CHAPTER XIILABOR

Robert Fay

Robert Fay, who made bombs with which he hoped tocripple the shipment of munitions to Europe

Meanwhile other detectives were watching the rooming house at Union Hill where Fay andScholz lived, and they saw the two come in about 4 o'clock in the morning. Scholz had very little sleep, for there was a ship leaving next day for Liverpool. He left the house at 7A. M.and went to the garage. Thereupon three detectives returned to the great oak tree at Grantwood. About noon Fay and his brother-in-law drove up, and unlocking the door of a rude hut in the wood, took out a bag, from which they poured a few grains of powder on the surface of a rock. Fay struck the rock with a hammer; a loud report followed, and the hammer broke in his hand. A moment later he heard a twig snap behind him. He turned, and saw a small army of detectives with drawn revolvers closing in on him. Fay protested and pleaded, and offered to bribe the detectives for his freedom, but he was locked up with Scholz. The two had stored in a warehouse several cases containing their completed bomb mechanisms; the police confiscated from their various caches five new bombs, 25 pounds of TNT, 25 sticks of dynamite, 150 pounds of chlorate of potash, two hundred bomb cylinders, 400 percussion caps, one motor-boat, one chart of New York harbor showing all its fortifications and piers, one foreign automobile, two German automatic pistols and a long knife—a considerable arsenal.

Their confessions caused the arrest of Paul Daeche, who had furnished them with explosives, Dr. Kienzle, Breitung, and Engelbert Bronkhorst. Fay received a sentence of eight years in the penitentiary, but after America went to war, Atlanta became too confining for his adventurous spirit, and he escaped the prison, and is believed to have crossed the Mexican border to safety. Scholz was sentenced to four years, and Daeche to three. Kienzle, Breitung and Bronkhorst were not tried, their apparent ignorance of Fay's designs outweighing in the jury's mind their obvious German sympathies. Kienzle, upon the declaration of war of April 6, 1917, became an enemy alien, and was interned.

So Lieutenant Fay never qualified in active service as a destroying agent. Yet he was profligate in his intentions. He offered two men $500,000 if they could intrigue among the shippers in order that a ship laden with copper for England might wander from the path of convoy into German hands, and he even entertained the fantastic hope, with his chart and his motor-boat and his bombs, of stealing out of the harbor to the cordon of British cruisers who hung outside the three-mile limit and attaching his bombs to their rudders, that the German merchantmen might escape into the open sea.

On October 26 theRio Lagescaught fire at sea; fire broke out in the hold of theEuterpeon November 3; three days later there was fire aboard theRochambeauat sea; the next day an explosion occurred aboard theAncona. And so the list runs on:

Dec. 4—Tynningham, two fires on ship.Dec. 24—Alston, dynamite found in cargo.Dec. 26—Inchmoor, fire in hold.1916Jan. 19—Sygna, fire at sea.Jan. 19—Ryndam, bomb explosion at sea.Jan. 22—Rosebank, two bombs in cargo.Feb. 16—Dalton, fire at sea.Feb. 21—Tennyson, bomb explosion at sea.Feb. 26—Livingston Court, fire in Gravesend Bay.

Dec. 4—Tynningham, two fires on ship.

Dec. 24—Alston, dynamite found in cargo.

Dec. 26—Inchmoor, fire in hold.

1916

Jan. 19—Sygna, fire at sea.

Jan. 19—Ryndam, bomb explosion at sea.

Jan. 22—Rosebank, two bombs in cargo.

Feb. 16—Dalton, fire at sea.

Feb. 21—Tennyson, bomb explosion at sea.

Feb. 26—Livingston Court, fire in Gravesend Bay.

April saw the round-up of the group who had been working under the Hamburg-American captains, and although numerous fires occurred during May, 1916, in almost every case they were traced to natural accidents. The number mounted more slowly as the year advanced. With the entrance of America into the war, and the tightening of the police cordon along the waterfront, the chance of planting bombs was still further reduced, but waterfront fires kept recurring, and until the day of ultimate judgment in Berlin, when each of Germany's arsonists inAmerica comes to claim his reward, none will know the total of loss at their hands. It was enormous in the damage it inflicted upon cargo, but it is improbable that it had any perceptible effect upon the whole export of shells for Flanders and France.

David Lamar—Labor's National Peace Council—The embargo conference—The attempted longshoremen's strike—Dr. Dumba's recall.

Labor produced munitions. The hands of labor could be frightened away from work by explosions, their handiwork could be bombed on the railways, the wharves, the lighters, and the ships, but a surer method than either of those was the perversion of the hearts of labor. So thought Count von Bernstorff and Dr. Albert, who dealt in men. So thought Berlin—the General Staff sent this message to America:

"January 26—For Military Attaché. You can obtain particulars as to persons suitable for carrying on sabotage in the United States and Canada from the following persons: (1) Joseph McGarrity, Philadelphia; (2) John P. Keating, Michigan Avenue, Chicago; (3) Jeremiah O'Leary, 16 Park Row, New York."One and two are absolutely reliable and discreet. Three is reliable, but not always discreet. These persons were indicated by Sir Roger Casement. In the UnitedStates sabotage can be carried out on every kind of factory for supplying munitions of war."(Signed) "Representative of General Staff."[3]

"One and two are absolutely reliable and discreet. Three is reliable, but not always discreet. These persons were indicated by Sir Roger Casement. In the UnitedStates sabotage can be carried out on every kind of factory for supplying munitions of war."

(Signed) "Representative of General Staff."[3]

So too thought von Rintelen, who hired men—usually the wrong ones.

Full of his project, he cast about for an intermediary. No sly chemist or muscular wharf-rat would do for this delicate task of anesthetizing men with the gas of German propaganda while it tied their hands and amputated their centres of right and wrong; the candidate must be a man of affairs, intimate with the chiefs of labor, skillful in execution, and the abler the better. Von Rintelen would pay handsomely for the right man. Whereupon David Lamar, the "Wolf of Wall Street," appeared on the scene and applied for the job—an entrance auspicious for the United States, for the newcomer's philosophy (if one could judge from his previous career) was "Me First."

In an attempt to defraud J. P. Morgan & Co., and the United States Steel Corporation Lamar had once impersonated Representative A. Mitchell Palmer in certain telephone interviews. (Palmer became custodian of alien property afterthe United States entered the war.) He was convicted and sentenced to two years' imprisonment in Atlanta Penitentiary. He appealed the case, and while he was out on bail pending the appeal, he fell in with Rintelen.

In April, 1915, a New Yorker who dealt in publicity was introduced to Rintelen, or "Hansen," by Dr. Schimmel. Rintelen offered the publicity man $25,000 to conduct a campaign of propaganda for more friendly relations with Germany, to offset the commercial power Great Britain bade fair to have at the end of the war, and assured him that he would go to any extreme to prevent shipments of munitions to the Allies. The war, he said, would be decided not in Europe but in America. There must be strikes in the munitions factories.

When the publicity man heard also that Rintelen was trying to stir up trouble with Mexico, he wrote on May 13 to Joseph Tumulty, President Wilson's secretary, informing him of the German's intentions. He was referred to the Department of Justice, and at their dictation continued in contact with Rintelen. Shortly thereafter David Lamar and his friend Henry Martin took a trip to Minneapolis, where they met Congressman Frank Buchanan and Ex-Congressman Robert Fowler, both of Illinois. Out of thatconference grew a plan for forming a labor organization the object of which was ostensibly peace, and actually an embargo upon the shipment of munitions abroad, but whether Buchanan and Fowler knew of von Rintelen's connection with the scheme remains to be proved. It can be readily seen that such a labor organization, if it had actually represented organized labor, could have forced such a stoppage, either by its collective potential voting power and influence, or by fostering a nation-wide strike of munitions workers.

The nucleus formed in Chicago, about one William F. Kramer. "Buchanan and Fowler came to me in June here in Chicago," said Kramer, "and told me about their plan to form a council. We opened headquarters, and we engaged two organizers, James Short and J. J. Cundiff, who got $50 a week apiece, a secretary, L. P. Straube, who got $50 a week, and a stenographer. I was a vice-president, but I didn't get anything. We were known then as Labor's Peace Council of Chicago, and we were supposed to be in it because of our convictions against the shipment of munitions. And I'll say that organized labor was made the goat."

Buchanan had no idea of restricting the council to one city. He called upon Samuel Gompers, head of the American Federation of Labor, atAtlantic City on June 9 and tried to induce him to back a movement in Washington for an embargo. Gompers refused flatly and completely to have anything to do with the plan, especially when Buchanan made known his associates. Those associates were busy meanwhile lobbying in Congress, representing themselves as friends of organized labor, and pressing the embargo question. About a week later Congressman Buchanan inflated the Chicago organization into Labor's National Peace Council, with headquarters at Washington, to recommend the convocation of a special session of Congress at once to "promote universal peace," which meant simply "to promote the introduction and enactment of an embargo." Its members met frequently, and annoyed the President and other important men,—even Andrew Carnegie,—with their importunings for attention, and got exactly what they wanted—wide publicity.

About July 10 Andrew D. Meloy, whose office in New York Rintelen was sharing at the time, noticed that his German associate began to keep a clipping-file of news of the Council. Meloy learned of the project, and assured Rintelen that he was foolhardy to attempt, by bribery of labor officials, to divert common labor from earning high wages. To which Rintelen repliedbrusquely: "Thanks. You come into this business about 11:45 o'clock."

Rintelen sent a telegram to Lamar in Chicago on July 16, the text of which follows:

"E. Ruskay, Room 700 B, Sherman Hotel, Chicago."Party who receives $12,500 monthly from competitors is now interfering with business in hand. Do you know of any way and means to check him? Wire."F. Brown."

"E. Ruskay, Room 700 B, Sherman Hotel, Chicago.

"Party who receives $12,500 monthly from competitors is now interfering with business in hand. Do you know of any way and means to check him? Wire.

"F. Brown."

"Ruskay" was Lamar. Later in the day the German sent this message:

"Twelve thousand five hundred now at capitol. Conference here today plans to guarantee outsiders and settlement possible within few days. New issue urgently needed. Notify B."

The "party" mentioned in the first despatch was the code designation for Gompers, and he was indicated in the second message as "Twelve thousand five hundred." "B" was Buchanan, upon whose connection with labor Rintelen told Meloy the success of the plan rested. Lamar hurried to New York, arriving July 19, and met Rintelen in a limousine at the 100th Street entrance to Central Park; on the ride which followed the "Wolf" told Rintelen that a strike then going on among the munitions workers at Bridgeport was "only a beginning of his efforts," andthat within thirty days the industry would be paralyzed throughout the country. Meloy advanced the information that Gompers had just gone to Bridgeport to stop the strike, to which Lamar replied:

"Buchanan will settle Gompers within twenty-four hours!"

The clippings kept coming in as testimony to the vigorous work being done by the organization's press bureau: the Council attacked the Federal Reserve Banks as "munitions trusts," it cited on July 8 nine ships lying in port awaiting munitions cargoes, and attacked Dudley Field Malone, then Collector of the Port of New York, for permitting such ships to clear; it claimed to represent a million labor votes, and four million and a half farmers; it listened eagerly to an address by Hannis Taylor, a disciple of the late warmhearted Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, in which Taylor criticized President Wilson and was roundly cheered by the German-American element in the audience. Semi-occasionally during the midsummer heat Charles Oberwager, attorney for the Council (whose firm had received handsome fees from von Papen), rose to deny any German connection with the organization. The Council assailed Secretary Lansing as a man "whose radicalism was liable to plunge this nationinto war." The Council assailed, in fact, any project which furthered the interests of the Allies. Rintelen began to have his doubts of the effectiveness of Lamar's work. The bank account in the Trans-Atlantic Trust Company had dwindled from $800,000 to $40,000, and Rintelen admitted that his transactions with Lamar cost him several hundred thousand dollars. Labor's National Peace Conference died quietly, Lamar flitted away to a country estate at Pittsfield, Mass., and Rintelen started across the Atlantic Ocean.

August wore on. The Council was getting ready for a second gaseous session, when Milton Snelling, a representative of the Washington Central Labor Union, who had been elected a first vice-president of the Council, withdrew from its membership, because he "discovered persons participating in the meetings who have been hanging on the fringe of the labor movement for their own personal aggrandizement, men who have been discarded ... others never having been members of any organization of labor," and because Jacob C. Taylor, the cigar-making delegate from East Orange, N. J., said, in answer to a query as to the Council's purpose: "We want to stop the export of munitions to the Allies. You see Germany can make all the munitions she wants."Then—and it may be coincidence—about one week later theNew York Worldbegan its publication of certain of the papers found in the brief case which Dr. Heinrich Albert, of the German Embassy, allowed to escape him on a New York elevated train; on August 19 Buchanan resigned the Council, and Taylor was elected to succeed him.

Indictments were returned against Rintelen, as well as against Lamar, Martin, Buchanan and their associates, on December 28, 1915. Buchanan at once exploded with a retaliatory demand for the impeachment of United States District Attorney Marshall, upon which Congress dared not take action. Marshall gracefully retired from the trial in May, 1916, lest he prejudice the Government's case, and Lamar, Martin and Rintelen were convicted of infraction of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law and sentenced to one year each in a New Jersey prison. Thus ended Labor's National Peace Council, thanks to David Lamar.

The project for an embargo looked attractive to the Embassy, however—so attractive that while the Council was at the height of its activity, Baron Kurt von Reiswitz wrote on July 22, 1915, from Chicago to Dr. Albert:

"Everything else concerning the proposedembargo conference you will find in the enclosed copy of the report to the Ambassador. A change has, however, come up, as the mass meeting will have to be postponed on account of there being insufficient time for the necessary preparations. It will probably be held there in about two weeks.

"Among others the following have agreed to coöperate: Senator Hitchcock, Congressman Buchanan, William Bayard Hale of New York and the well known pulpit orator, Dr. Aked (born an Englishman), from San Francisco.

"Hitchcock seemed to be very strong for the plan. He told our representative at a conference in Omaha: 'If this matter is organized in the right way you will sweep the United States.'

"For your confidential information I would further inform you that the leadership of the movement thus far lies in the hands of two gentlemen (one in Detroit and one in Chicago) who are firmly resolved to work toward the end that the German community, which, of course, will be with us without further urging, shall above all things remain in the background, and that the movement, to all outward appearances, shall have a purely American character. I have known both the gentlemen very well for a long time and know that personal interest does not count with them; the results will bring their own reward.

"For the purposes of the inner organization, to which we attribute particular importance, we have assured ourselves of the coöperation of the local Democratic boss, Roger C. Sullivan, as also Messrs. Sparman, Lewis and McDonald, the latter of theChicago American. Sullivan was formerly leader of the Wilson campaign and is a deadly enemy of Wilson, as the latter did not keep his word to make him a Senator; therefore, principally, the sympathy of our cause."

One is inclined to wonder where Rintelen's vast credits went, during his short visits in 1915. Lamar took a goodly sum, as we have seen; the negotiations for the purchase of the Krag rifles cost him no small amount; his ship bomb activities required a considerable payroll. But as further evidence of the high cost of causing trouble, we must consider briefly the profligate methods he employed in other attempts to inflame and seduce labor.

A walkout by the longshoremen of the Atlantic coast would cripple the supply of munitions to Europe, and might be successful enough to cause a shell famine in France of which the Central Powers could readily take advantage. There were 23,000 dock-workers in American ports; they must be guaranteed a certain wage for five weeks of strike; the cost in wages alone wouldtherefore amount to about $1,635,000, besides service fees to intermediaries. He had the money, and the first step was taken in the otherwise placid city of Boston.

On May 7, 1915, the day theLusitaniasank, William P. Dempsey, the secretary-treasurer of the Atlantic Coast International Longshoremen's Union, met Dennis Driscoll, a Boston labor leader and former city office-holder, at the old Quincy House in Hanover Street. Driscoll said that Matthew Cummings, a wealthy Boston grocer, had outlined to him the plan for the strike, and said he was acting for parties who were willing to pay a million dollars. Dempsey maintained his poise when the startling information was recited, but he was frightened, and at the conclusion of the interview he telegraphed at once to T. V. O'Connor, the president of the union, requesting an interview. The two union men met in Albany and discussed the affair pro and con, arriving at the conclusion that they had best reveal the plot to the Government. O'Connor accordingly told of the negotiations to Secretary Wilson of the Department of Labor, and then in connivance with the Secret Service, went on dealing with the grocer, constantly pressing him for the identity of the principals who, he said, were prepared to supply all the necessary money. Heimplicated George Sylvestor Viereck, the editor of a subsidized German propaganda-weekly calledThe Fatherland, and said that he had been introduced to him by Edmund von Mach. Neither of those men figured except as intermediaries, and Cummings suggested that Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, a loyal propagandist then in the United States, was the director of the enterprises. Owing to the high pitch of public feeling over theLusitania, Cummings could not receive permission from his superiors to go ahead with O'Connor, but he did his best to keep O'Connor interested. The latter, fearing that German agents were at work on the Pacific coast, took a trip to the far West, and during his absence Cummings telegraphed him twice. There the affair ended, for O'Connor ignored the message, and on July 14 returned to New York to find that a German attempt to force a walkout on the New York waterfront had failed, and that Cummings had stopped playing with fire and had gone back to his grocery in Boston.

When the Government turned the story over to a newspaper to publish on September 13, the time was not ripe to fix the responsibility for the attempt. Dr. Dernburg was a popular scapegoat at the time, and the implication of his authority in the attempt was allowed to stand. Rintelenwas in Donington Hall, a prison camp in England, and it was months thereafter before the United States and British Secret Services had fully compared notes on him. By that time there were other charges lying against him which promised better cases than an abortive attempt to promote a strike 'longshore.

We have witnessed the cumulative influence of newspaper reports in surrounding Labor's National Peace Council with an almost genuine atmosphere of national interest; we have been able to picture the hostility which the publication of the longshoremen's strike story aroused in legitimately organized labor; and although as a typical instance of newspaper influence we should postpone the following incident, it is a temptation too great to resist. It is the story of The Story That Cost an Ambassador, and if any further plea for its introduction be needed, let it be that it is another subtle attempt upon labor in the summer of 1915.

Dr. Constantin Dumba

Dr. Constantin Dumba, Austrian ambassador to the UnitedStates, recalled after the disclosures of the correspon-dence captured on the war correspondent, Archibald

James F. J. Archibald, an American correspondent who had seen most of the wars of recent years, and who wanted to see more, set sail from New York on August 21, 1915, for Amsterdam, with his wife, his campaign clothes, and a portfolio. At Falmouth, England, the usualsearch party came aboard, and inspected the papers in the portfolio. Archibald proved to be an unofficial despatch-bearer, upon whom his German and Austrian acquaintances in the United States placed great reliance—such men as Papen, Bernstorff, and Dr. Constantine Dumba sent reports to their governments in his care.

On September 5 theNew York Worldburst forth with the text of one of the letters—one from Dr. Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Washington, to his chief in the foreign office at Vienna, Baron Burian. It is worth reproducing here intact:

"New York, August 20.""Your Excellency:"Yesterday evening Consul-General von Nuber received the enclosed aide memoire from the chief editor of the local influential paperSzabadsag, after a previous conversation with me in pursuance of his verbal proposals to arrange for strikes at Bethlehem in Schwab's steel and munitions factory and also in the middle West."Archibald, who is well known to your Excellency, leaves today at 12 o'clock on board theRotterdamfor Berlin and Vienna. I take this rare and safe opportunity of warmly recommending these proposals to your Excellency's favorable consideration. It is my impression that we can disorganize and hold up for months, if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of munitions in Bethlehem and the middle West, which, in the opinion of theGerman military attaché, is of great importance and amply outweighs the comparatively small expenditure of money involved."But even if strikes do not occur it is probable that we should extort under pressure more favorable conditions of labor for our poor downtrodden fellow countrymen in Bethlehem. These white slaves are now working twelve hours a day, seven days a week. All weak persons succumb and become consumptive. So far as German workmen are found among the skilled hands means of leaving will be provided immediately for them."Besides this, a private German registry office has been established which provides employment for persons who voluntarily have given up their places. It already is working well. We shall also join in and the widest support is assured us."I beg your Excellency to be so good as to inform me with reference to this letter by wireless. Reply whether you agree. I remain, with great haste and respect,"Dumba."

"New York, August 20."

"Your Excellency:

"Yesterday evening Consul-General von Nuber received the enclosed aide memoire from the chief editor of the local influential paperSzabadsag, after a previous conversation with me in pursuance of his verbal proposals to arrange for strikes at Bethlehem in Schwab's steel and munitions factory and also in the middle West.

"Archibald, who is well known to your Excellency, leaves today at 12 o'clock on board theRotterdamfor Berlin and Vienna. I take this rare and safe opportunity of warmly recommending these proposals to your Excellency's favorable consideration. It is my impression that we can disorganize and hold up for months, if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of munitions in Bethlehem and the middle West, which, in the opinion of theGerman military attaché, is of great importance and amply outweighs the comparatively small expenditure of money involved.

"But even if strikes do not occur it is probable that we should extort under pressure more favorable conditions of labor for our poor downtrodden fellow countrymen in Bethlehem. These white slaves are now working twelve hours a day, seven days a week. All weak persons succumb and become consumptive. So far as German workmen are found among the skilled hands means of leaving will be provided immediately for them.

"Besides this, a private German registry office has been established which provides employment for persons who voluntarily have given up their places. It already is working well. We shall also join in and the widest support is assured us.

"I beg your Excellency to be so good as to inform me with reference to this letter by wireless. Reply whether you agree. I remain, with great haste and respect,

"Dumba."

The aide memoire, written by the editor of a Hungarian weekly, proposed to create unrest by a campaign in foreign language newspapers circulated free to labor, muck-raking labor conditions in Bethlehem, Youngstown, Cleveland, Pittsburg, and Bridgeport, where there were great numbers of foreign workmen, Hungarians, Austrians, and Germans. This was to be supplemented by a "horror novel" similar to the bloody effort of Upton Sinclair to describe theChicago stockyards. Special agents of unrest, roll-turners, steel workers, soapbox orators, picnic organizers, were all to be insinuated into the plants to stir up the workmen. This editor had stirred them up a few weeks before at Bridgeport—the strike which Lamar claimed as his own accomplishment—and he presented to Baron Burian a really comprehensive plan for creating unrest through his well-subsidized foreign-language press. And in passing it on, Dr. Dumba stood sponsor for it.

The British government saw in the discovery of the letter and the cool impudence of it, a rare chance for propaganda in America. So, as has been said, theWorldpublished the story, and at once the wrath of the truly American people justified President Wilson in doing what he and Secretary Lansing had already determined to do—to send Dr. Dumba home. Perhaps Dumba's reference to the "self-willed temperament of the President" in another note found on Archibald had something to do with the haste with which the Ambassador's recall was demanded; it followed on the heels of the publication of the letter:

"By reason of the admitted purpose and intent of Mr. Dumba to conspire to cripple legitimate industries of the United States and to interrupt their legitimate trade, and by reason of the flagrant violation of diplomatic proprietyin employing an American citizen protected by an American passport as a secret bearer of official despatches through the lines of the enemy of Austria-Hungary, the President directs us to inform your Excellency that Mr. Dumba is no longer acceptable to the Government of the United States as the Ambassador of his Imperial Majesty at Washington."

So went Dumba.

After his departure Baron Zwiedinek, his chargé d'affaires, and Consul von Nuber advertised widely in Hungarian newspapers calling on Austrians and Hungarians at work in munitions plants to leave. If they wrote the Embassy on the subject, the reply they received read:

"It is demanded that patriotism, no less than fear of punishment, should cause every one to quit his work immediately."

But neither threats, nor walking delegates, nor German spies could check the output of shells and guns. An attempt made by Dr. Albert to buy, for $50,000, a strike in Detroit motor factories failed. The factories were making money as they had never made money before, and labor was buying luxuries. To the American munitions-worker a comfortable supply of money meant much more than the shrill bleat of the Central Powers. And what was more, he was not entirely satisfied that the right was all onGermany's side. (Our space does not permit, nor is definite information at present available, to discuss the anarchist, socialist, and I. W. W. elements of labor, and their relations to Germany. These three factors, especially the last named, effected in the years 1914-1918 a sufficient amount of industrial unrest to qualify them as allies, if not actual servants, of the Kaiser. Whether they were employed by Germany will be brought out in a trial which began in Chicago in April, 1918.)

FOOTNOTE:[3]McGarrity, Keating, and O'Leary, upon the publication of this despatch, uttered vigorous denials of any connection with or knowledge of the despatch or the affairs mentioned.

[3]McGarrity, Keating, and O'Leary, upon the publication of this despatch, uttered vigorous denials of any connection with or knowledge of the despatch or the affairs mentioned.

The mistress of the seas—Plotting in New York—TheLusitania'sescape in February, 1915—The advertised warning—The plot—May 7, 1915—Diplomatic correspondence—Gustave Stahl—The results.

In the eyes of the German Admiralty theLusitaniawas the symbol of British supremacy on the seas. There were larger ships flying the Prussian flag, but one of them lay in her German harbor, the other at her Little-German pier in Hoboken, while theLusitaniaswept gracefully over the Western Ocean as she regally saw fit, leaving only a thin trail of smoke for the sluggish undersea enemy to follow. Time and again during the early months of war the plotters in Berlin had attempted her destruction, and every time she had slipped away—until the last, when the plot was developed on American soil.

Lusitania

TheLusitanialeaving the Hudson River on her last voyage

Her destruction would carry home to Germany news of heartening influence out of all proportion to the mere sinking of a large single tonnage. The German visible navy had, with the exception of scattering excursions into the North Sea, andthe swiftly quenched efforts of the South Atlantic fleet, been of negligible—and irksome—consequence. To sink the mistress of the British merchant fleet would be to inform all the world that Britain was incapable of protecting her cargo and passenger vessels, to puncture the comfortable British boast of the moment that business was being performed "as usual," and to gratify the blood-letting instincts of the Junkers. So von Tirpitz, with his colleagues, undertook to sink theLusitania, and to warn neutrals to travel in their own ships or stay ashore.

Early in December, 1914, the German agents who met nightly at the Deutscher Verein in Central Park South speculated on ways and means of bringing down this attractive quarry. Communication between Berlin and New York at that time was as facile as a telephone conversation from the Battery to Harlem. There were new 110-kilowatt transmitters in the German-owned Sayville wireless station, imported through Holland and installed under the expert supervision of Captain Boy-Ed, and memoranda issued in Berlin to the naval attaché were frequently the subject of guarded conversation in the German Club within a few hours after they had left the Wilhelmstrasse. Occasionally the conspirators found it more tactful to drive through the Park in alimousine during the evening, to discuss the project. Spies had made several trips to Liverpool and back again aboard the ship, under false passports, and Paul Koenig's waterfront henchmen supplied all necessary information of the guard maintained at the piers. All this was passed up to the clearing-house of executives, and their plans began to take shape.

Boy-Ed possessed a copy of the secret British Admiralty code, which explained his frequent trips to Sayville. He knew—and Tirpitz's staff therefore knew—the position of any British vessel at sea which had occasion to utter any message into the air. But before he conceived a use for this code other than as a source of information, he decided to try out a code of his own.

He arranged with Berlin a word-system whose theory was popular with Germany throughout the earlier years of her secret war communication: under the guise of apparently harmless expressions of friendship, or grief, or simple business, were transmitted quite definite and specific secret meanings. A message addressed by wireless from theLusitaniato a friend in England which read for example "Eager to see you. Much love" would scarcely arouse suspicion, especially as there was no word in it which might suggest military information. Yet in February, 1915, amessage of that type was despatched from the eastward-boundLusitaniato a British station; it was intercepted and interpreted by a German submarine commander in the "zone" nearby, who presently popped up in the ship's wake and fired a torpedo. His information was better than his aim. TheLusitaniadodged the steel shark, and fled to safety, her wireless informing the British naval world meanwhile of the presence of the U-boat.

The plotters had to reckon with her unequalled speed. TheLusitaniaand her sister ship, theMauretania, had each rather prided herself in the past on reducing the other's fresh, bright passage-record from Queenstown to New York—a record of four days and a few hours! The submarine of 1915 knew no such speed, and it was necessary, if the liner was to be torpedoed, to select out of the vastness of the ocean one little radius in which the submarine might lie in wait for a pot-shot. But just how?

Spies had reported that it was customary as theLusitanianeared the Irish coast on her homeward voyage for her captain to query the British Admiralty for instructions as to where her convoy might be expected. They reported that under certain conditions German agents might be placed on board. And they reported that the wirelessoperator was susceptible to bribery. Those three facts formed the nucleus of the final plan.

Audacious as they were in their use of American soil as the base for their plans, the German Embassy had certain obligations to the United States Government, which they felt must be observed. The unspeakable falsifying which is sometimes called expediency, sometimes diplomacy, required that official America must know nothing of the intentions of which the Embassy itself was fully conversant and approving. Further, a palliative must be supplied to the American people in advance. Consequently Count von Bernstorff, under orders from Berlin, inserted in theNew York Timesof April 23, 1915, the following advertisement:

NOTICETravelers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her Allies and Great Britain and her Allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that in accordance with formal notice given by the German Imperial Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain or any of her Allies are liable to destruction in these waters and that travelers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her Allies do so at their own risk.Imperial German Embassy.Washington, D. C., April 22d, 1915.

NOTICE

Travelers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her Allies and Great Britain and her Allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that in accordance with formal notice given by the German Imperial Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain or any of her Allies are liable to destruction in these waters and that travelers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her Allies do so at their own risk.

Imperial German Embassy.

Washington, D. C., April 22d, 1915.

OCEAN TRAVEL NOTICE

The newspaper advertisement inserted among"ocean travel" advertising by the Im-perial German Embassy prior totheLusitania'sdeparture onwhat proved to be herlast voyage

Germans in New York who knew of the plot dropped hints to their friends; anonymous warnings were received by several passengers who had booked their accommodations; Alfred Gwynne Vanderbilt received such a message, signed "Morte." But such whispers were common, theLusitaniahad outrun the submarines before and could presumably do it again; further, most Americans at that moment had some confidence left in civilization.

The plot was substantially this: when Captain Turner, on the last day of the voyage, should send his wireless query to the Admiralty, inquiring for his convoy of destroyers, a wireless reply in the British code directing his course must be sent to him from Sayville. His query would be heard and answered by the Admiralty, of course, but the genuine reply must not reach him.

Berlin assigned two submarines to a point ten miles south by west of the Old Head of Kinsale, near the entrance to St. George's Channel. She selected an experienced commander for the especial duty, and with him went a secret agent to shadow him as he opened his sealed instructions, and shoot him if he balked. And about the time when the U-boats slipped out of the Kiel Canal, and threaded their way through the mine-fields into the North Sea, submerging as they picked upthe smoke of British ships on the western horizon, theLusitaniawarped out of her pier in the Hudson River and set her prow for Sandy Hook, the Grand Banks, and Ireland.

She carried 1,254 passengers and a crew of eight hundred, a total of more than 2,000 souls, of whom 1,214 were sailing to their death. Germany had selected their graves; von Rintelen had two friends aboard who were detailed to flash lights from the portholes in case the ship made the submarine rendezvous at night. TheLusitaniacarried bombs which Dr. Karl Schimmel placed on board; she carried bombs which wretched little Klein placed on board; she carried, too, the creature who was to betray her. Her company was gay enough, and interesting; besides Mr. Vanderbilt her passenger list included Charles Frohman, the most important of theatrical managers; Elbert Hubbard, a quaint and lovable writer-artisan; Charles Klein, a playwright; Justus Miles Forman, a novelist; and numerous others of more or less celebrity, among them an actress who lived to reënact her part in the tragedy for the benefit of herself and a motion picture company. Ruthless as it was, theLusitaniaalso carried Lindon W. Bates, Jr., a youth whose family had befriended von Rintelen. And there were the women and children.

Meanwhile, Sayville was in readiness, a trained wireless operator prepared at any moment to hear Captain Turner's inquiry, and to flash a false reply with a perfect British Admiralty touch. On May 5 Captain Boy-Ed received word from Berlin that he had been awarded the Iron Cross. On May 7 theLusitaniaspoke: Captain Turner's request for instructions. Presently the reply came, and was hurried to his cabin. From his code book he deciphered directions to "proceed to a point ten miles south of Old Head of Kinsale and thence run into St. George's Channel, arriving at the Liverpool bar at midnight." He carefully calculated the distance and his running time on the assumption that he was protected on every side by the British fleet, and set his course for the Old Head of Kinsale.

The British Admiralty also received Captain Turner's inquiry, just as the Sayville operator had snatched it from the air, and despatched an answer: orders that theLusitaniaproceed to a point some 70 or 80 miles south of the Old Head of Kinsale, there to meet her convoy.Captain Turner never received that message.The British Government knows why the message was not delivered, though the fact has not, at this date, been made public.

TheLusitaniaheaded northeast all morning.At 1:20 o'clock she ran the gauntlet of two submarines; a torpedo was released, and found its target. The ghastly details of what followed have been told so fully, so vividly, and so appealingly that they need not be repeated here. They made themselves heard around a world that was already vibrant with uproar. The first sodden tremor of the ship told Captain Turner that he had been betrayed. He described later at the Coroner's inquest how he had received orders supposedly from the Admiralty, and had set out to obey them. He produced the copy of those orders, but of the genuine message from the Admiralty he knew nothing. Asked if he had made special application for a convoy, he said: "No, I left that to them. It is their business, not mine. I simply had to carry out my orders to go, and I would do it again."

America was in a turmoil. Germany had presumed too far; she—it is almost incongruous to call Germany "she"—had believed that her warning declaration that the waters about the British isles were a war zone would be respected, or if not respected, would serve as an excuse, and that the torpedoing would be accepted calmly by America. She was not prepared for Colonel Roosevelt's burning denunciation of this act of common piracy, nor for the angry editorialremonstrance of a people outraged at the loss of one hundred and fourteen American lives. But Germany recovered her presumptuous poise swiftly, and while ugly medals were being struck off commemorating the German triumph over the ship, and while destroyers were still searching British waters for the bodies of the dead, she sent a note of commiseration and sympathy to Washington. Three days later—on May 13—the United States conveyed to Berlin a strong protest against the submarine policy which had culminated in the sinking of theLusitania. Three days before Germany replied on May 28, a submarine attacked an American steamer, theNebraska, and the Imperial government followed up its first reply with a supplementary note justifying its previous attacks upon the American vesselsGulflightandCushing. Germany's fat was in the fire.

A German editor in the United States had the effrontery to announce that American ships would be sunk as readily as theLusitania. Secretary Bryan, of the Department of State, at that time a confirmed pacifist, resigned his post on June 8, thus drawing the sting of a second and sharper protest which went forward to Germany the next day. To this the Foreign Office replied on July 8 that American ships would be safe in the submarine zone under certain conditions, and thePresident on July 21 rejected this diplomatic sop as "very unsatisfactory." Count von Bernstorff finally announced, on September 1, that German submarines would sink no more liners without warning, and his government ratified his promise a fortnight later. The promise was at best a quibble, and it in no way restricted undersea depredations upon commerce and human life. After theLusitaniaaffair followed theLeelanaw, theArabic, and theHesperianand on February 16, 1916, Germany acknowledged her liability for theLusitania'sdestruction—the day after Secretary Lansing declared the right of commercial vessels to arm themselves in self-defense, and five days before the Crown Prince began the ten-months' battle of Verdun.

The published correspondence of the State Department gives in detail the negotiations regarding maritime relations, a record of Imperial hypocrisy which indicates clearly the desire and intention of the Germans to retain their submarine warfare at any cost. There is not space here to brief the papers, nor any great need, for it was theLusitaniawhich dictated the tone and outcome of the correspondence, and which brought the United States rudely face to face with the cruel facts of war.

In spite of these facts, Germany employed heragents in desperate, devious and futile attempts to gloss over the crime. Relatives of those who had drowned were persuaded by agents (one of them was "a lawyer named Fowler, now under Federal indictment on another count") to sue the Cunard Line for damages for having mounted guns on the liner, thus making her liable to attack. Paul Koenig paid a German, Gustave Stahl, of Hoboken, to swear to an affidavit that he had seen guns on the ship; this affidavit was forwarded by Captain Boy-Ed on June 1, to Washington, and had a wide temporary effect upon public sentiment until Stahl was convicted of perjury and sentenced to 18 months in Atlanta. It was Koenig who hid Stahl where neither the police nor the press could find him after he made his statement, and it was Koenig who, at the command of the Federal authorities, produced him. It was Rintelen who dined on the night of the tragedy at the home of one of the victims; it was Rintelen who received the news with a mild expression of regret because "he had two good men aboard."

Tactically Germany had attained her objectives; her submarines had obeyed orders and sunk a liner. Strategically Germany had made a gross miscalculation; recruiting in England took a pronounced rise, the Admiralty was shocked intoredoubled vigilance, the United States instead of swallowing the affront complicated the question of the freedom of the seas beyond all untangling except by force of arms, and beside the word "Belgium" on the calendar of crime the world wrote the word "Lusitania," as equally typical of the warfare of the Hun.

German law in America—Waetzoldt's reports—The British blockade—A report from Washington—Stopping the chlorine supply—Speculation in wool—Dyestuffs and theDeutschland—Purchasing phenol—The Bridgeport Projectile Company—The lost portfolio—The recall of the attachés—A summary of Dr. Albert's efforts.

In addition to the exercise of its diplomatic functions, now more important than they had ever been before, the German Embassy had assumed the burden of large commercial enterprises. Their execution was entrusted to Dr. Albert, the privy councillor and fiscal agent for the Empire. There was apparently no limit, either financial or territorial, to the scope of his efforts, and the fact that he was able to administrate such a volume of work is no small tribute to his zeal. But that very zeal outran his regard for American law, so in one of his earlier ventures he set out to substitute the law of the Empire for that of the nation to which he was accredited.

Dr. Albert was informed on March 10, 1915, bya German lawyer, S. Walter Kaufmann of 60 Wall Street, that his clients, the Orenstein-Arthur Keppel Company, had an order for 9,000 tons of steel rails to be shipped to Russia, despite instructions from the company's home office in Berlin that "no orders should be accepted for shipment to any country at war with Germany, because of Paragraph 89 of the Gesetz Buch." The Gesetz Buch is the German Penal Code. (One of Kaufmann's law partners was Norvin R. Lindheim, legal adviser to Germany's agents in the United States.) The manufacturers begged the permission of the Embassy to accept the order and pass the actual manufacture on to the United States Steel Company, in order to evade the letter of Paragraph 89, and in order "to delay the order, if that would in any way be desirable." The matter was neglected in the Embassy, and on July 13 the Orenstein-Arthur Keppel Company wrote from Keppel, Pa., to the German consul, Philadelphia, Dr. George Stobbe, again asking permission to accept the order. The consul replied, denying permission, on the ground that the shipment would facilitate the Russian transport of troops, and that such action would be within the meaning of Paragraph 89 of the Gesetz Buch. "That you are in position to delay the delivery of the order, to the prejudice of the hostile countryordering, in no way makes you less punishable," he continued. He forwarded a copy of his ruling to the Ambassador for approval, and it in turn was forwarded to Dr. Albert. The order was not taken; the fear of punishment by Germany was greater than the protection afforded by American Law.

The foregoing episode reveals the nature of Dr. Albert's chief problem—the financial blocking of supplies for the Allies. Let Boy-Ed destroy the ships, von Papen dynamite the factories and railways, Rintelen run his mad course of indiscriminate violence—the smooth financial agent would undertake only those great business ventures in which his shrewdness and experience could have play. He was receiving reports constantly on the economic status, and the following extract from a report from G. D. Waetzoldt, a trade investigator in the Consulate in New York, will illustrate the German frame of mind about midsummer of 1915:

"The large war orders, as the professional journals also print, have become the great means of saving American business institutions from idleness and financial ruin.

"The fact that institutions of the size and international influence of those mentioned could not find sufficient regular business to keep them tosome extent occupied, half at least, throws a harsh light upon the sad condition in which American business would have found itself had it not been for the war orders. The ground which induced these large interests to accept war orders rests entirely upon an economical basis and can be explained by the above-mentioned conditions which were produced by the lack of regular business. These difficulties, resulting from the dividing up of the contracts, are held to have been augmented, as stated in business circles, by the fact that certain agents working in the German interest succeeded in further delaying and disturbing American deliveries....

"So many contracts for the production of picric acid have been placed that they can only be filled to a very small part."

Dr. Albert also received a report from another trade expert, who had had a long conference with ex-Senator John C. Spooner of Wisconsin as to whether or not there could be prosecutions under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law against British representatives because of the restrictions placed by the British Government upon dealings by Americans in certain copper, cotton and rubber.

Naturally one of the most vital problems that stirred Dr. Albert was the British Orders in Council blockading Germany, from whichresulted the seizure of meat and food supplies and cotton by British war vessels. He was always on the alert for information of the attitude of the Administration and the people of the United States toward the blockade. In another report dated June 3, 1915, Waetzoldt said:

"There can be no doubt that the British Government will bring into play all power and pressure possible in order to complete the total blockade of Germany from her foreign markets, and that the Government of the United States will not make a strenuous effort to maintain its trade with Germany....

"It has been positively demonstrated during this time that the falling off of imports caused by the war in Europe will in the future be principally covered by American industry....

"The complete stopping importation of German products will, in truth, to a limited extent, especially in the first part of the blockade, help the sale of English or French products, but the damage which will be done to us in this way will not be great....

"TheLusitaniacase did, in fact, give the English efforts in this direction a new and powerful impetus, and at first the vehemence with which the Anti-German movement began anew awakened serious misgivings, but this case also willhave a lasting effect, which, unless fresh complications arise, we may be able to turn to the advantage of the sales of German goods....

"The war will certainly have this effect, that the American business world will devote all its energy toward making itself independent of the importation of foreign products as far as possible....

"If the decision is again brought home to German industry it should not be forgotten what position the United States took with reference to Germany in this war. Above all, it should not be forgotten that the 'ultimate ratio' of the United States is not the war with arms, but a complete prohibition of trade with Germany, and in fact, through legislation. That was brought out very clearly and sharply in connection with the still pending negotiations regarding theLusitaniacase."

That Dr. Albert used secret and perhaps devious means to secure his information is revealed by an unsigned confidential report which he received under most mysterious circumstances concerning an interview by a man referred to as "M. P." with President Wilson and Secretary Lansing. The person who wrote of "the conversation" on July 23, 1915, with "Legal Agent" Levyand Mr. John Simon does not give his name. A striking part of this conversation follows:

"Levy advises regarding a conference with M. P. Thereafter M. P. saw Lansing as well as Wilson. He informed both of them that an American syndicate had approached him which had strong German relations. This syndicate wishes to buy up cotton for Germany in great style, thereby to relieve the cotton situation, and at the same time to provide Germany with cotton." (Dr. Albert attempted, with a suitable campaign of press and political propaganda, to inflame the Southern planters over the British embargo on cotton.) "The relations of the American syndicate with Germany are very strong, so that they might even possibly be able to influence the position of Germany in the general political question. M. P. therefore asked for a candid, confidential statement in order to make clear not only his own position, but also necessarily the political opportunity. The result of the conversation was as follows:

"1. The note of protest to England will go in any event whether Germany answers satisfactorily or not.

"2. Should it be possible to settle satisfactorily theLusitaniacase, the President will bindhimself to carry the protest against England through to the uttermost.

"3. The continuance of the difference with Germany over theLusitaniacase is 'embarrassing' for the President in carrying out the protest against England....

"4. A contemplated English proposal to buy cotton in great style and invest the proceeds in America would not satisfy the President as an answer to the protest....

"5. The President, in order to ascertain from Mr. M. P. how strong the German influence of this syndicate is, would like to have the trend of the German note before the note is officially sent, and declares himself ready, before the answer is drafted, to discuss it with M. P., and eventually to so influence it that there will be an agreement for its reception, and also to be ready to influence the press through a wink.

"6. As far as the note itself is concerned, which he awaits, so he awaits another expression of regret, which was not followed in the last note. Regret together with the statement that nobody had expected that human lives would be lost and that the ship would sink so quickly.

"7. The President is said to have openly declared that he could hardly hope for a positivestatement that the submarine warfare would be discontinued."

Dr. Albert conferred with Captains Boy-Ed and von Papen on all military and naval matters having a commercial phase. Captain von Papen, on July 7, 1915, submitted to Dr. Albert a memorandum for his consideration and further recommendation, headed "Steps Taken to Prevent the Exportation of Liquid Chlorine." He told of the efforts made by England and France to buy that chemical in America, estimated the output here, and cited the manufacturers. He also enclosed a plan for checkmating the Allies and concluded with the following paragraph:

"It will be impossible, however, for this to go on any length of time, as the shareholders wish the profits to be derived therefrom. Dr. Orenstein therefore suggests that an agreement be consummated with the Electro Bleaching Company, through the President, Kingsley, whereby the delivery of liquid chlorine by this country to France and England will be stopped. A suggested plan is enclosed herewith.

"From a military standpoint I deem it very desirable to consummate such an agreement, in order to stop thereby the further exportation of about fifty-two tons of liquid chlorine monthly,especially in view of the fact that in France there is only one factory (Rouen) which can produce this stuff in small amounts, while it is only produced in very small quantities, in England."

During 1914 and 1915 German speculation in wool was active. Early in the war von Bernstorff summoned a German-American wool merchant recommended by a business friend in Berlin and directed him to buy all the wool he could secure. He did so, using Deutsches Bank credits for the purchases made for Germany, and making his purchases of wool for Germany even in Cape Town and Australia. The German-American, after following this practice for some months, decided that his financial allegiance belonged to America, so he tried, through Hugo Schmidt, to induce the German interests in his firm to sell out to him. On August 9, 1915, Schmidt wrote to Keswig, the Berlin principal:

"Your friend here has inquired in London, and he offers no matter what price may be realizable in London at that time to take over the wool from you at the original price, in which case you would naturally pay all the expenses, which are estimated to be about 6 per cent. As you see, it is not so simple to deal with your friends."

The German-American's offer meant a good profit to him, as the London price of wool at thattime had advanced nearly 15 per cent. Yet he apparently fell into no ill favor with Berlin, for in June, 1916, the German Foreign office wrote von Bernstorff:

"Interested parties here have repeatedly made representations for preferential treatment of the firm of Forstmann & Huffman in Passaic, N. J., in connection with shipment of coal tar dyes to the United States of America. Since this pure German firm, as is well known on your side, undertook last year the wool supply for Germany, and therefore claim it has been especially badly treated by England, it is most respectfully recommended to Your Excellency, should there be no reason to the contrary, to arrange for the greatest possible consideration for this firm in the later distribution of the shipments to consumers which now are in prospect."

Necessity, the mother of invention, had forced America's production of coal-tar derivatives and dyestuffs upward enormously during the first year of war. As the British blockade tightened, the German supply, which had long constituted the world supply, was cut off completely. The value of dyestuffs in America increased enormously from 1914 to 1915. Germany witnessed this growth with apprehension, and realized gravely that export expansion would follow increasedand perfected production in America, which it promptly did. German chemical interests involved in a drug house familiar with the German market, have testified that their firm "paid three times the value" of a cargo of dyestuffs shipped from Bremen to Baltimore in 1916 in the huge undersea-boatDeutschland, "which paid for the ship and cargo." Her sister ship, theBremen, which set forth for America, but never arrived, was also "built with money furnished by the dyestuff manufacturers," according to Ambassador Gerard.

TheDeutschlandherself was 300 feet long, with a cargo capacity of some 800 tons. She docked at the North German Lloyd piers in Baltimore, and after loading a cargo of rubber and nickel, took an opportune moment one foggy twilight to cast off and slip out to sea. She not only returned safely to Germany but made another round trip to America, putting in the second time at New London. She was at sea about three weeks on each crossing of the Atlantic.

Dr. Albert made plans for buying up carbolic acid to prevent it from reaching the Allies. Dr. Hugo Schweitzer, a German-American chemist of New York, paid down $100,000 cash on June 3, 1915, to the American Oil & Supply Company in New Jersey as part payment of $1,400,000 for1,212,000 pounds of carbolic acid, of which the American Oil & Supply Company had directed the purchase from Thomas A. Edison. Dr. Schweitzer said that he bought the liquid not to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Allies but to use in the manufacture of medical supplies.

Not the least interesting of Dr. Albert's financial experiences is that which conceived and bore the Bridgeport Projectile Company. In a conference early in 1915 in the offices of G. Amsinck & Co., in New York, Count von Bernstorff came to the conclusion that one way to prevent the shipment of munitions to the enemy was to monopolize the industry, or at least to control it financially as far as possible. Dr. Albert made an unsuccessful attempt to buy the Union Metallic Cartridge plant for $17,000,000. He chose as his lieutenants for his next task Hugo Schmidt, the New York representative of the Deutsches Bank, and Karl Heynen, whose past record had been auspicious, as agent for Mexico of the Hamburg-American Line. Heynen it was who had smuggled a cargo of arms ashore for Huerta at Vera Cruz, under the nose of the American fleet; he had received some 40,000 pesos (Mexican) for the coup, and he was regarded as a capable individual. On March 31, 1915, the BridgeportProjectile Company was incorporated for $2,000,000, paid in, with Walter Knight as president, Heynen as treasurer, and Karl Foster as secretary and counsel.

Schmidt drew up a contract with the new-born company calling for a large order of shells. On May 17 Heynen reported to Albert that 534 hydraulic presses for making shells of calibres 2.95 to 4.8 had been ordered, and would cost $417,550. These orders, with all others for tools and machinery which the Bridgeport company placed, were so well concealed about the business world that as late as August the impression was current that Great Britain was financing the company. On June 30 Heynen reported to Albert through Schmidt that the first shell cases would be manufactured under United States government inspection, in order to create the impression that the company was anxious for American contracts, and so that immediate delivery could be made in case such contracts were actually secured. "The most important buildings, forges, and machine shops, are almost under roof; the other buildings are fairly under way; presses, machinery and all other materials are being promptly assembled, and there is every indication that deliveries will commence as provided in the contract; i. e., on Sept. 1st, 1915."

The Bridgeport Projectile Company contracted with the Ætna Powder Company, one of the largest producers of explosives in America, for its entire output up to January, 1916, and then turned round and offered the Spanish government a million pounds of powder. The Spanish representatives may have suspected the identity of the company, for they raised certain objections to the contract, to which Heynen refused to listen, and he also reported to his superiors that British and Russian purchasing agents were going to call on him within a few days. He made a contract with Henry Disston & Co. for two million pieces of steel, most of them tools, for which Schmidt advanced the money. He contracted with the Camden Iron Works of Camden, N. J., for presses, and posted a forfeit of $165,000 in case the contract should be cancelled; the contract was signed and cancelled the next day by the Bridgeport company, causing the Camden concern great business difficulty.

Thus, by the manipulation of contracts, Dr. Albert and his associates were accomplishing the following ends:

1. Arranging to supply Germany with shells and powder (as soon as smuggling could be effected) at a time when official Germany was attempting to persuade the United States to placean embargo on the shipment of war materials to the Allies.

2. Securing a monopoly on all powder available.

3. So tying up the machinery and tool manufacturers that all their production for months to come was under contract to the Bridgeport Projectile Company, yet so wielding the cancellation clauses in its contracts that delivery could be delayed and the date further postponed when the manufacturers of machinery and tools could be free to take Allied orders.

4. Arranging to accept contracts for the United States and the Allies under such provisions that there would be no impossible forfeit if the contracts could not be fulfilled. This would have the effect of making the Allies believe that they were going to receive supplies which the Bridgeport Projectile Company had no intention of furnishing them.

5. Heynen, by the contract with the munitions industry, which his work afforded, knew where Allied orders for shells were placed, and he learned to his pleasure that the Allies were being forced to contract for shrapnel which was forged—a less satisfactory process than pressing. He also learned that the first two orders for forgedshrapnel placed by the Allies had been rejected because the product was inferior.

6. Paying abnormal wages with the unlimited funds at its disposal, stealing labor from the Union Metallic Cartridge Company in Bridgeport, and generally unsettling the labor situation.

7. Offering powder to Spain, a neutral with strong German affiliations.

The project was glorious in its forecast. But we may well let a German hand describe how it failed; among the papers captured by the British on the war correspondent and secret messenger Archibald at Falmouth in late August was a letter from Captain von Papen to his wife in Germany, in which he said:

"Our good friend Albert has been robbed of a thick portfolio of papers on the elevated road. English secret service men of course." (Papen was not altogether correct in this statement.) "Unfortunately, some very important matters from my report are among the papers, such as the purchase of liquid chlorine, the correspondence with the Bridgeport Projectile Company, as well as documents relating to the purchase of phenol, from which explosives are manufactured, and the acquisition of Wright's aeroplane patents. I send you also the reply of Albert, in order that youmay see how we protect ourselves. This we compounded last night in collaboration."[4]

Dr. Albert could hardly have chosen a more unfortunate set of documents to carry about with him and lose. "Pitiless publicity" was his reward, and the statement which he and von Papen prepared in refutation and denial was received by those in authority as precisely the sort of denial which any unscrupulous and able master of intrigue might be expected to issue under the circumstances—and no more. If there had been any doubt of the perniciousness of his activities—and there was none—it would have been dispelled by the seizure of the Archibald letters, but the result of the exposures of German activity which made theNew York World, a newspaper worth watching during August and September, 1915, was not the expulsion of Dr. Albert, but of the military and naval attachés. Albert, while he had been magnificently busy attempting to disturb America's calm, had been cunning enough to keep his hands free of blood and powder smoke;Boy-Ed and von Papen had to answer for the origination of so many crimes that it is almost incredible in the light of later events that they escaped with nothing more than a dismissal. On December 4, Secretary Lansing demanded their recall on account of their connection "with the illegal and questionable acts of certain persons within the United States"; Bernstorff made no reply for ten days, and received a sharp reminder for his delay; he then replied that the Kaiser agreed to the recall. Four days before Christmas von Papen sailed for England and Holland. On January 2 and 3, 1916, his effects were searched by the British at Falmouth and two documents among others found may be cited here. Boy-Ed sailed on New Year's Day, but with no incriminating documents, for he had been warned.

The first document found on von Papen was a letter from President Knight of the Bridgeport Projectile Company, dated Sept. 11, 1915, addressed to Heynen at 60 Wall Street—the building in which von Papen had his office—giving certain specifications for shells that were being made in the new Bridgeport plant; the second was a memorandum of an interview on December 21, between Papen, Heynen, G. W. Hoadley of the affiliated American-British ManufacturingCompany, and Captain Hans Tauscher. The four men had discussed specifications for a time, and had agreed that firing tests of the projectiles could be made "in a bomb-proof place by electrical explosion." Delays in production at Bridgeport are evident in the last sentence of the memorandum:

"It was agreed that Mr. Hoadley, till date, has complied with all the conditions of the contracts of the 1st April, with the exception of the commencement of the delivery of the shells, which is due toforce majeure, i. e., to failure to timely obtain the delivery of machinery and tools occasioned by strikes in the machine factories."

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