MAXIMO GOMEZ The foremost military chieftain of the War of Independence, Maximo Gomez y Baez, was a Cuban by adoption rather than birth, having been born at Bani, Santo Domingo, in 1838. He was an officer in the last Spanish army in that island, and went with it thence to Cuba. There he became disgusted with the brutality of the Spanish officers toward the Cubans, personally assaulted his superior, General Villar, and quit the Spanish service, returning to Santo Domingo, where he engaged in business as a planter. At the beginning of the Ten Years' War he returned to Cuba, joined the patriots, and did efficient service, rising to the chief command. After that war he returned to his plantation in Santo Domingo, but in 1895 joined José Marti in leading the Cuban War of Independence. Thereafter his story was the story of the Cuban cause. Declining to be considered a candidate for the Presidency of the Republic, he retired to private life after the establishment of independence, and died in 1905, full of years and honor.
Then Campos attempted a second barricade. He placed a line of troops across the island from Moron to Jucaro, near the western boundary of Camaguey, to prevent Gomez from going on into Santa Clara province. This was the line along which was afterward built a military railroad, and on which was constructed the famous "Trocha" or barrier of ditches, wire fences and block houses. It almost coincided with the line of demarcation between the two ecclesiastical dioceses into which the island was divided. But this attempt to confine the insurrection was no more successful than the other. Indeed it was folly to try to shut the revolution out of Santa Clara when it was already there. Marcos Garcia had left behind him many fervent patriots at{45}Sancti Spiritus, and these soon organized a formidable force under the competent lead of Carlos Ruloff, and took the field, advancing northward and westward as far as Vega Alta. General Zayas and other patriotic leaders operated in the southern part of Santa Clara, and soon that province was almost as fully aflame with revolution as Oriente itself. This was the more significant, because it was a populous and opulent province, where the inhabitants had much to lose through the ravages of war. But like the Romans in the "brave days of old," the Cubans of the revolution "spared neither lands nor gold, nor limb nor life," for the achievement of their national independence.
Meantime in Oriente the Cubans were more than holding their own. They suffered a sore loss in the death of the dashing champion Amador Guerra, who was treacherously slain in the moment of victory at Palmas Altas, near Manzanillo. But Henry Brooks landed supplies of artillery and ammunition at Portillo; Jesus Rabi almost annihilated a strong Spanish force in a defile near Jiguani and thus frustrated General Salcedo's plans to surround Maceo's camp at San Jorge; and on July 5 Quintin Bandera and Victoriano Garzon attacked and dispersed a newly landed Spanish army and captured its stores of arms and ammunition. These reverses for his arms exasperated Campos into the issuing of a proclamation on July 7, in which, while still offering pardon to all who voluntarily surrendered, he threatened death to all who were captured under arms, and exile to African prisons to all who were convicted of conspiring against the sovereignty of Spain.
Following this, Campos, "Spain's greatest soldier," took the field in person. Of this there was need, for Maceo was besieging Bayamo, capturing all supplies{46}which were sent thither, and threatening the Spanish garrison with starvation. Campos hastened to the relief of that place with General Santocildes and a strong force. But Maceo did not hesitate to measure strength with Campos. He attacked him openly at Peralejo, out-manœuvered him and out-fought him and came very near to capturing him with his whole headquarters staff. Campos was indeed saved from capture only by the desperate valor of Santocildes, who lost his life in defending him: but he did lose his entire ammunition train and was compelled to retreat with the remnant of his shattered forces into Bayamo and there undergo the humiliation of being besieged by the "rebels" whom he had affected to despise. There he remained for a week, until General Suarez Valdez could come with an army, not to defeat the Cubans but to help Campos to flee in safety over the road by which he had come. Then, when the Spaniards had concentrated more than 10,000 troops at Bayamo for a supreme struggle the wily Maceo quietly and swiftly removed his forces to another scene of action.
Meantime in the far east of the province the patriots besieged the fort in Sabana and would have forced its surrender had not Spanish reenforcements arrived from Baracoa for its relief. The fort was destroyed, however, and the place had to be abandoned by the Spanish. Also at Baire, where the revolution began, Jesus Rabi captured a Spanish fort and its garrison. Everywhere throughout Oriente the Spaniards were on the defensive, while in every other province, even in Pinar del Rio, the revolution was ominously gaining strength.{47}
It now seemed opportune to effect a more complete organization of the civil government of the Cuban Republic, and for that purpose a convention was held in the Valley of the Yara, at which on July 15 a Declaration of Cuban Independence was proclaimed, and on August 7, near Camaguey the action of May 18 was confirmed and amplified, Bartolome Maso being retained as President; Maximo Gomez as Vice-President and Minister of War; Salvador Cisneros as Minister of the Interior; Gonzalo Quesada as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, with residence in the United States; Antonio Maceo as General in Chief of the Army; and Jose Maceo as Commander of the Army of Oriente.
This was not, however, a finality. A national Constitutional Convention was called, at Najasa, near Guiamaro, in the Province of Camaguey, at which were present regularly elected representatives from all six provinces of the island. It afterward removed to Anton, in the same province, where it completed its labors on September 23, when the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba was completed and promulgated. Salvador Cisneros y Betancourt, Marquis of Santa Lucia, was chosen by acclamation to preside over the deliberations of this important body, and associated with him were the ablest and best minds of the Cuban nation.
This Constitution provided for the government of Cuba by a Council of Ministers, until such time as the achievement of independence and the signing of a treaty of peace with Spain should make it practicable for a Legislative{48}Assembly to be convoked and to meet for the performance of its functions. The Council of Ministers was to consist of six members: a President, Vice-President, and Secretaries of War, Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Treasury. This Council was to have full governmental powers, both legislative and administrative, civil and military; to levy taxes, contract loans, raise and equip armies, declare reprisals against the enemy when necessary, and in the last resort to control the military operations of the Commander in Chief. Treaties were to be made by the President and ratified by the Council. It was provided, however, that the treaty of peace with Spain, when made, must be ratified not only by the Council but also by the National Legislative Assembly which was then to be organized. No decree of the Council was valid unless approved by four of the six members, including the President. The President had power to dissolve the Council, in which case a new Council had to be formed within ten days. It was required that all Cubans should be obliged to serve the republic personally or with their property, as they might be able. But all property of foreigners was to be exempt from taxation or other levy, provided that their governments recognized the belligerency of Cuba. It was provided that there should be a national judiciary entirely independent of the legislature and executive.
Under this system the Council was organized as follows: President, Salvador Cisneros y Betancourt, of Camaguey; Vice-President, Bartolome Maso, of Manzanillo, Oriente; Secretaries—of War, Carlos Roloff, of Santa Clara; of Foreign Affairs, Rafael Portuondo, of Santiago; of the Treasury, Severa Pina, of Sancti Spiritus; of the Interior, Santiago J. Canizares, of Los Remedios. Each Secretary appointed his own Deputy, who should have full power when taking his chief's place, as{49}follows: War, Mario G. Menocal, of Matanzas; Foreign Affairs, Fermin G. Dominguez; Treasury, Joaquin Castillo Duany, of Santiago; Interior, Carlos Dubois, of Baracoa. The Commander in Chief was Maximo Gomez; the Lieutenant-General, or Vice-Commander in Chief was Antonio Maceo, and the Major Generals were Jose Maceo, Maso Capote, Serafin Sanchez, and Fuerto Rodriguez. Tomas Estrada Palma was minister plenipotentiary and diplomatic agent abroad. Later Bartolome Maso and General de Castillo were made special envoys to the United States.
Salvador Cisneros, the President, has already been frequently mentioned in this history. He came of distinguished ancestry, the names of Cisneros and Betancourt frequently occupying honorable places in the annals of Cuba. Born in 1832, he was by this time past the prime of life, but he was just as zealous and efficient in the cause of Cuban freedom as he was when he sacrificed his title of Marquis of Santa Lucia, and sacrificed his estates, too, which were confiscated by the Spanish government, when he joined the Ten Years' War, later to succeed the martyred Cespedes as President. Of Bartolome Maso, too, we have spoken much. He also was advanced in years, having been born in 1831, and he, too, had served through the Ten Years' War and had in consequence of his patriotism lost all his estates.
Carlos Roloff, the Secretary of War, was a Pole, who had come to Cuba in his youth and settled at Cienfuegos; bringing with him the passionate love of freedom which had long been characteristic of the Poles. He fought through the Ten Years' War and gained distinction therein, by his valor and military skill.
Mario G. Menocal, the Assistant Secretary of War, was a native of Jaguey Grande, Matanzas, at this time only{50}twenty-nine years old. He came of a family eminent in Cuban history, and indeed in the history of North America, since he was a nephew of that A. G. Menocal who was perhaps the most distinguished and efficient of all the engineers and surveyors for the Isthmian Canal schemes, both at Nicaragua and Panama. He himself was, even thus early in life, one of the foremost engineers of Cuba.
ANICETO G. MENOCAL
Rafael Portuondo y Tamayo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was another young man—born at Santiago in 1867—of distinguished family and high ability. His Assistant Secretary, Fermin Valdes Dominguez, was one of the most eminent physicians of Havana, and was one of those students who, as hitherto related, were falsely accused by the Volunteers of desecrating an officer's grave. He escaped the fate of shooting, which was meted out to one in every five of his comrades, but was sent to life-long penal servitude at Ceuta. After the Treaty of Zanjon he was released and returned to Havana, where he attained great distinction in his profession.
Severa Pina, Secretary of the Treasury, belonged to one of the oldest families of Sancti Spiritus. His Assistant, Dr. Joaquin Castillo Duany, has already been mentioned as one of the organizers of the Cuban Junta in New York. He had served on the United States Naval relief expedition which went to the Arctic regions in quest of the survivors of theJeannetteexploring expedition.
Santiago J. Canizares, Secretary of the Interior, was one of the foremost citizens of Los Remedios, and his{51}Assistant, Carlos Dubois, enjoyed similar rank at Baracoa.
Meantime Martinez Campos was straining every effort to fulfil his promise of victory. At the middle of July he had nearly 40,000 regular infantry, more than 2,500 cavalry, more than 1,000 artillery and engineers, 4,400 civil guards, 2,700 marines, and nearly 1,200 guerrillas. His navy comprised 15 vessels, to which were to be added six which were approaching completion in Spain and 19 which were being purchased of other European nations. Thus his troops outnumbered the Cubans by just about two to one. For the latter aggregated only 24,000, of whom 12,000 were under Maceo in Oriente, 9,000 in Camaguey under Gomez, and 3,000 under Roloff and Sanchez in Santa Clara. In August large reenforcements for Campos arrived from Spain, and they were no longer, as before, half trained boys, but were the very flower of the Spanish army. They brought the total that had been sent to Cuba up to 80,000, of whom 60,000 were regular infantry. However, probably between 18,000 and 20,000 must be subtracted from those figures, for killed, deserted, and died of yellow fever and other diseases. But even if thus reduced to 60,000, the Spanish were still twice as many as the Cubans, who had increased their forces to not more than 30,000.
The plans of campaign gave the Cubans, however, a great advantage. Fully half of the Spaniards had to remain on garrison duty in the cities and towns, especially along the coast, so that the number free to take the field against the Cubans was no greater than that of the latter. With numbers anywhere near equal, the Cubans were almost sure to win, because of their superior morale and their better knowledge of the country.
The Cubans suffered much, it is true, from lack of supplies,{52}and this lack became the more marked and grievous as the Spaniards increased their naval forces and drew tighter and tighter their double cordon of vessels around the island. Several costly expeditions which were fitted out in the United States during the year came to grief, being either restrained from sailing by the United States authorities or intercepted and captured by the Spanish. One such vessel, fully laden with valuable supplies, was seized at the mouth of the Delaware River, as it was setting out for Cuba, and the cargo was confiscated. The company of Cubans in command of the vessel were arrested and brought to trial, but were acquitted since the mere exportation of arms and ammunition in an unarmed merchant vessel was no violation of law. Far different was the fate of any such who were captured by the Spanish at the other end of the voyage, as they were approaching the Cuban coast. The mildest fate they could expect was a term of many years of penal servitude at Ceuta. Such was the sentence imposed upon sailors who were guilty of nothing more than smuggling the contraband goods into Cuba. As for Juan Gualberto Gomez and his comrades in an expedition which presumptively was intended for fighting as well as smuggling, twenty years at Ceuta was their sentence.
During the summer of 1895 a severe but necessary order was issued by the Cuban commander in chief. This, addressed to the people of Camaguey Province, directed the cessation of all plantation work, save such as was necessary for the food supply of the families there resident; and also strictly forbade the supplying of any food to the Spanish garrisons in the towns and cities. Disobedience to these orders, it was plainly stated, would mean the destruction of the offending plantation. It was the purpose of General Gomez to deprive the Spaniards{53}of all local supplies and make them dependent upon shipments of food, even, from Spain. This meant, no doubt, much hardship to the Cuban people. But there was little complaint, and it was seldom that the rule was violated. Whenever a flagrant violation was detected, the torch was applied, and canefield and buildings were reduced to ashes. There was also much destruction of railroads, bridges, telegraph lines and what not, to deprive the Spanish of means of transport and communication. It was a fine demonstration of the patriotism of the Cuban people that they almost universally acquiesced in this plan of campaign, without demur and without repining, although it of course meant heavy loss and untold inconvenience and often severe suffering, to them. They realized that they were at war, and that war was not to be waged with lace fans and rosewater.
At the end of September, after the close of the Constitutional Convention, preparations were made for renewing the military campaign with more aggressive vigor. Jose Maceo was assigned to the command of the eastern part of Oriente, General Capote and General Sanchez took respectively the northern and southern parts of the western half, and General Rodriguez led the advance into Camaguey. Maximo Gomez himself accompanied Rodriguez's army, and was presently joined by Antonio Maceo, and together they planned the great campaign of the war, which was conceived by Gomez and executed by Maceo. This was nothing less than the extension of the war into every province and indeed every district and village of the island, by marching westward from Oriente to the further end of Pinar del Rio.
Early in October Antonio Maceo set out to join Gomez in Camaguey, taking with him 4,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. At San Nicolas he suffered a setback at the{54}hands of General Aldave and a superior force of Spaniards, but resolutely continued his progress. Gomez meanwhile pushed on into Santa Clara, established headquarters near Las Tunas, where he could be in touch with expeditions from Jamaica, and began the aggressive against the Spaniards around Sancti Spiritus. Roloff, meanwhile, was operating at the northern part of the province, at Vueltas. Martinez Campos himself was in the field near Sancti Spiritus, but failed to check the Cuban advance. In fact, at almost every point the campaign was going steadily against the Spanish; so much against them that Campos feared to let the truth be known to the world. Accordingly he issued a decree forbidding the publication of any news concerning the war save that which was officially given out at his headquarters or by his chief of staff at Havana. Only Spanish and foreign—no Cuban—correspondents were permitted to accompany the army, and they only on their compliance with the rules.
Still Campos appeared to cherish the thought that he could end the war by compromise, through pursuing a policy of leniency toward at least the rank and file of the insurgents; and in this he had the support of the Madrid government. That government had staked its all upon him, and was naturally disposed to give him a free hand and to approve everything that he did. However, it insisted that the rebellion must be crushed and that no further reforms for Cuba could be considered until that was done. It was feeling the strain of the war severely, especially since its last loan for war funds had to be placed at more than fifty per cent discount.
October was a disastrous month for the Spanish at sea. One of their gunboats was wrecked on a key, and another, which had just been purchased in the United States, was{55}boarded and seized by a party of revolutionists in the Cauto River, stripped of all its guns and ammunition, and disabled and scuttled. General Enrique Collazo, who earlier in the season had several times been baffled in such attempts, at last got away from Florida with a strong party of Cubans and Americans and effected a safe landing in Cuba. A little later Carlos Manuel de Cespedes did the same, bringing a large cargo of arms. Two expeditions also came from Canada, under General Francisco Carillo and Colonel Jose Maria Aguirre. The latter, by the way, was an American citizen who had been arrested in Havana at the very beginning of the war, along with Julio Sanguilly, but was released at the very urgent insistence of the United States government. Sanguilly, who was suspected by some Cubans of having betrayed their cause, was held, tried, and condemned to life imprisonment; a fact which cleared him of suspicion of complicity with the Spaniards.
Maceo advanced through Camaguey and on November 12 reached Las Villas with an army of 8,000 men. Gomez had meanwhile moved northward almost to the Gulf coast, and was operating with 5,000 men between Los Remedios and Sagua la Grande, where he joined forces with Sanchez, who had marched westward, and with Roloff, Suarez, Cespedes and Collazo. He established headquarters near the Matanzas border, where he was in touch with Lacret, Matagas and other guerrilla leaders who were actively engaged in the latter province. In that same month Maceo fought a pitched battle with General Navarro, near Santa Clara, and a few days later Gomez similarly fought General Suarez Valdes in the same region. These were two of the greatest battles of the war, in point of numbers engaged and losses suffered, and were both handsomely won by the Cubans.{56}
In view of these losses, Campos welcomed the arrival of 30,000 additional troops from Spain, under General Pando and General Marin. He also resorted to recruiting troops in some of the South American countries, particularly in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, thinking to find them hardier and better able to endure the climate and the hardships of Cuba than men from the Peninsula. Such recruiting was not regarded with favor in those countries, where sympathy was generally on the side of the Cubans; but a considerable number of adventurers were found who were willing to serve for good pay as soldiers of fortune. More and more, too, the Spanish soldiery indulged in excesses against the inhabitants of Cuba as well as against the revolutionists in the field, and the conflict showed symptoms of degenerating into the savagery which marked it at a later date. It is to be recalled to the credit of Campos that he resisted all such tendencies, and that he indeed sent back to Spain two prominent Generals, Bazan and Salcedo, because of their barbarous methods and their criticisms of his humanity. General Pando, on arriving with the fresh troops from Spain, was placed in command at Santiago; General Marin was assigned to Santa Clara; General Mella operated in Camaguey; and General Arderius was charged with the hopeless task of guarding Matanzas, Havana and Pinar del Rio from invasion by the revolutionists.
The Cuban government, of President Cisneros and his colleagues, established its headquarters at Las Tunas, and there approved another military proclamation by the Commander in Chief, ordering the burning of all cane fields and the laying waste of all plantations which were providing or were likely to provide supplies to the Spaniards, and threatening with death all persons found giving the Spaniards aid or comfort. One notable blow was{57}struck at the south, before the final advance was made toward Havana and the west. This was at the middle of December. Campos himself was at Cienfuegos, with 20,000 troops, and Gomez and Maceo decided to give him battle. The redoubtable negro farmer, Quintin Bandera, from Oriente, who at the age of sixty-three years had become one of the most agile, daring and successful guerrilla leaders, raided the Spanish lines and drew out a considerable force, upon which the Cubans fell at Mal Tiempo, thirty miles north of Cienfuegos. Only a couple of thousand men were engaged on each side, but it was one of the most significant battles of the war, because it was the first in which the Cubans relied upon the machete, and the result of the experiment made that fearful weapon thereafter their favorite arm, particularly in cavalry charges, and it struck a terror into the hearts of the Spanish soldiers such as nothing else could do. The machete was an enormous knife, as long as a cavalry sabre or longer, with a single edge as sharp as a razor on a blade almost as heavy as the head of a woodsman's axe. It had been used on sugar plantations, for cutting cane, and was so heavy that a single stroke was sufficient to cut through half a dozen of the thickest canes. Swung by the expert and sinewy arm of a Cuban soldier, it would sever a man's head from his body, or cut off an arm or leg, as surely as the blade of a guillotine. At Mal Tiempo a whole company of Spanish regulars was set upon by Cuban horsemen armed with nothing but machetes, and every one of them was killed.
Turning swiftly away from Mal Tiempo, where they had both been present, Gomez and Maceo led their troops swiftly to the northwest and before Campos realized what their objective was they were raiding and defeating Spanish troops around Colon, in the east central part of the{58}Province of Matanzas, between Campos and Havana. The distracted Captain-General hastened thither and, learning that they were retiring eastward toward the town of Santo Domingo, in Santa Clara, directed his course thither; only to find himself outwitted by the Cubans who had really moved further toward Colon. At last he came into contact with them, and with Emilio Nunez who had joined them, near the little village of Coliseo, and there he was badly worsted in the fight, and came near to losing his life, his adjutant being shot and killed at his side. The coming of night saved him from further losses. But then the Cubans, pursuing Fabian tactics, withdrew to Jaguey Grande, in Santa Clara, well content with their achievement, where they took counsel over plans for the great drive which was to carry them through Matanzas and Havana clear into Pinar del Rio.
Campos made the best of his way hastily back to Havana, in a far different frame of mind from that in which he had come to Cuba eight months before. He had at that time in the island more than 100,000 troops in active service. Since his appointment as Captain-General nearly 80,000 men had been sent thither from Spain. In addition there were the Volunteers, or what was left of them. According to Spanish authorities at Havana at that time the Volunteers numbered 63,000. True, they would not take the field. But they were serviceable for police and garrison duty in cities and towns, thus permitting all the regular army to be put into the field. The same authorities declared that with the Volunteers, marines and all other branches, Campos had at his disposal 189,000 men. It is probable that the entire force under Gomez and Maceo in that first invasion of Matanzas did not exceed 10,000 men. These things gave{59}"Spain's greatest General" much food for thought; not of the most agreeable kind.
It gave others food for thought; the Spanish Loyalists of both Constitutionalist and Reformist predilections, and the dwindling but still resolute body of Cuban Autonomists. The last-named were at this desperate conjuncture of affairs Campos's best friends. The Constitutionalists were hostile to him. They had from the first disapproved his moderate and humane methods, wishing to return to the savagery of Valmaseda in the Ten Years' War. The Reformists were hesitant; they had little faith in Campos, yet they doubted the expedience of openly repudiating him. The Autonomists, having faith in his sincerity, respecting his humanity, and deploring the devastation and ruin which was befalling Cuba, urged that he should be supported loyally in at least one last effort to pacify the island and abate the horrors of civil war.
The intellectual and moral power of the Autonomists carried the day. The Reformists first and then the Constitutionalists agreed to join them in making a demonstration of loyalty and confidence to the Captain-General, to cheer and sustain him in the depression—almost despair—which he was certainly suffering. So the representatives of all three factions appeared publicly before Campos. For the Constitutionalists, Santos Guzman spoke; an intense reactionary, who could not altogether conceal his feelings of disapproval of Campos's liberal course, or his realization of the desperate plight in which the country was at that time. But he made an impassioned pledge of the loyalty of his party to the Captain-General. For the Autonomists, Dr. Rafael Montoro was the spokesman, one of the foremost orators and scholars{60}of the Spanish-speaking world. He had been a Cuban Senator in the Spanish Cortes, and perhaps more than any other man in Cuba commanded the respect and confidence of all parties, Spanish and Cuban alike. He also pledged to Campos the unwavering support of the Autonomists in what he believed sincerely to be the best policy for both Cuba and Spain. A representative of the Reformists spoke to the same effect. Then Campos responded with a frank confession that he had meditated resignation, fearing that he had lost the united confidence of the various parties; but that after this demonstration of loyalty, he would continue his military and civil administration with restored hope of success in pacifying the island.
We have called the Autonomists at this time the best friends of Campos. It might be possible, however, to argue successfully that they were his worst friends, or at least badly mistaken friends. It might have been better, that is to say, for him to have persisted in retirement at that time, instead of merely postponing the day of wrath. For his renewed efforts either to crush or to pacify the revolutionists were vain. At the very moment when he was gratefully listening to those pledges of loyal support, Gomez and Maceo were pushing unrelentingly forward, not merely through Matanzas but far into Havana province itself. And like Israel of old, they were guided or accompanied by a pillar of fire by night and a pillar of cloud by day. The plantations near the capital were sources of supply for the Spanish, and they must be destroyed. It seemed savage to doom canefields and factories to the torch. But it was more humane to do that and thus make the island uninhabitable for the Spaniards, than to lose myriads of lives in battle. Moreover, the destruction of the sugar crop, then ripe for harvest,{61}would do more than anything else to cripple the financial resources of Spain in the island. All Spain wanted of Cuba, said Gomez, grimly but truly, was what she could get out of it. Therefore if she was prevented from getting anything out of it she would no longer desire it but would let it go.
So night after night "the midnight sky was red" with the glow of blazing canefields and factories, and day after day the tropic sun was half obscured by rolling clouds of smoke from the same conflagrations; while behind them the advancing armies left a broad swath of blackened desolation, above which gaunt, tall chimneys towered solitary, above twisted and ruined machinery, grim monuments of the passing of the destroyer. Day after day the inexorable terror rolled toward the capital. On the last day of the year the vanguard of the patriot army was at Marianao, only ten miles from Havana, and every railroad leading out of the city was either cut or had suspended operations. Two days later Campos proclaimed martial law and a state of siege in the Provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio. Thus the new year opened with the entire island involved in the War of Independence. Nor was it merely a nominal state of war. Already Pinar del Rio was overrun by bands of Cuban irregulars, who destroyed the cane fields of Spanish Loyalists and ravaged the tobacco plantations of the famous Vuelta Abajo. But this was not enough. On January 5, 1896, Gomez, leaving Maceo and Quintin Bandera to hold Campos in check at Havana, drove straight at the centre of the Spanish line which strove to bar his progress westward, broke through it, and marched his whole army into Pinar del Rio.
That was the beginning of the end for Campos. In desperation he flung all available troops in a line across{62}the western part of Havana Province vainly hoping, since he had not been able thus to keep him out of Pinar del Rio, that thus he could keep Gomez shut up in that province, deprived of supplies or succor. Meantime he sent three of his ablest generals, Luque, Navarro and Valdez, into the western province, in hope of capturing Gomez. But the wily Cuban chieftain played with them, marching and countermarching at will and wearing them out, until he had completed his work there. Then as if to show his scorn at Campos's military barriers, he burst out of Pinar del Rio and reentered Havana, sweeping like a besom of wrath through the southern part of that province, and defeating the army of Suarez Valdez near Batabano. Then, while all the Spanish columns were in full cry after Gomez, Maceo crossed the border into Pinar del Rio at the north, and marched along the coast as far as Cabanas, destroying several towns on his way.
From Batabano the Cubans under Gomez and Angel Guerra turned northward again, and by January 12 were at Managuas, in the outskirts of Havana, from which the sound of firing could be heard in the capital itself. The railroads had been stopped before, and now all telegraph communication with Havana was cut, save that by submarine cable. The city was not merely in a technical state of siege but was actually besieged, and if Jose Maceo and Jesus Rabi, who were on the eastern border of the province, had been able promptly to join Gomez and Bandera, Havana would probably have been captured. In this state of affairs the Spanish inhabitants of the city were frantic with fear, and with faultfinding against Campos for his inability to protect them from the revolutionists. The Volunteers mutinied outright refusing to serve longer under his orders unless he would{63}alter his policy to one of extreme severity. The Spanish political leaders openly inveighed against him.
In these circumstances Campos invited the leaders of the various parties, the very men who shortly before had pledged their support to him, to meet him again for a conference. They came, but in a different spirit from before. Santos Guzman was first to speak. He declared that the Constitutionalists had lost confidence in the Captain-General and did not approve his policy, and that they could no longer support him. The spokesman of the Reformists was less violent of phrase but no less hostile in intent and purport. From neither of the factions of the Spanish party could Campos hope for further support. There remained the Cuban Autonomists, and with a constancy which would have been sublime if only it had been exercised in a better cause, they reaffirmed their loyalty to Campos and to his policy and renewed their pledges of support. But this was in vain. Campos realized that a Spanish Captain-General who had not the support and confidence of the Spanish party would be an impossible anomaly. He would not resign, but he reported to Madrid the state of affairs, and placed himself, like a good soldier, at the commands of the government; excepting that he would not change his policy for one of ruthless severity. If he was to remain in Cuba, his policy of conciliation, in cooperation with the Autonomists, must be maintained.
The answer was not delayed. On January 17 a message came from Madrid, directing Campos to turn over his authority to General Sabas Marin, who would exercise it until a permanent successor could be appointed and could arrive; and to return forthwith to Spain. Of course there was nothing for him to do but to obey. In relinquishing his office to his temporary successor he{64}spoke strongly in defence of the policy which he had pursued. Later, out of office, he talked with much bitterness of the political conspiracies which had been formed against him by the Spaniards of Cuba, of their moral treason to the cause of Spain, and of the sordid tyranny which they exercised. He declared that Spain herself was at fault for the Cuban revolution, which never would have occurred if the island had been treated as an integral province of Spain and not as a subject and enslaved country; and he prophesied that the verdict of history would be, as it had been in the case of Central and South America, that Spain had lost her American empire through the perverse faults of the Spaniards themselves. "My successor," he added, "will fail." Three days later he sailed for Spain.{65}
The administration of General Marin lasted only a few weeks, but it was marked with strenuous doings. His first effort was to do what Campos had failed to do, namely, to maintain an impassable barrier between Pinar del Rio and Havana. He massed troops on the line between Havana and Batabano, and took command himself at the centre, hoping to draw Maceo into a general engagement. But Maceo sent Perico Diaz with 1,400 men from Artemisia to create a diversion just north of the centre, which was done very effectively, Diaz and General Jil drawing a large Spanish force into a trap and inflicting terrible slaughter with a cavalry machete charge. Taking advantage of this, Maceo with a small detachment easily crossed the trocha at the south. At once the Spanish forces all rushed in that direction, to head off Maceo and to prevent him from joining Gomez, whereupon the remainder of Maceo's troops crossed the trocha at the centre and north. After raiding Havana Province at will, and capturing fresh supplies, Maceo returned to Pinar del Rio, fought and won a pitched battle at Paso Real, won another at Candelaria, where the Spanish General Cornell was killed, and captured the city of Jaruco and its forts with 80 guns.
By this time the new Captain-General had arrived. This was General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau; the man most of all desired—and indeed earnestly asked for—by the Volunteers and other extremists among the Spanish party in Cuba, the man most undesired by the Autonomists,{66}and the man most hated by the Cuban revolutionists. He had made himself unspeakably odious in the Ten Years' War as the chief aid of Valmaseda in his savage outrages, and he was confidently expected to renew in Cuba the horrors of that campaign; as he did. Upon the announcement of his appointment the Autonomists largely abandoned hope of any amicable arrangement, and those of them who were mayors or other officers promptly resigned their places, being unwilling to serve under him. Many of them left Cuba altogether, dreading the horrors which they knew were impending. As for the masses of the Cuban people, they flocked to the standard of the revolution in greater numbers than before. Within a month after Weyler's arrival at Havana, more than 15,000 fresh recruits were following the banners of Gomez and Maceo.
GENERAL WEYLER
It was on February 10 that Weyler landed in Cuba. He promptly issued a number of decrees addressed to both the Spanish Loyalists and the Cuban Revolutionists. He chided the former for their indifference and fears, warned them that they must expect to make sacrifices and endure sufferings, and demanded of them that they should themselves undertake the guardianship of their cities and towns so as to release all his troops for service in the field. The latter he threatened with all possible pains and penalties if they persisted in their contumacy. Death or life imprisonment was to be the fate of all who circulated news unfavorable to the government, who interfered with the operation of railroads, telegraphs or{67}telephones, who by word of mouth disparaged Spain or Spanish soldiers or praised the enemy, who aided the enemy in any way, or who failed to help the government and to injure the revolutionists at every opportunity. All inhabitants of Oriente, Camaguey and the district of Sancti Spiritus in Santa Clara were required to register at military headquarters and receive permits to go about their business. Later he ordered all persons living in rural districts to move into fortified towns, and confiscated the property of all who were absent from their homes without leave. It should be added that at the beginning of his administration he sought to curb and even reproved and punished the cruelties of his subordinates.
In spite of the repudiation of Campos and his policy of pacification, and the accession of Weyler and his policy of severity, the Spanish Prime Minister, Canovas del Castillo, determined to make another attempt at amicable settlement. Elections for a new Cortes were to be held, and he directed that they should be held in Cuba as well as in the Peninsula. To that end it was desirable to raise the state of siege in at least the three western provinces, and on March 8 Weyler issued an order which he hoped would conduce to that end. The civil guard, or rural military police, was to be restored to duty, amnesty was offered to all insurgents who surrendered within fifteen days and who had not been guilty of burning or confiscating property, and all others were to be treated as bandits, to be put summarily to death. All loyal inhabitants were required actively to assist in repairing railroads, telegraph lines, etc. A similar proclamation was issued for the other provinces.
The elections were set for April 12, and were then held. The Reformist faction of Spaniards refused to{68}take part in them, not approving the policy of Weyler. The Cuban Autonomists also refused to vote, or to nominate candidates, excepting for Deputies from the University of Havana and the Economical Society of Havana. They did this at great risk to themselves, because Weyler after trying persuasions resorted to the most ominous threats against them if they would not take part in the elections, and there really was much danger that at least their leaders would be arrested and imprisoned for treason. The outcome was that only Constitutionalists voted, and only their candidates were elected; representing an insignificant fraction of the Cuban people.
Meantime the war raged unceasingly. Having failed to keep the Cubans from invading Pinar del Rio, and then from emerging from that province, Weyler again formed a trocha from Havana to Batabano to prevent them from moving further east. But both Gomez and Maceo broke through, the former marching into the heart of Matanzas and playing havoc with the sugar plantations, and the latter going southward to the Cienaga de Zapata and thence into Santa Clara, where he received strong reenforcements from Oriente and Camaguey. Then, when Weyler was massing his troops in Santa Clara, Maceo with 10,000 men swept back to the very gates of Havana. With the adoption of Weyler's policy as announced in his proclamations, the war became a campaign of destruction on both sides, each burning towns in order that they might not be occupied by the other. In this fashion in a few weeks there were burned or laid in ruins in Pinar del Rio the towns of Cabanaz, Cayajabos, Vinales, Palacios, San Juan Martinez, Montezuelo, Los Arroyos, Cuano, San Diego, Nunez, Bahia Honda, Hacha and Quiobra; in Havana there perished{69}La Catalina, San Nicolas, Nueva Paz, Bejucal, Jaruco, Wajay, Melena and Bainoa; in Matanzas, Los Ramos, Macagua, Roque, San Jose and Torriente; and in Santa Clara, Amaro, Flora, Mata, Maltiempo, Ranchuelo, Salamanca and San Juan. Many other towns were partially destroyed. On March 13 Maceo attacked Batabano, one of the most strongly defended Spanish coast towns, took 50 guns and much ammunition, and destroyed the town. Nine days later Gomez sent troops into the city of Santa Clara, and captured 240,000 rounds of ammunition. He established his headquarters so near Las Cruces that General Pando fled from that place to Cienfuegos; for which cowardice he was recalled to Spain, as were several other generals. Maceo, after his exploit at Batabano, returned to Pinar del Rio, routed General Linares at Candelaria and another Spanish army at Cayajibaos, and destroyed part of the town of Pinar del Rio.
Filibustering was now rife. In spite of the vigilance of the United States government and of the Spanish navy, numerous expeditions carried men and arms to the Cuban patriots. Those which were successful were little heard of by the public, while those which failed often attracted much attention. General Calixto Garcia, one of the most resolute and daring veterans of the Ten Years' War, sent one on the steamerHawkins, which was lost at sea. He organized another on the British steamerBermuda, which was detained by the United States authorities on February 24, and he was arrested and tried for "organizing a military expedition," but was acquitted. A little later he reorganized the expedition and reached Cuba with it in safety. Enrique Collazo and others sent an expedition from Cedar Keys on theStephen R. Mallory, which was detained, for a time, but finally got off and landed most of the cargo in Matanzas. The{70}Danish steamerHorsawas seized by the United States authorities for carrying a military expedition. TheCommodorecarried a cargo of arms safely from Charleston, S. C. TheBermudatook another expedition from Jacksonville under Col. Vidal and Col. Torres, but was attacked by a Spanish gunboat before all the cargo was landed, and took to flight, throwing the rest of the cargo overboard. Other successful expeditions in the early part of 1896 were five on the steamerThree Friends, one of which was led by Julian Zarraga and one by Dr. Joaquin Castillo Duany; three on theLaurada, of which one was led by Juan Fernandez Ruiz and one by Rafael Portuondo; several led by Rafael Cabrera, one by General Carlos Roloff, and one by Juan Ruiz Rivera. One came from France, under Fernando Freyre y Andrade, bringing 5,000 rifles and 1,000,000 cartridges. President Cleveland issued a warning, that all violators of the United States neutrality laws would be prosecuted and severely punished, and General Weyler offered large rewards for information leading to the capture of such expeditions, but the chief effect was to stimulate Cuban patriots to greater efforts, if also to increased precautions.
Much attention was meanwhile paid to Cuban affairs by the United States government, not only in trying to check filibustering but also in looking after the rights—and wrongs—of American citizens, and also in seeking an ending of a war which was commercially ruinous and humanely most distressing. Several joint resolutions were introduced in the Congress at Washington, for recognizing the Cubans as belligerents, for inquiry into the state and conditions of the war, for intervention, and for recognizing the independence of the Cuban Republic. There were finally adopted on April 6 resolutions favoring{71}recognition of Cuban belligerency and the tender of good offices for the settlement of the war on the basis of Cuban independence. It was of course necessarily left to the discretion of the President to execute these designs. He did not deem it expedient to recognize Cuban belligerence, but he did promptly, on April 9, direct the American Minister at Madrid to make the tender of good offices for ending the war on the basis of reforms which would be satisfactory to the Cuban people. True, it had been made clear that the great mass of the Cuban people would accept nothing short of independence; but the American Secretary of State, Mr. Olney, believed that if a genuine measure of Home Rule were granted and put into effect, the Cubans and their friends in the United States would withdraw their support from the revolution and thus constrain the revolutionists to yield and accept the compromise. To this overture of the United States government Spain made no reply; nor did it to a similar suggestion offered by the Pope. But Tomas Estrada Palma, speaking for the Cuban Junta in New York and for Cubans and Cuban sympathizers throughout the United States, declared that they were not at all interested in any such scheme, and that they would consider nothing short of absolute independence.
The Spanish government did, indeed, consider a scheme of so-called autonomy, somewhat resembling that of Senor Abarzuza at the beginning of the war; but in the speech from the throne at the opening of the Cortes on May 11 it was frankly recognized that the revolutionists would accept nothing short of independence, and that therefore it would be expedient to attempt any such reforms until the insurrection had been subdued by force of arms; which was, of course, General Weyler's policy.
There were numerous diplomatic controversies between{72}Spain and the United States over Cuban affairs. The American Consul-General at Havana, Ramon O. Williams, intervened in behalf of numerous American citizens who had been arrested for complicity in the revolution, insisting upon their trial by civil and not by military courts. In the case of five American sailors taken on a filibustering expedition, death by shooting was ordered by Weyler, but the Spanish government quashed the sentence and ordered a civil trial on Mr. Williams's threat to close the Consulate and thus suspend relations. Antagonism between the consul and the Captain-General became so intense that Mr. Williams offered to resign his office, but the President requested him to remain. However he finally retired, at his own volition, and was succeeded on June 3 by Fitzhugh Lee; who proved equally resolute in his protection of American interests.
Meantime, what of the revolutionary civil government of the Republic of Cuba? At the beginning it was a fugitive in the mountain fastnesses of the Sierra Maestra, in the southern part of Oriente, between Santiago and Manzanillo. Thence it removed to Las Tunas, in the same province. But after the great eastward drive by Gomez and Maceo it established itself permanently in the Sierra de Cubitas, in the Province of Camaguey, midway between the city of Camaguey and the north coast of Cuba. There it remained, in a practically impregnable stronghold, and there it surrounded itself with such military industries as it was capable of conducting—largely the manufacture of dynamite, machetes, and of clothing. From that capital it directed an efficient administration of the major part of the island. It levied and collected taxes, and gave to about two-thirds of the island a mail service at least as efficient as that of the Spanish government had ever been. A complete judicial{73}and police system was maintained, and was more respected by the people than that of Spain. In brief it was substantially true, as President Cisneros declared, that the island was peaceful, law-abiding and well-governed, excepting in those places where the Spanish invaders were making trouble!
But the Spanish did make trouble. Weyler once more strove to place an impassable barrier between Pinar del Rio and Havana, to keep Maceo shut up in the former province. He constructed it so strongly, with ditches, block houses, barbed wire fences, artillery and what not as to make it almost impossible of passage. Then he put 10,000 of his best troops west of it, to fight Maceo, and distributed 28,000 more along the trocha to keep Maceo from breaking out. The result was most unfortunate for the Spanish troops west of the trocha. They were there to hunt down Maceo. Instead, Maceo hunted them. If they ventured to attack him, he repulsed them. More often he attacked them, and almost invariably routed them. At Lechuza he cut to pieces Colonel Debos's column and drove its survivors to the shelter of a gunboat at the shore. At Bahia Honda and Punta Brava the Spanish were badly beaten. In the Rubi Hills a Spanish force was all but annihilated, and the commanders began to clamor for reenforcements; though Maceo had only 11,000 men, and the Spanish had 50,000 along the trocha to keep him from crossing it. During the summer the campaign slackened a little, though Maceo won several spirited engagements and maintained his control of practically all the province excepting parts of the coast. In the early fall, with his army increased to 20,000 he resumed the aggressive; using for the first time a dynamite gun which thoroughly demoralized the Spaniards. Near Pinar del Rio city,{74}at Las Tumbas Torino, at San Francisco, at Guayabitos and at Vinales, he defeated the enemy and inflicted heavy losses. The same record was made early in October at San Felipe, at Tunibar del Torillo, at Manaja, at Ceja del Negro, and Guamo. A solitary Spanish victory was won at Guayabitos.
Like the general government at Cubitas, Maceo had headquarters in the mountains, and there guarded effectively a large and fertile region, where supplies ample for feeding his army could be produced. He also conducted workshops for the manufacture of arms and ammunition. Against this position, in his rage and desperation, Weyler himself in November led an army of 36,000 picked troops, with six Generals. For several days attack after attack was made, every one being repulsed by Maceo with heavy loss to the Spaniards, until at last, with a third of his army destroyed, Weyler abandoned the attempt and retreated. Unfortunately, on December 4 Maceo with his staff and a small force decided to undertake a secret expedition to seek a conference with leaders in Havana Province. They accordingly crossed the Bay of Mariel in a small boat and thus reached the eastern side of the trocha. Messages were sent to revolutionary chiefs in Havana and Matanzas, asking them to come to a council of war at a designated point near Punta Brava, familiar to them all as secure rendezvous. A few came promptly, but in some way the secret of the meeting became known to the Spanish. In consequence, on December 7, while he was expecting the arrival of more of his friends, Maceo heard the sound of firing at the outposts of his camp. Riding to the scene, he found Spanish troops attacking him. He rallied his troops and under his directions they were soon mastering the enemy, when a shot struck Maceo and he fell mortally wounded; his last words, referring to the progress of the skirmish, being, "It goes well."
JOSÉ ANTONIO MACEO
Born at Santiago de Cuba in 1849, of a family of patriots and brave fighters, and dying in battle at Punta Brava, near Havana, on December 7, 1896, José Antonio Maceo was one of the most gallant soldiers in the Ten Years' War and one of the very foremost chieftains of the War of Independence. Gifted with military genius and with leadership of men, he was the greatest strategist and the most popular commander in the Liberating Army, and the greatest terror to the foe. Partly of Negro blood, he was an equal honor to both races, and finely typified in himself their union in the cause of Cuban independence. A monument to his imperishable memory crowns Cacagual Hill, where his remains were buried.