Chapter 13

The same summer during which these decrees were passed at Rome, and these transactions took place in Africa, Publius Quinctilius Varus, the praetor, and Marcus Cornelius, the proconsul, fought a pitched battle with Mago the Carthaginian in the territories of the Insubrian Gauls. The legions of the praetor were in the first line; Cornelius kept his in reserve, riding forward into the front himself, and the praetor and proconsul, leading on the two wings, exhorted the soldiers to attack the enemy with the utmost vigour. Finding they produced no impression upon the enemy, Quinctilius said to Cornelius: "The battle, as you perceive, does not proceed with spirit, the enemy, having succeeded in their resistance beyond expectation, have become callous to fear, and there is danger lest it should be converted into boldness. We must stir up a tempest of cavalry if we wish to disorder and drive them from their ground; therefore, either do you sustain the fight in front, and I will lead the cavalry into the action; or else, I will act in the front line and you send out the cavalry of the four legions against the enemy." The proconsul offering to take whichever part of the service the praetor pleased, Quinctilius the praetor, with his son, surnamed Marcus, a spirited youth, went off to the cavalry, and desiring them to mount, instantly led them to the charge. The confusion on occasioned by these was increased by a shout raised by the legions; nor would the line of the enemy have stood unbroken, had not Mago, as soon as he saw the cavalry in motion, immediately brought into the action his elephants, which he kept in readiness. The horses were so terrified at the snorting, the smell, and appearance of these animals, that the aid of the cavalry was rendered ineffectual. As the Roman horseman had the advantage in point of efficiency in a close fight, when he could use his javelin and sword hand to hand, so the Numidians had the advantage when throwing their darts from a distance upon enemies borne away from them by their terrified horses. At the same time the twelfth legion, though a great number of them were slain, maintained their ground through shame rather than a reliance on their strength; but they would not have continued to do so longer, had not the thirteenth legion, brought up into the front line from the reserve, taken up the doubtful conflict. Mago, also, bringing up the Gauls from his reserve, opposed them to the fresh legion. The Gauls being routed without any great effort, the spearmen of the eleventh legion formed themselves into a circular body and charged the elephants, which were now disordering the line of infantry; and as scarcely one of the javelins which they threw upon them failed of taking effect, as they were close together, they turned them all upon the line of their own party. Four of them fell overpowered with wounds. It was then that the front line of the enemy gave ground, the whole body of the Roman infantry at the same time rushing forward to increase the panic and confusion, on seeing the elephants turn their backs. As long as Mago stood in front, the troops stepped back slowly, preserving their ranks and not relaxing their ardour in fighting; but when they saw him falling, from a wound in his thigh, which was transfixed, and carried off the field almost lifeless, in an instant they all betook themselves to flight. As many as five thousand of the enemy were slain, and twenty-two military standards captured on that day. Nor did the Romans obtain a bloodless victory. Two thousand three hundred of the army of the praetor, by far the greater part of whom belonged to the twelfth legion, were lost. Two military tribunes, Marcus Cosconius and Marcus Maenius, of the same legion; and of the thirteenth legion also, which joined in the action at its close, Cneius Helvius, a military tribune, fell in restoring the fight; and about twenty-two distinguished horsemen, together with several centurions, were trampled upon and killed by the elephants. The contest would have continued longer, had not the enemy conceded the victory, in consequence of the wound of their general.

Mago, setting out during the silence of the succeeding night, and marching as far at a time as his wounds would allow him, reached the sea-coast in the territory of the Ingaunian Ligurians. Here ambassadors from Carthage, who had put into the Gallic bay a few days before, came to him with directions to cross over into Africa with all speed; informing him that his brother Hannibal, for to him also they said ambassadors had gone with similar directions, would do the same, for the affairs of the Carthaginians were not in a condition to admit of their occupying Gaul and Italy with armies. Mago, not only influenced by the command of the senate and the danger which threatened his country, but fearful also lest the victorious enemy should be upon him if he delayed, and lest the Ligurians themselves, seeing that the Carthaginians were leaving Italy, should pass over to those under whose power they were likely soon to be placed; at the same time hoping that his wound would be less irritated by the motion of sailing than marching, and that he would have greater facilities for the cure of it, put his troops on board and set sail. But he had scarcely cleared Sardinia when he died of his wound. Several also of his ships, which had been dispersed in the main sea, were captured by the Roman fleet which lay near Sardinia. Such were the transactions by sea and land in that part of Italy which is adjacent to the Alps. The consul, Caius Servilius, without having performed any memorable achievement in Etruria, his province, and in Gaul, for he had advanced thither also, but having rescued from slavery, which they had endured for now the sixteenth year, his father, Caius Servilius, and his uncle, Caius Lutatius, who had been taken by the Boians at the village of Tanetum, returned to Rome with his father on one side of him and his uncle on the other, distinguished, by family, rather than by public, honours. It was proposed to the people, that Caius Servilius should be indemnified for having filled the offices of plebeian tribune and plebeian aedile contrary to what was established by the laws, while his father, who had sat in the curule chair, was still alive, he being ignorant of that circumstance. This proposition having been carried, he returned to his province. The towns Consentia, Uffugum, Vergae, Besidiae, Hetriculum, Sypheum, Argentanum, Clampetia, and many other inconsiderable states, perceiving that the Carthaginian cause was declining, went over to Cneius Servilius the consul in Bruttium. The same consul fought a battle with Hannibal, in the territory of Croto. The accounts of this battle are not clear. Valerius Antias states that five thousand men were slain. But this is an event of such magnitude, that either it must be an impudent fiction, or negligently omitted. It is certain that nothing further was done by Hannibal in Italy; for ambassadors from Carthage, recalling him into Africa, came to him, as it happened, at the same time that they came to Mago.

It is said that when Hannibal heard the message of the ambassadors he gnashed with his teeth, groaned, and scarcely refrained from shedding tears. After they had delivered the commands with which they were charged, he said: "Those who have for a long time been endeavouring to drag me home, by forbidding the sending of supplies and money to me, now recall me, not indirectly, but openly. Hannibal, therefore, hath been conquered, not by the Roman people, who have been so often slain and routed, but by the Carthaginian senate, through envy and detraction; nor will Publius Scipio exult and glory in this unseemly return so much as Hanno, who has crushed our family, since he could not effect it by any other means, by the ruins of Carthage." Already had his mind entertained a presentiment of this event, and he had accordingly prepared ships beforehand. Having, therefore, sent a crowd of useless soldiers under pretence of garrisons into the towns in the Bruttian territory, a few of which continued their adherence to him, more through fear than attachment, he transported the strength of his army into Africa. Many natives of Italy who, refusing to follow him into Africa had retired to the shrine of Juno Lacinia, which had never been violated up to that day, were barbarously massacred in the very temple. It is related, that rarely any person leaving his country to go into exile exhibited deeper sorrow than Hannibal did on departing from the land of his enemies; that he frequently looked back upon the shores of Italy, and, arraigning both gods and men, cursed himself and his own head that he did not lead his troops, while reeking with blood from the victory at Cannae, to Rome. Scipio, who since his appointment to the office of consul had not looked at the Carthaginian enemy in Italy, had dared, he said, to go and attack Carthage, while he, after slaying a hundred thousand fighting men at Trasimenus and Cannae, had suffered his strength to wear away around Casilinum, Cumae, and Nola. Amid these reproaches and complaints he was borne away from his long occupation of Italy.

At the same time intelligence was brought to Rome that both Mago and Hannibal had taken their departure. But the delight occasioned by this twofold source of joy was diminished by the reflection that their commanders had wanted either spirit or strength sufficient to detain them, for they had been charged by the senate to do so; and also in consequence of the anxiety they felt for the issue of a contest, in which the whole weight of the war rested on the efforts of one general and his army. About the same time ambassadors from Saguntum arrived, bringing with them some Carthaginians who had crossed over into Spain for the purpose of hiring auxiliaries, having seized them and the money they had with them. They laid down in the vestibule of the senate-house two hundred and fifty pounds' weight of gold, and eight hundred of silver. After the men had been received and thrown into prison, and the gold and silver returned, the ambassadors were thanked, and received, besides, presents and ships to convey them back into Spain. Some of the older senators then observed, that men were less powerfully affected by prosperity than adversity. That they themselves remembered what terror and consternation had been occasioned by the passage of Hannibal into Italy; what disasters and what lamentations had followed that event. When the camp of the enemy was seen from their walls, what vows were poured forth by each and all! How often, extending their hands to heaven, exclamations were heard in their assemblies. Oh! will that day ever arrive when we shall behold Italy cleared of her enemies and enjoying the blessings of peace! The gods, they said, had at length, in the sixteenth year, granted that favour and yet there was no one who proposed that thanks should be returned to them for it. That if men received a present blessing so ungratefully, they would not be very mindful of it when it was past. In consequence of this a general shout was raised from every part of the senate-house, that Publius Aelius the praetor, should lay the matter before the senate, and a decree was passed, that a supplication should be performed at all the shrines for the space of five days, and that a hundred and twenty victims of the larger sort should be immolated. Laelius and the ambassadors of Masinissa having been by this time dismissed, and intelligence having arrived that ambassadors of the Carthaginians, who were coming to the senate to treat about peace, had been seen at Puteoli, and would proceed thence by land, it was resolved, that Caius Laelius should be recalled, that the negotiations respecting the peace might take place in his presence. Quintus Fulvius Gillo, a lieutenant-general of Scipio, conducted the Carthaginians to Rome; and as they were forbidden to enter the city, they were lodged in a country-house belonging to the state, and admitted to an audience of the senate at the temple of Bellona.

They addressed the senate in nearly the same terms as they had employed before Scipio; laying the whole blame of the war upon Hannibal, and exculpating their state. They declared, that he had not only crossed the Alps, but the Iberus also, without the sanction of the senate; and that he had made war not only on the Romans, but previously on the Saguntines also, on his own individual responsibility. That, if the question were viewed in its proper light, it would be found that the league between the senate and people of Carthage and the Romans remained unbroken up to that day. Accordingly, all they had in charge to solicit was, that they might be allowed to continue in the enjoyment of that peace which was last entered into with the consul Caius Lutatius. When the praetor, according to the custom handed down from their ancestors, had given the fathers permission to ask the ambassadors any questions they might be pleased to put, and the older members who had been present at the making of the treaties had put some one question and others another, the ambassadors declared that they were not old enough to recollect, for they were nearly all of them young men. Upon this every part of the senate-house resounded with exclamations, that with Carthaginian knavery men had been chosen to solicit a renewal of the old peace who did not recollect its terms.

After this, the ambassadors having been removed out of the senate-house, the senators began to be asked their opinions. Marcus Livius recommended, that Caius Servilius, the consul nearest home, should be sent for, that he might be present at the proceedings relative to the peace; for as it was impossible that any subject of deliberation could occur of greater importance than the present, he did not see how it could be discussed, consistently with the dignity of the Roman people, in the absence of one or both of the consuls. Quintus Metellus, who three years before had been consul, and had filled the office of dictator, said that, since Publius Scipio, by destroying the armies and by devastating the lands of the enemy, had reduced them to such a state that they were compelled as supplicants to sue for peace; and as no one could estimate with more truth the intentions with which it was solicited, than he who was prosecuting the war before the gates of Carthage; the peace should be rejected or adopted on the advice of none other than Scipio. Marcus Valerius Laevinus, who had been twice consul, endeavoured to show that those who had come were spies, and not ambassadors; that they ought to be ordered to depart from Italy; that guards should be sent with them to their very ships, and that Scipio should be written to not to relax in prosecuting the war. Laelius and Fulvius added, that Scipio had grounded his hopes of effecting a peace on Hannibal and Mago not being recalled from Italy. He considered that the Carthaginians would practise every species of dissimulation, in expectation of the arrival of those generals and their armies, and then, forgetful of all treaties, however recent, and all gods, would proceed with the war. For these reasons they were the more disposed to adopt the opinion of Laevinus. The ambassadors were dismissed without having accomplished the peace, and almost without an answer.

About the same time Cneius Servilius, the consul, not doubting but that he should enjoy the glory of having restored Italy to a state of peace, pursued Hannibal, whom he considered had fled before him, and crossed over into Sicily, with the intention of proceeding thence into Africa. As soon as this became known at Rome, at first the fathers gave it as their opinion, that the praetor should inform the consul by letter that the senate thought it proper that he should return into Italy; but afterwards, the praetor declaiming that he would not heed his letter, Publius Sulpicius, who was created dictator for this very purpose, recalled the consul to Italy, in virtue of his superior authority. The remainder of the year he employed in conjunction with Marcus Servilius, his master of the horse, in going round to the cities of Italy, which had been alienated from the Romans during the war, and in taking cognizance of the cases of each. During the time of the truce, Lentulus the praetor sent over into Africa, from Sardinia, a hundred transports with stores, under a convoy of twenty ships of war, without meeting with any injury either from the enemy or storms. The same good fortune did not attend Cneius Octavius, while crossing over from Sicily with two hundred transports and thirty men of war. Having experienced a prosperous voyage until he arrived almost within sight of Africa, at first the wind dropped, but afterwards changing to the south-west, it dispersed his ships in every direction. He himself with the ships of war, having struggled through the opposing billows by the extraordinary exertions of his rowers, made the promontory of Apollo. The greater part of the transports were driven to Aegimurus, an island filling the mouth of the bay on which Carthage stands, and about thirty miles from the city; the rest were driven on shore directly opposite the city, near the warm baths. The whole occurrence was within sight of Carthage, and, accordingly, the people ran in crowds to the forum, from every part of the city. The magistrates summoned the senate, and the people were yelling in the vestibule of the senate-house, lest so great a booty should escape from their hands and their sight. Though some urged as an objection the obligation imposed upon them by having solicited peace, and others the restraint occasioned by the existence of a truce, the period of which had not yet expired, it was agreed in an assembly, made up almost of a mixture of the senate and people, that Hasdrubal should cross over to Aegimurus with fifty ships, and, proceeding thence, pick up the Roman ships scattered along the coasts and in the different ports. First the transports from Aegimurus, and then those from the baths, abandoned by the crews, were towed to Carthage.

The ambassadors had not as yet returned from Rome, nor was it known whether the Roman senate had pronounced in favour of peace or war; nor as yet had the period of the truce expired. Scipio, therefore, considering that the malignity of their offence was heightened by the fact, that, though they had solicited peace and a truce, they had cut off all hopes of the former and violated the latter, immediately despatched Lucius Baebius, Lucius Sergius, and Lucius Fabius, as ambassadors to Carthage. These, having narrowly escaped violence from the assembled multitude, and perceiving that they would be exposed to similar danger on their return, requested of the magistrates, by whose aid they had been protected from violence, to send ships to escort them. Two triremes were assigned them, which, when they had come to the river Bagradas, whence the Roman camp could be seen, returned to Carthage. The Carthaginian fleet was stationed at Utica, and from this three quadriremes were despatched, which suddenly attacked the Roman quinquereme from the main sea, while doubling the promontory, either owing to a message sent from Carthage that this should be done, or that Hasdrubal, who commanded the fleet, perpetrated the atrocity without public connivance. But neither could they strike it with their beaks from the rapidity with which it evaded them, nor could the fighting men board the higher from lower vessels. The quinquereme was gallantly defended as long as their weapons lasted; but these failing, and there being now nothing which could save them but the nearness of the land, and the multitude which had poured out from the camp upon the shore, they communicated a rapid motion to the vessel by means of their oars, and running her against the shore with all the force they could, they escaped themselves without injury, and only lost the vessel. Thus when the truce had been unequivocally violated by repeated acts of villany, Laelius and Fulvius arrived from Rome with the Carthaginian ambassadors. Scipio told them, that although the Carthaginians had not only broken their faith pledged in the truce, but had also violated the laws of nations in the persons of his ambassadors, yet he would not in their case do any thing unworthy of the maxims of the Roman people or his own principles; after saying which, he dismissed the ambassadors and prepared for war. When Hannibal was now drawing near land, one of the sailors, who was ordered to climb the mast to see what part of the country they were making, said the prow pointed toward a demolished sepulchre, when Hannibal, recognising the inauspicious omen, ordered the pilot to steer by that place, and putting in his fleet at Leptis, landed his forces there.

Such were the transactions in Africa this year. Those which followed extended themselves into that year in which Marcus Servilius Geminus, who was then master of the horse and Tiberius Claudius Nero were consuls. However, at the close of the former year, deputies from the allied states in Greece having arrived with complaints that their lands had been devastated by the king's garrisons, and that their ambassadors, who had gone into Macedonia to demand restitution had not been admitted into the presence of Philip; and having also brought information that four thousand men were said to have been conveyed over into Africa, under the conduct of Sopater, to assist the Carthaginians, and that a considerable quantity of money had been sent with them; the senate resolved that ambassadors should be sent to the king to inform him that the fathers considered that these acts were contrary to the treaty. The persons sent were Caius Terentius Varro, Caius Mamilius, and Marcus Aurelius. Three quinqueremes were assigned to them. This year was rendered remarkable by a most extensive fire, by which the buildings on the Publician hill were burned to the ground, and by the greatness of the floods. But still provisions were cheap, not only because, as it was a time of peace, supplies could be obtained from every part of Italy, but also because Marcus Valerius Falto and Marcus Fabius Buteo, the curule aediles, distributed to the people, so much for each street, at the rate of fourassesa bushel, a great quantity of corn which had been sent out of Spain. The same year died Quintus Fabius Maximus at an advanced age, if, indeed, it be true that he was augur sixty-two years, which some historians relate. He was a man unquestionably worthy of the high surname which he bore, even had it begun with him. He surpassed the honours of his father, and equalled those of his grandfather. His grandfather, Rullus, was distinguished by a greater number of victories and more important battles; but one antagonist like Hannibal is sufficient to counterbalance them all. He was esteemed rather cautious than spirited; and though it may be questioned whether he was naturally dilatory, or whether he adopted that kind of conduct because it was peculiarly suited to the war which he was carrying on, yet nothing can be more clear that he was that one man who by his delay retrieved our affairs, as Ennius says. Quintus Fabius Maximus, his son, was consecrated augur in his room. In the room of the same, for he held two priesthoods, Servius Sulpicius Galba was consecrated pontiff. The Roman games were repeated for one day, the plebeian were thrice repeated entire by the aediles, Marcus Sextius Sabinus and Cneius Tremellius Flaccus. Both these were elected praetors, and with them Caius Livius Salinator and Caius Aurelius Cotta. The difference in the accounts of historians renders it uncertain whether Caius Servilius the consul presided in the elections this year, or Publius Sulpicius, nominated dictator by him, because business detained him in Etruria; being engaged, according to a decree of the senate, in making inquisitions respecting the conspiracies of the principal inhabitants.

In the beginning of the following year, Marcus Servilius and Tiberius Claudius, having assembled the senate, consulted them respecting the provinces. As both were desirous of having Africa, they wished Italy and Africa to be disposed of by lots; but, principally in consequence of the exertions of Quintus Metellus, Africa was neither assigned to any one nor withheld. The consuls were ordered to make application to the tribunes of the people, to the effect, that, if they thought proper, they should put it to the people to decide whom they wished to conduct the war in Africa. All the tribes nominated Publius Scipio. Nevertheless, the consuls put the province of Africa to the lot, for so the senate had decreed. Africa fell to the lot of Tiberius Claudius, who was to cross over into Africa with a fleet of fifty ships, all quinqueremes, and have an equal command with Scipio. Marcus Servilius obtained Etruria. Caius Servilius was continued in command in the same province, in case the senate resolved that the consul should remain at the city. Of the praetors, Marcus Sextus obtained Gaul; which province, together with two legions, Publius Quinctilius Varus was to deliver to him; Caius Livius obtained Bruttium, with the two legions which Publius Sempronius, the proconsul, had commanded the former year; Cneius Tremellius had Sicily, and was to receive the province and two legions from Publius Villius Tappulus, a praetor of the former year; Villius, as propraetor, was to protect the coast of Sicily with twenty men of war, and a thousand soldiers; and Marcus Pomponius was to convey thence to Rome one thousand five hundred soldiers, with the remaining twenty ships. The city jurisdiction fell to Caius Aurelius Cotta; and the rest of the praetors were continued in command of the respective provinces and armies which they then had. Not more than sixteen legions were employed this year in the defence of the empire. And, that they might have the gods favourably disposed towards them in all their undertakings and proceedings, it was ordered that the consuls, before they set out to the war, should celebrate those games, and sacrifice those victims of the larger sort, which, in the consulate of Marcus Claudius Marcellus and Titus Quinctius, Titus Manlius, the dictator, had vowed, provided the commonwealth should continue in the same state for the next five years. The games were exhibited in the circus during four days, and the victims sacrificed to those deities to whom they had been vowed.

Meanwhile, hope and anxiety daily and simultaneously increased; nor could the minds of men be brought to any fixed conclusion, whether it was a fit subject for rejoicing, that Hannibal had now at length, after the sixteenth year, departed from Italy, and left the Romans in the unmolested possession of it, or whether they had not greater cause to fear, from his having transported his army in safety into Africa. They said that the scene of action certainly was changed, but not the danger. That Quintus Fabius, lately deceased, who had foretold how arduous the contest would be, was used to predict, not without good reason, that Hannibal would prove a more formidable enemy in his own country than he had been in a foreign one; and that Scipio would have to encounter not Syphax, a king of undisciplined barbarians, whose armies Statorius, a man little better than a soldier's drudge, was used to lead; nor his father-in-law, Hasdrubal, that most fugacious general; nor tumultuary armies hastily collected out of a crowd of half-armed rustics, but Hannibal, born in a manner in the pavilion of his father, that bravest of generals, nurtured and educated in the midst of arms, who served as a soldier formerly, when a boy, and became a general when he had scarcely attained the age of manhood; who, having grown old in victory, had filled Spain, Gaul, and Italy, from the Alps to the strait, with monuments of his vast achievements; who commanded troops who had served as long as he had himself; troops hardened by the endurance of every species of suffering, such as it is scarcely credible that men could have supported; stained a thousand times with Roman blood, and bearing with them the spoils not only of soldiers but of generals. That many would meet the eyes of Scipio in battle who had with their own hands slain Roman praetors, generals, and consuls; many decorated with crowns, in reward for having scaled walls and crossed ramparts; many who had traversed the captured camps and cities of the Romans. That the magistrates of the Roman people had not then so many fasces as Hannibal could have carried before him, having taken them from generals whom he had slain. While their minds were harassed by these apprehensions, their anxiety and fears were further increased from the circumstance, that, whereas they had been accustomed to carry on war for several years, in different parts of Italy, and within their view, with languid hopes, and without the prospect of bringing it to a speedy termination, Scipio and Hannibal had stimulated the minds of all, as generals prepared for a final contest. Even those persons whose confidence in Scipio and hopes of victory were great, were affected with anxiety, increasing in proportion as they saw their completion approaching. The state of feeling among the Carthaginians was much the same; for, when they turned their eyes on Hannibal, and the greatness of his achievements, they repented having solicited peace; but when again they reflected that they had been twice defeated in a pitched battle, that Syphax had been made prisoner, that they had been driven out of Spain and Italy, and that all this had been effected by the valour and conduct of Scipio alone, they regarded him with horror, as a general marked out by destiny, and born, for their destruction.

Hannibal had by this time arrived at Adrumetum; from which place, after employing a few days there in refreshing his soldiers, who had suffered from the motion by sea, he proceeded by forced marches to Zama, roused by the alarming statements of messengers, who brought word, that all the country around Carthage was filled with armed troops. Zama is distant from Carthage a five days' journey. Some spies, whom he sent out from this place, being intercepted by the Roman guard, and brought before Scipio, he directed that they should be handed over to the military tribunes, and after having been desired fearlessly to survey every thing, to be conducted through the camp wherever they chose; then, asking them whether they had examined every thing to their satisfaction, he assigned them an escort, and sent them back to Hannibal. Hannibal received none of the circumstances which were reported to him with feelings of joy; for they brought word that, as it happened, Masinissa had joined the enemy that very day, with six thousand infantry and four thousand horse; but he was principally dispirited by the confidence of his enemy, which, doubtless, was not conceived without some ground. Accordingly, though he himself was the originator of the war, and by his coming had upset the truce which had been entered into, and cut off all hopes of a treaty, yet concluding that more favourable terms might be obtained if he solicited peace while his strength was unimpaired, than when vanquished, he sent a message to Scipio, requesting permission to confer with him. I have no means of affirming whether he did this on his own spontaneous suggestion, or by the advice of his state. Valerius Antias says, that after having been beaten by Scipio in a battle, in which twelve thousand armed men were slain, and one thousand seven hundred made prisoners, he came himself with ten other deputies into the camp to Scipio. However, as Scipio did not decline the proposal for a conference, both the generals, by concert, brought their camps forward in order to facilitate their meeting by shortening the distance. Scipio took up his position not far from the city Naragara, in a situation convenient not only for other purposes, but also because there was a watering place within a dart's throw. Hannibal took possession of an eminence four miles thence, safe and convenient in every respect, except that he had a long way to go for water. Here, in the intermediate space, a place was chosen, open to view from all sides, that there might be no opportunity for treachery.

Their armed attendants having retired to an equal distance, they met, each attended by one interpreter, being the greatest generals not only of their own times, but of any to be found in the records of the times preceding them, and equal to any of the kings or generals of any nation whatever. When they came within sight of each other they remained silent for a short time, thunderstruck, as it were, with mutual admiration. At length Hannibal thus began: "Since fate hath so ordained it, that I, who was the first to wage war upon the Romans, and who have so often had victory almost within my reach, should voluntarily come to sue for peace, I rejoice that it is you, above all others, from whom it is my lot to solicit it. To you, also, amid the many distinguished events of your life, it will not be esteemed one of the least glorious, that Hannibal, to whom the gods had so often granted victory over the Roman generals, should have yielded to you; and that you should have put an end to this war, which has been rendered remarkable by your calamities before it was by ours. In this also fortune would seem to have exhibited a disposition to sport with events, for it was when your father was consul that I first took up arms; he was the first Roman general with whom I engaged in a pitched battle; and it is to his son that I now come unarmed to solicit peace. It were indeed most to have been desired, that the gods should have put such dispositions into the minds of our fathers, that you should have been content with the empire of Italy, and we with that of Africa: nor, indeed, even to you, are Sicily and Sardinia of sufficient value to compensate you for the loss of so many fleets, so many armies, so many and such distinguished generals. But what is past may be more easily censured than retrieved. In our attempts to acquire the possessions of others we have been compelled to fight for our own; and not only have you had a war in Italy, and we also in Africa, but you have beheld the standards and arms of your enemies almost in your gates and on your walls, and we now, from the walls of Carthage, distinctly hear the din of a Roman camp. What, therefore, we should most earnestly deprecate, and you should most devoutly wish for, is now the case: peace is proposed at a time when you have the advantage. We who negotiate it are the persons whom it most concerns to obtain it, and we are persons whose arrangements, be they what they will, our states will ratify. All we want is a disposition not averse from peaceful counsels. As far as relates to myself, time, (for I am returning to that country an old man which I left a boy,) and prosperity, and adversity, have so schooled me, that I am more inclined to follow reason than fortune. But I fear your youth and uninterrupted good fortune, both of which are apt to inspire a degree of confidence ill comporting with pacific counsels. Rarely does that man consider the uncertainty of events whom fortune hath never deceived. What I was at Trasimenus, and at Cannae, that you are this day. Invested with command when you had scarcely yet attained the military age, though all your enterprises were of the boldest description, in no instance has fortune deserted you. Avenging the death of your father and uncle, you have derived from the calamity of your house the high honour of distinguished valour and filial duty. You have recovered Spain, which had been lost, after driving thence four Carthaginian armies. When elected consul, though all others wanted courage to defend Italy, you crossed over into Africa; where having cut to pieces two armies, having at once captured and burnt two camps in the same hour; having made prisoner Syphax, a most powerful king, and seized so many towns of his dominions and so many of ours, you have dragged me from Italy, the possession of which I had firmly held for now sixteen years. Your mind, I say, may possibly be more disposed to conquest than peace. I know the spirits of your country aim rather at great than useful objects. On me, too, a similar fortune once shone. But if with prosperity the gods would also bestow upon us sound judgment, we should not only consider those things which have happened, but those also which may occur. Even if you should forget all others, I am myself a sufficient instance of every vicissitude of fortune. For me, whom a little while ago you saw advancing my standards to the walls of Rome, after pitching my camp between the Anio and your city, you now behold here, bereft of my two brothers, men of consummate bravery, and most renowned generals, standing before the walls of my native city, which is all but besieged, and deprecating, in behalf of my own city, those severities with which I terrified yours. In all cases, the most prosperous fortune is least to be depended upon. While your affairs are in a favourable and ours in a dubious state, you would derive honour and splendour from granting peace; while to us who solicit it, it would considered as necessary rather than honourable. A certain peace is better and safer than a victory in prospect; the former is at your own disposal, the latter depends upon the gods. Do not place at the hazard of a single hour the successes of so many years. When you consider your own strength, then also place before your view the power of fortune, and the fluctuating nature of war. On both sides there will be arms, on both sides human bodies. In nothing less than in war do events correspond (with men's calculations). Should you be victorious in a battle, you will not add so much to that renown which you now have it in your power to acquire by granting peace, as you will detract from it should any adverse event befall you. The chance of a single hour may at once overturn the honours you have acquired and those you anticipate. Every thing is at your own disposal in adjusting a peace; but, in the other case, you must be content with that fortune which the gods shall impose upon you. Formerly, in this same country, Marcus Atilius would have formed one among the few instances of good fortune and valour, if, when victorious, he had granted a peace to our fathers when they requested it; but by not setting any bounds to his success, and not checking good fortune, which was elating him, he fell with a degree of ignominy proportioned to his elevation. It is indeed the right of him who grants, and not of him who solicits it, to dictate the terms of peace; but perhaps we may not be unworthy to impose upon ourselves the fine. We do not refuse that all those possessions on account of which the war was begun should be yours; Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, with all the islands lying in any part of the sea, between Africa and Italy. Let us Carthaginians, confined within the shores of Africa, behold you, since such is the pleasure of the gods, extending your empire over foreign nations, both by sea and land. I cannot deny that you have reason to suspect the Carthaginian faith, in consequence of their insincerity lately in soliciting a peace and while awaiting the decision. The sincerity with which a peace will be observed, depends much, Scipio, on the person by whom it is sought. Your senate, as I hear, refused to grant a peace in some measure because the deputies were deficient in respectability. It is I, Hannibal, who now solicit peace; who would neither ask for it unless I believed it expedient, nor will I fail to observe it for the same reason of expedience on account of which I have solicited it. And in the same manner as I, because the war was commenced by me, brought it to pass that no one regretted it till the gods began to regard me with displeasure; so will I also exert myself that no one may regret the peace procured by my means."

In answer to these things the Roman general spoke nearly to the following effect: "I was aware that it was in consequence of the expectation of your arrival, that the Carthaginians violated the existing faith of the truce and broke off all hope of a peace. Nor, indeed, do you conceal the fact; inasmuch as you artfully withdraw from the former conditions of peace every concession except what relates to those things which have for a long time been in our own power. But as it is your object, that your countrymen should be sensible how great a burden they are relieved from by your means, so it is incumbent upon me to endeavour that they may not receive, as the reward of their perfidy, the concessions which they formerly stipulated, by expunging them now from the conditions of the peace. Though you do not deserve to be allowed the same conditions as before, you now request even to be benefited by your treachery. Neither did our fathers first make war respecting Sicily, nor did we respecting Spain. In the former case the danger which threatened our allies the Mamertines, and in the present the destruction of Saguntum, girded us with just and pious arms. That you were the aggressors, both you yourselves confess, and the gods are witnesses, who determined the issue of the former war, and who are now determining and will determine the issue of the present according to right and justice. As to myself, I am not forgetful of the instability of human affairs, but consider the influence of fortune, and am well aware that all our measures are liable to a thousand casualties. But as I should acknowledge that my conduct would savour of insolence and oppression, if I rejected you on your coming in person to solicit peace, before I crossed over into Africa, you voluntarily retiring from Italy, and after you had embarked your troops; so now, when I have dragged you into Africa almost by manual force, notwithstanding your resistance and evasions, I am not bound to treat you with any respect. Wherefore, if in addition to those stipulations on which it was considered that a peace would at that time have been agreed upon, and what they are you are informed, a compensation is proposed for having seized our ships, together with their stores, during a truce, and for the violence offered to our ambassadors, I shall then have matter to lay before my council. But if these things also appear oppressive, prepare for war, since you could not brook the conditions of peace." Thus, without effecting an accommodation, when they had returned from the conference to their armies, they informed them that words had been bandied to no purpose, that the question must be decided by arms, and that they must accept that fortune which the gods assigned them.

When they had arrived at their camps, they both issued orders that their soldiers should get their arms in readiness, and prepare their minds for the final contest; in which, if fortune should favour them, they would continue victorious, not for a single day, but for ever. "Before to-morrow night," they said, "they would know whether Rome or Carthage should give laws to the world; and that neither Africa nor Italy, but the whole world, would be the prize of victory. That the dangers which threatened those who had the misfortune to be defeated, were proportioned to the rewards of the victors." For the Romans had not any place of refuge in an unknown and foreign land, and immediate destruction seemed to await Carthage, if the troops which formed her last reliance were defeated. To this important contest, the day following, two generals, by far the most renowned of any, and belonging to two of the most powerful nations in the world, advanced, either to crown or overthrow, on that day, the many honours they had previously acquired. Their minds, therefore, were agitated with the opposite feelings of hope and fear; and while they contemplated at one time their own troops, at another those of their enemy, estimating their powers more by sight than by reason, they saw in them at once the grounds for joy and grief. Those circumstances which did not occur to the troops themselves spontaneously, their generals suggested by their admonitions and exhortations. The Carthaginian recounted his achievements in the land of Italy during sixteen years the many Roman generals and armies annihilated, reminding each individually of the honours he had acquired as he came to any soldier who had obtained distinction in any of his battles. Scipio referred to Spain, the recent battles in Africa and the enemy's own confession, that they could not through fear but solicit peace, nor could they, through their inveterate perfidy, abide by it. In addition to this he gave what turn he pleased to his conference with Hannibal, which was held in private, and was therefore open to misrepresentation. He augured success that the gods had exhibited the same omens to them on going out to battle on the present occasion, as they had to their fathers when they fought at the islands Aegates. He told them that the termination of the war, and their hardships, had arrived; that they had within their grasp the spoils of Carthage, and the power of returning home to their country, their parents, their children, their wives, and their household gods. He delivered these observations with a body so erect, and with a countenance so full of exultation, that one would have supposed that he had already conquered. He then drew up his troops, posting the hastati in front, the principes behind them, and closing his rear line with the triarii.

He did not draw up his cohorts in close order, but each before their respective standards; placing the companies at some distance from each other, so as to leave a space through which the elephants of the enemy passing might not at all break their ranks. Laelius, whom he had employed before as lieutenant-general, but this year as quaestor, by special appointment, according to a decree of the senate, he posted with the Italian cavalry in the left wing, Masinissa and the Numidians in the right. The open spaces between the companies of those in the van he filled with velites, which then formed the Roman light-armed troops, with an injunction, that on the charge of the elephants they should either retire behind the files, which extended in a right line, or, running to the right and left and placing themselves by the side of those in the van, afford a passage by which the elephants might rush in between weapons on both sides. Hannibal, in order to terrify the enemy, drew up his elephants in front, and he had eighty of them, being more than he had ever had in any battle; behind these his Ligurian and Gallic auxiliaries, with Balearians and Moors intermixed. In the second line he placed the Carthaginians, Africans, and a legion of Macedonians; then, leaving a moderate interval, he formed a reserve of Italian troops, consisting principally of Bruttians, more of whom had followed him on his departure from Italy by compulsion and necessity than by choice. His cavalry also he placed in the wings, the Carthaginian occupying the right, the Numidian the left. Various were the means of exhortation employed in an army consisting of a mixture of so many different kinds of men; men differing in language, customs laws, arms, dress, and appearance, and in the motives for serving. To the auxiliaries, the prospect both of their present pay, and many times more from the spoils, was held out. The Gauls were stimulated by their peculiar and inherent animosity against the Romans. To the Ligurians the hope was held out of enjoying the fertile plains of Italy, and quitting their rugged mountains, if victorious. The Moors and Numidians were terrified with subjection to the government of Masinissa, which he would exercise with despotic severity. Different grounds of hope and fear were represented to different persons. The view of the Carthaginians was directed to the walls of their city, their household gods, the sepulchres of their ancestors, their children and parents, and their trembling wives; they were told, that either the destruction of their city and slavery or the empire of the world awaited them; that there was nothing intermediate which they could hope for or fear. While the general was thus busily employed among the Carthaginians, and the captains of the respective nations among their countrymen, most of them employing interpreters among troops intermixed with those of different nations, the trumpets and cornets of the Romans sounded; and such a clamour arose, that the elephants, especially those in the left wing, turned round upon their own party, the Moors and Numidians. Masinissa had no difficulty in increasing the alarm of the terrified enemy, and deprived them of the aid of their cavalry in that wing. A few, however, of the beasts which were driven against the enemy, and were not turned back through fear, made great havoc among the ranks of the velites, though not without receiving many wounds themselves; for when the velites, retiring to the companies, had made way for the elephants, that they might not be trampled down, they discharged their darts at them, exposed as they were to wounds on both sides, those in the van also keeping up a continual discharge of javelins; until, driven out of the Roman line by the weapons which fell upon them from all quarters, these elephants also put to flight even the cavalry of the Carthaginians posted in their right wing. Laelius, when he saw the enemy in disorder, struck additional terror into them in their confusion.

Back to Index Next