FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[64]Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege.Berlin, 1902, in the series "Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften," published in 1905. A translation of this monograph by Professor J. H. Morgan has recently been published.[65]Cd. 7894, page 7, 8.[66]Cd. 7894, page 9.[67]See Appendix C. Official Reports issued by the Belgian Legation (1914). The Commission chiefly responsible for these official Belgian reports was composed of M. Cooreman, Minister of State (President); Count Goblet d'Alviella, Minister of State and Vice-President of the Senate; M. Ryckmans, Senator; M. Strauss, Alderman of the City of Antwerp; M. van Cutsem, Hon. President of the Law Court of Antwerp; and, as Secretaries, Chevalier Ernst de Bunswyck, Chef du Cabinet of the Minister of Justice, and M. Orts, Councillor of Legation.[68]Meeting of Edinburgh Obstetrical Society, December 9, 1914.Lancet, December 19, 1914, page 1, 440.[69]Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws and Customs of War in Belgium.[70]German Atrocities from German Evidence.One of the series of "Studies and Documents on the War." Publishing Committee: Mm. Ernest Lavisse, of the Académie française, Président; Charles Andler, professor of German literature and language in the University of Paris; Joseph Bédier, professor at the College de France; Henri Bergson, of the Académie française; Emile Boutroux, of the Académie française; Ernest Denis, professor of history in the University of Paris; Emile Durkheim, professor in the University of Paris; Jacques Hadamard, of the Académie des Sciences; Gustave Lanson, professor of French literature in the University of Paris; Charles Seignobos, professor of history in the University of Paris; André Weiss, of the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques.[71]German Atrocities from German Evidence.See footnote on page 32.[72]Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws and Customs of War in Belgium.[73]Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws and Customs of war in Belgium.[74]Cd. 7894, page 10.[75]Most of the points referred to in the following record are to be found in Sir Edward Grey's reply to the U.S. Note—dated March 15.[76]Cd. 7921, issued May 19, 1915, shows that although 1,282 men had been rescued by the British from German warships, not a single rescue had been effected by German men-of-war.[77]House of Lords, April 27, 1915.[78]House of Commons, April 27, 1915.[79]See Appendix D.[80]ReportreSwakopmund, issued by Secretary of State for Colonies.Times, May 6, 1915.

[64]Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege.Berlin, 1902, in the series "Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften," published in 1905. A translation of this monograph by Professor J. H. Morgan has recently been published.

[65]Cd. 7894, page 7, 8.

[66]Cd. 7894, page 9.

[67]See Appendix C. Official Reports issued by the Belgian Legation (1914). The Commission chiefly responsible for these official Belgian reports was composed of M. Cooreman, Minister of State (President); Count Goblet d'Alviella, Minister of State and Vice-President of the Senate; M. Ryckmans, Senator; M. Strauss, Alderman of the City of Antwerp; M. van Cutsem, Hon. President of the Law Court of Antwerp; and, as Secretaries, Chevalier Ernst de Bunswyck, Chef du Cabinet of the Minister of Justice, and M. Orts, Councillor of Legation.

[68]Meeting of Edinburgh Obstetrical Society, December 9, 1914.Lancet, December 19, 1914, page 1, 440.

[69]Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws and Customs of War in Belgium.

[70]German Atrocities from German Evidence.One of the series of "Studies and Documents on the War." Publishing Committee: Mm. Ernest Lavisse, of the Académie française, Président; Charles Andler, professor of German literature and language in the University of Paris; Joseph Bédier, professor at the College de France; Henri Bergson, of the Académie française; Emile Boutroux, of the Académie française; Ernest Denis, professor of history in the University of Paris; Emile Durkheim, professor in the University of Paris; Jacques Hadamard, of the Académie des Sciences; Gustave Lanson, professor of French literature in the University of Paris; Charles Seignobos, professor of history in the University of Paris; André Weiss, of the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques.

[71]German Atrocities from German Evidence.See footnote on page 32.

[72]Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws and Customs of War in Belgium.

[73]Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws and Customs of war in Belgium.

[74]Cd. 7894, page 10.

[75]Most of the points referred to in the following record are to be found in Sir Edward Grey's reply to the U.S. Note—dated March 15.

[76]Cd. 7921, issued May 19, 1915, shows that although 1,282 men had been rescued by the British from German warships, not a single rescue had been effected by German men-of-war.

[77]House of Lords, April 27, 1915.

[78]House of Commons, April 27, 1915.

[79]See Appendix D.

[80]ReportreSwakopmund, issued by Secretary of State for Colonies.Times, May 6, 1915.

We thus see with what an easy conscience Germany tears up her treaties and how she repudiates her most solemn pledges. In light of these facts let us examine the rush of promises Germany was prepared to give in order to ensure our neutrality in the War.

On July 29, 1914, Germany, having decided on the War in conjunction with Austria against Russia and France, made what our Ambassador at Berlin called "a strong bid for British neutrality," to which reference has been made, on page 14. Provided that Britain remained neutral Germany stated that every assurance would be given to Great Britain that the German Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France in Europe, should they prove victorious. Germany categorically stated that she was unable to give a similar undertaking with reference to the French colonies. She made a statement with regard to the integrity of Holland, and said that it depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but that when the War was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany. In other words, Great Britain was to stand by and

See Belgium invaded and, if she resisted, annexed by Germany;See all the French Colonies taken by Germany;Acquiesce in France, our neighbour and friend, being crushed under the iron heel of Germany, and, as Bismarck threatened, bled white by a war indemnity when all was over.

See Belgium invaded and, if she resisted, annexed by Germany;

See all the French Colonies taken by Germany;

Acquiesce in France, our neighbour and friend, being crushed under the iron heel of Germany, and, as Bismarck threatened, bled white by a war indemnity when all was over.

As Sir Edward Grey replied on July 30: "From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France,without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether, apart from that it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover."[81]

That is the "infamous bargain" which Britain spurned and to which the Prime Minister referred on August 6 in the House of Commons, in the following words:—

"What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day ... if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise—nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed—I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record—given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporised, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees."[82]

This suggestion of Germany is not the only infamous proposal she has made to Great Britain. She has made them with a persistence worthy of a better cause. In February, 1912, Lord Haldane went to Berlin on behalf of the Cabinet in order to obtain the basis of a friendly understanding between the two countries. What transpired is made clear in a speech delivered by Mr. Asquith, at Cardiff, on October 2, 1914, when the Prime Minister said:—

"We laid down in terms, carefully approved by the Cabinet, and which I will textually quote, what our relations to Germany ought, in our view, to be. We said, and we communicated this to the German Government:—

'Britain declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of any Treaty, understanding, or combination to which Britain is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.'

"There is nothing ambiguous or equivocal about that. But that was not enough for German statesmanship. They wanted us to go further. They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality, in the event of Germany being engaged in war, and this, mind you, at a time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and defensive forces, and especially upon the sea. They asked us—to put it quite plainly—for a free hand, so far as we were concerned, if and when they selected the opportunity to overpower and dominate the European world. To such a demand one answer was possible, and that was the answer we gave."[83]

FOOTNOTES:[81]Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 101.[82]House of Commons, August 6, 1914.[83]South Wales Daily News, October 3, 1914.

[81]Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 101.

[82]House of Commons, August 6, 1914.

[83]South Wales Daily News, October 3, 1914.

If, in view of all this evidence, Britain had refused to fight, what would have been her position? The Prime Minister, speaking at the Guildhall on September 4, 1914, said:—

"But let me ask you, and through you the world outside, what would have been our condition as a nation to-day if, through timidity, or through a perverted calculation of self-interest or through a paralysis of the sense of honour and duty, we had been base enough to be false to our word and faithless to our friends?"Our eyes would have been turned at this moment with those of the whole civilised world to Belgium—a small State which has lived for more than 70 years under a several and collective guarantee, to which we, in common with Prussia and Austria, were parties—and we should have seen, at the instance, and by the action of two of these guaranteeing Powers, her neutrality violated, her independence strangled, her territory made use of as affording the easiest and most convenient road to a war of unprovoked aggression against France."We, the British people, should have at this moment been standing by with folded arms and with such countenance as we could command, while this small and unprotected State (Belgium), in defence of her vital liberties, made a heroic stand against overweening and overwhelming force."We should have been watching as detached spectators the siege of Liège, the steady and manful resistance of a small Army, the occupation of Brussels with its splendid traditions and memories, the gradual forcing back of the patriotic defenders of their native land to the ramparts of Antwerp, countless outrages suffered by them, and buccaneering levies exacted from the unoffending civil population, and finally the greatest crime committed against civilisation and culture since the Thirty Years' War—the sack of Louvain, with its buildings, its pictures, its unique library, its unrivalled associations, a shameless holocaust of irreparable treasures lit up by blind barbarian vengeance...."For my part I say that sooner than be a silent witness—which means in effect a willing accomplice—of this tragic triumph of force over law and of brutality over freedom, I would see this country of ours blotted out of the pages of history."

"Our eyes would have been turned at this moment with those of the whole civilised world to Belgium—a small State which has lived for more than 70 years under a several and collective guarantee, to which we, in common with Prussia and Austria, were parties—and we should have seen, at the instance, and by the action of two of these guaranteeing Powers, her neutrality violated, her independence strangled, her territory made use of as affording the easiest and most convenient road to a war of unprovoked aggression against France.

"We, the British people, should have at this moment been standing by with folded arms and with such countenance as we could command, while this small and unprotected State (Belgium), in defence of her vital liberties, made a heroic stand against overweening and overwhelming force.

"We should have been watching as detached spectators the siege of Liège, the steady and manful resistance of a small Army, the occupation of Brussels with its splendid traditions and memories, the gradual forcing back of the patriotic defenders of their native land to the ramparts of Antwerp, countless outrages suffered by them, and buccaneering levies exacted from the unoffending civil population, and finally the greatest crime committed against civilisation and culture since the Thirty Years' War—the sack of Louvain, with its buildings, its pictures, its unique library, its unrivalled associations, a shameless holocaust of irreparable treasures lit up by blind barbarian vengeance....

"For my part I say that sooner than be a silent witness—which means in effect a willing accomplice—of this tragic triumph of force over law and of brutality over freedom, I would see this country of ours blotted out of the pages of history."

Further, we need not imagine that the peace we should have gained would have been a lasting one. If we had dishonoured our name in the manner Mr. Asquith has described, we should have been left without a friend in the world. Who can doubt that we should have been Germany's next victim if she had succeeded in crushing Belgium and France and warding off the blows of Russia? As Mr. Bonar Law said, on the same occasion:—

"We are fighting for our national existence, for everything which nations have always held most dear."

The fate which has fallen upon Belgium would have been our fate in a few years' time, but with this difference, that we should have had no powerful friends to give back as far as humanly possible what we had lost, as Russia, France and Britain are determined to do for Belgium.

Germany did her utmost to make the Great Powers believe that she had no knowledge of the contents of the Ultimatum delivered by Austria-Hungary to Serbia at 6 p.m. on Thursday, July 23, 1914.

Two days before the delivery of the Ultimatum, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, at the Diplomatic Audience, said to Herr von Jagow (German Secretary of State), that he supposed the German Government then had full knowledge of the Note prepared by Austria. Herr von Jagow protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that Note, and expressed himself in the same way on that date (July 21) to the French Ambassador also. The very next day (July 22), however, M. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, in a despatch to the Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, stated:—

"Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador, who stated to him that at Berlin adémarcheof the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Serbian Government was expected. Prince Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna, but that up to the present time they had not been successful in this, and that he was not without anxiety as to the results of adémarcheof this kind.... The communications of Prince Lichnowsky had left Sir Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did not conceal from me. The same impression was given me by the Italian Ambassador, who also fears the possibility of fresh tension in Austro-Serbian relations."[84]

Here it will be noticed that Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, stated that the German Government were endeavouring to "hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna." How could they have done this if they were not aware of the general terms of the Ultimatum which Austria-Hungary proposed sending to Serbia. Moreover, the impression given by the Italian Ambassador was probably derived from his knowledge of what had happened over a year before, when Austria appears to have been resolved on provoking war with Serbia on August 9, 1913.

But unfortunately for Germany the statement was refuted by one of its own States, Bavaria. The Ultimatum to Serbia was not delivered until 6 p.m. on the evening of July 23; yet earlier on that day M. Allizé, the French Minister at Munich, in his Report to Paris, stated:—

" ... Official circles have for some time been assuming with more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism."In particular, the President of the Council said to me to-day that the Austrian Note, the contents of which were known to him (dont il avait connaissance) was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be accepted by Serbia, but that none the less the existing situation appeared to him to be very serious."[85]

" ... Official circles have for some time been assuming with more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism.

"In particular, the President of the Council said to me to-day that the Austrian Note, the contents of which were known to him (dont il avait connaissance) was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be accepted by Serbia, but that none the less the existing situation appeared to him to be very serious."[85]

It is difficult to think that the President of the Bavarian Council knew the contents of the Austrian Note while the German Secretary of State at Berlin was kept in ignorance of its terms. Yet, the next day, Herr von Jagow again makes the denial which is forwarded to Paris in the French Ambassador's despatch, dated Berlin, July 24:—

"I asked the Secretary of State to-day in the interview which I had with him if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that Austria had presented a Note to the Powers on her dispute with Serbia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it."Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the Note was forcible and that he approved it, the Serbian Government having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria....Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.... It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to everyone that they were ignorant of the scope of the Note sent by Austria to Serbia."[86]

"Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the Note was forcible and that he approved it, the Serbian Government having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria....Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.... It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to everyone that they were ignorant of the scope of the Note sent by Austria to Serbia."[86]

Confirmation of Germany's complicity is received in a despatch to his Government from the French Ambassador (M. Paul Cambon) in London, dated July 24, 1914:—

"I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have despatched her Ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin."Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter Capital by the rumours of a navalententebetween Russia and England, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening of the Russian Army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in Germany."The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so, she could have stopped the despatch of the Ultimatum."[87]

"Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter Capital by the rumours of a navalententebetween Russia and England, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening of the Russian Army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in Germany.

"The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so, she could have stopped the despatch of the Ultimatum."[87]

Again on the same day (July 24, 1914) we have an interesting despatch from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris to the French Ambassadors abroad, detailing what transpired at a visit received from Herr von Schoen (the German Ambassador in Paris),at which the latter twice read (but refused to leave copy of) a note which said:—

"Under these circumstances the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as justified. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Serbia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Serbian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might even allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Serbian Government by strong pressure, and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.... The German Government consider that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately concerned."The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable consequences...."[88]

"The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable consequences...."[88]

A note of similar effect was left with Sir Edward Grey by the German Ambassador in London.[89]

Now the details of the Ultimatum to Serbia were only communicated to the French and Russian Governments on July 24, 1914, after 10 o'clock in the morning (nearly 17 hours after they had been delivered to Serbia), and presumably they were communicated to all the other Governments at about the same time. Germany would have us believe that she received the contents at the same time and on the same day as the other Governments. Yet, a few hours later, the German Ambassador in Paris is able, on instructions from his Government, to present a detailed note and to argue the matter in all its bearings. That is to say, Germany would have us believe that the Kaiser and his Ministers received the contents of the Ultimatum in the morning, and, almost within a few minutes, gathered together and discussed a question which they knew, if not carefully handled, must mean a European war; pretend that it was a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; and promptly instruct their Ambassador in Paris to the minutest details.

As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked to the British Ambassador in Petrograd on this fateful morning, "Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted."[90]

It has since been proved that Germany and Austria were parties not only to this, but to an exactly similar conspiracy which took place twelve months before.

On December 5, 1914, in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, Signor Giolitti (ex-Premier of Italy) made the following momentous statement:—

"During the Balkan War, on the 9th August, 1913, about a year before the present war broke out, during my absence fromRome, I received from my hon. colleague, Signor di San Giuliano (late Foreign Minister), the following telegram:—"'Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation thecasus foederisof the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to be inapplicable. (Sensation.)"'I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that, therefore, we do not consider that thecasus foederisarises."'Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve.'"I replied:—"'If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that acasus foederiscannot be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure.' (Hear, hear.)"This course was taken, and our interpretation was upheld and recognised as proper, since our action in no way disturbed our relations with the two Allied Powers. The declaration of neutrality made by the present Government conforms therefore in all respects to the precedents of Italian policy, and conforms also to an interpretation of the Treaty of Alliance which has been already accepted by the Allies."I wish to recall this, because I think it right that in the eyes of all Europe it should appear that Italy has remained completely loyal to the observance of her pledges." (Loud applause.)[91]

"'Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation thecasus foederisof the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to be inapplicable. (Sensation.)"'I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that, therefore, we do not consider that thecasus foederisarises."'Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve.'

"'I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that, therefore, we do not consider that thecasus foederisarises.

"'Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve.'

"I replied:—

"'If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that acasus foederiscannot be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure.' (Hear, hear.)

"This course was taken, and our interpretation was upheld and recognised as proper, since our action in no way disturbed our relations with the two Allied Powers. The declaration of neutrality made by the present Government conforms therefore in all respects to the precedents of Italian policy, and conforms also to an interpretation of the Treaty of Alliance which has been already accepted by the Allies.

"I wish to recall this, because I think it right that in the eyes of all Europe it should appear that Italy has remained completely loyal to the observance of her pledges." (Loud applause.)[91]

As theTimesof December 11, 1914, said in a Leading Article:—

"In the face of these facts, what becomes of the pretence of the German White Book that it was the murders which forced Austria to take action; what of the contention that Russia, or that England, is answerable for the war? Germany had known Austria's purpose for a year when she granted that Power a free hand to deal with Serbia at her discretion." ... These contemporary telegrams read by Signor Giolitti "prove that the war is no result of Russian arrogance, of French revenge, or of English envy, as the German Chancellor avers, but that it is the consequence of schemes long harboured, carefully thought out, and deliberately adopted by Austria and by Germany."

On the occasion referred to above it was not the murder of the heir-apparent at Serajevo which was the pretext for aggression; the issue of the moment was the Treaty of Bucharest.

Two days after the delivery of the Ultimatum to Serbia in July, 1914, Herr von Jagow issued another denial. In his Report to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, the French Ambassador at Berlin on July 25 wrote:—

"The English Chargé d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledgeof the Austrian Note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria."[92]

On the same day (July 25) the Russian representative in Paris reports to his Government, that the German Ambassador (Herr von Schoen) said:—

"that Austria had presented her Note to Serbia without any definite understanding with Berlin, but that Germany nevertheless approved of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly 'the bolt once fired' (these were his own words), Germany could only be guided by her duties as an ally."[93]

The next day the Acting Director of the "Direction Politique" in Paris, in a note on the visit to that Office paid by Herr von Schoen, the German Ambassador, stated (Paris, Sunday, July 26):—

"Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian Note, and had only approved it after its delivery; she thought, however, that Serbia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He declared besides that he did not know the text of the Serbian reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often ill-informed, represented it to be."[94]

A denial by the German Ambassador to England of his Government's cognisance of the Note is referred to in a despatch from the Russian Ambassador in London (Count Benckendorff) to M. Sazonof, dated July 25, 1914:—

"Grey has told me that the German Ambassador has declared to him that the German Government were not informed of the text of the Austrian Note, but that they entirely supported Austria's action."[95]

On July 25, 1914, a Note was handed by the German Ambassador at Petrograd to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

"We learn from an authoritative source that the news spread by certain newspapers, to the effect that the action of the Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade was instigated by Germany is absolutely false. The German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian Note before it was presented, and exercised no influence upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly attributed to Germany."Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers justified."[96]

"Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers justified."[96]

That this assumed ignorance was received with scepticism, and in some cases frank disbelief in other quarters, is apparent. The French Ambassador in Berlin reported on July 25:—

"The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of events.... He does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's démarche."He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation."[97]

"The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of events.... He does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's démarche.

"He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation."[97]

From the French Ambassador in Vienna on July 28 came the following statement to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris:—

"Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed her on to aggressive action against Serbia in order to be able herself to enter into war with Russia and France, in circumstances which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under conditions which have been thoroughly considered."[98]

Up to this date, as the Russian Berlin representative reported to his Government the Official German Wolff Bureau (News Agency) had not published the text of the conciliatory Serbian reply, although it had been communicated to them; nor had it appearedin extensoin any of the local papers—because of thecalmingeffect it would have had on German readers![99]

On the same day (July 28) the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris sent the following message to the French Ambassadors abroad:—

"I have had another visit from the German Ambassador this morning; he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's intentions, he declared that he did not know them and was ignorant of the nature of the means of coercion which she was preparing."[100]

But how does this compare with the following extract from a telegram sent the next day (July 29) by the Kaiser to the Tsar:—

"I cannot ... consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an 'ignominious war.' Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable."[101]

On July 29 the French Minister at Brussels reported:—

"I report the following impressions of my interview with M. Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact information. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies every apprehension; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian Government would have taken an initiative which would lead, according to a preconceived plan, to adeclaration of war, without previous arrangement with the Emperor William."The German Government stand 'with grounded arms' ready to take peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and English colleagues share this feeling."[102]

"The German Government stand 'with grounded arms' ready to take peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and English colleagues share this feeling."[102]

Finally, on July 30, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, stated to Sir Edward Grey:—

"I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."[103]

Confirmation of the whole evidence is found in the commercial world, for as Sir E. H. Holden, Chairman of the London City and Midland Bank, stated on January 29, 1915:—

"On the 18th of July last (1914) the Dresdner Bank caused a great commotion by selling its securities and by advising its clients to sell their securities. This was recognised as the first semi-official intimation of a probable European conflagration...."

FOOTNOTES:[84]Cd. 7717, No. 19.[85]Cd. 7717, No. 21.[86]Cd. 7717, No. 30.[87]Cd. 7717, No. 32.[88]Cd. 7717, No. 28.[89]Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 9.[90]Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 6.[91]Cd. 7860, page 401.[92]Cd. 7717, No. 41.[93]Cd. 7626, No. 19.[94]Cd. 7717, No. 57.[95]Cd. 7626, No. 20.[96]Cd. 7626, No. 18.[97]Cd. 7717, No. 35.[98]Cd. 7717, No. 83.[99]Cd. 7626, No. 46.[100]Cd. 7717, No. 78.[101]Cd. 7717, Appendix 5, No. 3.[102]Cd. 7717, No. 87.[103]Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 95.

[84]Cd. 7717, No. 19.

[85]Cd. 7717, No. 21.

[86]Cd. 7717, No. 30.

[87]Cd. 7717, No. 32.

[88]Cd. 7717, No. 28.

[89]Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 9.

[90]Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 6.

[91]Cd. 7860, page 401.

[92]Cd. 7717, No. 41.

[93]Cd. 7626, No. 19.

[94]Cd. 7717, No. 57.

[95]Cd. 7626, No. 20.

[96]Cd. 7626, No. 18.

[97]Cd. 7717, No. 35.

[98]Cd. 7717, No. 83.

[99]Cd. 7626, No. 46.

[100]Cd. 7717, No. 78.

[101]Cd. 7717, Appendix 5, No. 3.

[102]Cd. 7717, No. 87.

[103]Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 95.

Germany's view is very clearly indicated in a despatch from the British Ambassador at Vienna, dated July 26, 1914:—

"According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Serbia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Serbian territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over, and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian and Persian questions, being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.... He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Serbia, acting as if shemade any such claim.As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter."[104]

Germany's view is further explained by the British representative at Berlin, on July 26, 1914:—

"Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Serbian territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria didnotannex territory."[105]

The result of this German influence is shown on the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin by the following despatch from Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914:—

"Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here."[106]

So successful were the Germans in impressing this false view upon the Austrians that the position is best described by the British Ambassador in Vienna in his despatch to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 27, 1914:—

"I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war (with Serbia) inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment."[107]

Added to which we have further proof in a despatch from the British Ambassador at Rome, dated July 23, 1914:—

"Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success."[108]

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