmay bethan what theyare. In this book we take a practical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary, every day development.
[2]This illustrates the expression, “Deceitsof the Flesh.”
[3]Another reading omits the [Greek:——]; the meaning of the whole passage would be exactly the same—it would then run, “if he had been convinced of the rightness of what he does,i.e.if he were now acting on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change of conviction.”
[4]Major and minor Premises of the [Greek:——] [Greek——]
[5]Some necessarily implying knowledge of the particular, others not.
[6]As a modern parallel, take old Trumbull in Scott’s “Red Gauntlet.”
[7]That is, as I understand it, either the major or the minor premise, it is true, that “all that is sweet is pleasant,” it is true also, that “this is sweet,” what is contrary to Right Reason is the bringing in this minor to the majori.e.the universal maxim, forbidding to taste. Thus, a man goes to a convivial meeting with the maxim in his mind “All excess is to be avoided,” at a certain time his [Greek:——] tells him “This glass is excess.” As a matter of mere reasoning, he cannot help receiving the conclusion “This glass is to be avoided,” and supposing him to be morally sound he would accordingly abstain. But [Greek:——], being a simple tendency towards indulgence suggests, in place of the minor premise “This is excess,” its own premise “This is sweet,” this again suggests the self-indulgent maxim or principle (‘[Greek:——]), “All that is sweet is to be tasted,” and so, by strict logical sequence, proves “This glass is to be tasted.”The solution then of the phænomenon of [Greek:——] is this that [Greek:——], by its direct action on the animal nature, swamps the suggestions of Right Reason.On the high ground of Universals, [Greek:——] i.e. [Greek:——] easily defeats [Greek:——]. The [Greek:——], an hour before he is in temptation, would never deliberately prefer the maxim “All that is sweet is to be tasted” to “All excess is to be avoided.” The [Greek:——] would.
Horace has a good comment upon this (II Sat 2):Quæ virtus et quanta, bom, sit vivere parvoDiscite,non inter lances mensasque nitentesVerum hicimpransimecum disquirite
Compare also Proverbs XXIII. 31. “Look not thou upon the wine when it is red,” etc.
[8]As we commonly speak, Metaphysicians. Physiology of course includes Metaphysics.
[9][Greek: oron]. Aristotle’s own account of this word (Prior Analyt ii. 1) is [Greek: eis on dialuetai hae protasis], but both in the account of [Greek: nous] and here it seems that the proposition itself is really indicated by it.
[10]The Greek would give “avoids excessive pain,” but this is not true, for the excess of pain would be ground for excuse the warrant for translating as in the text, is the passage occurring just below [Greek: diokei tas uperbolas kai pheugei metrias lupas].
[11]Compare Bishop Butler on Particular Propensions, Analogy, Part I chap v sect. iv.
[12]That is, they are to the right states as Vice to Virtue.
[13]See the letter of Sabina Rentfree. Spectator, 431.
[14]Consult in connection with this Chapter the Chapter on [Greek: orgae] in the Rhetoric, II. 2, and Bishop Butler’s Sermon on Resentment.
[15]The reasoning here being somewhat obscure from the concisement of expression, the following exposition of it is subjoined.
Actions of Lust are wrong actions done with pleasure,Wrong actions done with pleasure are more justly objects of wrath,[*]Such as are more justly objects of wrath are more unjust,Actions of Lust are more unjust
[*][Greek: hubpis] is introduced as the single instance from which this premiss is proved inductively. See the account of it in the Chapter of the Rhetoric referred to in the preceding note.
[16][Greek: ton dae lechthenton]. Considerable difference of opinion exists as to the proper meaning of these words. The emendation which substitutes [Greek: akrataes] for [Greek: akolastos] removes all difficulty, as the clause would then naturally refer to [Greek: ton mae proairoumenon] but Zell adheres to the reading in the text of Bekker, because the authority of MSS and old editions is all on this side.I understand [Greek: mallon] as meant to modify the word [Greek: malakias], which properly denotes that phase of [Greek: akrasia] (not [Greek: akolasia]) which is caused by pain.The [Greek: akolastos]deliberatelypursues pleasure and declines pain if there is to be a distinct name for the latter phase, it comes under [Greek: malakia] more nearly than any other term, though perhaps not quite properly.Or the words may be understood as referring to the class of wrong acts caused by avoidance of pain, whether deliberate or otherwise, and then of course the names of [Greek: malakia] and [Greek: akolasia] may be fitly given respectively.
[17]“If we went into a hospital where all were sick or dying, we should think those least ill who were insensible to pain; a physician who knew the whole, would behold them with despair. And there is a mortification of the soul as well as of the body, in which the first symptoms of returning hope are pain and anguish” Sewell, Sermons to Young Men (Sermon xii.)
[18]Before the time of trial comes the man deliberately makes his Moral Choice to act rightly, but, at the moment of acting, the powerful strain of desire makes him contravene this choice his Will does not act in accordance with the affirmation or negation of his Reason. His actions are therefore of the mixed kind. See Book III. chap. i, and note on page 128.
[19]Let a man be punctualon principleto any one engagement in the day, and he must, as a matter of course, keep all his others in their due places relatively to this one; and so will often wear an appearance of being needlessly punctilious in trifles.
[20]Because he is destitute of these minor springs of action, which are intended to supply the defects of the higher principle.See Bishop Butler’s first Sermon on Compassion, and the conclusion of note on p. 129.
[1]“Owe no man anything, but toloveone another for he that loveth anotherhath fulfilled the Law.” Romans XIII. 8.
[2][Greek: kerameis]. The Proverb in full is a line from Hesiod, [Greek: kahi keramehus keramei koteei kai tektoni tekton].
[3]In this sense, therefore, is it sung of Mrs. Gilpin that she
“two stone bottles found,To hold the liquor that sheloved,And keep it safe and sound.”
[4]Cardwell’s reading, [Greek: tautae gar omoioi, kai ta loipa] is here adopted, as yielding a better sense than Bekker’s.
[5]The Great man will have a right to look for more Friendship than he bestows, but the Good mancanfeel Friendship only for, and in proportion to, the goodness of the other.
[6]See note on page 68, 1. 8.
[7]See I. Topics, Chap. v. on the various senses of [Greek: tauton].
[8]“For the mutual society, help, and comfort that the one ought to have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity.”
[9]Which one would be assuming he was, if one declined to recognise the obligation to requite the favour or kindness.
[1]“Neither the Son of man, that He shouldrepent.” Numbers xxiii. 19.“In a few instances the Second Intention, or Philosophical employment of a Term, is more extensive than the First Intention, or popular use.” Whately, Logic, iii. 10.
[2]“I have sometimes considered in what troublesome case is that Chamberlain in an Inn who being but one is to give attendance to many guests. For suppose them all in one chamber, yet, if one shall command him to come to the window, and the other to the table, and another to the bed, and another to the chimney, and another to come upstairs, and another to go downstairs, and all in the same instant, how would he be distracted to please them all? And yet such is the sad condition of nay soul by nature, not only a servant but a slave unto sin. Pride calls me to the window, gluttony to the table, wantonness to the bed, laziness to the chimney, ambition commands me to go upstairs, and covetousness to come down. Vices, I see, are as well contrary to themselves as to Virtue.” (Fuller’s Good Thoughts in Bad Times. Mix’t Contemplations, viii.)
[1]See note, p. 43.
[2]See Book II. chap. ix.
[3]See Book I. chap. v. ad finem.
[4]The notion alluded to is that of the [greek: idea]: that there is no real substantial good except the [greek: auto agathon], and therefore whatever is so called is so named in right of its participation in that.
[5]See note on page 136, 1. 15.
[6]Movement is, according to Aristotle, of six kinds:
From not being to being . . . . GenerationFrom being to not being . . . . DestructionFrom being to being more . . . . IncreaseFrom being to being less . . . . DiminutionFrom being here to being there . . Change of PlaceFrom being in this way to being in that Alteration
[7]Amay go to sleep quicker thanB, but cannotdo more sleepin a given time.
[8]Compare Book III. chap. vi. [Greek: osper kai epi ton somaton, k. t. l.]
[9]Which is of course a [Greek: genesis].
[10]That is, subordinate Movements are complete before the whole Movement is.
[11]Pleasure is so instantaneous a sensation, that it cannot be conceived divisible or incomplete; the longest continued Pleasure is only a succession of single sparks, so rapid as to give the appearance of a stream, of light.
[12]A man is as effectually hindered from taking a walk by the [Greek: allotria haedouae] of reading a novel, as by the [Greek: oikeia lupae] of gout in the feet.
[13]I have thus rendered [Greek: spoudae (ouk agnoon to hamartanomenon)]; but, though the English term does not represent the depth of the Greek one, it is some approximation to the truth to connect an earnest serious purpose with Happiness.
[14]Bishop Butler,contra(Sermon XV.).“Knowledge is not our proper Happiness. Whoever will in the least attend to the thing will see that it is the gaining, not the having, of it, which is the entertainment of the mind.” The two statements may however be reconciled. Aristotle may be well understood only to mean, that the pursuit of knowledge will be the pleasanter, the freer it is from the minor hindrances which attend onlearning.
[15]The clause immediately following indicates that Aristotle felt this statement to be at first sight startling, Happiness having been all the way through connected with [Greek: energeia], but the statement illustrates and confirms what was said in note on page 6, 1. 15.
[16]That is to say, he aims at producing not merely a happy aggregate, but an aggregate of happy individuals. Compare what is said of Legislators in the last chapter of Book I and the first of Book II.
[17]See note, page 146, 1. 17.