FOOTNOTES:

January 23rd.—The concentric movement of all the bodies of the German army was continued.

General Debschitz, approaching from the north, in passing Roches found only the abandoned camping ground of the French XXIVth Corps. The 4th Reserve Division occupied L'Isle without opposition, and met no resistance till it reached Clerval and Baume.

On the Ognon the Baden Division drove the French out of Montbozon.

In the centre of the army the VIIth Corps pushed the advanced guard of the 14th Division forward on Dannemarie, near Besançon. A fight ensued there in the form only of a cannonade which lasted till night. The 13th Division, again, which had crossed the Doubs at Dampierre, advanced on Quingey.

For want of rolling stock it had been possible to forward only one French brigade by railway, and the last trains were received at the Byans station with Prussian shells. These troops were in so bad case that they were unable even to place outposts. They abandoned Quingey almost without a struggle, and their hurried retreat on Besançon and beyond the Loue, stopped the advance of reinforcements already on the way. Thus 800 prisoners and a train of 400 convalescents fell into the hands of the Prussian advanced guard, who at once broke up the railway at Abbans-dessous.

On the right wing, the head of the IInd Corps advanced by the valley of the Loue on the southern bank. Several cuttings on this road had been prepared for defence, but were found undefended. It was at Villers Farlay that it first encountered a strong body of the enemy.

On the evening of this day, of the French forces the XXth Corps was on the north and the XVIIIth on the west of Besançon, at the distance of about four miles. Cavalry, artillery and the train were passing through the town or encamped on the glacis of the fortress. The XXIVth Corps was on the march thither, and the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the XVth were in possession of the southern bank of the Doubs about Baume and Larnod; but the 1st Division had not succeeded in holding Quingey. Thus the most direct and important line of communications of the French army was cut, and its position, by this fresh mischance, seriously compromised. Impracticable projects and counsels from Bordeaux poured in freely, but did not mend matters; and on the 24th General Bourbaki summoned the superior officers to a council of war.

January 24th.—The Generals declared that they had scarcely more than half their men under arms, and these were more inclined to fly than to fight. General Pallu alone thought he might answer for the men of the army reserve. The Intendant-General reported that, without trenching on the magazines of the place, the supplies in hand would last for four days at most. General Billot was in favour of attempting to fight a way through to Auxonne, but he declined to take the command in chief which was offered him. The exhaustion of the troops and their evidently increasing insubordination gave little hope of the success of offensive operations. So there was no alternative but to retire on Pontarlier, as the Commander-in-Chief had proposed.

This recourse, even, was seriously threatened. To relieve himself from pressure on the north, General Bourbaki ordered the XXIVth Corps to advance once more and hold the Lomont passes. On the south the XVth was to defend the deep mountain-ravine of the Loue, and General Crémer was more especially to cover the retreat of the army on the rightflank, which was most seriously threatened. For this difficult task, in addition to his own Division, a Division of the XXth Corps and the army reserve as the most trustworthy troops were placed under his command. The XVIIIth and the remainder of the XXth were to await marching-orders at Besançon.

In the German Head-quarter, where of course the plans of the French could not be known, various possibilities had to be reckoned with.

If the French remained at Besançon there would be no need to attack them there; the place was not suited for the accommodation of a large army, and its supplies could not long hold out. That they would again attempt to advance northwards was scarcely likely; by doing so they would be cutting loose from all their resources, and must encounter the larger part of the XIVth German Corps on the Ognon.

An attempt to break through to Dijon seemed more possible. But this would be opposed at St. Vit by the 13th Division, at Pesmes by Colonel von Willisen's detachment, and finally by General von Kettler.

Thus a retreat on Pontarlier seemed the most likely course; and to hinder their further march from that place would in the first instance be the duty of the IInd Corps, while in the meantime the VIIth was observing the enemy massed in Besançon, and opposing his sorties on both sides of the river.

The Commander-in-Chief therefore confined himself to giving general directions to his Generals, expressly authorizing them to act on their own judgment in eventualities which could not be foreseen.

General von Werder was instructed to advance by Marnay, and to place the 14th Division in touch with the Baden Division and Von der Goltz's Brigade, and then to distribute these bodies along the right bank of the Doubs. The 4th Reserve Division restored the bridges at L'Isle and Baume, and crossed over to the left bank. Colonel von Willisen was to join the VIIthCorps to supply its lack of cavalry. The IInd Corps was assembled behind Villers Farlay.

January 25th.—Reconnaissances on a large scale were arranged for next day. The reconnaissance of the VIIth Corps resulted in a sharp fight at Vorges. The head of the IInd Corps met the enemy in front of Salins and at Arbois, but found that the latter had not yet reached Poligny.

January 26th.—The advanced guard of the IInd Corps advanced on Salins. The fronts of the high-perched forts of St. André and Belin near the town, looked toward Switzerland, but their fire commanded also on flank and rear the plain to the south and west on the enemy's line of march. Salins constituted a strong barrier on the road to St. Laurent, and as long as it was held would cover the line of retreat of columns marching from Besançon to Pontarlier.

The two field-batteries of the advanced guard could, of course, do little against the heavy guns of the forts; but the Fusiliers of the 2nd Regiment advanced in rushes of small detachments up the narrow ravine, scaled its rugged faces, and, supported by the two Grenadier battalions, forced their way, about half-past two, into the railway-station and suburb of St. Pierre; but with the loss of 3 officers and 109 men.

Soon after General von Koblinski arrived by way of St. Thiébaud with the 42nd Regiment. As in consequence of the representations of the Mayor the commandant refrained from bombarding the town, the advanced guard was able to take up its quarters therein; the main body of the 3rd Division retreated from under the fire of the forts on Mouchard, and the defile remained closed again to further penetration. It was necessary to turn it by the south.

In that direction the 4th Division had already marched to Arbois, its head further forward up to Pont d'Héry; it found Poligny and Champagnole on the right still unoccupied.

The VIIth Corps reconnoitred both banks of the Doubs, and found the enemy in strong positions at Busy and at Vorges.

The 4th Reserve Division advanced along the southern bank as far as St. Juan d'Adam, near Besançon; the remainder of the XIVth Corps marched on Etuz and Marnay.

General von Kettler's report of the fighting on the 21st and 23rd determined General von Manteuffel to make a renewed attempt on Dijon. He detailed to this duty General Hann von Weyhern (commanding 4th Infantry Division, IInd Corps), placing him in command of the 8th Brigade, with Colonel von Willisen's troops and Degenfeld's Baden Brigade.

On the French side, General Bressoles had started on the 24th, in obedience to orders, to take renewed possession of the passages of the Doubs and the Lomont defiles. He had, in the first instance, turned against Baume with d'Aries' Division; but as he did not succeed even in driving the German outposts out of Pont les Moulins, he retired to Vercel. In consequence of this, on the morning of the 26th, Carré's Division, which had found the passes of the Lomont unoccupied, also moved to Pierre Fontaine. Comagny's Division had already retreated to Morteau, and was making its way unmolested to Pontarlier.

General Bourbaki was greatly disturbed by this failure of his right wing; more perhaps than was needful, since, in fact, only one German division stood north of him, which at most could drive his rearguard on Pontarlier, while the main force of the enemy threatened him far more seriously on the west. He nevertheless ordered a renewed advance, on the 26th, of the XXIVth Corps, which was now to be supported by the XVIIIth. But the march through Besançon of the latter, through streets covered with ice, took up the whole of the day which should have been devoted to the attack, so that nothing came of the scheme.

The Army Reserve had reached Ornans, and stood there in readiness. The two other Divisions advanced on the road to Salins, but heard while on the march that the Germans had just carried that place. They then occupied in Déservillers and Villeneuve d'Amont, the roads leading from thence to Pontarlier.

The War Minister, meanwhile, had decisively refused permission for the general retreat of the army, without any regard to the imperative necessities of the case.

The military dilettanteism which fancied it could direct the movements of the army from Bordeaux is characterized in a telegram of the afternoon of the 25th. Monsieur de Freycinet gives it as his "firm conviction"[82]that General Bourbaki, if he would concentrate his troops, and, if necessary come to an understanding with Garibaldi, would be strong enough to fight his way out, "either by Dôle, or by Mouchard, or by Gray, or by Pontailler" (north of Auxonne). The choice was left to him.

Still more amazing was the further suggestion that if indeed the state of the army prohibited a long march, it should be embarked on the railway at Chagey, under the eye, no doubt, of the pursuing enemy.

Such communications could only avail to shatter the brave commander's self-confidence. The disastrous reports which poured in from all sides, and the state of the troops which he had seen for himself as the XVIIIth Corps marched through the town, crushed his last hope and led him to attempt his own life.

The Commander had of course to bear the blame of the total failure of a campaign planned by Freycinet; his dismissal from the command was already on its way. General Clinchant was appointed in his stead, and under these disastrous circumstances took the command of the army.

All the Generals were, no doubt, extremely reluctantto bring their weary and dispirited troops into serious contact with the enemy. Every line of retreat was closely threatened, excepting only that on Pontarlier. The new Commander-in-Chief had no choice but to carry out the plans of his predecessor. He at once ordered the further march. He himself proceeded to Pontarlier. In that strong position he hoped to be able at least to give the troops a short rest. No large bodies of the Germans had been met with so far, the ammunition columns had got safely through, and if the defiles of Vaux, Les Planches, and St. Laurent could be reached and held in advance of the enemy there was still a possibility of escape to the southwards.

On the evening of the 27th, the Division Poullet was at Levier, nearest to the Germans; the two other Divisions under General Crémer, with the XVth and XXth Corps, were écheloned on the road from Ornans to Sombacourt; the XVIIIth Corps alone was on the eastern road through Nods. The XXIVth, in a miserable condition, had reached Montbenoît with its head at Pontarlier; two Divisions were still in Besançon.

On this same day General von Fransecky collected the main body of the IInd Corps at Arbois, and reinforced General du Trossel's posts at Pont d'Héry.

The XIVth Corps relieved the 14th Division of the VIIth Corps at St. Vit; the latter advanced to the right of the 13th Division into the Loue angle, which the French had already abandoned.

On the north, General von Debschitz held Blamont and Pont du Roide, while General von Schmeling watched Besançon from St. Juan, and General von der Goltz marched on Arbois to form a reserve.

January 28th.—Suspecting that the French were already on the march by Champagnole on St. Laurent, General Fransecky, to cut off from them that line of retreat, advanced on the following day in a southerly direction with the IInd Corps.

General du Trossel reached Champagnole withoutopposition, and thence sent his cavalry along the road to Pontarlier. Lieutenant-Colonel von Guretzky arrived at Nozeroy with a squadron of the 11th Dragoons, and found the place occupied; but he made prize of fifty-six provision-waggons and the military-chest, taking the escort prisoners.

The 5th and 6th Brigades advanced on Poligny and Pont du Navoy.

The 13th Division of the VIIth Corps, having been relieved at Quingey by the Baden troops, assembled at La Chapelle, while the 14th advanced on Déservillers. Its head found no enemy in Bolandoz, although his camp-fires were still smouldering; so that the main hostile army was not overtaken on that day.

General Clinchant had in fact moved his Corps closer on Pontarlier. But it soon became evident that supplies were not procurable for any long stay there. General Crémer received orders that night to move forward at once to Les Planches and St. Laurent with three cavalry regiments standing already on the road to Mouthe. The mountain-roads were deep in snow, but by forced marching he reached the points designated on the following afternoon. The XXIVth Corps and a brigade of the Division Poullett followed next day, and the latter also occupied with two battalions the village of Bonneveaux at the entrance to the defiles of Vaux. On the evening of the 28th the rest of the French army stood as follows: the XVIIIth Corps was behind the Drugeon at Houtaud close before Pontarlier; the 1st Division of the XVth had advanced over the brook to Sombacourt, the 3rd Division was in the town. On the left the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the XXth Corps held the villages from Chaffois to Frasne, and on the right the army reserve occupied Byans.

General von Manteuffel had ordered for the 29th a general advance on Pontarlier, where at last the French must certainly be found.

January 29th.—Of the IInd Corps General Koblinskyhad set out from Poligny in the night. When he reached Champagnole and had assembled the whole of the 5th Brigade he moved forward therefrom at about seven o'clock. General du Trossel with the 7th Brigade also reached Censeau without finding the enemy.

On the right Colonel von Wedell marched from Pont du Navoy on Les Planches with four battalions of the 6th Brigade. He found only dismounted troopers, posts probably left by General Crémer which were easily dispersed by the Jägers. Detachments were then sent out in different directions, and everywhere met with scattered troops; but at Foncine le Bas the head of the XXIVth Corps was found, and Colonel von Wedell now blocked the last line of retreat which had remained to the French.

With the rest of the IInd Corps General von Hartmann marched unopposed on Nozeroy.

The 14th Division of the VIIth Corps had not received the order to advance on Pontarlier till somewhat late; it did not start from Déservillers until noon, and only reached Levier at three o'clock, where, at the same hour, the head of the 13th Division also arrived from Villeneuve d'Amont, the state of the roads having greatly delayed its march.

The advanced guard of three battalions, half a squadron, and one battery, had met only stragglers on the way, and General von Zastrow commanded it to push forward to the Drugeon brook. In the forest on the left of the road closed detachments of the enemy were retiring on Sombacourt, and Major von Brederlow with the 1st battalion of the 77th Regiment turned off to attack that village lying on the flank. The 2nd company under Captain von Vietinghof dashed into it through Sept Fontaines with loud cheers, and was at once closely surrounded by strong bodies of the enemy; but the other companies soon came to its assistance. The first Division of the XVth French Corps was here completely routed without the Army Reserveclose at hand in Byans having come to its support. Fifty officers, including two generals, and 2700 men were taken prisoners; ten guns, seven mitrailleuses, forty-eight waggons, 319 horses and 3500 stand of arms fell into the hands of the Hanoverian battalion[83]which was left in occupation of Sombacourt.

The rest of the advanced guard had meanwhile approached Chaffois, where the road opens out from the mountains into the wide valley of the Drugeon. That village, as we have seen, was occupied by the 2nd Division of the XXth Corps.

Colonel von Cosel passed at once to the attack. Three companies of the 53rd Regiment surprised the French field-posts and took possession of the first houses of the village, but then the whole mass of the French XVIIIth Corps barred his further progress. By degrees all the available forces had to join in the fighting, and also reinforcements had to be brought up from the main body of the 14th Division. The fight lasted with great obstinacy for an hour and a half, when suddenly the French ceased firing and laid down their arms. They claimed that an armistice had already been agreed on.

Monsieur Jules Favre had, in fact, telegraphed to Bordeaux at a quarter-past eleven on the night of the 28th, that an armistice of twenty-one days had been concluded, without adding, however, that, with his consent, the three eastern departments had been excluded from its operations. The information, in this imperfect form, was transmitted to the civil authorities by the Delegation at 12.15 of the 29th; but Monsieur Freycinet did not forward it to the military authorities, whom the matter principally concerned, till 3.30 in the afternoon.

Thus could General Clinchant in all good faith transmitto General Thornton, in command of the Divisions at Chaffois, a message which, as regarded the Army of the East, was altogether incorrect. The latter at once sent his staff officer to the Prussian advanced guard, which was still in action, who demanded the cessation of the firing in recognition of the official communication.

General von Manteuffel had received in Arbois at five in the morning, full particulars from the supreme Head-quarter of the terms of the armistice, according to which the army of the South was to prosecute its operations to a final issue. An army order announcing this to all the troops was at once sent out, but did not reach the VIIth Corps till evening.

Nothing was known there of any armistice; however, the tidings might be on the way, and General von Zastrow granted the temporary cessation of hostilities, and even sanctioned the release of his prisoners, but without their arms.

Chaffois, with the exception of a couple of farmsteads, remained in possession of the 14th Division, which found such quarters there as might be; the 13th occupied the villages from Sept Fontaines back to Déservillers.

January 30th.—In full confidence in the news from the seat of Government, General Clinchant, on the 30th, suspended the movements of his army. The newly-appointed Commander of the XXIVth Corps, General Comagny, also gave up his intended attempt to cut his way with 10,000 men at Foncine through Colonel von Wedell's weak brigade. The other Corps, after the unfortunate course of the fighting on the previous evening, had drawn in close on Pontarlier; but detachments of cavalry were sent out on the roads to Besançon and St. Laurent, to establish a line of demarcation and also to keep up communications with the fortress and with Southern France.

On receiving the army order at about eleven o'clock, General Zastrow gave notice to the enemy in his frontof the resumption of hostilities, but restricted his immediate demands to the complete evacuation of Chaffois, which was complied with. Otherwise the Corps remained inactive where it was.

Of the IInd Corps General du Trossel had set out very early from Censeau, but the appearance of a French flag of truce, and his fear of offending against the law of nations, here too occasioned considerable hesitation. The forest of Frasne was not clear of the French till evening. Lieutenant-Colonel von Guretzky made his way into the village with quite a small force, and took prisoners twelve officers and 1500 men who held it, with two colours. The 5th Brigade then also moved up into Frasne; the rest of the Corps occupied the same quarters as on the previous day.

A flag of truce had presented itself at Les Planches, but Colonel von Wedell had simply dismissed the bearer. The outposts of the XIVth Corps did the same.

On the north of Pontarlier, General von Schmeling advanced to Pierre Fontaine, General von Debschitz to Maiche.

January 31st.—Early in the morning of this day the French Colonel Varaigne made his appearance at General von Manteuffel's head-quarters at Villeneuve, with the proposal that a cessation of hostilities for thirty-six hours should be agreed upon, till the existing condition of uncertainty should be removed; but this proposal was refused, as on the German side there were no doubts whatsoever. Permission was granted for the despatch of an application to Versailles, but it was at the same time explained that the movements of the Army of the South would not be suspended pending the arrival of the answer.

On this day, however, the IInd Army Corps marched only to Dompierre on a parallel front with the VIIth, its advanced guard pushing forward on the Drugeon to Ste. Colombe and La Rivière. Thence, in the evening, a company of the Colberg Grenadiers crossed the steepmountain ridge and descended on La Planée, where it took 500 prisoners. A right-flank detachment of two battalions and one battery under Lieutenant-Colonel Liebe marched unopposed up the long pass of Bonnevaux to Vaux, and took prisoners 2 officers and 688 men. The enemy then abandoned the defile of Granges Ste. Marie and retired to St. Antoine in the mountains.

The Corps had found every road strewn with cast-away arms and camp utensils, and had taken in all 4000 prisoners.

Of the VIIth Corps, as soon as the enemy had been informed of the resumption of hostilities, the 14th Division bent leftward on the Drugeon and up to La Vrine, whence a connection was effected with the 4th Reserve Division of the XIVth Corps in St. Gorgon. The 13th Division advanced to Sept Fontaines. Pontarlier was now completely surrounded, and General von Manteuffel fixed February 1st for the general attack thereon. The IInd Corps was to advance from the south-west, the VIIth from the north-west; General von der Goltz was to establish himself in front of Levier in reserve.

Meanwhile the French Commander-in-Chief had conceived doubts whether everything was quite right with the communications from his Government. All the mountain-passes leading to the south were now lost, and an escape in that direction was no longer to be hoped for. General Clinchant had already sent rearward the baggage and ammunition columns, the sick and worn-out men, through La Cluse under shelter of the forts of Joux and Neuv. And when in the afternoon a message from Bordeaux brought the intelligence that in fact the Army of the East had been excluded from the armistice, the Commander-in-Chief summoned his generals to a council of war. Every General present declared that he could no longer answer for his troops. General Clinchant himself therefore went out the same evening to Les Verrières, to conclude negotiations he had already opened, in virtue of which on the following day,February 1st, the army was to cross the Swiss frontier by three roads.

To cover this retreat, the Army Reserve was to hold Pontarlier till all the baggage-trains should have passed La Cluse, while the XVIIIth Corps was to take up a covering position between the two forts. Defensive works there were at once set about. What of the XVth Corps on the way by Morez had failed in getting through with the cavalry was to try to cross into Switzerland at any available point.

February 1st.—When the advanced guard of the IInd Corps now advanced on Pontarlier from Ste. Colombe, it met with but slight resistance at the railway station. The Colberg Grenadiers took possession of the town without a struggle, and captured many prisoners, but then found the road on the further side entirely blocked by guns and waggons. They could pass beyond on either side of the road only with difficulty through deep snow. Just in front of La Cluse the road winds between high rocky precipices into the wide basin of the Doubs, completely commanded by the isolated fortalice of Joux perched on the solid rock. On debouching into the open the foremost companies were received by a hot fire. Four guns, dragged up thither with the greatest exertions, could make no head against the heavy guns of the fort, and the French themselves here passed to the attack.

The Colberg Fusiliers had meanwhile climbed the heights to the left, followed by the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment and a battalion of the 49th Regiment, which drove the French out of the farmsteads on the rifted upland. The steep cliff on the right was also scaled, several rifle sub-divisions of the 49th climbed the acclivity up to La Cluse, and the Colberg Grenadiers advanced to the foot of Fort Neuv.

To take the strong fortalices by storm was obviously impossible, and furthermore because of the nature of the ground the fugitive enemy could scarcely be overtakenin force. Of the French, 23 officers and 1600 men were taken prisoners, with 400 loaded waggons; of the Germans, 19 officers and 365 men had fallen, mostly of the Colberg Regiment. The troops spent the night on the field of the fighting.

As no large force could come into action at La Cluse, General von Fransecky had ordered the main body of the Corps to march further southward to Ste. Marie. To avoid the necessity of crossing the steep chain of the Jura, General von Hartmann first betook himself to Pontarlier to avail himself of the better roads from thence, but his progress was stopped, the fight at La Cluse having assumed unexpected proportions. The VIIth Corps and the 4th Reserve Division, which had reached the Doubs at noon, were equally unable to get at the enemy.

During the whole day the French columns were crossing the Swiss frontier. The Army Reserve in Pontarlier was at the beginning swept away by the tide of baggage-waggons and drivers, and only joined the XVIIIth Corps on reaching La Cluse. During the night they both followed the general line of retreat. Only the cavalry and the 1st Division of the XXIVth Corps reached the neighbouring department of l'Ain to the southward, the latter force reduced to a few hundred men. There crossed the frontier on to Swiss soil some 80,000 Frenchmen.

General Manteuffel had transferred his headquarters to Pontarlier. There, in the course of the night, he first heard through Berlin of the convention arranged between General Clinchant and Colonel Herzog of the Swiss Confederation.

General von Manteuffel had achieved the important success of his three weeks' campaign by hard marching and constant fighting, although there had been no pitched battle since that of the Lisaine. These marches, indeed, had been such as none but well-seasoned troops could have accomplished under bold and skilful leadership,under every form of fatigue and hardship, in the worst season and through a difficult country.

Thus two French armies were now prisoners in Germany, a third interned in the capital, and the fourth disarmed on foreign soil.

FOOTNOTES:[81]Men of the 2nd Battalion, 61st Regiment, 8th Brigade, 4th Division, IInd Corps, which Corps consisted exclusively of Pomeranians.[82]"Conviction bien arrêtée."[83]The 77th Hanoverian Fusilier Regiment, of which this was the 2nd battalion, belonged to the 25th Brigade, 13th Division, VIIth (Westphalian) Army Corps.

[81]Men of the 2nd Battalion, 61st Regiment, 8th Brigade, 4th Division, IInd Corps, which Corps consisted exclusively of Pomeranians.

[82]"Conviction bien arrêtée."

[83]The 77th Hanoverian Fusilier Regiment, of which this was the 2nd battalion, belonged to the 25th Brigade, 13th Division, VIIth (Westphalian) Army Corps.

It only remains to cast a backward glance on the advance on Dijon, with the conduct of which General Hann von Weyhern was charged on January 26th.

On that same day Garibaldi received instructions there to take energetic measures against Dôle and Mouchard.

To support him, the Government, indefatigable in the evolution of new forces, was to put in march 15,000 Gardes-Mobiles under General Crouzat from Lyons to Lons le Saulnier, and a XXVIth Corps in course of formation at Châtellerault was to be sent from thence to Beaune. As it was beyond doubt that General von Manteuffel had moved with a strong force on the communications of the Army of the East, the specific order was transmitted on the 27th to the Commander of the Army of the Vosges, to leave only from 8000 to 10,000 men in Dijon and to advance at once with his main force beyond Dôle.

But the General was always greatly concerned for the safety of Dijon; he occupied the principal positions on the slopes of the Côte d'Or and detached a small force to St. Jean de Losne, behind the canal of Bourgogne. Of 700 volunteers who had marched on Dôle, no trace was ever found there.

Langres had shown more energy; several and often successful attacks on small outpost companies andetappen troops had been made from it from time to time.

General Hann von Weyhern's purpose of attacking Dijon from the south had to be abandoned, because the bridge over the Saône at St. Jean de Losne had been destroyed. He therefore on the 29th crossed the river at Apremont, and on the 31st assembled his detachments at Arc sur Tille. Here again General Bordone, the Chief of the general staff of the Army of the Vosges, vainly insisted that an armistice was in force. On the 31st General von Kettler marched with an advanced guard on Varois. To cut off the enemy's communications with Auxonne a left-flank detachment made itself master of the bridge over the Ouche at Fauverney. The first shells drove the French back on their intrenched position on the line St. Apollinaire—Mirande.

When the attempt to establish an armistice failed, General Bordone determined to evacuate Dijon in the course of the night and retire upon assured neutral ground. Thus, on February 1st, the head of the advanced guard found the position in front of the city abandoned, and General von Kettler marched in without encountering any opposition, just as the last train of French troops moved out of the railway-station. Sombernon and Nuits were also occupied on the 2nd.

Nothing now remained for General von Manteuffel but to establish the military occupation of the three Departments which he had won, and to guard them from without.

General Pelissier was still in the open field within their bounds, having reached Lons le Saulnier with the15,000 Gardes-Mobiles who had come up from Lyons and had been joined by the battalions sent back from Besançon by General Rolland, by no means an insignificant force numerically, but practically of no great efficiency. The commanders were recommended to retire and avoid further bloodshed; and they did so, as soon as some detachments of the IInd German Corps advanced on Lons le Saulnier and St. Laurent. Others occupied Mouthe and Les Allemands, where were found twenty-eight field-guns which had been abandoned by the French. As a measure of precaution, the Swiss frontier was watched by eight battalions. The fortalices of Salins, the little fortress of Auxonne, and Besançon, were kept under observation from the eastward. Although the Department of Haute-Marne was included in the armistice, the commandant of Langres had refused to recognize the authority of his Government. So this place had to be invested, and probably besieged. General von der Goltz was promptly ordered to advance once more on it, and General von Krenski was already on the march thither with seven battalions, two squadrons and two batteries, and a siege train from Longwy, which he had brought to capitulate on January 25th, after a bombardment of six days' duration. But it was not called into requisition at Langres. General von Manteuffel aimed at no further tactical results; he was anxious to save his troops from further losses, and to afford them all possible relief after their exceptional exertions. Not till now were the baggage-waggons brought up, even those of the superior staff officers having been necessarily left behind during the advance into the Jura. The troops were distributed for the sake of comfort in roomy quarters, but in readiness for action at any moment, the IInd Corps in the Jura, the VIIth in the Côte d'Or, the XIVth in the department of the Doubs. But the siege of Belfort was still to be vigorously carried on.

Immediately after the battle on the Lisaine the forces investing Belfort were increased to 27 battalions, 6 squadrons, 6 field batteries, 24 companies of fortress artillery, and 6 companies of fortress pioneers; 17,602 infantry, 4699 artillerymen, and 1166 pioneers, in all 23,467 men, with 707 horses and 34 field-guns.

The place was invested on the north and west by only a few battalions, and the main force was assembled to the south and east.

On January 20th the eastern batteries opened a heavy fire on Pérouse. Colonel Denfert concluded that an attack was imminent, and placed four battalions of his most trusted troops in the village, which had been prepared for an obstinate defence.

At about midnight, two battalions of the 67th Regiment advanced from Chêvremont on the Haut Taillis wood without firing a shot. Once inside it there was a determined struggle, but the French were driven back on the village, and the pioneers immediately intrenched the skirt of the wood towards Pérouse under a heavy fire from the forts. Half an hour later two Landwehr battalions advanced from Bessoncourt to the copse on the north of the village. They were received with a heavy fire, but made their way onward over abatis, pits and wire-entanglements, driving the enemy back into the quarries. A stationary fight now ensued, but the 67th presently renewed the attack, and without allowing themselves to be checked by the earthworks forced their way into Pérouse. They took possession of the eastern half of the straggling village at about half-past two, and the detachment defending the quarries, finding itself threatened, retreated. At five o'clock, Colonel Denfert abandoned the western part of the village, which was now completely occupied by the Germans. The losses on the German side were 8 officersand 178 men; the French left 5 officers and 93 men prisoners.

January 21st to 27th.—The next day the construction of the first parallel was undertaken, extending about 2000 yards from Donjoutin to Haut Taillis. Five battalions and two companies of Sappers were employed in this work, and were undisturbed by the French; but the rocky soil prevented its being constructed of the prescribed width.

General von Tresckow considered that he might thus early succeed in carrying both the Perches forts by a determined assault. Two half redoubts with ditches more than three yards deep cut perpendicularly in the solid rock, casemated traverses and bomb-proof blockhouses in the gorge, afforded protection to the defenders. Each work was armed with seven 12-cm. cannon, and they were connected by trenches, behind which reserves were in readiness. On the right flank this position was protected by a battalion and a sortie-battery in Le Fourneau; on the left the adjacent wood was cleared, cut down to a distance of 650 yards, and wire-entanglements between the stumps formed an almost impenetrable obstacle. In front the gentle slope of the ridge was under the cross-fire of the two forts.

When on the previous evening of the 26th the construction of the parallel was sufficiently advanced to allow of its being occupied by larger detachments, the assault was fixed for the 27th. Two columns, each of one battalion, one company of Sappers, and two guns, passed to the attack at daybreak on that morning. Two companies of Schneidemühl's Landwehr Battalion advanced against the front of Basses Perches and threw themselves on the ground within from 65 to 110 yards of the work. A sub-division of sharp-shooters and a few pioneers reached the ditch and unhesitatingly leaped in; the two other (Landwehr) companies, going round the fort by the left, got into its rear, and here too the men jumped into the ditch of the gorge. But theFrench who had been driven out of their shelter-trenches were now assembled, and the battalion from Le Fourneau came up. All the forts of the place opened fire on the bare and unprotected space in front of the parallel, and an attempt of reinforcements to cross it failed. The 7th Company of the Landwehr Battalion was surrounded by greatly superior numbers, and after a brave struggle was for the most part made captive. Most of the men in the ditch were still able to escape.

The advance of the right column against Hautes-Perches also failed. It had to cross 1100 yards of open ground. The encompassment of the fort was attempted, but it was impossible to force through the abatis and other obstacles under the destructive fire of the enemy.

This abortive attempt cost 10 officers and 427 men; and the slower process of an engineer attack had to be resumed.

January 28th to February 15th.—As the approaches to the forts progressed the flying sap could be carried forward about 330 yards every night unopposed by the enemy. In spite of all the difficulties caused by the nature of the soil, on February 1st the second parallel was thrown up at half distance from the Perches.

As the Fort of la Justice was a special hindrance to the operations, two new batteries had to be constructed to the east of Pérouse against it. Four mortar-batteries on the flanks of the parallel now directed their fire on the Perches at very short range. Three batteries were also constructed in the Bois des Perches to fire on the citadel, and one on the skirt of the wood near Bavilliers against the defences of the city. Henceforward 1500 shells a day were fired on the fortress and its outworks.

But further the prosecution of the attack became more and more difficult. The withdrawal of General Debschitz had seriously reduced the working strength of thebesieging force. There were only nine battalions for the exhausting service in the trenches. Specially serious was the heavy loss in pioneers, and two fresh companies had to be brought up from Strasburg. The bright moonlight illuminating the fields of snow far and wide made it impossible to proceed with the flying saps. Sap-rollers had to be used; the heads of the saps had to be protected by sandbags and the sides by gabions, while the earth for filling had often to be brought from a long distance in the rear.

On the head of all this, on February 3rd, a thaw set in, and the water from the heights filled the trenches, so that all communication had to be carried on across the open ground. Torrents of rain damaged the finished works; the parapet of the first parallel gave way altogether in places, and the banquette was washed away. The bottomless tracks made the arming of the batteries unspeakably difficult, and the teams of the columns and field artillery had to be employed in bringing up the ammunition. Many guns had become useless by overheating, while the enemy understood, by rapidly running out their guns, firing, and then running them back again, how to interrupt the work. Not merely was it necessary to continue the shelling of the Perches during the night, but a brisk rifle fire had to be kept up against them. Only now and then did the batteries newly placed in the parallels succeed in entirely silencing the guns of Hautes Perches. Epaulments had to be erected against Fort Bellevue and the defences of the railway-station, and Fort des Barres resumed activity. That under such exertions and the abominable weather the health of the troops suffered severely, need not be said; the battalions could often only muster 300 men for duty.

Meanwhile, however, the artillery of the attack had unquestionably become very much superior to that of the defence, and, in spite of every obstacle, the sapswere pushed on to the edge of the ditch of Les Perches.

On February 8th, at one in the afternoon, Captain Roese had gabions flung into the ditch of Hautes Perches, sprang into it with five sappers, and rapidly scaled the parapet by the steps hewn in the scarp. He was immediately followed by the trench guard, but only a few of the French were surprised in the casemated traverses. The situation of the garrison of the forts had in fact become extremely difficult. Ammunition had to be brought up under the enemy's fire, water could only be had from the pond at Vernier, and cooking could only be done inside the works. Colonel Denfert had already given orders to bury the material. Unseen by the besiegers the guns of which the carriages could still be moved had been withdrawn, and only one company left in each fort, which in case of a surprise was to fire and fly. Nothing was to be found in the abandoned work but wrecked gun-carriages and four damaged guns. This fort was at once reversed so that its front faced the fortress, but at three o'clock the latter opened so heavy a fire on the lost positions that the working parties had to take shelter in the ditches.

The garrison in Basses Perches attempted some resistance, but under cover of a reserve it soon retired to Le Fourneau, leaving five guns and much shattered material. Here also the fire of the place at first compelled the working parties to break off, but four 15-cm. mortars were at length brought into the fort, and two 9-cm. guns were placed on the spur of the hill to the westward, which directed their fire on Le Fourneau and Bellevue. During the night of the 9th the two works were connected by a shelter-trench 680 yards long, and thus the third parallel was established.

The position was now such that the attack could immediately be directed on the citadel, and on it thebatteries in the Bois des Perches and presently those in the second parallel opened fire. Moitte, Justice, and Bellevue were shelled simultaneously. General von Debschitz had returned, so that the investing corps was thus again brought up to its full strength, and all the conditions were improved by the return of the frost. By the 13th ninety-seven guns were ready in the third parallel.

The town had suffered terribly from the prolonged bombardment. Nearly all the buildings were damaged, fifteen completely burnt down, and in the adjoining villages 164 houses had been destroyed by the defenders themselves. The fortifications showed not less visible indications of serious damage, particularly the citadel. The hewn-stone facing of its front-wall had crumbled into the ditch. Half of the mantleted embrasures had been shattered, the expense powder magazines had been blown up, and a number of casemated traverses pierced. The guns in the upper batteries could only be reached by ladders. The garrison, of its original strength of 372 officers and 17,322 men, had lost 32 officers and 4713 men, besides 336 citizens. The place was no longer tenable; besides there now came the news that the army from which alone relief was to be expected, had laid down its arms.

Under these circumstances General von Tresckow summoned the commandant after a defence so brave to surrender the fortress, with free withdrawal for the garrison, this concession having the sanction of his Majesty. The French Government itself authorized the commandant to accept these terms. Colonel Denfert, however, insisted that he must be given a more direct order. To procure this an officer was sent to Basle, pending whose return there was a provisional armistice.

On the 15th a convention was signed at Versailles, which extended the armistice to the three departments which till then had been excluded from it, andalso to Belfort; but the 1st article demanded the surrender of that place.

After the conclusion of the definitive treaty, the garrison, in the course of the 17th and 18th, with its arms and trains, left the precincts of the fortress and withdrew by way of L'Isle sur Doubs and St. Hippolyte into the country occupied by French troops. The march was effected in detachments of 1000 men at intervals of 5 km., the last of which Colonel Denfert accompanied. The supplies which remained in the fortress were conveyed in rear of the departing troops in 150 Prussian proviant waggons. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon of February 18th Lieutenant-General von Tresckow entered the place at the head of detachments from all the troops of the investing corps.

There were found 341 guns, of which 56 were useless, 356 gun-carriages, of which 119 were shot to pieces, and 22,000 stand of arms, besides considerable supplies of ammunition and provisions.

The siege had cost the Germans 88 officers and 2049 men, 245 of whom were released from imprisonment by the capitulation. Immediately was set about the work of restoring and arming the fortress, and of the levelling of the siege works.

On the basis of the agreement of January 28th a line of demarcation was drawn, from which both parties were to withdraw their outposts to a distance of 10 km. The line ran south from the mouth of the Seine as far as the Sarthe, crossed the Loire at Saumur, followed the Creuse, turned eastward past Vierzon, Clamécy andChagny, and then met the Swiss frontier, after bending to the north of Châlons sur Saône and south of Lons le Saulnier and St. Laurent. The two departments of Pas de Calais and du Nord, as well as the promontory of Havre, were particularly excluded.

The fortresses still held by French troops in the districts occupied by the Germans were assigned a rayon in proportion to their importance.

In carrying out the details of the agreement a liberal interpretation was in most instances allowed. The arrangements had the sanction of those members of the Government of National Defence who were in Paris; while the delegates at Bordeaux, who had hitherto conducted the war, at first held aloof, and indeed, as yet had not been made acquainted with the detailed conditions. Gambetta, it is true, allowed the suspension of operations, but could not give the commanders more precise instructions.

General Faidherbe was thus without orders with regard to the evacuation of Dieppe and Abbeville. General von Goeben, however, refrained from taking immediate possession of these places. On the west of the Seine, the Grand Duke was forced to proclaim that the non-recognition of the line of demarcation would be followed by an immediate recommencement of hostilities.

The commandant of the garrison at Langres also raised difficulties, and only withdrew within his rayon on February 7th, as did General Rolland later at Besançon. Auxonne was at first unwilling to give up control of the railway. Bitsch, which had not been worth the trouble of a serious attack, repudiated the convention; the investment had therefore to be strengthened, and only in March, when threatened with a determined attack, did the garrison abandon its peak of rock.

Nor did the volunteers acquiesce at once, and there were collisions with them at various points. But after the conditions were finally settled, no more seriousquarrels occurred between the inhabitants and the German troops during the whole course of the armistice.

All the German corps before Paris occupied the forts lying in their front, more specifically the Vth took over Mont Valérien, and the IVth the town of St. Denis. Between the forts and the enceinte there lay a neutral zone, which civilians were allowed to cross only by specified roads placed under control of German examining troops.

Apprehensive as it was of the indignation of the populace, the French Government had hesitated so long to utter the word "capitulation," that now, even with the resumption of free communication, Paris was threatened with an outbreak of actual famine. The superfluous stores in the German magazines were therefore placed at the disposal of its authorities. The respective chief-Commands, the local Governments-General, and the Etappen-Inspections received instructions to place no difficulties in the way of the repair of the railways and roads in their districts, and the French authorities were even allowed to make use, under German supervision, of the repaired railroads which the invaders used to supply their own army. Nevertheless, the first provision-train only arrived in Paris on February 3rd, and it was the middle of the month before the French had succeeded in remedying the prevalent distress in the capital.

The German prisoners were at once given up. The surrender of arms and war-material followed by degrees, also the payment of the 200 million francs war-contribution imposed on the city.

But it was still doubtful if the party of "war to the bitter end" in Bordeaux would fall in with the arrangements made by the Paris Government, and whether the National Assembly about to be convened would finally ratify the conditions of peace imposed by the conquerors. The necessary measures in case of the resumption ofhostilities were therefore taken on the French as well as on the German side.

The distribution of the French forces at the establishment of the armistice was not favourable.

By General Faidherbe's advice the Army of the North was wholly disbanded, as being too weak to face the strength opposing it. After the XXIInd Corps had been transported by sea to Cherbourg, the Army of Brittany under General de Colomb was composed of it, the XXVIIth and part of the XIXth Corps, and, including Lipowski's volunteers, Cathelineau's and other details, its strength was some 150,000 men. General Loysel with 30,000 ill-armed and raw Gardes-Mobiles remained in the trenches of Havre.

General Chanzy, after his retreat on Mayenne, had made a movement to the left, preparatory to a new operation with the IInd Army of the Loire from the Caen base, which, however, was never carried out. The XVIIIth, XXIst, XVIth, and XXVIth Corps stood between the lower Loire and the Cher from Angers to Châteauroux, in a strength of about 160,000 men strong, the XXVth under General Pourcet was at Bourges, and General de Pointe's Corps at Nevers. The Army of the Vosges had withdrawn southward of Châlons sur Saône, and the remains of the Army of the East assembled under General Crémer at Chambéry as the XXIVth Corps.

The total of all the field-troops amounted to 534,452 men. The volunteers, even those most to be relied on, were dismissed, and the National Guard was designated as for the present "incapable of rendering any military service." In the depôts, the camps of instruction, and in Algiers there were still 354,000 men, and 132,000 recruits were on the lists as the contingent for 1871, but had not yet been called up.

In case the war should be persisted in, a plan for limiting it to the defensive in the south-east of France was under consideration, for which, however, accordingto the report sent on February 8th by the Committee of Inquiry to the National Assembly, scarcely more than 252,000 men in fighting condition were available. The fleet, besides, had given up so considerable a number of its men and guns for service on land, that it was no longer able for any great undertaking at sea.

On the German side the first consideration was to reinforce the troops to their full war-strength, and replenish the magazines.

The forts round Paris were at once armed on their fronts facing the enceinte. In and between these were 680 guns, 145 of which were captured French pieces; more than enough to keep the restless population under control. A part of the forces previously occupied in the siege, being no longer required, were removed, in order that the remaining troops should have better accommodation. Besides, it seemed desirable to strengthen the IInd Army, which had in its front the enemy's principal force. In consequence the IVth Corps marched to Nogent le Rotrou, the Vth to Orleans, and the IXth, relieved there, to Vendôme; so that now the quarters of this army extended from Alençon to Tours, and up the Loire as far as Gien and Auxerre.

The Ist Army was in the north with the VIIIth Corps on the Somme, and the Ist on both sides of the Lower Seine; in the south the Army of the South occupied the line of demarcation from Baume to Switzerland, and the country in the rear.

At the end of February the German field-army on French soil consisted of:—

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