FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[11]The XIIth Corps never stood on the right. It occupied its assigned position on the extreme left, and the delay arose from the Guard Corps having occupied a position other than that designed for it, and having been allowed to remain there.[12]Vionville in text seems a slip of the pen for Verneville.[13]Commanding the Guard Corps.[14]Of Saxony, commanding XIIth Corps.[15]These figures represent only the infantry of the eight (not seven) Corps engaged; they do not include the cavalry, 24,584; the artillery, at least as strong; nor the officerhood of the two armies, numbering several thousands. Inclusive of those items the German host "employed" in the battle of Gravelotte—St. Privat numbered, in round figures, 232,000 combatants. Accepting Moltke's own estimate of ten defenders per "Schrith" of front, there works out a total of 133,000 men, as the strength of the French army "employed" in the battle.[16]During the first fourteen days of August, the German troops were in conflict with the enemy on five occasions: viz. Saarbrücken, 2nd, loss 79; Weissenburg, 4th, loss 1551; Wörth, 6th, loss 10,642; Spicheren, 6th, loss 4871; Borny, 14th, loss 5000. Total losses during the fourteen days, 22,143.

[11]The XIIth Corps never stood on the right. It occupied its assigned position on the extreme left, and the delay arose from the Guard Corps having occupied a position other than that designed for it, and having been allowed to remain there.

[12]Vionville in text seems a slip of the pen for Verneville.

[13]Commanding the Guard Corps.

[14]Of Saxony, commanding XIIth Corps.

[15]These figures represent only the infantry of the eight (not seven) Corps engaged; they do not include the cavalry, 24,584; the artillery, at least as strong; nor the officerhood of the two armies, numbering several thousands. Inclusive of those items the German host "employed" in the battle of Gravelotte—St. Privat numbered, in round figures, 232,000 combatants. Accepting Moltke's own estimate of ten defenders per "Schrith" of front, there works out a total of 133,000 men, as the strength of the French army "employed" in the battle.

[16]During the first fourteen days of August, the German troops were in conflict with the enemy on five occasions: viz. Saarbrücken, 2nd, loss 79; Weissenburg, 4th, loss 1551; Wörth, 6th, loss 10,642; Spicheren, 6th, loss 4871; Borny, 14th, loss 5000. Total losses during the fourteen days, 22,143.

The siege of Metz had formed no part of the original plan of campaign; it had been intended to do no more than merely to maintain an observation on the place when the main army should have passed it on the advance towards Paris; and a Reserve Division, consisting of eighteen battalions, sixteen squadrons, and thirty-six guns, detailed for that duty, was now near at hand.

Under the altered conditions, however, the regular investment of Metz was now necessary, and this involved a radical alteration of the existing arrangements throughout the whole army.

A separate army under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, consisting of the Ist, VIIth, and VIIIth Corps of the former Ist Army, the IInd, IIIrd, IXth, and Xth Corps of the IInd Army, the Reserve Division and the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, in all 150,000 men, was assigned to the duty of investing Metz.

The Guard, IVth, and XIIth Corps and the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions were formed into a separate army under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony; it was styled "The Army of the Meuse" and was 138,000 strong.[17]This and the IIIrd Army, whichnumbered 223,000 men, were directed to advance against the new French army forming at Châlons.

Certainly the army investing Metz was left weaker than the blockaded enemy. It was to be expected that the latter would renew his efforts to break out to the westward. Prince Frederick Charles' main forces were therefore to remain on the left bank of the Moselle.

All these orders received the approval of the King, and were dispatched to the commanding officers by eleven o'clock on the morning of the 19th.

In accordance with the orders of Prince Frederick Charles, the Xth Corps occupied the woodland districts of the lower Moselle as far as St. Privat, while the IInd held the high ridge from that point to Moscou. To the right of the IInd, the VIIIth and VIIth Corps followed on, the latter positioned on both sides of the Upper Moselle. The Ist Corps occupied the Pouilly upland to left and right of the Seille, specially charged to protect the great magazines which were being established at Remilly and Pont à Mousson. The 3rd Reserve Division moved to the vicinity of Retonfay, north-east of Metz. The IXth and IIIrd Corps cantoned at St. Marie and Verneville as reserve. All the troops immediately set about the construction of earthworks, and of bridges over the Moselle above and below the fortress.

Of the Corps now belonging to the Army of the Meuse, the XIIth assembled at Conflans and the Guards at Mars la Tour; the IVth Corps, which had not been ordered to Metz, had already reached Commercy.

The IIIrd Army, after crossing the Vosges range, and having left a Bavarian brigade blockading Toul, waspressing forward in three columns. Its foremost Corps had already reached the Meuse, but were obliged to halt there for two days, so as to cross the river approximately abreast of the Meuse army. Its cavalry meanwhile patrolled three marches ahead as far as Châlons and Vitry, where, for the first time since Wörth, it regained touch of the enemy. The French encountered were only guarding posts on the Marne railway-line, which retired when the traffic thereon ceased.

FOOTNOTE:[17]These figures are erroneous. It is manifest that three Corps and two Cavalry Divisions, most of which had been materially weakened by casualties, could not furnish a strength of 138,000 men; nor could the IIIrd Army, originally 130,000 strong, swelled by one Corps and diminished by battle losses of 12,000, approximate a strength of 223,000. As a matter of fact, on August 22nd, the Meuse Army was 86,275 strong, and the IIIrd Army 137,622; the two armies together had a total strength, in round numbers, of 224,000 men.

[17]These figures are erroneous. It is manifest that three Corps and two Cavalry Divisions, most of which had been materially weakened by casualties, could not furnish a strength of 138,000 men; nor could the IIIrd Army, originally 130,000 strong, swelled by one Corps and diminished by battle losses of 12,000, approximate a strength of 223,000. As a matter of fact, on August 22nd, the Meuse Army was 86,275 strong, and the IIIrd Army 137,622; the two armies together had a total strength, in round numbers, of 224,000 men.

Meanwhile at Châlons there had been formed a French army of 166 battalions, 100 squadrons, and 380 guns, consisting of the Ist, Vth, VIIth, and XIIth Corps.

Of the last the Division which had been left behind on the Spanish frontier formed the nucleus, to which was added a body of very superior troops, consisting of four regiments of marines; later the two cavalry divisions also joined. General Trochu, who had been made Governor of Paris, had taken back with him thither eighteen battalions of Gardes-Mobiles, they having already given such proofs of insubordination that it was thought unsafe to confront them with the enemy.

The Emperor had arrived in Châlons and had placed Marshal MacMahon in command of the newly-formed army. In the French Head-quarter it was not unnaturally assumed that Marshal Bazaine was in retreat from Metz. By an advance of the Army of Châlons merely to Verdun the armies could form a junction with each other in the course of a few days, and so a fighting force be formed which might make head against the hitherto victorious enemy. On the other hand, MacMahon had to concern himself with the duty ofcovering Paris, and that capital, no less than his own right flank, was threatened by the appearance of the Crown Prince of Prussia's army on the Meuse.

For the attainment of a decision between advancing and retiring, it was beyond everything necessary to know the direction which Marshal Bazaine might have taken.

On the 18th tidings had come from him, that he had maintained his position in a battle about Rezonville, but that his troops had to be supplied with ammunition and supplies before they could renew the march. From this it seemed only too probable that the communications of the Army of the Rhine were already threatened; and MacMahon determined to march on Rheims, whence he could either reach Paris, though by a somewhat circuitous route, or move in the direction of the other army.

But when it became known that the Crown Prince of Prussia's army had not even been near Metz, and that Prussian cavalry had already appeared before Vitry, the Marshal could not deceive himself as to the danger involved in the latter alternative. With sound judgment, therefore, he stood out against the order of the Empress and the Ministry to undertake that enterprise; he determined against it, and announced his resolution to march to Paris. Under its walls he could accept a battle with advantage, since the fortifications, even in the event of defeat, assured a safe retreat and precluded pursuit.

Further reports from Metz did not afford a clear insight into the situation there. Also on the 18th, "the army had held its position," the narrative ran—only the right wing had changed front. "The troops required two or three days' rest," but the Marshal "counted still on being able to move out in a northerly direction," and fight his way to Châlons by the Montmédy—Ste. Menehould route, if this road was not strongly held by the enemy. In that case, he wouldmarch on Sedan, and even by Mézières, in order to reach Châlons.

Bazaine might already have committed himself to the movement thus indicated, and therefore Marshal MacMahon, who was not the man to leave his fellow-soldier in the lurch, instead of marching on Paris, set forth on the 23rd in the direction of Stenay.

The suddenness of this decision caused all the preparations for the undertaking to be left unexecuted. At the end of the first day's march the troops reached the Suippe late in the evening in pouring rain. They lacked every necessary, and two Corps remained entirely without food. The Marshal was therefore forced to move his army further northward to Rethel, where large magazines of provisions had been established, and where the railway facilitated the bringing up of stores. Even on the third day's march the army had made little progress eastward. The left wing remained at Rethel, the right reached the Aisne, near Vouziers. On August 26th the main army was still standing between Attigny and Le Chêne on the Ardennes canal, while the VIIth Corps and a regiment of Hussars lay in front of Vouziers for the protection of the right flank.

While the French army was thus marching eastward by a wide détour, the German forces, which had been put in motion at the same time, were for their part marching due westward.

According to orders issued from the supreme Head-quarter at Pont à Mousson, the advance on the enemy, supposed to be at Châlons, was to be effected in such manner that the IIIrd Army, marching on the left of the Army of the Meuse, should have the start by a day's march, so that the enemy, wherever he might stand halted, could be struck simultaneously in front and on his right flank, and thus forced away northward from the direction of Paris. The two armies were to convergeas they advanced, and to reach the line of Ste. Menehould—Vitry on the 26th.

On the first day's march, the armies still on a front some fifty-six miles long, the Meuse was reached; on the second day, the 24th, they advanced to the line St. Dizier—Bar le Duc—Verdun. The attempts to take the latter place and Toul in the by-going proved unsuccessful.

So early as on that day the 4th Cavalry Division, which had pushed far ahead, sent in important news. The Rhenish dragoons had found Châlons and the camp at Mourmelon deserted, and notwithstanding the destruction effected, there still remained in the latter considerable booty. An intercepted letter written by a French officer, which intimated that the relief of Metz was in prospect, and another which stated that Marshal MacMahon was at Rheims with 150,000 men and was fortifying his position there, were corroborated by the Paris newspapers.

On the 25th the Army of the Meuse formed a line from Sommeille to Dombasle, while the heads of columns of the IIIrd Army were already executing the march prescribed for the following day, on the Ste. Menehould—Vitry road. The small fortress of Vitry, a few hours after a battalion of Mobiles had left the place, surrendered to the 4th Cavalry Division. On its march to Ste. Menehould, thence to be forwarded by train to Paris, this battalion, 1000 strong, fell into the hands of the 6th Cavalry Division as it was moving on Dampierre, and was carried away captive.

The 5th Cavalry Division reached Ste. Menehould, and the 12th followed on the same road as far as Clermont, patrolling the country up to Varennes, within nine miles of the French outposts at Grand Pré, but without learning anything as to the whereabouts of the French army.

The scouting service to any great distance on the right of the army was hindered by the vicinity of theforest of Argonnes, which it was difficult for the cavalry to penetrate without the assistance of infantry. The inhabitants of the country began to show themselves extremely hostile. The Government had provided them with arms, and organized a general rising. The Germans, who hitherto had made war on the Emperor alone, were now forced to use their arms against the population. The franctireurs, though not affecting operations on a large scale, were a source of much annoyance to the smaller undertakings, and as it naturally embittered the soldiers to realize that they were no longer safe either by day or night, the character of the war became more stern, and the sufferings of the country were increased.

A Paris telegram, sent by way of London, reached this day (25th) the Royal Head-quarter at Bar le Duc. It stated that MacMahon was at Rheims, and sought to effect a junction with Bazaine.

It is always a serious matter to exchange, without the most pressing necessity, a once-settled and well-devised plan for a new and unprepared scheme. It would have been unwise and unskilful hastily to alter the whole direction of the advance because of rumours and information which might later probably turn out to be unfounded. Endless difficulties must result from such a course; the arrangements for bringing up baggage and reinforcements would have to be cancelled, and aimless marches might impair the confidence of the troops in their commanders.

The orders for the following day, issued at eleven o'clock in the morning, prescribed therefore for both armies merely a slight alteration of direction; Rheims instead of Châlons was indicated as the objective. The cavalry of the right wing, however, was explicitly ordered to advance to Buzancy and Vouziers, where a thorough insight into the situation could not but be obtained.

In war it is for the most part with probabilities onlythat the strategist can reckon; and the probability, as a rule, is that the enemy will do the right thing. Such a course could not be anticipated as that the French army would uncover Paris and march along the Belgian frontier to Metz. Such a move seemed strange, and indeed somewhat venturesome; but nevertheless it was possible. The chief of the General Staff, therefore, that same day worked out a tabular detail of marches, upon which the three Corps of the Army of the Meuse, together with the two Bavarian Corps which were nearest that army, could be brought together in the vicinity of Damvillers, on the right bank of the Meuse, in three not over-severe marches.

These forces, with the two Corps standing in reserve at Metz, which could be brought up, would constitute a force of 150,000 men, which might give battle in the specified vicinity, or compel the enemy to do so on the march to Longuyon. Without employing this reserve, there was every prospect that the advance of the French could be brought to a halt on this side of the Meuse, and then another Corps of the IIIrd Army could be brought up.

This march-table was soon to be brought into service. Fresh news arrived in the course of the same afternoon. The newspapers revealed the secret by publishing vehement speeches delivered in the National Assembly to the effect "that the French general who should leave his comrade in the lurch, deserved the execration of the country." It would be a disgrace, it was protested, to the French nation if the brave Bazaine were left unsuccoured: from all this, and considering the effect of such phrases on the French, it was to be expected that military considerations would give way to political. A telegram from London, quoting the ParisTemps, stated that MacMahon had suddenly resolved to hasten to the assistance of Bazaine, though the abandonment of the road to Paris endangered the safety of France.

The King, before night, approved of the march to the right, and the orders were dispatched that night direct to the respective Army Corps on the march.

On the 26th his Majesty moved his head-quarter to Clermont. The Crown Prince of Saxony had set out for Varennes early in the morning with the XIIth Corps, and had ordered the Guards to Dombasle, the IVth Corps to Fleury.

The cavalry, sent forward in every direction, found that the enemy had evacuated the region of the Suippe valley and had not yet entered that of the Meuse; that Buzancy and Grand Pré were in occupation of the French, and that a large encampment of their VIIth Corps had been specifically perceived on the height of Vouziers. The apparition of a few handsful of cavalry, despatched thither on observation duty, occasioned an almost unaccountable excitement. General Douay, quartered at Vouziers, received the most exaggerated reports, and must have thought that a general attack by the German army was imminent. The VIIth Corps was kept under arms the entire night in pouring rain, and the Marshal resolved to advance towards Vouziers and Buzancy with all his forces on the following morning. Thus the march to the east received a check as early as the 27th, but the untruthfulness of the reports very soon became sufficiently apparent.

If the German chiefs were deeply interested in gaining an insight into the enemy's movements, so on the French side this requisite was certainly urgent in no less imperative degree. With judicious disposal of their cavalry on the right flank, a surprise like that above mentioned would have been impossible, but the 1st French Cavalry Division was placed on the left flank, where there was no danger whatever, and the 2nd was rearmost of everything. It seemed as though in the French army less attention was paid to the repulse of an attack than to the evasion of one, and tothe unobserved attainment of Montmédy, the point of rendezvous with the other army. When the movement of the Germans from southward could no longer be doubted, it would certainly have been best for the French to take the vigorous offensive in that direction with intent to defeat them, or at least to sweep them out of the vicinity of their own line of march. If they had failed in this they would, at any rate, have readily learnt that their undertaking was impracticable, and that its further prosecution must certainly result in a catastrophe. It must, however, be admitted that the German cavalry formed an almost impenetrable screen. The Marshal could not know that his enemy was écheloned from Vitry to Varennes, a distance of more than thirty-seven miles, and was not at all in form to attack him just then in serious earnest.

August 27th.—The Marshal had cleared up his misconception, and on the 27th he continued his march, at least with part of his troops. The VIIth and Vth Corps covered the movement at Vouziers and Buzancy, the XIIth advanced to Le Chêne, and the 1st Cavalry Division to Beaumont, probably to ascertain the whereabouts of Marshal Bazaine. The Ist Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Division remained behind on the Aisne.

The Saxon Corps, the furthest forward of the German Army, had received direct orders to march to Dun on the 27th, and secure on the right bank the passages over the Meuse, as far as Stenay. It reached Stenay at three o'clock in the afternoon, and threw forward a post on the left bank.

The cavalry clung closely to the enemy and followed his movements, often engaging in petty skirmishes. The departure of the Vth French Corps from Buzancy in the direction of Le Chêne was at once detected, as also was the march to Beaumont; and the Saxon Cavalry Division pushed forward that evening toNouart. The Bavarian Corps reached the Clermont-Verdun road, the 5th Ste. Menehould; the other Corps of the IIIrd Army were hurrying by forced marches in a northerly direction.

The prospect now seemed certain that the enemy would be overtaken on the left bank of the Meuse. Word was sent to the blockading army before Metz that the two Corps asked for were no longer required, but they had already set out.

The latest dispositions made by Marshal MacMahon clearly betokened a last effort on his part to persevere in the original direction. He was écheloned along the northernmost of the roads by which he could reach Metz, but had left a strong reserve on the Aisne on which he might fall back. When he now learnt that nothing had been seen of the Army of the Rhine at Montmédy, but that it actually was still at Metz, he resolved on retreating, and, after giving orders to that effect for the following morning, reported his intention to Paris.

From thence during the night came the most strenuous remonstrances. The Minister of War telegraphed, "If you leave Bazaine in the lurch, the revolution will break out," and the Council of Ministers issued a peremptory order to relieve Metz. The troops in front of the Marshal, it was urged, were nothing more than part of the army investing Metz; he had the start of the Crown Prince of Prussia by several days' march; and General Vinoy had already left Paris for Rheims with the newly-formed XIIIth Corps as a reinforcement to him.

The Marshal silenced his military convictions and issued new orders. But the troops had started in advance of the promulgation of them. The change of route gave rise to much confusion; the roads were bad, and quarters for the night were not reached until darkness had long set in; the men were weary, wet to the skin, and depressed in spirits.

August 28th.—Little more than nine miles' distance eastward was attained. The XIIth Corps reached LaBesace, the Ist was on the march to Le Chêne, the VIIth was halted at Boult aux Bois because of a false report that two Prussian Corps were occupying Buzancy, further ahead. On the strength of this report the Vth Corps moved toward that town by way of Bar, but went on to Bois des Dames in the afternoon. Neither of these movements was interfered with. The German cavalry had strict orders, while watching the French as closely as possible, not in any way to check or press them, and the Saxon cavalry evacuated Nouart on the approach of the enemy. The Germans had to await the coming up of the IIIrd Army, the rearmost Corps of which, the VIth, had only just reached Ste. Menehould.

August 29th.—For this day also a non-offensive attitude was prescribed, and the bringing on of decisive operations was postponed until the 30th.

The Marshal in his head-quarter at Stonne had been informed that the Germans occupied Dun, and that the bridges over the Meuse had been destroyed. He had no pontoon-train, and could cross the river only lower down, at Mouzon and Villers. His XIIth Corps and 1st Cavalry Division passed over to the right bank unhindered at these points; the Ist Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Division proceeded to Raucourt. The VIIth Corps, delayed on march by petty skirmishes on its right flank, did not reach its destination at La Besace, but went into bivouac at Oches. The Vth Corps was to have moved to Beaumont, but the staff officer carrying the order fell into the hands of the Prussian cavalry together with his escort. General de Failly therefore marched upon Stenay, according to his original instructions.

Up to this time, apart from the cavalry, the Saxon Corps alone had been in contact with the enemy, but the Guard now came up to Buzancy in parallel line, while the Saxon Corps crossed over to the left bank of the Meuse at Dun. Its advanced guard at once took possession of the wooded spur to the north-eastof Nouart, drove out the French cavalry, and pressed ahead to Champy, where it encountered a strong force in Lespart's Division. The purpose of the reconnaissance having been attained, the advanced guard was called in. The French Division, in consequence of fresh orders received from the Marshal, withdrew simultaneously in a northerly direction.

On the German side four Corps of the IIIrd Army were now within nine miles rearward of the Army of the Meuse. The 5th Cavalry Division stood at Attigny on the enemy's line of communication; the 6th was hanging on the heels of the French columns of march, and, among other things, had taken Boncq with a dismounted party. The Royal Head-quarter was now advanced to Grand Pré, and, as the result of the various reports which had poured in, the resolution was taken to attack the enemy on the following day, before he should cross the Meuse. The Army of the Meuse was to march towards Beaumont, the IIIrd Army to move forward between that place and Le Chêne. To bring both armies to a parallel front, the right wing was not to move until ten o'clock, while the left[18]was to start before six o'clock. Only the trains absolutely requisite for the battle were to follow.

(August 30th.)

On the 30th of August, at ten o'clock, the King set out for Sommauthe by way of Buzancy. Both the Bavarian Corps were on the march thither, the VthCorps advanced in the centre towards Oches, the XIth, together with the Würtemberg Division, was heading for Le Chêne, the VIth for Vouziers. The IVth Corps on the right was advancing by Belval, the XIIth reached to the Meuse, while the Guard Corps followed in rear as a reserve.

Marshal MacMahon had issued orders for the attainment of the object that his entire army should on this day cross to the right bank of the Meuse; only the baggage trains and sick were to remain behind.

His Ist Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Division had left Raucourt so early as seven; they crossed the river at Remilly, light bridges having been thrown over for the infantry. The VIIth Corps at Oches had struck camp still earlier at four o'clock, but as it took with it in the march all its waggons, even the empty ones, the trains formed a column more than nine miles in length, and seven of its battalions were forced to march alongside the road in the capacity of baggage guard; so that the brigade bringing up the rear was unable to start until ten o'clock. This long procession soon came into contact with the Prussian cavalry, was fired upon by artillery, and compelled to arrest its march. Not till one o'clock could the movement on La Besace be resumed, and then, as heavy firing was heard from Beaumont, General Douay conceived it right to abandon the road to Mouzon and take that to Remilly.

To the Vth Corps had been precautionally assigned the duty of covering the march of the other two. The troops had reached the vicinity of Beaumont only at 4 a.m., and were thoroughly exhausted by fighting and the night-march. General de Failly therefore determined to halt his Corps for cooking and rest before pursuing the march. Precautionary measures seem to have been altogether neglected, though it must have been known that the enemy was now close at hand. While at half-past one the officers and men wereengaged in their meal, Prussian shells suddenly burst among these heedless groups.

The two Corps of the German right wing had to move through a wooded tract in four wholly independent columns, by ways sodden with rain. The Crown Prince of Saxony therefore ordered that no single column should attempt to enter on an attack before the neighbouring one was ready to co-operate.

The IVth Corps had started very early, and after a short rest had pursued its march at ten o'clock. When at noon the head of the 8th Division emerged from the forest, it discerned from its elevated position the enemy's camp about 800 paces distant, in the condition as described. General Schöler (commanding the Division) held that the opportunity of so complete a surprise was not to be let pass; the proximity of his force could not long remain undetected by the enemy. He announced it by his cannon-fire.

The Division soon recognized that it had drawn upon itself an enemy of immensely superior strength. The French rapidly got under arms, and dense swarms of riflemen hurried to the front, whose long-range Chassepôts inflicted great losses, especially upon the artillerymen. The main body of the 8th Division had meanwhile come up to the assistance of its advanced guard, and ere long the 7th Division appeared on the right. The French assailed it too with great impetuosity, and could only be repulsed at the bayonet-point. Presently, however, the foremost battalions of both Divisions made their way into the French camp in front of Beaumont, into the town itself, and finally into a second camp located northward of it. Seven guns, of which the teams were missing, and which continued firing up to the last moment, a number of gunners, waggons and horses, fell into the hands of the assailants.

Whilst now, about two o'clock, a pause occurred in the infantry fight, fourteen batteries of the IVthCorps engaged in a contest with the French artillery deployed on the stretch of heights north of Beaumont. The German artillery mass was presently strengthened by the Saxon artillery on the right, and by the Bavarian batteries on the left. This formidable and commanding artillery line, constantly advancing in echelon, promptly squandered the mitrailleuses, and at three o'clock the remaining French batteries also were silenced.

The IInd Bavarian Corps, on the left of the Prussian IVth, was advancing on La Thibaudine, when it was quite unexpectedly attacked from the west by a strong force of the enemy.

These troops were Conseil Dumesnil's Division of the VIIth French Corps, which was continuing in march to Mouzon in error, acting on its original orders. Completely surprised as it was, and attacked in front and flank, the Division gave up all hope of cutting its way through, and at about four o'clock beat a hasty retreat northwards, leaving two guns behind.

The Bavarians had in the meantime taken possession of the farm of Thibaudine, and the Prussians that of Harnoterie. The wooded hills prevented a clear view of the surrounding country; the enemy had completely disappeared.

General de Failly was making strenuous efforts to collect his scattered forces in front of Mouzon, under cover of a rear-guard halted at La Sartelle; and General Lebrun had left behind on the left side of the Meuse an infantry and a cavalry brigade and three batteries belonging to the XIIth Corps, to render him assistance.

At five o'clock the 8th Division, headed by the 13th Brigade, was pushing toilsomely through the dense forest of Givodeau, on its way to operate against this new defensive position. On emerging from the wood the battalions, which had fallen into some confusion, were received by a brisk fire at short range. The repeated efforts of the riflemen to advance were unsuccessful,and the dense underwood hindered the clubbed mass behind them from forming. By the time the Saxon Corps had succeeded with extreme difficulty in extricating itself from the forest and swamps of the Wamme stream, and had reached Létanne, the impracticability of further progress in the Meuse valley became apparent, since numerous French batteries, in unassailable positions on the opposite side of the river, commanded all the low ground. The Corps therefore ascended the plateau, moved in its turn through the Givodeau woods, and debouching thence swelled the strength of the forces assembled on the northern border, where, however, their development on a broader front was impossible. So about six o'clock the infantry engagement came to a stand for a time in this quarter.

On the left the 14th Brigade had come up into line with the 13th, and this body (the 7th Division) was followed by the 8th Division in two columns.

The 93rd Regiment had carried the height to the north-east of Yoncq, and advanced in pursuit of the enemy as far as to the foot of Mont de Brune. Four mitrailleuses and eight guns, some of them with their entire teams, fell thus into the hands of the Anhalters.

When, at half-past five, the artillery had come up into position, and at the same time the 27th Regiment was approaching, General Zychlinski (commanding 14th Brigade) advanced to the enveloping attack.

The French occupied in strength the summit of the entirely isolated hill; their batteries faced to eastward against the Bois de Givodeau, whence an assault threatened; but they swiftly changed front to the south and directed a heavy fire on the 93rd and the 2nd Battalion of the 27th, as they charged up on this face while the Fusilier battalion was at the same time pressing forward from the west. Regardless of their losses, the assailants eagerly scaled the ascent, the brigade and regimental commanders at their head. Six French guns were seized while in action, in spite of a braveresistance by the gunners and covering troops, and the enemy was pursued as far as the Roman road. Here four more guns, completely horsed, which had been abandoned by the artillerymen, fell into the hands of the conquerors.

The three battalions[19]hurried on towards Mouzon, without waiting for the support of the[20]14th Brigade following in rear, but they suddenly found themselves threatened by a cavalry-charge.

Marshal MacMahon had recognized the fact that the only thing left him now to do was to effect as orderly an evacuation as possible of the left bank of the Meuse; the reinforcements sent across from the right had already been recalled. The 5th Cuirassier Regiment alone still remained. When, a little to the north of the Faubourg de Mouzon, it was reached by the fire of the advancing Prussians, the French regiment hurled itself upon the enemy with a noble contempt for death.

The shock struck the 10th Company of the 27th Regiment. The soldiers, without closing their ranks, waited for the word of command of their leader, Captain Helmuth, and then fired a volley at close range, which struck down eleven officers and 100 men, the brave commander of the band of horsemen falling fifteen paces in front of his men. The survivors rushed back towards the Meuse, and, as all the bridges had been removed, they strove to gain the other side by swimming.

Considerable masses of the enemy were still in front of Mouzon, and upon these the batteries of the IVth Corps, as one after another they came into action, directed their fire. Two Bavarian batteries brought under their fire the bridge at Villers, lower down the river, and prevented it from being used. Then the suburb was carried after a fierce encounter, and here too the bridge across the Meuse was taken and held. The enemy, deprived of every way of retreat, receivedwith a hot fire the 8th Division emerging from the valley of the Yoncq, but was gradually driven back towards the river. The French troops in front of the Bois de Givodeau were also in a hopeless plight; they were assailed by the 7th Division and XIIth Corps, and were dispersed after an obstinate struggle. By nightfall the French had ceased their resistance on the hither side of the Meuse. Many lagging stragglers were taken prisoners, others hid themselves in the copses and farmhouses, or tried to escape by swimming the river.

In this battle, as in the preceding ones, the attack suffered far heavier loss than the defence. The Army of the Meuse lost 3500 combatants, the preponderating loss falling on the IVth Corps. The French estimated their loss at 1800; but in the course of the day and on the following morning, 3000 prisoners, mostly unwounded, fell into the hands of the victors, with 51 guns, 33 ammunition and many other waggons, and a military chest containing 150,000 francs. And, what was of supreme importance, by the result of this battle the French army had been driven into an extremely unfavourable position.

While the IVth Corps had been chiefly sustaining the day's battle, the Saxon Cavalry had pushed forward on the right bank of the Meuse, and had reconnoitred towards Mouzon and Carignan. The Guard Corps reached Beaumont, and General von der Tann with the 1st Bavarian Corps was at Raucourt, having marched by way of La Besace with some slight skirmishing on the way. The IInd Bavarian Corps was assembled at Sommauthe, the Vth Corps had reached Stonne, the XIth, La Besace. Thus seven Corps now stood in close concentration between the Meuse and the Bar.

The King rode back to Buzancy after the battle, as all the villages in the vicinity of the battle-field were crowded with the wounded. Here, as previously at Clermont, was felt the great inconvenience of inadequate lodging for hundreds of illustrious guests andtheir suites, when, for once in a way for military reasons, head-quarters were established in a small village, instead of in a large town. Shelter for those officers whose duty it was to prepare the necessary orders for the morrow was only found late at night, and with considerable difficulty.

These orders instructed that on the 31st two Corps of the Army of the Meuse should cross over to the right bank of the river, to prevent the possibility of further progress of the French to Metz by way of Montmédy. Two Corps of the army besieging Metz were besides already posted in that direction about Etain and Briey. The IIIrd Army was to continue its movement in the northward direction.

As the situation had now developed itself, it already seemed within sight that the Army of Châlons might be compelled to cross over into neutral territory, and the Belgian Government was therefore asked through diplomatic channels to concern itself with its disarmament in that event. The German troops had orders at once to cross the Belgian frontier, should the enemy not lay down his arms there.

While the Vth French Corps was still fighting about Beaumont, and when the rest of the army had crossed the Meuse, General MacMahon had ordered the concentration of his army on Sedan. He did not intend to offer battle there, but it was indispensable to give his troops a short rest, and provide them with food and ammunition. He then meant to continue the retreat by way of Mézières, which General Vinoy was just then approaching with the newly-formed XIIIth Corps. The Ist Corps, which had arrived at Carignan early in the afternoon, detached two of its divisions to Douzy in the evening to check any further advance of the Germans.

Though any pursuit immediately after the battle of Beaumont was prevented by the intervening river, the retreat of the French soon assumed the ominous character of a rout. The troops were utterly worn outby their exertions by day and night, in continuous rain and with but scanty supplies of food. The marching to and fro, to no visible purpose, had undermined their confidence in their leaders, and a series of luckless fights had shaken their self-reliance. Thousands of fugitives, crying for bread, crowded round the waggons as they struggled forward to reach the little fortress which had so unexpectedly become the central rallying point of a great army.

The Emperor Napoleon arrived at Sedan from Carignan late in the evening of the 30th; the VIIth Corps reached Floing during the night, but the XIIth Corps did not arrive at Bazeilles until the following morning. The Vth Corps mustered at the eastern suburb of Sedan in a fearfully shattered state, followed in the afternoon of the 31st by the Ist, which, after many rear-guard actions with the German cavalry, took up a position behind the Givonne valley. To pursue the march to Mézières on that day was not to be thought of. The XIIth Corps had that same evening to show a front at Bazeilles, where the thunder of their cannon already heralded the arrival of the Germans. The destruction of the bridges there and at Donchery was ordered, but the order remained unexecuted, owing to the worn-out condition of the men.

August 31st.—Of the army of the Meuse the Guard and 12th Cavalry Divisions had crossed the Meuse at Pouilly, and by a pontoon bridge at Létanne, and swept the country between the Meuse and the Chiers. Following close upon the rear of the French and harassing them in skirmishes till they reached their new position, they brought in as prisoners numbers of stragglers. The Guard Corps then crossed the Chiers at Carignan and halted at Sachy; the XIIth pushed on to about Douzy on the Meuse,[21]while its advanced guard thrust ahead on the further side (of the Chiers) as far as Francheval. The IVth Corps remained at Mouzon.

The 4th Cavalry Division of the IIIrd Army reconnoitred in the direction of Sedan, drove back the French outposts from Wadelincourt and Frénois, and, moving from the latter place, seized the railroad under the fire of hostile artillery. The 6th Cavalry Division on the left flank proceeded on the way to Mézières as far as Poix.

When the Ist Bavarian Corps reached Remilly before noon, it came under heavy fire from the opposite side of the river, and at once brought up its batteries in position on the hither slope of the valley of the Meuse. A sharp cannonade ensued, by the end of which sixty Bavarian guns were engaged. It was only now that the French attempted to blow up the railway bridge south of Bazeilles, but the vigorous fire of the 4th Jäger Battalion drove off the enemy with his engineers, the Jägers threw the powder-barrels into the river, and at midday crossed the bridge. The battalion entered Bazeilles in the face of a storm of bullets, and occupied the northern fringe of the straggling place. Thus the XIIth French Corps was forced to move up into a position between Balan and Moncelle, where, having been reinforced by batteries belonging to the Ist Corps, it had to encounter, and that with considerable waste of power, the daring little band of Germans.

General von der Tann[22]did not however hold it advisable to commit himself on that day to a serious conflict on the further side of the Meuse with a closely compacted enemy, while his own Corps was still unconcentrated; and, since the weak detachment in Bazeilles had no hope of being reinforced, it withdrew therefrom at about half-past three without being pursued.

Meanwhile two pontoon bridges had been laid at Allicourt, without molestation from the French. These and the railway bridge were barricaded for the night, while eighty-four guns further secured them from being crossed. The Ist Bavarian Corps went into bivouac at Angecourt, the IInd at Hancourt.

To the left of the Bavarians the XIth Corps marched towards Donchery, followed by the Vth. The advanced guard found the place unoccupied, and extended itself on the further side of the river. By three o'clock two other bridges were completed close below Donchery, whilst the railway bridge above the place, also found unguarded, was destroyed.

On the extreme left the Würtemberg and the 6th Cavalry Divisions came in contact with the XIIIth French Corps, which had just arrived at Mézières.

The King removed his head-quarters to Vendresse.

In spite of a succession of occasionally very severe marches in bad weather, and of being in regard to supplies chiefly beholden to requisitioning, the Army of the Meuse advancing on the east, and the IIIrd Army on the south, were now directly in face of the concentrated French Army. Marshal MacMahon could scarcely have realized that the only chance of safety for his army, or even for part of it, lay in the immediate prosecution of his retreat on the 1st of September. It is true that the Crown Prince of Prussia, in possession as he was of every passage over the Meuse, would have promptly taken that movement in flank in the narrow space, little more than four miles wide, which was bounded on the north by the frontier. That nevertheless the attempt was not risked was only to be explained by the actual condition of the exhausted troops; for on this day the French Army was not yet capable of undertaking a disciplined march involving fighting; it could only fight where it stood.

On the German side it was still expected that the Marshal would strike for Mézières. The Army of the Meuse was ordered to attack the enemy's positions with the object of detaining him in them; the IIIrd Army, leaving only one Corps on the left bank, was to press forward on the right side of the river.

The French position about Sedan was covered to rearward by the fortress. The Meuse and the valleys ofthe Givonne and the Floing brooks offered formidable obstructions, but it was imperative that those outmost lines should be obstinately held. The Calvary height of Illy was a very important point, strengthened as it was by the Bois de Garenne in its rear, whence a high ridge stretching to Bazeilles afforded much cover in its numerous dips and shoulders. In the event of a retreat into neutral territory in the last extremity, the road thereto lay through Illy. Bazeilles, on the other hand, locally a very strong point of support to the Givonne front, constituted an acute salient, which, after the loss of the bridges across the Meuse, was open to attack on two sides.

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