PART III.
Having explained and illustrated the etymology and syntax of the English language, as fully as the limits, which I have prescribed to myself, will permit, I would now request the reader’s attention to some additional observations.
The grammar of every language is merely a compilation of those general principles, or rules, agreeably to which that language is spoken. When I say, a compilation of rules, I would not be understood to mean, that the rules are first established, and the language afterwards modelled in conformity to these. The very reverse is the fact: language is antecedent to grammar. Words are framed and combined to express sentiment, before the grammarian can enter on his province. His sole business is, not to dictate forms of speech, or to prescribe law to our modes of expression; but, by observing the modes previously established, by remarking their similarities and dissimilarities, his province is to deduce and explain the general principles, and the particular forms, agreeably to which the speakers of that language express themselves. The philosopher does not determine by what laws the physical and moral world should be governed; but, by the careful observation and accurate comparison of the various phenomena presented to his view, he deduces and ascertains the general principles, by which the system is regulated. The province of the grammarian seems precisely similar. He is a mere digester and compiler, explaining whatarethe modes of speech, not dictating what theyshould be. He can neither assign to any word a meaning different from that which custom has annexed to it; nor can he alter a phraseology, to which universal suffrage has givenits sanction. Usage is, in this case, law; usagequem penes arbitrium est, et jus et norma loquendi. If it were now the practice to say, “I loves,” instead of “I love,” the former phraseology would rest on the same firm ground, on which the latter now stands; and “I love,” would be as much a violation of the rules of grammar, or, which is the same thing, of established usage, as “I loves” is at present.Regula est, quæ rem, quæ est, breviter enarrat; non ut ex regula jus sumatur, sed ex jure, quod est, regula fiat.—Paul. Leg. 1, de Reg. Jur.
Having said thus much to prevent misconception, and to define the proper province of the grammarian, I proceed to observe, that this usage, which gives law to language, in order to establish its authority, or to entitle its suffrage to our assent, must be, in the first place,reputable.
The vulgar in this, as in every other country, are, from their want of education, necessarily illiterate. Their native language is known to them no farther, than is requisite for the most common purposes of life. Their ideas are few, and consequently their stock of words poor and scanty. Nay, their poverty, in this respect, is not their only evil. Their narrow competence they abuse and pervert. Some words they misapply, others they corrupt; while many are employed by them, which have no sanction, but provincial or local authority. Hence the language of the vulgar, in one province, is sometimes hardly intelligible in another. Add to this, that debarred by their occupations from study, or generally averse to literary pursuits, they are necessarily strangers to the scientific improvements of a cultivated mind; and are therefore entirely unacquainted with that diction, which concerns the higher attainments of life. Ignorant of any general principles respecting language, to which they may appeal; unable to discriminate between right and wrong; prone therefore to adopt whatever usage casual circumstances may present; it is no wonder, if the language of the vulgar be a mixture of incongruity and error, neither perfectly consistent with itself, nor to themselves universally intelligible. Their usage, therefore, is not the standard, to which we must appeal for decisive authority;a usage so discordant and various, that we may justly apply to it the words of a celebrated critic,
Bellua multorum es capitum; nam quid sequar, aut quem?
Bellua multorum es capitum; nam quid sequar, aut quem?
Bellua multorum es capitum; nam quid sequar, aut quem?
The question then is, what is reputable usage? On this subject philologists have been divided. Dr. Campbell appears to me to decide judiciously, when he says, that the usage, to which we must appeal, is not that of the court, or of great men, nor even of authors of profound science, but of those, whose works are esteemed by the public, and who may, therefore, be denominatedreputableauthors. By referring to their practice, he appeals to a standard less equivocal, than if he had resorted to the authority of good writers; for, as he justly observes, there may be various opinions respecting the merits of authors, when there may be no disagreement concerning the rank which they hold in the estimation of the public; and, because it is the esteem of the public, and not their intrinsic merit, (though these go generally hand in hand,) that raises them to distinction, and stamps a value on their language. Besides, it is to be observed, that consummate knowledge is not always accompanied with a talent for communicating it: hence the sentiment may be confessedly valuable, while the language is regarded as of no authority.
This usage must be, in the second place,national. It must not be confined to this or that province; it must not be the usage of this or that district, the peculiarities of which are always ridiculous, and frequently unintelligible beyond its own limits; but it must be the general language of the country, intelligible everywhere, and in no place ridiculous. And, though the variety of dialects may collectively form a greater number of authorities than national usage can boast, taken singly they are much fewer. Those, to use Campbell’s apposite similitude, who deviate from the beaten road, may be incomparably more numerous than those who travel in it; yet, into whatever number of by-paths the former may be divided, there may not be found in any one of these tracks so many as travel in the king’s highway.
In the third place, this usage must bepresent. Here it may be asked, what is meant by present usage? Is it theusage of the present year, the present age, or the present century? How is it defined, or by what boundary is it limited? In short, how far may we revert in search of decisive authority? may we go back, for example, as far as Chaucer, or must we stop at the age of Addison?
In determining this matter, the same learned and judicious critic observes, that regard must be had to the species of composition and the nature of the subject. Poetry is properly allowed a greater latitude than prose; and therefore, a word, which in prose we should reject as a barbarism, may, with strict propriety, be admitted in verse. Here, also, there are limits which must not be passed; and, perhaps, any word, which cannot plead the authority of Milton, or of any contemporary or later poet, may be justly regarded as obsolete. In prose, no word, unless the subject be art or science, should be employed, which has been disused for a period greater than the age of man. This is the judgment of the same critic. Against this answer, indeed, it is possible to raise a thousand cavils; and, perhaps, we shall be reminded of the poet’s strictures on the termancientin his days[134]. One thing, however, is certain, that, though it be difficult to fix a precise limit, where the authority of precedent terminates, and legislative usage commences, or to define with precision the age of man, it must be acknowledged, that there are limits, in respect to usage, which we must not overleap, as there is a certain term, which the life of man cannot surpass.
As there is a period, beyond which precedent in language ceases to have authority; so, on the contrary, the usage of the present day is not implicitly to be adopted. Mankind are fond of novelty; and there is a fashion in language, as thereis in dress. Whim, vanity, and affectation, delight in creating new words. Of these, the far greater part soon sink into contempt. They figure for a little, like ephemeral productions, in tales, novels, and fugitive papers; and are shortly consigned to degradation and oblivion. Now, to adopt every new-fangled upstart at its birth, would argue not taste, nor judgment, but childish fondness for singularity and novelty. On the contrary, if any of these should maintain its ground, and receive the sanction of a reputable usage, to reject it, in this case, would be to resist that authority, to which every critic and grammarian must bow with submission. The termmob, for example, was, at its introduction, zealously opposed by Dean Swift. His resistance, however, was ineffectual; and to reject it now would betray prudish affectation, and fruitless perversity. The wordinimical, previously to the American war, could, I believe, plead, in its favour, only one authority. In some dictionaries, accordingly it was omitted; and in others stigmatized as a barbarism. It has now obtained a permanent establishment, and is justly admitted by every lexicographer.
“In words, as fashions, the same rule will hold;Alike fantastic, if too new or old:Be not the first, by whom the new are tried,Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.”Pope’s Essay on Criticism.
“In words, as fashions, the same rule will hold;Alike fantastic, if too new or old:Be not the first, by whom the new are tried,Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.”Pope’s Essay on Criticism.
“In words, as fashions, the same rule will hold;
Alike fantastic, if too new or old:
Be not the first, by whom the new are tried,
Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.”
Pope’s Essay on Criticism.
In short, in this, as in every other question on this subject, perspicuity should be our guide. If the subject be art or science, or if the composition be intended for literary men, then a greater latitude may be allowed, as the reader is supposed to be master of the language, in all its varieties. But if the subject be accommodated to common capacity, and the composition designed for ordinary readers, the rule now given, not to employ a word, which has been disused for a period greater than the age of man, will be deemed, I conceive, rational and necessary.
The usage, then, which gives law to language, and which is generally denominated “good usage,” must bereputable,national, andpresent. It happens, however, that “good usage” is not always uniform in her decisions, and that unquestionableauthorities are found for different modes of expression. In such cases, the following canons, proposed by the same author, will be of considerable service, in enabling the reader to decide, to which phraseology the preference is due. These canons I shall give, nearly in the words of the author; and illustrate them, as I proceed, by a few apposite examples, partly his, and partly my own.
Canon I.—When the usage is divided, as to any particular words or phrases, and when one of the expressions is susceptible of a different meaning, while the other admits only one signification, the expression, which is strictly univocal, should be preferred.
For this reason,aught[135], for “anything,” is better thanought;scarcely, as an adverb, better thanscarce;by consequenceis preferable toof consequence, which signifies also “of importance;” andexceedingly, as an adverb, is preferable toexceeding.
For the same reason,to purpose, for “to intend,” is better thanto propose, which signifies also “to lay before,” or “submit to consideration;” andproposal, for “a thing offered or proposed,” is better than “proposition,” which denotes also “a position,” or the “affirmation of any principle or maxim.” Thus we say, “he demonstrated Euclid’sproposition,” and “he rejected theproposalof his friend.”
Agreeably also to this canon,disposal, in common language, when a grant, or giving away is denoted, or when the management of anything is to be expressed, is preferable todisposition, which signifies alsoarrangement, and likewisetemper of mind; andexposure, as the verbal noun fromexpose, is better thanexposition, the verbal noun ofexpound. We should say, “the exposure of a fault,” and “the exposition of a text.” The analogous wordscomposure, fromcompose, andcomposition, fromcompound, orcompose, have been suffered to retain their distinct significations. “To speakcontemptuouslyof a person,” is better than “to speakcontemptibly;” the latter term meaning generally, “in a contemptible manner,” or, “in a manner worthy of contempt;”whereas the former is univocal, and denotesdisrespectfully, or “in a manner significant of contempt.”
For the same reason,obvious, for “evident,” is better thanapparent, which means also “seeming,” as opposed to “real.”
The termprimitive, as equivalent tooriginal, is preferable toprimary. The latter is synonymous withprincipal, and is opposed tosecondary; the former is equivalent tooriginal, and is opposed toderivativeoracquired. I shall illustrate this distinction by a few examples. The wordsfalsehoodandlieagree in expressing the same primary idea, namely, “contrariety to fact;” but they differ in their secondary ideas, the former implying simply, “inconsistency with physical truth,” the latter being a term of reproach, expressing “a wilful breach of veracity, or of moral truth.”To kill, andto murder, agree also in their primary ideas, both denoting “the deprivation of life;” but they differ in their secondary, the former implying no moral turpitude, the latter denoting an immoral act. From these examples it will appear, thatprimarydenotes “what is principal or chief,” as opposed to “secondary,” or “subordinate.”
Primitiveis equivalent tooriginal; thus we say, theprimitivemeaning of the wordvillain, was “a nearer tenant to the lord of the manor;” custom has altered its signification, and it now denotes “a wicked fellow.” Thus theprimaryand theprimitivemeaning of words may be very different; these terms, therefore, ought to be duly discriminated.
Intension, for “the act of stretching or straining,” is for the same reason, preferable tointention, which signifies also “purpose,” or “design.” “I am mistaken,” is frequently used to denote “I misunderstand,” or “I am in error;” but as this expression may also signify, “I am misunderstood,” it is better to say, “I mistake.”
This canon I would earnestly recommend to the observance of every writer, who is solicitous to exclude all unnecessary ambiguity, but more emphatically to my junior readers, who are peculiarly prone to the violation of this rule, misled by false notions of elegance and dignity. There prevails at present a foolish and ridiculous, not to say absurd, disposition in some writers, to prefer in every instance, with no discrimination,long to short words. They seem to entertain an inveterate antipathy to monosyllabic terms; and disdaining whatever savours of Saxon origin, are incessantly searching after thesesquipedalia verbaof Greek or Latin extraction, with no regard whatever to precision and perspicuity. Thus many words, which cannot be dismissed without detriment to the language, are falling into disuse, and their places supplied by equivocal and less appropriate terms.
Canon II.—In doubtful cases analogy should be regarded.
For this reason,contemporaryis better thancotemporary,conbeing used before a consonant, andcobefore a vowel; as,concomitant,coeval.
For the same reason, “he needs,” “he dares,” “whether he will or not,” are better than “he need,” “he dare,” “whether he will or no.” The last of the three phraseologies, here recommended, Priestley thinks exceptionable. To me, as to Campbell, the ellipsis appears evident; thus, “whether he will, or will not:” hence “will not” seems the only analogical expression.
Canon III.—When expressions are in other respects equal, that should be preferred, which is most agreeable to the ear. This requires no illustration.
Canon IV.—When none of the preceding rules take place, regard should be had to simplicity. On this ground, “accept,” “approve,” “admit,” are preferable to “accept of,” “approve of,” “admit of.”
I have already observed, that no expression, or mode of speech, can be justified, which is not sanctioned by usage. The converse, however, does not follow, that every phraseology, sanctioned by usage, should be retained; and, in such cases, custom may properly be checked by criticism, whose province it is, not only to remonstrate against the introduction of any word or phraseology, which may be either unnecessary or contrary to analogy, but also to extrude whatever is reprehensible, though in general use. It is by this exercise of her prerogative, that languages are gradually refinedand improved; and were this denied, language would soon become stationary, or more probably would hasten to decline. In exercising this authority, she cannot pretend to degrade instantly any phraseology, which she may deem objectionable; but she may, by repeated remonstrances, gradually effect its dismission. Her decisions in such cases may be properly regulated by the following canons, as delivered by the same author.
Canon I.—All words and phrases, particularly harsh, and not absolutely necessary, should be dismissed; as, “shamefacedness,” “unsuccessfulness,” “wrongheadedness.”
Canon II.—When the etymology plainly points to a different signification from what the word bears, propriety and simplicity require its dismission. For example, the word “beholden,” taken for “obliged,” or the verb “to unloose,” for “to loose,” or “untie,” should be rejected.
Canon III.—When words become obsolete, or are never used, but in particular phrases, they should be repudiated; as they give the style an air of vulgarity and cant, when their general disuse renders them obscure. Of these “lief,” “dint,” “whit,” “moot,” “pro and con,” furnish examples; as, “I had as lief go,” “by dint of argument,” “not a whit better,” “a moot point,” “it was argued pro and con.” These phraseologies are vulgar, and savour too much of cant to be admitted in good writing.
Canon IV.—All words and phrases, which, analyzed grammatically, include a solecism, should be dismissed; as, “I had rather go.” The expression should be, “I would,” or “I’d rather go:” and from the latter, the solecism “I had go,” seems by mistake to have arisen,I’dbeing erroneously conceived to be contracted forI had, instead of a contraction forI would. This is the opinion of Campbell, and to this opinion I expressed my assent, in the former edition of this Treatise. I acknowledge, however, that it now appears to me not strictly correct; and that Webster has not questioned its accuracy on insufficient grounds. In the phrases adduced byCampbell, such as “I’d go,” “I’d rather stay,” we can readily perceive the probability thatI’dis a contraction for “I would.” But in such expressions as “I had like to have been caught,” which occur not only in colloquial language, but also in authors of considerable name, it is impossible to admit Campbell’s explanation. I must observe also, that the phraseology, which he censures, occurs in some of our earliest writers, and is so frequently found in Pope and Swift, that one is tempted to infer, notwithstanding its solecistic appearance, that it is genuine English. It is difficult, however, nay, perhaps impossible, to reconcile it to analogy. Were I to offer conjecture on the subject, I should be inclined to say, that in such phrases as “I had go,”I hadis, by a grammatical figure very common in English, put forI would have, orI would possess, and that the simple name of the act or state, by an ellipsis perhaps of the verbal sign, is subjoined, as the object wished, no regard being had to the completion of the action; in the same manner as we say, I would havegone, when we wish the action perfected. But by whatever authority this phraseology may be recommended, and in whatever way it may be reconciled to the rules of syntax, it has so much the appearance of solecism, that I decidedly prefer with Campbell the unexceptional form of expression,I would. The phraseI had likeappears to me utterly irreconcilable with any principle of analogy.
Canon V.—All expressions, which, according to the established rules of the language, either have no meaning, or involve a contradiction, or, according to the fair construction of the words, convey a meaning different from the intention of the speaker, should be dismissed. Thus, when a person says, “he sings a good song,” the words strictly imply that “the song is good,” whereas the speaker means to say, “he sings well.” In like manner, when it is said, “this is the best part he acts,” the sentence, according to the strict interpretation of the words, expresses an opinion, not of his manner of acting, but of the part or character which he acts. It should be, “he acts this part best,” or “this is the part which he acts best.” “He plays a good fiddle,” for “heplays well on the fiddle,” is, for the same reason, objectionable.
Of expressions involving a contradiction, the following will serve as an example. “There were four ladies in company, every one prettier than another.” This is impossible. If A was prettier than B, B must have been less pretty than A; but by the expression every one was prettier than another, therefore B was also prettier than A. Such absurdities as this ought surely to be banished from every language[136].
Of those, which have little or no meaning, Campbell has given us examples, “currying favour,” “having a month’s mind,” “shooting at rovers.” Such modes of expression, he justly calls trash, the disgrace of any language.
These canons I have extracted from “Campbell on Rhetoric,” a book which I would recommend to the reader’s attentive perusal.
I proceed to observe, that to write any language with grammatical purity, implies these three things:
1st. That the words be all of that language.
2ndly. That they be construed and arranged, according to the rules of syntax in that language.
3rdly. That they be employed in that sense, which usage has annexed to them.
Grammatical purity, therefore, may be violated in three ways:
1st. The words may not be English. This error is called barbarism.
2ndly. Their construction may be contrary to the English idiom. This error is termed solecism.
3rdly. They may be used in a sense different from their established acceptation. This error is named impropriety[137].
The barbarism is an offence against lexicography, by admitting new words, as, “volupty,” “connexity,” “majestatic;” or by using obsolete words, as, “uneath,” “erst;” or anoffence against etymology, by improper inflection, as, “teached” for “taught,” “oxes” for “oxen.”
The solecism is an offence against the rules of syntax, as, “I reads,” “you was.”
The impropriety is an offence against lexicography, by mistaking the meaning of words or phrases.
A solecism is regarded by grammarians as a much greater offence than either of the others; because it betrays a greater ignorance of the principles of the language. Rhetorically considered, it is deemed a less trespass; for the rhetorician and grammarian estimate the magnitude of errors by different standards; the former inquiring only how far any error militates against the great purpose of his art—persuasion; the latter, how far it betrays an ignorance of the principles of grammar. Hence with the former, obscurity is the greatest trespass; with the latter, solecism, and that species of barbarism which violates the rules of etymology[138].