SEPTEMBER
Diary of the War
Sept. 1918.
The German retreat still continued, and the Allies gained ground all along the line. The salient at St. Mihiel was carried by the American Army, and the Hindenburg line was captured by the British. A combined attack of the British and Belgian troops under the command of King Albert succeeded beyond all expectation, and the British Fleet was able to join in and bombard the coast. An Austrian offer to enter into Peace negotiations was published, and at the same time the Germans made overtures to the Belgians, but the Allied conference at Versailles refused even to consider either of these proposals.
In Macedonia the Allied Forces inflicted a defeat on the Bulgarians, who retreated on a front of nearly 100 miles, and on September 25 the Bulgarian Government applied for an unconditional armistice.
In Palestine General Allenby commenced a series of attacks on the Turks between Rafat and the sea, and on the 30th Damascus was taken.
During September Marshal Foch followed up his successes all along the line, and the Germans were forced to abandon position after position. Ludendorff, however, always imagined that the Siegfried line was impregnable, and that if the German Army succeeded in getting back there intact, there was no reason why this position should not be held during the winter.
To the British Army was assigned the difficult task of piercing this impregnable line and rendering it untenable, but many doubts were expressed as to whether this was feasible. Sir Douglas Haig, however, was convinced that it could be done, and directed the First and Third Armies to open the attack in the direction of Cambrai, in the hopes that after they had advanced it would be possible for the Fourth Army to pierce the strongest part of the line farther south.
After the operations at the end of August the Guards Division had only five days' rest before it was again put into the line. On September 2 the Canadian Corps had broken the Drocourt—Queant Switch, whilst on the Sixth Corps front the Third Division had, after very heavy fighting, made ground in the neighbourhood of Noreuil and Lagnicourt. The Guards Division moved up from the Ransart area, and was ordered to continue the attack the following day. The position of the advanced troops of the Third Division was so uncertain that it was decided to form up for the attack, along the railway line just east of Noreuil, some distance in rear of theline which the Third Division claimed to have reached, the troops of this Division being then withdrawn. This necessitated the sacrifice of a certain amount of ground won by the Third Division at a heavy cost, but it ensured a straight jumping-off line, and enormously simplified the task of the artillery. (This procedure was repeated on October 9, and on each occasion was fully justified by results.)
After a long and tiring march from their rest areas, Sergison-Brooke's and Follett's Brigades formed up on the right and left respectively, with De Crespigny's Brigade in reserve south of St. Leger. The attack started under a very good barrage at 5.20A.M.Reports soon showed that the enemy had withdrawn during the night, and the advance continued without opposition until the old British front line, just short of the Hindenburg line, was reached. By this time the troops were utterly exhausted, having covered since noon the previous day some twenty miles, in full fighting kit and over hilly country.
During the course of the advance a number of prisoners and guns were captured, but the most noticeable feature on the ground which was recovered was the enormous number of the enemy's dead horses which littered and often blocked the roads: eloquent testimony of the work of our aeroplanes and long-range guns, but entailing heavy and unpleasant fatigue work for our tired troops.
On September 4 Follett's Brigade was ordered to push forward, and form an advance-guard for the rest of the Division, but it found that theGermans were holding the Hindenburg line in some force. This prevented any ground being gained, and the line soon stabilised along the Army front.
The principal features of the operations that took place between September 5 and 26 were:
(a) Some fine trench fighting, by which the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Lord Gort, reached the line of the Canal du Nord.
(b) The heavy and continuous fighting for the village of Mœuvres farther north, during which it changed hands several times before being finally captured and held by the Fifty-second Division.
(c) The heavy gas-shelling, with which the Germans searched all possible assembly positions every night in evident fear of an attack, and which, but for the improved gas discipline, would have caused heavy casualties.
During this period the troops had the satisfaction of seeing two huge German bombing 'planes brought down in flames, on successive nights by our night-flying scouts, working in conjunction with the reorganised searchlight system.
On September 11 Major-General Feilding left to take command of the London District on the retirement of Lieut.-General Sir Francis Lloyd, who had held that command with conspicuous success during the war. For four years Sir Francis Lloyd had occupied one of the most responsible and difficult positions in the Army, and had dealt, especially in the initial stages of the war, with innumerable problems requiring consummate skill, judgment, and tact.
There were several generals who were eligible to succeed Major-General Feilding in command of the Guards Division; all of them had fought consistently for four years, and had been proved and tempered in the furnace of war. The choice of the Commander-in-Chief fell upon Major-General T. G. Matheson, C.B., an officer of exceptional ability, who was reputed to be one of the best Divisional Commanders in the British Army.
On September 25 the orders for the forthcoming attacks were issued. The Guards Division was to attack and capture the ridge running east from Flesquières to Premy Chapel. On the right the Third Division would attack and capture the village of Flesquières, and on the left the Fifty-second Division would capture the Hindenburg line west of the Canal du Nord, after which the Sixty-third Division would pass through, and swinging right-handed would take the Hindenburg support line and the villages of Graincourt and Anneux. In the event of this operation being completely successful, further objectives were given, including Marcoing for the Third Division, Nine Wood and the outskirts of Noyelles for the Guards Division, Cantaing and Fontaine-Notre-Dame for the Fifty-seventh Division, which was to pass through the Sixty-third Division. The Sixty-second and Second Divisions were to be prepared to pass through the Third and Guards Divisions respectively, and capture Rumilly and the high ground east of the Canal de l'Escaut. In the Guards Division Sergison-Brooke's Brigade was to take the first objective (the Hindenburgsupport line) and form a defensive flank to the left during the next advance, until Graincourt had been secured by the Fifty-second and Sixty-third Divisions.
De Crespigny's Brigade would then pass through and capture the trench-system north-west, north, and north-east of Flesquières, moving on afterwards to the spur running from Flesquières to Cantaing with a view to capturing the batteries in that area and turning the Graincourt line. This advance was to synchronise with the attack by Follett's Brigade, but was not to be pressed against strong resistance.
Follett's Brigade was to pass through De Crespigny's Brigade, and to capture the third objective, including the high ground round Premy Chapel. Detailed orders for a farther advance were given in the event of no great resistance being encountered.
The attack would be supported by six brigades R.H.A., heavy artillery, and three machine-gun companies.
The assembly was rendered unusually difficult by reason of the exceptionally large number of troops that had to be accommodated, by the necessity of avoiding gas areas, and by the extreme darkness of the night. The 1st Battalion Scots Guards also suffered from a barrage, which the enemy put down on their assembly trench just before zero. The attack started at 5.20A.M., and at once met with a check on the left, where the 1st Battalion Coldstream was held up by a machine-gun hidden under a fallen bridge. By the time this obstacle had beenovercome the barrage was lost, and this Battalion suffered heavy casualties before reaching its objective, particularly near Mammoth cross-roads, but the remainder of the Brigade reached the first objective with very slight loss.
The advance to the second objective was a very difficult operation. It was known that the Sixty-third Division could not reach Graincourt from the north for another two hours, and General de Crespigny had therefore to hold back his left, and push forward along Shingler Trench with his right. In the meantime Graincourt and the trenches south of it were kept under heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, in order to prevent, as far as possible, the Germans enfilading the troops advancing farther south. Flesquières was captured in conjunction with the Third Division, but the beetroot factory to the east of it held out, so that it was impossible for Follett's Brigade to get through in time to follow their barrage.
The Fifty-second and Sixty-third Divisions on the left had been held up, which prevented De Crespigny's Brigade from advancing, and the left flank of the Guards Division was therefore very much extended, and exposed to cross fire from the left. General Follett, who had come up with General de Crespigny to see how the battle developed, before his Brigade came into action, was killed by this cross fire. His death was mourned by the whole Division, for there was no braver man in the Army, and indeed it was a serious loss to his Brigade just as it was going into action. Major-General Matheson sent orders that Lieut.-Colonel Lord Gort was to take command of the Brigade, but that pending his arrival General de Crespigny was to command both Brigades.
At this stage the battle might easily have died down, as the time-table was out of gear; the attack on the left had apparently failed, and the Germans in Graincourt village and Graincourt line were giving a great deal of trouble with their cross fire. Fortunately, however, a Commander of great enterprise and determination in Lord Gort was in the line, and before long the 1st Battalion Grenadiers, supported by the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, had pushed out along the ridge east of Flesquières, and established itself only just short of Premy Chapel, while the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, together with units of De Crespigny's Brigade, formed a defensive flank along Shingler and Silver Trenches.
Not long after, the Sixty-third Division, having organised a new attack, pushed down the Hindenburg support line, and the Germans began to pour out of Graincourt; as they streamed away, horse, foot, and gun, towards Cantaing, they were caught in flank by rifle, machine-gun, and artillery fire from the Guards Division, and suffered heavily. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers at once pushed forward and captured Orival Wood, taking some guns, and driving the remaining batteries away.
The Second Division was ordered to pass through and pursue the retreating enemy, but dusk fell before it reached the front line, and all it could do was to take over the line occupied by the advanced troops of the Guards Division,which was withdrawn during the night to the area east and west of the Canal du Nord.
On September 27 the casualties in the Guards Division were 40 officers and 1200 other ranks. The total number of prisoners taken by the Division was 25 officers and 703 other ranks, in addition to 10 field-guns.
1st Batt.
On September 2 the Battalion proceeded to the area about Homme Mort, and halted for dinner near Moyenneville. In the afternoon the whole Brigade concentrated in Maida Vale, and Lord Gort rode forward with the Company Commanders towards Longatte, in view of an attack the following day. The orders for the attack were issued that night, and early the next morning the Battalion proceeded to Noreuil, where they went into old German dug-outs. The Germans had retired to the Hindenburg line, and a general advance on Bourlon and Mœuvres was ordered (on the whole Corps front). The 1st Battalion marched to a position west of Lagnicourt, where they remained for the night. A farther advance was made the next day, and on the 5th it reached Louverval Wood, where a week was spent training and practising open warfare.
On the 11th the Battalion moved up into the front line, but the relief was only effected by the infiltration of the companies through troops of the 50th Infantry Brigade. This Brigade, having made an attack that evening, had failed to secure its objective, and the relief was consequently not an easy one. Lord Gort and Captain Simpson spent the night reconnoitring the trenches in the outer zone of the Hindenburg line, in constant danger of being caught by the Germans, and the information they gained enabled the Battalion to establish itself by dawn the next morning in the objective, which the 5th Infantry Brigade had intended to secure the night before. At dawn a bombing attack was made up Brown Trench, and the line of Alban Avenue was secured. A barrage, supporting the attack on Havrincourt, was put down on the whole front, and soon brought retaliation from the enemy. Near the sunken trench in Alban Avenue a shell burst, killing Lieutenant E. B. Shelley, and wounding Second Lieutenant Payne severely and Captain Simpson slightly. In addition to the shelling, the enemy's machine-guns were very active, enfilading Alban Avenue. In the afternoon the 225th German Infantry Regiment carried out a bombing attack on Beatty and Babs posts, but was repulsed with several killed and wounded, leaving two machine-guns in our hands. Throughout the day the enemy maintained a heavy harassing fire, and in the evening again attempted a bombing attack on Beatty and Babs posts, but with the same result. The following day the shelling decreased considerably, and inter-company relief was carried out. First Lieutenant W. B. Evans, U.S.A.M.O.R.C., and Captain the Rev. J. O. Venables, in addition to 27 other ranks, were gassed on the 13th, and every day there were a number of men killed, wounded, and gassed.
On the 15th the following letter from Brigadier-General W. S. Osborn, 5th Infantry Brigade, was received by Brigadier-General Follett:
The 5th Infantry Brigade much appreciates the support given them on their left by the 1st Batt. Grenadier Guards in Beatty Post and Alban Trench. The counter-attack repulsed by Grenadier Guardsmen would have fallen on their weakened Companies. A captured map showed the Hun main line running down Hunt Avenue with outposts in Slag Avenue, and the counter-attack was evidently made to gain this resistance line. Will you please thank Colonel Lord Gort from me on behalf of the 5th I.B.
The 5th Infantry Brigade much appreciates the support given them on their left by the 1st Batt. Grenadier Guards in Beatty Post and Alban Trench. The counter-attack repulsed by Grenadier Guardsmen would have fallen on their weakened Companies. A captured map showed the Hun main line running down Hunt Avenue with outposts in Slag Avenue, and the counter-attack was evidently made to gain this resistance line. Will you please thank Colonel Lord Gort from me on behalf of the 5th I.B.
The week preceding the attack on Premy Chapel was uneventful, and on the 25th Major-General Matheson explained the details of the operations. Captain Lawford was appointed to the Staff of the Fourth Army, and Captain Lovell, M.C., took over the duties of Adjutant.
Attack on Premy ChapelSeptember 27th. 1918Emery Walker Ltd.
Attack on Premy Chapel
September 27th. 1918
Emery Walker Ltd.
Sept. 26.
On the evening of the 26th the Battalion left its billets about a mile north-west of the village of Lagnicourt, and marched with its full battle equipment, accompanied by Lewis guns, limbers, field-kitchens, and water-carts, along the Lagnicourt—Doignies road, to its bivouacs about 1500 yards west of Louverval Wood. The strength of the Battalion was 15 officers and 395 other ranks actually going into action.
The officers who took part in the attack were:
Lieut. R. W. F. Echlin was acting Brigade Transport Officer, and Lieut. R. G. Buchanan as Quartermaster.
Lord Gort issued the following operation orders:
The Battalion will attack Premy Chapel hill tomorrow the 27th, with the object of securing the line of the sunken road.The attack will be made in conjunction with the 2/20th London Regiment, who will be advancing on Marcoing, and the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, who will be attacking Leech Trench.The strong patrols of the Battalion will debouch for the attack from the line of the sunken road at zero + 4 hours 20 minutes so as to cross the brown line (Beet Trench) at zero +4 hours and 30 minutes. Approach march orders have been issued separately.The Battalion will attack with No. 2 Company on right and No. 4 Company on left in front line, preceded at a distance of 300 yards by strong patrols.Dividing line between the two leading Companies in the attack will be T of Beet Trench to A in Log Avenue, all inclusive to No. 4 Company.No. 3 Company will be in support écheloned behind No. 4 Company at a distance of 500 yards in readiness to make a flank attack on Premy Hill from the north should it be found necessary.The King's Company will be in Battalion Reserve and will follow No. 3 Company at a distance of 500 yards until the neighbourhood of Premy Trench is reached, when it will occupy suitable shell-holes and trenches.Two Stokes mortars, each with 50 rounds, will move immediately in rear of and under the command of the O.C. No. 3 Company.One section machine-guns will follow in rear of the King's Company and will be prepared to assist a flank attack on Premy from the north with covering fire and to assist the consolidation of Premy Hill by guns placed in the Graincourt line.Corps heavy artillery will bombard Premy Hill until zero + 5 hours, when the guns will lift on to Nine Wood for half an hour and then cease firing.
The Battalion will attack Premy Chapel hill tomorrow the 27th, with the object of securing the line of the sunken road.
The attack will be made in conjunction with the 2/20th London Regiment, who will be advancing on Marcoing, and the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, who will be attacking Leech Trench.
The strong patrols of the Battalion will debouch for the attack from the line of the sunken road at zero + 4 hours 20 minutes so as to cross the brown line (Beet Trench) at zero +4 hours and 30 minutes. Approach march orders have been issued separately.
The Battalion will attack with No. 2 Company on right and No. 4 Company on left in front line, preceded at a distance of 300 yards by strong patrols.
Dividing line between the two leading Companies in the attack will be T of Beet Trench to A in Log Avenue, all inclusive to No. 4 Company.
No. 3 Company will be in support écheloned behind No. 4 Company at a distance of 500 yards in readiness to make a flank attack on Premy Hill from the north should it be found necessary.
The King's Company will be in Battalion Reserve and will follow No. 3 Company at a distance of 500 yards until the neighbourhood of Premy Trench is reached, when it will occupy suitable shell-holes and trenches.
Two Stokes mortars, each with 50 rounds, will move immediately in rear of and under the command of the O.C. No. 3 Company.
One section machine-guns will follow in rear of the King's Company and will be prepared to assist a flank attack on Premy from the north with covering fire and to assist the consolidation of Premy Hill by guns placed in the Graincourt line.
Corps heavy artillery will bombard Premy Hill until zero + 5 hours, when the guns will lift on to Nine Wood for half an hour and then cease firing.
The remainder of the orders contained detailed instructions for the action of the Battalion, if the attack on the right and left proved successful.
Sept. 27.
It was very dark when the Battalion started on its march, and the artillery on both sides was very quiet. The order of march was No. 2 Company under Captain Carter, No. 4 under Lieutenant Jones, No. 3 under Captain Simpson, and the King's Company under Lieutenant Brown, while Lord Gort, accompanied by Captain Lovell, the Adjutant, and some orderlies, walked at the head of the Battalion. On reaching the Bapaume—Cambrai road a halt was made to wait for zero hour, 5.20A.M., at which time the Battalion was to advance towards Flesquières. At zero hour the advance began across countryto Demicourt. There was at first very little shelling, but as the Battalion neared the Canal du Nord the shells began to fall more rapidly. There was no water in the Canal, and by means of short ladders placed against the banks the crossing was effected 100 yards north of Lock Seven, with only a dozen casualties, including Lieutenant Jesper, who was wounded as he reached the near bank. Lord Gort went back to Lock Seven to confer with the officer commanding the tanks which were to support the Battalion, and was unable to find him; it was ascertained later that he had been wounded. The Battalion had to be in position east of Flesquières at 9.20A.M., and Lord Gort therefore continued the advance without further delay. The ground over which it was necessary to pass was undulating, and was swept by the enemy's fire, but the skilful manner in which Lord Gort conducted this advance accounted for the small number of casualties the Battalion sustained. The situation did not look very promising, for the Germans were still holding Graincourt some 4000 yards to the left rear. The 2nd Battalion was unable to advance on Orival Wood, which should have been taken before the 1st Battalion started, and the Third Division, through which the 1st Battalion had to advance, had failed to carry Beet Trench. On nearing Flesquières, the enemy's machine-gun fire from the direction of Graincourt became very heavy, and Captain Carter was killed, being hit in the head. On reaching Flesquières Lord Gort took the leading companies round the northernedge of the village, threading a way through the houses, as the machine-gun fire was heavy from the left flank. Two enemy batteries were still in action in the neighbourhood of Beet Trench, and the Germans were also holding the Beetroot Factory and Beet Trench very strongly with infantry and machine-guns. No sign of any troops on the left could be seen, and tanks, which were to co-operate, had not yet arrived. Lord Gort himself took the leading platoons of the two leading companies into position for assault, and while doing so was slightly wounded over the left eye. While the patrol platoon of No. 2 Company was crawling forward to locate the exact position of the enemy, Second Lieutenant Clarke, with the patrol platoon of No. 4 Company, worked round the left flank of the enemy, captured Beetroot Factory, and took the garrison prisoners. It was a skilful and daring manœuvre, as the platoon was fired at from both flanks, and suffered heavily. One tank now arrived, and Lord Gort at once decided to push on towards Premy Chapel, in spite of the fact that no corresponding advance seemed to have been begun on either flank.
Second Lieutenant Clarke, who had returned with his prisoners, was now ordered to take a platoon from No. 3 Company in support, and again work round the left flank in order to attack Beet Trench from the rear. Lord Gort went across the open to a tank, that was working behind the sunken road, and showed the Commander where to cross, and in what direction to advance; but when it neared Beet Trench thetank was put out of action by direct artillery fire. It was now found that the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, which should have been advancing on the left flank, was not in position, nor was the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards able to advance on Orival Wood. On the right the situation was better, for the Sixty-third Division was reported to be making good progress. The 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, which was in Brigade Reserve, undertook to come up and protect the left flank. All the time there were several hostile air balloons up directing the fire on the tank, and a German aeroplane had signalled the presence of troops in the sunken road, which immediately became a target for the enemy's artillery. One shell burst close to Lord Gort, wounding him severely in the arm, but although an artery had been cut and he lost a great deal of blood, he refused to go back to the dressing-station, and asked Captain Lindsay to bind his arm up temporarily.
His wound, however, proved more serious than he thought, and Captain Simpson took over command of the Battalion. Somewhat later Lord Gort insisted on starting off again to join the leading companies, but on reaching Beet Trench he collapsed from loss of blood.
Meanwhile the platoon of No. 3 Company under Second Lieutenant Clarke had succeeded in their turning movement, captured a German machine-gun post, and, in spite of being fired on by our tank, worked round to the east of Beet Trench. Two hundred Germans were driven into the sunken road, and forced to surrender,while two batteries of field howitzers and six machine-guns were captured.
The two leading companies continued their advance and No. 3 Company moved forward in their support in échelon to their left flank, while the King's Company moved up to the sunken road in reserve. The enemy was now shelling the neighbourhood of Beet Trench, and sweeping the whole ground with machine-gun fire. No. 2 Company reached Labour Trench, leaving two platoons in support in Premy Trench, but in the face of point-blank artillery fire from Nine Wood was unable to advance any farther. Lieutenant A. A. Morris, who was the only officer left with the company, was killed while advancing with the leading platoons. Second Lieutenant A. Grant in No. 4 Company was killed about the same time, while Lieutenant B. Jones was wounded.
The enemy was holding Marcoing on the right flank and a spur by Leech Alley on the left, so that the whole attack had become wedge-shaped, and, while no advance was taking place on either flank, the 1st Battalion continued to drive this wedge into the enemy's lines. But however successful or daring a manœuvre like this may be, its ultimate success depends on the knowledge when to stop. In answer to a message sent by Captain Simpson, Brigadier-General de Crespigny said that any farther advance was not to be attempted in the face of such heavy fire, until the left flank had been secured by the advance of fresh troops through Graincourt. Captain Simpson decided to establish the main line of resistance in Beet Trench, with a line of outpostspushed well in front, to act as a screen for the advance of the Second Division, which was known to be advancing. Accordingly No. 2 Company was withdrawn to Premy Support Trench, No. 3 to the gun-pit and Beetroot Factory, and the King's and No. 4 Companies to Beet Trench, with outposts some 300 yards in front. This manœuvre was carried out under heavy fire, but was executed with such steadiness that the casualties were few. The men, however, seemed disappointed that they could not push farther on. The Adjutant, Captain Lovell, was hit by a machine-gun bullet whilst accompanying Captain Simpson, who had gone up to superintend the movement.
The Germans appear to have been thoroughly mystified by this attack throughout the whole operation, and to have imagined that the advance might eventually develop into a turning movement, threatening their line of retreat. When the Second Division came up at 2.30, they found the enemy retreating everywhere before them. As soon as the advance had been begun by this Division, the 1st Battalion was withdrawn to an area west of the Canal.
The extraordinary success achieved by the Battalion during this attack was entirely due to the courage, endurance, and determination of Lord Gort, who was awarded the V.C. for his conspicuous bravery. He was able by his example and the reckless exposure of his own life to infuse into all ranks an indomitable determination to reach the objective, no matter what the cost might be. He had himself brought the Battalionto a very high state of efficiency, and there is little doubt that with a less highly trained battalion such an attack might have ended disastrously.
The casualties incurred during this attack were: Killed, Captain J. S. Carter, Lieutenant A. A. Morris, and Second Lieutenant A. Grant; wounded, Lieut.-Colonel Lord Gort, Captain W. H. Lovell, Lieutenant B. H. Jones, Lieutenant A. M. Brown, Second Lieutenant J. C. Blunt, Second Lieutenant L. C. Jesper; and amongst other ranks there were 35 killed and 24 wounded.
The last days in September were spent by the Battalion reorganising and re-fitting in bivouacs west of Canal du Nord, when the following officers arrived: Captain P. M. Spence, M.C., Lieutenant C. G. Kennaway, Lieutenant R. S. Challands, Lieutenant A. M. Brown, Second Lieutenant M. G. Farquharson, Second Lieutenant E. A. D. Bliss, Second Lieutenant N. P. Andrews, Second Lieutenant J. C. Blunt, and Second Lieutenant R. B. Osborne.
2nd Batt.
During the first week in September the Battalion near Adinfer was training and reorganising, after the heavy losses incurred in the operations at the end of August. From the 7th to 11th the Battalion, under Major Harcourt-Vernon, went up into the front line, where it came in for much shelling, especially from gas-shells, and, although the troops on each flank carried out offensive operations, it was not called upon to attack. After ten days spent out of the line,during which Second Lieutenant K. B. Bibby and Second Lieutenant E. M. Neill joined, the Battalion moved up to Llama Post.
The following officers took part in the operations on September 27:
Sept. 27.
During the night rain fell, and the tracks were, in consequence, very slippery. This, added to the fact that some of the bridges which had been put across the trenches on the previous day had been broken, caused some delay, and prevented the pack animals, which were following the companies with hot food containers, from keeping up with the Battalion; they were consequently sent round by road, but failed to arrive before the companies left their assembly positions. The enemy's artillery was exceptionally quiet during the march, and only a few shells fell in Boursies, as the Battalion passedthrough. Walsh Trench and Walsh Support were reached at 4.30A.M.
The general plan of attack was as follows: Sergison-Brooke's Brigade was to take the first objective, which was the Hindenburg support line between Graincourt and Flesquières. The 1st Battalion Irish Guards was then to pass through and take the second objective, which was the old British front line of December 1917 to March 1918, just north of Flesquières. The 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards was to follow the Irish Guards, and pass through them in order to exploit any success gained towards Orival Wood and Graincourt, while Follett's Brigade on the right would push on towards Nine Wood.
The Battalion moved off at zero plus one hour from its assembly position, in the normal approach formation with No. 1 Company under Captain Hermon-Hodge, and No. 2 under Lieutenant Dent in the front line, and Nos. 3 and 4 Companies under Lieutenant Palmer and Captain Drummond in support. The ridge west of the Canal du Nord was being heavily shelled, but the Battalion passed over it with few casualties, and crossed the Canal itself easily enough with the aid of ladders on each bank. Any advance through the intricate labyrinth of trenches in the Hindenburg line was by no means a simple matter, especially under fire, and the instructions Major Harcourt-Vernon received were to bring up the Battalion to Soap Trench and Ship Trench in the Hindenburg support line, and then to advance to the forming-up area. The Battalion was unable to leave the Hindenburgsupport line until 8.20A.M., partly on account of No. 4 Company having lost direction, and being engaged by machine-gun fire from the left, and partly on account of Summer Lane not having been completely cleared of the enemy. In order to deal with this machine-gun nest in Summer Lane, Major Harcourt-Vernon despatched one platoon under Second Lieutenant Pelly with orders to clear the Germans out. Second Lieutenant Pelly successfully carried out his orders, and not only chased the Germans away, but also took eight prisoners. The advance was then continued, but a heavy fire from the direction of Graincourt and Knave Trench caused many casualties, and Second Lieutenant Pelly was wounded. The mopping up had not been very thorough, and some casualties occurred from snipers' bullets from the rear.
The Third Division had taken Flesquières, but the Sixty-third Division had failed to occupy Graincourt, with the result that the Germans were able to enfilade the troops advancing to Flesquières. When the Battalion advanced to the Beetroot Factory, two batteries of field-guns fired at them with open sights, and machine-guns from Graincourt swept the ground over which they had to pass. On reaching the Beetroot Factory, the Company Commanders at once sent out patrols to make good the ground towards Orival Wood, and silence the batteries and machine-guns, which were causing the casualties, but the volume and accuracy of the enemy's fire prevented them from making much headway. Lieutenant Combe and Lieutenant Bevan werewounded, whilst trying to push forward with patrols, and there seemed no prospect of advancing until Graincourt had been captured.
In the afternoon the situation underwent a change owing to Lord Gort's daring advance with the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards. This had the effect of moving the whole German line. Graincourt was at last taken, and an advance on Orival Wood was begun. About 4.30 the Second Division began to arrive, and in conjunction with the King's Regiment advanced from Flesquières. This enabled the 2nd Battalion to push through Orival Wood, although it was unable to debouch from its north edge. Lieutenant Sharpe was wounded during this advance. The Battalion succeeded in capturing seven field-guns and three howitzers, in addition to some forty prisoners. Later in the evening the Fifty-seventh Division attempted to attack down the Graincourt—Marcoing Road, and met with little success.
The Battalion was withdrawn at 3 o'clock the next morning, and returned to a camp on the west of the Canal. The casualties were not heavy. The Battalion lost 9 men killed, 86 wounded, and 2 missing, in addition to the 4 officers already mentioned as having been wounded.
3rd Batt.
On the 24th the Battalion moved back to Ransart, and reorganised the companies which had suffered. Lieutenant J. A. Inglis-Jones joined on the 31st. Lieut.-Colonel Thorne leftto take over command of the Ninth Corps School, and was succeeded by Major Viscount Lascelles.
On September 1 a warning order was received that the Brigade would take part in an attack, and the following morning the Battalion marched to Hamelincourt. Under the impression that it would stay there for the night, Lord Lascelles gave the men orders to collect material in the ruins of the village, bivouac, and cook their dinners; but bivouacking took rather longer than was expected, and just when dinners were cooked, orders were received for the Battalion to move at once to L'Homme Mort, near St. Leger. The result was that the men had a hurried meal. At a Brigade conference that was held, verbal orders for the attack were issued, and it was decided that, rather than risk finding pockets of Germans within the forming-up positions, it would be safer to ignore the advance made that morning, and form up on ground that had been in our possession for several days.
At 1A.M.the leading company started for the assembly positions, and although the guide twice lost his way it arrived at the destination at 3A.M.An hour later Lord Lascelles went round the positions and could find no trace of the other three companies. At 5.5A.M., the hour at which the Battalion was to advance, they arrived, having been on the march for four hours, owing to inefficient guides.
The Germans had meanwhile decided not to wait for the attack and had already retired when the Battalion commenced to advance, so that there was no fighting. When No. 1 and No. 2Companies, under Captain Fryer and Captain Dury, reached the final objective, it was merely a matter of rounding up a certain number of deserters. Lord Lascelles, on going up to the leading companies, found a stretch of undulating country in front with no sign of the enemy, and ordered an advance to the next ridge, at the same time directing No. 3 Company, under Lieutenant Cornish in support, and No. 4 Company, under Captain Hirst in reserve, to move forward as far as the position already occupied by the leading companies. This sweeping advance with no apparent opposition somewhat confused the leading companies, which were accustomed during the long period of trench warfare to short advances with definite objectives.
The fatigue of the men was beginning to tell, and this last advance was a distinct effort, but by two o'clock in the afternoon the leading companies had consolidated the position in Boursies. There were no casualties, although the enemy put up a few shells over the Battalion, as it topped the ridge 500 yards west of the village. During the afternoon the German artillery became very busy, and interfered a good deal with the patrols, but otherwise caused little or no damage. The men had been on the move since dawn the day before, and were consequently exhausted, but the Germans made no attempt to counter-attack, and it was therefore possible to get some rest.
At 5 o'clock the following morning the 3rd Guards Brigade passed through the Battalion, which was withdrawn to watch the exposed right flank. The visibility was good, and a fewsentries were all that were required, while the remainder of the Battalion obtained some rest. On the 5th the Battalion relieved the Welsh Guards in the front line, and Lord Lascelles decided to move the Battalion Headquarters farther forward, and to hand over what had been the Welsh Guards Headquarters to the Medical Officer for an aid-post. Nos. 3 and 4 Companies were placed in the front line, with Nos. 1 and 2 in support. The right of the Battalion was not in touch with any troops, there being a gap of some 500 yards, and this was accounted for by the fact that the ground was covered with wire of the old Hindenburg line and of the old British line facing it. This wire was almost impenetrable laterally, and was at right angles to the line held by the Battalion. The enemy was in considerable strength in front, and held some 400 yards west of the Canal du Nord as an outpost line in the old maze of trenches, with a strong defensive position behind the Canal. The ground sloped down to the Canal, and the farther the Battalion advanced, the more they were overlooked from the opposite slope; but the necessity of gaining touch with the 1st Battalion King's Royal Rifles made an advance necessary. The line of resistance, about 600 yards behind the front line, which the Battalion received instructions to dig, was nearly finished, when the enemy put a concentrated gas bombardment on the valley, where the Company Headquarters of the two companies in support were placed. For an hour the Germans bombarded the valley with sneezing-gas shells, and all the officers and menkept on their masks, but when the gas bombardment appeared to cease and was succeeded by one of H.E. shells, every one incautiously took off his mask. This new bombardment proved to be one of mustard gas. By the time this was realised every one was being sick, and all the officers and N.C.O.'s were casualties. Lord Lascelles came up from Battalion Headquarters to see what had happened, and met Captain Dury being led away blind. There were 61 men in No. 1 Company and 30 men in No. 2 who had been gassed, in addition to the following officers: Second Lieutenant S. Calvocoressi, Captain G. Dury, Second Lieutenant W. B. L. Manley, Lieutenant H. P. Gordon, and Second Lieutenant R. K. Henderson.
In the meantime Lieutenant Cornish, commanding No. 3 Company, had received orders from Lord Lascelles to close the gap on his right, and after reconnoitring the situation had established a liaison post with the King's Royal Rifles at Joan Post. When darkness came he managed to send out more men, and added two fresh posts south of Goat Trench; but the ground to be covered was over 500 yards, and the difficulty was that the line from the right of the Battalion to the left of the King's Royal Rifles ran diagonally over a crest, and not parallel to it. Lines of very thick and strong wire ran in irregular lines, and in various directions. What therefore seemed fairly simple by daylight was extremely difficult in the dark, since no patrol could keep direction on account of the wire. A compass was useless, owing to the wire, and there were no landmarks. Lord Lascelles, who was not at all happy about his right flank, ordered Lieutenant Cornish to double his liaison post, and to put up a Véry light perpendicular at dusk from his post on the left of the gap, so that a detachment from the liaison post could work towards it.
These measures, although far from satisfactory, were the best that could be done in the circumstances, and Lieutenant Cornish was afterwards highly commended for the energy and resource which he showed in dealing with an admittedly difficult situation.
On the 8th the Battalion was relieved by the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers, and retired to some trenches in Dunhelm Avenue. From the 8th to the 15th the whole of the 2nd Brigade went into reserve positions near Lagnicourt, where no incidents of any importance occurred. As a draft was shortly expected, the companies were not equalised in strength, but it was Nos. 1 and 2 Companies that had suffered most, and, as the other two companies would have to lead the attack at the end of the month, there was no objection to the half-assimilated draft being in reserve.
On the 20th the Battalion was warned that it would shortly have to take part in the attack on the Canal du Nord, and that it would relieve the 1st Battalion Scots Guards on the night of the 21st. A piece of ground was at once selected for practice purposes, and the enemy's trenches and salient features were taped out on it, while the Royal Engineers constructed a model of the area to be attacked. The expected draft arrivedjust in time to take part in the rehearsal, and was absorbed in Nos. 1 and 2 Companies. The following day after a Company Commanders' conference, the details of the attack were carefully explained by the Commanding Officer, Lord Lascelles, who had attended a conference at Brigade Headquarters. No. 3 Company and one platoon of No. 4 were to attack Slag Heap; the remainder of No. 4 Company would be in support; No. 2 Company would remain where it was in the front line, and No. 1 would be in Brigade Reserve. Thus all four companies were to be more or less in the front line, but No. 4 Company, under Lieutenant Bunbury, was the one most likely to come into touch with the enemy. During the relief No. 4 Company was raided, but the Welsh Guards had not yet left the line, and the enemy consequently received a very warm reception. The possibility of an attack on that part of the line had already occurred to Lieutenant Bunbury, as a similar raid had been attempted two days before, and the ground being a regular rabbit-warren of disused trenches made it extremely difficult to guard against a surprise; but he kept his company constantly on the alert, and was ready for the Germans when they came.
On the 25th a heavy barrage descended on the whole front line, and all wires became disconnected. The enemy raided the position of the line occupied by No. 4 Company, and managed to get into trenches at an unoccupied spot, but were ejected by a patrol. There were a few casualties from the barrage, but no men missing.On the following day detailed orders for the attack were issued, and the Battalion proceeded to the assembly position.