Chapter 4

In the same paper Commander Sims explained the principal tactical qualities that are desirable in a fleet—namely, compactness of the battle formation and the flexibility of the fleet as a unit—that is, its ability to change its formation in the least possible time and space with safety to its units. Proceeding to elaborate his views, Commander Sims stated:

"For example, suppose two fleets of eight vessels each, composed of ships that are alike in all respects, and suppose their personnel to be equally skilful, with the exception of the Commanders-in-Chief, whose difference in energy and ability is such that one fleet has been so drilled as to be able to man[oe]uvre with precision and safety while maintaining one-half the distance between its units that the other fleet requires."This is putting an extreme case, but it shows:"1. That the short fleet, being about half the length of the other one, can complete certainimportant man[oe]uvres in about one-half the time and one half the space required for similar man[oe]uvres of the long fleet."2. That, when ranged alongside each other, the defeat of the long fleet is inevitable, since the rapidity of hitting of the individual units is assumed to be equal, and each of the four leading ships of the long fleet receives about twice as many hits as she can return, though the eighth ship of the short fleet would suffer a preponderance of gun-fire from the fifth or sixth vessel of the long fleet, the seventh and eighth being too far astern to do much damage, as would also be the case if the long fleet had several vessels astern of these."It is because of the principle here illustrated that the constant effort of competent flag-officers is to reduce the distance between the units of their fleets to the minimum that can be maintained with safety under battle conditions—that is, while steaming at full speed, without the aid of stadimeters, sextants, and other appliances that should be used only for preliminary drills."Doubtless some flag-officers, by constant competitive exercises in man[oe]uvring, may succeed in attaining an interval between ships that is less by 15 or 20 per cent. than that attained by others; but manifestly there is hardly any possibility of much greater improvement in this respect, because the minimum practical interval between ships depends upon their lengths and man[oe]uvring qualities. For example, the German interval is 300 metres from centre to centre, while larger ships, say 400 feet long, require about 400 yards, and thosebetween 450 and 500 feet in length require about 450 yards."If we accept Captain Mahan's advice and build comparatively small, low-speed battleships, while our possible enemies build large, swift, all-big-gun ships, it seems clear that we will sacrifice the enormous advantages of fleet compactness and flexibility, the superior effect of heavy-gun fire and the ability to concentrate our fire—the loss of these advantages to be fully realised twenty-five years hence, when our enemies have fleets of big ships while we still have those of our present size."

"This is putting an extreme case, but it shows:

"1. That the short fleet, being about half the length of the other one, can complete certainimportant man[oe]uvres in about one-half the time and one half the space required for similar man[oe]uvres of the long fleet.

"2. That, when ranged alongside each other, the defeat of the long fleet is inevitable, since the rapidity of hitting of the individual units is assumed to be equal, and each of the four leading ships of the long fleet receives about twice as many hits as she can return, though the eighth ship of the short fleet would suffer a preponderance of gun-fire from the fifth or sixth vessel of the long fleet, the seventh and eighth being too far astern to do much damage, as would also be the case if the long fleet had several vessels astern of these.

"It is because of the principle here illustrated that the constant effort of competent flag-officers is to reduce the distance between the units of their fleets to the minimum that can be maintained with safety under battle conditions—that is, while steaming at full speed, without the aid of stadimeters, sextants, and other appliances that should be used only for preliminary drills.

"Doubtless some flag-officers, by constant competitive exercises in man[oe]uvring, may succeed in attaining an interval between ships that is less by 15 or 20 per cent. than that attained by others; but manifestly there is hardly any possibility of much greater improvement in this respect, because the minimum practical interval between ships depends upon their lengths and man[oe]uvring qualities. For example, the German interval is 300 metres from centre to centre, while larger ships, say 400 feet long, require about 400 yards, and thosebetween 450 and 500 feet in length require about 450 yards.

"If we accept Captain Mahan's advice and build comparatively small, low-speed battleships, while our possible enemies build large, swift, all-big-gun ships, it seems clear that we will sacrifice the enormous advantages of fleet compactness and flexibility, the superior effect of heavy-gun fire and the ability to concentrate our fire—the loss of these advantages to be fully realised twenty-five years hence, when our enemies have fleets of big ships while we still have those of our present size."

Finally, this officer added:

"If it be claimed that it would be better to reduce the speed of the large vessel to sixteen knots and put the weight saved into guns, it may be replied that the heavy turret guns cannot be mounted to advantage (so as to increase the hitting capacity of the vessel) without very considerably increasing the size of the ship, because the number of heavy turrets that can be placed to advantage is governed largely by the length of the ship—which increases slowly with the displacement. This point is fully discussed in a recent article in a German publication. I do not remember the displacement used by the author to illustrate the principle, but, supposing the ones quoted below to be correct, he shows that if it requires a displacement of 20,000 tons to obtain a broadside fire of, say, eight 12-inch turret guns, you could not advantageously mount any additional turrets on 21,000 or 22,000 tons, but would have to go to 25,000 or 26,000tons to obtain the necessary space. And, conversely, if you design a 20,000-ton battleship for sixteen instead of twenty knots, you cannot utilise the weight saved to increase the gun-power by adding 12-inch turrets, as you could by adding a number of intermediate guns."It is now hardly necessary to state that adding superimposed turrets (by which the number of guns could be doubled, if the weights permitted) does not materially increase the hitting capacity of the ship as a whole, because of the 'interference' caused by having four guns in one two-story turret, while it decreases her defensive power by adding to the vertical height of her vital targets."Captain Mahan characterizes the sudden inclination in all navies to increase the size of the new battleships (from about 15,000 to about 20,000 tons) as a 'wilful premature antiquating of good vessels' ... 'a growing and wanton evil.' If these words are intended in their true meaning, the statement is to me incomprehensible. I can understand an individual being wilful and wanton, but I cannot believe that the naval officers of the world could, without good cause, be suddenly and uniformly inspired in this manner. On the contrary, it seems to me that the mere fact of there being a common demand for such large vessels is conclusive evidence that there must be a common cause that is believed to justify the demand."This common cause is undoubtedly a common belief that the same amount of money expended for large war vessels will add more to a nation's naval power than the same amount expended forsmall vessels, for it cannot reasonably be assumed that the tax-ridden nations of Europe expend their great naval budgets wilfully and wantonly. Undoubtedly each nation earnestly strives to expend these sums as to derive the greatest increase of naval power. The same is true in reference to their armies. As the mechanical arts improve each nation endeavours to improve its war material. When a nation adopts new rifles, it is not a wilful premature antiquating of several million excellent ones, it is a case offorce majeure—it must adopt them or suffer a relative loss of military efficiency, and it must make no mistake as to the relative efficiency of its weapons. In 1870 the French suffered a humiliating defeat as a direct result of the colossal conceit which rendered them incapable of accepting conclusive evidence that the German field artillery was greatly superior to theirs."The same law—that of necessity—governs the evolution of battleships. As might have been expected, this evolution has, as a rule, been gradual as regards increased displacement. The exception is the sudden recent increase (4,000 to 5,000 tons) in displacement. This exception therefore needs explanation.... It was due to a complete change of opinion as to thehitting capacityof guns of various calibres. This is now well understood by all officers who have recently been intimately associated with the new methods of gunnery training. These methods have demonstrated this point in such a manner as to leave no doubt in our minds as to the correctness of our conclusions. The rapidity of hitting of the heaviest guns has been increased severalthousand per cent., and that of smaller guns about in proportion to their calibre." ... The inception of the epoch-making principles of the new methods of training belongs exclusively to Captain (now Rear-Admiral) Percy Scott, Director of Naval Practice of the British Navy, who has, I believe, done more in this respect to improve naval marksmanship than all of the naval officers who have given their attention to this matter since the first introduction of the rifled cannon on men-of-war; nor should we forget that this degree of improvement was rendered possible by the introduction of telescope sights, the successful application of which to naval guns was made by Commander B.A. Fiske, U.S. Navy, as early as 1892. As soon as the above facts gained general acceptance in Great Britain and the United States, the evolution of the all-big-gun one-calibre battleship became a foregone conclusion; and the reason for the great increase in displacement, as I understand it, is simply that you cannot build an efficient ship of this class on less than about 20,000 tons, because you cannot mount more than two 12-inch turrets to advantage upon a battleship of much less displacement, because the length and breadth are not sufficient."

"It is now hardly necessary to state that adding superimposed turrets (by which the number of guns could be doubled, if the weights permitted) does not materially increase the hitting capacity of the ship as a whole, because of the 'interference' caused by having four guns in one two-story turret, while it decreases her defensive power by adding to the vertical height of her vital targets.

"Captain Mahan characterizes the sudden inclination in all navies to increase the size of the new battleships (from about 15,000 to about 20,000 tons) as a 'wilful premature antiquating of good vessels' ... 'a growing and wanton evil.' If these words are intended in their true meaning, the statement is to me incomprehensible. I can understand an individual being wilful and wanton, but I cannot believe that the naval officers of the world could, without good cause, be suddenly and uniformly inspired in this manner. On the contrary, it seems to me that the mere fact of there being a common demand for such large vessels is conclusive evidence that there must be a common cause that is believed to justify the demand.

"This common cause is undoubtedly a common belief that the same amount of money expended for large war vessels will add more to a nation's naval power than the same amount expended forsmall vessels, for it cannot reasonably be assumed that the tax-ridden nations of Europe expend their great naval budgets wilfully and wantonly. Undoubtedly each nation earnestly strives to expend these sums as to derive the greatest increase of naval power. The same is true in reference to their armies. As the mechanical arts improve each nation endeavours to improve its war material. When a nation adopts new rifles, it is not a wilful premature antiquating of several million excellent ones, it is a case offorce majeure—it must adopt them or suffer a relative loss of military efficiency, and it must make no mistake as to the relative efficiency of its weapons. In 1870 the French suffered a humiliating defeat as a direct result of the colossal conceit which rendered them incapable of accepting conclusive evidence that the German field artillery was greatly superior to theirs.

"The same law—that of necessity—governs the evolution of battleships. As might have been expected, this evolution has, as a rule, been gradual as regards increased displacement. The exception is the sudden recent increase (4,000 to 5,000 tons) in displacement. This exception therefore needs explanation.... It was due to a complete change of opinion as to thehitting capacityof guns of various calibres. This is now well understood by all officers who have recently been intimately associated with the new methods of gunnery training. These methods have demonstrated this point in such a manner as to leave no doubt in our minds as to the correctness of our conclusions. The rapidity of hitting of the heaviest guns has been increased severalthousand per cent., and that of smaller guns about in proportion to their calibre.

" ... The inception of the epoch-making principles of the new methods of training belongs exclusively to Captain (now Rear-Admiral) Percy Scott, Director of Naval Practice of the British Navy, who has, I believe, done more in this respect to improve naval marksmanship than all of the naval officers who have given their attention to this matter since the first introduction of the rifled cannon on men-of-war; nor should we forget that this degree of improvement was rendered possible by the introduction of telescope sights, the successful application of which to naval guns was made by Commander B.A. Fiske, U.S. Navy, as early as 1892. As soon as the above facts gained general acceptance in Great Britain and the United States, the evolution of the all-big-gun one-calibre battleship became a foregone conclusion; and the reason for the great increase in displacement, as I understand it, is simply that you cannot build an efficient ship of this class on less than about 20,000 tons, because you cannot mount more than two 12-inch turrets to advantage upon a battleship of much less displacement, because the length and breadth are not sufficient."

The Dreadnought design and all that it meant threw the German Admiralty into confusion. At the moment they were still engaged in the construction of the vessels of the Deutschland class, of about 13,000 tons, in which primary importance was given to the secondary gun—fourteen 6·7-inch weapons—to the sacrifice of the big gun—four 11-inch pieces—andspeed; whereas the new British design ignored the secondary gun in order to mount no fewer than ten big guns, and develop the speed to the extent of three or four knots above battleships then building. Before theDreadnoughtof the British programme of 1905 had been laid down at Portsmouth, two German battleships of the familiar design with mixed armament had been begun—theSchleswig Holsteinin the Germania Yard and theSchlesienat Dantzic. So completely were the German authorities unprepared for the revolution initiated by the British Admiralty, that from the summer of 1905 until July, 1907, the keel of not a single further battleship was laid in Germany. In the meantime, while British yards were busy with vessels of the new type, the design of the German ships was reconsidered. After an interval of two years the keels of two vessels of theDreadnoughttype were laid down, and two more keels were placed in position a month later—that is, in August, 1907. These four ships—the Nassau class—inaugurated the Dreadnought policy in Germany. Two were completed in May, 1910, and two in September following.

These ships embody the all-big-gun principle in association with a powerful secondary armament, consisting of a dozen 5·9-inch guns and sixteen 24-pounders. Moreover, whereas the British Dreadnought had been provided with only ten big guns, which was held by the British gunnery experts to be the maximum number which could be carried with advantage on the displacement then considered advisable, the German vessels were given twelve guns, not of the 12-inch but of the 11-inch type. Each of these ships displaces 18,600 tons, and has a nominal speed of twenty knots. Their normal coalcapacity is 885 tons, with a maximum storage of 2,655 tons. On the other hand, the early BritishDreadnought, with about the same displacement and coal-carrying capacity, attained a speed of one or two knots more, owing to the use of turbines in place of reciprocating engines. The contrast between the armour and armament of the British and German ships, comparing the four Nassaus of the German Fleet[14]with the Superb class of the British Navy, is given in the table on p. 129.

By energetic action the British Admiralty had obtained a lead in the new type of battleship.[15]Moreover, even after the character of the Dreadnought became known, the German authorities remained ignorant of the fact that the "armoured cruisers" of the Invincible class were really swift battleships carrying the same type of battle gun as theDreadnought, in association with a speed exceeding twenty-five knots, and an armour belt not inferior to that placed on the latest pre-Dreadnought German battleships. By this decisive move, the British authorities had depressed the value of all mixed armament battleships, in which the British Fleet was becoming weak in face of foreign—and particularly German—rivalry, and had started the competition of armaments on an entirely new basis upon terms of advantage.

No sooner was the true inwardness of the Dreadnought policy realized than the German authorities began the preparation of a new German Navy Act. It was eventually decided that the best

means of accomplishing the end in view—namely, the construction of a larger number of ships of the armoured classes in the next few years than was provided in the Act of 1900, was to reduce the nominal effective age, and legislate for the replacement of allbattleships and large cruisers within twenty years. Accordingly, attached to the new Act passed early in 1908, which was over two years after the laying down of the Dreadnought, was a schedule setting forth that four large armoured ships should be laid down annually between 1908 and 1911, both inclusive, and that in 1911 onwards to 1917, two keels annually should be placed in position. By means of this single clause measure, which became law on April 6th, 1908, the construction of ships of the Dreadnought type was accelerated, and whereas the British Admiralty had definitely abandoned the construction of large cruisers of the armoured class—as the German authorities knew by this time—the Marine Office decided that each of the "large cruisers" specified in the Act of 1900 should be swift Dreadnoughts.

This point is an important one. Between 1897 and 1904, Great Britain laid down 27 battleships and 35 armoured cruisers—a total of 62 armoured ships in eight years, or an average of 7·75 ships a year. In this period Germany built 16 battleships and 5 armoured cruisers, or 21 armoured ships—equal to an average of 2·62 ships a year. In 1905 the Admiralty determined to cease building armoured cruisers. In that year they laid down 4 "capital ships"—all of them Dreadnoughts; in the next two years 3 annually, and in 1908, 2 ships only. While the British authorities abandoned the building of armoured cruisers, Germany decided to accelerate her battleship construction, and she also decided that all the "large cruisers" specified in her Law should be swift Dreadnoughts, and thus from 38 battleships and 20 armoured cruisers, she rose to an establishment of 58 battleships.

At the end of 1911, when it was imagined that theGerman programme would fall from 4 large ships annually to 2 ships, a new Navy Bill was produced.[16]Incidentally this measure added to the establishment 3 battleships and 2 unarmoured cruisers, and made provision for the construction of a maximum of 72 submarines.

The significance of the successive changes in shipbuilding policy in Germany, reflecting in an ascending scale the naval ambitions of the Marineamt, may be realised from the following summary, showing the establishment of large armoured ships fixed under successive measures:

Under the operation of German naval legislation, it was determined to provide sixty-one large armoured ships of maximum power, all of them less than twenty years old. The Act did not specify the character of the vessels of the various classes to be laid down. It was elastic in this respect. It left to the Marine Office complete freedom in the matter of design; but, on the other hand, it tiedeffectually the hands of the Reichstag, and it could not, except it repealed the Navy Law, reduce in any year the number of keels to be laid down. There could be no reduction in the output of naval material until a new Navy Law had been passed. This is a point which was frequently forgotten in England.

But the notable feature of the Navy Act passed by the Reichstag in 1912 was not the additions to the shipbuilding programme, though these were notable, but the steps taken to increase the instant readiness of the fleet for war. Prior to the passage of this measure it had been the practice in the British Navy to maintain only about half the men-of-war of various classes on a war footing, relegating the remainder to reserves representing various stages of preparedness for action. The German Navy Act of 1912 set up an entirely new standard with a view to obtaining the maximum advantage from a conscript service, where the pay is low, in competition with a voluntary service, such as obtains in the British Fleet, with very much higher rates of pay. In the speech which he delivered in Committee in the House of Commons on July 22nd, 1912, Mr. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, gave a lucid explanation of the essential features of this German Navy Act. He said:

"The main feature of that Law is not the increase in the new construction of capital ships, though that is an important feature. The main feature is the increase in the striking force of ships of all classes which will be available, immediately available, at all seasons of the year. A third squadron of 8 battleships will be created and maintained in full commission aspart of the active battle-fleet. Whereas, according to the unamended Law, the active battle-fleet consisted of 17 battleships, 4 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 12 small cruisers; in the near future that active fleet will consist of 25 battleships, 8 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 18 small cruisers; and, whereas at present owing to the system of recruitment which prevails in Germany, the German Fleet is less fully mobile during the winter than during the summer months, it will, through the operation of this Law, not only be increased in strength, but rendered much more readily available."Ninety-nine torpedo-boat destroyers—or torpedo-boats, as they are called in Germany—instead of 66, will be maintained in full commission out of a total of 144. Three-quarters of a million pounds had already been taken in the general estimate for the year for the building of submarines. The new Law adds a quarter of a million to this, and that is a provision which, so far as we can judge from a study of the finances, would appear to be repeated in subsequent years. Seventy-two new submarines will be built within the currency of the Law, and of those it is apparently proposed to maintain fifty-four with full permanent crews."Taking a general view, the effect of this Law will be that nearly four-fifths of the entire German Navy will be maintained in full permanent commission—that is to say, instantly and constantly ready for war. Such a proportion is remarkable, and so far as I am aware, finds no example in the previous practice of modern naval Powers. So great a change and development in the GermanFleet involves, of course, important additions to their personnel. In 1898 the officers and men of the German Navy amounted to 25,000. To-day that figure has reached 66,000."Under the previous Laws and various amendments which have preceded this one, the Germans have been working up to a total in 1920, according to our calculations, of 86,500 officers and men, and they have been approaching that total by increments of, approximately, an addition of 3,500 a year. The new law adds a total of 15,000 officers and men, and makes the total in 1920 of 101,500.[17]The new average annual addition is calculated to be 1,680 of all ranks, but for the next three years by special provision 500 extra are to be added. From 1912 to 1914 500 are to be added, and in the last three years of the currency of the Law 500 less will be taken. This makes a total rate of increase of the German Navy personnel of about 5,700 men a year."The new construction under the Law prescribes for the building of three additional battleships—one to be begun next year (1913), one in 1916, and two small cruisers of which the date has not yet been fixed. The date of the third battleship has not been fixed. It has been presumed to be later than the six years which we have in view."The cost of these increases in men and in material during the next six years is estimated as £10,500,000 above the previous estimatesspread over that period. I should like to point out to the Committee that this is a cumulative increase which follows upon other increases of a very important character. The Law of 1898 was practically doubled by the Law of 1900, and if the expenditure contemplated by the Law of 1900 had been followed the German estimates of to-day would be about £11,000,000. But owing to the amendments of 1906 and 1908, and now of 1912, that expenditure is very nearly £23,000,000. But the fact that the personnel plays such a large part in this new amendment, and that personnel is more cheaply obtained in Germany than in this country, makes the money go farther there than it would do over here."The ultimate scale of the new German Fleet, as contemplated by the latest Navy Law, will be 41 battleships, 20 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 40 small cruisers, besides a proper proportion—an ample proportion—of flotillas of torpedo-boat destroyers and submarines, by 1920. This is not on paper a great advance on the figures prescribed by the previous Law, which gave 38 battleships, 20 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 38 small cruisers. That is not a great advance on the total scale. In fact, however, there is a remarkable expansion of strength and efficiency, and particularly of strength and efficiency as they contribute to striking power. The number of battleships and large armoured cruisers alone which will be kept constantly ready and in full commission will be raised by the Law from twenty-one, the present figure, to thirty-three—that is to say, an addition of twelve, or an increase of about57 per cent. The new fleet will in the beginning include about twenty battleships and large cruisers of the older types, but gradually, as new vessels are built, the fighting power of the fleet will rise until in the end it will consist completely of modern vessels."This new scale of the German Fleet—organized in five battle squadrons, each attended by a battle or armoured cruiser squadron, complete with small cruisers and auxiliaries of all kinds, and accompanied by numerous flotillas of destroyers and submarines, more than three-fourths—nearly four-fifths, maintained in full permanent commission—the aspect and scale of this fleet is, I say, extremely formidable. Such a fleet will be about as numerous to look at as the fleet which was gathered at Spithead for the recent Parliamentary visit, but, of course, when completed it will be far superior in actual strength. This full development will only be realized step by step. But already in 1914 two squadrons will, so far as we can ascertain, be entirely composed of Dreadnoughts, or what are called Dreadnoughts, and the third will be made up of good ships like the Deutschlands and the Braunschweigs,[18]together with five Dreadnought battle-cruisers. It remains to be noted that this new Law is the fifth in fourteen years of the large successive increases made in German naval strength, that it encountered no effective opposition in its passage through the Reichstag, and that, though it has been severely criticized in Germany since its passage,the criticisms have been directed towards its inadequacy."

"Ninety-nine torpedo-boat destroyers—or torpedo-boats, as they are called in Germany—instead of 66, will be maintained in full commission out of a total of 144. Three-quarters of a million pounds had already been taken in the general estimate for the year for the building of submarines. The new Law adds a quarter of a million to this, and that is a provision which, so far as we can judge from a study of the finances, would appear to be repeated in subsequent years. Seventy-two new submarines will be built within the currency of the Law, and of those it is apparently proposed to maintain fifty-four with full permanent crews.

"Taking a general view, the effect of this Law will be that nearly four-fifths of the entire German Navy will be maintained in full permanent commission—that is to say, instantly and constantly ready for war. Such a proportion is remarkable, and so far as I am aware, finds no example in the previous practice of modern naval Powers. So great a change and development in the GermanFleet involves, of course, important additions to their personnel. In 1898 the officers and men of the German Navy amounted to 25,000. To-day that figure has reached 66,000.

"Under the previous Laws and various amendments which have preceded this one, the Germans have been working up to a total in 1920, according to our calculations, of 86,500 officers and men, and they have been approaching that total by increments of, approximately, an addition of 3,500 a year. The new law adds a total of 15,000 officers and men, and makes the total in 1920 of 101,500.[17]The new average annual addition is calculated to be 1,680 of all ranks, but for the next three years by special provision 500 extra are to be added. From 1912 to 1914 500 are to be added, and in the last three years of the currency of the Law 500 less will be taken. This makes a total rate of increase of the German Navy personnel of about 5,700 men a year.

"The new construction under the Law prescribes for the building of three additional battleships—one to be begun next year (1913), one in 1916, and two small cruisers of which the date has not yet been fixed. The date of the third battleship has not been fixed. It has been presumed to be later than the six years which we have in view.

"The cost of these increases in men and in material during the next six years is estimated as £10,500,000 above the previous estimatesspread over that period. I should like to point out to the Committee that this is a cumulative increase which follows upon other increases of a very important character. The Law of 1898 was practically doubled by the Law of 1900, and if the expenditure contemplated by the Law of 1900 had been followed the German estimates of to-day would be about £11,000,000. But owing to the amendments of 1906 and 1908, and now of 1912, that expenditure is very nearly £23,000,000. But the fact that the personnel plays such a large part in this new amendment, and that personnel is more cheaply obtained in Germany than in this country, makes the money go farther there than it would do over here.

"The ultimate scale of the new German Fleet, as contemplated by the latest Navy Law, will be 41 battleships, 20 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 40 small cruisers, besides a proper proportion—an ample proportion—of flotillas of torpedo-boat destroyers and submarines, by 1920. This is not on paper a great advance on the figures prescribed by the previous Law, which gave 38 battleships, 20 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 38 small cruisers. That is not a great advance on the total scale. In fact, however, there is a remarkable expansion of strength and efficiency, and particularly of strength and efficiency as they contribute to striking power. The number of battleships and large armoured cruisers alone which will be kept constantly ready and in full commission will be raised by the Law from twenty-one, the present figure, to thirty-three—that is to say, an addition of twelve, or an increase of about57 per cent. The new fleet will in the beginning include about twenty battleships and large cruisers of the older types, but gradually, as new vessels are built, the fighting power of the fleet will rise until in the end it will consist completely of modern vessels.

"This new scale of the German Fleet—organized in five battle squadrons, each attended by a battle or armoured cruiser squadron, complete with small cruisers and auxiliaries of all kinds, and accompanied by numerous flotillas of destroyers and submarines, more than three-fourths—nearly four-fifths, maintained in full permanent commission—the aspect and scale of this fleet is, I say, extremely formidable. Such a fleet will be about as numerous to look at as the fleet which was gathered at Spithead for the recent Parliamentary visit, but, of course, when completed it will be far superior in actual strength. This full development will only be realized step by step. But already in 1914 two squadrons will, so far as we can ascertain, be entirely composed of Dreadnoughts, or what are called Dreadnoughts, and the third will be made up of good ships like the Deutschlands and the Braunschweigs,[18]together with five Dreadnought battle-cruisers. It remains to be noted that this new Law is the fifth in fourteen years of the large successive increases made in German naval strength, that it encountered no effective opposition in its passage through the Reichstag, and that, though it has been severely criticized in Germany since its passage,the criticisms have been directed towards its inadequacy."

Such is the evolution which German naval ambitions have undergone since the Reichstag in the early years of the Emperor's reign refused to believe that four relatively small battleships in full commission, with the same number of ineffective coast-defence ships of small size, did not represent the maximum naval power which Germany need provide, and that an expenditure of two and three-quarter millions sterling was not sufficient burden to impose annually upon the Teutonic peoples over and above the cost in money and service of the predominant army.

Nothing reveals the statesmanship of Admiral von Tirpitz so strikingly as the character of the naval legislation for which he has been responsible, and the manner in which he has bent every influence in Germany and every occurrence abroad to promote his ends. Prior to the introduction of the Navy Act of 1898, the only example of a continuous naval policy was the Naval Defence Act of 1889, under which seventy ships of various types were added to the British Navy during a period of four years. Of these vessels only ten were of the armoured classes. This measure was confined to shipbuilding, and it made no provision for increasing the personnel or for setting up a fixed standard of commissioning. It merely provided a certain number of ships and left it to Parliament to provide or not to provide crews with which to man them, and, as a matter of fact, Parliament did not provide the necessary officers and men until long after the ships were at sea. Admiral von Tirpitz was not satisfied with so unmethodical and unstatesman-like a measure of procedure when he went to theMarineamt in 1897. He presented to the Reichstag a complete scheme of naval expansion, making provision not only for the construction of ships in specified numbers over a period of six years, but providing also for the due expansion of the personnel and for the attainment of a fixed establishment of ships first in full commission, secondly with nucleus crews, and thirdly in reserve. In obtaining the assent of the Reichstag to this measure, which to a great extent removed the naval expansion movement from the control which it had hitherto exercised annually on the presentation of the Estimates, the Minister of Marine achieved his first great triumph.

This Act was to have remained in operation for a period of six years, and was represented as an embodiment of German needs, quite independent of the naval preparations then being made by other Powers. During the next two years no development occurred in the naval programmes either of Great Britain or other foreign countries, but an Anglophobe wave passed over the Continent as a result of the South African War. German sympathies in particular were aroused, and Admiral von Tirpitz at once seized the opportunity to repeal the fixed and immutable Fleet Law of 1898, and to replace it by a new enactment providing a Battle Fleet of roughly twice the strength of that legalized in the establishment of the former measure. This measure was to have remained in force until 1917. Six years later—a Liberal Government, intent on disarmament, having assumed office in the United Kingdom—an amendment representing another expansion was passed; two years after that the fourth Fleet Law became operative, and in 1912 another measure was adopted by the Reichstag under the influence of a renewed Anglophobe movement in Germany. Experience has shown that German Fleet Laws are regarded as immutable and fixed when proposals in the direction of a limitation of armaments are made, but as flexible as though no Fleet Law existed when political circumstances are favourable for making a further effort towards a higher standard of naval power.

Nor does this study exhaust the remarkable features of this naval legislation. An ordinary statesman, ignorant of naval matters, might have so framed the successive Naval Laws as seriously to tie the hands of the naval authorities in the development of the fleet, whereas Admiral von Tirpitz, with great skill, restricted the powers of interference on the part of the Reichstag, while leaving the Marine Office with almost complete freedom in shaping the naval machine in the process of expansion. This double end was achieved by the use of generic naval terms in the loose manner adopted by those unfamiliar with their significance. Admiral von Tirpitz made up his "paper" establishment in the Fleet Laws by styling every ship of slow speed but carrying an armoured belt "a battleship," and then, under the terms of the Law, he made provision for these dummy vessels to be replaced by veritable battleships of maximum power. Thus ships of 4,000 tons displacement have been replaced by Dreadnoughts of 25,000 tons, carrying the heaviest guns, and protected by thick armour. The establishment fixed by the Reichstag has not been exceeded, but by a simple process of conjuring, small coast-defence ships have been quietly converted into first class sea-going battleships, ranking in strategical and tactical qualities with the most formidable ships in the British Fleet. The naval authorities have bythis means been able to prove to the uninitiated when challenged that they have kept within the four corners of the Law, that the number of battleships has remained fixed according to the establishment between the periods of each enactment, and at the same time they have been in a position to follow an active shipbuilding policy, while raising from year to year the necessary personnel for manning the new vessels. This in another notable feature of Admiral von Tirpitz's policy. The legislation has been so elastic as to enable him to raise the necessary number of officers and men to suit the requirements of the Fleet. When a Dreadnought, requiring 1,106 officers and men, has been completed for sea to take the place of a ship of the Hagen class, with a crew of only 306, the additional personnel has been instantly ready.

The same process has been adopted in increasing the cruiser squadrons of the German Navy. The Law has specified that a certain number of "large cruisers" shall be built, and it has been left to the discretion of the naval authorities to interpret this elastic term in tons, guns, armour, knots of speed, and personnel. In accordance with the Law, Admiral von Tirpitz has thus been able to replace cruisers of negligible fighting value and of small size by Dreadnought battle cruisers mounting guns of immense power and attaining speeds hitherto without precedent. Similarly, small torpedo-boats have given way in the establishment of the Navy to torpedo-boat destroyers of large size, and step by step the naval strength of Germany has been increased by a process, the cleverness and ingenuity of which even the German people themselves have not realized.

Germany has immensely increased her resources ofships and men, but she has done more than that: she has forced other Powers to organize and train their squadrons on a standard of efficiency never attempted in the past. She has increased the strain and stress of peace until it resembles closely the actual conditions of war, and having determined year in and year out to keep nearly four-fifths of her fleet always on a war footing, always instantly ready for action, she has compelled other countries, in accordance with the dictates of ordinary foresight, to take similar action, however onerous the financial burden. It is on Great Britain and the United States that the weight of this burden has borne most heavily, for in those States alone is reliance placed on a voluntary system of manning, which is necessarily very costly.

FOOTNOTES:[8]It is interesting to note, however, that even at this early date the German Admiralty made provision for the storage of oil in order to supplement the coal supply.[9]Cf.Appendix I.[10]The five later ships were given a belt with a thickness of 9·4 inches amidships, but otherwise their protection and armament closely resembled those laid down at an earlier date.[11]See Appendix II.[12]One of these "armoured cruisers" was not built.[13]It has since become known that the Americans had designed an all-big-gun ship before the British Dreadnought was laid down.[14]British naval opinion held from the first that these ships of the Nassau type vitiated the Dreadnought principle of simplicity of armament, and were so over-gunned as to be ineffective units. Sea-service has tended to confirm this view.[15]In the three succeeding years, in accordance with the British Government's policy of a limitation of naval armaments, and as an example to other Powers, this advantage was partially lost, and hence the large programme of 1909-10.[16]Cf.Appendix II.[17]In his speech in the House of Commons on March 26th, 1913, the First Lord corrected this figure. He stated that the maximum to be attained under the new Fleet Law in 1920 was 107,000, apart from reserves.[18]These two groups of ships are of practically the same design.

FOOTNOTES:

[8]It is interesting to note, however, that even at this early date the German Admiralty made provision for the storage of oil in order to supplement the coal supply.

[9]Cf.Appendix I.

[10]The five later ships were given a belt with a thickness of 9·4 inches amidships, but otherwise their protection and armament closely resembled those laid down at an earlier date.

[11]See Appendix II.

[12]One of these "armoured cruisers" was not built.

[13]It has since become known that the Americans had designed an all-big-gun ship before the British Dreadnought was laid down.

[14]British naval opinion held from the first that these ships of the Nassau type vitiated the Dreadnought principle of simplicity of armament, and were so over-gunned as to be ineffective units. Sea-service has tended to confirm this view.

[15]In the three succeeding years, in accordance with the British Government's policy of a limitation of naval armaments, and as an example to other Powers, this advantage was partially lost, and hence the large programme of 1909-10.

[16]Cf.Appendix II.

[17]In his speech in the House of Commons on March 26th, 1913, the First Lord corrected this figure. He stated that the maximum to be attained under the new Fleet Law in 1920 was 107,000, apart from reserves.

[18]These two groups of ships are of practically the same design.

CHAPTER VI

German Ships, Officers, and Men

In material, in the art of constructing and equipping ships of war, Germany at the beginning of the war ranked far above most of the Great Powers, and she was little, if anything, behind even Great Britain in workmanship, rapidity and cheapness. Her personnel also stood high, for she had succeeded in translating into naval terms the professional and disciplinary codes which have raised the German Army to a position of pre-eminence. Above all she had succeeded, in a degree never before attempted by any country, in keeping ships and men in constant association. The German naval authorities recognized that, while a conscriptive system of manning a fleet brings into the organization certain grave and ineradicable disadvantages, it did at least enable large numbers of officers and men to be borne for service at a relatively small annual cost. Realising this economic benefit of conscription, the Marineamt had no hesitation in increasing its personnel rapidly from year to year. The expansion of this element of naval power kept pace with the activity of the shipyards. This policy of simultaneous increase of ships and of men, accompanied as it was by the expansion of her shipbuilding and allied industries and of her dockyards, has been the secret of the rapid rise of Germany as a maritime Power wielding world-wide influence.

Within the memory of the present generation German ships of war, if not built in England, were constructed in Germany with materials obtained entirely or in part from England. Her earliest armoured ships of any account—theDeutschland, theKaiserand theKonig Wilhelm—were all constructed on the banks of the Thames at the old Samuda Yard. The great industry which Germany and other foreign nations helped to support is now dead, and on the other side of the North Sea is to be seen an activity more intense and on a far larger scale than the Thames establishments could boast even in the day of their greatest prosperity.

Though there are many shipbuilding yards and engine-making establishments in Germany, the naval authorities depend exclusively upon the vast establishment of Krupp for armour and guns, and the repute of the firm in both respects stands high. The vast establishment which supplies the German and many other Governments was founded in 1810 by Friedrich Krupp, who bought a small forge and devoted himself, with little commercial success, to the manufacture of cast steel. In this he was ahead of Germany's requirements, but on the basis thus laid by the father, the son built; and in 1851 a solid steel ingot which he exhibited at the Great Exhibition in London completely took the metallurgic world by surprise, and his fortune was made. He turned his energy and knowledge to the making of guns, armour, weldless steel rails, and other manufactures; and the modest works at Essen continued to expand until to-day they and the associated establishments give employment to about 70,000 men, not all of whom, of course, always are engaged on the manipulation of armaments.

For many years the Krupp process of armour manufacture was adopted in every country of the world, but later on the British Admiralty, it is common knowledge, adopted a superior process which produces a plate of greater resisting power, and the German cemented type of armour no longer holds the premier position which it occupied when its advantages over the Harvey plate were demonstrated. On the other hand, the Krupp firm still claim that their ordnance is not equalled by any in the world, and on the strength of this claim they have obtained most valuable orders, extending over a long series of years, from foreign Governments. British guns are made on the wire-wound system—that is, steel ribbon is wound under great pressure round the gun, and over this is placed an outer hoop; Krupp's, on the other hand, still remain faithful to the solid steel tube to resist the gas pressures exerted, arguing that their method of steel manufacture enables them to submit it to strains which other steel might not stand. There has been endless controversy as to the merits of the two systems; and the subject was again discussed as recently as the end of 1912, when the Italian Minister of Marine laid a report before the Italian Parliament with reference to the armaments of the principal fleets. According to this statement the British, Italian, and Japanese are the only Navies to mount wire-wound guns; the probable life of the Italian and Japanese 12-inch guns was given at 80 rounds, whereas the English gun was good for only 60 rounds. On the other hand, the Austrian and German guns were given from 200 to 220 rounds, and the American 14-inch gun was estimated to have a probable life of 150 rounds. Particulars with reference to British and German guns were given as follows:

The attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty was directed to these statements in the House of Commons, and he reiterated the assurance of former Ministers that the expert advisers were satisfied as to the wisdom of retaining the wire-wound system. He gave no data as to the foundation of this confidence, and in the German technical Press—no doubt with an eye to foreign orders—the superiority of the German gun over the British was repeated with at least equal assurance.

The great advantage of the wire-wound system, it has always been claimed, is that after much use, when the rifling is worn, the gun can be given a new inner tube, a comparatively simple and cheap operation which results in practically a new gun being made available for sea service in a short time. All that can be said as to the two systems from practical experience is that the Japanese found the British-made weapons give eminently satisfactory results during the war with Russia, while the Krupp artillery guns used by the Turkish Army in the Balkan War of 1912 did not realize expectations.

Probably in naval material—in ships, their armour, armament, and engineering equipment—there is little difference as between the leading navies. One may be thought to have an advantage in some particular respect, but this may possibly be counterbalanced by the rival's superiority in another. Generally, the British ships mount fewer guns but of larger calibre, and to the experienced eye they look very workman-like; while the German ships carry smaller guns in greater number and have a crowded appearance which does not appeal to British naval opinion in its desire for simplicity of design and plenty of working room. Virtually, all the instruments for exerting naval power as they exist to-day are experimental, based upon the empirical knowledge. When the war between the United States and Spain occurred, it was anticipated that it would throw light upon these problems, but these anticipations were not realized, and even the struggle between Russia and Japan failed to satisfy fully the natural curiosity of the naval constructor and the naval officer owing to the inefficiency with which the Russian ships were handled, and the deplorable slackness of the administration.

It is the fashion to calculate the relative strength of fleets in tons and guns, but the probability is that on the day of trial in a great battle at sea these nice paper computations will be entirely upset by the course of events. Morale, as Napoleon observed, dominates war. This dictum is no less true to-day than it was in the past. Man is still greater than the instruments of his creation, and the experience of war on a grand scale will certainly confirm the teaching of history—that the important element in naval power is men rather than ships. On the eve of the Battle of St. Vincent, when Jervis, in command offifteen ships, was pacing the quarter-deck of his flag-ship and the Spanish Fleet was entering the field of vision, the numbers of the enemy were reported by the Captain of the Fleet to the Commander-in-Chief as they were counted. "There are eight sail of the line, Sir John," "Very well, sir," answered the Admiral. "There are twenty sail of the line, Sir John." "Very well, sir," Jervis responded. "There are twenty-five sail of the line, Sir John." "Very well, sir," the Admiral again replied imperturbably. "There are twenty-seven sail of the line, Sir John," the Captain of the Fleet at length reported, and when he had the temerity to remark on the great disparity between the British and Spanish Fleets, the Admiral, confident in the efficiency of his small fleet, replied: "The die is cast, and if there be fifty sail, I will go through them." We may be sure that the victor of the Battle of St. Vincent, who by stern but wisely directed measures created the fleet which Nelson used with such dramatic effect at Trafalgar, would have scorned and ridiculed an entire reliance on mere paper calculations of guns and tons, realizing that victory or defeat depends mainly upon the personal element and morale.

It is in respect of officers and men that there is the greatest contrast between the British Fleet and the Navies of the Continent of Europe. The British service is organized on a voluntary system, while the Continental fleets are manned mainly by conscripts; the former serve for many years, while the latter for the most part submit to only the short period of duty required by law and then pass into the reserve. In the matter of officers, however, the German Fleet is certainly not worse served than the British Navy; though the cadets begin their training at a somewhat later age, a thoroughly good sea officer is produced.The marked distinction between the two services is that, whereas under the White Ensign special duties are assigned to special classes of officers—gunnery, torpedo, navigation, signalling and physical training—in the German Navy no hard-and-fast lines are drawn. It is held that the British system would entail a larger number of officers than are available on the other side of the North Sea. However this may be, the German authorities can certainly pride themselves upon a corps of executive officers which in many respects is not excelled in any country. As in the British service, special lines of officers are trained for engineering, medical, and accountant duties and these have no executive standing.

The method of training executive officers for the German Fleet differs in some important respects from that which obtains in England. In the British service the cadets, who enter when they are, on the average, thirteen and a half years of age, have not completed their general education, and consequently spend four years at the Naval Colleges at Osborne and Dartmouth respectively before they go afloat in a training ship. The German naval officer receives much the same general education as any other boy before he enters the navy, whereas the British cadet, after entering, is submitted to an educational course specially devised with a view to his future naval career; his studies embrace physical science and practical engineering, and emphasis is laid upon athletics and as much sea experience as can be obtained in small craft. When the four years ashore are completed he goes afloat at about the same age as the average German cadet and makes a six months' cruise. Which is the better system? Who shall say? This is certain, however, that British navalofficers have always held that lads for the sea service cannot be caught, broken in, and inoculated, so to speak, too early.

Throughout the years of naval expansion the German authorities have been struggling to eliminate as far as possible the disadvantages of conscription in its application to naval conditions. The War Department is responsible for putting in force the conscription law, and periodically the navy sends in its requisition, stating the number of recruits who will be needed, and where and when they are to join. The men selected are passed direct into the fleet without preliminary training each October. Under the British system boys are entered at about sixteen years of age, and receive a short training first in one of the shore or stationary sea establishments, and are subsequently drafted into one of the ships of the Training Squadron, thence joining the sea-going fleet. A certain number of youths are also entered at an average age of about seventeen and a half years, and these recruits dispense with the preliminary course, but are also drafted to the Training Squadron before joining the fleet. Nearly all the men of the fleet sign on for twelve years' active service, and the best of these are permitted to re-engage for another ten years in order to earn pensions. A relatively small number of men, not boys, join the British Navy for a term of only five years, with the obligation to remain in the Reserve for seven years. Five years, consequently, is the minimum in the British Navy, and applies to only a relatively small number of men; but three years is the maximum period of German conscripts, and during this time the officers and warrant officers have to do their best to transform the raw material provided by the State into skilled seamen.

It is easy to imagine the difficulties which assail the administration in Germany in these circumstances. Every year one-third of the naval conscripts complete their period of active service and are passed into the Reserve, and their places are taken by an equivalent batch of raw recruits. The result is that in the winter months the officers and petty officers of the fleet are occupied in licking into shape these embryo sailors, and from October until May the fighting ships of the Empire become practically training vessels.

If this were a complete representation of the conditions in the German Fleet its efficiency would be of a low order. The Navy is, however, stiffened by a proportion of conscripts who re-engage voluntarily, and by a certain number of volunteers who enter as boys. These lads engage at ages ranging from fifteen to eighteen years. They agree to undergo an apprenticeship of two years followed by seven years of active fleet service. Volunteers are not trained ashore or in fixed naval establishments as in the United Kingdom, but are drafted to sea-going training ships, which cruise in home waters during the summer months and pass into the Mediterranean during the winter. By these two expedients the German naval authorities have been able to secure about 25 per cent. of the German personnel on what passes in Germany for a long-service system. The boy volunteers and the conscripts who re-engage constitute the class from which petty officers are drawn, and these men are the backbone of the naval organization ashore and afloat, and it is to their efforts that the high standard of efficiency which Germany's Navy has attained may in a large measure be traced.

Year by year, in order to provide crews for the larger number of ships passed into the fleet, theMarine Office has been compelled to increase the number of conscripts required for sea service, and thus the task of training the Navy has been increased in advance of the expansion of the material, because men must begin training before their ships are ready for sea. The officers and petty officers have had not only to train raw recruits embarked to take the place of conscripts at the end of their three years' term, but to find means also of training additional recruits entered as net additions to the naval strength. When it is added that in 1894 the number of officers and men in the Navy was less than 21,000, whereas it is now nearly 80,000, and under the Navy Act of 1912 is to be raised to 107,000, some conception may be formed of the character of the problem which has presented itself, not only to the central administration ashore, but to the officers afloat, intent upon attaining the highest standard of efficiency at sea. Admission of these difficulties was made by Admiral von Tirpitz in the explanatory Memorandum which accompanied the last Navy Bill presented to the Reichstag and which directed attention to "two serious defects" in the organization of the fleet:

"The one defect consists in the fact that in the autumn of every year the time-expired men—i.e.almost one-third of the crew in all ships of the battle fleet, are discharged and replaced mainly by recruits from theinland population. Owing to this, the readiness of the battle fleet for war is considerably impaired for a prolonged period."

When it is recalled that the maritime population of Germany amounts only to 80,000, and that compulsory service in the active fleet lasts for only threeyears, it will be realized that most of the recruits taken for the German Navy must necessarily be landsmen. The personnel in 1914 numbered roughly over 70,000, after deducting from the total the executive officers, engineers, cadets, and accountants. If approximately 17,000 of these are regarded as long-service men there remain roughly 54,000 conscripts, one-third of whom pass annually into the Reserve, and are replaced by raw hands. Under the new Navy Law it was intended to strengthen the personnel in the next few years by 6,400 annually. While the average period of service in the British Navy, including the relatively small number of five years' men entered for short service, is about ten years, the average in the German Fleet does not amount to as much as half this period.

It is possible to attach too much importance to the fact that the German Navy is recruited "mainly by recruits from the inland population." The inherited sea habit counts for less to-day than at any time since men attempted to navigate the seas. Ships of war have become vast complicated boxes of machinery, and naval life requires the exercise of qualities different from those it demanded in the sail era. Then brute courage, endurance, and familiarity with the moods of the sea were the main attributes of sailors, but to-day a large proportion of the crews must be experts in the handling of complicated mechanical appliances. In these changed conditions the compulsory system of education in Germany has proved of the greatest advantage in providing recruits of a high standard of intelligence, who probably acquire in six months as complete a familiarity with their work as it would have taken a seaman of the old school as many years to attain. At the same time, while resistingthe temptation to place too great importance upon the inherited sea habit, it would be no less a mistake to ignore entirely its influence upon naval efficiency. Familiarity breeds contempt for the terrors of the sea and for the horrors of a naval action, and it is reasonable to expect that in the hour of trial the long-service men of the British Navy will exhibit a moral standard when projectiles are falling fast and thick far higher than that of the conscript. A modern Dreadnought is intended to fire its guns in broadsides and not in succession, and when it is borne in mind that at one discharge these guns will deliver on an enemy's ship, if they are fired accurately, between five and six tons of metal, it will be realized that at such a moment the calibre of men will count more than the calibre of guns.

When the Act of 1900 was introduced the Reichstag was informed by Admiral von Tirpitz in a Memorandum that "as, even after the projected increase has been carried out, the number of vessels in the German Navy will still be more or less inferior to that of other individual Great Powers, our endeavours must be directed towards compensating this superiority by the individual training of the crews and by tactical training by practice in larger bodies.... Economy as regards commissioning of vessels in peace time means jeopardizing the efficiency of the fleet in case of war." Never since navies existed have a body of officers and men been worked at higher pressure than those of Germany; drill has never ceased; no effort has been spared to obtain the last ounce of value out of every one on board the ships. The promotion of officers rests with the Emperor, and he is unsparing in his punishment of anything like slackness; an officer who is not enthusiastic, alert,and competent, stands no chance of rising in rank. The German Navy has no use for anything but the best which the Empire can provide, and in order that the highest expression of theesprit de corpswhich has contributed to German influence on shore may be instilled into the Navy, no officer, however influential or brilliant, can enter either the executive or engineering branch unless his claims are endorsed by all his contemporaries; one black ball—if the term may be used—is sufficient to disqualify an aspirant, though he may have passed all the prescribed examinations brilliantly.

The German Fleet has its limitations, but within those limitations it probably has no superior in the world: the ships are well built, the officers are capable sailors, and the men are raised to the highest pitch of efficiency possible under a short-service system.

CHAPTER VII

William II. and his Naval Minister

The German Fleet, as it is to-day, may be regarded as the work of two men—the Emperor William II. and Admiral von Tirpitz.

Even for those who have lived long in Germany, it is difficult to form a judgment as to the aims and motives of the Emperor William's naval policy, and of the part which he has played in its carrying out. With regard to their sovereign, Germans are inclined to fly to one of two extremes; according to the class to which they belong, they represent him either as a heaven-born genius of universal gifts, or as a busybody whose meddlesomeness is rendered specially mischievous by mediæval delusions as to the functions of monarchs and their relations to the Deity. Everything that he does or says is set down as quite right by the one party and as quite wrong by the other. Moreover, the opinions of those brought into closest contact with him are vitiated by the prevalence of a type of sycophancy which is fortunately becoming extinct in other countries.

The patriotic German, who is familiar with his country's history, knows that, five or six hundred years ago, his forefathers monopolized the markets and policed the seas of Northern and Western Europe. He realizes keenly that Germany's maritime and industrial progress was first checked, and thenretarded for centuries, by political division and internecine and foreign wars. Possibly he still remembers that great crescendo of victory in which Prussia smothered Denmark, then overthrew Austria in a single battle, and finally, at the head of the kindred Teutonic States, humbled France in the dust, and welded Germany together in one indivisible whole. Even if he does not remember it as part of his own personal experience, all its vivid and stimulating episodes have been a thousand times impressed upon his mind by schoolmaster, politician, historian, and journalist. That after this tremendous martial achievement he should regard his country as the mistress of the continent of Europe is no matter for surprise. But he sees, too, that the Germany of Luther and Goethe, of Ranke, Liebig, Helmholz, and Mommsen, of Bismarck and Moltke, has become also the Germany of Krupp, Siemens, Rathenau, Ballin, and Gwinner; that the products of German industry, the fruits of an unexampled application of the discoveries of science to the processes of manufacture, have been carried by German ships to the remotest ends of the earth; that the material prosperity of his country has been advancing in every direction by leaps and bounds. And he thus believes Germany to be strong, wise, and wealthy, and in every way fitted to stand at the head of mankind. But in one respect he has felt, to his bitter mortification, that she is powerless. Wherever he goes on the world's oceans, he is confronted by those iron walls of Great Britain, which mean that he is there only by the sufferance of one who is immeasurably stronger than himself.

The German patriot has never realized that no efforts on the part of Germany could materially alterthe balance of sea-power to her advantage as against Great Britain, and that she would be compelled to fight for her pretensions long before she was in a position to give battle on anything like equal terms. He has believed that the British nation is unnerved and effete, that it has lost both its martial and industrial vigour, that its energies have been sapped by too much wealth and prosperity, and that it is rapidly following the downward path. Finally, he is convinced that the British Parliament, under the influence of an aggressive democracy, exclusively concerned with its own immediate material needs, is losing the capacity to realize and grapple with the larger problems of international politics, and that the Cabinets proceeding from it will, in timorous anxiety, procrastinate and vacillate till it is too late to strike. In this idea he has been only confirmed by the pacifist movement in Great Britain, by the British agitation for disarmament by international agreement, and by the well-meant but unfortunate attempt of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman to effect by example what much amiable precept had done nothing to accomplish. These phenomena he has looked upon not as evidence of good-will and peaceableness, but as symptoms of physical, moral, and financial exhaustion.

Such was the view of many in Germany to whom we cannot fairly deny the name of "patriot" if we are to claim it for an analogous disposition among ourselves. It was the view almost universally held by the officers of the German Army and Navy, and, with certain qualifications and reservations, it may be said to have been the view of the Emperor William. This will be evident if, with the help of his many spoken and written utterances, we attempt to followthe main lines which, with many sudden and violent deviations, his thought has taken on this subject. He has, for example, in his speeches repeatedly dwelt on the power and renown of the Hanse League—"one of the mightiest undertakings that the world has ever seen," which "was able to raise fleets such as the broad back of the sea had probably never borne up to that time," which "won such high prestige for the German name abroad," which "created markets for the German industrial regions," and which "only failed because it lacked the support of a strong united Empire obedient to a single will." At Hamburg, in June, 1911, he used these words: "I have only acted historically, for I said to myself on my accession, that the tasks which the Hansa attempted to solve by itself, and which it could not solve because the strong Empire was not at its back, and the defensive and executive power of the Empire did not exist, must unquestionably at once fall on the shoulders of the newly-arisen German Empire; and it was simply the obligations of old traditions that had to be resumed." It was in one former Hanse town that the Emperor spoke the familiar words, "Our future lies on the water"; in another that he declared "The trident should be in our hand"; in a third that he uttered the appeal, "We have bitter need of a strong German Fleet."

Again, he has repeatedly extolled the Great Elector—"the one among my ancestors for whom I have the most enthusiasm, who has from my earliest youth shone before me as a bright example," who, "looking far ahead, carried on politics on a large scale, as they are carried on to-day." In his great speech at Bremen in 1905, the Emperor said: "When as a youth I stood before the model of Brommy's ship, I felt withburning indignation the outrage that was then done to our fleet and our flag"; and these words undoubtedly referred to the injudiciously-phrased note in which Palmerston threatened that vessels which undertook belligerent operations under the colours of that greater German Empire, which then was not and was never to be, would render themselves liable to be treated as "pirates." The present realities of sea-power had been early revealed to him when, as he told the officers on board a British flag-ship in the Mediterranean, he "was running about Portsmouth Dockyard as a boy"; and, as he said in a speech made during the visit of King Edward to Kiel in 1904, "the stupendous activity on the sea at the headquarters of the greatest navy in the world impressed itself indelibly on his youthful mind," and made him, "as Regent, endeavour to realize on a scale corresponding to the conditions of his country what he had seen as a young man in England."

How far the Emperor has helped to realize his own naval ambitions, and how far his efforts have actually told against them, it is very difficult to determine with anything like exactitude. His agitation for a bigger fleet has been open and unwearying, and outside Germany the idea is very prevalent that he not only contrived the naval policy of the Empire, but also, almost single-handed, generated the degree of popular support without which it could not have been carried out. This idea will be seen to be erroneous. The Emperor's influence upon his own people is very greatly overrated in other countries, and even the crisis of 1908, in which the storm of discontent which had long been gathering burst with full force upon his head, does not seem to have been properly understood outside Germany. On that occasion, the ImperialParliament listened without a protest, without a murmur, as a Liberal deputy, slowly, deliberately, and with dramatic emphasis, spoke the following words: "In the German Reichstag not a single member has come forward to defend the actions of the German Emperor." The incident was without a parallel in the history of parliaments. Even the Conservative party, which has always gloried in being the chief prop of the throne, passed and published a resolution expressing the wish that the Emperor should "in future exercise a greater reserve in his utterances," and declaring that "arrangements must be made to prevent with certainty a recurrence of such improper proceedings." It may be remarked, in passing, that this blow fell upon William II. because he had confessed to having had Anglophile sentiments, and to having performed friendly services to Great Britain, at a time when the general feeling of the German people was one of hostility to this country. Nor was it without significance that when, after holding aloof from public affairs for several weeks, he at last emerged from the solitude of his palace at Potsdam, it was in England that he sought the recuperation and rest of which he stood in need.

The dismissal of Bismarck and the subsequent attempts of the Emperor to depreciate the life-work of the man to whom he owed the Imperial crown, were, of course, the principal causes of the spirit of opposition which flared up with such startling suddenness in 1908. The popularity of William I. was in no small measure due to his absolute trust and confidence in his Chancellor, and the abrupt ejection of this incomparable statesman from his office will never be forgotten or forgiven till the generation of his contemporaries has passed away.

These things go far to explain why it was that, in spite of the vigorous naval agitation of the Emperor, the German Fleet, as was pointed out in the Memorandum attached to the Bill of 1898, became weaker instead of stronger during the first ten years of his reign. From the day of his accession he had lost no opportunity of manifesting his interest in the fleet and his desire that it should be largely increased. Among his earliest acts as monarch was his unheralded appearance in admiral's uniform at a parliamentary luncheon given by Bismarck, to decorate one of the guests who had displayed sympathies and wishes with regard to the Navy similar to his own. Year after year, tables of diagrams, showing the disparity between the fleet of Germany and those of the leading naval Powers, and prepared, it is said, by the Emperor's own hand, were sent out over his signature to the Reichstag, the Government departments, and all public institutions where it was thought they might meet the gaze of appreciative eyes. At a soirée given at the New Palace at Potsdam in 1895, he assembled round him a group of members of the majority parties of the Reichstag, and lectured them for two-and-a-half hours on Germany's need of sea-power. Bismarck's eightieth birthday was then approaching, and the Emperor concluded his remarks by urging upon his hearers that they should seize the opportunity of "doing the founder of our colonial policy the pleasure of passing the sum absolutely required for the Navy." A couple of years later, he delivered a similar address after a dinner given to members of the Reichstag by the Finance Minister, von Miquel, illustrating his arguments with the diagrams of warships mentioned above. About the same time, an English illustratedpaper published a picture of the foreign war vessels on the East Asian station. Among them, as the sole representative of Germany, was a small gunboat, which, as was pointed out in the accompanying text, was "under sail only." Against these words the Emperor wrote, "What mockery lies therein," and the picture, with this comment, was laid before the Budget Commission of the Reichstag, then engaged in the discussion of the naval estimates. Moreover, the monarch had himself recourse to the paint-brush, and exhibited in the Berlin Academy of Arts a picture of an attack by a flotilla of torpedo craft on a squadron of ironclads. No doubt he hoped in this way to arouse sympathy for his ideas in some who were not accessible to the ordinary methods of political persuasion. The "Song to Aegir," the Scandinavian Neptune, of which he composed the music, was probably also intended to have a similar operation.

But all these pleas and cajoleries had little or no positive result. Indeed, taken in conjunction with other phrases of the Imperial activity, they seem rather to have excited opposition in the breasts of the members of the Reichstag, who possibly considered themselves just as well qualified as the monarch to estimate the degree and appreciate the needs of Germany's maritime interests, and at any rate half-suspected that his efforts directly to influence their deliberations involved an encroachment on their constitutional privileges. The first naval estimates submitted in the new reign, which provided for the laying down of the unusually large number of four battleships, were got through the Reichstag without much difficulty, but when Admiral von Hollmann became Minister of Marine in the following year, hefound that quite a different temper had taken possession of the Parliament. It was not only that the Emperor's general governmental acts had begun to stir up opposition; his oratorical flights in praise of sea-power and world-empire had also generated strong suspicions that he was urging Germany along a path which would lead her to ruin at home and disaster abroad. Hollmann's by no means exorbitant demands were branded both in the Reichstag and the press as "unconscionable," his programme as "boundless," and on every side were heard contemptuous and impatient references to "the awful fleet." For a decade the naval estimates were ruthlessly and recklessly cut down to, on an average, not far short of half their original figure, and finally, in 1897, the ministerial career of Hollmann was terminated by the unceremonious rejection of three out of the four cruisers which, in a special Memorandum, he had sought to prove were indispensable for the protection of the Empire's stake on the seas. And all this time the Emperor had never ceased to agitate, by word and deed, for the ideas which he had so much at heart and to which the Reichstag nevertheless showed itself so completely indifferent, if not actually hostile.

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