LORD PALMERSTON ON THE SPANISH MARRIAGE.
Here I have had a long conversation with Lady Palmerston, from which I infer that Palmerston's fixed idea is to humble France and to make her feel her humiliation, and, in order to do so, to connect himself more closely with the three Powers, who appear to be ready to do anything for him if he will break with France. She abused Aberdeen, and said he had made his agents all over the world act in subserviency to the French; this system Palmerston considers it his mission to put an end to, and I gather that he means on the contrary to thwart and oppose France whenever and wherever he can. She told me that these Powers were now better disposed than ever to us, and regarding France as the most encroaching Power, only wanted to join us in keeping her down. I took an opportunity of telling Palmerston that Bunsen and Prince Albert want to have a pamphlet written about Cracow and German affairs, and that the former had proposed to Reeve to write it; Reeve said he had no objection provided Palmerston was first consulted and approved, and this he wrote to Bunsen.1I told Palmerston that Reeve wished him to be apprised of this. He said he was much obliged to me for giving him an opportunity of thinking of it, but that his impression was that it would be better not to write anything, as Cracow was now an affair settled and done, and it was not desirable to say anything offensive to the three Powers, whose co-operation with us was essential in the far more important concern of the Spanish marriages. From this I infer that he means to continue to wage war on the Montpensier marriage, and to form a sort of preparatory league against France. I am greatly alarmed at the spirit he evinces, and fully expect we shall sooner or later get into some scrape.This evening (31st) I had a long conversation with him, in which he discussed Jarnac's communications with me (which I had told Lady Palmerston) and with him. He declares he gave him the verbal assurances he asked for as strongly as possible, and he does not believe anything else he might have done would have produced any effect in arresting the progress of the intrigue at Madrid. The French pretend that the Spanish Court insisted on having Montpensier, and that the Queen only consented to marry her cousin on condition that the King gave his son to the Infanta; that this match was therefore a Spanish and not a French object. He said that Villa Franca (Montemolin's man) told him that when he was at Paris Louis Philippe said to him that he wished the Count de Montemolin to marry the Queen; that he had only to renounce his claims, which would be a mere form, as he would declare himself King as soon as he was married, and that he contemplated the restoration of the Salic Law, which at all events he should insist on, as far as the Infanta was concerned, whenever the Duke de Montpensier married her. Palmerston's present idea is that this restoration of the Salic Law may be effected, and that the Spaniards will adopt such a course. I pointed out the difficulty and the levity of such a proceeding: enacting a law one day which cuts off the contingent rights of Don Carlos and his family and lets in Ferdinand's two daughters; then abrogating this law and restoring the former course of succession, but preserving only one of the sisters thus let in and excluding the other, and excluding also the heir under the abrogated law now again to be restored, thus re-establishing the law but not re-establishing the rights which that law conferred. All this would make such a mass of confusion and contradictions, and abrogating some rights and creating others so partially, arbitrarily, and capriciously, that the certain result would be a future state of uncertainty, rivalry, and strife. He did not say a word to me of my journey to Paris, nor I to him.
London, January 2nd, 1847.—Returned from Broadlands yesterday; I had written from thence to Clarendon, andtold him my impressions. He thinks that part of what was said of Aberdeen is true. English agents everywhereweremade subservient to the French, and to such an extent that they did not dare complain of any French misconduct, because they knew they should be reproved and run the risk of being humiliated in their public capacities, and he attributes to thislaissez faireof Aberdeen's much of Louis Philippe's success in his intrigues, and the uncomfortable state of things in Europe. He had been over to John Russell at Chorley Wood, and found him in no state of bitterness, but sick of foreign affairs and the plots and intrigues he had been so troubled with, and so absorbed with the much more important subject of Ireland that he could take no interest in the former. In short, Clarendon has in great measure succeeded in dissipating my alarm. He recommends that I should advise moderation, and give the French Government to understand that a moderate tone there will secure one here, and he has sent me a letter for Duchâtel, with whom he wishes me to communicate confidentially.2
January 3rd.—I saw M. de St. Aulaire and Jarnac yesterday, and had much conversation with both. St. Aulaire said he saw he had nothing to do but remainles bras croisés, and say as little as possible.
I go to-night.
M. GUIZOT'S EXPLANATION.
Paris, January 6th.—Arrived here yesterday morning at half-past twelve o'clock, travelling all night from Boulogne. I had no sooner got here than Normanby put into my hands a box of papers, copies of his despatches to Palmerston, containing details he was anxious I should know, and filling up gaps in the history of the Spanish affair. The most essential of these papers are despatches to Palmerston, giving an account of two interviews with Guizot, and as to which there could be no mistake, as he read to Guizot his letter, givingthe details of one of them (the most important). Guizot acknowledged its general accuracy, and made a verbal amendment or two in it. I take for granted these papers will be published. Normanby is very anxious they should, and justly considers that unless they are, the strength of our case will never be known. There are certain things contained in them which Guizot never can explain away satisfactorily, and which must leave a stain on his candour and good faith. On August 28 Normanby formally proposed to Guizot a joint action in favour of Enrique; he replied that this would suit him perfectly, and that he would write to Bresson and instruct him accordingly. On that very day the announcement of the two marriages appeared in the Spanish Gazette. Normanby of course subsequently asked for an explanation of this extraordinary conduct. Guizot seems to have lost his head in the excitement of his exploit, for he replied that hearing nothing to satisfy him, and on the strength of his note of February 27, 'J'ai agi'—that is, that he had already acted independently and hostilely long before the day on which he pretended that he would give instructions to Bresson to act conjointly with us. He endeavoured to excuse this duplicity by saying that Bresson had acted on general, not on particular instructions; but this was inconsistent with his 'J'ai agi.' Then about the time of the celebration of the marriages, he had said they would not take place atthe same time; again, on being pressed on this point, he said he had meant that they would not take placetogether, and that such had not been the intention when he said so. Jarnac told me the other day that he had heard great stress was laid on this by us, and that we meant to make it a matter of grave charge. I said I did not believe it was so seriously considered, and doubted that much more was thought about it, though at first it had been considered as a proof of insincerity; but I find that it is of importance, for upon the expectation thus conveyed by Guizot rests Palmerston's defence for one of the weakest points of his case, his long silence after hearing of the marriages being settled. Palmerston's conduct and hisdelays throughout have been quite inconceivable, and certainly will, if not weaken his case, draw considerable censure upon him if it all comes out. There was, in the first place, his neglect and obstinacy in not giving in writing the assurances he had given verbally; next, as to the proposal of joint action, Jarnac came to him, intending to make the proposal, but in consequence of the despatch of July 19 he did not make it. He then went to Paris, and on his return he did make it. He could get no answer, and none was sent till August 22. Bulwer was then instructed to propose Enrique, and the French Government was invited to instruct Bresson to co-operate, but he allowed a month to elapse before he wrote this instruction; then when the conclusion of the marriages was imparted to him, he suffered three weeks to elapse before he took any notice, and then sent his protest. It never would have been effectual, but the only chance for him would have been an instantaneous remonstrance by return of post. All these delays, such tardiness, coupled with other slight circumstances, give some colour to the proceedings of the French Government, and, to a certain degree, help out their case. Normanby is fully conscious of the damage thus done to ours, and the only excuse for the last delay is, that Palmerston was reposing on the assurance that the marriage of the Infanta was not to take place at the same time with that of the Queen; but this, when examined, will appear hardly any excuse.
PRINCESS LIEVEN ON THE QUARREL.
I called yesterday afternoon on Madame de Lieven, who was very glad to see me, and we forthwith broke into the subject, without, however, any sort of agreement. She abused Palmerston, and said if Aberdeen had been in office it would not have happened. As to argument, she really had none to offer, but repeated over and over that 'we had departed from the agreement with Aberdeen;' and if not, 'pourquoi nommer le Cobourg?' She said all Europe was against us, that we had with little dignity knocked at the doors of the three Powers who turned their backs on us, and that we had done good to France and harm to ourselves by this useless appeal, as they were now more alienated fromus and better inclined to the French, and that they all thought us in the wrong. She said much about Normanby, hisgreennessas ambassador, and the follies he committed; asking advice of different people, and very incompetent people too; and she repeated the story Jarnac had told me of his saying we never should have harmony restored till Guizot was turned out and the Infanta had renounced, which, she said, had been told her by Apponyi, who had heard it from Normanby himself. She had got other stories of the same kind, and a heap of little charges of holding communications with Thiers, Molé, and others hostile to the Government. She said that the King was very angry with our Queen for having said that he had broken his word, and never would be reconciled to her till she had withdrawn that accusation. I said that between his word and hers I could not for a moment doubt, and that I suspected he would have a long time to wait if he did so till she withdrew the charge she had made. She said Guizot was very strong, the King very firm, the marriage very popular, and that they all desired nothing so much as to make known all that had passed, secure that in so doing they should have public opinion all the world over on their side. We parted wide as the poles asunder, but very good friends.
January 7th.—Guizot appointed me at four o'clock yesterday, but when I went there he was not returned from the Council. I called again and saw him for a moment; but as he said he had his courier to despatch, and 'avait à me parler sérieusement,' he begged me to go to him to-day at half-past four.
I called on Lord Cowley,3and had a long conversation with him. He is impatient for a reconciliation, and thinks that far too great importance has been attached to the question itself. He blames Palmerston severely for his despatch of July 19, and thinks that more warning and menace wereheld out than I had conceived;4thathiscommunications ought to have satisfied Palmerston that the French Government were in an excited state and prepared to do something unless he prevented them. This makes his delays still more inexcusable. He also fancies that it would never have happened if Aberdeen had remained in office.
At night to the Opera, where I met Thiers and was introduced to Molé. I am to call on Thiers to-morrow afternoon. Molé told Normanby that he was very uneasy about two things,—the arrest of Olozaga in Spain, and the intervention of the Austrians in Italy, which he expected to take place. Molé, by Normanby's account, speaks very disparagingly of Guizot, and, by Madame de Lieven's, very contemptuously of Normanby. It is amusing enough to hear all the stories the people here tell and the opinions they express of one another.
DISCUSSION WITH M. GUIZOT.
At night.—This morning I called on Madame de St. Aulaire, whom I found, and Madame de Gontaut, whom I did not; then, Madame de Lieven. Much talk on the old subject, and the fire of my tongue extinguished the fire of hers, for, without the least convincing her, I reduced her to silence. The great gun I brought to bear on her was Aberdeen's despatch to the Duke de Sotomayor, which proved that Palmerston had in no way departed from the system of conduct pursued by Aberdeen. From her I went to Guizot, and was with him for an hour and a half. We began with an agreement that we should be mutually frank and sincere. He went through the whole case and exhibited all his causesof complaint and suspicion against Palmerston, that when he came into office he never said a word (in public or private) expressive of a desire to be on good terms with France, neither in his speech at Tiverton, nor in the House of Commons, nor to Jarnac; that he never alluded to the Spanish question nor sought to establish or confirm an understanding thereupon with France; that the despatch he wrote to Bulwer (19th), which contained instructions for his conduct, was not imparted to the French Government; and that when Jarnac spoke to him, and Palmerston showed him the despatch, it was already gone. All this apparent reserve and uncommunicativeness excited suspicions that he was not well disposed and, above all, not going to tread in the footsteps of Aberdeen. I defended him by saying that he ought to have considered Palmerston's situation—just come into office, encumbered with business, occupied with questions of much more urgent importance in the House of Commons. Nothing new having occurred about Spain, he contented himself with desiring Bulwer to abide by his predecessor's instructions, and really had nothing to say on the subject; that it was his habit to write in a rather familiar, offhand style, and his despatch to Bulwer, which was not intended to be published or communicated, was of that description, but that it meant nothing; and when asked, and the objection urged to the obnoxious passage, he gave the most positive assurance that no change of policy was contemplated. Guizot insisted that it did not signify what he meant; that the question was, what impression it was calculated to convey. Then he went into the various delays, and the impossibility of getting an answer from him; all of which served to confirm his suspicions that a different and hostile policy was already in active operation, that the note of February 27 gave him a right to act,le cas échéant, and that in a letter to Jarnac (which he gave me to read) he plainly indicated his intention by saying that if England adoptedune politique isolée, he would adopt one also, and he asked me whether I would not have understood what this meant—and that it meant, what he afterwards did. I said I did not mean toacquit Palmerston of much negligence and tardiness; that I thought he ought to have at once come to a satisfactory understanding with France about the marriages; that he was greatly to blame in all his delays, but that he did him less than justice; that Palmerston was not the bitter enemy of France which he supposed, and that he was reposing all along on the faith of the engagements which Aberdeen had communicated to him, never thought the matter pressed, nor had the least idea that they took it so seriously; that he must remember we did not regard Spanish affairs with the deep interest and attach to them the same importance they did. He said he was convinced that Palmerston came into office with a resolution to overturn French influence all over the world; that he fancied (as many others did) that Aberdeen had sacrificed the interests or the dignity of England to the French Government, while he himself had continually been charged with doing the same thing in France: charges which destroyed each other. But that this was Palmerston's idea, and that he was resolved to oppose France everywhere, to display his independence; that this was especially his object in Spain, where he wanted to raise the Progressista and depress the Moderado party as the most effectual means of substituting English for French influence; that the real reason he supported Don Enrique, and called him 'the only fit husband,' was that he was the head of the Progressista party, and his being chosen as the Queen's husband would be a great encouragement and triumph to it; that this party was the enemy of Christina and of the present government, and for this reason our choice was obnoxious to them; that except for these reasons he had no objection to Don Enrique, and long ago had desired Bresson to get him recalled in a despatch which he showed me; that he was convinced that Palmerston not only had determined to act in the way he had stated, but that he thought he could intimidate France.5
M. GUIZOT DEFENDS THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.
I replied that he was entirely mistaken: that he exaggeratedPalmerston's disposition and mistook his position; that in Melbourne's time he did what he chose in his own department, but that was not now the case; that all important affairs were decided by the Government, and that John Russell was far from having any bitter feeling against France, and had always entertained sentiments of esteem towards Guizot personally; that neither he nor anyone else (not even Palmerston) wished to see him out of office. It was true that they did think there had been on different occasions and in various places an undue succumbing to France, but that there was no desire to commence a general struggle against French interests; that they would certainly see with pleasure the Liberal party in Spain again lift up its head, and some such reaction as should promise a Government disposed to act in a constitutional manner, and put an end to the despotism that now prevailed. He said that he considered this the best and most constitutional Government that Spain had ever had; that it was far more so than Espartero's; that every change had been effected in a legal, constitutional manner by the Cortes itself; while all former changes, especially the expulsion of Queen Christina, had been effected by violence. I said I was amazed to hear him say so, and begged to ask him how the Cortes itself was constituted, and whether it had not been packed by stratagem and force, and by the most unscrupulous use of despotic power—the municipalities having been suppressed and all free opinion overborne. He only replied that the municipal question was made the instrument of the Queen's deposition, and that it had been voted by the Cortes.
It is very difficult to record accurately a conversation in which we often diverged and then returned to the same topic. I pressed him hard on his want of openness and confidence, and urged that when the two countries had been so long on such terms of amity, and the two Sovereigns also, that before he proceeded to act in so serious and decisive a manner and which could not fail to offend England, he ought to have left nothing vague, but have said distinctly and at once what he intended to do. He ought, if he took the noteof February 27 as his justification, to ascertain that Palmerston was cognisant of that note. Why did he not as soon as he came into office renew to Palmerston the notice he had thought it necessary to convey to Aberdeen, and why not say frankly that he regarded the state of the case to be such that, acting on the right he had reserved to himself, he should send instructions to Bresson to conclude the marriages. His answers to this were very weak. He said that it was not his business to look after Palmerston's affairs, and that he had a right to conclude, since Aberdeen had communicated with him, that he had imparted to him this note; that he showed confidence to those who showed confidence to him, and that he did not think Palmerston had acted towards him in such a manner as to require such confidential communication on his part. His real reason was (though I did not think it necessary to charge him with it), that if he had given notice to Palmerston, the latter would have sent off to Madrid and probably counteracted his scheme. He insisted that his letters to Jarnac, and the conversation he had had with Lord Cowley (which he repeated to me word for word as Lord Cowley had done), were warning enough and were sufficient indication of his intentions. Besides that Bresson's instructions were general, he had had them above a year with a discretionary power to act upon them whenever he had reason to believe the Coburg marriage wasimminent, which case he contended had arrived. I said if its imminence arose from our despatch, Bresson had himself created it, inasmuch as he had shown it to the Spanish Government. He said that was not true, that Bresson had given him his most positive assurance that though he had spoken of it to different people he had never shown it to the Spanish Ministers. He spoke with great energy of the King's feelings and of his own, especially at the strong language that had been applied to him personally, and of his having been accused in a formal document as well as in a letter, ofbad faith; that it was impossible to transact business with any confidence and in a useful manner with those who charged him with bad faith. Such accusations were intolerable. Hethen spoke of his letter to John Russell; that he had only intended to call his attention to the difficulty of going on with Palmerston while he put such a tone into the discussions; that it was absurd to suppose that he had ever thought or dreamt of effecting Palmerston's removal from office. He excused this letter very clumsily, and said he had not expected any answer to it (being evidently to the last degree nettled at that which he had received). I admitted that this letter was very imprudent, that it was very strong, and spoke of Palmerston in terms he was likely to feel and not easily to forgive; that he should have recollected what a situation he placed John Russell in, who really was compelled to answer it as he did, or to quarrel outright with Palmerston; that if he had not answered it as he did, the indignation and resentment of Palmerston would have been very great, and he would probably have resigned; and that he might have found means of conveying his sentiments in some manner less dangerous and offensive. He insisted on the clear intention of Palmerston, from the despatch, the delays, and various circumstances, to depart from the engagement with Aberdeen. I said that we could prove that Aberdeen himself had laid down precisely the same rule of conduct on which Palmerston had acted, and expressed the very same sentiments; that they were recorded in a former despatch addressed to the Duke de Sotomayor for the information of the Spanish Government; that this was very different from the letter to Bulwer which was neither to be shown nor any thing done upon it, but was a reply to two important questions: the first, whether if the Spaniards chose a husband for the Queen not a Bourbon prince, such choice would be displeasing to England; and secondly, if France attempted to coerce their choice, whether England would support them. His reply was plain and decisive: viz. that their choice would not be objected to by England, whatever it might be; and that while it was impossible to conceive that France ever would attempt coercion, if she did, Spain would have the 'sympathy' of England and of all Europe. He said he had no copy of this despatch, and did not well recollect itscontents. I said, 'But you have seen it.' He 'had not had it in his hands, it had been read to him.' He was evidently much put out by the citation of it.
EFFECT OF LORD PALMERSTON'S DESPATCH.
After a great deal more talk he spoke of his intentions. First, however, he complained of our refusal to join with him in the Cracow affair, and that we had done so in an offensive manner, giving him to understand that his breach of the Treaty of Utrecht made it improper to join with him in enforcing that of Vienna, but that, nevertheless, he was resolved to observe the greatest moderation and to evince norancune; that he should lay the papers he thought necessary before the House of Peers, and make such a statement of the whole case as he was convinced would prove to demonstration to France, to Europe, and even to many people in England itself, that he was clear and blameless in the transaction; that he might deceive himself, but that such was his sincere belief; that he should, however, do this in language of moderation and with an earnest desire to avoid furnishing any fresh matter for irritation; that he should continue his endeavours to act towards England in a friendly spirit, and he should not be deterred by her past conduct from offering to communicate and consult with her on all those subjects which it was desirable they should consider with reference to their mutual or common interests. He said he had a great deal more to say to me, hoped to see me again, and that I would dine with him, and so we parted.
January 10th.—On Friday I called by appointment on Duchâtel. There is nothing of much interest to record of my conversation with him. He talked in the same strain as Guizot, expressed great desire for reconciliation, confidence in the goodness of their case, said their majority was stronger and more secure than ever, and any change of government impossible.
LORD COWLEY'S VIEW OF THE CASE.
Yesterday morning I went to Lord Cowley, who showed me his letters to Palmerston giving him an account of the state of the Spanish question and of his conversations thereupon with the King and Guizot. These communications ought certainly to have drawn Palmerston's attention to thesubject, and have induced him to lose no time in coming to some understanding with the French Government. At the same time the anxiety of the King to gain time, and his urgent recommendations to Miraflores to have patience, may have misled Palmerston and made him think there was no danger. It is clear to me that what they took alarm at was Miraflores' communication; that they really did believe the Coburg alliance wasimminent, and that when it was followed up by Palmerston's despatch of the 19th their fears were still more increased. They all along suspected both Palmerston and Bulwer; and they did, in truth, think that between Christina's impatience, the difficulty of finding an eligible Bourbon, the probable intrigues of Bulwer, and the suspected co-operation of Palmerston, unless they settled the matter themselvessomehowit would be settled in the way they most dreaded. They knew, or at least they thought, that their difficulty would be very agreeable to Palmerston, and that it was not likely he would help them out of it. In this state of things I have no doubt that Guizot wrote to Bresson and told him to settle the affair if he could, and that Bresson was furnished with fresh instructions on which he did act, and not on the old discretionary ones on which they now pretend that he acted. Lord Cowley thinks Christina told Bresson that if he would at once strike a bargain and give the Duke de Montpensier for the Infanta, Don Francisco should have the Queen; that he instantly accepted this proposal, sent it off to Paris by telegraph, where it was confirmed at once. Whether this was the exact mode or not, or whoever took the initiative, I believe this is the way it was done; certainly the King seemed anxious to put the question off. Lord Cowley thinks he expected to be able to bring back Trapani. Guizot's vehemence (for he spoke much more strongly than the King) ought to have alarmed Palmerston. The mischief has arisen from Palmerston being careless and thoughtless, Guizot suspicious and alarmed.
Yesterday morning at two o'clock I called on Thiers by appointment, found him in a very pretty apartment full ofbeautiful drawings, copies of Italian frescoes, pictures, bronzes, books andcahiersof MS., the sheets (much corrected and interlined I could see) of his work. These he told me were his 'seul délassement,' and that politics never interrupted his literary labour. We then talked about the present state of affairs, and very amusing he was, sparing nobody and talking with his usual abundance and openness. He said he had read the notes that had passed between Palmerston and Guizot; that his own opinion was that Guizot would break down on theprocédés, but that at all events it was a quarrelà outrance; that each accused the other of bad faith, and could only justify himself by fixing that imputation on his antagonist; that moderation became impossible when such charges were bandied, and he had read with astonishment the strong things contained in these notes; that if Guizot had the worst of this encounter he would fall, not however by the desertion of the majority, not by this Chamber, but through the King. 'You must not,' he said, 'believe what you hear of the strength of the Government and of its security; don't believe all Madame de Lieven tells you;c'est une bavarde, une menteuse, et une sotte; vous l'avez beaucoup connue, vous avez été son amant, n'est-ce pas?' I defended myself from the imputation, and assured him that though she had had lovers when first she came to England I never had had the honour of being one of them. He then said he would tell me what would happen: the Kingse faisait illusionthat the Whig Government could not stand; but when he found out that this was an erroril aurait peur; and if we continued to refuse to be reconciled, he would get rid of Guizot. The present Chamber would not overthrow him, but the King would. 'Savez-vous ce que c'est que le Roi? Le mot est grossier, mais vous le comprendrez. Eh bien, c'est un poltron.'6I said I was surprised to hear this, for wethought he wasun homme de coeur, and had given proofs of his courage very often. 'Non, non, je vous dis qu'il est poltron, et quand il se trouvera définitivement mal avec vous il aura peur; alors il suscitera des embarras à Guizot; il y a quarante ou cinquante hommes dans la Chambre, je les connais, qui tourneront contre lui, et de cette manière il tombera, pas par la Chambre, encore moins par vous.' He said the accusations had been so strong that each Minister was bound to prove his own case and themauvaise foiof his adversary, and Guizot would stand or fall by the result of the explanations. 'Vous pouvez être sûr que ce que je vous dis est la vérité, d'autant plus que ce n'est pas moi qui lui succéderai, c'est Molé. Cependant je vous parle franchement, et je vous avoue que je serais enchanté de sa chute; d'abord parce que je le déteste, et après, parce que l'alliance anglaise est impossible avec lui; c'est un traître et un menteur qui s'est conduit indignement envers moi, mais je ne serai pas ministre.' However, he could afford to wait; he was forty-eight years old, and his health excellent. As long as the King was in no danger he would never send for him; as soon as he was he would send for him. The King could endure nobody who would not consent to be his tool; he would never take office without being his master,et j'en viendrai à bout; he would rather continue in his independence than take office on any other terms. He told me he had seen the notes, and was amazed at the sharpness of their contents. We then went out together, and walked to the Faubourg St. Honoré, talking about his book, Napoleon, etc.
CONVERSATION WITH M. THIERS.
At night.—I have been dining with Thiers, and met Odilon Barrot, Cousin, Rémusat, Duvergier de Hauranne, Mignet, and several others I can't remember. They were all prodigiously civil to me, and with Cousin and Mignet I had a great deal of conversation. Palmerston's note arrived this morning. It is very clever and well done, buttoo long, and hispolémiqueabout the Treaty of Utrecht in my opiniondéplacéeand mischievous. But he is determined to urge this point, and is endeavouring to get the Allied Powers to join with him in a protest or some formal expression of opinion upon it. I don't believe they will ever do this; but if they did, it would probably produce most serious consequences. His policy in this is perfectly inconceivable to me. Normanby read it to Guizot this afternoon, and at the same time offered him the despatch of the 19th July (to Bulwer), and Aberdeen's to Sotomayor to publish with the other pieces,both or neither, but he refused them. I had another furious set-to with Madame de Lieven, who is the most imprudent woman I ever saw; but we always part friends. Normanby has shown Thiers several papers, and Molémany morehe tells me. I have begged him to be cautious.
FEAR OF THE COBURG MARRIAGE.
January 12th.—I called on Guizot yesterday by appointment; found him more stiff and reserved than the first time, and not apparently in good sorts. He did not appear to have anything particular to say, but reverted to the old topics; that he would not go again over the same arguments; but it was clear that from the beginning Lord Palmerston had a fixed policy which he had immediately begun to carry out: to raise the Progressista party in Spain, and destroy the Moderado and French influence with it; that we fancied ourselves obliged to substitute English for French influence there as an indispensable security for our power in the Mediterranean; and we appealed to the Treaty of Utrecht; that great changes had taken place since that time. It was true France had acquired Algeria, and through it a certain power in the Mediterranean; but that we had acquired Gibraltar, Malta, and Corfu, which we had not been possessed of before, and which were quite sufficient to secure our power there. He said a great deal more of Palmerston, for he still insists, and either believes, or at all events pretends to believe, that Palmerston was bent on the Coburg marriage, and doing his utmost to bring it about. He really thinks it was sound policy on his part, and for thatreason was pursuing it. I again and again assured him he was mistaken. 'You forget,' I said, 'that when this affair began, Palmerston had not been ten days in office, was overwhelmed with business, and had many other things more pressing to occupy his attention. He had found an understanding concluded with Aberdeen, which he accepted. He had no thoughts of doing anything; he knew of nothing urgent that had occurred, and the truth is,il n'y pensait pas.' 'Comment!' he said, rather angrily, 'il n'y pensait pas? Est-ce que vous nous prenez pour dupes que vous voulez nous faire croire cela? 'I said I believed it was so; that this Spanish question which was of such deep interest to them was of much less interest to us; and 'why,' I said, 'if you considered the matter so urgent, if you knew what was going on in Spain (which Lord Palmerston did not), and considered the marriage you so feared to beimminent, why did not you go at once to Palmerston and tell him so?' 'Ce n'était pas à moi,' he replied, 'de faire l'éducation de Lord Palmerston.' 'No,' I said; 'mais c'était à vous de faire vos propres affaires, and to communicate frankly with him when you wanted his assistance.' He would not allow this. I said, since I had been here and had seen and heard a great many things I did not know before, I had become convinced that his alarm about the Coburg marriage was perfectly sincere, that he really did believe it was likely to take place, and that the real object of the King had been to get the Spanish Court to wait and not insist on an immediate marriage; that it was not the despatch of July 19, but the mission of Miraflores and what he had said to the King which had really alarmed them. He said this was not exact; it was not that which had given them the alarm, but from various circumstances they were convinced that the Coburg marriage would have been settled offhand if they had not taken decisive steps to prevent it; that this marriage it was impossible for France to tolerate. There was already a Coburg in England, another in Portugal, and to have had a third at Madrid would have been to make Spain a part of Portugal, and to have exhibited to all the world the triumph of English over French influence;that this combination which we wanted to bring about, they were bound to defeat, and then again assuming thatour Courtwas bent on it, he said: 'Le fait est que vous êtes meilleurs courtisans que nous.' I told him that I was assured the Court had never sought this alliance, and that Prince Albert had long ago written to his cousin to say that he must not think of it, as it was impossible.
I then asked him why Christina had been so impatient to conclude a marriage of some sort, and why she could not wait as the King had advised. He said, for reasons partly personal and partly political; that Queen Christina was a very extraordinary woman—'très habile, avec un esprit très impartial'—that she had no prejudices, and he had heard her talk of her greatest enemies, of Espartero even, without rancour and with candour; that she had great courage, patience and perseverance, and never quitted a purpose she had once conceived; that royalty was irksome to her, and government and political power she did not care about except so far as they were instrumental to the real objects of her life, which were to live easily, enjoy herself, and amass money for her children, who were numerous, and whom she was very anxious to enrich; that she was aware of the precarious nature of her influence, and felt the necessity of connecting herself with, and obtaining the support of, one of the great Powers—England or France—the latter by preference, but the former if not the latter; that she had, therefore, always wanted the King to give her his son for the Queen, and when he refused this, she had got angry and turned to the Coburg alliance and the English connexion; that besides, the young Queen was impatient to be married, and that if they had not found her a husband, she would infallibly have taken a lover. 'Vous ne savez pas ce que c'est que ces princesses Espagnoles et Siciliennes; elles ont le diable au corps, et on a toujours dit que si nous ne nous hâtions pas, l'héritier viendrait avant le mari.' For these reasons she was impatient to conclude, and she infallibly would have concluded the marriage with the Prince of Coburg if we had persisted in refusing the Duke de Montpensier, and had not effectedsome other arrangement. She trusted that the King, her uncle, would have acceptedthe fait accompli, and at all events that she should have been secure of English support.
THE FRENCH PAPERS.
I then said that after all what was now most important was to look to the future, that our quarrel must be fought out, but that a short time would bring those discussions to an end. What was to happen then? I believed and hoped that he was not likely to berenverséhere, and I was satisfied Lord Palmerston would not be in England, and how were the affairs of the two Governments to be conducted between them? If Spain, which had once been a militarychamp de bataille, was henceforward to be a politicalchamp de bataillebetween the two countries, I did not see how anyententewas possible. Must this last for ever? or was it impossible that the two Governments should unite in bringing about a better state of things in Spain, and giving to her in reality something of the freedom and independence which she possessed in name? He seemed by no means disposed to enter on this subject, and as I thought I observed in his manner some symptoms of a desire that our conversation should terminate, I rose and took leave of him. He was very civil, but rather formal and ceremonious on my going away.
Paris, January 13th.—This morning we read in the newspapers thepièces remisesby Guizot to the Chamber of Peers, and among them, to our great surprise, an extract of Palmerston's despatch to Bulwer of July 19, Guizot having refused Palmerston's offer to place it (with Aberdeen's to Sotomayor) at his disposal. Normanby immediately wrote him a very strong note complaining of this publication after what had passed between them. In the afternoon I saw Madame de Lieven, who made very light of it, and treated it as a frivolous complaint. Bacourt, who was there, endeavoured to find excuses for Guizot, but was obliged to confess that he had no right to use this without our permission. When I got home I found Guizot's reply had come. He said he had given nothing more than he had quoted in one of his notes, and had done no more than produce the English version of what he had quoted in French, and he assertedhis right to do this. He finished, however, by saying that if Normanby would send him the two despatches, he would add them to the other documents. Normanby wrote back word that he regretted he should have produced this extract in a manner calculated to give a false impression of the tenor of the despatch, sent him the documents, and hoped, as he was going to publish more, he would produce Palmerston's last note. There has been a schism here in the Opposition; Billault, Dufaure, and thirty or forty deputies have separated from Thiers, and are preparing to join Molé if Guizot falls. It seems clear that neither party will take our side on the marriage question, and that the Government will not be attacked at all in the Peers, and very probably very feebly in the Deputies.
January 16th.—For the last two days I have been sightseeing, Hôtel Cluny, Churches, Notre-Dame, Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois, the Gallery of the Louvre, and all day yesterday was at Versailles. I had not seen it for above thirty years, and was struck with the vast dimensions and the ugliness of the building; it is, however, interesting on the whole.
I dined with Guizot on Friday; had very little talk on politics. He came into one of the rooms where Bacourt and I were talking and joined us. I then said that though I had come here without any mission I had come not without the hope of being able to take back with me something which promised a renewal of good understanding. Guizot said he was ready to be on good terms with us, but he coulddonothing of any sort or kind, and this he repeated in a very peremptory tone. He was probably (though very civil to me) not in the best of humours in consequence of the article which had appeared that morning in the 'Constitutionnel' (Thiers's paper), with a circumstantial and quite accurate account of what has recently passed between Guizot and Normanby about the despatches. This, which could only come from the Embassy, has shocked I suppose everybody, and made Guizot and his friends indignant. Normanby was himself very much annoyed when he read the article, and at once perceived the bad effect it would have. He said he didnot know how it got there, but he suspects Thiers who probably sent it or caused it to be sent; however, both William Hervey and Craven are so hot and so unreserved that the Opposition paper might very easily get over it. Normanby has told Thiers and Molé everything, and Thiers came twice in three days to the Embassy. All this is well known, and Normanby passes for an ambassador in constant and confidential communication with the enemies and rivals of the Ministers. In spite of all this, within the last two days I have found a less excited tone. We had, however, our own complaint to make, which probably kept them more quiet about the 'Constitutionnel.' When all the papers came out it appeared that Guizot had published another fragment that he had no right to do of one of Palmerston's despatches, about 'the only fit husband.' This had been read to him, but no copy given to him, and he took the words down with his pencil at the time. These words he published in a formal official shape. His excuse is the same, that the words had been quoted in one of his notes.