Hardly less chequered were the fortunes of Captain Wake, the only regularly accredited Prussian privateer of whom anything is known. The operations of his ship, theEmbden, in the Mediterranean also resulted in ceaseless bickerings, and he was delayed in Cagliari for two years by disputes of one sort or another. At last, growing weary, he set off to Berlin to prosecute his claims to a Swedish ship which he had seized, but of which the authorities at Cagliari would notpermit him to dispose. Four and a half years after the capture, she was adjudged his good prize; but before he could enter into possession of her she was sunk at her moorings by a violent storm.
The total gain of the Prussian Government from the activity of these three privateers was quite negligible; while, on the other hand, the trouble and annoyance caused by them was immeasurable. The anticipations that the seas would be swept of Austrian and Swedish commerce by a swarm of vessels under the Prussian flag proved to have been quite illusory, and it was a particular disappointment to Frederick that the German shipowners looked askance at the whole business, and in no single instance applied for letters of marque.
A noteworthy feature of the episode is that Frederick's Government, reversing the practice of the Hansa, laid down for its privateers the rule that a neutral flag covered the enemy's goods, and that neutral goods were safe from capture even when under the enemy's flag. This, it is maintained, has ever since been Prussian tradition.
A final word is due to the "Société de Commerce Maritime"—now under the name "Seehandlung," the State bank of the Kingdom of Prussia—which was established by Frederick the Great in 1772, "to carry on shipping under the Prussian flag, and trade with the ports of Spain and all other places where reasonable and certain prospects of substantial profits from imports and exports are to be found." It was vessels of this corporation which, towards the close of the first half of the nineteenth century, bore a German flag for the first time round the world, and its foundation shows that the Great Elector's ideas were only dormant and not dead.
Frederick's immediate purpose was to open up the markets of South America to Silesian linen, but, in consequence of the rigid protectionist policy of Spain, it was only possible to do this by transhipment at Spanish ports. The original capital of the company was 1,200,000 thalers, in shares of 500 thalers each, and of these 2,100 were the property of the King. The Société was granted the exclusive right of trading in English, French, and Spanish salt, and in Polish wax, and was also endowed with many other privileges. It did not at first prove a very profitable venture, and its early days were also clouded over by the defalcations of one of its managers. In course of time it became little more than a branch of the Royal Treasury and the negotiator of State loans, but in the thirties of last century it passed under the control of a man who determined to restore to it something of its original character, and laid out a considerable capital in English-built ships. At that period German merchantmen seldom ventured beyond Bordeaux and Lisbon; but the vessels of the Seehandlung repeatedly encircled the globe, showed their flag in the remotest harbours of Orient and Occident, and established directly that export to South America of the wares of the Riesengebirge which Frederick the Great had in his mind when he called the company into existence.
FOOTNOTES:[5]Thaler then = about 4s. 6d.
FOOTNOTES:
[5]Thaler then = about 4s. 6d.
[5]Thaler then = about 4s. 6d.
CHAPTER III
Germany's Fleet in the Last Century
Though the sword of Napoleon completed the destruction of the Holy Roman Empire, which had done so much to hamper the development of the Teutonic race, the Vienna Congress, rearranging the map of Europe after his overthrow, left Germany still divided into thirty-nine different states. There were four kingdoms, one electorate, seven grand duchies, ten duchies, ten principalities, one landgraviate, and the four free towns—Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, and Frankfort-on-Main. These states were loosely united in the German Confederacy.
The people of Germany, and especially those who had risen against Napoleon, had expected a more complete unity on a democratic basis, and the disappointment of their hopes was one of the chief causes of the revolution which, in 1848, broke out simultaneously in nearly every one of the federal capitals. This movement took the Governments by surprise, and so overwhelming was the popular demand for unity, that they offered but little opposition to the convening of a National Assembly, which met at Frankfort-on-Main on May 18th, 1848, and appointed the Austrian Archduke Johann provisional "Administrator of the Empire." It is generally asserted that the failure of this serious attempt to weld Germany together was an inevitable consequence of thejealousy existing between Austria and Prussia, but none can say with certainty what the sequel might not have been, had not Frederick William IV., the grand-uncle of the present German Emperor, refused the imperial crown when it was offered to him by the National Assembly. It is very well conceivable that, if that monarch had been less fully persuaded of the divine rights of kings and of the incompetence of popular representatives to bestow crowns, the work which Bismarck did in the next twenty years, with so grievous an expenditure of blood and iron, might have been accomplished by peaceable means, and that the world might to-day have been confronted with the problem of a much larger, much richer, and much more united Germany. Those who would not regard German domination in Europe as an unmixed blessing have reason to be thankful for Frederick William's archaic theories on the relationships of Princes to their peoples.
And those who care to amuse themselves by following up the grand alternatives of history must not forget that 1848 saw the birth of the modern German Fleet, which was the fruit of a purely popular movement. Indeed, the patriots of the Frankfort Parliament found in the "imperial fleet," which they actually founded, the necessary symbol of that national unity which was the goal of their aspirations.
Strong, spontaneous, and almost universal as was the German naval movement of 1848, it did not attain its actual dimensions without an effective external stimulus. In the very month in which the revolutionaries were defending their barricades in the streets of Berlin and other German capitals, Frederick VII. had declared his intention of incorporating Schleswig in Denmark; and, while an informal convention wasarranging the preliminaries for the National Assembly, the Danish fleet was blockading the coasts of Prussia in retaliation for the military support afforded by that Kingdom, as the mandatory of the German Confederation, to the rebellious duchies. Nothing was better calculated than an incident of this sort to bring home to the German mind the importance of sea-power. That the ships of a little country like Denmark should be able, with impunity, to forbid the sea to a great military Power, seemed to every German who reflected upon it a grotesque inversion of the natural order of events.
Though the National Assembly, at one of its first sittings, appointed a permanent committee to grapple with the naval question, the impatient interest of the public displayed itself in schemes and suggestions which poured in from every side. In many places committees were formed to help to raise the funds necessary for the equipment of a fleet. It is significant of the widespread nature of the movement that the raftsmen of Gernsbach, in the Black Forest, offered to transport down the River Murg free of cost the timber required for the building of Germany's war ships. The seaports, which felt most keenly the insulting pressure of the Danish blockade, took the leading part in the agitation. A congress of delegates from the German coast towns came together at Hamburg and nominated a "naval commission," on which, in addition to the Governments most immediately concerned, a number of private committees were represented. This body wasted no time in talk, but set to work with feverish activity. As warships were not to be had ready-made, several merchant vessels were purchased and hastily armed with guns furnished by Hanover; and at the beginning of July,the Federal Government was notified that these extemporized men-of-war were ready to put out and attack the enemy. But at the moment the negotiations with Denmark for a truce had already begun, and for the time being the squadron remained peacefully at its moorings.
Meanwhile, even before an Imperial Executive had been got together, the Frankfort Parliament had voted for naval purposes a sum of 6,000,000 thalers,[6]half of which was to be spent immediately and the remainder as necessity might arise. Part of the money was to be taken from the fortress fund of the old Confederacy, and the remainder raised by levies in due proportion on the various states of the union. The question of these "matricular contributions," which in some cases were altogether refused, and in others only paid after much hesitation and vacillation, was one of the chief reasons for the ultimate dissolution of the first "German" Navy.
In November an imperial naval authority was constituted under the control of the Minister of Commerce, who was at the same time deputy for Bremen. An advisory commission of experts was also appointed, and the chair in this body was, at the personal request of the Archduke-Administrator, taken by the man who, in one sense, may be regarded as the father of the present German Fleet, Prince Adalbert of Prussia, and to whom, for this reason, more detailed reference must be made hereafter. The commission submitted a scheme, in which it was recommended that Germany should, for the present, make no attempt to gain a place in the ranks of the first-class naval Powers, but content herself with the protection of her Baltic and North Sea coasts andher sea-borne trade. These purposes, it was held, could be fulfilled by a fleet of fifteen sixty-gun sailing frigates—if possible with auxiliary engines—five steam frigates, twenty steam corvettes, ten despatch-boats, five schooners, and thirty gun-sloops.
During the winter, officials were despatched to England to purchase and order ships, and to America to induce the United States Government to allow some of its naval officers to enter temporarily into the German service. These latter negotiations at first promised success, but in the end the Government at Washington declared itself unable to entertain the request. With the purchase of material the German emissaries had better luck, and when the truce with Denmark expired in the spring of 1849, the Navy List already contained the names of twelve vessels, though, it is true, hardly one of them was yet fit for action. A Commander-in-Chief had also been found in the person of Karl Bromme, a native of Leipzig, whose name had been permanently anglicized into "Brommy" while he was learning seafaring in the American merchant service. This man, "the first German Admiral," had followed Cochrane to Greece, where he was successively Flag Captain to Admiral Miaulis, organizer in the Ministry of Marine, and Commandant of the Military School at the Piræus. From there he was tempted away to become "Imperial Commissioner" to the incipient German Navy, and after taking part in the sittings of the commission of experts, he was sent in that capacity to Bremerhaven to supervise the formation of the fleet and to found a naval arsenal.
On June 4th Brommy, with a steam frigate and two steam corvettes, attacked a Danish frigate which was lying becalmed off Heligoland. Hardly, however,had the engagement commenced before a signal shot from the island warned the belligerents that they were within British territorial waters, and must suspend hostilities. Soon afterwards the Danish blockading squadron approached the scene, and the German ships hurried back to their harbour. This was the only opportunity the German Fleet had of showing its quality. Brommy was promoted to Rear-Admiral later in the year.
Insignificant as the Heligoland skirmish was in itself, it had a sequel which has played a great part in all subsequent movements for increasing the German Fleet. Brommy's ships had fought under the black-red-and-gold that were to be the colours of the new Empire. But this Empire had then no legal existence, and, as a matter of fact, never did have one, and no doubt Palmerston was only giving expression to recognised principles of international law when he wrote that vessels committing acts of belligerency under the black-red-and-gold flag would render themselves liable to be treated as "pirates." The Frankfort Government, a product of excitement and inexperience, made many mistakes which the ripe tradition of an old-established administration would have avoided, and, in its haste to assert itself on the seas, doubtless did not give sufficient thought to the restrictions imposed upon it by its own anomalous status. The hoisting of the black-red-and-gold on a flotilla or warships was undeniably a questionable proceeding, and one which justified the view propounded by the British Foreign Minister. At the same time, his words belong to the category of things which had better have been left unsaid. The word "pirate" rankled then, and has ever since continued to rankle, and the Palmerstonian note has been citedten thousand times, and is still cited, as the supreme example of the tyrannous arrogance with which Britain rules the waves.
A fortnight after Brommy's one exploit as a German naval commander, the remnant of the National Assembly was dispersed by military force at Stuttgart, where it had taken refuge, and Germany relapsed into the condition of a loosely-jointed federation of mutually jealous and suspicious Princes, whose rival claims had to be settled on the battlefield before the great work of unification could be accomplished. The infant navy, which had been the work of a popular movement and a popular Parliament, proved a source of dissension and embarrassment to the Confederacy Governments. Several of the inland states were altogether opposed to the idea that Germany needed a navy. A strong party advocated that one fleet should be provided by Austria for the Adriatic, a second by Prussia for the Baltic, and a third by the remaining German states for the North Sea. The last point of this project was the subject of special negotiations, and at one time there seemed some chance of Hanover assuming the office of "Federal Admiral."
In the end, however, divergent interests and irreconcilable rivalries produced the only possible result, and, in February, 1852, the Confederated Governments decided to cut the Gordian knot. The promising German Navy was dissolved, Admiral Brommy received his discharge (he was subsequently employed for some time as Chief of the Technical Department of the Austrian Admiralty), and an Oldenburg official, whose unforgettable name has helped to brand his memory with the whole infamy of a transaction for which he was in nowise responsible, was appointed "Commissioner of the Germanic Confederationcharged with the regulation of naval affairs." This, at least, is the designation appended to his signature on the advertisement which, in the German, English, and French languages, announced to all the world that the German Navy was forthwith to be knocked down to the highest bidder. It was the form rather than the fact of the sale which was taken so ill in Privy Councillor Hannibal Fischer, but it is difficult to see what else he could have done. He made efforts to dispose of the ships by private treaty, and actually sold some of them to Prussia and others to English firms, but a residue remained for which no purchaser could be found in this way, and there was nothing for it but to put them up to public auction. There thus came under the hammer two steam frigates, six steam corvettes, a sailing frigate, and twenty-seven gunboats propelled by oars. Of the eight steamers three had been built at Bristol, and one each at Glasgow, Leith, New York, Hamburg, and Bremen. Except in the case of the American vessel, the engines were all of British make.
Concurrently with the abortive efforts to found a German Navy, Prussia had taken independent action, and laid the real foundation of the great fleet which now aspires to contest the British mastery of the seas. At that time there was not even the slenderest basis for the kingdom to work upon. The task had to be undertaken from the very beginning. During the first half of the nineteenth century, it is true, the advisability of building a navy had more than once been exhaustively discussed by the Prussian Government. In the general resettlement of 1815, the island of Rügen and the strip of Pomeranian coast opposite to it had passed from Sweden to Prussia, and included in the transfer were six gun-sloops anda Swedish officer, Captain Christian Lange, who was summoned to Berlin to report to the War Ministry on the utility of the little flotilla. As the result of his representations, he was commissioned to submit plans and estimates for a war schooner, and for an armed rowing boat for use on the rivers. These vessels were eventually built, with the express idea that they were to serve as experiments and models for the construction of a regular fleet. In great haste prescriptions as to a naval uniform were issued, and the questions of dockyards and harbour works were also deliberated. But the only issue of all this work was the conviction that the national resources were not yet equal to the financial strain which would have been entailed by the creation of a navy. Similar investigations and discussions in the years 1825 and 1832 were, for the same reason, equally fruitless. At the commencement of the revolutionary year, the only vessels in the possession of the Prussian Government were a corvette, which was employed as a Navigation School, a paddle steamer, which conveyed the mails between Stettin and St. Petersburg, and which, under the terms of the contract for its construction, was to be adaptable to the purposes of an "auxiliary cruiser," and a couple of armed yawls.
By the autumn of 1848 a Prussian flotilla of ten sloops and yawls, three of which had been built with the funds collected by private committees, was ready for operations against the Danes. It was placed under the command of a Dutch ex-naval captain named Schröder. The crews provided for him—465 men in all—were a strange medley of active soldiers, reservists, and seamen from the merchant service. For various reasons, not the least weighty of which was the doubtful status of the black-red-and-goldflag, the squadron sailed under the Prussian colours. While it was fitting out, the first steps were taken towards the establishment of a naval organization and the training of a corps of officers.
By the following summer the Prussian fleet could already boast two steamers, one sailing corvette, and twenty-one gun sloops, with a total complement of thirty-seven officers and 1,521 men, and mounting in all sixty-seven guns. But only once did this primitive navy have the satisfaction of taking part in a pitched naval engagement. This was a duel between a Prussian steamer and a Danish brig, which fought for five hours off the island of Rügen. The encounter was terminated by the fall of darkness, and before day broke again another Danish corvette arrived on the scene and put the Prussians to flight. But, in spite of a lack of fighting, the presence of Commodore Schröder's force along the coast undoubtedly did much to relieve the pressure of the blockade.
The peace with Denmark in 1850 ushered in a period of assiduous and systematic labour at the task of building up a Prussian fleet. Throughout this important period, the moving spirit was the man who has already been described as the father of the German Navy, Prince Adalbert of Prussia. This enthusiastic and indefatigable sailor was a first cousin of King Frederick William IV., who refused the imperial crown as a democratic gift, and of the Emperor William I., who finally won it on the battlefields of France. In his boyhood, Prince Adalbert had had the doctrine of the vital importance of sea-power implanted in his mind by a veteran soldier, Field-Marshal Gneisenau, and he never forgot the lesson. At the age of twenty-one he paid a visit of two months' duration to England, where he wascordially welcomed into naval circles, and where his passion for the sea was inflamed by the conversation of men who had fought under Nelson at Trafalgar. He lost no opportunity of inspecting war vessels, shipyards, and docks, and returned to Germany with note-books crammed with information as to all he had seen and heard. A British admiral is said to have declared that the Prince knew more about the warships of Great Britain than many of their own officers, and one of the last acts of this sailor Hohenzollern was to pay a visit to the English dockyards to familiarize himself with the latest novelties in naval construction.
Four years after his first journey to England, one of those naval enquiries already alluded to was held at Berlin, and a commission was appointed to advise as to the types of vessels to be chosen for the fleet which the Prussian Government contemplated building at some indefinite future date. Prince Adalbert was a member of this body, but when asked for his views on the subject he satisfied himself with laying before his colleagues the opinion of his friend, Captain Mingaye, a British naval officer, who advised that the triumph of steam over sails and oars presented Prussia with a splendid opportunity to create sea-power which should be "mighty" from the outset. Curiously enough, the War Minister, von Rauch, inferred from this suggestion that naval construction was passing through a transition stage of doubtful issue, and it was used by him as a pretext for postponing the consideration of the whole question; for, he argued, Prussia could not afford to squander money on uncertain experiments. In the succeeding years, the Prince cruised the Mediterranean in an Austrian ship with his friend the Archduke Johann, afterwards theImperial Administrator, and made in Sardinian and British war vessels several longer voyages, during which he devoted himself with a whole heart to the study of seamanship and navigation. He also added materially to his knowledge while on board one of the ships of the British Mediterranean Squadron, which at the time was engaged in man[oe]uvres. On his return home from these experiences, he secured the appointment of Schröder to the Navigation School shipAmazon, always with the idea that the vessel would be the training-ground of the officers' corps of a future Prussian Navy. As we have seen, the Prince was chosen as chairman of the Frankfort advisory committee on naval questions. Some months previously he had addressed to the National Assembly a "Memorandum as to the Formation of a German Fleet." This document, which was printed and published, not only is a remarkable testimony to the author's insight into the true nature of naval problems, but also contains a clear enunciation of the principles which have since guided Germany's naval policy. Pointing to the humiliation of the Danish blockade he wrote:
"And this Germany—united Germany—must calmly submit to, precisely at the great moment when, after long years, it once more feels itself a whole, a Power of forty millions of people. But the Fatherland recognises the oppressive nature of its situation; it demands a remedy all the more speedy because after these events, it foresees with certainty how much more painful its position might some day be if it were pitted against one of the great Sea Powers, a Power against which the German ships would not besecure even in their own harbours, a fleet which could menace our coasts with debarkations on a much more extensive scale than is possible to our present foe. United Germany, however, wishes to see her territories energetically protected, her flag respected, her trade once more flourishing, and in the future to have some influence on the sea."
"And this Germany—united Germany—must calmly submit to, precisely at the great moment when, after long years, it once more feels itself a whole, a Power of forty millions of people. But the Fatherland recognises the oppressive nature of its situation; it demands a remedy all the more speedy because after these events, it foresees with certainty how much more painful its position might some day be if it were pitted against one of the great Sea Powers, a Power against which the German ships would not besecure even in their own harbours, a fleet which could menace our coasts with debarkations on a much more extensive scale than is possible to our present foe. United Germany, however, wishes to see her territories energetically protected, her flag respected, her trade once more flourishing, and in the future to have some influence on the sea."
Prince Adalbert then weighed the three alternatives: (a) Defensive coast protection; (b) offensive coast protection; and (c) an independent German sea-power; and finally reached the conclusion:
"Germany must either build no battleships or at once build so many that she can act towards her neighbours as an independent Sea-Power. Anything intermediate would be a useless expense, an empty pretension, and would arouse in the nation expectations which, in the moment of danger, our sea-power would not be able to fulfil."If we now ask what would be the smallest number of battleships which would allow us to act in European waters as an independent fleet, especially against the ever-ready Russian Baltic fleet, I think we must take twenty battleships as the minimum that would be able to measure itself with it. But such a fleet would make Germany fourth among the Sea-Powers of first rank, and place her incontestably in a position to play a great rôle on the sea, a rôle which would be worthy of her position in Europe. For with her twenty battleships she would be able to throw an enormous weight into the scales, turn the balance by her adherence to an alliance, andconsequently be as much sought after as an ally on account of her sea-power as on account of her land-power."
"Germany must either build no battleships or at once build so many that she can act towards her neighbours as an independent Sea-Power. Anything intermediate would be a useless expense, an empty pretension, and would arouse in the nation expectations which, in the moment of danger, our sea-power would not be able to fulfil.
"If we now ask what would be the smallest number of battleships which would allow us to act in European waters as an independent fleet, especially against the ever-ready Russian Baltic fleet, I think we must take twenty battleships as the minimum that would be able to measure itself with it. But such a fleet would make Germany fourth among the Sea-Powers of first rank, and place her incontestably in a position to play a great rôle on the sea, a rôle which would be worthy of her position in Europe. For with her twenty battleships she would be able to throw an enormous weight into the scales, turn the balance by her adherence to an alliance, andconsequently be as much sought after as an ally on account of her sea-power as on account of her land-power."
The Prince accordingly proposed that the German building programme should include 20 battleships with auxiliary screws, 10 frigates, 30 steam cruisers, 40 gunboats, and 80 gun-sloops; and that the construction of these vessels should be spread over a period of ten years. In this project we have that same principle of the gradual working up to a fixed standard of strength which has characterised all modern German naval legislation.
However, the Prince did not manage to persuade the Frankfort technical commission to adopt his scheme in its entirety, though the programme approved went a long way towards meeting his views. Why this programme was never carried out has already been seen. In the Memorandum just quoted from, Prince Adalbert had written: "The entire nation unanimously demands a German war fleet, for German, absolutely German, it must be, a true representative of the new-born unity of the Fatherland"; and it must have been with a heavy heart that he saw his vision melt away, and went back to Berlin to employ his gifts in a more restricted and less promising field.
The difficulties which opposed themselves to the realisation of the Prince's ideas will be appreciated, when it is stated that the man who built the first warship of any size which had been launched from a German yard since the days of the Hanseatic League is still alive. Wilhelm Schwarm, now ninety-four years of age, was employed as a young man in Klawitter's shipyard at Dantzig, and at the timewhen the air was filled with talk of a future German Navy, the firm very shrewdly sent him over to the works of Robinson and Russell, on the Thames, to learn the art of constructing vessels of larger size than were then built on the Baltic. He brought back with him the plans for a paddle corvette, which was built under his supervision on the Klawitter slips, fitted with English engines, and, under the name ofDantzig, was an important addition to the Prussian fleet.
At the time of the Crimean War this vessel showed the Prussian flag at Constantinople for the first time in history, and it was also with her that Prince Adalbert experienced a rather grotesque adventure in the Mediterranean in 1856. In the previous year a German ship had been plundered by the Riff pirates, and the Prince, happening to be in those parts with theDantzig, made a reconnaissance, in one of the ship's boats, of the coast of Cape Tree Forcas, where the outrage had occurred. The natives, as was their custom, fired on the party from the shore. Annoyed by this molestation, Prince Adalbert determined to teach the Arabs a severe lesson. Having manned and armed all his boats, he stormed the steep and rocky shore and planted the Prussian flag on the summit of the cliffs. His triumph was, however, a very brief one, for the enemy immediately returned to the attack, and drove the landing party back to the boats with the loss of seven killed and twenty-three wounded. Official panegyrists extol this rash escapade as an "heroic deed," and declare that it did much to raise the confidence of the young Prussian Navy. As the Riff pirates were no doubt also exultant over their victory, the affair must have been one of those rare encounters with the issue of which both sides wereequally satisfied. TheDantzigwas sold a few years later in England, in the belief that her timbers were unsound, and was then passed on to Japan, where she was run ashore and burnt by her own crew during an engagement in the civil war.
The problem of obtaining properly qualified personnel for the corps of naval officers was not less difficult to solve than that of building efficient warships. England would have been the natural source on which to draw for instructors, but for political reasons it was decided not to seek assistance from that most competent of all quarters, and the services of three officers of the Swedish Navy were secured. For similar reasons a Swedish naval constructor was engaged. A few years later, however, permission was asked and obtained for a number of cadets to learn their profession on British men-of-war.
The year 1852 brought an event of the utmost importance for the development of the Prussian Navy—the acquisition of Wilhelmshaven as a North Sea base. At that time Prussia did not possess an inch of coast-line on the North Sea, and could obtain access to it only through the Belt and the Sound, then under the control of the superior naval power of Denmark. Among the innumerable projects with which the National Assembly had been deluged, was the scheme of three citizens of Rendsburg for the construction of a water-way pretty much along the line subsequently followed by the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. This plan was, however, based on the false assumption that Schleswig-Holstein would at once become, and ever afterwards remain, German territory. It had also been proposed to the Frankfort Government by an Oldenburg official that the Jade Bay should be chosen as the North Sea base for thefleet, and this suggestion seems to have fixed the attention of Prince Adalbert on the inlet which is now the chief naval headquarters of the German Empire. The Grand Duke of Oldenburg was approached, and he consented to cede to Prussia the piece of marshly land which has since been covered by the harbours, docks, shipyards, workshops, barracks, and fortifications of Wilhelmshaven. Prussia paid a sum of 500,000 thalers for this invaluable possession, and at the same time took upon herself the protection of the coast and sea-trade of the duchy.
Herculean efforts and inexhaustible patience were required to adapt Prussia's acquisition on the Jade to its destined purposes. Years had to be spent in a careful survey of the bed of the harbour, in order to ascertain how far the channel was affected by the movements of sand and mud under the influence of the tide. Further years were consumed by the task of sinking piles in the treacherous peaty soil to obtain a solid foundation for dock and harbour walls. Frequently a storm or a spring tide destroyed in a few hours the fruits of months of strenuous labour. As Hanover refused to allow the construction of a railway across her territory, which lay between Prussia and Oldenburg, it was necessary to convey all the building materials to the spot by the long and tedious sea-route. At first not even drinking-water was to be had on the desolate site, and prolonged and costly exertions were needful before it could be procured in sufficient quantities. Sixteen years elapsed before the new harbour was formally declared open by the Prussian King, afterwards the Emperor William I., in the presence of British ships, the officers of which probably regarded the works with indulgent curiosityand little guessed the significance which Wilhelmshaven would one day possess for their own country.
When the second war with Denmark broke out in 1864, Prussia's fleet was still absurdly inadequate to deal with the naval force opposed to it. The ship establishment at the close of 1863 was composed as under:
Steamships with Fighting Value.
3 corvettes, mounting 27 or 28 guns each.1 corvette, mounting 17 guns.
Steamships with little Fighting Value.
4 first-class gunboats, mounting 3 guns each.17 second-class gunboats, mounting 2 guns each.3 despatch-boats, mounting together 8 guns.
Steamship without Fighting Value.
1 corvette, mounting 9 guns.
Sailing Ships with little or no Fighting Value.
3 frigates, mounting a total of 112 guns.3 brigs, mounting a total of 4 guns.2 schooners, mounting a total of 4 guns.
Also without Fighting Value.
40 rowing-boats, mounting a total of 76 guns.
Denmark, on the other hand, had 31 steam war vessels, among which were 1 battleship, 5 frigates, 3 corvettes, and 4 armoured craft. Even with the assistance of a number of Austrian ships, which arrived in the North Sea from the Mediterranean, the Prussian fleet could contribute nothing decisive towards the issue of the war. At the most it prevented the Danish blockade of the German coast-line from being effective. The Prussian Government attempted to reduce its inferiority by hiring merchant vessels, and hurriedly purchased warships in France andEngland. One of these latter, the monitorArminius, which was of English build, was almost entirely paid for with the voluntary contributions which had continued to flow in. This fact shows how steady and keen the interest of a large section of the population in the development of the navy already was, and how erroneous it is to ascribe the naval enthusiasm in Germany of recent years entirely to the official agitation. Peace was concluded before the new ships could be made ready for sea.
The war of 1864 was one of the great cross-roads of British history. Difficult as it is to "overlook the cards of Providence," as Bismarck puts it, there can be little doubt that we took the wrong turning. The great German Chancellor candidly admitted that the possession of Kiel and a strategic canal through Holstein were two of the principal objects which Prussia had in view when she drew the sword. The two leading members of the British Cabinet were in favour of backing up Denmark; and one of them, Palmerston, used language in Parliament which might well have led that country to count upon our support. A strong body of English public opinion also warmly espoused the Danish cause. But Queen Victoria, largely influenced by the sympathy for Germany which she had imbibed from the Prince Consort, threw all the weight of the Crown into the opposite scale.
There are few more agitated passages to be found in the records of diplomacy than those letters to Lord Granville in which she argued, threatened, entreated, and, finally falling back on the last strength of woman, her weakness, complained that she was "completely exhausted by anxiety and suspense," and "so tired and unwell she can hardly hold up herhead or hold her pen." Her will prevailed in the end, and she was able to congratulate herself that, "owing to the determined stand she had made against her two principal ministers, she had saved the country from an unnecessary war." When Prussia, completely reversing her attitude, made those very claims of the Danish King which she had contested by force of arms her pretext for annexing the two duchies under the "rights of conquest," the Queen suffered a bitter disillusionment, and, on her instructions General Grey wrote to Lord Granville, that "Prussia should at least be made aware of what she and her Government and every honest man in Europe must think of the gross and unblushing violation of every assurance and pledge that she had given which Prussia had been guilty of." It will hardly be contended now that a war which should have left Schleswig-Holstein in the hands of Denmark would have been anything but exceedingly advantageous, economical, and opportune for Great Britain.
Even before, in the formal division of the spoils, Prussia had obtained Austrian recognition of her right to Kiel, she had occupied that port and transferred her naval headquarters thither from Dantzig. The construction of the North Sea Baltic Canal was delayed many years, mainly by the opposition of Count Moltke, who argued that its cost would be so great that it would, on the whole, be cheaper to build a second fleet with the money. He further urged that the canal would be navigable only in the summer, and that in the event of a war the army would be weakened by the necessity of providing for its defence. But for the doubts and jealousies of the sister service, the German Navy might years ago have enjoyed thebenefits of that prolongation of the Canal, contemplated by Bismarck, which would have allowed its ironclads to steam from Kiel to Wilhelmshaven without putting out into the open sea.
In the hope that the lessons of the war would have produced the desirable effect on the public mind, the Prussian Government, in 1865, laid before its Parliament a bill that may be considered as the definite inauguration of the naval policy which Germany has ever since pursued. In the Memorandum submitted to the House with the measure, it was contended that the time had come for Prussia to join the ranks of the Sea-Powers, in order that she might be in a position to protect her own and the other German coasts and maritime trade, and, for all future time, to assert her European position as against such States as were accessible only by water. "For the present," it was stated, "she is unable to enter into rivalry with the first-class naval Powers, but she must occupy a position commanding esteem among those of the second class."
Accordingly, the Government asked for authority to build 10 armoured frigates of the highest efficiency, an equal number of armoured vessels of the cupola or turret type for coast defence, 16 corvettes for the protection of sea-borne trade, 6 despatch-boats, and at least 4 transports. It was calculated that ten years would be necessary for the execution of this plan, but rather for the training of the personnel and the provision of the indispensable harbour works than for the actual construction of the ships. The cost of the proposed fleet was estimated at 34,500,000 thalers, that of its annual maintenance at about 5,000,000 thalers. In recommending the scheme to the Diet, Bismarck used the following words, whichcontain very noteworthy implications: "During the last twenty years no question has so unanimously interested public opinion in Germany as precisely the naval question. We have seen associations, the Press, and the Diets give expression to their sympathy, and this sympathy exercised itself in the collection of comparatively important sums. The Government and the Conservative party have been reproached with the slowness and parsimony with which action has been taken in this direction. It was particularly the Liberal parties which carried on this agitation. We believe, therefore, that we are doing you a great pleasure with this Bill."
But the Liberal majority, then exclusively preoccupied with the constitutional struggle against the masterful and autocratic Minister-President, threw out the Bill, and modified naval estimates were given the force of law by royal decree. The attitude of the Prussian Liberals of that epoch was very similar to that of the Socialists in recent years.
In the brief war of 1866, the Austrian fleet was tied down to the Mediterranean by the superior sea-power of Italy, and the operations of the Prussian ships were confined to a few cheap victories over the antiquated coast and river fortifications of Hanover. As the result of the war, Prussia was rounded off by the incorporation of the Kingdom of Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Nassau, and the old imperial town of Frankfort-on-Main. She thus secured for herself the entire German North Sea littoral, with the exception of the coast-line of Oldenburg, which by treaty was already hers in fact if not in law. Immediately after the conclusion of peace, all the States to the north of the Main were closely welded together in the North German Confederation, the first decisivestep towards the creation of the Empire. An article in the Federal Constitution ran: "The Federal Navy is one and indivisible under the command of Prussia. Its organization and composition fall to His Majesty the King of Prussia, who nominates the officials and officers of the navy, and to whom they, as well as the crews, must take the oath of fealty. Kiel harbour and the Jade harbour are federal war harbours. The expenses necessary for the establishment and maintenance of the fleet and the institutions connected therewith will be borne by the Federal Treasury."
Two years later a fresh naval programme was submitted to, and approved by, the North German Reichstag. It laid down that within ten years the fleet should be brought up to the subjoined strength:
16 large and small armoured ships.20 corvettes.8 despatch-boats.3 transports.22 steam gunboats.7 school-ships.
The new vessels actually needed for the attainment of this establishment were 12 armoured ships, 12 corvettes, 6 despatch-boats, 2 transports, and 1 school-ship. As native ship-builders had so far had no experience in the construction of ironclads, only one vessel of this type was placed in Germany, the State yard at Dantzic being experimentally entrusted with the work, while the rest were purchased or ordered in England or France. No fact could illustrate more vividly the tremendous progress which Germany has since made in this respect.
Oddly enough, the great war with France was succeeded by a marked cooling-off of the popular enthusiasm for the navy in Germany. The reasons for this appear to have been disappointment withwhat the fleet actually accomplished and the complete overthrow of the enemy without its assistance. Even if all the federal ships had been in perfect trim and manned by thoroughly trained crews, they were confronted by so overwhelming a superiority of force that at best they could have achieved little or nothing. But the outbreak of hostilities coincided with a series of accidents which temporarily disabled several of Germany's best war vessels, and at that time there was not a single dock in the country in which they could be repaired. Officers and crews were, too, imperfectly trained and insufficiently familiar with both engines and guns, the harbour equipments were inadequate, and, in fact, everything was in a state of unpreparedness.
That the French, with their great naval superiority, effected so little, and did not even make a determined attempt to force the Jade and destroy the works at Wilhelmshaven, can only be ascribed to their lack of initiative and the paralyzing operation of their crushing defeats on land. The only regular engagement fought at sea during the war was an encounter of uncertain issue between a small German gunboat and a French despatch-boat off the coast of Cuba. But in spite of the odds against the federal fleet, public opinion in Germany protested that it should have shown more dash and enterprise, and in some way have crowned itself with laurels. Even more prejudicial to the popularity of an ambitious naval policy was the patent fact that the hereditary and most formidable foe had been thoroughly and rapidly humbled by a purely land campaign, and that his superiority on the sea had availed him practically nothing. To such considerations must be attributed a large share of the indifference with which manyGermans regarded their navy during the next thirty years.
The prevalent views were reflected in the Memorandum with which, in 1872, the Minister of Marine, Lieutenant-General von Stosch, ushered in the first naval programme of the new German Empire. This document stated that in a long war Germany must leave the offensive to her land force, and that the proper task of her navy was to assert the power of the Empire where smaller interests were at stake in places to which the army could not penetrate. An increase in the fleet was, however, stated to be necessary on the ground of the growth of German sea-borne trade, and it was proposed that the following vessels should be available by the year 1882:
8 armoured frigates.6 armoured corvettes.7 armoured monitors.2 armoured batteries.20 cruisers.6 despatch-boats.18 gunboats.28 torpedo-boats.5 school-ships.
The cost of these vessels was estimated at 73,000,000 thalers, that of their maintenance in the year 1882 at 1,300,000 thalers. The plan, which was much more modest in its pretensions than its predecessors, and in principle constituted a retirement from the position formerly taken up, was approved by the first Parliament of the new Germany.
The first royal review of the German Fleet took place in the Warnemünde roads in 1875. The ships present were four ironclads, a despatch-boat, and four school-ships; their total complements 2,862 officers and men.
When the year 1883 arrived, General von Stosch published a Memorandum on the execution of his plan. It is significant of the change that had comeover public opinion that the Government had not dared to ask the Reichstag for a substitute for the armoured frigateGrosser Kurfürst, which was lost in collision off Folkestone, and that consequently one of the eight vessels of her type was lacking. The last of the six armoured corvettes had yet to be built, and instead of five monitors thirteen armoured gunboats had been constructed, because it was thought that the latter class of ship was better suited for the defence of the Jade, Weser, and Elbe. It had been decided not to build the floating batteries, which would have been an easy prey to the "fish" torpedo, introduced as a weapon of naval warfare since they were projected. One out of the twenty corvettes, and eight large and nine small torpedo craft were also still wanting. German national vanity had, however, secured a questionable triumph: the Empire was now entirely independent of foreigners so far as its warships were concerned. But if Germany had continued to purchase some of her warships in England while she was still but a tyro in the art of naval architecture, she would have saved much money, and made more rapid progress.
General von Stosch simultaneously presented another Memorandum, dealing with the future development of the navy. In it he laid stress on the reasons which could be adduced against the principle hitherto followed, and since readopted, of fixing the building programme in advance for a longer period, and advised that it was inexpedient to look farther ahead than three or four years. While admitting that "the seas are ever more ceasing to separate the nations," and that "the course of history seems ever more to indicate that a State cannot withdraw from the sea if it is striving to maintain for itself a positionin the world beyond the immediate future," he laid down the axiom that "naval battles alone seldom decide the destinies of States, and for immeasurable time the decision of every war will for Germany lie with her land army." Thus, though he admitted the desirability of "a concentrated high sea fleet always ready for action," he considered it best to defer the construction of battleships till further experience had shown whether their functions could not be equally well performed by vessels of a smaller type. The conclusion reached by the Memorandum was that it was necessary to add without delay to only one class of vessel—namely, that which served the purposes of coast defence. In this connection the following words were used:
"Here it is the torpedo-boat, which, especially when used in large numbers at night, will render the carrying through of a blockade almost impossible. Every night the blockading ships would be compelled to withdraw to a distance under steam. Their coal consumption would thereby be much increased, the tension of the crews, in consequence of the need for unremitting vigilance, would become intolerable, and at night the blockaded harbours would be accessible. Even when in motion, the blockading ships would not be safe at night. The torpedo-boats would follow them and recognize their aim by the lights which the enemy would not be able to do without when steaming in squadron formation. The torpedo-boat is a weapon which is of special advantage to the weaker on the sea. A few States already possess a considerable strength in torpedo craft. For the German Navy 150torpedo-boats are considered necessary, and of these thirty-five will be ready for service shortly."
"Here it is the torpedo-boat, which, especially when used in large numbers at night, will render the carrying through of a blockade almost impossible. Every night the blockading ships would be compelled to withdraw to a distance under steam. Their coal consumption would thereby be much increased, the tension of the crews, in consequence of the need for unremitting vigilance, would become intolerable, and at night the blockaded harbours would be accessible. Even when in motion, the blockading ships would not be safe at night. The torpedo-boats would follow them and recognize their aim by the lights which the enemy would not be able to do without when steaming in squadron formation. The torpedo-boat is a weapon which is of special advantage to the weaker on the sea. A few States already possess a considerable strength in torpedo craft. For the German Navy 150torpedo-boats are considered necessary, and of these thirty-five will be ready for service shortly."
It was while the German Fleet was still impotent for all serious purposes that the Empire acquired the mass of its colonies: South-West Africa, Togo, the Cameroons, German New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Marshall Islands were all annexed in 1884. The decisive step towards the acquisition of German East Africa was taken in the following year.
William I. lived just long enough to lay the foundation-stone of the Kiel Canal, which had been one of the dreams of the Frankfort patriots forty years earlier. His death was followed after an interval of three months by that of Frederick I., and with the accession of William II., in 1888, the latest era of German naval policy may be said to have commenced. Until, however, Admiral Tirpitz was put in charge of the Ministry of Marine, in 1897, practically nothing was done to add to the fighting strength of the fleet. Any progress which was made in connection with the navy was confined to developments of organisation, and to the exchange of German rights in Zanzibar and Witu for the islet of Heligoland. This transaction was scoffed at by Bismarck, then in retirement, who, however, only contemplated the possibility of a naval war with France, and it was bitterly resented by German public opinion, and especially by that heated section of it which poses as the pioneer on the path of militarism, navalism, and colonism. Only during the last three or four years has the conviction gradually begun to gain ground, that perhaps, after all, Germany did not make such a bad bargain, and Heligoland has simultaneously taken an ever more and more prominent place in the speculations of political prophetsas to the probable outcome of an Anglo-German war.
The keen interest of the Emperor William, and his ambition to play the leading part on the stage of the world, would not, in themselves, have sufficed to bring about the change which has been wrought during the past seventeen years. The decisive personal factors here have been the fixed purpose, the steady will, the unflagging energy, the inexhaustible patience, the profound political insight, and the rare diplomatic skill of Admiral Tirpitz, the nearest approach to a really great man that Germany has produced since Bismarck. He is the true creator of the German fleet.