Chapter Twelve.Other Recent Cases. Bibliography.The work of the supply ship captured recently in a port on the east coast of Scotland hardly comes within the limits of this book, but it is significant as showing the daring of German methods, which apparently include the obtaining of supplies from an enemy’s country by means which endanger neutral shipping—so long as the neutral ships can be found to take the risks. It was noted by the naval authorities that German submarines had been displaying activity at such a distance from their legitimate ports of supply as to render probable and almost certain the existence of other sources of supply. A watch was consequently kept for suspicious neutral shipping, and in the end a capture was made.A vessel came into port and proceeded to load for departure, and the customs officers could find nothing wrong with her. Her papers were in order, her cargo contained nothing in the nature of contraband of war, and there was no cause for detaining her, as far as could be seen. But there were noted on the deck of the vessel, neatly coiled, cables and cables, enough to furnish a whaler on a three-years’ sailing voyage and leave over sufficient to start a ropemaker in business. All over the decks bulky coils of hawser lay, and though, at any other time, the hawsers might have passed without notice, it was felt by the customs men that the superabundance of rope justified further investigation than had already been bestowed on the boat.So one of the coils was unfastened, its wrappings removed, and the cable itself was uncoiled. Then was it found that there was merely a shell of rope, which served as covering for a steel drum containing oil fuel suited for the use of submarine engines. And there the story ends.The other case which I propose to quote shows equal audacity. At the Guildhall Court there appeared, on October 5, George Newton Spencer, who described himself as a clerk, and gave his address as Lubeckerstrasse, 33, Hamburg, Germany. He was charged with “unlawfully inciting Mr Frank Henry Houlder (Houlder Brothers, Limited, Leadenhall Street and Liverpool) to trade with the enemy.”Mr Humphreys stated in opening the case for the prosecution that the charges against the accused were based on the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1914. The accused was a British subject (as they all seem to be) who had been long resident in Germany, and had been clerk to a shipping company with a rather long name, but which might be translated as the Transport Shipping Company of Hamburg. The accused appeared to have been sent over to this country by his employers towards the end of September for the purpose of negotiating what, from their point of view, was a most important transaction. Although an Englishman, and of the age of thirty-two years, no difficulty was made by the German military authorities over the accused obtaining a pass to travel in Germany and leave the country. There was little doubt that the object of his visit was known to the authorities, who gave him that permission, although, from the German Emperor’s point of view, he was an alien enemy.The prisoner arrive in London on September 22, and on the next day he called on Mr Houlder. He introduced himself by producing a document in English, signed by his employers, which contained the proposal which had been made the subject of the charge. The proposal was as follows: There were six ships owned by the company at Hamburg, on which Messrs Houlder had mortgages amounting to about 30,000 pounds. These ships, on the outbreak of the war, and certainly in September—were either in neutral ports, and therefore temporarily lost to their owners, or were prizes of war, and as such temporarily—and probably finally—lost to their owners. The proposal to Messrs Houlder—to whom was payable 20,000 pounds on November 11, and 13,000 pounds on November 15, was to the effect that they should pay over 15,000 pounds to the Hamburg firm, and take over three of the steamers. The result would be that the mortgages on all six of the vessels would be wiped off, and Messrs Houlder would become the owners of them, while the steamship company at Hamburg would have 15,000 pounds in cash to enable them to carry on their business. The fact that one of the steamers was a prize of war in Gibraltar, and would probably be sold as such, made the proposal still more remarkable. Since, under these circumstances, Messrs Houlder could have no title, the Hamburg firm were virtually, asking for cash for nothing.Mr Houlder did not seriously consider the proposition, but, having made up his mind what to do, told the defendant he would have to consult his solicitors, and mentioned the existence of the proclamation which he assumed would prevent them from carrying out the transaction. Defendant replied to the effect that his employers had communicated with the German Foreign Office—as they had no proclamation—and had received permission to carry out the transaction. He handed Mr Houlder a bundle of documents in German, which showed that the defendant’s employers in Hamburg, before ever they attempted to put this transaction in form, obtained leave from their own authorities, to whom they stated their own frank view-point with regard to the matter. It was set out that monetary benefit to a certain amount would accrue to the Hamburg company as a result of the transaction, and that the vessels were all old freight steamers, of no possible use to the German Navy—neither were they fit for transport purposes. The Berlin Secretary of State for Home Affairs replied that no objection would be taken to the transaction.Mr Houlder communicated with the Admiralty instead of with his solicitors, and in the meantime the defendant went to a firm of marine insurance agents and made a similar proposal—this time to the extent of about 13,400 pounds cash benefit to the Hamburg firm. In neither case was any application made to the authorities in England for a licence to break the law regarding trading with the enemy. The total effect of the proposals, had they been carried through, would have been to place the Hamburg company in possession of about 28,000 pounds, with no compensating advantage whatever to the British firms—and the defendant was committed for trial. He received sentence of imprisonment for his treachery on October 14, 1914, after due and proper trial.The only point worthy of comment in connection with this case is the doubtful morality, in a business sense, of German firms. We may set aside the fact that a contravention of an enemy’s law was attempted, for no country would consider or regard the laws of a country with which it was at war, unless they involved principles of definite conduct and were the laws of civilisation rather than the laws framed for the protection of the said enemy in time of war. The point at issue is that a shipping company of Hamburg, by its offer of valueless titles in exchange for hard British cash, was attempting such a form of sharp practice as would land any British trader in the criminal courts for fraud. One is forced to the conclusion that among many Germans, and even among German firms whose standing ought to guarantee the cleanliness of their hands in business, there is no such thing as honesty, at least where dealing with a foreign firm is concerned. These people asked two London firms to break British law, and to be swindled. By German ethics, evidently, this is fair play and just dealing. It is an effect of the spy system on the moral fibre of the nation, rather than an instance of the working of the spy system itself—though the British subject who passed out from Germany at an acute point of the war between the two countries, without being questioned by German authorities, looks perilously like a spy at work, and the nature of his other missions in England, had he been left at liberty, calls for some speculation.Much may be learned with regard to the present working of German spies by intelligent perusal of the war reports, especially those coming from France, for the Russian theatre of war is so tremendous and so far off that the small details seldom come through—the details small in themselves, but of far-reaching import. As an instance may be again mentioned the way in which German troops, occupying a town, chalk on certain doors “Spare this house”—there is a world of enlightenment in the three words. Similarly, in advance and retreat the Germans have their agents with them or near them, and often the report makes tacit admission of the fact, in such a way that it is clear to one who reads with the espionage system in mind. The work of these agents is as endless as it is dishonourable and deadly—a poison that works just as efficiently as the legitimate weapons of war—and often more efficiently, since one can guard against an open weapon, but against the treachery that uses naturalisation and all things to further the ends of the monster trampling across the earth, there is no guard that soldiers can use as they use their weapons against troops opposed to them.The bibliography of espionage—German espionage—is a brief one, so far as books of value are concerned. First and foremost stand Stieber’s Memoirs, which tell all that Stieber chose to tell—and that is a good deal. The work has been translated into French, but not into English. There is the “Indiscretions” of Wollheim, a book which gives some idea of the system, but is mainly concerned with incident. The Memoirs of Busch, Bismarck’s friend, afford further light on the system, but only in a fragmentary way. “Military Espionage in Peace and War,” by W.N. Klembovski, a Russian Staff Officer, is more a manual of what ought to be done by purely military spies than a book descriptive of the German system. “Espionage Militaire,” by Lieutenant Froment of the French Army, is open to the same class of criticism, as is to a certain extent “Espionage,” by N. de Chilly, though the last named is a more informative book. “The German Spy System in France,” an English translation of Paul Lanoir’s book on the subject, is a brief but well-compiled review of what Germany has accomplished in the way of espionage since 1870 in France, and although rather pessimistic in tone as regards French counter-measures, ranks as a work of value.As a rule “confessions” of spies may be disregarded, though they make good melodramatic reading. The nature of the subject is such that those who would tell the whole cannot, and those who can will not. Bearing in mind the effect of thorough espionage on the German nation as a whole, it is to be hoped that in the near future the whole system will be swept away, together with the form of government that gave it birth and room to grow.
The work of the supply ship captured recently in a port on the east coast of Scotland hardly comes within the limits of this book, but it is significant as showing the daring of German methods, which apparently include the obtaining of supplies from an enemy’s country by means which endanger neutral shipping—so long as the neutral ships can be found to take the risks. It was noted by the naval authorities that German submarines had been displaying activity at such a distance from their legitimate ports of supply as to render probable and almost certain the existence of other sources of supply. A watch was consequently kept for suspicious neutral shipping, and in the end a capture was made.
A vessel came into port and proceeded to load for departure, and the customs officers could find nothing wrong with her. Her papers were in order, her cargo contained nothing in the nature of contraband of war, and there was no cause for detaining her, as far as could be seen. But there were noted on the deck of the vessel, neatly coiled, cables and cables, enough to furnish a whaler on a three-years’ sailing voyage and leave over sufficient to start a ropemaker in business. All over the decks bulky coils of hawser lay, and though, at any other time, the hawsers might have passed without notice, it was felt by the customs men that the superabundance of rope justified further investigation than had already been bestowed on the boat.
So one of the coils was unfastened, its wrappings removed, and the cable itself was uncoiled. Then was it found that there was merely a shell of rope, which served as covering for a steel drum containing oil fuel suited for the use of submarine engines. And there the story ends.
The other case which I propose to quote shows equal audacity. At the Guildhall Court there appeared, on October 5, George Newton Spencer, who described himself as a clerk, and gave his address as Lubeckerstrasse, 33, Hamburg, Germany. He was charged with “unlawfully inciting Mr Frank Henry Houlder (Houlder Brothers, Limited, Leadenhall Street and Liverpool) to trade with the enemy.”
Mr Humphreys stated in opening the case for the prosecution that the charges against the accused were based on the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1914. The accused was a British subject (as they all seem to be) who had been long resident in Germany, and had been clerk to a shipping company with a rather long name, but which might be translated as the Transport Shipping Company of Hamburg. The accused appeared to have been sent over to this country by his employers towards the end of September for the purpose of negotiating what, from their point of view, was a most important transaction. Although an Englishman, and of the age of thirty-two years, no difficulty was made by the German military authorities over the accused obtaining a pass to travel in Germany and leave the country. There was little doubt that the object of his visit was known to the authorities, who gave him that permission, although, from the German Emperor’s point of view, he was an alien enemy.
The prisoner arrive in London on September 22, and on the next day he called on Mr Houlder. He introduced himself by producing a document in English, signed by his employers, which contained the proposal which had been made the subject of the charge. The proposal was as follows: There were six ships owned by the company at Hamburg, on which Messrs Houlder had mortgages amounting to about 30,000 pounds. These ships, on the outbreak of the war, and certainly in September—were either in neutral ports, and therefore temporarily lost to their owners, or were prizes of war, and as such temporarily—and probably finally—lost to their owners. The proposal to Messrs Houlder—to whom was payable 20,000 pounds on November 11, and 13,000 pounds on November 15, was to the effect that they should pay over 15,000 pounds to the Hamburg firm, and take over three of the steamers. The result would be that the mortgages on all six of the vessels would be wiped off, and Messrs Houlder would become the owners of them, while the steamship company at Hamburg would have 15,000 pounds in cash to enable them to carry on their business. The fact that one of the steamers was a prize of war in Gibraltar, and would probably be sold as such, made the proposal still more remarkable. Since, under these circumstances, Messrs Houlder could have no title, the Hamburg firm were virtually, asking for cash for nothing.
Mr Houlder did not seriously consider the proposition, but, having made up his mind what to do, told the defendant he would have to consult his solicitors, and mentioned the existence of the proclamation which he assumed would prevent them from carrying out the transaction. Defendant replied to the effect that his employers had communicated with the German Foreign Office—as they had no proclamation—and had received permission to carry out the transaction. He handed Mr Houlder a bundle of documents in German, which showed that the defendant’s employers in Hamburg, before ever they attempted to put this transaction in form, obtained leave from their own authorities, to whom they stated their own frank view-point with regard to the matter. It was set out that monetary benefit to a certain amount would accrue to the Hamburg company as a result of the transaction, and that the vessels were all old freight steamers, of no possible use to the German Navy—neither were they fit for transport purposes. The Berlin Secretary of State for Home Affairs replied that no objection would be taken to the transaction.
Mr Houlder communicated with the Admiralty instead of with his solicitors, and in the meantime the defendant went to a firm of marine insurance agents and made a similar proposal—this time to the extent of about 13,400 pounds cash benefit to the Hamburg firm. In neither case was any application made to the authorities in England for a licence to break the law regarding trading with the enemy. The total effect of the proposals, had they been carried through, would have been to place the Hamburg company in possession of about 28,000 pounds, with no compensating advantage whatever to the British firms—and the defendant was committed for trial. He received sentence of imprisonment for his treachery on October 14, 1914, after due and proper trial.
The only point worthy of comment in connection with this case is the doubtful morality, in a business sense, of German firms. We may set aside the fact that a contravention of an enemy’s law was attempted, for no country would consider or regard the laws of a country with which it was at war, unless they involved principles of definite conduct and were the laws of civilisation rather than the laws framed for the protection of the said enemy in time of war. The point at issue is that a shipping company of Hamburg, by its offer of valueless titles in exchange for hard British cash, was attempting such a form of sharp practice as would land any British trader in the criminal courts for fraud. One is forced to the conclusion that among many Germans, and even among German firms whose standing ought to guarantee the cleanliness of their hands in business, there is no such thing as honesty, at least where dealing with a foreign firm is concerned. These people asked two London firms to break British law, and to be swindled. By German ethics, evidently, this is fair play and just dealing. It is an effect of the spy system on the moral fibre of the nation, rather than an instance of the working of the spy system itself—though the British subject who passed out from Germany at an acute point of the war between the two countries, without being questioned by German authorities, looks perilously like a spy at work, and the nature of his other missions in England, had he been left at liberty, calls for some speculation.
Much may be learned with regard to the present working of German spies by intelligent perusal of the war reports, especially those coming from France, for the Russian theatre of war is so tremendous and so far off that the small details seldom come through—the details small in themselves, but of far-reaching import. As an instance may be again mentioned the way in which German troops, occupying a town, chalk on certain doors “Spare this house”—there is a world of enlightenment in the three words. Similarly, in advance and retreat the Germans have their agents with them or near them, and often the report makes tacit admission of the fact, in such a way that it is clear to one who reads with the espionage system in mind. The work of these agents is as endless as it is dishonourable and deadly—a poison that works just as efficiently as the legitimate weapons of war—and often more efficiently, since one can guard against an open weapon, but against the treachery that uses naturalisation and all things to further the ends of the monster trampling across the earth, there is no guard that soldiers can use as they use their weapons against troops opposed to them.
The bibliography of espionage—German espionage—is a brief one, so far as books of value are concerned. First and foremost stand Stieber’s Memoirs, which tell all that Stieber chose to tell—and that is a good deal. The work has been translated into French, but not into English. There is the “Indiscretions” of Wollheim, a book which gives some idea of the system, but is mainly concerned with incident. The Memoirs of Busch, Bismarck’s friend, afford further light on the system, but only in a fragmentary way. “Military Espionage in Peace and War,” by W.N. Klembovski, a Russian Staff Officer, is more a manual of what ought to be done by purely military spies than a book descriptive of the German system. “Espionage Militaire,” by Lieutenant Froment of the French Army, is open to the same class of criticism, as is to a certain extent “Espionage,” by N. de Chilly, though the last named is a more informative book. “The German Spy System in France,” an English translation of Paul Lanoir’s book on the subject, is a brief but well-compiled review of what Germany has accomplished in the way of espionage since 1870 in France, and although rather pessimistic in tone as regards French counter-measures, ranks as a work of value.
As a rule “confessions” of spies may be disregarded, though they make good melodramatic reading. The nature of the subject is such that those who would tell the whole cannot, and those who can will not. Bearing in mind the effect of thorough espionage on the German nation as a whole, it is to be hoped that in the near future the whole system will be swept away, together with the form of government that gave it birth and room to grow.
Chapter Thirteen.Appendix.Since the preceding pages were written, and as proofs are being passed for press, the following statement has been issued for publication by the Home Office with regard to British counter-espionage measures:“In view of the anxiety naturally felt by the public with regard to the system of espionage on which Germany has placed so much reliance, and to which attention has been directed by recent reports from the seat of war, it may be well to state briefly the steps which the Home Office, acting on behalf of the Admiralty and War Office, has taken to deal with the matter in this country. The secrecy which it has hitherto been desirable in the public interest to observe on certain points cannot any longer be maintained, owing to the evidence which it is necessary to produce in cases against spies that are now pending.“It was clearly ascertained five or six years ago that the Germans were making great efforts to establish a system of espionage in this country, and in order to trace and thwart these efforts a Special Intelligence Department was established by the Admiralty and the War Office which has ever since acted in the closest co-operation with the Home Office and Metropolitan Police and the principal provincial Police Forces. In 1911, by the passing of the Official Secrets Act, 1911, the law with regard to espionage, which had hitherto been confused and defective, was put on a clear basis and extended so as to embrace every possible mode of obtaining and conveying to the enemy information which might be useful in war.“The Special Intelligence Department, supported by all the means which could be placed at its disposal by the Home Secretary, was able in three years, from 1911 to 1914, to discover the ramifications of the German secret service in England. In spite of enormous efforts and lavish expenditure of money by the enemy, little valuable information passed into their hands. The agents, of whose identity knowledge was obtained by the Special Intelligence Department, were watched and shadowed without in general taking any hostile action or allowing them to know that their movements were watched. When, however, any actual step was taken to convey plans or documents of importance from this country to Germany the spy was arrested, and in such case evidence sufficient to secure his conviction was usually found in his possession. Proceedings under the Official Secrets Acts were taken by the Director of Public Prosecutions, and in six cases sentences were passed varying from eighteen months to six years’ penal servitude. At the same time steps were taken to mark down and keep under observation all the agents known to be engaged in this traffic, so that when any necessity arose the Police might lay hands on them at once, and accordingly on August 4, before the declaration of war, instructions were given by the Home Secretary for the arrest of twenty known spies, and all were arrested. This figure does not cover a large number (upwards of two hundred) who were noted as under suspicion or to be kept under special observation. The great majority of these were interned at or soon after the declaration of war.“None of the men arrested in pursuance of the orders issued on August 4 has yet been brought to trial, partly because the officers whose evidence would have been required were engaged in urgent duties in the early days of the war, but mainly because the prosecution, by disclosing the means adopted to track out the spies and prove their guilt, would have hampered the Intelligence Department in its further efforts. They were, and still are, held as prisoners under the powers given to the Secretary of State by the Aliens Restriction Act. One of them, however, who established a claim to British nationality, has now been formally charged, and, the reasons for delay no longer existing, it is a matter for consideration whether the same course should now be taken with regard to some of the other known spies.“Although this action taken on August 4 is believed to have broken up the spy organisation which had been established before the war, it is still necessary to take the most rigorous measures to prevent the establishment of any fresh organisation and to deal with individual spies who might previously have been working in this country outside the organisation, or who might be sent here under the guise of neutrals after the declaration of war. In carrying this out the Home Office and War Office have now the assistance of the Cable Censorship, and also of the Postal Censorship, which, established originally to deal with correspondence with Germany and Austria, has been gradually extended (as the necessary staff could be obtained) so as to cover communications with those neutral countries through which correspondence might readily pass to Germany or Austria. The censorship has been extremely effective in stopping secret communications by cable or letter with the enemy; but, as its existence was necessarily known to them, it has not, except in a few instances, produced materials for the detection of espionage.“On August 5 the Aliens Restriction Act was passed, and within an hour of its passing an Order-in-Coundl was made which gave the Home Office and the Police stringent powers to deal with aliens, and especially enemy aliens, who under this act could be stopped from entering or leaving the United Kingdom, and were prohibited while residing in this country from having in their possession any wireless or signalling apparatus of any kind, or any carrier or homing pigeons. Under this Order all those districts where the Admiralty or War Office considered it undesirable that enemy aliens should reside have been cleared by the Police of Germans and Austrians, with the exception of a few persons, chiefly women and children, whose character and antecedents are such that the local Chief Constable, in whose discretion the matter is vested by the Order, considered that all ground for suspicion was precluded. At the same time the Post Office, acting under the powers given them by the Wireless Telegraphy Acts, dismantled all private wireless stations; and they established a special system of wireless detection by which any station actually used for the transmission of messages from this country could be discovered. The Police have co-operated successfully in this matter with the Post Office.“New and still more stringent powers for dealing with espionage were given by the Defence of the Realm Act, which was passed by the Home Secretary through the House of Commons and received the Royal Assent on August 8. Orders-in-Council have been made under this Act which prohibit, in the widest terms, any attempt on the part either of aliens or of British subjects to communicate any information which is calculated ‘to be or might be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy’; and any person offending against this prohibition is liable to be tried by court-martial and sentenced to penal servitude for life. The effect of these Orders is to make espionage a military offence. Power is given both to the police and to the military authorities to arrest without a warrant any person whose behaviour is such as to give rise to suspicion, and any person so arrested by the police would be handed over to the military authorities for trial by court-martial. Only in the event of the military authorities holding that there is no prima-facie case of espionage or any other offence tryable by military law is a prisoner handed back to the civil authorities to consider whether he should be charged with failing to register or with any other offence under the Aliens Restriction Act.“The present position is, therefore, that espionage has been made by statute a military offence tryable by court-martial. If tried under the Defence of the Realm Act, the maximum punishment is penal servitude for life; but if dealt with outside that Act as a war crime the punishment of death can be inflicted.“At the present moment one case is pending in which a person charged with attempting to convey information to the enemy is now awaiting his trial by court-martial, but in no other case has any clear trace been discovered of any attempt to convey information to the enemy, and there is good reason to believe that the spy organisation crushed at the outbreak of the war has not been re-established.“How completely that system had been suppressed in the early days of the war is clear from the fact—disclosed in a German Army Order—that on August 21 the German Military Commanders were still ignorant of the despatch and movements of the British Expeditionary Force, although these had been known for many days to a large number of people in this country.“The fact, however, of this initial success does not prevent the possibility of fresh attempts at espionage being made, and there is no relaxation in the efforts of the Intelligence Department and of the Police to watch and detect any attempts in this direction. In carrying out their duties, the military and police authorities would expect that persons having information of cases of suspected espionage would communicate the grounds of the suspicion to local military authority or to the local police, who are in direct communication with the Special Intelligence Department, instead of causing unnecessary public alarm, and possibly giving warning to the spies by public speeches or letters to the Press. In cases in which the Director of Public Prosecutions has appealed to the authors of such letters and speeches to supply him with the evidence upon which their statements were founded in order that he might consider the question of prosecuting the offender, no evidence of any value has as yet been forthcoming.“Among other measures which have been taken has been the registration, by Order of the Secretary of State, made under the Defence of the Realm Act, of all persons keeping carrier or homing pigeons. The importation and the conveyance by rail of these birds have been prohibited; and, with the valuable assistance of the National Homing Union, a system of registration has been extended to the whole of the United Kingdom, and measures have been taken which it is believed will be effective to prevent the possibility of any birds being kept in this country which would fly to the Continent.“Another matter which has engaged the closest attention of the police has been the possibility of conspiracies to commit outrage. No trace whatever has been discovered of any such conspiracy, and no outrage of any sort has yet been committed by any alien—not even telegraph-wires having been maliciously cut since the beginning of the war. Nevertheless, it has been necessary to bear in mind the possibility that such a secret conspiracy might exist or might be formed among alien enemies resident in this country.“Accordingly, immediately after the commencement of hostilities, rigorous search was made by the police in the houses of Germans and Austrians, in their clubs and in all places where they were likely to resort. In a few cases individuals were found who were in possession of a gun or pistol which they had not declared, and in one or two cases there were small collections of ancient firearms, and in such cases the offenders have been prosecuted and punished; but no store of effective arms—still less any bombs or instruments of destruction—have so far been discovered.“From the beginning, any Germans or Austrians who were deemed by the police to be likely to be dangerous were apprehended, handed over to the military authorities, and detained as prisoners of war; and, as soon as the military authorities desired it, general action was taken to arrest and hand over to military custody Germans of military age, subject to exceptions which have properly been made on grounds of policy. About 9,000 Germans and Austrians of military age have been so arrested, and are held as prisoners of war in detention camps, and among them are included those who are regarded by the police as likely in any possible event to take part in any outbreak of disorder or incendiarism.”
Since the preceding pages were written, and as proofs are being passed for press, the following statement has been issued for publication by the Home Office with regard to British counter-espionage measures:
“In view of the anxiety naturally felt by the public with regard to the system of espionage on which Germany has placed so much reliance, and to which attention has been directed by recent reports from the seat of war, it may be well to state briefly the steps which the Home Office, acting on behalf of the Admiralty and War Office, has taken to deal with the matter in this country. The secrecy which it has hitherto been desirable in the public interest to observe on certain points cannot any longer be maintained, owing to the evidence which it is necessary to produce in cases against spies that are now pending.
“It was clearly ascertained five or six years ago that the Germans were making great efforts to establish a system of espionage in this country, and in order to trace and thwart these efforts a Special Intelligence Department was established by the Admiralty and the War Office which has ever since acted in the closest co-operation with the Home Office and Metropolitan Police and the principal provincial Police Forces. In 1911, by the passing of the Official Secrets Act, 1911, the law with regard to espionage, which had hitherto been confused and defective, was put on a clear basis and extended so as to embrace every possible mode of obtaining and conveying to the enemy information which might be useful in war.
“The Special Intelligence Department, supported by all the means which could be placed at its disposal by the Home Secretary, was able in three years, from 1911 to 1914, to discover the ramifications of the German secret service in England. In spite of enormous efforts and lavish expenditure of money by the enemy, little valuable information passed into their hands. The agents, of whose identity knowledge was obtained by the Special Intelligence Department, were watched and shadowed without in general taking any hostile action or allowing them to know that their movements were watched. When, however, any actual step was taken to convey plans or documents of importance from this country to Germany the spy was arrested, and in such case evidence sufficient to secure his conviction was usually found in his possession. Proceedings under the Official Secrets Acts were taken by the Director of Public Prosecutions, and in six cases sentences were passed varying from eighteen months to six years’ penal servitude. At the same time steps were taken to mark down and keep under observation all the agents known to be engaged in this traffic, so that when any necessity arose the Police might lay hands on them at once, and accordingly on August 4, before the declaration of war, instructions were given by the Home Secretary for the arrest of twenty known spies, and all were arrested. This figure does not cover a large number (upwards of two hundred) who were noted as under suspicion or to be kept under special observation. The great majority of these were interned at or soon after the declaration of war.
“None of the men arrested in pursuance of the orders issued on August 4 has yet been brought to trial, partly because the officers whose evidence would have been required were engaged in urgent duties in the early days of the war, but mainly because the prosecution, by disclosing the means adopted to track out the spies and prove their guilt, would have hampered the Intelligence Department in its further efforts. They were, and still are, held as prisoners under the powers given to the Secretary of State by the Aliens Restriction Act. One of them, however, who established a claim to British nationality, has now been formally charged, and, the reasons for delay no longer existing, it is a matter for consideration whether the same course should now be taken with regard to some of the other known spies.
“Although this action taken on August 4 is believed to have broken up the spy organisation which had been established before the war, it is still necessary to take the most rigorous measures to prevent the establishment of any fresh organisation and to deal with individual spies who might previously have been working in this country outside the organisation, or who might be sent here under the guise of neutrals after the declaration of war. In carrying this out the Home Office and War Office have now the assistance of the Cable Censorship, and also of the Postal Censorship, which, established originally to deal with correspondence with Germany and Austria, has been gradually extended (as the necessary staff could be obtained) so as to cover communications with those neutral countries through which correspondence might readily pass to Germany or Austria. The censorship has been extremely effective in stopping secret communications by cable or letter with the enemy; but, as its existence was necessarily known to them, it has not, except in a few instances, produced materials for the detection of espionage.
“On August 5 the Aliens Restriction Act was passed, and within an hour of its passing an Order-in-Coundl was made which gave the Home Office and the Police stringent powers to deal with aliens, and especially enemy aliens, who under this act could be stopped from entering or leaving the United Kingdom, and were prohibited while residing in this country from having in their possession any wireless or signalling apparatus of any kind, or any carrier or homing pigeons. Under this Order all those districts where the Admiralty or War Office considered it undesirable that enemy aliens should reside have been cleared by the Police of Germans and Austrians, with the exception of a few persons, chiefly women and children, whose character and antecedents are such that the local Chief Constable, in whose discretion the matter is vested by the Order, considered that all ground for suspicion was precluded. At the same time the Post Office, acting under the powers given them by the Wireless Telegraphy Acts, dismantled all private wireless stations; and they established a special system of wireless detection by which any station actually used for the transmission of messages from this country could be discovered. The Police have co-operated successfully in this matter with the Post Office.
“New and still more stringent powers for dealing with espionage were given by the Defence of the Realm Act, which was passed by the Home Secretary through the House of Commons and received the Royal Assent on August 8. Orders-in-Council have been made under this Act which prohibit, in the widest terms, any attempt on the part either of aliens or of British subjects to communicate any information which is calculated ‘to be or might be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy’; and any person offending against this prohibition is liable to be tried by court-martial and sentenced to penal servitude for life. The effect of these Orders is to make espionage a military offence. Power is given both to the police and to the military authorities to arrest without a warrant any person whose behaviour is such as to give rise to suspicion, and any person so arrested by the police would be handed over to the military authorities for trial by court-martial. Only in the event of the military authorities holding that there is no prima-facie case of espionage or any other offence tryable by military law is a prisoner handed back to the civil authorities to consider whether he should be charged with failing to register or with any other offence under the Aliens Restriction Act.
“The present position is, therefore, that espionage has been made by statute a military offence tryable by court-martial. If tried under the Defence of the Realm Act, the maximum punishment is penal servitude for life; but if dealt with outside that Act as a war crime the punishment of death can be inflicted.
“At the present moment one case is pending in which a person charged with attempting to convey information to the enemy is now awaiting his trial by court-martial, but in no other case has any clear trace been discovered of any attempt to convey information to the enemy, and there is good reason to believe that the spy organisation crushed at the outbreak of the war has not been re-established.
“How completely that system had been suppressed in the early days of the war is clear from the fact—disclosed in a German Army Order—that on August 21 the German Military Commanders were still ignorant of the despatch and movements of the British Expeditionary Force, although these had been known for many days to a large number of people in this country.
“The fact, however, of this initial success does not prevent the possibility of fresh attempts at espionage being made, and there is no relaxation in the efforts of the Intelligence Department and of the Police to watch and detect any attempts in this direction. In carrying out their duties, the military and police authorities would expect that persons having information of cases of suspected espionage would communicate the grounds of the suspicion to local military authority or to the local police, who are in direct communication with the Special Intelligence Department, instead of causing unnecessary public alarm, and possibly giving warning to the spies by public speeches or letters to the Press. In cases in which the Director of Public Prosecutions has appealed to the authors of such letters and speeches to supply him with the evidence upon which their statements were founded in order that he might consider the question of prosecuting the offender, no evidence of any value has as yet been forthcoming.
“Among other measures which have been taken has been the registration, by Order of the Secretary of State, made under the Defence of the Realm Act, of all persons keeping carrier or homing pigeons. The importation and the conveyance by rail of these birds have been prohibited; and, with the valuable assistance of the National Homing Union, a system of registration has been extended to the whole of the United Kingdom, and measures have been taken which it is believed will be effective to prevent the possibility of any birds being kept in this country which would fly to the Continent.
“Another matter which has engaged the closest attention of the police has been the possibility of conspiracies to commit outrage. No trace whatever has been discovered of any such conspiracy, and no outrage of any sort has yet been committed by any alien—not even telegraph-wires having been maliciously cut since the beginning of the war. Nevertheless, it has been necessary to bear in mind the possibility that such a secret conspiracy might exist or might be formed among alien enemies resident in this country.
“Accordingly, immediately after the commencement of hostilities, rigorous search was made by the police in the houses of Germans and Austrians, in their clubs and in all places where they were likely to resort. In a few cases individuals were found who were in possession of a gun or pistol which they had not declared, and in one or two cases there were small collections of ancient firearms, and in such cases the offenders have been prosecuted and punished; but no store of effective arms—still less any bombs or instruments of destruction—have so far been discovered.
“From the beginning, any Germans or Austrians who were deemed by the police to be likely to be dangerous were apprehended, handed over to the military authorities, and detained as prisoners of war; and, as soon as the military authorities desired it, general action was taken to arrest and hand over to military custody Germans of military age, subject to exceptions which have properly been made on grounds of policy. About 9,000 Germans and Austrians of military age have been so arrested, and are held as prisoners of war in detention camps, and among them are included those who are regarded by the police as likely in any possible event to take part in any outbreak of disorder or incendiarism.”
|Preface| |Foreword| |Chapter 1| |Chapter 2| |Chapter 3| |Chapter 4| |Chapter 5| |Chapter 6| |Chapter 7| |Chapter 8| |Chapter 9| |Chapter 10| |Chapter 11| |Chapter 12| |Chapter 13|