12
The Latin holidays detained the consuls and praetors at Rome till the fifth of the calends of May; on which day, having completed the solemnities on the mount, they proceeded to their respective provinces. Afterwards a new difficulty respecting religious matters arose out of the prophetic verses of Marcius, who had been a distinguished soothsayer; and on a search being made the year before, for books of this description, agreeably to a decree of the senate, these verses had fallen into the hands of Marcus Atilius, the city praetor, who had the management of that business, and he had immediately handed them over to the new praetor, Sulla. The importance attached to one of the two predictions of Marcius, which was brought to light after the event to which it related had occurred, and the truth of which was confirmed by the event, attached credence to the other, the time of whose fulfilment had not yet arrived. In the former prophecy, the disaster at Cannae was predicted in nearly these words: "Roman of Trojan descent, fly the river Canna, lest foreigners should compel thee to fight in the plain of Diomede. But thou wilt not believe me until thou shalt have filled the plain with blood, and the river carries into the great sea, from the fruitful land, many thousands of your slain countrymen, and thy flesh becomes a prey for fishes, birds, and beasts inhabiting the earth. For thus hath Jupiter declared to me." Those who had served in that quarter recognised the correspondence with respect to the plains of the Argive Diomede and the river Canna, as well as the defeat itself. The other prophecy was then read, which was more obscure, not only because future events are more uncertain than past, but also from being more perplexed in its style of composition. "Romans, if you wish to expel the enemy and the ulcer which has come from afar, I advise, that games should be vowed, which may be performed in a cheerful manner annually to Apollo; when the people shall have given a portion of money from the public coffers, that private individuals then contribute, each according to his ability. That the praetor shall preside in the celebration of these games, who holds the supreme administration of justice to the people and commons. Let the decemviri perform sacrifice with victims after the Grecian fashion. If you do these things properly you will ever rejoice, and your affairs will be more prosperous, for that deity will destroy your enemies who now, composedly, feed upon your plains." They took one day to explain this prophecy. The next day a decree of the senate was passed, that the decemviri should inspect the books relating to the celebration of games and sacred rites in honour of Apollo. After they had been consulted, and a report made to the senate, the fathers voted, that "games should be vowed to Apollo and celebrated; and that when the games were concluded, twelve thousandassesshould be given to the praetor to defray the expense of sacred ceremonies, and also two victims of the larger sort." A second decree was passed, that "the decemviri should perform sacrifice in the Grecian mode, and with the following victims: to Apollo, with a gilded ox, and two white goats gilded; to Latona, with a gilded heifer." When the praetor was about to celebrate the games in the Circus Maximus, he issued an order, that during the celebration of the games, the people should pay a contribution, as large as was convenient, for the service of Apollo. This is the origin of the Apollinarian games, which were vowed and celebrated in order to victory, and not restoration to health, as is commonly supposed. The people viewed the spectacle in garlands; the matrons made supplications; the people in general feasted in the courts of their houses, throwing the doors open; and the day was distinguished by every description of ceremony.
13
While Hannibal was in the neighbourhood of Tarentum, and both the consuls in Samnium, though they seemed as if they were about to besiege Capua, the Campanians were experiencing famine, that calamity which is the usual attendant of a protracted siege. It was occasioned by the Roman armies' having prevented the sowing of the lands. They therefore sent ambassadors to Hannibal, imploring him to give orders that corn should be conveyed to Capua from the neighbouring places, before both the consuls led their legions into their fields, and all the roads were blocked up by the troops of the enemy. Hannibal ordered Hanno to pass with his army from Bruttium into Campania, and to take care that the Campanians were supplied with corn. Hanno, setting out from Bruttium with his army, and carefully avoiding the camp of the enemy and the consuls who were in Samnium, when he drew near to Beneventum, pitched his camp on an eminence three miles from the city. He next ordered that the corn which had been collected during the summer, should be brought from the neighbouring people in alliance with him, into his camp, assigning a guard to escort those supplies. He then sent a messenger to the Capuans, fixing a day when they should attend at his camp to receive the corn, bringing with them vehicles and beasts of every description, collected from every part of their country. The Campanians executed this business with their usual indolence and carelessness. Somewhat more than four hundred vehicles, with a few beasts of burden besides, were sent. After receiving a reproof from Hanno for this conduct, who told them, that not even hunger, which excited dumb animals to exertion, could stimulate them to diligence, another day was named when they were to fetch the corn after better preparation. All these transactions being reported to the Beneventans, just as they occurred, they lost no time in sending ten ambassadors to the Roman consuls, who were encamped in the neighbourhood of Bovianum. The consuls, hearing what was going on at Capua, arranged it so that one of them should lead an army into Campania; and Fulvius, to whose lot that province had fallen, setting out by night, entered the walls of Beneventum. Being now near the enemy, he obtained information that Hanno had gone out to forage with a portion of his troops; that the Campanians were supplied with corn by a quaestor; that two thousand waggons had arrived together with an undisciplined and unarmed rabble; that every thing was done in a disorderly and hurried manner; and that the form of a camp, and all military subordination, were destroyed by the intermixture of rustics out of the neighbourhood. This intelligence being sufficiently authenticated, the consul ordered his soldiers to get ready only their standards and arms against the next night, as he must attack the Carthaginian camp. They set out at the fourth watch of the night, leaving all their packages and baggage of every description at Beneventum; and arriving a little before daylight at the camp, they occasioned such a panic, that, had the camp been situated on level ground, it might doubtlessly have been taken on the first assault. The height of its situation and the works defended it; for they could not be approached on any side except by a steep and difficult ascent. At break of day a hot engagement commenced, when the Carthaginians not only defended their rampart, but having more even ground, threw down the enemy as they attempted to ascend the steep.
14
Persevering courage, however, at length prevailed over every impediment, and they made their way up to the ditch and rampart in several parts at the same time, but with many wounds and much loss of soldiers. The consul, therefore assembling the military tribunes, said they must desist from this inconsiderate enterprise; and that it appeared to him to be the safer course, that the troops should be led back to Beneventum for that day, and then on the following day to pitch his camp close to that of the enemy, so that the Campanians could not quit it, nor Hanno return to it; and in order that that object might be attained with the greater ease, that he should send for his colleague and his army; and that they would direct their whole force on that point. This plan of the general was disconcerted, after the signal began to sound for a retreat, by the clamours of the soldiery, who despised so pusillanimous an order. Nearest to the gate of the enemy's camp was a Pelignian cohort, whose commander, Vibius Accuaeus, seizing the standard, threw it over the rampart. Then pronouncing a curse upon himself and his cohort, if the enemy got possession of that standard, he rushed forward before the rest, and crossing the ditch and rampart, burst into the camp of the enemy. The Pelignians were now fighting within the rampart, when in another quarter Valerius Flaccus, a military tribune of the third legion, taunting the Romans with cowardice for conceding to allies the honour of taking the camp. Titus Pedanius, first centurion of the first century, snatched the standard out of the hands of the standard-bearer, and cried out, "Soon shall this standard, and this centurion, be within the rampart of the enemy; let those follow who would prevent the standard's being captured by the enemy." Crossing the ditch, he was followed first by the men of his own maniple, and then by the whole legion. By this time the consul also, changing his plan on seeing them crossing the rampart, began to incite and encourage his soldiers, instead of calling them off; representing to them, how critical and perilous was the situation of the bravest cohort of their allies and a legion of their countrymen. All, therefore, severally exerting themselves to the utmost, regardless whether the ground were even or uneven, while showers of weapons were thrown against them from all sides, the enemy opposing their arms and their persons to obstruct them, made their way and burst in. Many who were wounded, even those whose blood and strength failed them, pressed forward, that they might fall within the rampart of the enemy. The camp, therefore, was taken in an instant, as if it had been situated upon level ground, and not completely fortified. What followed was a carnage rather than a battle. The troops of both sides being huddled together within the rampart, above six thousand of the enemy were slain; above seven thousand, together with the Campanians who fetched the corn, and the whole collection of waggons and beasts of burden, were captured. There was also a great booty, which Hanno in his predatory excursions, which he had been careful to make in every quarter, had drawn together from the lands of the allies of the Romans. After throwing down the camp of the enemy, they returned thence to Beneventum; and there both the consuls (for Appius Claudius came thither a few days after) sold the booty and distributed it, making presents to those by whose exertions the camp of the enemy had been captured; above all, to Accuaeus the Pelignian, and Titus Pedanius, first centurion of the third legion. Hanno, setting off from Cominium in the territory of Cere, whither intelligence of the loss of the camp had reached him, with a small party of foragers, whom he happened to have with him, returned to Bruttium, more after the manner of a flight than a march.
15
The Campanians, when informed of the disaster which had befallen themselves and their allies, sent ambassadors to Hannibal to inform him, that "the two consuls were at Beneventum, which was a day's march from Capua; that the war was all but at their gates and their walls; and that if he did not hasten to their assistance, Capua would fall into the power of the enemy sooner than Arpi had; that not even Tarentum itself, much less its citadel, ought to be considered of so much consequence as to induce him to deliver up to the Roman people, abandoned and undefended, Capua, which he used to place on an equal footing with Carthage." Hannibal, promising that he would not neglect the interest of the Campanians, sent, for the present, two thousand horse, with the ambassadors, aided by which, they might secure their lands from devastation. The Romans, meanwhile, among the other things which engaged their attention, had an eye to the citadel of Tarentum, and the garrison besieged therein. Caius Servilius, lieutenant-general, having been sent, according to the advice of the fathers, by Publius Cornelius, the praetor, to purchase corn in Etruria, made his way into the harbour of Tarentum, through the guard-ships of the enemy, with some ships of burden. At his arrival, those who before, having very slight hopes of holding out, were frequently invited by the enemy, in conferences, to pass over to them, now, on the contrary, were the persons to invite and solicit the enemy to come over to them; and now, as the soldiers who were at Metapontum had been brought to assist in guarding the citadel of Tarentum, the garrison was sufficiently powerful. In consequence of this measure, the Metapontines, being freed from the fears which had influenced them, immediately revolted to Hannibal. The people of Thurium, situated on the same coast, did the same. They were influenced not more by the defection of the Metapontines and Tarentines, with whom they were connected, being sprung from the same country, Achaia, than by resentment towards the Romans, in consequence of the recent execution of the hostages. The friends and relations of these hostages sent a letter and a message to Hanno and Mago, who were not far off among the Bruttii, to the effect, that if they brought their troops up to the walls, they would deliver the city into their hands. Marcus Atinius was in command at Thurium, with a small garrison, who they thought might easily be induced to engage rashly in a battle, not from any confidence which he reposed in his troops, of which he had very few, but in the youth of Thurium, whom he had purposely formed into centuries, and armed against emergencies of this kind. The generals, after dividing their forces between them, entered the territory of Thurium; and Hanno, with a body of infantry, proceeded towards the city in hostile array. Hanno staid behind with the cavalry, under the cover of some hills, conveniently placed for the concealment of an ambush. Atinius, having by his scouts discovered only the body of infantry, led his troops into the field, ignorant both of the domestic treachery and of the stratagem of the enemy. The engagement with the infantry was particularly dull, a few Romans in the first rank engaging while the Thurians rather waited than helped on the issue. The Carthaginian line retreated, on purpose that they might draw the incautious enemy to the back of the hill, where their cavalry were lying in ambush; and when they had come there, the cavalry rising up on a sudden with a shout, immediately put to flight the almost undisciplined rabble of the Thurians, not firmly attached to the side on which they fought. The Romans, notwithstanding they were surrounded and hard pressed on one side by the infantry, on the other by the cavalry, yet prolonged the battle for a considerable time; but at length even they were compelled to turn their backs, and fled towards the city. There the conspirators, forming themselves into a dense body, received the multitude of their countrymen with open gates; but when they perceived that the routed Romans were hurrying towards the city, they exclaimed that the Carthaginian was close at hand, and that the enemy would enter the city mingled with them, unless they speedily closed the gates. Thus they shut out the Romans, and left them to be cut up by the enemy. Atinius, however, and a few others were taken in. After this for a short time there was a division between them, some being of opinion that they ought to defend the city, others that they ought, after all that had happened, to yield to fortune, and deliver up the city to the conquerors; but, as it generally happens, fortune and evil counsels prevailed. Having conveyed Atinius and his party to the sea and the ships, more because they wished that care should be taken of him, in consequence of the mildness and justice of his command, than from regard to the Romans, they received the Carthaginians into the city. The consuls led their legions from Beneventum into the Campanian territory, with the intention not only of destroying the corn, which was in the blade, but of laying siege to Capua; considering that they would render their consulate illustrious by the destruction of so opulent a city, and that they would wipe away the foul disgrace of the empire, from the defection of a city so near remaining unpunished for three years. Lest, however, Beneventum should be left without protection, and that in case of any sudden emergency, if Hannibal should come to Capua, in order to bring assistance to his friends, which they doubted not he would do, the cavalry might be able to sustain his attack, they ordered Tiberius Gracchus to come from Lucania to Beneventum with his cavalry and light-armed troops and to appoint some person to take the command of the legions and stationary camp, for the defence of Lucania.
16
An unlucky prodigy occurred to Gracchus, while sacrificing, previous to his departure from Lucania. Two snakes gliding from a secret place to the entrails, after the sacrifice was completed, ate the liver; and after having been observed, suddenly vanished out of sight. The sacrifice having been repeated according to the admonition of the aruspices, and the vessel containing the entrails being watched with increased attention, it is reported that the snakes came a second, and a third time, and, after tasting the liver, went away untouched. Though the aruspices forewarned him that the portent had reference to the general, and that he ought to be on his guard against secret enemies and machinations, yet no foresight could avert the destiny which awaited him. There was a Lucanian, named Flavius, the leader of that party which adhered to the Romans when the others went over to Hannibal; he was this year in the magistracy, having been created praetor by the same party. Suddenly changing his mind, and seeking to ingratiate himself with the Carthaginians, he did not think it enough that he himself should pass over to them, or that he should induce the Lucanians to revolt with him, unless he ratified his league with the enemy with the head and blood of the general, betrayed to them, though his guest. He entered into a secret conference with Mago, who had the command in Bruttium, and receiving a solemn promise from him, that he would take the Lucanians into his friendship, without interfering with their laws, if he should betray the Roman general to the Carthaginians, he conducted Mago to a place to which he was about to bring Gracchus with a few attendants. He then directed Mago to arm his infantry and cavalry, and to occupy the retired places there, in which he might conceal a very large number of troops. After thoroughly inspecting and exploring the place on all sides, a day was agreed upon for the execution of the affair. Flavius came to the Roman general, and said, that "he had begun a business of great importance, for the completion of which, it was necessary to have the assistance of Gracchus himself. That he had persuaded the praetors of all the states which had revolted to the Carthaginians in the general defection of Italy, to return into the friendship of the Romans, since now the Roman power too, which had almost come to ruin by the disaster at Cannae. was daily improving and increasing, while the strength of Hannibal was sinking into decay, and was almost reduced to nothing. He had told them that the Romans would be disposed to accept an atonement for their former offence; that there never was any state more easy to be entreated, or more ready to grant pardon; how often, he had observed to them, had they forgiven rebellion even in their own ancestors! These considerations," he said, "he had himself urged, but that they would rather hear the same from Gracchus himself in person, and touching his right hand, carry with them that pledge of faith. That he had agreed upon a place with those who were privy to the transaction, out of the way of observation, and at no great distance from the Roman camp; that there the business might be settled in few words, so that all the Lucanian states might be in the alliance and friendship of the Romans." Gracchus, not suspecting any treachery either from his words or the nature of the proposal, and being caught by the probability of the thing, set out from the camp with his lictors and a troop of horse, under the guidance of his host, and fell headlong into the snare. The enemy suddenly arose from their lurking-place, and Flavius joined them; which made the treachery obvious. A shower of weapons was poured from all sides on Gracchus and his troop. He immediately leaped from his horse, and ordering the rest to do the same, exhorted them, that "as fortune had left them only one course, they would render it glorious by their valour. And what is there left," said he, "to a handful of men, surrounded by a multitude, in a valley hemmed in by a wood and mountains, except death? The only question was, whether, tamely exposing themselves to be butchered like cattle, they should die unavenged; or whether, drawing the mind off from the idea of suffering and anticipation of the event, and giving full scope to fury and resentment, they should fall while doing and daring, covered with hostile blood, amid heaps of arms and bodies of their expiring foes." He desired that "all would aim at the Lucanian traitor and deserter;" adding, that "the man who should send that victim to the shades before him, would acquire the most distinguished glory, and furnish the highest consolation for his own death." While thus speaking, he wound his cloak round his left arm, for they had not even brought their shields out with them, and then rushed upon the enemy. The exertion made in the fight was greater than could be expected from the smallness of the number. The bodies of the Romans were most exposed to the javelins, with which, as they were thrown on all sides from higher ground into a deep valley, they were transfixed. The Carthaginians seeing Gracchus now bereft of support, endeavoured to take him alive; but he having descried his Lucanian host among the enemy, rushed with such fury into their dense body that it became impossible to save his life without a great loss. Mago immediately sent his corpse to Hannibal, ordering it to be placed, with the fasces which were taken at the same time, before the tribunal of the general. This is the true account; Gracchus fell in Lucania, near the place called the Old Plains.
17
There are some who have put forth an account, stating, that when in the territory of Beneventum, near the river Calor, having gone out from his camp with his lictors and three servants, for the purpose of bathing, he was slain while naked and unarmed, and endeavouring to defend himself with the stones which the river brought down, by a party of the enemy which happened to be concealed among the osiers which grew upon the banks. Others state, that having gone out five hundred paces from the camp, at the instance of the aruspices, in order to expiate the prodigies before mentioned on unpolluted ground, he was cut off by two troops of Numidians who happened to be lying in ambush there. So different are the accounts respecting the place and manner of the death of so illustrious and distinguished a man. Various also are the accounts of the funeral of Gracchus. Some say that he was buried by his own friends in the Roman camp; others relate, and this is the more generally received account, that a funeral pile was erected by Hannibal, in the entrance of the Carthaginian camp; that the troops under arms performed evolutions, with the dances of the Spaniards, and motions of the arms and body, which were customary with the several nations; while Hannibal himself celebrated his obsequies with every mark of respect, both in word and deed. Such is the account of those who assert that the affair occurred in Lucania. If you are disposed to credit the statement of those who relate that he was slain at the river Calor, the enemy got possession only of the head of Gracchus; which being brought to Hannibal, he immediately despatched Carthalo to convey it into the Roman camp to Cneius Cornelius, the quaestor, who buried the general in the camp, the Beneventans joining the army in the celebration.
18
The consuls having entered the Campanian territory, while devastating the country on all sides, were alarmed, and thrown into confusion, by an eruption of the townsmen and Mago with his cavalry. They called in their troops to their standards from the several quarters to which they were dispersed, but having been routed when they had scarcely formed their line, they lost above fifteen hundred men. The confidence of the Campanians, who were naturally presumptuous, became excessive in consequence of this event, and in many battles they challenged the Romans; but this one battle, which they had been incautiously and imprudently drawn into, had increased the vigilance of the consuls. Their spirits were restored, while the presumption of the other party was diminished, by one trifling occurrence; but in war nothing is so inconsiderable as not to be capable, sometimes, of producing important consequences. Titus Quinctius Crispinus was a guest of Badius, a Campanian, united with him by the greatest intimacy. Their acquaintance had increased from the circumstance of Badius having received the most liberal and kind attentions at the house of Crispinus, in a fit of illness, at Rome, before the Campanian revolt. On the present occasion, Badius, advancing in front of the guards, which were stationed before the gate, desired Crispinus to be called; and Crispinus, on being informed of this, thinking that a friendly and familiar interview was requested, and the memory of their private connexion remaining even amidst the disruption of public ties, advanced a little from the rest. When they had come within view of each other, Badius exclaimed, "I challenge you to combat, Crispinus; let us mount our horses, and making the rest withdraw, let us try which is the better soldier." In reply, Crispinus said, that "neither of them were in want of enemies to display their valour upon; for his own part, even if he should meet him in the field he would turn aside, lest he should pollute his right-hand with the blood of a guest;" and then turning round, was going away. But the Campanian, with increased presumption, began to charge him with cowardice and effeminacy, and cast upon him reproaches which he deserved himself, calling him "an enemy who sheltered himself under the title of host, and one who pretended to spare him for whom he knew himself not to be a match. If he considered; that when public treaties were broken, the ties of private connexion were not severed with them, then Badius the Campanian openly, and in the hearing of both armies, renounced his connexion of hospitality with Titus Quinctius Crispinus the Roman. He said, that there could exist no fellowship or alliance with him and an enemy whose country and tutelary gods, both public and private, he had come to fight against. If he was a man, he would meet him." Crispinus hesitated for a long time; but the men of his troop at length prevailed upon him not to allow the Campanian to insult him with impunity. Waiting, therefore, only to ask his generals whether they would allow him to fight, contrary to rule, with an enemy who had challenged him; having obtained their permission, he mounted his horse, and addressing Badius by name, called him out to the combat. The Campanian made no delay. They engaged with their horses excited to hostility. Crispinus transfixed Badius with his spear in the left shoulder, over his shield. He fell from his horse in consequence of the wound; and Crispinus leaped down to despatch him as he lay, on foot. But Badius, before his enemy was upon him, ran off to his friends, leaving his horse and buckler. Crispinus, decorated with the spoils, and displaying the horse and arms which he had seized together with the bloody spear, was conducted amid the loud plaudits and congratulations of the soldiery into the presence of the consuls, where he was highly commended, and was presented with gifts.
19
Hannibal, having moved his camp from the territory of Beneventum to Capua, drew out his troops in order of battle the third day after his arrival; not entertaining the least doubt but that, as the Campanians had fought successfully a few days ago when he was absent, the Romans would be still less able to withstand him and his army, which had been so often victorious. After the battle had commenced, the Roman line was distressed chiefly from the attack of the cavalry, being overwhelmed with their darts, till the signal was given to the Roman cavalry to direct their horses against the enemy; thus it was a battle of the cavalry. But at this time the Sempronian army, commanded by Cneius Cornelius the quaestor, being descried at a distance, excited alarm in both parties equally, lest those who were approaching should be fresh enemies. As if by concert, therefore, both sounded a retreat; and the troops were withdrawn from the field to their camps, in an equal condition; a greater number, however, of the Romans fell in the first charge of the cavalry. The consuls, to divert the attention of Hannibal from Capua, departed thence on the following night in different directions, Fulvius into the territory of Cuma, Claudius into Lucania. The next day Hannibal, having received intelligence that the camp of the Romans was deserted, and that they had gone off in different directions in two divisions, doubtful at first which he should follow, commenced the pursuit of Appius; who, after leading him about whichever way he pleased, returned by another route to Capua. Hannibal, while in this quarter, had another opportunity of gaining an advantage. Marcus Centenius, surnamed Penula, was distinguished among the centurions of the first rank by the size of his person, and his courage. Having gone through his period of service, he was introduced to the senate by Publius Cornelius Sulla, when he requested of the fathers that five thousand men might be placed at his disposal. He said, that "as he was acquainted with the character of the enemy, and the nature of the country, he should speedily perform some service; and that he would employ those arts by which our generals and armies had been hitherto ensnared against the inventor of them." This was not promised more foolishly than it was believed; as if the qualifications of a soldier and a general were the same. Instead of five, eight thousand men were given him, half Romans, half allies. He himself also got together a considerable number of volunteers, in the country, on his march; and having almost doubled his force, arrived in Lucania, where Hannibal had halted after having in vain pursued Claudius. No doubt could be entertained of the issue of a contest which was to take place between Hannibal, as general on one side, and a centurion on the other; between armies, one of which had grown old in victory, the other entirely inexperienced, and for the most part even tumultuary and half-armed. As soon as the troops came within sight of each other, and neither of them declined an engagement, the lines were formed. The battle, notwithstanding the utter disparity of the contending parties, lasted more than two hours, the Roman troops acting with the greatest spirit as long as their general survived. But after that he had fallen, for he continually exposed himself to the weapons of the enemy, not only from regard to his former character, but through fear of the disgrace which would attach to him if he survived a disaster occasioned by his own temerity, the Roman line was immediately routed. But so completely were they prevented from flying, every way being beset by the cavalry, that scarcely a thousand men escaped out of so large an army; the rest were destroyed on all hands, in one way or other.
20
The siege of Capua was now resumed by the consuls with the utmost energy. Every thing requisite for the business was conveyed thither and got in readiness. A store of corn was collected at Casilinum; at the mouth of the Vulturnus, where a town now stands, a strong post was fortified; and a garrison was stationed in Puteoli, which Fabius had formerly fortified, in order to have the command of the neighbouring sea and the river. Into these two maritime forts, the corn recently sent from Sicily, with that which Marcus Junius, the praetor, had bought up in Etruria, was conveyed from Ostia, to supply the army during the winter. But, in addition to the disaster sustained in Lucania, the army also of volunteer slaves, who had served during the life of Gracchus with the greatest fidelity, as if discharged from service by the death of their general, left their standards. Hannibal was not willing that Capua should be neglected, or his allies deserted, at so critical a juncture; but, having obtained such success from the temerity of one Roman general, his attention was fixed on the opportunity which presented itself of crushing the other general and his army. Ambassadors from Apulia reported that Cneius Fulvius, the praetor, had at first conducted his measures with caution, while engaged in besieging certain towns of Apulia, which had revolted to Hannibal; but that afterwards, in consequence of extraordinary success, both himself and his soldiers, being glutted with booty, had so given themselves up to licentiousness and indolence, that all military discipline was disregarded. Having frequently on other occasions, as well as but a few days ago, experienced what an army was good for, when conducted by an unskilful commander, he moved his camp into Apulia.
21
The Roman legions, and the praetor, Fulvius, were in the neighbourhood of Herdonia, where, receiving intelligence of the approach of the enemy, they had nearly torn up the standards and gone out to battle without the praetor's orders; nor did any thing tend more to prevent it than the assured hope they entertained that they could do so whenever they pleased, consulting only their own will. The following night, Hannibal having obtained information that the camp was in a state of tumult, and that most of the troops were in a disorderly manner urging the general to give the signal, and calling out to arms, and therefore feeling convinced that an opportunity presented itself for a successful battle, distributed three thousand light troops in the houses in the neighbourhood, and among the thorns and woods. These, on a signal being given, were to rise up from their lurking-place with one accord; and Mago, with about two thousand horse, was ordered to occupy all the roads in the direction in which he supposed their flight would be directed. Having made these preparations during the night, he led his troops into the field at break of day. Nor did Fulvius decline the challenge; not so much from any hope of success entertained by himself, as drawn by the blind impetuosity of his soldiers. Accordingly, the line itself was formed with the same want of caution with which they entered the field, agreeably to the whim of the soldiers, who came up as chance directed, and took their stations just where they pleased; which they afterwards abandoned, as fear or caprice suggested. The first legion and the left wing of the allied troops were drawn up in front. The line was extended to a great length, the tribunes remonstrating, that there was no strength in it, and that wherever the enemy made the charge they would break through it: but no salutary advice reached their minds, nor even their ears. Hannibal was now come up, a general of a totally different character, with an army neither similar in its nature, nor similarly marshalled. The consequence was, that the Romans did not so much as sustain their shout and first attack. Their general, equal to Centenius in folly and temerity, but by no means to be compared with him in courage, when he saw things going against him, and his troops in confusion, hastily mounting his horse, fled from the field with about two hundred horsemen. The rest of the troops, beaten in front, and surrounded on the flank and rear, were slaughtered to such a degree, that out of eighteen thousand men, not more than two thousand escaped. The enemy got possession of the camp.
22
When these disastrous defeats, happening one upon another, were reported at Rome, great grief and consternation seized the city. But still, as the consuls had been hitherto successful when it was most important, they were the less affected by these disasters. Caius Lastorius and Marcus Metilius were sent as ambassadors to the consuls, with directions carefully to collect the remains of the two armies, and use every endeavour to prevent their surrendering themselves to the enemy, through fear or despair, (which was the case after the battle of Cannae,) and to search for the deserters from the army of volunteer slaves. Publius Cornelius was charged with the same business; to him also the levy was intrusted. He caused an order to be issued throughout the market and smaller towns, that search should be made for the volunteer slaves, and that they should be brought back to their standards. All these things were executed with the most vigilant care. The consul, Appius Claudius, having placed Decius Junius in command at the mouth of the Vulturnus, and Marcus Aurelius Cotta at Puteoli, with directions to send off the corn immediately to the camp, as each of the ships from Etruria and Sardinia arrived with it, returned himself to Capua, and found his colleague Quintus Fulvius at Casilinum, conveying every requisite thence, and making every preparation for the siege of Capua. Both of them then joined in besieging the city, summoning Claudius Nero, the praetor, from the Claudian camp at Suessula; who, leaving a small garrison there, marched down to Capua with all the rest of his forces. Thus there were three generals' tents erected round Capua; and three armies, applying themselves to the work in different parts, proceeded to surround the city with a ditch and rampart, erecting forts at moderate intervals. The Campanians attempting to obstruct the work, a battle was fought in several places at once; the consequence of which was, that at length the Campanians confined themselves within their gates and walls. Before, however, these works were carried quite round, ambassadors were sent to Hannibal to complain that Capua was abandoned, and almost given up to the Romans, and to implore him, that he would now, at least, bring them assistance, when they were not only besieged, but surrounded by a rampart. A letter was sent to the consuls from Publius Cornelius, the praetor, directing that before they completely enclosed Capua with their works, they should grant permission to such of the Campanians as chose to quit Capua, and take their property with them. That those should retain their liberty, and all their possessions, who quitted it before the ides of March, but that those who quitted it after that day, as well as those who continued there, would be considered as enemies. Proclamation was made to the Campanians to this effect, but it was received with such scorn, that they spontaneously used insulting language and menaces. Hannibal had marched his legions from Herdonea to Tarentum, with the hope of getting possession of the citadel of that place, by force or stratagem. But not succeeding there, he turned his course to Brundusium, thinking that town would be betrayed to him, but, while fruitlessly spending time there also, the Campanian ambassadors came to him with complaints and entreaties. Hannibal answered them in a proud manner, that he had before raised the siege of Capua, and that now the consuls would not sustain his approach. The ambassadors, dismissed with these hopes, with difficulty effected their return to Capua, which was by this time surrounded by a double trench and rampart.
23
At the time when the circumvallation of Capua was carrying on with the greatest activity, the siege of Syracuse, which had been forwarded by intestine treachery, in addition to the efforts and bravery of the general and his army, was brought to a conclusion. For in the beginning of spring, Marcellus being in doubt whether he should direct the operations of the war against Himilco and Hippocrates at Agrigentum, or press the siege of Syracuse, though he saw that it was impossible to take the city by force, which, from its situation, both with respect to sea and land, was impregnable, nor by famine, as it was supported by an uninterrupted supply of provisions from Carthage, yet that he might leave no course untried, directed the Syracusan deserters (and there were in the Roman camp some men in this situation of the highest rank, who had been driven out of the city during the defection from the Romans, because they were averse to a change of measures) to sound the feelings of those who were of the same party in conferences, and to promise them, that if Syracuse was delivered up, they should have their liberty, and be governed by their own laws. There was no opportunity however, of having a conference; for as many were suspected of disaffection, the attention and observation of all were exerted, lest any thing of the kind should occur unknown to them. One of the exiles, who was a servant, having been allowed to enter the city in the character of a deserter, assembled a few persons, and opened a conversation upon the subject. After this, certain persons, covering themselves with nets in a fishing smack, were in this way conveyed round to the Roman camp, and conferred with the fugitives. The same was frequently repeated by different parties, one after another; and at last they amounted to eighty. But after every thing had been concerted for betraying the city, the plot was reported to Epicydes, by one Attalus, who felt hurt that he had not been intrusted with the secret; and they were all put to death with torture. This attempt having miscarried, another hope was immediately raised. One Damippus, a Lacedaemonian, who had been sent from Syracuse to king Philip, had been taken prisoner by the Roman fleet. Epicydes was particularly anxious to ransom this man above any other; nor was Marcellus disinclined to grant it; the Romans, even at this time, being desirous of gaining the friendship of the Aetolians, with whom the Lacedaemonians were in alliance. Some persons having been sent to treat respecting his ransom, the most central and convenient place to both parties for this purpose appeared to be at the Trogilian port, near the tower called Galeagra. As they went there several times, one of the Romans, having a near view of the wall, and having determined its height, as nearly as it could be done by conjecture, from counting the stones, and by forming an estimate, in his own mind, what was the height of each stone in the face of the work; and having come to the conclusion that it was considerably lower than he himself and all the rest had supposed it, and that it was capable of being scaled with ladders of moderate size, laid the matter before Marcellus. It appeared a thing not to be neglected; but as the spot could not be approached, being on this very account guarded with extraordinary care, a favourable opportunity of doing it was sought for. This a deserter suggested, who brought intelligence that the Syracusans were celebrating the festival of Diana; that it was to last three days, and that as there was a deficiency of other things during the siege, the feasts would be more profusely celebrated with wine, which was furnished by Epicydes to the people in general, and distributed through the tribes by persons of distinction. When Marcellus had received this intelligence, he communicated it to a few of the military tribunes; then having selected, through their means, such centurions and soldiers as had courage and energy enough for so important an enterprise, and having privately gotten together a number of scaling-ladders, he directed that a signal should be given to the rest of the troops to take their refreshment, and go to rest early, for they were to go upon an expedition that night. Then the time, as it was supposed, having arrived, when, after having feasted from the middle of the day, they would have had their fill of wine, and have begun to sleep, he ordered the soldiers of one company to proceed with the ladders, while about a thousand armed men were in silence marched to the spot in a slender column. The foremost having mounted the wall, without noise or confusion, the others followed in order; the boldness of the former inspiring even the irresolute with courage.
24
The thousand armed men had now taken a part of the city, when the rest, applying a greater number of ladders, mounted the wall on a signal given from the Hexapylos. To this place the former party had arrived in entire solitude; as the greater part of them, having feasted in the towers, were either asleep from the effects of wine, or else, half asleep, were still drinking. A few of them, however, they surprised in their beds, and put to the sword. They began then to break open a postern gate near the Hexapylos, which required great force; and a signal was given from the wall by sounding a trumpet, as had been agreed upon. After this, the attack was carried on in every quarter, not secretly, but by open force; for they had now reached Epipolae, a place protected by numerous guards, where the business was to terrify the enemy, and not to escape their notice. In effect they were terrified; for as soon as the sound of the trumpets was heard, and the shouts of the men who had got possession of the walls and a part of the city, the guards concluded that every part was taken, and some of them fled along the wall, others leaped down from it, or were thrown down headlong by a crowd of the terrified townsmen. A great part of the inhabitants, however, were ignorant of this disastrous event, all of them being overpowered with wine and sleep; and because, in a city of so wide extent, what was perceived in one quarter was not readily made known through the whole city. A little before day, Marcellus having entered the city with all his forces, through the Hexapylos, which was forced open roused all the townsmen; who ran to arms, in order, if possible, by their efforts, to afford succour to the city, which was now almost taken. Epicydes advanced with a body of troops at a rapid pace from the Insula, which the Syracusans themselves call Nasos, not doubting but that he should be able to drive out what he supposed a small party, which had got over the wall through the negligence of the guards. He earnestly represented to the terrified inhabitants who met him, that they were increasing the confusion, and that in their accounts they made things greater and more important than they really were. But when he perceived that every place around Epipolae was filled with armed men, after just teasing the enemy with the discharge of a few missiles, he marched back to the Achradina, not so much through fear of the number and strength of the enemy, as that some intestine treachery might show itself, taking advantage of the opportunity, and he might find the gates of the Achradina and island closed upon him in the confusion. When Marcellus, having entered the walls, beheld this city as it lay subjected to his view from the high ground on which he stood, a city the most beautiful, perhaps, of any at that time, he is said to have shed tears over it; partly from the inward satisfaction he felt at having accomplished so important an enterprise, and partly in consideration of its ancient renown. The fleets of the Athenians sunk there, and two vast armies destroyed, with two generals of the highest reputation, as well as the many wars waged with the Carthaginians with so much peril arose before his mind; the many and powerful tyrants and kings; but above all Hiero, a king who was not only fresh in his memory, but who was distinguished for the signal services he had rendered the Roman people, and more than all by the endowments which his own virtues and good fortune had conferred. All these considerations presenting themselves at once to his recollection, and reflecting, that in an instant every thing before him would be in flames, and reduced to ashes; before he marched his troops to the Achradina, he sent before him some Syracusans, who, as was before observed, were among the Roman troops, to induce the enemy, by a persuasive address, to surrender the city.