ZANDVOORDE
Following the loss of Kruiseik on the 29th came the loss of Zandvoorde on the 30th. The particular section in the line of defence known as the Zandvoorde trenches had from first to last been a death-trap, and had proved particularly expensive to the 3rd Cavalry Division, whose special privilege it had been to defend them. They curved round the south-east side of the village, following the contours of the ridge, and, being the most prominent feature in the entire Ypres salient, were particularly susceptible to shell-fire from all quarters, except the north. Their chief attraction, from the purely military point of view, lay in the fact that they were on the crest of a ridge some 120 feet high, which here juts out into the plain, and which faces the ridge of about the same height a mile and a quarter away, on which Kruiseik stands. Their weakness lay in the fact that they were practically surrounded by the enemy, and were even open to attack from the direction of Hollebeke, which lay due west of their southern extension. In these circumstances their loss on the 30th was not wholly a matter for regret.
At the moment of the final attack, the 7th C.B. (Household Cavalry) had already been in these trenches for three days and nights, under a ceaseless shell-fire from south and east, and occasionally even from west. In the case of the machine-gun section of the Blues, under Lord Worsley, that period was doubled, the detachment having been in the advance trenches for six days and nights unrelieved.
There is reason to believe that the supreme attack on Zandvoorde had originally been planned for the 29th, so as to take place simultaneously with that on Kruiseik, but a delay in the arrival of the XV. German Army Corps resulted in its postponement till the following day. The expected reinforcements arrived during the night of the 29th and—all being now according to arrangement—the attack took place at daybreak on the following morning.
The attack took the form of a storm of shrapnel and high-explosives of so terrific a nature that by nine o'clock the Household Cavalry trenches had been literally blown to pieces, and the brigade was forced to retire slowly down the hill, keeping up a covering fire as it went. The retirement was effected in good order, but Lord Hugh Grosvenor's squadron of the 1st Life Guards, "C" Squadron of the 2nd Life Guards, and Lord Worsley's machine-gun section of the Blues did not succeed in withdrawing with the rest of the brigade, and their fate is still a matter of uncertainty. It is probable, however, that, in the pandemonium which was reigning, the order to retire did not reach them, and that those who survived the bombardment awaited the infantry attack which followed, and fought it out to an absolute finish. An officer in the R. Welsh Fusiliers' trenches, on the left of the Zandvoorde trenches, subsequently described the defence put up that day by the Household Cavalry as one of the finest feats of the war. It may well be that untold deeds of heroism remain yet to be recorded in connection with that morning's work.[10]
The R. Welsh Fusiliers were on the right of the 22nd Brigade and on the left of the Household Cavalry, in trenches which curved back from the Zandvoorde trenches and faced in the main north-west, whereas the Zandvoorde trenches faced south-east. These trenches were at the best ill-constructed affairs, and were weakened in the middle by a big gap where the road from Zandvoorde to Becelaere passed through them.
The Zandvoorde trenches passed into the hands of the enemy soon after nine, and the Germans at once swarmed into them and began making their way along towards the north, till they reached a position from which they could get the Welsh Fusiliers in flank. Then began the annihilation of this very gallant regiment. From the moment that the Zandvoorde trenches went, its position was hopeless, its right flank being completely unprotected, and its own trenches disconnected and ill-adapted for mutual protection. The regiment, however, fought as it had fought on the 19th and again on the 20th and 21st. It fought, in the words of the C. in C., "till every officer had been killed or wounded; only ninety men rejoined the brigade." As a matter of fact, the exact number of survivors out of a battalion which a fortnight earlier had numbered 1,100 was 86, and these were shortly afterwards absorbed into the 2nd Queen's, their only remaining officer being the Quartermaster.
Among those that fell on that day were Captain Barker, Col. Cadogan and his Adjutant, Lieut. Dooner. The latter was killed in a very gallant attempt to cross the interval which divided the trenches, and investigate the state of affairs on the right; and the Colonel fell in an equally gallant attempt to rescue his subordinate after he had fallen.
The position was now—as may be supposed—extremely serious, the enemy being in complete possession of the Zandvoorde ridge. The 7th C.B. (Household Cavalry), when it had fallen back in the morning, had retired through the 6th C.B. and formed up in rear.
Its retreat had been greatly assisted by the magnificent work of the two Horse Artillery Batteries attached, viz., "C" Battery, under Major White, and "K" Battery, under Major Lamont. Both displayed the greatest daring and activity, and the latter succeeded in completely knocking out a German battery which was just coming into action on the Zandvoorde ridge.
In the meanwhile, the only force which stood in the way of the enemy was the 6th C.B., that is to say, three cavalry regiments, all considerably weakened by fighting. The gravity of the situation lay in the fact that if the Klein Zillebeke position went, there was nothing further to prevent the enemy marching straight into Ypres, only three miles distant, in which case the 1st A.C. and 7th Division would have been irretrievably cut off from their base and supplies, and the capture or annihilation of these three divisions would have inevitably followed.
Accordingly Sir Douglas Haig, quick to realize that the events of the next few hours would decide the making or marring of the campaign, sent out an ultimatum to the effect that the line to which we had now been driven,i.e., from Gheluvelt to the corner of the canal north of Hollebeke, was to be held at all costs. Concurrently an urgent appeal was sent to General Allenby to send up with all possible speed any and all regiments available. Allenby sent the Scots Greys and the 3rd and 4th Hussars—all from different brigades. The Greys and the 3rd Hussars arrived first on the scene, and passed across to the left flank of the 6th C.B., filling up, in fact, the gap between that brigade and General Bulfin's (2nd) Brigade on its left. The 4th Hussars, who had further to come, arrived in time to take up a position on the right of the Royals (who were the right-hand regiment of the 6th C.B.), and carry on the line of defence beyond the railway. The position then was that the line of the three regiments of the 6th C.B. was extended by the 3rd Hussars and Greys on the left, and by the 4th Hussars on the right.
The 7th C.B., who had concentrated at the little village of Zwartelen in rear of the 6th C.B., now sent off two squadrons of the Blues to support the Royals, who were holding the château at Hollebeke. This château lies on the low ground to the east of the canal, whereas Hollebeke itself is on the west side. The château was considerably in advance of the line which was ordered to be held, and with Zandvoorde gone was of no strategic importance. This combined force held off the enemy for some hours, during which time Sergt. McLellan, of the Royals, especially distinguished himself by several acts of great gallantry, but by midday the château had to be abandoned and was occupied by German infantry. Except for this loss, the cavalry line held its ground throughout the day. There was no further infantry attack, but it had to stand a severe shelling all through the afternoon, and its casualties were numerous, among those of the 10th Hussars being Captain Kinkead, Captain Fielden, Captain Stewart and the Hon. H. Baring.
The R. Sussex, too, in General Bulfin's 2nd Brigade, on the left of the cavalry, came in for their full share of the bombardment and suffered very severely, Col. Crispin and Lieuts. Croft, Marillier and Lousada being killed.
At five o'clock in the afternoon the five cavalry regiments were relieved by Lord Cavan's Brigade, the 2nd Grenadier Guards under Major Lord Bernard Lennox[11]taking over the position on the canal—later on to become famous under the name of Hill 60, while the Irish Guards continued the line on their left. The line was still further strengthened on the following morning by the addition of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry from the 5th Brigade, and the 2nd Gordon Highlanders from the 20th Brigade, these two battalions being added to General Bulfin's command, which was on the left of Lord Cavan's.
GHELUVELT
October 31st may be said to have witnessed the supreme effort of the enemy to break through to Ypres. The attack on this day was pressed simultaneously along the whole of our front from Messines to the Menin road, and lasted not only throughout the day but during the greater part of the night. This tremendous battle, covering as it did a frontage of twelve miles, can only be adequately described by cutting it up into three sections, the first of which deals with the fight along the Menin road, the second with the struggle at Klein Zillebeke, and the third with the attack on the cavalry corps at Wytschate and Messines.
We will deal first with the fight on the Menin road. Here, it will be remembered, our troops had been forced back on the 29th from a line just west of Kruiseik cross-roads to the Gheluvelt trenches, three-quarters of a mile further back, and on the higher ridge on which that village stands.
On the morning of the 31st the new position was in its turn attacked, and under conditions which in many ways recalled the fight of two days before. There was, however, this difference, that, while the attack of the 29th had been in the nature of a surprise in the fog, and had been unheralded by any previous cannonade, that of the 31st was preceded by a bombardment which, in point of violence, threw into the shade everything which the campaign had yet witnessed. The expenditure of ammunition must have been colossal. This terrific discharge of missiles commenced at daybreak, and gradually increased in volume up to eleven o'clock, when it ceased and the infantry attack commenced.
The shell-fire had been mainly focussed on the 3rd and 22nd Brigades in the neighbourhood of Gheluvelt. By the association of these two Brigades, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the Queen's (R. West Surrey Regiment) for the first time in history found themselves fighting side by side. The occasion was an historic one, but not without a strong note of tragedy, both battalions being in the direct track of the bombardment, and suffering very severely. Each battalion, too, lost its C.O. during the morning, Col. Pell of the 1st Battalion being killed and Col. Coles of the 2nd Battalion wounded.
The tactics of the enemy in these Menin road attacks almost always took the same form. All the batteries within the area would concentrate on the road and on the trenches immediately to right and left of the road, making these positions absolutely untenable. Then, when the troops in the track of the shell-fire had fallen back dazed into semi-unconsciousness by the inferno, they would drive a dense mass of infantry into the gap, and so enfilade—and very often surround—the trenches which were still occupied to right and left of the gap. By this method, companies, and sometimes whole battalions, which had stuck out the shell-fire, were overwhelmed and annihilated.
Such a fate on this occasion overtook the right flank company of the South Wales Borderers just north of Gheluvelt. This company formed the northern boundary of the gap caused by the bombardment, and the German wedge, spreading out towards the right, bore down on it from three sides. Major Lawrence, in command of the company, faced half the men about and kept up the fight to the bitter end, but it was merely a question of selling their lives as dearly as possible. The tide swept over them and they ceased to exist.
The remaining companies of the South Wales Borderers managed to maintain their ground till the line north of the road was re-established in the following way.
At 1.30 the 2nd Worcestershire Regiment, who were in reserve at the six cross-roads at the corner of the Polygon wood, a mile to the rear, were ordered to retake the lost position. This they did in the following very gallant manner, led by Major Hankey. They deployed in the woods just to the rear of Gheluvelt, and, advancing in a series of short rushes, charged right up to the line of the lost trenches. The last rush had to be made across 200 yards of open ground in the face of a terrific shrapnel fire. Over 100 of the Worcesters fell in this last rush, but the remainder charged home and drove out the Germans with heavy loss. The old trenches were found to have been filled in, but a sunken road just in rear provided fair cover, and this the Worcesters now lined, joining up their left with the right of the South Wales Borderers. The Germans, however, were still in the village itself and the position was at best a precarious one. They managed, however, to hold on till dark.
The Worcesters lost 187 men in this short, brilliant charge. The achievement was alluded to by the C. in C. as one of the finest in the whole campaign, and one which saved the army from a very awkward predicament.
The 1st Scots Guards, on the left of the South Wales Borderers again, as on the 29th, stood firm throughout the day, and contributed in no small measure to the ultimate repulse of the enemy. In the afternoon one company of this battalion was detached to co-operate in the counter-attack made by the Worcesters, and generally to re-establish the broken line north of Gheluvelt. This they succeeded in doing, with very able support from the 42nd Battery R.F.A., but in the doing of it lost Captain Wickham and Major Vandeweyer, the former of whom was killed.
Meanwhile another historic resistance was being put up south of the road by the 2nd R. Scots Fusiliers. This battalion formed the southern boundary of the gap, just as the South Wales Borderers formed the northern boundary; and when the German infantry wedge was forced in, it found its trenches very badly raked from the gardens of the château, where the enemy had installed some machine-guns. General Watt, the Brigadier, recognizing that the position of this regiment had now become untenable, telephoned through to them to retire. The wire, however, had been cut by shrapnel and the message did not arrive. Two orderlies were thereupon successively dispatched to order their retirement. Both were knocked over and again the order did not reach. In the meanwhile, Col. Baird Smith, having received no order to retire, continued to hold his ground with ever dwindling numbers, till in the end the German masses swept over them, and another gallant British battalion ceased to exist. Only seventy men, commanded by a junior officer, escaped the carnage of that day.
Five months later, General Watt, addressing the officers and men at Sailly, after another great performance by the same battalion, said with reference to this occasion: "Col. Baird Smith, gallant soldier that he was, decided and rightly to hold his ground, and the R. Scots Fusiliers fought and fought till the Germans absolutely surrounded them and swarmed into the trenches. I think it was perfectly splendid. Mind you, it was no case of 'hands up' or any nonsense of that sort; it was a fight to a finish. You may well be proud to belong to such a regiment and I am proud to have you in my brigade."
To the south of the R. Scots Fusiliers, and in the same brigade, were the 2nd Bedfords. This regiment, too, had suffered very severely during the day, both its senior officers, Major Traill and Major Stares, being killed, but the brigade order to retire had not failed to reach it, as in the case of the Scotchmen, and it had been able to effect its withdrawal in good order.
The Germans did not carry their advance beyond Gheluvelt. The ground they had gained had only been won by a prodigious expenditure of ammunition, followed by a reckless sacrifice of men, and their losses had been enormous. Their further progress, too, was barred by the troops which had been shelled out of the village in the morning. These were now formed up half facing the road between Gheluvelt and Veldhoek, and offered a successful bar to any further advance on the part of the enemy. The Germans, however, did not relinquish their attempts to push on to Veldhoek without further serious fighting, in the course of which the 2nd Queen's sustained still further losses, their three senior officers, Col. Coles, Major Croft and Major Bottomley falling wounded, as well as Captain Weeding and Lieut. Philpot. Night fell without any further advance on the part of the enemy. Gheluvelt itself, however, in spite of the gallant counter-attack north of the road, during the afternoon, may be considered as having been lost from this day on.
MESSINES AND WYTSCHATE
In order to avoid the confusion inseparable from a constant change of scene, it will be best to deal briefly now with the doings at Messines and Wytschate, after which the Klein Zillebeke section can monopolize our attention up to the close of this little chronicle. In order to pick up the thread where it was dropped, it will be necessary to go back to the 30th. On that day General Allenby wired to Head Quarters that his numbers were too weak to hold his position from the canal at Hollebeke to the La Doune stream, south of Messines, for long unaided, and the C. in C. at once responded by sending up four battalions from the 2nd A.C. under General Shaw to his assistance. These, as will presently be seen, arrived in the very nick of time to save the situation. Pending their arrival, the cavalry had a truly colossal task before them. They were absurdly outnumbered; they had opposed to them, in the XXIV. and II. Bavarian Corps, some of the finest fighters in the German Army, stimulated by the presence of the Kaiser himself, and they were engaged in a form of warfare to which they had never been trained. French reinforcements were being hurried up, it is true, but it was reckoned that, at the earliest, they could not arrive in less than forty-eight hours. During these forty-eight hours, could the cavalry, with the assistance which had been sent up from the 2nd A.C., successfully oppose the pressure of two army corps? This was the problem of the moment. We know now that it did succeed in doing so, but even with this fact behind us as a matter of history, we may still—in view of the extraordinary disparity in numbers—wonder as to how it was done.
First let us deal with Messines, which was almost on the southern boundary of the Cavalry Corps position. Here we find posted the 1st and 2nd C.B., or, to be more exact, these two brigades were in the trenches to the east of that town, the Bays being on the north side, then the 9th Lancers and 4th Dragoon Guards, with the 5th Dragoon Guards to the south. In reserve, in the second line, were the 18th and 11th Hussars. The latter regiment had suffered severely from the bombardment on the previous day, their trenches being completely blown in and many men buried and killed. Amongst the officers, Lieuts. Chaytor and Lawson-Smith had been killed, and Lieut.-Col. Pitman, Major Anderson and the Hon. C. Mulholland wounded. Again, on the following day, the regiment lost a very fine athlete, and a champion boxer, in Captain Halliday, who was killed by a shell near the Convent.
In spite of an appalling bombardment, the regiments in the front line held on all through the night of the 30th, and up to midday on the 31st. Then they began to be gradually driven back, and by 2 p.m. they were all in the town. The retirement was effected in perfect order. Corpl. Seaton, 9th Lancers, behaved with extraordinary courage during this movement and was recommended for the Victoria Cross. With the idea of helping the withdrawal of his regiment, he remained absolutely alone in his trench working his machine-gun till the enemy were within twenty yards. Incredible as it may appear, he then managed, thanks to great coolness and presence of mind, to rejoin his regiment unwounded.
Once in the town, the cavalry lined the houses of the main street from end to end, and there awaited developments. These took the form of a cessation of the shelling and a very determined attempt on the part of the Bavarians to take the town. They failed, however, to get across the square, being shot down in numbers from the windows of the houses opposite. A second and more carefully thought-out attack followed later, and it is doubtful how this might have ended but for the opportune arrival of the K.O.S.B. and the K.O.Y.L.I., one at each end of the town. This reinforcement once more turned the scale against the Bavarians, and for the second time they were driven back. Both the infantry battalions engaged, in the words of General Allenby to Sir Horace, "fought magnificently," but the K.O.Y.L.I. lost its CO., Col. King, who was killed while leading that regiment to the attack. The respite of the cavalry was short. The enemy was in over-powering force and they were not to be denied. They now proceeded for five solid hours to shell the place with every conceivable species of projectile known to warfare. At 2 a.m. on the 31st the infantry attacked for the third time.
In the meanwhile the only available reserve was being hurried up from Neuve Eglise, as fast as motor-buses could bring it. This was the London Scottish, which had arrived at the front the day previous, after having been employed for some weeks at the base. They reached Messines during the preliminary bombardment on the night of the 30th, and, before going into action, were split up, half of the battalion joining up with the K.O.S.B. at one end of the town, and the rest with the K.O.Y.L.I. at the other. There was a full moon and a clear sky, and it was as light as day, and it has been said that for picturesque effect no incident in the war has equalled that night attack on Messines. An additional interest was lent to the scene by the fact that the London Scottish were the first Territorial battalion to be in action, and there was some speculation as to how their conduct would compare with that of the Regulars. It is now a matter of history that they acquitted themselves as well as the most tried troops, and that under exceptionally trying circumstances. If it be true that casualties in killed and wounded are the barometer of a regiment's intrepidity, then they indeed register high in the scale, for they lost 9 officers and 400 men in that first night's fighting. In any event they rendered very valuable service in an acute emergency, and it is on record that in a hand to hand bayonet encounter with the Bavarians, they actually drove those noted warriors back. The odds, however, were altogether too great against the little British force, and on the morning of November 1st Messines passed into the hands of the enemy.
A feat so remarkable as to rival the deeds of Shaw, the Lifeguardsman, was performed by Sergt.-Major Wright, of the Carabineers, during this defence of Messines. This N.C.O., while carrying a message to Head Quarters, found his path blocked by a part of the enemy. Without a moment's hesitation he charged them and cut his way through, killing five. Another Carabineer who behaved with repeated gallantry during these operations was Pte. Meston, and both he and Sergt.-Major Wright were given the D.C.M.
On the same night,i.e., the night of October 31st, Wytschate shared the fate of Messines.
The 4th C.B. had succeeded in holding this place throughout the day, but during the course of the night they found themselves very hard pressed, and were gradually forced back. In this emergency the Northumberland Fusiliers and Lincolns were ordered up to the support of the cavalry.
These two 9th Brigade battalions had arrived at Kemmel during the afternoon, having marched that day from Estaires, a distance of some twelve miles. They were in billets, resting after their hard day's work, when the message arrived, about one o'clock in the morning, to the effect that they were required. Within an hour from the receipt of the message both battalions were on the road, the Lincolns being the first to arrive on the scene of action. The country was totally unknown to the newcomers, but a cavalry sergeant was met who volunteered to lead them to the position occupied by the enemy. Under his guidance they entered the cutting through which the light railway, which runs along the edge of the road from Kemmel to Wytschate, passes just before it reaches the town. Here they became aware of a number of men moving in their direction, who called out in excellent English and Hindustani that they were British cavalry and Indians. Before the actual identity of these men could, in the gloom of the night, be ascertained for certain, the newcomers opened fire, both from the end of the cutting and from the sides; and the Lincolns, who were closely packed in the narrow defile, fell in numbers before they could be extricated. After getting clear, they met the Northumberland Fusiliers advancing from the direction of Kemmel, and together the two battalions formed up, and with great gallantry once more attacked the entrance to the town. The inequality in numbers, however, was too great. The Germans were literally swarming in the town, and it was clear that General Shaw's two battalions had been set to an impossible task. They retired to the outskirts of the town, where they held on till daylight, lying in the open fields. When dawn broke the London Scottish could be seen on their right, but no troops on their left. The unpleasantness of the situation was not in any way relieved by a heavy fire which our own artillery now opened upon the two battalions, under the mistaken impression that they were Germans. Many men were killed and wounded by this fire. In conformity with the general plan of retiring to the Wulverghem road, the Lincolns and Northumberland Fusiliers were now withdrawn, and Wytschate went the way of Messines. The Lincolns lost 400 men and all but 4 officers during this short night attack. Col. W. E. Smith was specially commended for the great personal courage which he showed during the attack, and for the skill with which he ultimately withdrew his regiment. Lieut. Blackwood was awarded the D.S.O. for very gallantly continuing to lead the attack after every officer senior to himself had fallen. The losses of the Northumberland Fusiliers were not quite so heavy, but were still very severe, especially in officers.
The dismounted cavalry line now retired to the Wulverghem to Kemmel road, where they entrenched themselves, but their numbers were quite inadequate for the frontage to be held. Pending the arrival of the French, Sir Horace was ordered by the C. in C. to send up to their assistance every available man from the 2nd A.C., which was recouping at Pradelles. The Dorsets and Worcesters were accordingly sent to Neuve Eglise, and the remaining seven and a half battalions—all skeletons—were sent up to east of Bailleul under General Morland. Such was the position on November 1st.
On this day the anxiously awaited 16th French Army began to arrive, the troops being railed up at the rate of eighty train loads a day, and at 11 a.m. on the 2nd, both Messines and Wytschate were retaken by the French with some assistance from our cavalry. Some of the 12th Lancers, led by 2nd Lieut. Williams, of the Scots Greys, made a very brilliant bayonet charge during the recapture of the latter town. The above-mentioned officer was officially reported to have himself killed eleven Germans on this occasion, and was awarded the D.S.O.
The French now officially took over from us the line from Messines on the south to the canal on the north. It is interesting to note that, between October 27th and November 11th, some 200,000 French infantry, twenty regiments of cavalry and sixty pieces of heavy artillery reached Ypres, Poperinghe, and Bailleul. It is difficult to conceive of any more eloquent tribute to the astonishing performance of the thin little khaki ribbon, which had for a fortnight wound round Ypres, than the fact that this great force was found none too strong to hold one fourth of the front over which our handful of men had so far successfully resisted all the attempts of the enemy to break through. In calling attention to these figures, it is not intended in any sense to draw invidious comparisons between the relative merits of the French and British soldier, or even to suggest that the British troops accomplished a task of which the French would have been incapable. It is generally admitted by all our commanders at the front that the Frenchman as a fighter is unsurpassed, though his methods of fighting are not the same as ours; and, allowing for the fact that, in cases where the entire manhood of a nation fights, the average of individual excellence must obviously be lower than when only a select body of volunteers is engaged, for explanatory purposes with regard to the disposition of troops, one may safely reckon a French and British regiment as being of equal fighting value.
All that is aimed at, then, is to try and bring to the mind of the reader, by a comparison of figures, some grasp of the immensity of the performance of our troops east and south of Ypres, during the desperate efforts of the enemy to break through in the last fortnight of October and the first fortnight of November. It is worthy of note, too, that in spite of the huge reinforcements brought up, no material advance was made on the position taken over from us on November 1st. It is true that on the day following, the newly-arrived French troops re-took Wytschate and Messines, from which we had been driven, but they were unable to hold those places, and the line along which they had found us facing the enemy was never perceptibly advanced. The new line at the beginning of November, held jointly by the French troops and British cavalry, ran—roughly speaking—from Klein Zillebeke to Ploegsteert, with a concave face which skirted Hollebeke, Wytschate, and Messines. Our 1st Cavalry Division, supported by some units from the 2nd A.C., was withdrawn to Wulverghem, and the 2nd Cavalry Division went into reserve at Bailleul. Neuve Eglise became our advanced base for that part of the line, and was very quickly packed with British troops.
We have now taken a permanent farewell, as far as these pages are concerned, of all occurrences south of the canal at Hollebeke. We have seen the 2nd A.C. relieved by the Indians, and the Cavalry Corps relieved by the French, and, with this change of guardianship, we have seen two of the most important points in the line of defence pass out of the keeping of the original Expeditionary Force.
Of that force the 1st A.C. alone (with the 7th Division, which it had absorbed) still remained unrelieved east and south-east of Ypres. The force, however, which now stood between the enemy and the possession of Ypres, had by this time lost many of its distinctive characteristics. The actual battalion units had become in most cases reduced to a mere shadow of their original strength. The 7th Division had become part of the 1st A.C., and several battalions of the 2nd A.C. were acting in concert with this already mixed corps. Many of the brigades had been broken up from their original constituents, and the fragments consolidated into new and temporary brigades. Sir Horace was for the moment an A.C. commander without an A.C., the remnants of his six heroic brigades being scattered here and there along the whole front.
The first, and perhaps the most interesting, because the most strenuous, epoch in the war—as far as it concerned the British Force—was nearly closed; but not quite. Before that can be written of it, some great deeds had yet to be done, and were done. The Germans were still making continuous and determined efforts to break through to Ypres by way of Klein Zillebeke, and to that particular zone of the fighting our attention can henceforth be confined.
KLEIN ZILLEBEKE
When we last took leave of the Klein Zillebeke section of the fighting line, on the night of October 30th, the cavalry position from Klein Zillebeke to the canal had just been taken over by Lord Cavan with the 2nd Grenadiers and Irish Guards, the former being on the canal. On the left of the Irish Guards were the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, with the Oxford Light Infantry in reserve, and beyond them the Sussex and Northamptons, with their left joining up with the 22nd Brigade. On the left of the 22nd Brigade was the 21st Brigade, with the 2nd R. Scots Fusiliers on its extreme flank just south of the Menin road at Gheluvelt. The 20th Brigade was in reserve.
During the morning the 3rd Cavalry Division was kept at Verbranden Molen ready for emergencies, but about 1 p.m. orders were received for it to go to the support of the 3rd C.B. at St. Eloi. Contradictory orders were, however, afterwards received, and in the end the brigade joined up with the 4th Hussars, and together they held the two bridges over the canal at the bend just north of Hollebeke till nightfall. In this action Sergt. Seddons, of the 4th Hussars, showed great gallantry during the defence of the eastern bridge and was deservedly awarded the D.C.M. In the meanwhile the 6th C.B. was sent along the Menin road so as to be ready to co-operate with the 7th Division or the 1st A.C. in case of need. That need—as will presently be seen—very quickly arose.
The original plan for this day had been to attack and retake the Zandvoorde ridge, together with the trenches which had been lost the day before, but the enemy's extreme activity rendered this impracticable, and we were in the end forced to act purely on the defensive.
We are now, be it remembered, dealing with the morning of October 31st, the day on which the cavalry were driven out of Wytschate and Messines and the 1st and 7th Divisions out of Gheluvelt. The terrific bombardment of that morning has already been described. It was chiefly concentrated on the Menin road, but the whole line from Gheluvelt to the canal was involved.
The 2nd Brigade, which was between the two Guards' battalions and the 7th Division, had a curious experience during the morning. It survived the bombardment, and when this slackened to allow the German infantry to advance, it was still in its trenches and prepared to remain there. About eight o'clock, however, General Bulfin summoned the four C.O.'s of the brigade, and ordered a general retirement of the brigade to the cross-roads at Zillebeke, about a mile in rear. This was duly carried out, and without much loss on the part of the Sussex and Northamptons, who were able to retire through the Zwartelen woods without coming under observation. The 2nd Gordon Highlanders, however (attached temporarily to the 2nd Brigade), were less fortunate. Their trenches were in the open, running north-eastward from Klein Zillebeke farm along the edge of the country lane known as the Brown Road, and, in retiring, they had to cross a considerable tract of exposed ground, during which they suffered very severely from machine-gun fire, Captain McLean's company being practically wiped out.
It was afterwards freely rumoured that this order to retire had been delivered to General Bulfin, as a Divisional Order, by a German dressed in the uniform of a British Staff officer. Some colour is given to this rumour by the extreme improbability of such an order having been officially given after Sir Douglas Haig's ultimatum of the day before, that the line which this apocryphal order caused to be abandoned was to be held at all costs. In any event, it is a matter of history that those concerned did not accept the retired position as a permanency, and a counter-attack was quickly organized. The 6th C.B., which had been waiting in reserve on the Menin road, was brought up as far as the Basseville brook, where they deployed to the south, and, partly mounted and partly dismounted, charged through the Zwartelen woods. Simultaneously the Gordon Highlanders, now reduced to 300, and under the command of Major Craufurd (Col. Uniacke having been knocked out by a shell earlier in the day), charged on the right of the cavalry, with the Oxford Light Infantry extending the line again on their right. Before this united movement the Bavarian troops in the woods turned and ran, but, true to their principles, continued to cover their retreat with a heavy machine-gun fire. Two of these machine-guns were successfully located, and the 6th C.B. menhandled a gun into the firing line and knocked them both out in fine style. This broke the back of the resistance. The Bavarians started surrendering, and the Gordon Highlanders took a number of prisoners up to the time when Lieut. Grahame was shot dead by an officer who had surrendered to him; after that they took fewer.
The enemy losses were very heavy. Eight hundred and seventy prisoners were taken during the day, and the number of killed and wounded in the woods ran into several hundreds.
This charge—successful though it had been in clearing the Zwartelen woods of the enemy—had not yet reinstated the 2nd Brigade in the line which they had occupied in the morning, before the much-discussed order to retire had arisen. General Bulfin therefore decided to try during the night to regain the morning position. Accordingly at midnight, under the full moon, and at the same time that the desperate battle was raging round Messines and Wytschate eight miles to the south-west, the 2nd Brigade made their second counter-attack. This, as far as it went, was a complete success. The trenches were carried and occupied, and the Germans driven out. Unfortunately, however, the 22nd Brigade, on the left, found themselves unable to get up into line, and, owing to their left being unprotected, the 2nd Brigade battalions had one after the other—in succession from the left—to fall back again.
These two attacks,i.e., the afternoon charge through the woods and the midnight assault on the trenches, had now reduced the Gordons to 3 officers and 110 men, and these were for the time being amalgamated with the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, who were on their right. The Irish Guards remained in their original position, on the right of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, but the 2nd Grenadiers were relieved by French Territorials and went back into reserve.
The nett result of this terrible day's fighting was that our line was pushed back everywhere, except at Klein Zillebeke and Zonnebeke, the two points which marked the northern and southern limits of the Ypres salient. The effect of the recapture of the Gheluvelt position by the 2nd Worcesters and 1st Scots Guards was neutralized by the cave in the line south of that place, which rendered Gheluvelt untenable. It had therefore to be abandoned. The loss of that place, however, was of no material importance, as its abandonment had long been recognized as a necessary step in the gradual straightening out of the Ypres salient. The only serious effect of the new line was that Klein Zillebeke, which for long had been the re-entering angle, so to speak, of the position, now, by the retirements to right and left of it, was pushed forward into a species of salient, and its vulnerability was thereby appreciably increased. This increased vulnerability at once transformed Klein Zillebeke into the centre of interest as far as this zone was concerned, this little village being—for reasons already given—a spot which at any and all costs had to be kept from the enemy. To Klein Zillebeke and neighbourhood, then, we may not unreasonably look for early developments.
One of the many unhappy incidents of this day's costly fighting was the landing of a shell in the Divisional Head Quarters at Hooge, by which General Lomax received wounds from which he subsequently died, General Munro was rendered unconscious, and Col. Kerr and five staff officers were killed.
THE RELIEF OF THE SEVENTH DIVISION
All through the 31st and morning following, the Irish Guards on the right of the Gordon Highlanders were subjected to a relentless shelling, and their casualties were considerable. On the morning of November 1st both their machine-guns were knocked out, and at 3 p.m. news came that they were retiring. Lord Cavan sent word for them to hold on some 200 yards to the rear, and also for the French Territorials between them and the canal at Hollebeke to hold on to their position at all costs. This the French managed to do, with very great credit to themselves, at the same time throwing back their left so as to keep in touch with the new position.
The Germans at once occupied the Irish Guards' trenches, but luckily did not realize the position sufficiently to pursue their advantage further, otherwise the consequences might have been serious. As it was, sufficient time was given for the 2nd Grenadiers and 7th C.B. to come up in support, and with this stiffening the new line was held for the rest of the day. But there was a cave at Klein Zillebeke.
The Irish Guards had 400 casualties during this and the previous day's fighting, including 11 officers: Major Stepney, the Hon. A. Mulholland and Lieuts. Coke and Mathieson being killed, and Col. Lord Ardee (attached from the Grenadiers), the Hon. T. Vesey, the Hon. A. Alexander, Lieuts. Fergusson, Gore-Langton, Lord Kingston, and Lord Francis Scott (attached from Grenadiers), wounded. The last named officer and Captain Orr-Ewing (attached from Scots Guards) were each awarded the D.S.O. "for gallant and persistent attempts to rally the battalion."
On the morning of November 2nd there was a renewal of the regulation attack along the Menin road. This time the attack took the form of a high-explosive bombardment of the barricade across the road at Veldhoek. This was soon demolished and an infantry attack on the 1st Brigade ensued, as a result of which that skeleton brigade yielded 300 yards of ground, but held on to the trenches in rear till nightfall.
Further south, about 11.30 on the same morning, a tremendous attack was delivered against the 2nd Brigade, in the course of which Gen. Bulfin was wounded and part of the line driven in. An urgent appeal for support was sent to Lord Cavan, upon whom it now devolved to take over command of Gen. Bulfin's four battalions, in addition to his own two. He made his way with all speed to the scene of action, with a view to discovering the extent of the mischief. This proved to be (so far) that the Northamptons had been driven in, and that the enemy—following up—had broken through in numbers into the Hooge woods. Beyond the Northamptons, that is to say, on the left of his new command, the R. Sussex were still standing firm. This regiment, however, was greatly reduced in numbers, its casualties during the last four days having averaged over a hundred per day. On the 30th Col. Crispin had been killed; on the following day his successor, Major Green, had been killed, and the regiment was at the moment under the command of Captain Villiers. Lord Cavan found it in an extremely precarious situation, owing to its weak numerical condition, and the envelopment of its right flank, consequent upon the Northamptons' retirement. He thereupon hurried up the 2nd Grenadiers from reserve as far as the Brown Road, where he ordered them to leave their packs and go straight through the wood towards the south-east with the bayonet.
These Ypres woods have all the appearance of an English copse wood, that is to say, they are formed of some six years' growth of hazel and ash, with standard oaks dotted about here and there. Incidentally they were at this time full of pheasants, destined to be shot in normal times by the Lords of the Châteaux of Hooge, Gheluvelt and Heronhage. Precisely in the manner of a line of beaters driving game, the Grenadiers now pushed through the thick undergrowth, and while the pheasants rose before the advancing line, so did the Germans run. By 4.30 the wood was cleared and the morning line restored. The Northamptons thereupon re-occupied their trenches, but they were not destined to be left there in peace. About six in the evening the Germans again attacked the same part of the line, this time advancing with discordant yells, thinking, no doubt, to repeat their performance of the morning. If so, the event must have come to them as something of a surprise, for the Northamptons—profiting possibly by their previous experience—coolly waited till the attacking party was within fifty yards of the trenches, and then mowed them down. Not a German reached the trenches, and over 200 dead were left on the ground.
At night the R. Sussex were brought back into reserve and the remnant of the Gordons went back to the 20th Brigade, which brigade was at the time in the grounds of the Hooge Château. In addition to their previous losses, the Gordons had during the day lost their C.O., Major Craufurd, who was wounded in the early morning. The position of Lord Cavan's command was then, as follows: the Northamptons on the left, in touch with the R. Welsh Fusiliers in the 7th Division; then the Oxfordshire Light Infantry and the 2nd Grenadiers, who had become very much mixed up, and on the right the Irish Guards. Beyond were the French Territorials.
With the fall of night on the 2nd of November the acuteness of the five days' crisis may be said to have passed. The all-highest War Lord had come and gone; the supreme effort of the enemy to break through to Ypres had been made, and had failed; the British force had come out of the ordeal reduced to a shadow, and battered out of recognition, but unconquered. The Kaiser's forces had fallen back sullen and—for the time being—disheartened, realizing at last the hopelessness of the task they had been set to accomplish. Their losses had been prodigious, and though their repeated attacks had—at great sacrifice—forced back the face of the Ypres salient some two miles, the only military effect resulting therefrom was that the British force was at last in occupation of the true line of defence dictated by military prudence and the natural features of the country. From this line, that is to say, the ridge some 150 feet in height which runs from the corner of the canal at Hollebeke to Zonnebeke, they were never afterwards dislodged.
The 3rd, 4th and 5th were in the main uneventful. November 5th was chiefly memorable in this year, not for anti-Popish demonstrations, but as the day on which the 7th Division—after three weeks' incessant fighting—was temporarily relieved. During the three weeks in question it had lost 356 officers out of a full complement of 400, and 9,664 rank and file out of a total of 12,000. Battalions had been reduced to the dimensions of platoons, and had, in some cases, lost every combatant officer.
The 7th Division's performance, during its three weeks east of Ypres, will go down to history as one of the most remarkable achievements in the records of war. Many other units had, by the second half of November, lost as heavily in officers and men as had the twelve battalions of the 7th Division—in one or two cases even more heavily; but the losses of these had been distributed over three months; those of the 7th Division were concentrated into three weeks. They had been suddenly pitchforked into a position of the most supreme responsibility. They found themselves more by chance than by design standing in the road along which the War Lord had elected to make his most determined efforts to reach Calais. These efforts came as a succession of hammer-blows, which gave the defending force neither rest nor respite, and to cope with which their numbers were ludicrously insufficient. Their failure, however, would have spelt disaster to the cause of the Allies, and—realizing this—they actually achieved the impossible. There is something particularly stirring in the thought of this small force beaten back step by step, as fresh and fresh troops were hurled upon it day after day, and yet never turning its back to the foe, never beaten, never despondent, and never for a moment failing in the trust which had been imposed upon it. The most remarkable feature about the 7th Division was that it had no weak spot in its composition. Each one of its twelve battalions lived up in every particular to the high standard of duty and efficiency which the Division set itself from the beginning. The troops were mostly veterans from abroad, who had been summoned back from foreign service too late to take part in the earlier stages of the war, and they may therefore in a sense be considered as picked troops.[12]
The 7th and 15th Brigades from the 2nd A.C., who relieved the 7th Division, were themselves sadly thinned in numbers. The 7th Brigade, which took the place of the 20th Brigade, had, in fact, lost seventy-four per cent. of its numbers during the fighting round La Bassée, and was in almost as bad a plight as the 20th Brigade, which it relieved. The 15th Brigade, which replaced the 22nd, was rather stronger, having received drafts from home.
The 20th Brigade went back to Locre, and the 22nd to Bailleul. The 21st—which perhaps had suffered rather the least of the three—remained for the time being in the trenches.
At night the 6th C.B. took over the trenches at Heronhage Château from the 3rd Brigade, who had been having a rough time during the preceding days, and these went back into reserve.