In other districts of the colony the effect was, for a while, doubtful. The extreme reluctance of Englishmen to admit the necessity for military interference by the Government told strongly in favor of the rioters. There was some danger that Melbourne and Geelong, left almost entirely unprotected by the concentration of troops and police at Ballarat, would be taken possession of by rioters from the country districts, and Sir Charles Hotham made hasty application to Sir William Denison, the Governor of Tasmania, for military assistance. Very soon, however, the feelings of orderly citizens asserted themselves. Special constables were sworn in at Melbourne and Geelong, marines from two men-of-war stationed at Port Phillip guarded the prisons and the powder stores, wealthy men volunteered to serve as mounted police, and the arrival of the Ninety-ninth Regiment from Tasmania on December 10th dealt a final blow to the hopes of the insurgents. Even before this event, all the respectable classes in the community had rallied round the Governor, and he felt himself in a position to defy further outbreaks.
But the ugliest feature of the whole affair was yet to be revealed. Out of the large number of prisoners taken at the capture of the stockade, only thirteen were committed for trial, the magistrates being instructed to commit only when the evidence was of the clearest nature. It being considered impossible to obtain an impartial trial by a local jury, the prisoners were brought down to Melbourne, and, after various delays, the charges were proceeded with on February 20, 1855. A Boston negro, named John Joseph, and a reporter for the BallaratTimes, named Manning, were first tried. The latter may have been merely led away by professional ardor in the pursuit of "copy," though the fact that he had been openly drilled and instructed in the use of a pike by the insurgents would seem to show that his zeal was somewhat excessive.
In the case of Joseph, the evidence was overwhelming; he had actually been seen to fire upon the troops, and he was captured in a tent which had been used as a guard-room by the insurgents. No counter-evidence was offered, the prisoners' counsel relying entirely on the alleged absence of treasonable intention. Nevertheless both prisoners were speedily acquitted, and, although the Government wisely withdrew the remaining cases for the time, subsequent trials produced similar results. Ultimately, however, the difficulties of the situation were allayed by the reforms introduced on the recommendation of the commission appointed to consider the whole subject of the gold-fields. This body presented, on March 27, 1855, an extremely able report, in which it recommended the abolition of the license fee and the substitution therefor of a "miners' right" or Crown permission, lasting for a year, and granted for a nominal fee of one pound, to occupy for mining purposes a specific piece of Crown land. The deficiency in revenue anticipated from the abolition of license fees was to be met by the imposition of an export duty upon gold at the rate of a half-crown an ounce.
The commission strongly recommended the granting of the political franchise to holders of "miners' rights," and the provision of liberal facilities for the acquisition of land by the miners. It also advocated the simplification of the existing complex system of government in the mining districts, whereby commissioners, police authorities, commissariat officials, and magistrates all worked independently of each other, and suggested the substitution therefor of experienced "wardens" at the head of elective boards, who should not only dispose, with the aid of skilled assessors, of disputes specially connected with mining operations, but who should have power to issue by-laws adapted to the special requirements of each district.
These recommendations were for the most part carried out by legislation of the same year (1855), and, before his lamented death in December, 1855, Sir Charles Hotham had the happiness being able to report to the Home Government the almost perfect tranquillity of the gold-fields. Moreover, the revenue had not suffered by the substitution of the export duty for the license fees; but the collector of customs was of opinion that the result of the change had been to throw the entire burden of the tax upon the importers of the colony instead of upon the mining population. The Government was not, however, disposed to concern itself with considerations of abstract justice so long as it could collect a sufficient revenue without serious opposition.
(1854) THE RISE OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, Abraham Lincoln
The election of 1852 virtually destroyed the Whig party, and Franklin Pierce, the candidate of the Democratic party, was elected by great majorities. If the Whig party had perished because it had no distinct position upon the one overshadowing question of the day, so neither did the new President comprehend the nature and condition of that issue. In his first message he complacently congratulated the country that the slavery question had been settled peacefully and forever by the compromise measures of 1850. He little knew how ineffective were those compromises; he never dreamed that it was a question that no compromise could settle permanently, and probably had no conception of the new force that was to be given to it during his own term of office. Stephen A. Douglas, an acknowledged aspirant to the Presidency, being Chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories, introduced and carried through Congress a measure called the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, which, in providing for the admission of those Territories as States, embodied his doctrine of "Popular Sovereignty" in that it permitted the inhabitants to determine by popular vote whether they should come into the Union as free States or as slave States, and abolished the Missouri Compromise, which for thirty-four years had forbidden the acquisition of any slave territory north of the parallel of 36° 30'.
The abrogation of this compromise, which had been looked upon as a sacred compact, convinced a majority of the Northern people that the system of slavery was filled with the spirit of aggressiveness and determined to spread itself into all the Territories. Consequently there arose for the first time a powerful anti-slavery party, which, while denying that it had any purpose of meddling with that institution in the States where it already existed, declared that it should never be extended into any more of the national domain. At the same time this was a stronger party in favor of the protective tariff than had ever before existed. This organization, which gave itself the name "Republican party," came into existence in 1854, the same year in which Senator Douglas's bill abrogated the Missouri Compromise. There are several claimants for the honor of first proposing it; but as a fact, it sprang into existence with virtual simultaneousness in several of the Northern States. If there was a priority, it was in Massachusetts, where Robert Carter acted as Secretary of the Convention and wrote the resolutions. Two years later this party entered the Presidential contest with John C. Frémont as its candidate. It cast an enormous vote, but was not successful, mainly for the reason that the short-lived American (or Know-Nothing) party was then at its best, and had its own ticket, headed by Millard Fillmore. Four years later still, it nominated and elected Abraham Lincoln as President, and the clearest argument for its existence that ever has been put forth is in Lincoln's first speech in his famous debate with Senator Douglas, which was delivered in Springfield, Illinois, June 17, 1858. The full text of that speech follows herewith.
If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do, and how to do it. We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was initiated with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion, it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. "A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved; I do not expect the house to fall; but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.
Have we no tendency to the latter condition? Let anyone who doubts, carefully contemplate that now almost complete legal combination—piece of machinery, so to speak—compounded of the Nebraska doctrine and the Dred Scott decision. Let him consider, not only what work the machinery is adapted to do, and how well adapted, but also let him study the history of its construction, and trace, if he can, or rather fail, if he can, to trace the evidences of design, and concert of action, among its chief architects, from the beginning.
The new year of 1854 found slavery excluded from more than half the States by State constitutions, and from most of the national territory by Congressional prohibition. Four days later commenced the struggle which ended in repealing that Congressional prohibition. This opened all the national territory to slavery, and was the first point gained. But, so far, Congress only had acted, and an indorsement by the people, real or apparent, was indispensable to save the point already gained, and give chance for more.
This necessity had not been overlooked, but had been provided for, as well as might be, in the notable argument of "squatter sovereignty," otherwise called "sacred right of self-government," which latter phrase, though expressive of the only rightful basis of any government, was so perverted in this attempted use of it as to amount to just this: That if anyoneman choose to enslaveanother, nothirdman shall be allowed to object. That argument was incorporated into the Nebraska Bill itself, in the language which follows: "It being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States." Then opened the roar of loose declamation in favor of "squatter sovereignty" and "sacred right of self-government." "But," said opposition members, "let us amend the bill so as to expressly declare that the people of the Territory may exclude slavery." "Not we," said the friends of the measure; and down they voted the amendment.
While the Nebraska Bill was passing through Congress, alaw case,involving the question of a negro's freedom, by reason of his owner having voluntarily taken him first into a free State, and then into a Territory covered by the Congressional prohibition, and held him as a slave for a long time in each, was passing through the United States Circuit Court for the District of Missouri; and both Nebraska Bill and lawsuit were brought to a decision in the same month of May, 1854. The negro's name was "Dred Scott," which name now designates the decision finally made in the case. Before the then next Presidential election, the law case came to and was argued in the Supreme Court of the United States; but the decision of it was deferred until after the election. Still, before the election, Senator Trumbull, on the floor of the Senate, requested the leading advocate of the Nebraska Bill to statehis opinionwhether the people of a Territory can constitutionally exclude slavery from their limits; and the latter answers, "That is a question for the Supreme Court."
The election came. Buchanan was elected, and the indorsement, such as it was, secured. That was the second point gained. The indorsement, however, fell short of a clear popular majority by nearly four hundred thousand votes, and so, perhaps, was not overwhelmingly reliable and satisfactory. The outgoing President, in his last annual message, as impressively as possible echoed back upon the people the weight and authority of the indorsement. The Supreme Court met again, did not announce their decision, but ordered a reargument. The Presidential inauguration came, and still no decision of the court; but the incoming President, in his inaugural address, fervently exhorted the people to abide by the forthcoming decision, whatever it might be. Then, in a few days, came the decision.
The reputed author of the Nebraska Bill finds an early occasion to make a speech at this capital indorsing the Dred Scott decision, and vehemently denouncing all opposition to it. The new President, too, seizes the early occasion of the Silliman letter to indorse and strongly construe that decision, and to express his astonishment that any different view had ever been entertained!
At length a squabble springs up between the President and the author of the Nebraska Bill, on the mere question offact, whether the Lecompton Constitution was or was not in any just sense made by the people of Kansas; and in that quarrel the latter declares that all he wants is a fair vote for the people, and that he cares not whether slavery be voteddownor votedup. I do not understand his declaration, that he cares not whether slavery be voted down or voted up, to be intended by him other than as an apt definition of the policy he would impress upon the public mind—the principle for which he declares he has suffered so much, and is ready to suffer to the end. And well may he cling to that principle! If he has any parental feeling, well may he cling to it. That principle is the only shred left of his original Nebraska doctrine. Under the Dred Scott decision "squatter sovereignty" squatted out of existence, tumbled down like temporary scaffolding; like the mould at the foundry, served through one blast, and fell back into loose sand; helped to carry an election, and then was kicked to the winds. His late joint struggle with the Republicans, against the Lecompton Constitution, involves nothing of the original Nebraska doctrine. That struggle was made on a point—the right of a people to make their own constitution—upon which he and the Republicans have never differed.
The several points of the Dred Scott decision, in connection withSenator Douglas's "care not" policy, constitute the piece of machinery,in its present state of advancement. This was the third point gained.The points of that machinery are:
Firstly. That no negro slave, imported as such from Africa, and no descendant of such slave, can ever be a citizen of any State, in the sense of that term as used in the Constitution of the United States. This point is made in order to deprive the negro, in every possible event, of the benefit of that provision of the United States Constitution which declares that "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."
Secondly. That, "subject to the Constitution of the United States," neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature can exclude slavery from any United States Territory. This point is made in order that individual men may fill up the Territories with slaves, without danger of losing them as property, and thus to enhance the chances of permanency to the institution through all the future.
Thirdly. That whether the holding a negro in actual slavery in a free State makes him free, as against the holder, the United States courts will not decide, but will leave to be decided by the courts of any slave State the negro may be forced into by the master. This point is made, not to be pressed immediately; but, if acquiesced in for a while, and apparently indorsed by the people at an election, then to sustain the logical conclusion that what Dred Scott's master might lawfully do with Dred Scott in the free State of Illinois, every other master may lawfully do with any other one, or one thousand slaves, in Illinois, or in any other free State.
Auxiliary to all this, and working hand in hand with it, the Nebraska doctrine, or what is left of it, is to educate and mould public opinion, at least Northern public opinion, not to care whether slavery is voted down or voted up. This shows exactly where we now are, and partially, also, whither we are tending.
It will throw additional light on the latter to go back and run the mind over the string of historical facts already stated. Several things will now appear less dark and mysterious than they did when they were transpiring. The people were to be left "perfectly free," "subject only to the Constitution." What the Constitution had to do with it outsiders could not then see. Plainly enough now, it was an exactly fitted niche for the Dred Scott decision to come in afterward, and declare the perfect freedom of the people to be just no freedom at all. Why was the amendment, expressly declaring the right of the people, voted down? Plainly enough now, the adoption of it would have spoiled the niche for the Dred Scott decision. Why was the court decision held up? Why even a Senator's individual opinion withheld, till after the Presidential election? Plainly enough now, the speaking out then would have damaged the perfectly free argument upon which the election was to be carried. Why the outgoing President's felicitation on the indorsement? Why the delay of a reargument? Why the incoming President's advance exhortation in favor of the decision? These things look like the cautious patting and petting of a spirited horse preparatory to mounting him, when it is dreaded that he may give the rider a fall. And why the hasty after-indorsement of the decision by the President and others?
We cannot absolutely know that all these exact adaptations are the result of preconcert. But when we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions of which we know have been gotten out at different times and places and by different workmen—Stephen, Franklin, Roger, and James, for instance—and when we see these timbers joined together, and see they exactly make the frame of a house or a mill, all the tenons and mortises exactly fitting, and all the lengths and proportions of the different pieces exactly adapted to their respective places, and not a piece too many or too few—not omitting even scaffolding—or, if a single piece be lacking, we see the place in the frame exactly fitted and prepared yet to bring such piece in—in such a case we find it impossible not to believe that Stephen and Franklin and Roger and James all understood one another from the beginning, and all worked upon a common plan or draft drawn up before the first blow was struck.
It should not be overlooked that by the Nebraska Bill the people of aStateas well as Territory were to be left "perfectly free," "subject only to the Constitution." Why mention a State? They were legislating for Territories, and not for or about States. Certainly the people of a State are and ought to be subject to the Constitution of the United States; but why is mention of this lugged into this merely Territorial law? Why are the people of a Territory and the people of a State therein lumped together, and their relation to the Constitution therein treated as being precisely the same? While the opinion of the court, by Chief Justice Taney, in the Dred Scott case, and the separate opinions of all the concurring judges expressly declare that the Constitution of the United States neither permits Congress nor a Territorial Legislature to exclude slavery from any United States Territory, they all omit to declare whether or not the same Constitution permits a State, or the people of a State, to exclude it.Possibly, this is a mere omission; but who can be quite sure, if McLean or Curtis had sought to get into the opinion a declaration of unlimited power in the people of a State to exclude slavery from their limits, just as Chase and Mace sought to get such declaration, in behalf of the people of a Territory, into the Nebraska Bill—I ask, who can be quite sure that it would not have been voted down in the one case as it had been in the other?
The nearest approach to the point of declaring the power of a State over slavery, is made by Judge Nelson. He approaches it more than once, using the precise idea, and almost the language, too, of the Nebraska Act. On one occasion, his exact language is, "Except in cases where the power is restrained by the Constitution of the United States, the law of the State is supreme over the subject of slavery within its jurisdiction." In what cases the power of the States is so restrained by the United States Constitution is left an open question, precisely as the same question, as to the restraint on the power of the Territories, was left open in the Nebraska Act. Put this and that together, and we have another nice little niche, which we may, ere long, see filled with another Supreme Court decision, declaring that the Constitution of the United States does not permit aStateto exclude slavery from its limits. And this may especially be expected if the doctrine of "care not whether slavery be voted down or voted up" shall gain upon the public mind sufficiently to give promise that such a decision can be maintained when made.
Such a decision is all that slavery now lacks of being alike lawful in all the States. Welcome or unwelcome, such decision is probably coming, and will soon be upon us, unless the power of the present political dynasty shall be met and overthrown. We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming that the people of Missouri are on the verge of making their State free, and we shall awake to the reality instead that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a slave State. To meet and overthrow the power of that dynasty is the work now before all who would prevent that consummation. That is what we have to do. How can we best do it?
There are those who denounce us openly to their own friends, and yet whisper us softly that Senator Douglas is the aptest instrument there is with which to effect that object. They wish us toinferall, from the fact that he now has a little quarrel with the present head of the dynasty, and that he has regularly voted with us on a single point, upon which he and we have never differed. They remind us that he is a great man, and that the largest of us are very small ones. Let this be granted. But "a living dog is better than a dead lion." Judge Douglas, if not a dead lion, for this work is at least a caged and toothless one. How can he oppose the advances of slavery? He don't care anything about it. His avowed mission is impressing the "public heart" tocare nothing about it. A leading Douglas Democratic newspaper thinks Douglas's superior talent will be needed to resist the revival of the African slave-trade. Does Douglas believe an effort to revive that trade is approaching? He has not said so. Does he really think so? But if it is, how can he resist it? For years he has labored to prove it a sacred right of white men to take negro slaves into the new Territories. Can he possibly show that it is less a sacred right to buy them where they can be bought cheapest? And unquestionably they can be bought cheaper in Africa than in Virginia. He has done all in his power to reduce the whole question of slavery to one of a mere right of property; and, as such, how can he oppose the foreign slave-trade—how can he refuse that trade in that "property" shall be "perfectly free"—unless he does it as a protection to the home production? And as the home producers will probably not ask the protection, he will be wholly without a ground of opposition.
Senator Douglas holds, we know, that a man may rightfully be wiser to-day than he was yesterday; that he may rightfully change when he finds himself wrong. But can we, for that reason, run ahead, and infer that he will make any particular change, of which he himself has given no intimation? Can we safely base our action upon any such vague inference? Now, as ever, I wish not to misrepresent Judge Douglas's position, question his motives, or do aught that can be personally offensive to him. Whenever, if ever, he and we can come together on principle so that our cause may have assistance from his great ability, I hope to have interposed no adventitious obstacle. But clearly he is not now with us; he does not pretend to be—he does not promise ever to be.
Our cause, then, must be intrusted to and conducted by its own undoubted friends—those whose hands are free, whose hearts are in the work, whodo carefor the result. Two years ago the Republicans of the nation mustered over thirteen hundred thousand strong. We did this under the single impulse of resistance to a common danger, with every external circumstance against us. Of strange, discordant, and even hostile elements we gathered from the four winds, and formed and fought the battle through, under the constant hot fire of a disciplined, proud, and pampered enemy. Did we brave all then, to falter now—-now, when that same enemy is wavering, dissevered, and belligerent? The result is not doubtful. We shall not fail; if we stand firm, weshall not fail. Wise counsels may accelerate or mistakes delay it, but sooner or later the victory is sure to come.
(1854) THE OPENING OF JAPAN, Matthew C. Perry
In view of the events that have followed, the ending of Japan's self-isolation and the opening of that country, first to American commerce, and later to world-wide intercourse, must now be regarded as an achievement of momentous consequence, far exceeding in importance all that even the most prophetic statesmanship of the time could foresee.
Under the shoguns (or military chiefs) who after the seventh century overshadowed the hereditary rulers, the Mikados, there grew up in Japan a feudal system whereby the generals, recognized as overlords, increased and perpetuated their power. The attempts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to introduce Christianity were met with resistance and persecution, and ended in failure. In the same centuries Japan traded with the Portuguese, but excluded them in 1638. After this the Japanese isolation was complete, except for restricted trade with the Dutch, until the conclusion of Commodore Perry's treaty.
About the middle of the nineteenth century a large amount of American capital was invested in the whaling industry in Japanese and Chinese waters, and one motive for the sending of Perry's expedition to Japan was the protection of the whalers. Other things leading to that step were: the discovery of gold in California; the growth of industrial and commercial centres on the Pacific Coast of the United States; increasing trade with China; and the development of steam-navigation, necessitating coaling-stations and ports for shelter in the Orient. At the same time progressive minds in Japan were advancing in knowledge of Western science and political affairs; thus the East and the West were almost prepared for a change in their mutual relations.
In 1851 the United States Government empowered Commodore John H. Aulick to negotiate and sign commercial treaties with Japan. On the eve of his intended departure he was prevented from sailing, and in the following year Commodore Matthew C. Perry, brother of Oliver Hazard Perry, the hero of Lake Erie, succeeded to his mission. He was invested with extraordinary naval and diplomatic powers, his immediate object being to establish a coaling-station in Japan. On November 24, 1852, he sailed from Norfolk with the Mississippi, leaving other ships to follow as soon as ready. With his squadron he entered the Bay of Tokio (then called Yedo) in July, 1853, causing great commotion among the inhabitants of the Japanese capital, who mistook his appearance for a hostile approach. It required both firmness and tact on Perry's part to open friendly communication and present his proposals; but he succeeded in doing so much, and then, saying that in the following spring he would come for an answer, he withdrew to China. In February, 1854, he returned to Tokio with a fleet of eight vessels. After some parley, the Japanese authorities agreed to a conference at Kanagawa, a seaport adjoining Yokohama. Of the negotiations that followed and the treaty in which they resulted, the following pages tell, and Commodore Perry's own account is the best record of his distinguished service not only to his own country and Japan, but likewise to the civilized world.
After concessions made by the Japanese, the greatest good feeling prevailed on both sides, and there seemed every prospect of establishing those national relations which had been the purpose of Commodore Perry's mission. In accordance with the harmony and friendship that existed, there was an interchange of those courtesies by which mutual good feeling seeks an outward expression. The Japanese had acknowledged with courtly thanks the presents that had been bestowed in behalf of the Government, and now, on March 24th, invited the Commodore to receive the various gifts that had been ordered by the Emperor in return, as a public recognition of the courtesy of the United States.
The Commodore, accordingly, landed at Yokohama, with a suite of officers and his interpreters, and was received at the treaty-house with the usual ceremonies by the high commissioners. The large reception-room was crowded with the presents. The objects were of Japanese manufacture, and consisted of specimens of rich brocades and silks; of their famous lacquered ware, such aschow-chowboxes, tables, trays, and goblets, all skilfully wrought and finished with an exquisite polish; of porcelain cups of wonderful lightness and transparency, adorned with figures and flowers in gold and variegated colors, and exhibiting a workmanship that surpassed even that of the ware for which the Chinese are remarkable. Fans, pipe-cases, and articles of apparel in ordinary use, of no great value but of exceeding interest, were scattered among the more luxurious and costly objects.
With the usual order and neatness that seem almost instinctive with the Japanese, the various presents had been arranged in lots, and classified in accordance with the rank of those for whom they were respectively intended. The commissioners took their positions at the farther end of the room, and when the Commodore and his suite entered, the ordinary compliments having been interchanged, the Prince Hayashi read aloud, in Japanese, the list of presents and the names of the persons to whom they were to be given. This was then translated by Yenoske into Dutch, and by Mr. Portman into English. This ceremony being over, the Commodore was invited by the commissioners into the inner room, where he was presented with two complete sets of Japanese coins, three matchlocks, and two swords. These gifts, though of no great intrinsic value, were significant evidences of the desire of the Japanese to express their respect for the representative of the United States. The mere bestowal of the coins, in direct opposition to the Japanese laws which absolutely forbid all issue of their money beyond the Kingdom, was an act of marked favor.
As the Commodore prepared to depart, the commissioners said there was one article intended for the President, which had not yet been exhibited. They accordingly conducted the Commodore and his officers to the beach, where one or two hundred sacks of rice were pointed out, heaped up in readiness to be sent on board the ships. As that immense supply of substantial food seemed to excite some wonder on the part of the Americans, Yenoske the interpreter remarked that it was always customary with the Japanese, when bestowing royal presents, to include a certain quantity of rice, although he did not say whether the quantity always amounted, as on the present occasion, to hundreds of sacks.
While contemplating these substantial evidences of Japanese generosity, the attention of all was suddenly riveted upon twenty-five monstrous fellows who tramped down the beach like so many huge elephants. They were professional wrestlers and formed part of the retinue of the princes, who kept them for their private amusement and for public entertainment. They were enormously tall, and tremendously heavy. Their scant costume, which was merely a colored cloth about the loins, adorned with fringes and emblazoned with the armorial bearings of the prince to whom each belonged, revealed their gigantic proportions in all the bloated fulness of fat and extent of muscle.
Two or three of these huge monsters were the most famous wrestlers in Japan and ranked as the champion Tom Cribbs and Sayers of the country. Koyanagi, the reputed bully of the capital, was one of them, and paraded himself with the conscious pride of superior size and strength. He was especially brought to the Commodore that he might examine his massive form. The commissioners insisted that the monstrous fellow should be minutely inspected, that the hardness of his well-rounded muscle should be felt, and that the fatness of his cushioned frame should be tested by the touch. The Commodore accordingly attempted to grasp his arm, which he found as solid as it was huge, and then passed his hand over the monstrous neck, which fell in folds of massive flesh, like the dewlap of a prize ox. As some surprise was naturally expressed at this wondrous exhibition of animal development the monster himself gave a grunt expressive of his flattered vanity.
They were so enormously big that they appeared to have lost their distinctive features, and seemed to be only twenty-five masses of fat. Their eyes were barely visible through a long perspective of socket, the prominence of their noses was lost in the puffiness of their bloated cheeks, and their heads were set almost directly on their bodies with merely folds of flesh where the neck and chin are usually found. Their great size, however, was more owing to development of muscle than to deposition of fat; for, although they were evidently well fed, they were not less well exercised, and capable of great feats of strength.
As a preliminary exhibition of the power of these men, the princes set them to removing the sacks of rice to a convenient place on the shore for shipping. Each of the sacks weighed not less than one hundred twenty-five pounds, and there were only two of the wrestlers who did not carry each two sacks at a time. They bore the sacks on the right shoulder, lifting the first from the ground and adjusting it without help, but obtaining aid for the raising of the second. One man carried a sack suspended by his teeth, and another, taking one in his arms, turned repeated somersaults as he held it, apparently with as much ease as if his weight of flesh had been only so much gossamer and his load a feather.
After this preliminary display, the commissioners proposed that the Commodore and his party should retire to the treaty-house, where they would have an opportunity of seeing the wrestlers exhibit their professional feats. From the brutal performance of these wrestlers, the Americans turned with pride to the exhibition—to which the Japanese commissioners were now in their turn invited—of the telegraph and the railroad. It was a happy contrast, which a higher civilization presented, to the disgusting display on the part of the Japanese officials. In place of the show of brute animal force there was a triumphant revelation, to a partially enlightened people, of the success of science and enterprise.
The Japanese took great delight in seeing the rapid movement of the Liliputian locomotive; and one of the scribes of the commissioners took his seat upon the car, while the engineer stood upon the tender, feeding the furnace with one hand, and directing the diminutive engine with the other. Crowds of the Japanese gathered round and looked on the repeated circlings of the train with unabated pleasure and surprise, unable to repress a shout of delight at each blast of the steam-whistle. The telegraph, with its wonders, though before witnessed, still created renewed interest, and all the beholders were unceasing in their expressions of curiosity and astonishment. The agricultural instruments having been explained to the commissioners by Doctor Morrow, a formal delivery of the telegraph, the railway, and other articles, which made up the list of American presents, ensued.
The Prince of Mamasaki had been delegated by his coadjutors ceremoniously to accept, and Captain Adams was appointed by the Commodore to deliver, the gifts; and each performed his functions by an interchange of compliments and a half-dozen stately bows.
After this, a detachment of marines from the squadron were put through their various evolutions, while the bands furnished martial music. The Japanese commissioners seemed to take a very great interest in this military display, and expressed themselves much gratified at the soldierly air and excellent discipline of the men. This closed the performances of the day.
The next day (March 25th), Yenoske, accompanied by Kenzeiro, his fellow-interpreter, came on board the Powhatan to acknowledge formally, in behalf of the commissioners, their gratitude for the exhibition of the marines, the locomotive, and the telegraph, with all which they declared themselves highly delighted. Yenoske and his coadjutor were invited to seat themselves in the cabin of the Commodore, and, after some expressions of courtesy which the Japanese officials were careful never to intermit, proposed to talk over some points in connection with the projected treaty. The Commodore said he had no objections to the discussion of the matters informally; but he protested against considering the interpreters as the official representatives of the commissioners, with the latter of whom only, he declared, could he treat authoritatively.
Monday, March 27th, was the day appointed for the entertainment to which the Commodore had invited the commissioners and their attendants. Accordingly, great arrangements were made in the flagship preparatory to the occasion. The quarterdeck was adorned with a great variety of flags, and all parts of the steamer were in perfect order, while the officers, marines, and men dressed themselves in their uniforms and prepared to do honor in every respect to their expected visitors. As it was known that the strictness of Japanese etiquette would not allow the high commissioners to sit at the same table with their subordinates, the Commodore ordered two banquets, one to be spread in his cabin for the chief dignitaries, and another on the quarter-deck.
Previous to coming on board the Powhatan, the commissioners visited the sloop-of-war Macedonian, being saluted as they stepped on her deck by seventeen guns from the Mississippi lying near. The great guns and boarders having been exercised for their entertainment, the commissioners, with their numerous attendants, left for the Powhatan, the Macedonian firing a salvo in their honor as they took their departure. On arriving on board the flagship, they were first conducted through the different departments of the steamer, and examined with minute interest the guns and the machinery. A boat was lowered, with a howitzer in its bows, and this was repeatedly discharged, much to their amusement, for they evidently had a great fondness for martial exercise and display. The engines were next put in motion, and they evinced the usual intelligence of the higher class of Japanese in their inquiries and remarks.
The Commodore had invited the four captains of the squadron, his interpreter, Mr. Williams, and his secretary, to join the commissioners at his table. Yenoske, the Japanese interpreter, was allowed the privilege, as a special condescension on the part of his superiors, to sit at a side-table in the cabin, where his humble position did not seem to disturb either his equanimity or his appetite. Hayashi, who always preserved his grave and dignified bearing, ate and drank sparingly, but tasted of every dish, and sipped of every kind of wine. He was the only one, in fact, whose sobriety was proof against the unrestrained conviviality that prevailed among his bacchanalian coadjutors.
The Japanese party upon deck, who were entertained by a large body of officers from the various ships, became quite uproarious under the influence of overflowing supplies of champagne, Madeira, and punch, which they seemed greatly to relish. The Japanese took the lead in proposing healths and toasts, and were by no means the most backward in drinking them. They kept shouting at the top of their voices, and were heard far above the music of the bands that enlivened the entertainment by a succession of brisk and cheerful tunes. In the eagerness of the Japanese appetite there was but little discrimination in the choice of dishes and in the order of courses, and the most startling heterodoxy was exhibited in the confused commingling of fish, flesh, and fowl, soups and syrups, fruits, fricassees, roast and boiled, pickles and preserves. As a most generous supply had been provided, there were still some remnants of the feast left after the guests had satisfied their voracity, which most of these Japanese, in accordance with their custom, stowed away about their persons to carry off. The Japanese always have an abundant supply of paper within the left bosom of their loose robes, in a capacious pocket. This is used for various purposes; one species, as soft as our cotton cloth, and withal exceedingly tough, is used for a handkerchief; another furnishes the material for taking notes, or for wrapping up what is left after a feast. On the present occasion, when the dinner was over, all the Japanese guests simultaneously spread out their long folds of paper, and gathering what scraps they could lay their hands on, without regard to the kind of food, made up an envelope of conglomerate eatables in which there was such a confusion of the sour and sweet, the albuminous, oleaginous, and saccharine, that the chemistry of Liebig or the practised taste of the Commodore's Parisian cook would never have reached a satisfactory analysis. They not only always followed this practice themselves, but insisted that their American guests, when entertained at a Japanese feast, should adopt it also.
Whenever the Commodore and his officers were feasted on shore, paper parcels of the remnants were thrust into their hands on leaving. After the banquet the Japanese were entertained by an exhibition of negro minstrelsy, got up by some of the sailors. The gravity of the saturnine Hayashi was not proof against the grotesque exhibition, and even he joined in the general hilarity. It was now sunset and the Japanese prepared to depart, with quite as much wine in them as they could well bear. The jovial Matsusaki threw his arms about the Commodore's neck, crushing in his tipsy embrace a pair of new epaulettes, and repeating, in Japanese, with maudlin affection, these words, as interpreted into English: "Nippon and America, all the same heart." He then went toddling into his boat, supported by some of his more steady companions, and soon all the happy party had left the ships and were making rapidly for the shore. The Saratoga fired the salute of seventeen guns as the last boat pulled off from the Powhatan, and the squadron was once more left in the usual quiet of ordinary ship's duty.
The following day the Commodore landed to have a conference in regard to the remaining points of the treaty, previous to signing. He was met at the treaty-house by the commissioners. As soon as the Commodore had taken his seat, a letter was handed to him, which the Japanese said they had just received from Simoda. It was from Commander Pope, and had been transmitted through the authorities overland. Its contents gave a satisfactory report of Simoda, and the Commodore at once said he accepted that port, but declared that it must be opened without delay. Hakodate, he added, would do for the other, and Napha, in Riu Kiu [Loo Choo Islands], could be retained for the third. In regard to the other two he was willing, he said, to postpone their consideration to some other time.
The Commodore now proposed to sign the agreement in regard to the three ports, and directed his interpreter to read it in Dutch. When the document had been thus read and afterward carefully perused by the Japanese, they said they were prepared to concur in everything except as to theimmediateopening of Simoda. After discussion, it was finally settled that, though the port might be opened, the Japanese would address a note to the Commodore, saying that not everything which might be wanting by ships would be furnished there before the expiration of ten months, but that wood and water and whatever else the place possessed would be supplied immediately; and to this note the Commodore promised to reply and express his satisfaction with such an arrangement.
The question now came up with respect to the extent of privileges to be granted to Americans who might visit Simoda, in the discussion of which it was plain that the Japanese meant to be distinctly understood as prohibiting absolutely, at least for the present, the permanent residence of Americans, with their families, in Japan. The distance, also, to which Americans might extend their excursions into the country around the ports of Simoda and Hakodate was settled; and it is observable that, at the special request of the Japanese, the Commodore named the distance, they assenting at once to that which he mentioned.
The proposition to have consular agents residing in Japan evidently gave great anxiety to the commissioners. The Commodore was firm in saying there must be such agents, for the sake of the Japanese themselves as well as for that of his own countrymen, and it was finally conceded that there should be one, to live at Simoda, and that he should not be appointed until a year and eighteen months from the date of the treaty.
Two more articles, including the new points that had been discussed, were now added to the transcript of the proposed treaty; the Japanese promised to bring on board the Powhatan next day a copy in Dutch of their understanding of the agreement as far as concurred in, and the Commodore departed.
In the next two days several notes passed between the Commodore and the Japanese commissioners, in the course of which various questions that had been already considered were definitely settled; and the American interpreters were occupied, in cooperation with the Japanese, in drawing up the treaty in the Chinese, Dutch, and Japanese languages. On the 29th the ships Vandalia and Southampton arrived from Simoda with the confirmation of what Commander Pope had already said in his despatch—which had been transmitted by the Japanese authorities, overland, to the Commodore—namely, that the harbor and town of Simoda had been found, on examination, suitable in every respect for the purposes of the Americans. All was now in readiness for the final signing of the treaty.
Accordingly, on Friday, March 31, 1854, the Commodore went to the treaty-house with his usual attendants, and immediately on his arrival signed three several drafts of the treaty written in the English language, and delivered them to the commissioners, together with three copies of the same in the Dutch and Chinese languages, certified by the interpreters, Messrs. Williams and Portman, for the United States. At the same time the Japanese commissioners, in behalf of their Government, handed to the Commodore three drafts of the treaty written respectively in the Japanese, Chinese, and Dutch languages, and signed by the four of their body delegated by the Emperor for that purpose.
Immediately on the signing and exchange of the copies of the treaty, the Commodore presented the first commissioner, Prince Hayashi, with an American flag, remarking that he considered it the highest expression of national courtesy and friendship he could offer. The Prince was evidently deeply impressed with this significant mark of amity, and returned his thanks for it with indications of great feeling. The Commodore then presented the other dignitaries with the various gifts he had especially reserved for them. All formal business being now concluded, to the satisfaction of both parties, the Japanese commissioners invited the Commodore and his officers to partake of an entertainment prepared for the occasion.
The tables were spread in the large reception hall. These were wide divans, such as were used for seats, and of the same height. They were covered with a red-colored crape, and arranged in order according to the rank of the guests and their hosts, an upper table raised somewhat above the rest being appropriated to the Commodore, his superior officers, and the commissioners. When all were seated the servitors brought in a rapid succession of courses, consisting chiefly of thick soups, or rather stews, in most of which fresh fish was a component part. These were served in small earthen bowls or cups, and were brought in upon lacquered stands, about fourteen inches square and ten inches high, and placed, one before each guest, upon the tables. Together with each dish was a supply of soy or some other condiment, while throughout there was an abundant quantity, served in peculiar vessels, of the Japanese national liquor, thesake, a sort of whiskey distilled from rice. Various sweetened confections and a multiplicity of cakes were liberally interspersed among the other articles on the tables. Toward the close of the feast, a plate containing a broiled crawfish, a piece of fried fish of some kind, two or three boiled shrimps, and a small square pudding with something of the consistence of blancmange, was placed before each, with a hint that they were to follow the guests on their return to the ships, and they were accordingly sent and duly received afterward.
After the feast, which passed pleasantly and convivially, compliments being freely exchanged, and healths drunk in Liliputian cups of sake, the commissioners expressed great anxiety about the proposed visit of the Commodore to Yedo. They earnestly urged him not to take his ships any farther up the bay, as they said it would lead to trouble by which the populace might be disturbed and their own lives perhaps jeoparded. The Commodore argued the matter with them for some time, and, as they still pertinaciously urged their objections to his visit to the capital, it was agreed that the subject should be further discussed by an interchange of notes. The meeting then broke up.
When it was determined by our Government to send an expedition to Japan, those in authority were not unmindful of the peculiar characteristics of that singular nation. Unlike all other civilized peoples, it was in a state of voluntary, long-continued, and determined isolation. It neither desired nor sought communication with the rest of the world, but, on the contrary, strove to the uttermost to prevent it. It was comparatively an easy task to propose, to any Power the ports of which were freely visited by ships from every part of the world, the terms of a commercial treaty. But not so when, by any Power, commerce itself was interdicted. Before general conditions of commerce could be proposed to such a Power, it was necessary to settle the great preliminary that commerce would be allowed at all. Again, if that preliminary was settled affirmatively, a second point of great moment remained to be discussed, viz., to what degree shall intercourse for trading be extended? Among nations accustomed to the usages of Christendom, the principles and extent of national comity in the interchanges of commercial transactions have been so long and so well defined and understood that, as between them, the term "commercial treaty" needs no explanation; its meaning is comprehended alike by all, and in its stipulations it may cover the very broad extent that includes everything involved in the operations of commerce between two maritime nations. But in a kingdom which, in its polity, expressly ignored commerce and repudiated it as an evil instead of a good, it was necessary to lay the very foundation as well as to adjust the terms.
Hence the instructions to Commodore Perry covered broad ground, and his letters of credence conformed to his instructions. If he found the Japanese disposed to abandon, at once and forever, their deliberately adopted plan of non-intercourse with foreigners (an event most unlikely), his powers were ample to make with them a commercial treaty as wide and general as any we have with the nations of Europe. If they were disposed to relax but in part their jealous and suspicious system, formally to profess relations of friendship, and, opening some only of their ports to our vessels, to allow a trade in those ports between their people and ours, he was authorized to negotiate for this purpose, and secure for his country such privileges as he could, not inconsistent with the self-respect which, as a nation, we owed to ourselves. It must not be forgotten, in the contemplation of what was accomplished, that our representative went to a people who, at the time of his arrival among them, had, both by positive law and usage of more than two hundred years, allowed but one of their harbors, Nagasaki, to be opened to foreigners at all; had permitted no trade with such foreigners when they did come, except, under stringent regulations, with the Dutch and the Chinese; were in the habit of communicating with the world outside of them at second-hand only, through the medium of the Dutch who were imprisoned at Dezima; and a people who, as far as we know, never made a formal treaty with a civilized nation in the whole course of their history.
There were but two points on which the Commodore's instructions did not allow him a large discretion to be exercised according to circumstances. These were, first, that if happily any arrangements for trade, either general or special, were made, it was to be distinctly stipulated that, under no circumstances and in no degree, would the Americans submit to the humiliating treatment so long borne by the Dutch in carrying on their trade. The citizens of our country must be dealt with as freemen, or there should be no dealings at all. The second point was that, in the event of any of our countrymen being cast, in God's providence, as shipwrecked men on the coast of Japan, they should not be treated as prisoners, confined in cages, or subjected to inhuman treatment, but should be received with kindness and hospitably cared for until they could leave the country.
The nearest approach to a precedent was to be found in our treaty with China, made in 1844. This therefore was carefully studied by the Commodore. Its purport was "a treaty or general convention of peace, amity, and commerce," and to settle the rules to "be mutually observed in the intercourse of the respective countries." So far as "commerce" is concerned, it permitted "the citizens of the United States to frequent" five ports in China "and to reside with their families and trade there, and to proceed at pleasure with their vessels and merchandise to or from any foreign port, and from either of the said five ports to enter any other of them." As to duties on articles imported, they were to pay according to a tariff that was made part of the treaty, and in no case were to be subjected to higher duties than those paid, under similar circumstances, by the people of other nations. Consuls were provided for, to reside at the five open ports, and those trading there were "permitted to import from their own or any other ports into China, and sell there and purchase therein, and export to their own or any other ports, all manner of merchandise of which the importation or exportation was not prohibited by the treaty." In short, so far as the five ports were concerned, there existed between us and China a general treaty of commerce.
The Commodore caused to be prepared, in the Chinese characters, a transcript of the treaty, with such verbal alterations as would make it applicable to Japan, with the view of exhibiting it to the Imperial commissioners of that country should he be so successful as to open negotiations. He was not sanguine enough to hope that he could procure an entire adoption of the Chinese treaty by the Japanese. He was not ignorant of the difference in national characteristics between the inhabitants of China and the more independent, self-reliant, and sturdy natives of the Japanese islands. He knew that the latter held the former in some degree of contempt and treated them in the matter of trade very much as they treated the Dutch. He was also aware that the Chinese, when they made their treaty, did know something of the advantages that might result from intercourse with the rest of the world; while as to the Japanese, in their long-continued isolation, either they neither knew nor desired such advantages, or, if they knew them, feared they might be purchased at too high a price in the introduction of foreigners, who, as in the case of the Portuguese, centuries before, might seek to overturn the empire. It was too much, therefore, to expect that the Japanese would in all the particulars of a treaty imitate the Chinese.
Of the difficulties encountered, even after the Japanese had consented to negotiate, the best account may be given from the conferences and discussions between the negotiators, of all which most accurate reports were kept on both sides, in the form of dialogue. At the first meeting of the Commodore with the Imperial commissioners, on March 8th, he acted on the plan he had proposed to himself with respect to the treaty with China, and thus addressed them:
Commodore Perry. I think it would be better for the two nations that a treaty similar to the one between my country and the Chinese should be made between us. I have prepared the draft of one almost identical with our treaty with China. I have been sent here by my Government to make a treaty with yours; if I do not succeed now, my Government will probably send more ships here; but I hope we shall soon settle matters amicably.
Japanese. We wish for time to have the document translated into the Japanese language.
This was but one among a hundred proofs of their extreme suspicion and caution; for there was not one of the Imperial commissioners, probably, who could not have read, without the least difficulty, the document as furnished by the Commodore; and certain it is that their interpreters could have read it off into Japanese at once.
The Commodore, who wished to do as far as possible everything that might conciliate, of course made no objection to a request so seemingly reasonable, though he knew it to be needless, and was content to wait patiently for their reply. In one week that reply came in writing, and was very explicit: "As to opening a trade, such as is now carried on by China with your country, we certainly cannot yet bring it about. The feelings and manners of our people are very unlike those of other nations, and it will be exceedingly difficult, even if you wish it, to change immediately the old regulations for those of other countries. Moreover, the Chinese have long had intercourse with Western nations, while we have had dealings at Nagasaki with only the people of Holland and China."
This answer was not entirely unexpected, and put an end to all prospect of negotiating a "commercial treaty" in the European sense of that phrase. It only remained therefore to secure, for the present, admission into the kingdom, and so much of trade as Japanese jealousy could be brought to concede. At length, after much and oft-repeated discussion, the point was yielded that certain ports might be opened to our vessels; and then, in the interview of March 25th, came up the subject of consuls.
Japanese. About the appointment of consuls or agents, the commissioners desire a delay of four or five years, to see how the intercourse works. The governor of the town and the official interpreter will be able to carry on all the business of supplying provisions, coal, and needed articles, with the captain, without the intervention of a consul.
Perry. The duties of a consul are to report all difficulties that arise between American citizens and Japanese to his Government in an authentic manner, assist the Japanese in carrying out their laws and the provisions of the treaty and recovering debts made by the Americans; and also communicating to the Government at Washington whatever the Japanese wish, as no letters can be received after this through the Dutch; and if no consuls are received, then a ship-of-war must remain in Japan constantly, and her captain must do the duties of a consul.
Japanese. If we had not felt great confidence in you, we should not have consented to open our ports at all. Consuls may be accepted by and by, after experience has shown their need; and we hope that all American citizens obey the laws of their country and behave properly.
Perry. True, and I hope no difficulty will arise; and this appointment of consuls in Japan, as they are in China, Hawaii, and everywhere else, is to prevent and provide for difficulties. No American will report his own misdeeds to his own Government, nor can the Japanese bring them to our notice except through a government agent. This provision must be in the treaty, though I will stipulate for only one, to reside at Simoda, and he will not be sent probably for a year or two from this time.
And thus it was that the Commodore had to explain everything and feel his way, step by step, in the progress of the whole negotiation.
Japanese. The commissioners wish every point desired by the Admiral to be stated clearly, for the Japanese are not equal to the Americans, and have not much to give in exchange.
Perry. I have already stated all my views as regards our intercourse, in the draft of the treaty you have. [This was one prepared by the Commodore after the rejection of the transcript of the Chinese treaty.] Let the commissioners state their objections to it. This treaty now to be made is only a beginning; and as the nations know each other, the Japanese will permit Americans to go anywhere, to Fujiyama—all over the country.
Japanese. We have found restrictions necessary against the Portuguese and the English.
Then followed observations by the Japanese on Pellew's entry into Nagasaki harbor, which showed how much dislike of the English that event had occasioned. A strong proof of their remarkable caution was furnished by the Japanese at the conference held on March 28th when most of the terms of the treaty had been agreed upon.
Perry. I am prepared now to sign the treaty about these three harbors.
Mr. Portman, interpreter, then read in Dutch that portion of the treaty which contained such points as had been already agreed upon.
Japanese. It is all correct except that we have objection to opening the port of Simoda immediately; if any vessels were to go there in distress, we should be glad to furnish them with provisions, wood, and water.
Perry. You have already consented, in one of your letters to me, to open that port immediately. I am very desirous of settling that matter now, as I wish to despatch the Saratoga home to inform the Government, before Congress adjourns, how matters are advancing; that will take some time, and there is no probability that any ships will come here before ten or twelve months have expired; so that it will make no difference to you whether you put it in the treaty to be opened now or in ten months.
Japanese. We are willing to put it in the treaty "to be opened now," if you will give us a letter or promise that no ships will come here before the President gives his permission.
Perry. I cannot do that very well, but I am willing to put it off ninety days; that will be about the time I shall return from Hakodate; it was your own proposition, yesterday, to open that port immediately. I consent to this, however, to show you how desirous I am to do what I can to please you. I cannot consent to a longer time.
Japanese. If we put it in the treaty to be opened now, we would like you to give us an order that no ships shall enter that port before ten months.
Perry. I cannot do that. But there is no probability that any ships will come here before that time, as I shall not leave here for three months, and they will not hear of it before that time; and when they do hear of it, it will take several months for ships to make the voyage here. If you choose I will keep one of the ships at Simoda for several months.
Japanese. If ships go there before that time we shall not be able to give them other than provisions, wood, and water.
Perry. The ships that may go there will want such things only as you may have; if you have them not, of course you cannot and will not be expected to furnish them; but, as I said before, there is no probability that ships will go there before the expiration of ten months.
Japanese. When you come back from Matsumai, we shall have plenty of provisions at Simoda for the whole squadron; but to other ships we cannot furnish more than wood, water, etc.
Perry. When we return from Matsumai we shall not want many provisions, as we shall be going to a place where we shall get plenty. It is only the principle I wish settled now. I have come here as a peacemaker, and I desire to settle everything now, and thus prevent trouble hereafter; I wish to write home to my Government that the Japanese are friends.
Japanese. We will write you a letter stating that we cannot furnish you anything before ten months, but that we can furnish wood and water immediately, and that we will furnish such other things as we possibly can. This letter we should like you to answer.
Perry. Very well; I will.
Japanese. [Entering on another part of the terms agreed on.] We will not confine Americans, or prevent them from walking around; but we should like to place a limit to the distance they may walk.
Perry. I am prepared to settle that matter now, but they must not be confined to any particular house or street. Suppose we make the distance they may walk, the same distance that a man can go and come in a day. Or, if you choose, the number oflisorrismay be agreed upon.
Japanese. We are willing that they shall walk as far as they can go and come in a day.
Perry. There is no probability that sailors would wish to go on shore more than once from curiosity; besides, they will have their daily duties to attend to on board ship and will not be able to go on shore.
Japanese. We do not wish any women to come and remain at Simoda.
Perry. The probability is that few women will go there, and they only the wives of the officers of the ships.
Japanese. When you come back from Matsumai we should likeyouto settle the distance that Americans are to walk. It is difficult forusto settle the distance.
Perry. Say the distance of seven Japanese miles in any direction from the centre of the city of Simoda.
Japanese. Very well. A few miles will make no difference. You are requested not to leave agents until after you have experienced that it is necessary.
Perry. I am willing to defer the appointment of a consul or an agent one year or eighteen months from the date of the signing the treaty; and then, if my Government think it necessary, it will send one.
In fact, not an article of the treaty was made without the most serious deliberation by the Japanese. In answer to a question from Captain Adams, in the very first stages of the negotiation, they replied: "The Japanese are unlike the Chinese; they are adverse to change; and when they make a compact of any kind they intend that it shall endure for a thousand years. For this reason it will be best to deliberate and examine well the facilities for trade and the suitableness of the port before any one is determined on." Probably nothing but the exercise of the most perfect truthfulness and patience would ever have succeeded in making a treaty with them at all; and from the language of one of their communications, it is obvious that, with characteristic caution, they meant that their present action should be but a beginning of intercourse, which might or might not be afterward made more extensive, according to the results of what they deemed the experiment.
This, it must be remembered, was the first formal treaty they ever made on the subject of foreign trade, at least since the expulsion of the Portuguese, and they evidently meant to proceed cautiously by single steps.
There is observable throughout the negotiations the predominating influence of the national prejudice against the permanent introduction of foreigners among them. The word "reside" is but once used in the whole treaty, and that in the article relative to consuls. The details of conferences, already given, show how anxiously they sought to avoid having consuls at all. Indeed, Commodore Perry says, "I could only induce the commissioners to agree to this article, by endeavoring to convince them that it would save the Japanese Government much trouble if an American agent were to reside at one or both of the ports opened by the treaty, to whom complaints might be made of any malpractice of the United States citizens who might visit the Japanese dominions." They wanted no permanent foreign residents among them, official or unofficial. This was shown most unequivocally in the remark already recorded in one of the conferences—"We do not wish any women to come and remain at Simoda."
Simoda was one of the ports open for trade with us; they knew that our people had wives and daughters, and that a man's family were ordinarily resident with him in his permanent abode, and that if the head of the family lived in Simoda as a Japanese would live, there would certainly be women who would "come and remain at Simoda." But more than this. It will be remembered that the Commodore had submitted to them our treaty with China, and they had held it under consideration for a week, at the end of which time they said: "As to opening a trade, such as is now carried on by China with your country, we certainly cannot yet bring it about. The Chinese have long had intercourse with Western nations, while we have had dealings at Nagasaki with only the people of Holland and China." Now what was "such a trade" as we carried on with China? The Japanese read in our treaty that five ports were open to us, that permission was given "to the citizens of the United States to frequent" them; and further, "to reside with their families and trade there." This they deliberately declined assenting to when they refused to make a treaty similar to that with China. They surely would not afterward knowingly insert it in any treaty they might make with us.
The only permanent residence to which they gave assent, and that most reluctantly, was the residence of a consul. Temporary residence was allowed to our shipwrecked citizens, as well as to those who went to Simoda or Hakodate on commercial business. They are allowed to land, to walk where they please within certain limits, to enter shops and temples without restriction, to purchase in the shops, and have the articles sent to the proper public office duly marked, where they will pay for them, to resort to public-houses or inns that are to be built for their refreshment "when on shore" at Simoda and Hakodate; and until built, a temple, at each place, is assigned "as a resting-place for persons in their walks." They may accept invitations to partake of the hospitality of any of the Japanese; but they are not permitted to enter "military establishments or private houses without leave." Without leave, our citizens cannot enter them within the territories of any nation with which we have a treaty. In short, the whole treaty shows that the purpose of the Japanese was to make the experiment of intercourse with us before they made it as extensive or as intimate as it was between us and the Chinese. It was all they could do at the time, and much, very much, was obtained on the part of our negotiator in procuring a concession even to this extent.
But, as he knew that our success would be but the forerunner of that of other powers, and as he believed that new relations of trade once commenced, not only with ourselves, but with England, France, Holland, and Russia, could not fail, in the progress of events, to break up the old restrictive policy, effectually and forever, and open Japan to the world; and must also lead gradually to liberal commercial treaties, he wisely, in the ninth article, secured to the United States and their citizens, without "consultation or delay," all privileges and advantages which Japan might hereafter "grant to any other nation or nations." And the Commodore's comments on this article conclusively show thathe, at least, did not suppose he had made a "commercial treaty":
"Article IX. This is a most important article, as there can be little doubt that, on hearing of the success of this mission, the English, French, and Russians will follow our example; and it may be reasonable to suppose that each will gain some additional advantage, until a commercial treaty is accomplished. Article IX will give to Americans, without further consultation, all these advantages."
All other powers were forced to be content in obtaining just what we, as pioneers, obtained. Their treaties were like ours. That of Russia was copied from ours, with no change but that of the substitution of the port of Nagasaki for Napha in Riu Kiu. We respectfully submit, therefore, that all, and indeed more than all, under the circumstances, that could have been reasonably expected has been accomplished.
(1855) THE CAPTURE OF SEBASTOPOL, Sir Edward B. Hamely and Sir Evelyn Wood
This is the most famous event of the Crimean War, in which Russian power was pitted against the allied forces of Turkey, France, Great Britain, and Sardinia. The war grew out of rival demands concerning a protectorate in Turkey. In 1852 Napoleon III asked for the restoration of the protectorate of the Holy Places in the Ottoman Empire to the Latin Church. Supported by Russia, the Greek Church had virtually supplanted the Latin Church in Turkish dominions, and Russia now put forward a demand for a protectorate over the Greek subjects of the Sultan. Turkey had no interest in the religious questions at issue, and she pursued a wavering course between the disputing powers, fearing to offend either of them. Russia at last began openly to threaten Turkey, and, finding vacillation and diplomacy no longer availing for a postponement of the conflict, the Sultan declared war, October 4, 1853.