It is here assumed that only Members of the League of Nations may become parties to the Protocol of Geneva[1]; the Protocol is a development of the Covenant and it would, in any view, be logically impossible for any State, not a Member of the League, to become a Signatory to the Protocol; on the other hand, Members of the League are, of course, not obligated to sign or to ratify the Protocol of Geneva.
Accordingly, if the Protocol shall come into force, the Powers of the world, from the point of view of the Protocol, will, at least theoretically, be divided into three classes:
1. Members of the League of Nations who are parties to the Protocol.
2. Members of the League of Nations who are not parties to the Protocol.
3. Non-Members of the League of Nations who are not parties to the Protocol.
From this it follows, again looking at the matter from the point of view of the Protocol of Geneva, that the international relations of the various countries of the world would fall into the following six classes:
1. Relationsinter seof the Signatories to the Protocol.
2. Relationsinter seof the Members of the League not Signatories to the Protocol.
3. Relationsinter seof non-Members of the League.
4. Relations of the Signatories to the Protocol with the Members of the League not Signatories thereto.
5. Relations of Members of the League not Signatories to the Protocol with States non-Members of the League.
6. Relations of the Members of the League Signatories to the Protocol with States non-Members of the League.
It is proposed in this discussion first to consider the first of the above six classes, namely, the relations of the Signatories to the Protocol,inter se; and this discussion will proceed primarily on the assumption that the obligations of the Protocol are carried out.
In numerous places the Protocol speaks of the parties thereto as "the signatory States,"e. g., Articles 1, 2, 3, 8, 11, etc. It is curious this is so in view of the meticulous insistence by the British Dominions at the Peace Conference, on the use, throughout the text of the Covenant generally, of the expression "Members of the League" instead of "States Members of the League."[2]
Certainly it is contemplated that ratification of the Protocol may be made on behalf of the British Dominions. Accordingly, I think that the use in the Protocol of the expression "signatory States" is probably an inadvertence, as in no proper international sense of the word are the British Dominions States, despite the fact that they have an international status under the League of Nations and even otherwise.[3]
The first point to be noticed is that under Article 2 of the Protocol there is a very general and a very sweeping obligation on the part of the Signatories not to resort to war. This is a point of the utmost importance. The obligation goes very much farther than anything in the Covenant; the language of this obligation will be examined in detail hereafter.
Before coming to that, however, it is well to look at the provisions of the Protocol regarding the settlement of international disputes. War is one method for the settlement of such disputes, and, in order to make effective the obligation of the Signatories not to resort to war, substitute methods of settlement are provided.
It is very natural and proper that this should be done. A mere obligation not to resort to war, without more, would almost imply that disputes between the parties to the obligation shouldfindsomeother method of settlement. For if some other method could not be found, feelings due to the continuance of the dispute might well arouse such passions in one country or another as to sweep away the obligation for peace. The two questions of the ending of war and the settlement of disputes between States are not only logically but realistically very closely related.
Disputes between States are often regarded as comprising those that relate to international questions and those that relate to domestic questions, the former being divided into justiciable and non-justiciable disputes.
I prefer, however,for this discussion, to classify possible international disputes in three kinds, namely:
1. Disputes as to international questions.
2. Disputes as to domestic questions.
3. Disputes as tostatus quo.
I am aware of the fact that such classification as the foregoing is overlapping. Disputes as to thestatus quowill to some extent fall within the two classes first mentioned; they may relate therefore to questions which are international or which are domestic in their nature. However, I think the classification is justified, at least for reasons of convenience, and also, in my opinion, for reasons which go very much deeper.
Let me illustrate this by reference to questions arising from frontiers. The existence and the location of a frontier are essentially questions of international import. The location of a frontier may, in a given case, not only be an international question in the sense that it should be settled internationally, but also in the sense that it is justiciable, according to the usual idea of justiciable questions. This would be so in a case where the location of the frontier depended wholly upon the interpretation of a treaty between the two neighboring States.
But it is quite possible to imagine an international question regarding a frontier which is not in any way justiciable; such,for example, was the question as to where the frontier between Poland and Russia should be drawn after the World War.[4] That some frontier had to be drawn was obvious; but there was no possible legal basis for determiningwhereit should be drawn. The question was one of judgment, to be settled by agreement between the parties, if possible; or otherwise, if it was to be peacefully settled, by reference to some sort of tribunal which would decide according to principles[5] of equity, impossible to express in any precise legal formula. In other words, the question was an international political one.
Again, suppose that the frontier between the two States has been settled by agreement and that there is no doubt whatever where it is. One of the two States desires to have that frontier changed; in other words, desires that there shall be a cession of territory. Here is a question of thestatus quo. In a sense it may be called international, because it relates to an international frontier; but it not only falls wholly outside any idea of justiciable questions in the international sense, but also outside any idea of being a political question which any tribunal whatever could decide onanybasis. In other words, it is within that class of cases of an international nature in regard to which two Statesmay, if they choose, negotiate, but in regard to which either one of them may at its pleasure refuse even to consider negotiations.
In any condition of international affairs which it is possible to visualize under the present State system, this must continue to be so. The State system presupposes necessarily the existence of States. One of the inherent conditions of the existence of a State is its right to the possession of its own undisputed territory as against any other State,[6] which does not mean, I mention in passing, as against a revolutionary movementwithinthe State; that is another story. The putting in question of this undisputedright of one State to hold its own territory as against another State would mean the putting in question of the existing State order as a whole.
Further, while I have included domestic questions as a separate class of questions in the above list, I think that logically many of them fall within the thought of questions which concern thestatus quo. I do not dispute that these domestic questions may at times have an international aspect; but they are questions which each State has an absolute right under law to regulate according to its own pleasure, and it is for this reason that they fall within the class of cases which are, in theory, not to be questioned internationally. Of course a State may, if it chooses, negotiate regarding them, just as it may, if it chooses, negotiate about the cession of part of its territory. But it may also, if it chooses, so to speak end the negotiations by refusing to commence them at all.
However, it is proper, none the less, to consider these domestic questions as a separate group, for the reason that there is a possibility of development toward their international consideration within the present State system. I shall pursue that thought further a little later.
[1] Those who framed the Protocol have a different opinion. See the discussion,supra, p. 10,et seq.
[2]cf.the expression in Article 34 of the Court Statute "States or Members of the League of Nations."
[3] The exact position of the British Dominions within the League is not yet wholly settled. See the recent British and Irish notes regarding the Irish Treaty, London Times, December 16 and 24, 1924.
[4] See Treaty of Versailles, Article 87, third paragraph.
[5] Such as, perhaps, the idea of self determination, the economic situation of the inhabitants, etc.
[6] See the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations adopted by the American Institute of International Law, specially Paragraph IV, A. J. I. L., Vol. X, pp. 212, 213.
So far as concerns disputes of an international nature, the Protocol, taken in connection with the Covenant, provides for a final and binding settlement of such disputes between Signatories to the Protocol in every case whatsoever.
In order to determine the precise effect of the Protocol in this regard, it is necessary first to examine the provisions of the Covenant.
The provisions of the Covenant which particularly cover this matter are those of Articles 12, 13 and 15. Let us therefore consider the text of these Articles,[1] looking in the first place at the text of Articles 12 and 13 and the first paragraph of Article 15, which follow:
ARTICLE 12. "The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report of the Council.
"In any case under this Article, the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute."
ARTICLE 13. "The Members of the League agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject matter to arbitration or judicial settlement.
"Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent andnature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement.
"For the consideration of any such dispute, the Court to which the case is referred shall be the Permanent Court of International Justice, established in accordance with Article 14, or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.
"The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any decision or award that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto."
ARTICLE 15 (first paragraph). "If there should arise between the Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof."
Looking at these provisions in their entirety, it will be seen that the engagements taken by the Members of the League relate to "any dispute likely to lead to a rupture." This is the language of both Articles 12 and 15. We may say that this means any dispute whatever, any serious dispute from the point of view of international peace. We may lay aside trifling disputes which cannot lead to serious differences between States, whether or not they drag on through years of diplomatic negotiation. Accordingly, we may say that the Covenant in these provisions covers any international dispute whatever as to international questions in the sense above mentioned.
Further examining the provisions above quoted, we see thatthe Members of the League agree in every such possible case to do one of three things: they agree to submit all disputes either (a) to arbitration or (b) to judicial settlement or (c) to the Council. They donotagree to submit any particular case or any particular class of cases to arbitration; they donotagree to submit any particular case or any particular class of cases to judicial settlement; but they do specifically agree that all cases that are not submitted to the one or to the other, go to the Council. The effect of such submission to the Council will be discussed hereafter; at the moment it is only necessary to point out that under these provisions the submission to the Council isobligatory. That submissionmust, under Article 15, take place, in the absence of submission to arbitration or to the Court. But the submission to arbitrators or to the Court is voluntary.
The first change made in this scheme of the Covenant is that Parties to the Protocol agree to accept the so-called "compulsory" jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the cases mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court. Thus, in such cases the dispute between the Parties would go, as a matter of right, at the demand of either one of them, to the Court, where it would be finally determined. To that extent the jurisdiction of the Council is lessened.
Under the Protocol, this acceptance of the so-called compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice is to take place by the signatory States within a month after the coming into force of the Protocol, which, as we have seen, would mean within a month after the adoption by the Conference on Reduction of Armaments of the plan for such reduction.
The Parties to the Protocol thus agree to accept this so-called compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court; but it is provided that they may do so with appropriate reservations.
Accordingly, it is desirable to consider summarily just what this so-called compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice is.
All that the word "compulsory" in this connection means is "agreed to in advance." The general provisions of the CourtStatute[2] describe the jurisdiction of the Court as extending to any case which the Parties, either after it has arisen or by "treaties and conventions in force,"[3] choose to submit. The so-called optional clause relating to the so-called compulsory jurisdiction in effect provides that as to certain defined classes of cases the parties agree, now, in advance of any dispute, that disputes of those particular characters will be submitted to the Court.
The definition of these classes of disputes is found in Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, and in this regard follows generally in its language the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 13 of the Covenant, which declares that these particular classes of disputes are "among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement."
By the so-called optional clause relating to the Court Statute, it is these classes of disputes as to any or all of which the jurisdiction of the Court may be accepted as "compulsoryipso factoand without special agreement, in relation to any other Member or State accepting the same obligation."
The classes of "legal disputes" mentioned in Article 36 of the Court Statute are as follows:
"legal disputes concerning:
(a) The interpretation of a treaty;
(b) Any question of international law;
(c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
(d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation."
In regard to these definitions of classes of disputes, it is necessary to make some general observations. No matter what definition may be made in advance as to the classes of disputes which are to be submitted to the Court, a difference of opinionmay exist in any given case as to whether the particular dispute which has arisen is or is not within one of the defined classes.
It follows that the mere definition of classes of disputes which, by agreement in advance, are to be submitted to a particular tribunal, is not in itself sufficient; any such definition must be accompanied by a provision for a case when one of the parties to a dispute claims that the particular dispute is within the defined class and the other party to the dispute does not admit that the dispute is within the defined class; some method must be provided for determining that preliminary question of jurisdiction.
Let me put this concretely: let me suppose that two Members of the League have agreed to the optional clause and that a dispute arises between them. One party to the dispute says that the question involved concerns the interpretation of a treaty and accordingly submits the question to the Permanent Court of International Justice in accordance with the procedure under the Statute of that Court. The other party to the dispute says that the dispute does not in any way concern the interpretation of the treaty and submits the matter to the Council of the League under Article 15 of the Covenant.
Clearly there would be here for decision a preliminary point of jurisdiction and, in so far as the optional clause is concerned, the matter is covered by the Statute of the Court in the final paragraph of Article 36, reading as follows:
"In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court."
In other words, by the Court Statute, it is for the Court to say whether or not it has jurisdiction in any such case; so that in the particular case above supposed, where one party was seeking to go to the Court and the other party was seeking to go to the Council, it would be for the Court in the first instance to decide as to the jurisdiction. If the Court decided that it had jurisdiction, the dispute would come on for decision by theCourt; if the Court decided that it had not jurisdiction, consideration of the dispute would come on before the Council.
The provision in the last paragraph of Article 36 of the Court Statute is a wise and necessary one. It avoids conflicts of jurisdiction and it permits a preliminary and easily realizable method of determining the question of jurisdiction.
It is unnecessary to consider in further detail the described classes of legal disputes mentioned in Article 36 of the Court Statute. Any party to the Protocol may make reservations in acceding to this optional clause and, as the Report of the First and Third Committees to the Assembly points out,[4] these reservations may be of a very extensive character; but the fact that the Signatories to the Protocol agree to accede, even to some extent, to this so-called compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court is of great importance.
However, the most important change which the Protocol makes in regard to the settlement of international disputes concerns the functions of the Council in the case of a dispute submitted to it.
The only respect in which the functions of the Council in such a case under the Protocol arepreciselythe same as the functions of the Council under the Covenant is that the Council must begin along the lines of mediation and conciliation.[5]
This, we may observe, comes directly from the third paragraph of Article 15 of the Covenant, which provides that "the Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute." Such language relates to the mediatory and conciliatory functions of friendly governments. The Council is composed of representatives of governments, of governments friendly to the parties to the dispute, because the governments which are Membersof the Council as well as the governments which are parties to the dispute have joined in a Covenant of Peace.
Accordingly, the first duty of the Council, in the event of any submission of a dispute, is to mediate and conciliate. These are very valuable functions. They permit of delay. The governments which compose the Council may prolong the consideration of the point at issue.[6] The parties to the dispute have come to the Council for a settlement; and the Council may deliberate during a reasonable period so as to permit passions to cool and reason to resume her sway.
Now, as I remarked, these mediatory functions of the Council remain precisely the same under the Protocol as under the Covenant.
Suppose, however, the mediation fails, what is the next duty of the Council? Under the Covenant,[7] the next duty of the Council would be this, to consider the dispute; but under the Protocol (Article 4(1)), the next duty of the Council is to "endeavour to persuade the parties to submit the dispute to judicial settlement or arbitration." This obviously is a very different thing from consideration of the dispute by the Council itself. Instead of considering the dispute, the Council says to the parties: Is there not some kind of a tribunal to which you are willing to refer it?
Still more striking is the fact that, even if this endeavour fail, it does not even then necessarily become the duty of the Council to consider the dispute on its merits.Either oneof the parties may demand the setting up of a Committee of Arbitrators. The difference between such a provision as this and the provisions of the Covenant is remarkably great. Under the Covenant, when, as the outcome of the mediation of the Council, the parties do not themselves agree upon a settlement, the Council is inevitably required to consider the merits of the case. Under the Protocol, if the parties do not agree, the dispute goes to the Court or to a tribunal of some kind, if such a reference is agreed on; it next goes to a Committee of Arbitrators if onlyone of the parties demands it; this means that the Council never gets to consideration of the dispute on the merits, unless the parties to the dispute at the time are unanimous in wishing that this shall happen.
It is obvious that when we have a situation whereanyparty to a dispute may demand the appointment of an arbitral committee, the Council of the League can only consider cases of dispute which all parties thereto,afterthe dispute has arisen,unanimouslyagree should be considered by the Council.
The reason why I attach the utmost significance to this change, in connection with some other changes which are to be noticed, is that it is a total departure in theory from the idea of the Covenant that political disputes should be settled by a political body such as the Council of the League of Nations. After all, that was the fundamental idea of Article 15 of the Covenant, that the Council of the League should lay hold of the dispute, at least to the extent of preventing war from arising out of it.The theory of the Protocol is that every kind of international dispute should be settled either by a Court or by arbitration, that the functions of the Council are those of mediation and conciliation and that the Council is never to consider the merits of the dispute unless the parties thereto at the time of the dispute unanimously wish such consideration. Even then, as we shall see, a single dissent in the Council regarding the merits is sufficient to render its consideration of no effect, and arbitration again comes into play.
It should be pointed out here that if the dispute goes to a Committee of Arbitrators at the request of one of the parties, any point of law in dispute must be sent by the Committee of Arbitrators to the Permanent Court of International Justice for an opinion.[8]
Now, let us proceed with the duties of the Council. If the dispute has gone to arbitration, the functions of the Council are at an end; but if no party "asks for arbitration,"[9] then and onlythen the Council takes up the consideration of the dispute. In this case, the Council in fact becomes an arbitral board,providedit can reach a unanimous conclusion; but its deliberations and recommendations have no effect whatever if it cannot reach a unanimous conclusion.
Under the present composition of the Council the arbitral tribunal which it would become in such circumstances would be composed of from eight to ten members. The Council itself would be a body of at least ten members, possibly eleven, possibly twelve (if the dispute were between two outside parties), but the votes of the disputants would not be counted.
It is clear that unanimity would be somewhat difficult to reach in a tribunal of that size. It must be remembered that under the Protocol no dispute can reach the Council for such an arbitral decision unless (a) the mediatory efforts of the Council have failed and (b) the parties have refused to agree upon any form of arbitration and (c) neither party wishes arbitration.[10] Clearly a dispute which had reached that stage would be one upon which unanimous agreement by an arbitral tribunal of representatives of from eight to ten governments would be improbable.
Furthermore, it seems to me almost certain under the new procedure that one of the parties would demand arbitration, because it would always be in the power of one member of the Council to compel such arbitration. This is a point which, so far as I have observed, has not elsewhere been noticed.
The final provision of the Protocol for the settlement of the dispute is that if the matter goes to the Council for consideration; and if the views of the Council are not unanimous (aside from the parties), there is then a "compulsory" arbitration. The Council proceeds itself to determine the composition, the powers and the procedure of the Committee of Arbitrators.
So, taking all the provisions together, the whole result is that a dispute which is past the stage of mediation either goes to arbitration outside the Council or must be unanimously decidedby the members of the Council; and this puts it in the power of any one member of the Council to compel an arbitral award by an outside body.
It should be added that, under the Protocol, as under the Covenant, the Assembly may be substituted for the Council in the consideration of a dispute. It would have in such case the same mediatory powers as the Council and the same arbitral powers as the Council if all the parties refused any other form of arbitration.[11]
A very summary statement of the functions of the Council under the Covenant shows what a radical change is made by the provisions of the Protocol. Under the present provisions of Article 15 of the Covenant, a dispute which passes the stage of mediation is considered by the Council. If the Council is unanimous in making recommendations, their effect is simply to prevent war, not finally to settle the dispute. If the Council is not unanimous, its recommendations may have a moral effect, but have no legal effect whatever.
So far as concerns these provisions of the Protocol, they may be summed up as follows: they provide that every possible dispute between the parties to the Protocol which is subject to international cognizance shall be finally determined by a judicial or arbitral tribunal resulting in a legally binding decision or award; and the parties to the Protocol solemnly agree that they will accept any such decision or any such award as final and that they will carry it out in full good faith.[12]
[1] As amended.
[2] Article 36, first paragraph.
[3] For a collection of such agreements, see Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series D, No. 4.
[4] see the discussion as to this in that Report,infra, p. 171.
[5] Doubtless the word "conciliation" is not a term of art in this regard. But it seems to me that the functions of the Council under Article 15 of the Covenant go somewhat beyond "mediation" in the strict sense of the writers. See Nys, Droit International, Vol. II, p. 543; also Vattel (1853 edition), p. 276. The Protocol (Article 6) calls a result from these efforts "an amicable settlement." The French speaks of such efforts as "l'essai de conciliation."
[6] The period of "six months" is mentioned in Article 12 of the Covenant.
[7] Article 15, Paragraph 4,et seq.
[8] Protocol, Article 4 (2) c.
[9] by a Committee of Arbitrators.
[10] By a Committee of Arbitrators.
[11] The powers and duties of the Assembly in such case are stated in the last two paragraphs of Article IS of the Covenant. They are continued, to the extent stated, by Article 6 of the Protocol.
[12] The question as to what may happen under the Protocol if such a decision or award isnotcarried out is discussedinfra, p. 50,et seq.
In many recent discussions of international affairs these two originally innocent Latin words "status quo" have attained a really malevolent significance. They seem to be regarded as meaning the same thing as the motto "Whatever is, is wrong," and some who talk about thestatus quoappear to be in the same mind as Omar when he longed
"To grasp this sorry scheme of things entire............................. —and thenRe-mould it nearer to the heart's desire."
It may be well to give some critical examination to this question of thestatus quoand to see what, if anything, is meant by the ideas which lie back of these criticisms.
In the first place, the thought of the critics usually relates to existing international frontiers and, in some instances, to existing international conditions.
Now as to frontiers, if we look at thestatus quohistorically, we find that it is practically universally the result of changes in a previousstatus quo. The cause of these changes may have been war, may possibly have been agreements and may have been something other than either of these.[1] I shall refer to them later. But here it should be observed that there is hardly any region of the globe where thestatus quodoes not result from some one or more of these changes within times comparatively recent.
Of course there are some exceptions to this observation, the Arctic and Antarctic, for example; but in the populated regions of the globe, thestatus quo, so far as frontiers are concerned, is a thing comparatively new.
If we look at this existing situation, thisstatus quoof international frontiers, we find that under modern conditions acomparatively short period of time is all that is necessary to give to thestatus quothe sanctity of universal consent, regardless of its origin. Let me give an instance or two of this.
The Southern frontier of the United States, for part of its extent is the direct result of a war between the United States and Mexico, a war which by many, and I am among them, is considered to have been a war of aggression. Now no one but a madman would believe that there ought to be a change in thestatus quoof the communities now existing in New Mexico, which in 1850 was uninhabited country, by delivering them over to Mexican rule. It is true that, during the World War, Germany proposed to Mexico in the celebrated Zimmerman note[2] that this should be done; but that incident only emphasizes the truth of my remark.
One of the most recent instances of a change in thestatus quo, so far as the United States is concerned, is the case of the Virgin Islands, which were bought from Denmark in 1916.[3] There was a change made by agreement, made for a purchase price which was satisfactory to the ceding country and made after a plebiscite of the inhabitants, who voted almost unanimously for the change. Here, again, for reasons differing from those of the foregoing instance, no one in his senses would consider that the existingstatus quowas not one of justice and common sense.
Now, if we take the situation generally, we will find, in accordance with the instances that I have mentioned, that the international situation as to frontiers the world over[4] is, as to perhaps 99%, either consecrated by usage which is the equivalent of common consent or at least of common sense, or else is the result of agreement which contains in it both elements.
The fact is, as any realist will admit, that every frontier, no matter how absurd originally or even now, contains, in the very fact of its existence, elements of stability and of reason which tosome extentjustify its existence. The ordinary individual near afrontier, as distinguished from the agitator, becomes used to it. Business transactions adjust themselves to it and in a very short time after its creation any proposed change implies inherently a certain amount of undesirability. It is impossible, perhaps, to imagine or to draw a more absurd frontier than that between Switzerland and France in the region of Geneva.[5] It is a monstrosity, geographically and economically, and yet every one is contented with it or at least more contented with it than with the idea of changing it. Naturally there are certain attendant annoyances, as in a motor ride out of Geneva which involves two or more Customs frontier examinations within a few kilometres; and there are certain absurdities involved in catching Swiss fish and French fish in different parts of Lake Leman; and one is amused in reading Customs regulations which permit cows to pasture in one country and be milked in the other without duty; but still every one has gotten used to these matters and gets along with them.
So on the whole these two maligned words represent a rather peaceful condition.
Before the World War the irritation produced in the minds of many by the then existingstatus quolargely related to the frontiers in Eastern Europe and the somewhat similar irritation now existing among alleged liberal thinkers is due to the frontiers created by the Peace Treaties in general which are so usually and inaccurately referred to as the Treaty of Versailles.
Here, I think it is fair to make a certain distinction regarding the causes internationally of a givenstatus quoat any particular time and of the existing situation in particular. These causes are two, generally speaking—agreement and war. The instances in modern history of changes in frontiers reached by free agreement are innumerable. I do not see how any one who recognizes the existing state system can object to them or believe that force should be used to change them. Of course there are critics who object to the existing state system and froma theoretical point of view there is something to be said for these objections. The real answer to them at this time is, that whether they are good or bad, the present state system is one that, so far as any human being can see now, is certain to exist for some more centuries at least; and accordingly, outside of dreamland, we must take this system as it is. Given that state system, agreements between states as to their frontiers should be sacred. If a state can make an agreement about its frontier, and then, because it made a bad agreement or a stupid agreement or because circumstances changed after the agreement was made, may go to war to set aside the agreement, the result would only be international anarchy—the state system and everything else would have disappeared together.
The other source of changes in thestatus quois war or strictly speaking the treaties of peace that result from war. I pass by the legal position, which is theoretically correct, that a treaty of peace made by a vanquished Power with a victor is supposedly a free agreement. This is true enough from the technical point of view but has no bearing here. The fact is that when one side wins a war and the other loses it, the treaty of peace is made under compulsion and constraint.
The argument that is made by those who criticize thestatus quoof the Peace Treaties of 1919 and 1920 runs about as follows;
1. In certain respects the frontiers and arrangements created by the Peace Treaties are unjust.
2. The setting up by the Peace Treaties of an international organization against war is an attempt to sanctify the wickednesses of thestatus quo.
3. Both the Treaties and the international organization which they set up should at least be denounced and probably rejected. This conclusion in various minds is different and uncertain, but I think that I have stated it fairly.