Chapter 2

Site of Fort Henry

Our camp that night was made at the landing which, owing to the high waters, was nearly overflowed. The landing was upon the north side of a deep slough extending from the Cumberland River to the Tennessee, about twelve or fifteen miles above Paducah. The slough was about forty rods wide where we were, and in order to proceed to Fort Henry, we were obliged to cross it, which we did early upon the following morning. The water was icy cold and came well up to the sides of our horses. The Regulars were in advance and their commanding officer evidently considered it an opportune time for showing the supreme importance of discipline. The four men who went to the assistance of their drowning comrade, were compelled to walk, lead their horses and carry their arms through the slough. They wore high cavalry boots which were filled with water, and in this condition the poor fellows were forced to walk with their horses in the deep mud during the entire day.

Brutality and fatality have not infrequently been associated in war with subsequent engagements. Our sympathies instinctively turn to that crude method of obtaining justice. It is surprising that it was not resorted to in this case.

There had been much rain, the streams were overflowing and the deep mud greatly impeded our progress. We had hoped to arrive at the fort on the fifth; but the condition of the roads made it impossible. General Grant, more than anybody, realized the great strategic importance of Forts Henry and Donelson and knew how highly they were prized by the enemy. In his "Memoirs" he says:

"The two positions were so important to the enemy,as he saw his interest, that it was natural to suppose that reinforcements would come from every quarter from which they could be got. Prompt action on our part was imperative."

Accordingly, on the 6th, without waiting for more troops, Grant ordered an attack upon Fort Henry. We heard the firing and used every effort to get there but without avail. Upon our arrival we found that the fort had been reduced by the gun-boats, that the greater portion of the garrison had retreated to Fort Donelson before the battle commenced and that only ninety, who had been left to man the guns and cover the retreat, had been captured.

Fort Heiman was on the west bank of the Tennessee and commanded Fort Henry. It had been evacuated before the attack upon the latter and the garrisons of the two forts had gone to re-enforce that of Fort Donelson. Grant's problem, then, was to capture that stronghold, defended by twenty-one thousand men, with an available force at hand, of only fifteen thousand and that in mid-winter, with no alternative for his army but to move and fight and sleep in mud and rain and snow until victory brought them shelter. He has stated his view as follows:

"I was impatient to get to Fort Donelson because I knew the importance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would re-enforce it rapidly. I felt that 15,000 men on the 8th, would be more effective than 50,000, a month later."

He did not falter. Mud and rain and snow it must be; and he went on, inspiring his men with his splendid confidence.

After our arrival at Fort Henry, Captain Hotaling went out with a platoon of sixteen men to reconnoiter Fort Donelson, eleven miles distant. They encountered some of Forrest's cavalry and drove them in. Several of the confederates were wounded in the conflict, one frightfully so, from a saber-stroke from the captain. Nicholas Hotaling received a buck-shot wound in the cheek and George Taylor, two shots in the jaw, resulting in a painful wound.

After a day's rest at Fort Henry, Colonel Silas Noble, with Companies A and B and the two companies of Regulars who accompanied us from Paducah, in all about two hundred men, went out to make a reconnaissance in force and succeeded without mishap, in getting close to the enemy's works. Our road led along the crest of a high ridge with a deep ravine upon each side. Instead of deploying a skirmish-line, two men were stationed at a cross-road. While the Colonel was studying the works through his field-glass, shots were heard behind us. Instantly the Regulars went into line. At the same moment a thousand cavalry appeared upon our right in the ravine below. The Regulars fired a volley and the command was given: "Fours right! Gallop! March!" When they reached the road the confederates were swarming towards them. The command: "Left into line! Fire!" was followed by a volley which checked their assailants. Our two companies were back upon the ridge firing volley after volley and we did not realize that we were being surrounded—as we were—until warned by the second volley from the Regulars. Then we started back. The enemy had recovered from the volley given by the Regulars and filled the lane. Our fire checked them however but we were not out of our difficulties. A large body of infantry had appeared upon the river-side of the lane which we were obliged to traverse for half a mile, while many were upon the other side. It was an exciting ride. The "zip" of the bullets was constant but the enemy, being below us, made the common mistake under such circumstances, of aiming too high. The cavalry attempted to cut us off by another road but we were better mounted than they and escaped with a surprisingly small loss. One of our men, Frank Hatch, was captured and one of Company B's men mortally wounded. Aside from these and the wounding of several horses, we were unscathed and returned to Fort Henry some time after dark, very tired but well satisfied with our accomplishment.

On the 12th of February we accompanied the army in a general move against Fort Donelson. The fact that there were but four companies of cavalry with the expedition proved to have been a misfortune as will be shown by the sequel.

We reached the vicinity of the fort about eleven o'clock and commenced to feel our way and tighten our lines. The remainder of the day was spent by us in reconnoitering. During the evening of the 13th, Thayer's Brigade, which was sent around on the transports from Fort Henry, was landed from the Cumberland side and the night was spent in their disposal to complete the line of battle.

About daybreak on the morning after our arrival, the first cannon was fired from a Confederate battery, a section of which was in charge of George Fletcher, an uncle of the writer. Twenty-six of our company, of which the writer was one, were sent out to reconnoiter when our presence drew the battery fire. The first was a solid shot, followed by grape. But one man, "Jim" Parsons, was injured. He insisted that his face was grazed by a grape-shot. A comrade near him was quite as confident that the injury was caused by the limb of a tree which flew back and hit him.

There was an ambulance bearing a hospital-flag in front of us and when the enemy saw it they ceased to fire.

Our companies were used to patrol the right army wing from the center to the extreme right, while the two companies of Regulars were used for a like purpose from the center to the extreme left of the left wing. About ten o'clock in the day matters upon the right began to assume a grave aspect. McLernand's division attempted to capture a battery which held a strong position near a line of rifle-pits. The slaughter was terrific and our men were forced to give it up. The 11th Illinois Infantry and the Chicago Batteries, A and B, suffered severely.

We were nearly out of rations and had no forage of any kind for our horses. There was nothing to do but wait, however, as the enemy was absorbing all of our attention. On the afternoon of the 14th, our gun-boats made a severe attack upon the fort but were repulsed and forced to retire, two of them, including the flag-ship, being badly disabled. They had fought better than they then knew, however, as results soon showed. The enemy's lines were closely reconnoitered and in the afternoon, Captain Hotaling, who kept close watch, became satisfied that something unusual was going on within the enemy's lines. Before night he sent word to Colonel Babcock, General Grant's Chief of Staff, to come to the extreme right. The Colonel arrived just at dark, when the Captain informed him that it was his opinion that the enemy's cavalry would attempt to break out that night or in the morning. Should they do so, our line was too weak to withstand their charge; that we should be immediately strengthened with one brigade of infantry and two batteries of artillery. Babcock was said to have reported to General Grant and returned about nine o'clock with the statement that he did not think there would be a move of that kind before the next day and that there would be ample time in the morning to re-enforce the line. Hotaling was not convinced and we were kept near the road upon the extreme right where our Captain anticipated that Forrest's cavalry would attempt to break through. Grant makes no mention of having received any intimation of such a condition and the inference from his statements would indicate that he failed to receive Colonel Babcock's report.

We remained in the rear of the line of battle until about 12 o'clock that night. It snowed hard and became very cold. Our horses were restless, so we moved towards the center, tore down a rail-fence and built fires in a vain effort to warm ourselves. About five o'clock a. m., we returned to our former position where we remained until nearly nine o'clock. Our horses became so hungry and exhausted that Lieutenants Bennett and Jackson took us back a mile or two upon the road leading towards the Tennessee River in the hope of finding forage but without success. From there we were moving towards our center, when a humming fire upon the extreme right attracted our attention. We returned upon the keen run, just in time to see the rear of a body of cavalry about a quarter of a mile away, in full retreat. The enemy had made a desperate attack upon our right wing, which was doubled back upon itself more than half a mile. Had they taken prompt advantage of the situation they might all have escaped; or, had they followed up back of our line, it is possible that our whole army might have been stampeded.

When our company started back to find forage, Calvin Steel was unable to go. He had been very sick the night before, so we left him by the road-side with his horse and when the enemy advanced he was captured. They were obliged to make a temporary hospital for their wounded where they left Steel but took his horse and equipments. Steel wanted a drink of water and went to a pail for it. It was empty. He asked permission of the surgeon to fill it at a spring. Upon reaching the spring he found a horse tied to a fence. Forgetting his errand, he mounted the horse and came flying back to meet us upon our return near where he had been captured. He was very ill, however, and was sent to the hospital at St. Louis, where he remained until nearly fall, when he returned. He was still too weak for service and was detailed to the commissary department of General Logan's Division, where he remained until after the fall of Vicksburg.

Much speculation has been given to the incident which involved the breaking of our line, as well as to the fact that Floyd and Pillow and Forrest were permitted to escape before the final surrender. It has been suggested that had re-enforcements been supplied, together with a battery to have prevented transports from plying up the Cumberland with escaping troops, the history of the war might have been changed and Shiloh might never have been fought.

It must not be forgotten that General Grant was subject to the immediate command of a painstaking plodder who mistook arrogance for dignity and timidity for caution. Halleck's orders contemplated a very different thing from what happened at Donelson. We owe the capture of the fort and the discovery thereby to the world of General Grant, to the treachery of a telegraph operator at Cairo, who, in the belief that he was helping the Southern cause, held up Halleck's order to Grant to "fortify Fort Henry strongly on the land-side," until Grant, in ignorance of it, had gone on and invested Fort Donelson. Had Grant received that order, Donelson and Shiloh and Vicksburg might have had a very different history, and General Grant might not have been known. The fame given him by that one victory was too great even for General Halleck to take away, who did his utmost to do it. With Halleck tying the hands of Grant after his great victory, even to the extent of making groundless charges against him and causing his arrest and with the entire South frantically and hysterically pushing Albert Sidney Johnson forward to a sacrifice, the battle of Shiloh was as much of a logical result as that effect follows cause. Had Grant been given free rein, it could not have been fought; for he would have possessed Corinth before the Confederate armies could have concentrated.

Grant's generalship and brilliant resourcefulness were never shown to better effect than when confronted with that crisis at Donelson. He had depended upon the gun-boats to help reduce the works, run the batteries and take position above. They did severe execution in the fort but in a few hours were helplessly disabled. Grant knew of his own loss but not of that in the fort. At this stage he writes:

"The sun went down on the night of the 14th of February, 1862, leaving the army in front of Fort Donelson anything but comforted over the prospects. The weather had turned intensely cold; the men were without tents and could not keep up fires where most of them had to stay, &c."

It was but natural for him to view the situation in the light of facts as they then appeared and not as he might guess them to be. Had he calculated upon the cowardice rather than the bravery of opposing commanders, he might have provided differently; but it was incredible to him that a fresh army of 21,000 men, within a well provisioned fortress, in direct communication with another army from which it could draw supplies and men, with the Federal gun-boats rendered helpless from its fire, would, at the very outset, without a siege, try to escape from one in an open field, when, by so doing, it was abandoning the key to an immense territory needed for its supplies, breaking, to a large extent, communication between its armies and submitting to lasting disgrace before its own people. That Grant was justified in this view is shown by the fact that the two Confederate Generals, Floyd and Pillow, were, after the surrender, promptly tried and summarily relieved from their commands.

Flag-Officer Foote had been wounded when his flag-ship was disabled and before sunrise on the morning of the 15th, sent for General Grant to call upon him on his flag-ship about four miles below the fort. It was decided that the gun-boats should be sent away for repairs before it would be possible to renew the attack. This, it was estimated, would require about ten days. There was no alternative but a siege.

While leaving the boat, Grant was notified of the severe attack upon our right and of the breaking of our line. He hurried to the scene, about seven miles away. Before knowing the true situation, he gave orders to retire and intrench with a view to a siege. When, however, he learned that the enemy was actually trying to escape, he at once saw its significance and said to Colonel Webster of his staff: "The one who attacks first now will be victorious." Instead of intrenching, he gave orders for an immediate and vigorous attack along the entire left before the enemy, who had withdrawn his forces to our right, could reform. The result was an irresistible onslaught upon the enemy's center and right.

McClernand's men had failed mainly for want of ammunition. Grant gave orders for a supply and for reforming the line. The Confederates waited just long enough to permit this to be done. It subsequently developed that Pillow mistook his partial success for complete victory and stopped to talk about it when he should have been following it up. That he must have been wildly jubilant is indicated by the fact that he telegraphed to Johnson at Nashville, "on the honor of a gentleman," that "the day is ours." A controversy arose between Floyd and Pillow. Pillow, the veteran general, flushed with temporary success, refused to recognize the authority of Floyd, whom he regarded as a civilian, finally took matters into his own hands and ordered Buckner to renew the attack upon our right. Buckner obeyed but it was too late. Our line had been reformed and was ready. A desperate struggle ensued and the enemy was driven back into his works. In the meantime our left wing had pushed forward against the weakened defences upon the enemy's right and bivouacked that night within his lines. The fort was doomed. The famous night council was held by Floyd and his Staff. Before morning dawned Floyd and Pillow were aboard the transports on their way up the river with three thousand men and Forrest, with a thousand men and horses, was struggling in the icy waters of a bayou in a desperate effort to get away. It was one of the ironies of Fate that at about the same time, the authorities at Richmond were rejoicing over Pillow's grandiloquent message announcing Confederate victory.

General Lew Wallace describes Forrest's escape as follows:

"Col. Forrest was present at the council, and when the final resolution was taken he promptly announced that he neither could nor would surrender his command. He assembled his men, all as hardy as himself, and moved out and plunged into a slough formed by back water from the river. An icy crust covered its surface, the wind blew fiercely and the darkness was unrelieved by a star. There was fearful floundering as the command followed him. At length he struck dry land and was safe."He was next heard of at Nashville."

"He was next heard of at Nashville."

The surrender was made upon the following morning, and a very picturesque example of "Southern hospitality" occurred in connection with it. When General Buckner sent his first letter to General Grant, proposing an armistice with a view to the appointment of commissioners to consider the question of surrender, he directed that small white flags be displayed before the different commands in order to prevent hostilities pending the negotiations. No such flag was displayed over the fort. General Lew Wallace, upon seeing the flags, understood that there had been a surrender and went right into Buckner's headquarters where he was politely received by Buckner, introduced to his staff and invited to breakfast. This was an hour before Grant received Buckner's final letter of surrender.

It may be interesting here to mention the 10th Missouri sharp-shooters who contributed much to the success of the battle. We first met them at Bird's Point. The organization was composed almost entirely of backwoodsmen who were skillful hunters and trappers. They wore grey uniforms with oddly shaped caps, each adorned with a squirrel's tail at the back, and they were armed with target-rifles. They were a shrewd, reticent, independent lot of fellows, knew how to use their weapons with deadly effect, and were, in a sense, entirely independent. Each man was expected to approach as closely as possible to the enemy's lines, choose a prominent position, conceal himself and pick off officers, gunners in batteries, orderlies and others. Three of these men succeeded in keeping one rebel battery silenced for an entire day. These same men afterwards did effective work at Shiloh.

On the afternoon before the surrender, Fred, one of our faithful cooks, arrived at our lines in the rear with two camp-kettles, coffee, and a sack of hard-tack; all of which was gratefully received. That evening we rode back to Fort Henry to feed our horses and get some more substantial refreshments for ourselves. In the morning we returned, rode directly into the fort and were assigned to a camp within the works a short distance east and south of the town of Dover, where we remained about five or six days.

Walking down one day to the water front to look at the gun and mortar-boats, I was surprised by meeting my old friend and neighbor, James Minnis, tugging at a long rope attached to a mortar-boat which the men were towing up stream. There were some others there of Battery G, 2nd Illinois Artillery but Minnis was the only one whom I knew.

Our friends in the North were quick to realize conditions and needs among the soldiers. Dr. Gould of Lane, was soon there to minister to the wants of the sick and wounded and rendered valuable assistance, as did many other self-sacrificing physicians and surgeons.

Calvin Steel

Calvin SteelMr. Steel served with credit during the war and at its close returned to his home at Rochelle, where he married. In 1871 he moved to Fairbury, Nebraska, and engaged in mercantile business. He held various public offices, including County Clerk, County Treasurer, State Representative and State Senator. Upon the election of Governor Savage to the United States Senate, Mr. Steel, by virtue of his office as President of the Senate, became acting Governor of the State and completed the unexpired term with credit and distinction. Mr. Steel served one year as the Grand Army Department Commander of his State. He died at his home in March, 1910. As a soldier, he was faithful and brave—as a friend, loyal and true—as a man, just, sincere and lovable.

CHAPTER IV.

From Donelson to Metal Landing‌—‌Rescue From Flooded Camp‌—‌Pittsburg Landing‌—‌Grand Review‌—‌Escort Wallace's Men to Crump's Landing‌—‌The Long Roll‌—‌Detailed to Bring up Wallace‌—‌Hardship of Men‌—‌Second Day's Battle‌—‌Retreat and Pursuit‌—‌Dickey's Cowardice‌—‌Charge Against Forrest's Men‌—‌Pathetic Incidents.

"And the old field lay before me all deserted far and wide;There was where they fell on Prentis,—there McClernand met the tide;There was where stern Sherman rallied, and where Hurlbut's heroes died,—Lower down, where Wallace charged them, and kept charging 'til he died."—Willson.

"And the old field lay before me all deserted far and wide;

There was where they fell on Prentis,—there McClernand met the tide;

There was where stern Sherman rallied, and where Hurlbut's heroes died,—

Lower down, where Wallace charged them, and kept charging 'til he died."

—Willson.

We remained at Fort Donelson about five or six days after the battle, when the two companies, A and B, moved to Metal Landing on the Tennessee River, a few miles above Fort Henry. There was a deep slough north of the landing and the water from the river, which was very high and still rising, poured rapidly into it. A small log building at the landing stood on the highest point of ground and it was near this that our cooking was done. As the water continued to rise we were confined to a space about twenty-five by fifty feet, which was all that was above water. Most of our horses were standing in water. For four days we hailed all passing boats but none came to our relief. Finally, we were taken upon a transport and carried to another landing above water, where we remained a short time before being transported to Pittsburg Landing. At the latter place we found quite a large camp and were assigned to a position south of Snake Creek, upon the extreme right wing, next to General John A. McArthur's Division. Our camp was about a mile and three-quarters west-north-west of the landing and upon one side of us was the 12th Illinois Infantry.

The two companies did considerable scouting in the direction of Corinth. Troops continued to arrive and the camps of many were out two or three miles, the infantry being upon the outskirts, while the cavalry was stationed within the infantry and artillery lines. In the light of subsequent experience, it would seem that it would have been better had these conditions been reversed. The troops were assigned to their respective camps in the order in which they arrived; and inasmuch as the new arrivals were made up of troops of more recent levies, it followed that, whether intentional or not, the troops farthest out were those of least experience. Most of them had been drilled but slightly and but few had ever been in battle.

View of Pittsburg Landing

On Monday, preceding the date of the battle of Shiloh, a grand review was held and it was afterwards reported that the confederates were then sufficiently near so that from the tops of high trees they were enabled, with the use of field-glasses, to watch a given point and in that manner estimate our force. This may have been true as to some of their scouts but only as to them, for it was not until April third, four days later, that Johnson issued his "Order No. 8," for an advance from Corinth and the concentration of his forces at Mickey's, eight miles southwest of Pittsburg Landing. On the day before the battle, Company B and a part of our company were scouting and encountered the enemy's cavalry in considerable numbers. The remainder of the company was detailed to escort some of General Lew Wallace's men to Crump's Landing, seven miles north, where he was stationed, after which they returned to Pittsburg Landing.

This fact is significant as throwing some light upon a letter referred to by General Grant in a note on page 351, Vol 1, of his "Memoirs," which letter was written by General Lew Wallace to General W. H. L. Wallace and is referred to in the note in part as follows:

"* * *In this letter General Lew. Wallace advises General W. H. L. Wallace that he will send 'to-morrow' (and his letter also says 'April 5th,' which is the same day the letter was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the 4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters and suggesting the propriety of W. H. L. Wallace's sending a company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that they could 'act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and from the different camps.'"

General Grant's note states that this letter was sent "over the road running from Adamsville to the Pittsburg landing and Purdy road." It is presumable therefore, that they returned that way, but I was not with them and I do not know which way was taken. As far as I am aware, nothing has been published to show that the suggestion of General Lew Wallace was actually carried out. That they did return by way of the Purdy road is rendered still more probable by what occurred in connection with our company on the day of the battle.

On Sunday, April 6th, it was our intention to visit friends in the other commands, as was our custom when the weather was fair as it was that day, and we were off duty. We had arisen as usual, cared for our horses and had about finished breakfast, when the report of fire-arms arrested our attention and we rushed to saddle our horses. Just then the long roll greeted our ears from various directions and our bugler, J. L. Padgett, sounded "Boots and saddles." In three minutes our two companies, under command of Captain Hotaling, were in line ready for action.

We galloped towards Shiloh Church, where heavy firing was heard but before reaching it there was a lull in the firing which lasted about thirty-five or forty minutes. While waiting in line, General Grant rode up and saluted Captain Hotaling. I was very near to him and heard his order distinctly.

"Captain Hotaling," he said, "I detail you on my staff today. I want you to take charge of the 10th Missouri Sharp Shooters. Place them and fight them."

Then turning to Lieutenant Bennett, he said:

"Lieutenant Bennett, you will take your Company A and go with as much dispatch as possible to Crump's Landing. Present my compliments to General Lew Wallace and tell him to come immediately, you being the escort."

He then gave orders to Captain Larison of Company B, but I did not hear them as we were off instantly.

The roads were very muddy, and after crossing Snake Creek, were almost impassable. The horses constantly floundered in mud and water which was often up to the saddle-skirts. As the road approached the river near to Crump's it became somewhat better but we were obliged to move slowly and it was about twelve o'clock when we reached Wallace's camp. He was apparently awaiting orders. The arms were stacked and the entire command was ready to march. Lieutenant Bennett delivered his message and the order was at once given to fall in line.

Wallace's command started out ahead and our company, instead of being in advance as an escort in accordance with General Grant's order, was in the rear, apparently acting as a rear guard. Why this was I do not know; but it would indicate that Wallace relied upon the knowledge of his men who had been to Pittsburg Landing the day before to lead him.

For some reason the River Road, the shortest route to the battlefield by several miles, was not taken. We marched a considerable distance until we came to an old overshot-mill, when, much to our surprise, we met the head of the column returning. They had spent several hours in marching upon the wrong road and were obliged to turn back to the River Road. From the old mill we could see a road which we thought to be the River Road but there was no apparent approach to it. We retraced our steps therefore, to the junction with the River Road which was followed to the battlefield, where we arrived about seven o'clock in the evening.

The condition of Wallace's men upon reaching the front was pitiable—especially that of the infantry. They floundered and wallowed in the mud and water in which they frequently sank to their hips; but, with all this, nothing but eagerness was shown by officers and men to get to the front.

Two regiments of Wallace's First Brigade, the 11th Indiana and the 8th Missouri, were conceded to have been the finest drilled of any regiments in the entire service. They had been in competitive drill against the 130th New York Zouaves and other famous regiments in both the volunteer and regular service and in every instance were the victors. Moreover, they were as brave and manly as they were matchless in manouvers. Upon the following day, in which a bloody and awful struggle occurred, they acquitted themselves nobly and did much to retrieve the almost fatal error of the day before.

On the seventh we acted as a support for a battery known to us as Hoatling's Battery, next to that of McAllister, and saw the field extending south and east over a mile from Shiloh Church. The ground was fought over three times inch-by-inch. Bragg's Battery, in the extreme corner, was cut to pieces by Hoatling's and McAllister's batteries. Bragg's men stood up to their work until every gun was dismounted or disabled and all of the horses and mules were killed or mortally wounded. In the rear, dead mules and horses lay everywhere and in the ravine in front, for a distance of about forty rods, one could have walked upon dead men. It was the most appalling human slaughter that I have ever witnessed. There had been a severe rain the night before and as the water ran down the ravine past the bodies it became literally a stream of blood.

In the afternoon of the second day's engagement, the rebels gave way and commenced to retreat. About four o'clock Companies A and B the 7th Illinois and the 5th Ohio Cavalry were placed under command of Colonel T. Lyle Dickey of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry who was ordered to pursue. These were fine regiments and we might have captured many prisoners had it not been for our commander. Dickey's cowardice, previously suspected, was soon demonstrated. As soon as the order to pursue was given, we started with a rush. This was not in accordance with Dickey's conception of pursuit. It meant overtaking the enemy who had shown a disposition to resent undue familiarities. Besides, what was the use?—it was raining hard anyway. So, we were ordered to halt and "await further orders," the meaning of which was easy to surmise, for night was approaching and the enemy was vanishing.

While thus awaiting we dismounted in front of the remains of Bragg's famous battery. In a tent nearby we found two men who had brothers in our company. One, Daniel Twiney, with both legs shot off and another, James Prescott, slightly wounded. Our men bore them from the field to the hospital. Twiney was sent to St. Louis where he died shortly after his arrival. We remained there until it became sufficiently dark and foggy to render pursuit useless, when the redoubtable Dickey ordered "right about for quarters."

On the morning after the battle, we received an early order to report to Dickey, whose martial figure was conspicuous at the head of his regiment. After marching about five miles from the battleground, we approached an opening more or less covered with scattered timber, where the enemy had taken a stand. Here the Colonel exhibited his remarkable characteristics as a military commander. The Fifth Ohio Cavalry and a regiment of Ohio infantry had preceded us. Dickey gave orders for the infantry to deploy as skirmishers in advance of the cavalry, with the Fourth Cavalry upon the right. Our two companies, A and B, and the Fifth Ohio were formed in line of battle upon the left. As soon as this disposition was made, our dauntless leader announced, loud enough, it seemed, to have been heard by the enemy, that "orders would come from the rear." General Forrest's cavalry, which was protecting the Confederate retreat, made a charge upon us. In doing so, they kept in column, a manouver I had never before heard of. In the meantime, the infantry regiment had deployed directly in our front. About the time the latter were engaged, Dickey gave orders for the cavalry to fire by battalion and retreat;—and this, while we were in line in a muddy slough.

Our two companies waited until the enemy was close to us, when we gave them a volley. This was followed by the order: "Right about, gallop, march." In a moment Lieutenant Bennett gave the command: "Rally Company A." We delivered another volley and then by common consent, without an order having been given, our company charged them. Instead of meeting our charge, they made a hasty retreat and we followed them for about a mile. A considerable number of the enemy were wounded and among them, their dashing commander, who was shot in the back. This we learned through some of our command who, about an hour after the charge, visited a temporary Rebel hospital where they were told by the surgeon that General Forrest, who had just left there, had been slightly wounded. He did not state the location of the wound, but that information was supplied by a citizen.

When we returned from the charge, our dapper commander with "orders from the rear," who was noted for his spick-and-span appearance, had retired; some said,—"to lace his corsets." In the absence of proof as to the character of his under-garments, the truthfulness of the statement is open to question; but whatever the reason, it must have been urgent, for we did not see him again that day.

Upon our return from the charge we went over the entire field where the fight occurred. About twelve or fourteen of our infantry men were killed and several wounded. One poor fellow lay with his musket still in his hand. He had apparently been in the act of shooting but his enemy had shot first. His eyes were open and in the right one there appeared a perfect image of a man upon a white horse.

This circumstance recalls another pathetic incident of the many which might be related. Battery A of the First Illinois Battery, which, with Battery B, stood next to that of McAllister's, had nearly all of its horses killed. With seven of his mates lying dead around him, one faithful old horse stood in harness all day on Monday and until Tuesday morning when he was cut loose.

There was no further attempt at pursuit and the enemy was permitted to return to Corinth where ample time was given him to collect re-enforcements and to strengthen his position.

The battle of Shiloh was the bloodiest of all the western battles. It has been claimed by some that our army was not surprised; but to those who were there, the claim is no less surprising than the fact appeared to be then. The successes at Forts Henry and Donelson had made our men and their leaders over-confident. They counted too much upon the moral effect of those victories upon the enemy. Besides, it seemed incredible that an army so recently defeated and apparently so demoralized, should leave a strongly intrenched position and march twenty miles over ground rendered almost impassable by mud and rain, to meet one of substantially equal force in an open field. If it was a surprise, as those who were there at the first onset and saw the conditions, believed it to have been, it is not for me, it may not be for anyone, to fix the responsibility. Let him bear it who may,—the thousands of graves and the long lines of trenches filled with Union dead, will remain as a proof of the appalling price that it is possible to pay for indifference and over-confidence.

Samuel H. Fletcher

CHAPTER V.

The Corinth Campaign‌—‌Battle of Davis' Bridge on the Hatchie River‌—‌Bolivar‌—‌Death of Col. Hogg‌—‌Water Valley‌—‌Fight at Holley Springs‌—‌Cowardice of Col. Murphy‌—‌Foraging.

"The brave make danger opportunity;—The waverer, paltering with the chance sublimeDwarfs it to peril.* * *"—Lowell.

"The brave make danger opportunity;—The waverer, paltering with the chance sublimeDwarfs it to peril.* * *"

"The brave make danger opportunity;—

The waverer, paltering with the chance sublime

Dwarfs it to peril.* * *"

—Lowell.

The severe losses at Shiloh resulted in a reorganization of a considerable portion of our army. Many fragmentary regiments were consolidated in order to make full ones. Much time was consumed in this process and we remained at Pittsburg Landing until its completion.

On the eleventh of April, four days after the battle, Major General Henry Wagner Halleck appeared and assumed command in person. This was the beginning of a campaign in extraordinary contrast to that which had been so brilliantly prosecuted by Grant, whose methods and plans were held in contempt by his superior.

Halleck was a man from whom the people had expected much. They believed, largely upon his own authority, that he was a great general, for his unqualified statement about anything was presumed to close discussion.

Halleck had written a book upon military science which was generally supposed to contain the last word upon that subject. He was self-centered and opinionated to a degree and his arrogance was only equaled by his excessive caution, which nobody at that time was presumptuous enough to hint might have been called by another name. This general's policy, constantly impressed upon his officers, was to "do nothing to bring on an engagement." With an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men opposed to one whose effective force was considerably less than half that number, he instructed his generals that it was "better to retreat than to fight." This rule was strictly observed and upon different occasions important advantages were waived and reverse movements made in conformity to it. The result was an elaborate underground campaign in which the spade was the only aggressive factor. Except at the very outset, the army literally burrowed its way into Corinth. While the pioneer corps toiled beneath the surface, the others watched, not so much as guards but rather as sentinels to give the alarm. The vicinity of Corinth was a veritable labyrinth with complex runways such as might have been made by gigantic field-mice. This harmless procedure must have been quite as amusing to the Rebels as it was irksome to us. But even they grew tired of the farce and considerately exploded a magazine as a hint that they had marched out and would not hurt us if we had really set our hearts upon marching in.

Illinois Monument at Shiloh to Special Commands

Illinois Monument at Shiloh to Special Commands the front tablet is to companies a and b.

At last Corinth was "captured." The army did not start upon its advance until April 30th, when the men, burrowing through the ground like gophers, moved at an average rate of about 1700 feet per day. A month was consumed in this process. Trenches, rifle-pits and bomb-proofs were constructed to shelter one hundred thousand men; and all this to capture another lot of trenches, rifle-pits and bomb-proofs that were empty. It was a bloodless victory, and the countless hills and holes that cost so much labor and so many lives incident to the use of polluted surface-water and exposure under unsanitary conditions, will remain indefinitely as monuments to the caution and timidity of that unique general whose conception of prosecuting the war seemed to have been to treat the entire South as an immense garrison to be captured only after complete investment and a prolonged, careful and strictly methodical siege. Halleck's "caution" would appear to have been the result of a fevered imagination rather than the outgrowth of well considered military conditions which he should and might have known but did not; for, on the day following the evacuation of Corinth, when the Rebels were many miles away in full retreat, he caused his whole army to be drawn up in preparation for battle, announcing in orders that there was "every indication that our left was to be attacked that morning." The "indications" proved to be as humiliating as the preparations to meet them were preposterous; but their significance was entirely obscured by the cloud of egotism which seemed to envelop the personality of this overrated commander who might have been more successful had he possessed a sense of humor. In the light of Halleck's experience, it is refreshing to recall General Grant's opinion of what might have been:

"For myself, I am satisfied that Corinth could have been captured in a two days' campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of re-enforcements after the battle of Shiloh." Memoirs, V. 1, pg. 381.

During the Corinth campaign Companies A and B acted as escort to Brigadier General T. A. Davies. After the evacuation an order was issued directing them to report to the regiment but Captain Hotaling, who was originally responsible for their detachment, because he believed that he could do more effectual work with them separately, succeeded, through the influence of General Oglesby, in having the order changed to include Company B; whereupon Company A was, at the request of General O. A. C. Ord, who commanded the post at Corinth, assigned to his staff.

I had previously been detailed to act as orderly to Colonel Baker of the Second Iowa regiment, who was then in command of a brigade. He was succeeded by General Thomas Sweeney and I was with the latter until he, in turn, was succeeded by General Hackelman with whom I remained until the battle of Iuca, just before the second fight at Corinth, when I returned to my company which was ordered to Jackson, Tennessee.

The time spent at Corinth was dull and monotonous but the monotony ceased upon our arrival at Jackson. We remained in camp about seven or eight days until the battle of Corinth, where General Hackelman, Colonel Baker and Lieutenant Brainard, all good friends of mine, were killed. After the battle, General Ord, in command of Logan's and Hurlbut's Divisions, the latter of which had been sent ahead from Bolivar, Tennessee, attempted to intercept Price and Van Dorn at Davis' Bridge on the Hatchie River.

About six o'clock in the evening orders were given to pack haversacks with two days' rations and be in the saddle in forty minutes. We marched to the depot, loaded our horses in box-cars, mounted the deck with our saddles and were off. The road was rough and the cars swayed like ships in a storm. By lying down and holding fast to the deck we were enabled to stay in place until our arrival at Bolivar, which we reached at about half past twelve that night. As soon as possible we commenced our march for Davis' Bridge which was about twenty miles away. Just as the sky began to redden in the east we arrived at Hurlbut's headquarters and found his command in line of battle near the bridge. We were none too soon. The battle began soon after our arrival and raged until afternoon. The enemy fought persistently but was slowly driven back and finally retreated up the stream. One of our men captured a rebel officer upon one of General Van Dorn's horses. W. B. Cummins was in command of the company in the absence of Captain Hotaling who was upon staff duty.

General Ord was wounded in this battle which caused his retirement for a considerable time from active service. In his report of the battle he paid a high compliment to the men of our company, whom he commended for their rare intelligence and skill.

At the beginning of General Ord's retirement he requested General Grant to reserve Company A as his personal guard but he was gone so long that the company was ordered to report to General Logan, with whom it had been but a short time when Captain Hotaling was appointed Senior Aid upon Logan's staff with the title of Major, in which capacity he served with distinction until the close of the war. Our company continued to act as escort for General Logan until after the surrender of Vicksburg.

After the battle at Davis' Bridge I was detailed as hospital assistant to help in holding sponge and to assist in amputating legs and arms. It was a grewsome experience and my first of the kind. Between forty and fifty men were brought in in varying conditions and among them General Ord, who was wounded in the leg.

The next morning we moved back to Bolivar where we were the guests of our regiment. It was a joyous reunion and we slept but little that night. Our joy was marred however, by the absence of our beloved Colonel Harvey Hogg, who met his death a few days previous in a heroic charge at the battle of Bolivar. His death was said to have occurred within sight of his mother's house. On the day of the battle, those of the regiment who were detailed to bury the dead, found the Colonel's body stripped of all clothing, and were told by the rebels that "the hogs did it." The statement is proof of its absurdity and of the unbelievable hatred which existed at the time against southerners who fought for the Union. The details of Colonel Hogg's death have been embodied in a separate sketch and need not be enlarged upon here.

Our visit ended in the morning when we marched back to Jackson where we were engaged in picket duty and foraging until the weather began to get chilly. From Jackson we marched by way of Bolivar to Water Valley, Mississippi, about sixty miles south of Holly Springs. The latter place had been chosen as a secondary base of supplies for that portion of the army located south of there. General Grant, in what he regarded as an almost hopeless endeavor to fit his plans to those of Gen. Halleck and the orders resulting from the latter, was compelled to scatter his forces and to guard as best he could, a number of widely separated points in order to maintain railway communication with the North. Under the conditions existing, they could not all be adequately protected. Colonel R. C. Murphy, of the eighth Wisconsin, with about fifteen hundred men, including companies C, F, G, H, I and K, of the Second Illinois Cavalry, was left to guard the post. The companies mentioned were under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Quincy McNeil.

Believing that the destruction of the munitions and stores accumulated there would greatly cripple our army, Van Dorn undertook to capture the place. He was especially anxious to secure the horses of our regiment which had the reputation of being one of the best mounted in the service. So, on the 20th of December, with a force of mounted infantry and cavalry outnumbering that of the Union troops more than ten to one, he made a dash to capture the place. Murphy had been notified of his approach but made no preparations to meet him nor did he take the trouble to inform his command. Van Dorn had no difficulty in "surprising" him and less in inducing him to surrender. Before the troops knew of the situation the town was surrounded by several thousand confederates and the post with stories and troops had been formally surrendered by Murphy. The six companies of our regiment were encamped upon the fair-grounds, over all parts of which they were scattered. Lieutenant Colonel McNeil, with Captains Jones and Higgins were upon the east side of the Camp, Captain Marsh upon the north and Majors Mudd and Bush upon the west and south sides respectively. The men were told that the Second had been surrendered with the other troops. "Not by a damned sight," was the reply, "If they want the Second, they must fight for it." At this instant the rebels rushed in upon the east side and immediately began shooting down those who were saddling their horses. McNeil rallied the men nearest to him and advanced to the attack. Captains Jones and Higgins seconded McNeil. There was no time to form. McNeil was pressed by overwhelming numbers, surrounded and captured. At the same time Marsh was rallying the men at the north and the conflict or series of conflicts, became an indiscriminate struggle to the death. Just then the enemy in still larger numbers poured into the camp and captured the stragglers and convalescents. Captain Jones' horse was shot under him, Lieutenant Garrett was wounded and both were made prisoners. Marsh ordered a saber charge and broke through the line at the north, followed by Captain Higgins and the men who had been with McNeil. Marsh charged west and then south in the hope of supporting Major Bush. Major Mudd, who had been ordered to Oxford by rail and was preparing to go, knew nothing of the situation until he heard of the surrender. He rallied a few men nearest to him and ordered a saber charge. The same order was simultaneously executed by Marsh and Bush, all of whom broke through the lines at different points. The several detachments were separated. Those of Marsh and Bush joined upon the south and charged through the town fighting desperately. The enemy swarmed like locusts but, unable to withstand the terrific onset, gave way at every point. Realizing that a considerable number of their comrades must have been captured, Major Bush charged back like a whirlwind, recaptured the camp and released the captives. Those behind seemed to realize that their comrades would return. Some were found crouched upon the ground behind their dead and dying horses which they used for breastworks, still fighting with coolness and desperation. When the rescue came, these men hurriedly mounted behind their comrades or captured loose horses and went on with them. The charge was scarcely halted. Turning to the west, they again broke through the line and escaped to Coldwater, a town about twenty miles distant. Captain Marsh received three severe wounds but kept on through the fight.

In the meantime, Major Mudd, with a small detachment, succeeded in breaking through the western line, but in doing so, lost a number of his men. The fact of escape was not enough to satisfy his soldierly instinct. Seeing a band of rebels in front of him he gave chase, although at the time he was pursued by a much larger number. Twenty-four prisoners were captured, including one major; but being unable to take care of them, twelve were released. Whether these were a part of the detachment pursued, I have not been able to ascertain.

Major Mudd with his detachment also escaped to Coldwater where he aided in preparations for the defense of that place which was threatened by the enemy.

On the following Sunday, this officer, under orders from Colonel O'Meara, commanding at Coldwater, went back to Holly Springs under a flag of truce, but finding the place deserted and being joined by Lieutenant Stickel with a few men, took possession of the town and held it until the arrival of Colonel Marsh on the same day.

Another detachment of men, numbering about seventy, broke through the rebel lines and escaped towards Memphis. They bivouacked that night several miles away from Holly Springs, without fire, food or shelter and reached Memphis in due time hungry, cold, exhausted and destitute.

The loss in killed, wounded and missing was about one hundred and fifty; but, aside from prisoners captured, it was believed that the enemy's loss was much greater.

In a general order issued on December 23rd, 1862, General Grant, after severely censuring Murphy and a part of the garrison, said:

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