[1] Whether these "undertakings" would have the same legal quality as a treaty is at least doubtful.
It is to be remembered that in this portion of the discussion consideration is given only to the relationsinter seof the Signatories to the Protocol.
As among these States the famous Article 10 of the Covenant will have lost all its significance.
Article 10 of the Covenant has two distinct aspects. The more important of these is the undertaking by the Members of the League to "preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence" of other Members. Because of these guarantees Article 10 was objected to in this country and in Canada chiefly for the reason that it might involve the use of armed force by the guarantor States. The further idea that this use of armed force would necessarily come into play upon a decision of the Council of the League of Nations was largely fallacious and was practically removed by the resolution of the Assembly regarding Article 10.[1]
The other side of these guarantees of Article 10, which has perhaps not always been very well appreciated, is that the obligation of a guarantor State under Article 10maybe very limited indeed and may even be nothing at all, even in the case of a wilful attack. Article 10 goes only to two things, territorial integrity and political independence. If an aggressor State respects these two things it can do otherwise what it chooses, so far as the guarantor States are concerned. For example, under Article 10 aloneand taking nothing else into consideration, one State could attack another, destroy every building in the country, blow up every mine, and lay waste every field, and then retire, saying: The territorial integrity of the country attacked is now preserved, and its remaining inhabitants retain their full political independence. Under such circumstances, no guarantor State under Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations would be obliged to do anything.
Now I say that under the Protocol any significance of Article 10, as among the parties to the Protocol, has disappeared; clearly this is so. Article 10, so to speak, waited, or at least might wait till the end of the war.[2] If the aggressor State did not in the Treaty of Peace or otherwise annex any territory and left the attacked State independent, Article 10 did nothing at all.[3] But the Protocol commences to work even before any war commences and certainly at its commencement; there must be no attack.[4] It is not a question of the final result of the attack; it is merely a question of the existence of the aggression; and it isthenthat all the other parties to the Protocol come to the defence of the attacked State. The lesser Article 10 of the Covenant is swallowed up in the greater Protocol.
The other aspect of Article 10 of the Covenant was the undertaking by each Member of the League torespectthe territorial integrity and political independence of the other Members. This, of course, is an undertaking in regard only to the acts of the State giving it. Such a self-denying clause would be implied in the Covenant if it were not expressed and equally, of course, it is inherent in the Protocol.
Indeed, in the Protocol it was thought necessary to insert a provision regarding the political independence and territorial integrity, not of the attacked State but of the aggressor. All that is left now of Article 10, so far as the signatories to the Protocolinter seare concerned, is to be found in the second paragraph of Article 15 of the Protocol, which says that the territorial integrity and the political independence of the aggressor State shall not be affected by the application of the sanctions of the Protocol.
A development of the Covenant by which Article 10 becomes unimportant, except as a measure of protectionforan aggressor, is perhaps the most remarkable and unforeseen of all possible developments.
[1] September 25, 1923. Technically, the resolution was not adopted, the vote not being unanimous, 29 in favor, one, Persia, opposed, and 22 absent or abstaining. League of Nations Official Journal, October, 1923, Special Supplement No. 11, p. 34.
[2]i. e., so far as the Guarantor States are concerned.
[3] In the debates of the First Committee of the Fourth Assembly it was asserted that "no forcible invasion" is possible without a violation of Article 10 of the Covenant; but in certain circumstances war is permissible under the Covenant (Article 15, Paragraph 7); and with a permissible war, there could be a permissible invasion. See Oppenheim,
[4]i. e., no aggression, in the sense intended by the Protocol.
At the beginning of this discussion[1] it was pointed out that upon the coming into force of the Protocol, there would, in theory at least, and from the point of view of its provisions, be three classes of Powers in the world, to wit, the parties to the Protocol, the Members of the League not parties to the Protocol and the non-Members of the League, the last named of course being also not parties to the Protocol.
It should also be mentioned again that the possibility of this second class of States, namely, the Members of the League not parties to the Protocol, is a temporary possibility only. For certainly if the Protocol comes finally into force, its provisions will in due course be embodied in the Covenant, as indeed is contemplated by Article 1 of the Protocol; and thereupon those Members of the League who have not ratified the Protocol will either become parties to the amended Covenant or will, under the provisions of Article 26 of the Covenant, cease to be Members of the League.
However, temporarily, there will doubtless be certain Members of the League of Nations who do not ratify the Protocol and the relation of these States to others during this provisional period is to be considered.
So far as concerns the relationsinter seof this temporary or provisional class of States (those which remain Members of the League without ratifying the Protocol) it may be said at once that these relations, from this point of view, will continue to be governed by the Covenant and by the Covenant alone. The Protocol does not make or purport to make any change in this regard; so that, as among those States, we might envisage during this temporary period the theoretic possibility of a war not forbidden by the Covenant, just as we might envisage the possibility, during that period, of a dispute among those Powers remainingunsettled. It is, I suppose, fair to add that both of these speculations are here of juristic interest only.
Similarly, the relations of non-Members of the Leagueinter sewill continue, as they are now, to be governed neither by the Covenant nor by the Protocol. These States would not have bound themselves by either document and so far as concerns their relations with each other, neither the Covenant nor the protocol attempts to regulate them.
The only provision of either document which has any bearing in this regard is to be found in Article 17 of the Covenant, which says in substance that in case of a dispute between States not Members of the League, such non-Members shall be invited to becomead hocmembers upon conditions laid down by the Council. If they refuse, the Council, under the last paragraph of Article 17 of the Covenant, may take measures toward the prevention of hostilities; but these measures would be in the nature of good offices or mediation only and could be accepted or rejected by the two non-Members of the League as they saw fit; they could decline them wholly and go to war at their pleasure.
There is indeed one question which suggests itself to the mind under Article 17 of the Covenant concerning a dispute between two non-Members of the League. Suppose they should be both invited for the purpose of settling the dispute to become membersad hoc, and one of them accepted the invitation and the other refused, would the dispute then be considered as being a dispute between a Member and a non-Member? The real answer to this question probably is that on issuing the invitation the Council would make it a condition that both parties to the dispute should accept it. The legal answer as to the possibility of the case supposed is a matter of some doubt. I incline to the view that the invitation contemplated by Article 17 of the Covenant in a case when the dispute is between two non-Members, is a joint invitation and a joint invitation only. I do not think that it is intended that a non-Member of the League may temporarily seek the protection and guarantees of the Covenant against another non-Member.
However, the question is of interest only from the point of view of the meaning of language; if the possibility should arise, it would doubtless be taken care of by the Council.
Another and also comparatively unimportant point may be here noticed and that is in regard to the relations between the signatories to the Protocol and the Members of the League not signatory thereto, another phase of the temporary situation heretofore considered. As to this, it may be said very briefly that such relations would continue to be governed wholly by the Covenant. The Members of the League which do not ratify the Protocol could not during this temporary period be regarded as being in any way affected by what, as to them, would be in the nature of proposed amendments to the text of the Covenant itself. These non-Signatories of the Protocol would therefore continue to look only to the Covenant for the regulation of their relations with any Member of the League. The Protocol does not contemplate a League within a League; it simply contemplates, during this temporary phase, a situation where certain Members of the League had assumed certain obligations without any constraint or effect whatever upon such Members as might not choose to assume them.
The really vital question is as to the effect of the Protocol and of the Covenant upon non-Members of the League in their relations with Signatories to the Protocol.
Even assuming that the plans now proposed for the admission of Germany to the League are carried out, there will remain for a considerable period two Great Powers, the United States and Russia, outside the League; and there are two other States of occasional international importance, the admission of which to the League is not, so far as I know, presently contemplated, these being Mexico and Egypt.
Accordingly, the possible effect of the Covenant and the Protocol on non-Members of the League is one of very great consequence. It is a question which is being actively discussed in so far as it may have a bearing on the relations between Great Britain and the United States.
It is unquestionably true that the Protocol may have a real effect on non-Members of the League. Of course there is a legal formula which correctly says that a treaty cannot bind States not parties thereto,res inter alios acta; but even in the strictest legal sense this formula is only part of the truth in international matters. Any one who questions this will be convinced by reading Roxburgh's International Conventions and Third States.[2] A treaty between State A and State B may harm State C or it may benefit State C, as the Treaty of Versailles benefited Denmark by the cession of Slesvig, though Denmark was a neutral and not a party to the Treaty of Peace.[3]
Let us consider the matter first from the point of view of the Covenant. There are sanctions which may be applied under the Covenant and the application of these sanctions might affect a non-Member of the League either because they were applied against that particular non-Member or because they were applied against some other State.
It is rather curious that this question has not been very much considered under the Covenant; interest in it has been greatly revived by the Protocol; but the possible realities under the Covenant are, it seems to me,in some respectsmore important than those under the Protocol alone.
In considering this question it is well to look at it from the concrete point of view with a specific instance or example before us.
The sanctions of the Covenant[4] are an economic and financial blockade. These sanctions may be applied either as against a Member of the League which resorts to war contrary to the provisions of the Covenant or they may be applied against a non-Member of the League which resorts to war against a Member after refusing to settle its dispute with that Member (Covenant, Article 17, paragraph 3).
Suppose at the time of the Corfu dispute, Italy had gone onto war against Greece, and the British had deemed it their duty to apply an economic blockade against Italy.
Suppose another case; suppose that Russia attacked Poland and that the British deemed it their duty to apply the economic blockade against Russia. We are speaking here in both of these cases merely of the provisions of the Covenant; and the question raised is what attitude might the United States take in such a case as one of these.
I have suggested two instances for the reason that there is a slight difference between them. That difference lies in the fact that in the first instance supposed, Italy, as a Member of the League, would have agreed to the application of the sanctions; they would have been applied by the British as a result of Italy breaking her treaty. But in the second instance, Russia never having agreed to the Covenant, the sanctions would be applied by the British solely as a result of the British agreement to apply them and not because of any legal breach by Russia, however morally wrong her attack on Poland might be.
I do not think that the difference between the two supposed cases would make any difference legally in the attitude that the United States might take in the one case or the other. The blockade would arise from the provisions of the Covenant in either case. To that document the United States is not a party. In each case our correct legal position would be that our international rights were not limited by the agreement of others.
Accordingly, let us consider the case of the blockade of Russia by the British, recalling that, under the hypothesis, Russia has attacked Poland and that the economic and financial blockade of the first paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant has come into full force. Now, so far as that blockade cut off relations between Great Britain and Russia, it would be none of our business. But the language of Article 16 includes
"the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals (residents)[5] of the Covenant-breaking State (Russia, under the hypothesis;see Covenant, Article 17) and the nationals (residents) of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not."
What this would mean would be that all intercourse between Russia and the United States would be cut off by the British Fleet so far as they could do it. The questions suggested are: Could the United States protest; and would we protest?
The first question is a question of law. Would the United States have the right under international law to object to such a blockade? As a preliminary to the answer to this question, it must be pointed out that a blockade of Russia by the British might result in two different situations. Russia could undoubtedly regard such a blockade as being war, and if she did, no other country, neither the United States nor any other country, could then object to the blockade. The reason for that is that, without going into the much debated question as to the "legality" of war, under present international law it can at least be said that a neutral may not object to the belligerent status of two countries at war with each other. Of course a neutral may object to the manner of carrying on the war, or to particular incidents during the fighting; a neutral may protest that a particular blockade is not binding because not effective, and so on; but these things are not immediately important here. The important thing here is that if the blockade resulted in war, we could not object to the fact of war and its incidents.
On the other hand, a blockademightcontinue merely as a blockade, without the technical status of war arising. This is, I suppose, not very likely in the case of the blockade of a Great Power, but still it is legally possible under the terms of the Covenant.
The situation created would be new under international law. It would have to be considered as arising wholly from treaty and consequently not a situation binding on Third States, but as to them simply a situation in which their rights were governed by the principles of international law. Under these rules, the nearest approach to such a situation is the so-called pacific blockade of the past.
In my view, which is the view of the vast majority of writers on the question, Third States do not have to respect a pacific blockade. (See Oppenheim, 3rd edition, Vol. II, page 56.) Accordingly, it seems to me that the United States would be entitled to regard such a blockade as not affecting her commerce with Russia.[6]
If the United States took such a position, as probably she would, the practical value of such a blockade would be very largely diminished, for I do not think there is any doubt that the Members of the League would admit that the blockade only applied to such Third States outside the League of Nations as might acquiesce in it.
Under the Protocol, precisely the same legal situation as to the blockade of Russia exists as under the Covenant and the same conclusions would follow. However, the probability of such a blockade under the Protocol, without an actual state of war resulting, is much less than under the Covenant. The Protocol provides definitely for military sanctions and it can hardly be doubted, as a matter of reality, that if the sanctions of the Protocol commenced to be applied to a State in or out of the League and that State resisted, the result would be war as between that resisting State and at least those of the Members of the League, like Great Britain, that were taking a real part in the application of the sanctions.
And, as pointed out above, the legal situation is much clearer in the case of war than in the case of this economic and financial boycott of the Covenant. It would be much "easier"[7] to go to war than it would be to apply the economic and financial sanctions alone. The world has gotten more or less used, in a legal sense, to the legalities and illegalities of war; but there are no precedents as to the corresponding situations[8] in such ablockade as has been suggested; and it is, above all, custom and general agreement that make international law.
I may sum up my views on this point as follows:
If under either the Covenant or the Protocol, the economic sanctions were applied either against a Member of the League or a non-Member of the League and the application of these sanctions did not result in war, the United States legally could, and very likely would, contend that any resulting blockade was not applicable to the United States and the commerce and intercourse of her residents; and this view would be accepted by the Members of the League as being legally sound; and the result of course would be that the practical effect of any such blockade would be very much weakened.
However, if the application of the sanctions either of the Covenant or of the Protocol resulted in war between the State against which the sanctions were applied and the States applying them, the United States could not object to that state of war, although of course it would have its rights as a neutral in such a war as in any other war and these neutral rights would not be affected by any provision of either the Covenant or the Protocol.
The next consideration is the possible application of sanctions against the United States. From the foregoing review of the provisions of the Covenant and of the Protocol it is evident that such action against the United States is possible from a theoretic point of view. It is, however, important here to repeat that there is no possible sanction in either paper against a non-Member of the League except after war breaks out, a war which the non-Member of the League has commenced against a Member or against a Signatory to the Protocol as the case may be. In other words, the sanctions of either paper could only become operative against the United States after the United States had gone to war against a Member of the League.
Continuing the theoretic view of the matter, it would be idle to discuss any difference between one kind of sanction and another in such a case. If the United States went to war with State A, a Member of the League, and any other State undertook toapply economic or any other sanctions on behalf of State A and against the United States, it would here be regarded simply as an act of war, creating two or more enemies instead of one.
Perhaps from the common sense outlook, such contingencies are not worthy of discussion, for what they would mean if they happened would be either that there was another world war, in which case the provisions of no document would be very important, or else there would be some kind of a minor war such as that between the United States and Spain, in which the other Powers of the world would find some way of keeping their hands off, regardless of legalistic arguments based on the Covenant or on the Protocol or on both.
It may be suggested that in the foregoing discussion I have omitted any thought of the possibility of war between the United States and Japan; but I have kept that possibility in mind. Its theoretical possibilities, so far as they might exist by reason of the United States attacking Japan have been considered above.
Let us consider the opposite possibility, an attack by Japan on the United States.
Suppose, then, that Japan attempted to raise before the League the question of the treatment of her nationals by the United States; there is no way in which such a question could be considered by the League except under the vague general clauses of Article 11 of the Covenant; all that the League could do, even in theory, would be to ask if the United States cared to discuss the matter; and the United States would presumably decline to take part in any such discussion. Further, it may be supposed that the United States would not have the slightest desire to commence a war in the matter as the United States is satisfied with the situation as it is—it is Japan which is dissatisfied. The United States would merely refuse to discuss a question which it deemed domestic.
Suppose then that Japan went to the length of declaring war on the United States for this cause. While immaterial from the point of view of the United States, I cannot see that such a war would violate the Covenant in its letter; of course it wouldviolate its spirit of peace; but I do not think there is any specific provision of the Covenant which, in terms, forbids it.
The Protocol in this regard goes farther in its language. The general covenant not to resort to war in Article 2 includes such a resort to war, not only against a signatory, but also against a State which "accepts all the obligations hereinafter set out"; in other words, against a sort ofad hocadherent to the Protocol (Article 16), but we may assume that these last words would not include the United States.
The preamble asserts that a war of aggression constitutes a violation of the solidarity of the members of the international community, and also an international crime. Article 10 of the Protocol says that every State which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the present Protocol is an aggressor; and in Article 8 the document goes to its greatest length, so far as non-Signatories are concerned, by saying that the signatory States undertake to abstain from any act which might constitute a threat of aggression against another State. These last words "against another State" are the important words, because they include every State in the world, not only a Signatory. Furthermore, in that same Article 8 any Signatory can bring to the notice of the Council its view that "another State" is making preparations for war, which of course would include another Signatory.
So it is perhaps arguable that under the Protocol an attack by a Signatory against a State which is not a Signatory might be an aggression and that the sanctions of the Protocol might be brought into play in favor of the non-Signatory. If that view be correct, then, in the case supposed, namely, an attack by Japan upon the United States, it would seem that, if the matter were brought before the Council byanySignatory (as it undoubtedly would be) the Councilmightdeclare Japan to be an aggressor under the Protocol; and it would then become the duty of the other Signatories to apply against Japan all the sanctions of the Protocol, at least unless the United States objected to such a course and preferred to go it alone.
However, there is at least grave doubt as to all this. The provisions of Article 16 of the Protocol and of Article 17 of the Covenant rather indicate that a State which pays no attention to an invitation to become anad hocMember or Signatory takes its chances as they existdehorsthe Covenant or the Protocol. I think myself that this is the better view. To suppose otherwise would be to suppose that States outside the League (or the Protocol) had all the advantages of States within, and none of the burdens or obligations, a difficult thing to envisage.
So, on the whole, I conclude that an attack by Japan upon the United States because of a "domestic" or other question would permit the Members of the League, both under the Covenant and under the Protocol, to be interested onlookers and nothing more.
[1]Supra, p. 13.
[2] Longmans, Green & Co., 1917.
[3] A subsequent treaty between Denmark and the Principal Allied Powers confirmed the cession. A. J. I. L. Supplement 1923, Vol. XVII, p. 42.
[4] Article 16.
[5] The discussions in the Assembly of Article 16 of the Covenant show that the word "nationals" is to be read as "residents."
[6] See Moore's Digest, Vol. VII, pp. 135-142.
[7] That is, in the sense that there would to some extent be known and applicable rules of conduct for all States.
[8] Innumerable questions of difficulty as to private contracts might be suggested; but I am thinking here of relations between States.
Under Article 17 of the Protocol, a Disarmament Conference to which all States of the world are to be invited is to meet at Geneva on June 15th, 1925. It is made the duty of the Council to draw up a general programme for reduction and limitation of armaments to be laid before the Conference and to be communicated to the various Governments not later than March 15th, 1925. The provision to this effect says that the Council shall give due regard to the undertakings of the Protocol regarding sanctions, but the preparation of this general programme is in substantial accord with Article 8 of the Covenant.
The Assembly adopted a quite elaborate resolution[1] regarding this Conference. This resolution makes seven or eight suggestions in general terms for the agenda of the Disarmament Conference. While the resolution was adopted, it was pointed out in the discussion that the Council has a perfectly free hand in the matter and that the requests of the Assembly regarding the agenda were nothing more than requests. There is perhaps no occasion to go over them in detail, but one or two points may be mentioned.
The matter of demilitarized zones figures in this Assembly list. As such zones are specifically mentioned in Articles 9 and 10 of the Protocol there is no doubt that this is one of the questions that would be on the agenda. Another suggestion of the Assembly for the agenda of the Conference is "the control and investigation of armaments in the contracting States." Such control and investigation were a part of the so-called American Plan,[2] and in view of the fact that the control and investigation of the armaments of the former enemy States are now before the League, there can be no doubt that this matter also would be on the agenda of the Disarmament Conference prepared by the Council.
It was pointed out previously[3] that the date of the Disarmament Conference may be postponed. It now seems very likely that it will be.[4] Indeed, I feel that there was a little too much optimism at Geneva in fixing the date as early as June 15th, 1925, involving the completion of a programme by March 15th.
Of course, in getting up a programme of general disarmament, and an agenda for the Conference on Disarmament, it is true that the Council would have available the advice of the Permanent Military Commission and of the different bureaus of the Secretariat. Even so, the task of finishing these preparations in three or four months, getting them approved by the Council and also by at least the chief of the interested Governments, is one that seems to me to be very doubtful of accomplishment.
It is perhaps not generally understood what an amount of work and how great a number of questions are involved in such discussions as are proposed. There are something like twenty European Governments that are vitally interested. Some of these Governments have quite different points of view and all of them have their military, naval, air and chemical programmes in force and subject to the control of their own Parliaments.[5] The idea of a general reduction of armaments involves, at least provisionally, the recasting of the entire military system of Europe. It is complicated by numerous possibilities of regional agreements which in themselves would create new problems of complexity.
Furthermore, it is not generally recognized that a great deal of the work of such a Conference as this has to be done in advance. Doubtless no Conference in plenary session ever drew up a paper; no Legislature ever wrote a law. The utmost that any such body can do is to consider concrete proposals drawn up often by one individual, but certainly always by very small groups. I venture to say that ten lawyers could hardly draw adeed without appointing a sub-committee. The success or failure of the Disarmament Conference will very largely depend on the care and judgment used in the preparations for its meeting.
We can look back on the Washington Conference and see the truth of some of these observations there. That Conference dealt with only a portion of the field of naval armaments, among only five powers, only three of which had any substantial naval force. The naval staffs of the countries particularly interested had to prepare in advance elaborate studies, and yet with all this the Conference lasted nearly three months. Certainly the task of a general conference on disarmament is very much greater than that of the Washington Conference was.
It took nearly four months to draw up the Treaty of Versailles, which is by far the most elaborate and complex international agreement ever written. In the circumstances this was a remarkably short time. The most serious detailed criticism that I have seen of the time involved suggests that it might have been two or three weeks less. It is to be remembered, however, that the Peace Conference worked at that time under a perfectly enormous pressure from all sides to complete its task, which, as a matter of fact, would never have been completed within anything like the time taken if the decisions had not finally been left to three or four men to take.
I need not dwell further on the difficulties of the details. Any one who reads the Disarmament Treaty drawn up at the Washington Conference will appreciate something of their nature; but, looking at the matter from the larger point of view, there is a question of real statesmanship involved. The possible field to be covered by a general conference on disarmament cannot perhaps be limited; but the extent to which the first discussion shall go will determine its success or failure. If it attempts to go too far, that will be fatal; if, on the other hand, the attempt is only to go a short distance now and to continue on the road further later on, the Conference may be a success, despite the fact that it will meet with the criticisms of those who want to do everything at once.
The question of a permanent, or rather of a recurrent, Conference on Disarmament, as proposed by the so-called American Plan,[6] is one that is inevitably bound to come up at any such Conference, for whatever the Conference does or whatever it tries to do, it will have to leave much undone. Many questions will remain open, many changes of the future will not be foreseen, and those who meet in the Conference will see when they end their work that they have only begun it.
It is also to be noted again that the Conference is to fix the period within which the plan of reduction which it adopts is to be carried out. If within that time the plan is not carried out, the Council is to make a declaration rendering the Protocol null and void. The Conference is also to lay down the grounds on which the Council may make such a declaration.
In other words, the Protocol itself is to depend wholly upon the work of the Conference; it is to the Conference that the whole responsibility is transferred. If the Conference does not adopt the plan, and then if that plan is not carried out[7] within the time and on the conditions that the Conference declares, the Protocol falls.
Never, I venture to say, has any important treaty ever been drawn up depending upon a more impressive condition subsequent.
[1] See Annex D, p. 210 at p. 213,et seq.
[2] Annex F, p. 263.
[3] p. 5.
[4] This was written before the meeting of the Council in Rome in December, 1924. The Disarmament Conference certainly cannot meet before 1926. The present situation of the preliminaries is stated in a note to the Resolution of the Council of October 3, 1924,infra, p. 215.
[5] For a statement of existing European armaments, see note to page 100.
[6] Annex F, p. 263.
[7] See the discussion as to this,supra, p. 7, showing that the "plan" will be another Treaty or Treaties and that the "carrying out" probably means ratification thereof.
NOTE.—A statement of existing European Forces was made to Parliament on June 18, 1924 (Hansard, Parliamentary Debates [Commons], N. S., Vol. 174, page 2151). It gave the following figures:
Great Britain ........   155,935    Latvia ...............   20,000Germany ..............   100,000    Lithuania ............   15,000Austria ..............    21,500    Poland ...............  250,000Hungary ..............    35,000    Norway ...............   16,000Jugo Slavia ..........   130,000    Sweden ...............   32,000Rumania ..............   125,000    Denmark ..............   27,000Czecho Slovakia ......   149,877    Greece ...............  110,000Netherlands ..........   163,262    Bulgaria .............   20,000Italy ................   250,000    Turkey ...............   88,000Switzerland ..........   500,000    France ...............  732,248Soviet Union ......... 1,003,000    Belgium ..............   86,531Finland ..............    30,000    Spain ................  240,113Esthonia .............    16,000    Portugal .............   40,000Total armed forces in Europe, 1924 ........... 4,356,466