Article 12.
Article 16, paragraph 1, of the Covenant provides for the immediate severance of all trade or financial relations with the aggressor State, and paragraph 3 of the same Article provides,inter alia, for economic and financial co-operation between the State attacked and the various States coming to its assistance.
As has already been pointed out, these engagements have been confirmed and made more definite in Article 11 of the Protocol.
But the severance of relations and the co-operation referred to necessarily involve measures so complex that, when the moment arises, doubts may well occur as to what measures are necessary and appropriate to give effect to the obligations assumed under the above provisions. These problems require full consideration in order that States may know beforehand what their attitude should be.
Article 12 defines the conditions of such investigation.
It is not expressly stated that the problem will be examined by the Council in collaboration with the various Governments, but the Council will naturally, if it deems it necessary, invite the Governments to furnish such information as it may require for the purpose of carrying out the task entrusted to it under Article 12.
Article 13, paragraph 1.
The above explanation of Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 2, contains many references to Article 13.
As I have already pointed out, in case sanctions have to be applied, it is highly important that there should exist some organ competent to express an opinion as to the best way in which their obligations could be carried out by the signatories. As you are aware, this organ, according to the Covenant, is the Council. In order that the Council may effectively fulfil this duty, Article 13 empowers it to receive undertakings from States, determiningin advancethe military, naval and air forces which they wouldbe able to bring into action immediately in order to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions arising, out of the Covenant and the present Protocol.
It is also necessary to emphasise the fact that the means which the States signatories to the present Protocol have at their disposal for the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of Article 11 vary considerably owing to the differences in the geographical, economic, financial, political and social condition of different States. Information as to the means at the disposal of each State is therefore indispensable in order that the Council may in full understanding give its opinion as to the best method by which such obligations may best be carried out.
Finally, as regards the question of the reduction of armaments, which is the final goal to which our efforts are tending, the information thus furnished to the Council may be of very great importance, as every State, knowing what forces will be available for its assistance in case it is attacked, will be able to judge to what extent it may reduce its armaments without compromising its existence as a State, and every State will thus be able to provide the International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments with very valuable data. I should add, moreover, that Article 13, paragraph 1, does not render it compulsory for States to furnish this information. It is desirable that States should furnish the Council with this information, but they are at liberty not to do so.
Article 13, paragraphs 2 and 3.
The provisions of Article 13, paragraphs 2 and 3, refer to the special agreements which were discussed at such length last year. In view of the fact that, according to paragraph 2, such agreements can only come into force when the Council has invited the signatory States to apply the sanctions, the nature of these agreements may be defined as follows:
Special agreements must be regarded as the means for the rapid application of sanctions of every kind in a particular caseof aggression. They are additional guarantees which give weaker States an absolute assurance that the system of sanctions will never fail. They guarantee that there will always be States prepared immediately to carry out the obligations provided for in Article 11 of the Protocol.
In accordance with Article 18 of the Covenant, it is expressly stated that these agreements will be registered and published by the Secretariat, and it has also been decided that they will remain open for signature to any State Member of the League of Nations which may desire to accede to them.
Article 14.
Article 14 is in perfect keeping with the last paragraphs of Articles 10 and 11. In the paragraphs in question, the coming into operation of the sanctions depends upon an injunction by the Council; it therefore also devolves upon the Council to declare that the object for which the sanctions were applied has been attained. Just as the application of the sanctions is a matter for the States, so it rests with them to liquidate the operations undertaken with a view to resisting the act of aggression.
Article 15.
Paragraph 1 is similar to Article 10 of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance drawn up last year.
Paragraph 2 is designed to prevent the sanctions provided for in Article 11 from undergoing any change in character during the process of execution and developing into a war of annexation.
In view of the observations of various delegations regarding the punishment of the aggressor, it should be added that it would be incorrect to interpret this article as meaning that the only penalties to be apprehended by the aggressor as the result of his act shall be the burdens referred to in paragraph 1. Ifnecessary, securities against fresh aggression, or pledges guaranteeing the fulfilment of the obligations imposed in accordance with paragraph 1, might be required. Only annexation of territory and measures involving the loss of political independence are declared inadmissible.
"Territory" is to be taken to mean the whole territory of a State, no distinction being made between the mother-country and the colonies.
Articles 17 and 21.
Although it has not been possible to solve the problem of the reduction of armaments in the clauses of the document submitted to the Assembly for approval, our work paves the way to it and makes it possible.
The reduction of armaments will result, in the first place, from the general security created by a diminution of the dangers of war arising from the compulsory pacific settlement of all disputes.
It will also ensue from the certainty which any State attacked will have of obtaining the economic and financial support of all the signatory States, and such support would be especially important should the aggressor be a great Power, capable of carrying on a long war.
Nevertheless, for States which, owing to their geographical position, are especially liable to attack, and for States whose most important centres are adjacent to their frontiers, the dangers of a sudden attack are so great that it will not be possible for them to base any plan for the reduction of their armaments simply upon the political and economic factors referred to above, no matter what the importance of such factors may be.
It has also been repeatedly declared that many States would require to know what military support they could count on, before the convening of the Conference, if they are to submit tothe Conference proposals for large reductions of armaments; this might necessitate negotiations between the Governments and with the Council before the meeting of the Conference for the reduction of armaments provided for in Article 17. The undertakings referred to in Article 13 of the Protocol should be interpreted in the light of the above.
In drawing up the general programme of the Conference, it will also be necessary, as stated in paragraph 2 of Article 17, for the Council, apart from other criteria "to take into account the undertakings mentioned."
In view of the close interdependence of the three great problems involved, namely, the pacific settlement of disputes, sanctions against those who disturb the peace of the world, and reduction of armaments, the Protocol provides for the convening by the Council of a general Conference for the Reduction of Armaments and for the preparation of the work of such a Conference. Furthermore, the application of the clauses concerning arbitration and sanctions will be conditional on the adoption by the said Conference of a plan for the reduction and limitation of armaments.
Moreover, in order to preserve the connection between the three big problems referred to above, it is provided that the whole Protocol will lapse in the event of the non-execution of the scheme adopted by the Conference. It devolves upon the Council to declare this under conditions to be determined by the Conference itself.
The last paragraph of Article 21 provides for the case of the partial lapsing of the Protocol after it has been put into force. Should the plan adopted by the Conference be regarded as having been put into effect, any State which fails to execute it, so far as it is concerned, will not benefit by the provisions of the Protocol.
Article 19.
The present Protocol emphasises and defines certain obligations arising out of the Covenant. Those of which the present Protocol makes no mention are not affected in any manner. They still exist. Examples which might be quoted are those laid down in Article 16, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, namely, the obligation of the States to give one another mutual support in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the application of the economic and financial sanctions or the obligation of the States to take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to forces which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.
Moreover, as the Swiss Delegation suggests, attention should be directed to the fact that the present Protocol does not in any way affect the special position of Switzerland arising out of the Declaration of the Council at London on February 13th, 1920. As the special position of Switzerland is in accordance with the Covenant, it will also be in accordance with the Protocol.
No further explanations need be added to these comments on the articles. The main principles of the Protocol are clear, as are the detailed provisions.
Our purpose was to make war impossible, to kill it, to annihilate it. To do this, we had to create a system for the pacific settlement of all disputes which might arise. In other words, it meant the creation of a system of arbitration from which no international dispute, whether legal or political, could escape. The plan drawn up leaves no loophole; it prohibits wars of every description and lays down that all disputes shall be settled by pacific means.
But this absolute character which has been given to the system of arbitration should also belong to the whole of the scheme, to the treatment of every question of principle. If there were one single gap in the system, if the smallest opening were left for any measure of force, the whole system would collapse.
To this end arbitration is provided for every kind of dispute, and aggression is defined in such a way as to give no cause for hesitation when the Council has to take a decision.
These reasons led us to fill in the gaps in the Covenant and to define the sanctions in such a way that no possible means could be found of evading them, and that there should be a sound and definite basis for the feeling of security.
Finally, the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments is indissolubly bound up with this whole system:there can be no arbitration or security without disarmament, nor can there be disarmament without arbitration and security.
The peace of the world is at stake.
The Fifth Assembly has undertaken a work of worldwide political importance which, if it succeeds, is destined profoundly to modify present political conditions. This year great progress in this direction has been made in our work. If we succeed, the League of Nations will have rendered an inestimable service to the whole modern world. Such success depends partly upon the Assembly itself and partly upon individual Governments. We submit to the Assembly the fruit of our labours: a work charged with the highest hopes. We beg the Assembly to examine our proposals with care, and to recommend them to the various Governments for acceptance.
In this spirit and with such hopes do we request the Assembly to vote the draft resolutions 1 and 2 that are presented with this Report.
The Assembly,
Noting the declarations of the Governments represented, observes with satisfaction that they contain the basis of an understanding tending to establish a secure peace,
Decides as follows:
With a view to reconciling in the new proposals the divergences between certain points of view which have been expressed and, when agreements have been reached, to enable an International Conference upon Armaments to be summoned by the League of Nations at the earliest possible moment:
(1) The Third Committee is requested to consider the material dealing with security and the reduction of armaments, particularly the observations of the Governments on the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance prepared in pursuance of Resolution XIV of the Third Assembly and other plans prepared and presented to the Secretary-General, since the publication of the draft Treaty, and to examine the obligations contained in the Covenant of the League in relation to the guarantees of security which a resort to arbitration and a reduction of armaments may require:
(2) The First Committee is requested:
(a) To consider, in view of possible amendments, the articles in the Covenant relating to the settlement of disputes;
(b) To examine within what limits the terms of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the statute establishing the Permanent Court of International Justice might be rendered more precise and thereby facilitate the more general acceptance of the clause;
and thus strengthen the solidarity and the security of the nations of the world by settling by pacific means all disputes which may arise between States.
Whereas the work of the League of Nations in connection with the reduction of armaments is entering this year upon a period of re-organisation which requires the direct attention of the Council,
The Assembly entrusts to the Council the question of the co-ordination of the work of its Commissions for the Reduction of Armaments.
The Assembly recommends the Council to re-organise the Temporary Mixed Commission in conformity with the following principles:
(1) The Commission shall include the representatives of a certain number of Governments;
(2) The Commission shall include qualified delegates of the Technical Organisation of the League of Nations, that is to say:
Representatives of the Economic Committee," " " Financial Committee," " " Transit Committee," " " Permanent Advisory Commission," " " Employers' and LabourGroups of the InternationalLabour Office,Experts, jurists or others elected by the Council.
(3) Delegates of States not represented on the Commission may be invited to attend whenever the Commission thinks fit.
(4) The Council may invite any States not Members of the League of Nations which may have notified their intention of taking part in the International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments to appoint representatives to participate in the work of the Commission.
I. The Assembly,
Having taken note of the reports of the First and ThirdCommittees on the questions referred to them by the Assembly resolution of September 6th, 1924,
Welcomes warmly the draft Protocol on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes proposed by the two Committees, of which the text is annexed to this resolution, and
Decides
(1) To recommend to the earnest attention of all the Members of the League the acceptance of the said draft Protocol;
(2) To open immediately the said Protocol in the terms proposed for signature by those representatives of Members of the League who are already in a position to sign it and to hold it open for signature by all other States;
(3) To request the Council forthwith to appoint a Committee to draft the amendments to the Covenant contemplated by the terms of the said Protocol;
(4) To request the Council to convene an International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments, which shall meet at Geneva as provided by the following stipulations of Article 17 of the draft Protocol:
"In preparation for the convening of the Conference, the Council shall draw up, with due regard to the undertakings contained in Articles 11 and 13 of the present Protocol, a general programme for the reduction and limitation of armaments which shall be laid before the Conference and be communicated to the Governments at the earliest possible date, and at the latest, three months before the Conference meets.
"If by May 1st, 1925, ratifications have not been deposited by at least a majority of the permanent Members of the Council and ten other Members of the League, the Secretary-General of the League shall immediately consult the Council as to whether he shall cancel the invitations or merely adjourn the Conference to a subsequent date to be fixed by the Council so as to permit the necessary number of ratifications to be obtained."
(5) To request the Council to put into immediate execution the provisions of Article 12 of the draft Protocol.
II. The Assembly,
Having taken cognisance of the report of the First Committee upon the terms of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice;
Considering that the study of the said terms shows them to be sufficiently wide to permit States to adhere to the special Protocol, opened for signature in virtue of Article 36, paragraph 2, with the reservations which they regard as indispensable;
Convinced that it is in the interest of the progress of international justice, and consistent with the expectations of the opinion of the world, that the greatest possible number of States should, to the widest possible extent, accept as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court.
Recommends:
States to accede at the earliest possible date to the special Protocol opened for signature in virtue of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
I. The Assembly recommends the Council to place the question of Regional Agreements for the Reduction of Armaments on the agenda of the International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments.
II. Whereas the majority of the States which have replied have stated that, with certain exceptions, they have not exceeded the expenditure on armaments shown in their last budgets, and whereas the recommendation addressed to the Governments relates to the period which must elapse before the meeting of the International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments, which is to take place next year:
The Assembly does not consider it necessary to repeat the recommendation regarding the limitation of expenditure on armaments, as this question is to be placed upon the agenda of the International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments.
III. The Assembly is of the opinion:
1. That another technical conference on naval disarmament is unnecessary.
2. That the question of naval disarmament should be discussed as part of the general question of disarmament dealt with by the International Conference proposed in the resolution of September 6th, 1924, adopted by the Fifth Assembly, and that it rests with the Council to settle the programme.
IV. The Assembly requests the Council, in preparing the general programme of the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments provided for in Article 17 of the Protocol, to consider the advisability of including in that programme the following points:
1. General plan for a reduction of armaments in accordance with Article 8 of the Covenant, in particular:
(a) Basis and methods of reduction (budget, peace-time effectives, tonnage of naval and air fleets, population, configuration of frontiers, etc.);
(b) Preparation of a typical budget for expenditure on armaments.
2. Special position of certain States in relation to the reduction of armaments:
(a) Temporary reservations by countries exposed to special risks;
(b) Recommendation of regional agreements for the reduction (or limitation) of armaments,
3. Recommendation of the establishment of demilitarised zones (Article 9).
4. Control and investigation of armaments in the contracting States.
The Assembly also requests the Council to instruct the competent organisations of the League to examine the schemes relating to the above questions which have already been submitted to the Third Committee, or which may subsequently be received by the Secretariat, and to take them into consideration in preparing the programme of the Conference.
1. With a view to the preparation of the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments, the Council decides to form itself into a Committee. The representatives on the Council who consider that it will not be possible to attend the Committee in person will, as soon as possible, send to the Secretary-General the names of their substitutes on this Committee.
The Committee will hold its first meeting on November 17th, in order to draw up a general programme of the work connected with the application of Article 12 of the Protocol and with the reduction of armaments.
The Governments of the States represented on the Council are requested to give their representatives on the Committee the necessary instructions in order that the general lines of the programme may be laid down during its meeting of November 17th.[1]The Secretary-General will invite the Governments of the States Members of the League not represented on the Council to forward through him to the Committee any suggestions which they may think useful with a view to the preparation of this programme.
2. The Secretariat is requested to collect the data necessary for the economic and financial investigations relative to the application of Article 12 of the Protocol, and is authorised to distribute these data to the competent organs of the League (Economic and Financial Organisation and Transit Organisation) with a view to the work which will subsequently be required of them by the Committee.
The Secretariat will obtain information from the official documents at the disposal of the League or from documents which might, if necessary, be furnished by the Governments.
3. In conformity with the Assembly resolution, and in order to assist the Committee in co-ordinating the preparatory work for the Conference, the Temporary Mixed Commission shall be re-organised and shall take the name of the Co-ordination Commission, and be composed as follows:
(a) The Committee of the Council (ten members) assisted by:
(b) The President and one member or two members of each of the three Organisations, Economic, Financial and Transit (six members);
(c) Six members appointed by the Permanent Advisory Commission (six members);
(d) Two members of the Employers' Group and two members of the Workers' Group of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, appointed by the latter (four members);
(e) If considered advisable, a certain number of experts—jurists and others—appointed by the Council.
The Secretary-General is requested to invite at a suitable moment the above-mentioned organisations to appoint their representatives.
[1] The Council, at its 31st Session at Brussels, October 28th, 1924, "decided itself to undertake at its session in Rome (December, 1924) the work of preparing for the Conference on the Reduction of Armaments," instructing the Council Committee to continue and complete this work and report to the Council at its session in March, 1925.
The work of either the Council or its Committee was dependent to a large extent upon the receipt of suggestions from Members of the League which had been requested from them in a circular letter of the Secretary-General, October 11, 1924.
Various items regarding the Protocol of Geneva were on the Agenda of the Council for its December, 1924, meeting at Rome. Preparatory work regarding "the general program" under the second paragraph of Article 17 of the Protocol was the most important. Two other relevant items were (1) the reorganization of the Temporary Mixed Commission and the Permanent Advisory Commission into a single co-ordinated Commission; and (2) the date of the meeting of the Commission of Jurists (appointed at the Brussels session of the Council in October, 1924) to draft the amendments to the Covenant contemplated by the Protocol.
A Conservative Government came into power in Great Britain early in November, 1924, Mr. Austen Chamberlain becoming Foreign Secretary. At the request of the British Government, the agenda items for the December, 1924 meeting of the Council at Rome relating to the Protocol of Geneva were postponed until the March meeting. In the meantime, the British Government has suggested to the Dominions a meeting of the Imperial Conference for the purpose of adopting a policy of the British Commonwealth of Nations regarding the Protocol of Geneva. Whether such a meeting will be held, or whether the general British policy will be decided on as a result of correspondence, is not at this writing certain.
London, November1, 1924.
Sir,
We have the honour to submit herewith a report on the proceedings at the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva this year in connection with the Draft Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.
The First Assembly of the League of Nations in 1920 prepared to give effect to article 8 of the Covenant, the first two paragraphs of which read: "The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of International obligations. The Council .......... shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments." That Assembly decided "to instruct a Temporary Commission to prepare reports and proposals for the reduction of armaments as provided for by article 8 of the Covenant." In the following year the Second Assembly defined the task more clearly in a resolution instructing the Temporary Mixed Commission to make proposals for the reduction of armaments which, in order to secure precision, "should be in the form of a draft Treaty or other equally defined plan, to be presented to the Council, if possible, before the Assembly next year" (1922). In the course of the ensuing year the Temporary Mixed Commission was able to formulate certain principles which, in its opinion, might serve as a basis for the draft Treaty which it had been instructed to draw up. After discussion of these principles the Third Assembly passed a resolution—the famousResolution 14—recognising that in existing circumstances many Governments would be unable to accept responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments unless they received in exchange a satisfactory guarantee of the safety of their country, and suggesting that such guarantee could be found in a defensive agreement binding them to provide immediate and effective assistance, in accordance with a pre-arranged plan, in the event of one of them being attacked. The Temporary Mixed Commission were instructed to prepare a draft Treaty on these lines. The result of their labours was submitted to the Fourth Assembly last year in the form of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which was referred by the Assembly to the Governments for their observations.
2. Certain Governments accepted the draft Treaty in principle: very few intimated their readiness to adhere to its actual terms. His Majesty's Government, in a note which has already been made public,[1] explained the reasons which would render it impossible for them to subscribe to the Treaty.
3. When, therefore, the Fifth Assembly met on the 1st September of this year, the labours of four years, which had been devoted to the preparation of a scheme for giving effect to the obligation undertaken by all signatories in article 8 of the Covenant, had not succeeded in establishing agreement, and there seemed no prospect of making any further advance along the path which had hitherto been followed.
4. Some new direction would have to be given, and the presence in Geneva of the British and French Prime Ministers gave a special importance to the meeting.
5. It was realised that the problem was not merely to find a general scheme of disarmament and security, but that the particular question of French security was of immediate political importance, and would shortly require a solution. The question of "security" had already been raised in conversations between Mr. MacDonald and M. Herriot in July last, at Chequersand in Paris. During the latter meeting, the subject was discussed at some length, and the position as it was then left by the two Prime Ministers was set out in the Franco-British memorandum of the 9th July concerning the application of the Dawes plan. The relevant paragraph read as follows: "The two Governments have likewise proceeded to a preliminary exchange of views on the question of security. They are aware that public opinion requires pacification: they agree to co-operate in devising through the League of Nations or otherwise, as opportunity presents itself, means of securing this, and to continue the consideration of the question until the problem of general security can be finally solved." In a declaration made in the Chamber on the 21st August, reporting on the results of the London Conference, M. Herriot said "security must be the object of another Conference. He did not see why France should not take the initiative .......... For the rest, the security question would be dealt with at Geneva."
6. The debate in the League Assembly was opened by the British Prime Minister on the 4th September. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald began by explaining that it was not because they were indifferent to the problem of national security that His Majesty's Government had given an adverse opinion on the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. They believed that security could not be based on military alliances, and they hesitated to become involved in any agreements which committed them to vague and indefinite obligations. In this respect the Treaty of Mutual Assistance was open to criticism, especially in its article 3 and in its definition of aggression. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald emphasised that the main problem was the problem of national security in relation to national armaments, and the initial difficulty was encountered in the definition of such terms as "security" and "aggression." In regard to the latter, he said, "the one method by which we can approximate to an accurate attribution of responsibility for aggression is arbitration," and he proposed that the article of the Statute of the Permanent Court dealing witharbitration should be carefully examined by a Commission, with a view to its being placed before the Assembly in a somewhat more precise, expanded and definite form than it now had. Such a step would be necessary as a preliminary to the discussion of disarmament, which could produce no good result unless an atmosphere of confidence were previously created. To summon a Conference on disarmament without such a preparation of the ground would be to court immediate and disastrous failure. Such a Conference must be the ultimate aim, and it must include all the nations and must be held in Europe. In his view the Covenant already contained ample provisions for starting arbitration, for the sanctions that were necessary and for all other eventualities that might arise: what was now required was that the Covenant should be elaborated. "The British Government thinks that the matter should now be explored, beginning with the Covenant, applying the Covenant to our present circumstances, and, in the spirit of the League of Nations, developing a policy that will give security and reduce armaments. The British Government stands by the Covenant. The British Government has no wish to reduce the authority of the Council. It rather wishes to extend the authority of the Council consistently with the continued existence and prosperity of the League. Articles 10, 12, 13, 15 and 16 of the Covenant might well form themselves into a charter of peace if we would only apply them and fill them out."
7. Speaking on the following day, the French Prime Minister expressed a similar view: "It is in the development and the fullest possible application of the articles of this solemn instrument (the Covenant) that France seeks for the rules which are to guide her future action and her foreign policy." M. Herriot welcomed Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's suggestion that arbitration should be the test of aggression, and he expressed the hope that the Fifth Assembly would be able to accept the principle of arbitration, which would solve the difficulties, as henceforth the aggressor would be the party which refused arbitration. M. Herriotadded: "Arbitration is essential, but it is not sufficient. It is a means, but not an end. It does not entirely fulfil the intentions of article 8 of the Covenant, which are security and disarmament. We in France regard three terms—arbitration, security and disarmament—as inseparable." A nation which accepted arbitration had a right to security. "Justice without might is impotent. Might without justice is tyranny." In conclusion: "We stand by the Covenant, but we wish to make it a living Covenant. We simply claim for each nation the rights conferred upon it by the Covenant, no more and no less."
8. It is unnecessary to indicate in detail the views expressed by other speakers who participated in this opening debate, from which it was evident that there was general agreement on a number of points:—
(a.) That as a preliminary to disarmament there must be provided an inclusive scheme for the pacific settlement of international disputes of all kinds.
(b.) That the Covenant of the League itself provided the basis of such a scheme, but that it required elaboration, precision and extension in certain directions.
(c.) That to give effect to such a scheme States should develop the principle of compulsory arbitration.
(d.) That a State, having accepted this principle, would, if it resorted to force in disregard of its obligation to submit to arbitration, be automatically declared an aggressor, and outlawed.
(e.) That some form of co-operation must be devised for effective resistance to aggression, both as a deterrent to any possible aggressor and as a guarantee of security to all States enabling them to contemplate a reduction of their own armed forces, which at present constituted their sole guarantee of safety.
9. In order to give effect to these ideas, a resolution was submitted to the Assembly on the 6th September by the British and French delegations in the following terms:—
"The Assembly,
"Noting the declarations of the Governments represented, observes with satisfaction that they contain the basis of an understanding tending to establish a secure peace,
"Decides as follows:—
"With a view to reconciling in the new proposals the divergencies between certain points of view which have been expressed, and when agreement has been reached, to enable an international conference upon armaments to be summoned by the League of Nations at the earliest possible moment—
"(1.) The Third Committee is requested to consider the material dealing with security and reduction of armaments, particularly the observations of the Governments on the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance prepared in pursuance of Resolution 14 of the Third Assembly, and other plans prepared and presented to the Secretary-General since the publication of the draft Treaty, and to examine the obligations contained in the Covenant of the League in relation to the guarantees of security which a resort to arbitration and a reduction of armaments may require;
"(2.) The First Committee is requested—
"(a.) To consider, in view of possible amendments, the articles in the Covenant relating to the settlement of disputes;
"(b.) To examine within what limits the terms of article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute establishing the Permanent Court of International Justice might be rendered more precise, and thereby facilitate the more general acceptance of the clause;
"And thus strengthen the solidarity and the security of the nations of the world by settling, by pacific means, all disputes which may arise between States."