FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[38]Commanding 2nd Baden Brigade.[39]Commanding Baden Division.[40]Châlons-sur-Saône.

[38]Commanding 2nd Baden Brigade.

[39]Commanding Baden Division.

[40]Châlons-sur-Saône.

(October 24th.)

At the beginning of the blockade, inundations and marsh-land rendered Schlettstadt, a fortified town of 10,000 inhabitants, unapproachable on the east and south, and partly on the north. The place itself, perfectly safe from storm, with high walls and a wet ditch, was armed with 120 guns, but garrisoned with only 2000 men, for the most part Gardes-Mobiles. There was a deficiency of safe casemates, and on the westfront vineyards and hedgerows favoured the near approach of assaults, while the railway embankment was a ready-made protecting wall for the construction of the first parallel. To divert the attention of the besieged from this front of attack, a battery was constructed on the 20th at the Kappel Mill on the south-east, from which fire was opened on the barracks and magazine in the town, and on the sluice which maintained the inundation. By the evening of the 21st, the infantry posts had advanced to within 400 paces of the glacis, and the construction of the first parallel was proceeded with that night, immediately behind the railway, as well as of emplacements for six batteries within 1230 feet from the ramparts. The garrison fired in the dark on the entire field of attack, but almost without effect. By the morning the trenches were two feet wide and three and a half feet deep, and 20 heavy guns and 8 mortars were ready to open fire. A hot artillery duel now began with the fortress, which replied very steadily. The battery at the mill subjected the west front to a telling reverse fire, and several guns and embrasures were severely damaged. The town was fired at several points, and the defenders' fire gradually ceased. During the night, which was very stormy, the batteries of the attack kept up their fire, the parallel was widened and two new batteries were begun.

At daybreak of the 24th the white flag was seen flying, and a capitulation was forthwith signed, by which Schlettstadt surrendered with its garrison and war-material. The commandant begged the Germans to take possession at once, as the greatest disorder reigned within the town. The public buildings were being plundered by the mob and the drunken soldiery, and a powder-magazine was actually on fire. The German battalions promptly restored order, extinguished the flames, and took away the prisoners. Seven thousand stand of arms fell into German hands,besides the fortress artillery and a large quantity of stores. The siege had cost the victors only twenty men. Schlettstadt was occupied by Etappen troops, and the battalions released from duty there marched into southern Alsace, three of them going to strengthen the siege of Breisach, which was now being proceeded with.

(November 10th.)

This fortress, lying in the plain and of very symmetrical shape, was proof against a coup-de-main because of its ditches, which were dry indeed, but faced with solid masonry. The garrison of over 5000 men had well-protected quarters in the bomb-proof casemates of the ravelins. Fort Mortier, standing near the Rhine, and constructed for independent defence, effectually commanded the ground over which the intended attack must be made on the north-west front of the fortress. Therefore 12 heavy guns were brought up from Rastatt to Alt Breisach, where the right bank of the Rhine commands the fort at effective range.

It was not till near the end of October that the siege-guns arrived before New Breisach from Schlettstadt, and when the infantry had closed up and all preparations were complete, fire from 24 heavy guns was opened on the fortress on November 2nd from Wolfgantzen, Biesheim and Alt Breisach.

By three o'clock a large part of the town was on fire, and detachments of infantry were skirmishing with the French posts at the foot of the glacis. Fort Mortier had suffered exceptionally severely. Nevertheless,an attempt to storm it was repulsed, but at six o'clock it capitulated, an utter ruin. Only one gun remained in serviceable condition. Two new mortar batteries were erected to shell the main fortress, the defence became perceptibly more feeble, and on November 10th Breisach surrendered on the same terms as Schlettstadt, but the garrison was allowed to march out with the honours of war. The fortifications were almost uninjured, but the town was for the most part burnt down or severely damaged. The success had cost the Germans only 70 men; 108 guns, 6000 small arms and large quantities of stores fell into their hands.

While these strongholds in Alsace-Lorraine were thus being reduced, Verdun still intercepted the line of railway which formed the shortest line of communication with Germany.

(November 9th.)

This place, too, was made quite storm-free by high walls and deep wet ditches; but, on the other hand, it was surrounded by a ring of heights whence it could be seen into, and at the foot of these heights villages and vineyards favoured an approach to within a short distance of the outworks.

The fortress was armed with 140 guns and abundantly victualled, and the garrison, which had been supplemented by escaped prisoners, was 6000 strong. A bombardment by field-artillery had already proved perfectly ineffectual. For a long time Verdun was only under observation, at first by cavalry, and afterwardsby a small mixed force. At the end of September the 65th Regiment and twelve companies of Landwehr assembled under General von Gayl before the east face of the place. It was not till October 9th that two companies of fortress-artillery brought up some French heavy guns from Toul and Sedan. The infantry now advanced to within a few hundred paces of the west and north fronts and there established itself. Under this cover the construction of the batteries was begun on the evening of October 12th.

The heavy ground after the rain, and the rocky subsoil very thinly covered, made the work uncommonly difficult, yet by next morning fifty-two guns were able to open fire. But the fortress replied with such effect that before noon two batteries on the Côte de Hayvaux on the westward were reduced to inaction.

In the course of this three days' artillery engagement, 15 German guns were placed out of action, the artillery lost 60 men and the infantry 40. The disabled guns on the walls of the enemy were constantly replaced by fresh ones.

The garrison, which was far stronger than the besiegers, now assumed the offensive. During the stormy night of the 19th—20th, the picquets on the Hayvaux were overpowered, and the guns in the battery there were spiked. On the 28th a sortie in greater force was made. The French climbed up Mont St. Michel, lying northward of Verdun, and destroyed the breast-works and bomb-proofs of the batteries, from which, however, the guns had been withdrawn. Another body pushed up the Hayvaux, and as the soaked state of the ground prevented the guns from being withdrawn, they were totally disabled. The villages in the neighbourhood were also occupied by the French.

It was now evident that the means hitherto brought to bear on the reduction of Verdun were quite inadequate.But after the fall of Metz the Ist Army was able to send up reinforcements. At the end of the month 5 battalions and 2 companies of pioneers and several of artillery arrived, and also a quantity of German material.

The siege park now numbered 102 guns with abundant ammunition, and preparations were at once made for a regular attack.

But for this the garrison did not wait. After an armistice had been granted, the place capitulated on November 8th, in virtue of which the garrison, with exception of the local National Guards, became prisoners of war. The officers were dismissed on parole with their swords and personal property, and it was agreed that the war-material in store should be given back on the conclusion of peace.

The Ist Army having in addition undertaken the siege of Mézières, the 1st Infantry Division moved on that place, and the 3rd Brigade, sent forward by railway to Soissons, on November 15th set about the siege of the small fortress of La Fère. The rest of the Ist Corps reached Rethel on the same day, the VIIIth Rheims, and the 3rd Cavalry Division Tagnon, between the two places named. The VIIth Corps was still fully engaged in guarding the prisoners and in besieging Thionville and Montmédy.

Of the IInd Army the IXth Corps and 1st Cavalry Division reached Troyes on the 10th, the IIIrd Vendeuvre, the Xth Neufchâteau and Chaumont. The important railway connections there and at Bolognewere occupied, and the injury done to the line to Blesme was repaired, so as to open up a new line of communication. The health of the German forces had been materially improved by short marches along good roads and by abundant supplies; but a telegram from Versailles now ordered an accelerated advance.

The Government in Paris being powerless, the Delegation at Tours was displaying increased activity. Gambetta, as Minister both of War and of the Interior, was exercising the power almost of a Dictator, and the fiery energy of this remarkable man had achieved the feat of placing 600,000 armed men and 1400 guns in the field in the course of a few weeks.

In the Arrondissements the National Guards were formed into companies and battalions; then in each Department these were consolidated into brigades; and finally the brigades were incorporated along with the nearest troops of the line and Gardes-Mobiles into the larger Army-Corps.

Thus, in the course of October, under cover of the troops of General d'Aurelle de Paladines which had re-crossed the Loire, a new XVIIth Corps was made up at Blois, another, the XVIIIth, at Gien, and a third, under Admiral Jaurès, at Nogent le Rotrou. A large force was in Picardy under General Bourbaki, another at Rouen under Briand, and a third on the left bank of the Seine under Fiéreck.

The detachments of the army investing Paris, which were pushed forward to the south, west, and north, already met in all directions strong forces of the enemy, which they indeed repulsed in many small encounters, but could not follow up to the places of their origin. For such purposes the arrival of the army released from the siege of Metz was needed, and this was not to be looked for before some time in November, while now in October there was threatened a general advance of the French forces on Paris.

Having regard to the inferior strength of Generalvon Tann's Division holding Orleans, at a French council of war held at Tours it was decided to recover that important place. The attack was to be delivered chiefly from the west. The French XVth Corps—two Infantry Divisions and one of Cavalry—therefore assembled at Mer on the northern bank of the Lower Loire, and the main body of the XVIth behind the forest of Marchénoir. The remaining portions of both Corps were to co-operate on the Upper Loire by way of Gien. Any further advance was not projected, at any rate for the present; on the contrary, General d'Aurelle's instructions were to form an intrenched camp about Orleans for 200,000 men.

General von Tann's reconnoitring parties to the westward everywhere met hostile detachments, which were indeed driven back by restraining skirmishes into the forest of Marchénoir without much difficulty, but which betrayed the vicinity of large forces of the enemy. On the whole an attack from the south-west on the investing army before Paris seemed the likeliest event, since this would threaten both the German Head-quarter in Versailles and the siege-park at Villacoublay; while the German reinforcements from the eastward would have the furthest distance to reach the quarter indicated.

The French forces to the west of Orleans were already extended over a wide stretch of country from Beaugency to Châteaudun. The volunteers grew bolder every day, and the people more hostile.

At last, in quest of some more accurate information, Count Stolberg (commanding 2nd Cavalry Division) on November 7th made a reconnaissance in force. Three regiments of the 2nd Cavalry Division, two batteries, and some companies of Bavarian Infantry advanced by Ouzouer and drove the enemy out of Marolles, but they found the skirts of the forest strongly held.

General Chanzy had brought up all his immediately available troops to St. Laurent des Bois. A sharp fire-fightensued, lasting about half an hour, which caused severe losses in the Bavarian infantry; and then, as the great superiority of the French was evident, the engagement was broken off.

As a matter of fact, both the French Corps were already in full march on Orleans. Reaching the forest on the 8th, they occupied it firmly, their right wing at Messas and Meung, their left at Ouzouer. The XVth Corps was next to move to the right to the Mauve and the XVIth to the left on Coulmiers. The heads of those Corps showed themselves at Bardon and Charsonville respectively. Both the French Cavalry Divisions were directed northward on Prénouvellon to turn the right wing of the Bavarians with a force of ten regiments, six batteries, and numerous volunteer bands, and thus to cut off their retreat on Paris.

To counteract this attempt the Bavarian Cuirassier Brigade started for St. Péravy, the 2nd Cavalry Division for Baccon, and, further south, the 2nd Bavarian Infantry Division advancing from Orleans held the country about Huisseau and St. Ay.

But an attack was also threatening the German rear from the considerable force at Gien. General von der Tann realized that it was now the last moment when he could hope to extricate himself from so hazardous a position; and that same evening he issued the necessary orders. However desirable it was to keep possession of Orleans, he could not accept battle in so thickly wooded country, where the action of his relatively strong artillery and cavalry would be seriously impeded, and where indeed he might be entirely hemmed in. The General, however, determined to strike at the most immediately threatening hostile force in the open country about Coulmiers, where he would at the same time be nearer to the 22nd Division at Chartres, on which he could call for support.

General von Wittich had already asked and obtained permission to fall back on Orleans, but on the 9thhe had only reached Voves, with his cavalry at Orgères; thus he could not take any direct part in that day's fighting.

The IInd Army was in full march from Metz, but on this day its head had but just arrived at Troyes.

(November 9th.)

Left thus to its own resources, the Ist Bavarian Corps moved out in the night, and on the morning of the 9th stood concentrated on the skirts of the forest between Château Montpipeau and Rosières, with the village of Coulmiers in its front. The Bavarian Cuirassiers on the right wing protected the line of retreat by St. Sigismond; the 2nd Cavalry Division was distributed by brigades along the whole front, with detachments well in advance and infantry posts ready in support. Only a small detachment remained in Orleans after the bridge over the Loiret had been destroyed, to protect the numerous sick and wounded in the field hospitals, and occupy the city at any rate till the result of the fight was decided.

The first reports brought in that morning were of the advance of a strong hostile column from Cravant on Fontaines and Le Bardon. This was Rébillard's Brigade, which, as it seemed, aimed at turning the Bavarian left flank and marching direct on Orleans. To oppose it on the bank of the Mauve, General von der Tann at about nine o'clock sent the 3rd Brigade in a southerly direction to Préfort, a little over two miles distant, and as at the same time a sharp contest had now begun at the outposts near Baccon, the 1st Brigademarched to La Renardière. The remainder of the Corps remained in and behind Coulmiers. The General's intention was to assume the offensive from this point against the enemy's left flank, if, as seemed probable, the latter should attempt to push his chief attack across the Mauve. In furtherance of this intention the cavalry of the right flank was ordered to close in to Coulmiers.

But the superior strength of the French allowed of their fetching a much wider compass to the left. While General d'Aurelle with the XVth Corps detained the Bavarians southward of the road from Ouzouer to Orleans, General Chanzy advanced with Barry's Division against their centre and directed Jauréguiberry's Division northward against their right; and finally the strong force of French cavalry under General Reyau moved in the direction of Patay, thus threatening the German communication with Paris.

This movement of the French XVIth Corps compelled General von Tann, at the very beginning of the engagement, to despatch the 2nd Brigade, which had constituted his reserve, to prolong his right wing northwards towards Champs, and thus obtain touch with the 4th Cavalry Brigade. The Bavarian Cuirassiers, retiring according to orders from St. Péravy to the southward, about eleven o'clock encountered Reyau's cavalry, which, however, restricted itself to a mere cannonade.

Meanwhile, after a stout resistance, the advanced posts of the Bavarians had been driven in by the enemy's superior strength. The 1st Rifle Battalion, after having retarded the advance of the French horse-batteries through Champdry for a long time, retreated from Baccon to La Rivière,[41]where it expected to be received by the 2nd (Rifle Battalion). But the situationof the latter soon became very critical. Peytavin's Division closely followed up through Baccon, beset La Rivière with five batteries, and then attacked the burning village from three sides at once. After energetic reprisals the Riflemen retired in good order on the 1st Brigade in Renardière, where General Dietl had taken up a position for defence.

After the evacuation of Baccon by the Bavarians, Barry's Division had continued its advance through Champdry, and its batteries deployed opposite Coulmiers and in front of Saintry, in preparation for an assault by strong lines of tirailleurs.

The 4th Bavarian Brigade occupied the park extending to the west; the quarries further in front were occupied by two battalions, two others were sent to the right to the farmsteads of Ormeteau and Vaurichard, so as to keep up some sort of communication with the 2nd Brigade. One battery to the south and four batteries to the north of Coulmiers were supported by the 5th Cavalry Brigade.

Thus at noon the Bavarian Corps, with only three brigades, held the ground from Renardière to the front of Gémigny, its front disproportionately extended to a length of more than four miles. But the French right wing remained quite inactive, so that the 3rd Brigade which had been sent to Préfort was recalled to Renardière.

When the French Corps had made good its foothold opposite the thin Bavarian line, it attacked in earnest at about one o'clock.

The Riflemen in Renardière had indeed repulsed the enemy's first rush, but this position was no longer tenable with only four battalions against the whole of Peytavin's Division. At about one o'clock General Dietl retired unmolested, under cover of an intermediate position, on the wood of Montpipeau, and occupied its border. Here he was joined by the 3rd Brigade, which on its retirement from Préfort hadfound Renardière already evacuated. The French had followed up from thence but hesitatingly, came under the fire of six batteries between the points of the forests at La Planche and Coulmiers, and made no further advance with their right wing.

In the centre Barry's Division about one o'clock had driven the Bavarian Riflemen out of the stone-quarries in front of Coulmiers. Not till three o'clock did it advance to a renewed general attack on the 4th Brigade, which was repulsed by the fire of the German guns and the repeated charges of the 5th Cavalry Brigade.

Meanwhile, d'Aries' Brigade of the XVth French Corps, after leaving Renardière, arrived southward of Coulmiers, and its batteries strengthened the fire which was being directed on that village. The Bavarian guns were compelled before the rush of the French tirailleurs to take ground further in rear, where they resumed their activity, while the infantry drove the French out of the park at the point of the bayonet.

But after four hours' fighting the resistance of this single brigade against three French brigades had become extremely arduous. Of the whole Corps only two battalions remained intact as a reserve at Bonneville, no reinforcement was to be looked for from anywhere, and on the right flank the French threatened the communications with Chartres as well as with Paris. At four in the afternoon General von der Tann gave orders to break off the fight and to retire by brigades from the left wing on Artenay.

Fresh troops of the enemy at this moment forced their way into the park of Coulmiers. Colonel Count von Ysenburg held the eastern outlets of the village, and withdrew his troops by alternate echelons through Gémigmy in good order.

It now proved of the greatest importance that the 2nd Brigade should have been able to maintain itsposition in front of this village, thus covering the further retreat.

At noon, General von Orff (in command of the Brigade), on approaching Champs and Cheminiers, had found these villages occupied by Deplanque's French Brigade. First he silenced its artillery, then he deployed his four battalions for action, with the 4th Cavalry Brigade on the right flank.

Reyau's Cavalry ere long came up between these two villages, after it had given up its two hours' cannonade against the Bavarian Cuirassiers and had been driven out of St. Sigismond by dismounted hussars. But this body of horse soon got out from under the fire of the Bavarian guns and moved off to the westward, it was said because it mistook Lipkowski's volunteers, skirmishing further to the north, for German reinforcements advancing. And when the Bavarian horse-batteries opened fire on Champs from the north-east, the French abandoned the place at about two o'clock, in great disorder.

General von Orff now brought the artillery up to within 500 paces of Cheminiers, and marched the infantry up through the intervals.

Admiral Jauréguiberry, however, arriving in person, succeeded in rallying the wavering troops, and this attack failed. The French batteries soon compelled the Bavarian horse-batteries to retire.

When, at about three o'clock, Bourdillon's Brigade and the reserve artillery of the XVIth French Corps also arrived at Champs, and news was brought of the state of the fighting at Coulmiers, General von Orff determined to refrain from all further attack, and confined himself to maintaining his position in front of Gémigny to the last extremity. Unshaken by the fire of the numerous hostile batteries, the weak brigade repulsed the repeated attacks of the enemy.

Thus the 4th Brigade was enabled unmolested to retire from Coulmiers by Gémigny and St. Péravy,and the 1st, from Montpipeau further eastward, on Coinces. The 2nd Brigade followed to Coinces, and finally the 3rd formed the rear-guard as far as St. Sigismond, where it halted and bivouacked. The cavalry covered the retreat on all sides.

After a short rest the retreat of the main body was continued during the night, by very bad roads. Artenay was reached by the morning. Orleans was evacuated, and the garrison which had been left there rejoined its Corps. The stores were conveyed by railway back to Toury; but one ammunition column, 150 prisoners, and the sick who could not be moved, fell into the hands of the French.

This contest of 20,000 Germans against 70,000 French cost the former about 800 in killed and wounded; the enemy's loss was nearly double.

From Artenay, on November 10th, the 2nd Brigade undertook the duty of covering the further march on Toury, where close quarters were available. Thither, too, came the 22nd Division from Chartres, and took up a position at Janville close to the Bavarians. General von der Tann had extricated himself from a difficult position with much skill and good fortune. The enemy did not attempt a pursuit. General d'Aurelle restricted himself to awaiting further reinforcements in a strong position before Orleans. The French preparations were, however, in greater activity on the Upper Loir and the Eure.

On the German side the IInd Army Corps arrived before Paris on the 5th of November; the 3rd Division was included in the investing line between the Seine and Marne; the 4th moved on to Longjumeau.

When the Guard Landwehr took possession of the peninsula of Argenteuil, a brigade of the IVth Corps became available for service on the north side of the capital. On the south side, the 17th Division at Rambouillet, the 22nd at Chartres, and the Bavarian Corps, which had moved to Ablis, with the 4th and 6thCavalry Divisions, were ultimately formed into a separate Army-Detachment of the IIIrd Army, under the command of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, and it was ordered to betake itself in the first instance to Dreux.

FOOTNOTE:[41]According to theStaff History, on La Renardière and La Grande Motte.

[41]According to theStaff History, on La Renardière and La Grande Motte.

On the 17th of November the 17th Division advanced by Maintenon. On the left, a French detachment was driven back across the Blaise; and when a few companies of marines, who attempted to block the high-road, had been disposed of, General von Tresckow (commanding the Division) marched into Dreux that evening. The combat had cost the Germans 50 men, the French 150 and 50 prisoners.

Prince Frederick Charles, whose forces were now at length assembled before Orleans in face of the enemy, expressed the wish that the (Grand Duke's) Detachment should advance on Tours by way of Le Mans. The Grand Duke accordingly marched on Nogent le Rotrou, which place, being the central rendezvous of the French levies, promised to be the scene of an obstinate resistance.

After several skirmishes the Detachment approached the place, but when on the 22nd preparations were being made to storm it from three sides, it was found that the enemy had already evacuated it. At the same time orders arrived from the supreme Headquarter, instructing the Grand Duke to fall back at once on Beaugency to join the right wing of the IInd Army, which it was necessary should immediately be reinforced in view of the superior strength of the enemy. "The force now massing before Orleans is to postpone all hostilities until the arrival of the Detachment. The slight opposition offered by the Frenchon the Eure and Huisne sufficiently shows that no serious danger threatens on that side; the enemy in that quarter need only be kept under observation by cavalry." The Detachment was not to be permitted even a single rest day, and its march was to be conducted with the utmost speed.

On the 23rd, the Divisions had closed up on their respective heads, and the Grand Duke on the 24th moved on Châteaudun and Vendôme; but the Bavarian Corps only got as far as Vibraye, while the two Prussian Divisions withdrew from the difficult country of the Perche, and the cavalry found the whole line of the Loir held by the enemy.

In fact, the French had sent a brigade of the troops massed behind the forest of Marchénoir by railway to Vendôme, expressly to protect the Government at Tours, while General de Sonis had advanced with the rest of the XVIIth Corps on Brou. Here on the 25th his advance met an ammunition column and bridge-train of the Bavarian Corps. At first only the 10th Cavalry Brigade could engage the enemy, but when presently two companies and eight guns had occupied the bridge over the Loir at Yèvres, the waggons were got through Brou in safety, and the enemy could not enter that place till the cavalry had continued its march.

The Bavarian Corps was meanwhile advancing on Mondoubleau and St. Calais, not certainly the shortest route to Beaugency, but, on the contrary, on the direct road to Tours. The two Divisions only reached the vicinity of Vibraye and Authon.

The appearance of a hostile force at Brou was deemed of sufficient importance to justify a détour by that place, postponing for the moment the prescribed march on the Loire. But when the 22nd Division approached Brou on the 26th, it found that the enemy had already retired during the night. The Government at Tours had ordered the whole of the XVIIthCorps to concentrate at Vendôme for their protection. But when the German cavalry made its appearance at Cloyes and Fréteval, General Sonis considered that he could not pursue his march further along the Loir, and made a détour by Marchénoir. But two night-marches so shattered the levies for the first time collected in mass that whole swarms of stragglers wandered about the neighbourhood all day and could only with difficulty be re-assembled at Beaugency.

To imbue the operations with unity of command, the Grand Duke was now, by instruction from the supreme Head-quarter, placed under Prince Frederick Charles's orders, and General von Stosch[42]was despatched to undertake the duties of Chief of the Staff to the Detachment. That force by the Prince's orders was to come in with all speed to Janville, whither troops of the IXth Corps would be sent to meet it by way of Orgères.

The Grand Duke therefore marched, on the 27th, with both his (Prussian) Divisions (17th and 22nd) to Bonneval, where there was already a squadron of the 2nd Cavalry Division. The Bavarian Corps, which, after finding Brou abandoned, had been directed on Courtalin, marched to Châteaudun. Having thus accomplished a junction with the IInd Army, the sorely fatigued troops of the Detachment were allowed a day's rest on the 28th, in quarters on the Loir.

FOOTNOTE:[42]Until then Commissary-General. He succeeded Colonel von Krenski as the Grand Duke's Chief of Staff.

[42]Until then Commissary-General. He succeeded Colonel von Krenski as the Grand Duke's Chief of Staff.

(Second half of November.)

Prince Frederick Charles had hastened the advance of his army as much as possible, but it had metwith many hindrances. The roads were broken up, National Guards and franctireurs stood watchful for mischief, and even the country people had taken up arms. However, by November 14th the IXth Corps with the 1st Cavalry Division reached Fontainebleau, whence it pursued its march to Angerville. The IIIrd Corps was following on Pithiviers. Of the Xth Corps the 40th Brigade was left at Chaumont, to make connection with the XIVth Corps; the 36th reached Montargis and Beaune la Rolande on the 21st.[43]The two brigades following in rear (37th and 39th) had a sharp encounter on the 24th at Ladon and Maizières. In this combat 170 French prisoners were taken, who belonged to a corps which, as General von Werder had already reported, was proceeding under General Crouzat's command from Chagny to Gien by railway. The order of battle was found on an officer who was among the prisoners.

That while the Grand Duke's Detachment was marching to join it, the IInd Army, only now fully concentrated, was in very close proximity to considerable forces of the enemy, was ascertained beyond doubt by several reconnoissances.

On the 24th troops of the IXth Corps advanced along the great high-road. A few shells caused the enemy to evacuate Artenay, pursued by the cavalry as far as Croix Briquet. Early in the same day a mixed detachment of all arms from the IIIrd Corps reached Neuville aux Bois. Two detachments of the 38th Brigade marched on Bois Commun and Bellegarde, but everywhere those inquisitive reconnaissances were met by very superior numbers of the enemy.

It was ascertained that the position of the Frenchbefore Orleans extended for about 37 miles from the Conie to Loing; and the massing of troops, especially on their (right) flank, made it highly probable that they proposed advancing by Fontainebleau on the rear of the besieging army. Still, this intention was not so evident as to justify Prince Frederick Charles in leaving the great highways from Orleans to Paris unguarded. However, to enable him to lend his left wing timely support in case of need, he moved the 5th Infantry Division of the IIIrd Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division to Boynes, nearer to the Xth Corps which was weak, and the 6th Division occupied Pithiviers in their stead. The quarters at Bazoches vacated by the 6th Division, were assigned to the IXth Corps. Finally, the Grand Duke received orders to reach Toury with his heads of columns by the 29th at latest. These dispositions were all carried out in due course.

Immediately after its success at Coulmiers the French Army of the Loire seemed for the moment only to have thought of securing itself against a counter-blow. It retired on Orleans, threw up extensive entrenchments, for which marine artillery was even brought up from Cherbourg, and awaited the arrival of further reinforcements. The XXth Corps, already mentioned, 40,000 strong, joined the XVth, XVIth, and XVIIth at Gien, in addition to one Division of the XVIIIth newly assembled at Nevers, and finally the volunteer bands under Cathelineau and Lipowski.

Thus the French Army round Orleans numbered 200,000; the German infantry opposed to this host for the time reached a strength of not more than 45,000 men.

Gambetta soon became urgent for renewed offensive operations. As General d'Aurelle raised objections to an advance by Pithiviers and Malesherbes, the Dictator himself took in hand the dispositions. In the night of the 22nd—23rd he telegraphed orders from Tours thatthe XVth Corps was at once to assemble at Chilleurs aux Bois and reach Pithiviers on the 24th; the XXth to march to Beaune la Rolande; and that then both Corps were to advance by way of Fontainebleau on Paris. The General pointed out that, according to his reckoning, 80,000 Germans must be encountered in an open country, and that it would be more advisable to await their attack in an intrenched position. Further, that this movement could be of no service in affording succour to the distressed capital, and that meanwhile there would remain unperformed the strengthening of the right wing, where on the 24th the unsteadiness of the XVIIIth and XXth Corps had caused the loss of the already mentioned fight at Ladon and Maizières.

In accordance with instructions received from Tours on the 26th, General Crouzat ordered the advance for the 28th of the two Corps he commanded—the XVIIIth by the right through Juranville, the XXth by the left through Bois Commun—for an encompassing attack on Beaune la Rolande. The XVth Corps in addition was moved up to Chambon in support, and Cathelineau's volunteers went forward to Courcelles.

As we have seen, on this same day the Grand Duke's Detachment had come up on the extreme right of the IInd German Army. On the left stood the Xth Corps with the 38th Brigade at Beaune, the 39th at Les Côtelles; the 37th, with the Corps artillery, had advanced to Marcilly between these two places.

FOOTNOTE:[43]There seems some confusion here. The 36th Brigade belonged, not to the Xth, but to the IXth Corps. The 38th Brigade is stated in theStaff Historyto have reached Beaune la Rolande on 23rd, the rest of the Corps (exclusive of the 40th Brigade) still behind at Montargis.

[43]There seems some confusion here. The 36th Brigade belonged, not to the Xth, but to the IXth Corps. The 38th Brigade is stated in theStaff Historyto have reached Beaune la Rolande on 23rd, the rest of the Corps (exclusive of the 40th Brigade) still behind at Montargis.

(November 28th.)

The French attack on November 28th failed because of the miscarriage of the projected combination, thetwo separate attempts exerting little reciprocal influence. On the right, the head of the XVIIIth Corps struck the outposts of the 39th Brigade at an early hour, in front of Juranville and Lorcy. Not until after a stout resistance were these driven in by about nine o'clock on Les Côtelles and behind the railway-embankment at Corbeilles, where they took possession of the park.

The French could now deploy in the open country in front of Juranville, and following up with strong lines of tirailleurs preceding them, they forced their way into Corbeilles and drove the garrison out to the north and west. But meanwhile, on the other side, a reinforcement from the reserve at Marcilly reached Les Côtelles, and now Colonel von Valentini passed to the attack of Juranville with the 56th Regiment. The artillery could afford no co-operation, the enemy made an obstinate resistance, and not till noon did he begin to retreat, while bitter fighting still continued round some detached houses. But when strong columns came up from Maizières and Corbeilles, the Germans were compelled to abandon the conquered village, carrying off with them 300 prisoners.

About two o'clock the greater portion of the French Corps deployed near Juranville for an attack on the position at Long Cour, into which the 39th Brigade had retired. But since the attack had not been prepared by artillery, it came to nothing under the fire of five Prussian batteries.

The first attack on Les Côtelles was also repulsed, but when it was repeated an hour later, the Germans had to abandon the place with the loss of fifty men taken prisoners. A gun, seven of the gunners of which had fallen, sank so deep in the soft ground that the few men left could not drag it out.

The XVIIIth French Corps, however, made no further way, but, as dusk came on, contented itself with an ineffective cannonade, and finally the 39th Brigade was able to maintain its position abreast of Beaune.

On the left wing of the French line of battle the attack had also from the first been of an encompassing tendency, the 2nd Division of the XXth Corps having advanced on Beaune, and the 1st on Batilly. But it was near noon before the arrival of part of its 3rd Division, which had remained in reserve, enabled the enemy to drive in the German advanced posts from Bois de la Leu to the cross-roads north-west of Beaune. And here also the 38th Brigade soon found itself under the artillery and infantry fire from Pierre Percée, the enemy continually gaining ground from the northward. The retreat had to be continued along the Cæsar road, whereon a gun, of which the men and horses had for the most part perished, fell into the enemy's hands. About the same time the 2nd French Division ascended the heights to the east of Beaune, and Colonel von Cranach was first enabled to rally the 57th Regiment further rearward, near La Rue Boussier, whereby the withdrawal of the batteries hurrying away from Marcilly was covered, and the further advance of the enemy was then arrested. Any such effort on his part entirely ceased when he was suddenly threatened on his own flank by the 1st Prussian Cavalry Division advancing from Boynes, and came under fire of its horse-batteries.

Meanwhile the 16th Regiment found itself completely isolated in Beaune, and surrounded on three sides by the enemy.

The town, which was surrounded by the remains of a high wall, and the churchyard were as far as possible prepared for defence. The enemy, after his first onset by strong swarms of riflemen had been driven back, set about bombarding the town. His shells burst through the walls of the churchyard and set a few buildings on fire, but every attempt at an assault was steadfastly repulsed.

In the meantime, General von Woyna had replenished the ammunition of his batteries, and while occupying Romainville on the right, he also took up a positionopposite the copses of Pierre Percée, so that by three o'clock he was able to bring up seven companies on the east side of Beaune.

About this time assistance came with the arrival of the IIIrd Army Corps. While the 6th Division was still pressing on towards Pithiviers, the 5th had already that morning stood to arms in front of that place. The first news from Beaune had sounded so far from alarming, that the Corps-artillery retired to its quarters. Nevertheless, in consequence of the increasing cannon thunder and later information of a serious encounter, General von Alvensleben gave the word for the Corps to advance, with the 5th Division of which General von Stülpnagel had already set out of his own initiative. The 6th followed, and detached a battalion to observe towards Courcelles; wherein, however, Cathelineau's volunteers remained inactive.

Part of the 52nd Regiment, which was marching at the head of the column, turned off to the right, and, supported by artillery, began a fire-fight about 4.30 against Arconville and Batilly. Another part penetrated into the Bois de la Leu and the copses near La Pierre Percée, where it recaptured the gun which had been lost there earlier. Four batteries in position on the road from Pithiviers, behind Fosse des Prés, directed their fire on the enemy still holding his ground on the west side of Beaune, from which he was finally driven by the 12th Regiment, and pursued as far as Mont Barrois.

After dark the Xth Corps encamped about Long Cour, Beaune and Batilly, and the 5th Division in its rear; the 6th remained at Boynes, where the 1st Division of Cavalry also found accommodation.

In the battle of Beaune la Rolande General von Voigts-Rhetz had to hold his ground against the enemy with 11,000 men against 60,000, with three brigades against six Divisions, until help reached him towards evening. This action cost the Germans 900 and theFrench 1300 men in killed and wounded; and 1800 unwounded prisoners fell into the hands of the Germans.

In the evening the French XXth Corps had retreated as far as Bois Commun and Bellegarde; the XVIIIth, on the contrary, had taken up its position near Vernouille and Juranville, in fact, directly in front of the Xth German Corps, on the ground which the former had won. The expectation was therefore not unnatural that the fighting would recommence on the morrow.

Prince Frederick Charles, therefore, directed the Xth and IIIrd Corps to assemble on the 29th in full preparedness. The IXth received orders to advance with two brigades towards Boynes and Bazoches, and the remaining troops were to follow as soon as the Grand Duke's Detachment should have reached the main road to Paris. Of it in the course of the day the heads arrived, the 4th Cavalry Division at Toury, the infantry at Allaines and Orgères. The 6th Cavalry Division, which was marching on the right flank, met first with opposition at Tournoisis.

Meanwhile General Crouzat had been instructed from Tours by a message which reached him on the evening of the 28th, to desist for the present from further offensive attack, and the French right wing was thereupon drawn further back. On the 30th both Corps moved leftward, in order to be again nearer to the XVth. For the purpose of disguising this lateral movement, detachments were sent in a northerly direction and met reconnoitring parties of the German Xth and IIIrd Corps, with which skirmishes took place at Maizières, St. Loup and Mont Barrois; and the movement of the French was soon detected, in the first instance on their left flank.

The Government at Tours had received news from Paris that General Ducrot would attempt on the 29th to break through the German investing lines with 100,000 men and 400 guns, and endeavour to connectwith the Army of the Loire in a southerly direction. The balloon which carried this despatch had descended in Norway, whence the message had been forwarded. It was concluded from this that the General was already vigorously engaged, and that help must be no longer delayed. Commissioned by Gambetta, M. Freycinet submitted to a council of war called by General d'Aurelle, a scheme for the advance of the whole army on Pithiviers. In the event of a refusal by the Commander-in-Chief to accept the same, M. Freycinet carried an order for his supersession.

It was decided in the first place to execute a wheel to the right with the left wing, Chilleurs aux Bois forming the pivot of the movement. While a front was thus being formed against Pithiviers, the Corps of the right wing on a parallel front were to await the order to move until this was accomplished. The XXIst Corps was to be sent to Vendôme to cover the left flank.

As the result of those dispositions, on the 1st of December the XVIth Corps moved on Orgères, in the direction of the railway; the XVIIth followed to Patay and St. Péravy.

Opposite to these forces, on the right wing of the IInd German Army the 17th Division of the Grand Duke's Detachment had arrived at Bazoches, the 22nd at Toury, and the Bavarian Corps reached the vicinity of Orgères. Thus the hostile shock fell first on the last body. Attacked in front by a far superior force, and threatened in flank by Michel's Cavalry Division, the 1st Bavarian Brigade was forced to retreat at threeo'clock to Villepion. The 2nd Brigade approaching from Orgères, halted to the west of Nonneville, and the 4th marched up to between Villepion and Faverolles, which position the Bavarians, in spite of heavy losses, succeeded in holding for a long time. On their right wing Prince Leopold of Bavaria, with the four guns of his battery still serviceable, arrested the enemy's advance on Nonneville, but under the personal leadership of Admiral Jauréguiberry the French forced their way into Villepion. As night drew on, and the want of ammunition was becoming serious, the 1st Bavarian Brigade went to Loigny; the 2nd, however, did not retreat until five o'clock to Orgères, where also the 3rd arrived in the evening, whilst the 4th joined the 1st at Loigny.

The engagement cost both sides about 1000 men, and only the foremost Bavarian detachments were forced back for a short distance.

This measure of success, and the news from Paris, rekindled in Tours ardent hopes of victory. As will be seen further on, a sortie from Paris on 30th November had certainly so far succeeded that the village of Epinay on the northern section of the line of investment was occupied for a short time. Thereupon it was summarily concluded that this was the village of the same name which lay to the south near Longjumeau, and that there was now scarcely any obstacle to the junction of the Army of Orleans with that of Paris. Cathelineau's volunteer Corps was directed at once to occupy the forest of Fontainebleau, and the imminent annihilation of the Germans was announced to the country.

The head of the Army of Orleans, nevertheless, had barely made half a day's march in the direction of Paris, and the right wheel of the left wing remained to be accomplished. The XVIth Corps was to attempt to reach the line Allaines-Toury by the 2nd of December; the XVIIth was to follow, and the XVth, marching fromChilleurs through Artenay, was to close to the right. The Grand Duke, on the report of the great force in which the enemy was approaching, determined to march to meet him with the whole strength of the Detachment. The requisite orders were issued at eight o'clock in the morning to the Divisions, which were already standing prepared on their respective assembling-grounds. The Bavarian Corps was directed to take up a position opposite Loigny with its left wing at Château-Goury; the 17th Division to march immediately from Santilly to Lumeau, and the 22nd from Tivernon to Baigneaux. The cavalry was to undertake the protection of both wings.

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