25
Next day, the gates having at first been shut, and afterwards suddenly thrown open, in consequence of a body of Attalus's troops from Aegina, and the Romans from Piraeeus, having entered the city, the king removed his camp to the distance of about three miles. From thence he proceeded to Eleusis, in hopes of surprising the temple, and a fort which overlooks and surrounds it; but, finding that the watches had not been neglected, and that the fleet was coming from Piraeeus to support them, he laid aside the design, and led his troops, first to Megara, and then to Corinth; where, on hearing that the council of the Achaeans was then sitting at Argos, he went and joined the assembly, unexpected by the Achaeans. They were at the time consulting about a war against Nabis, tyrant of the Lacedaemonians; who, on the command being transferred from Philopoemen to Cycliades, a general by no means his equal, perceiving that the confederates of the Achaeans were falling off, had renewed the war, was ravaging the territories of his neighbours, and had become formidable even to the cities. While they were deliberating what number of men should be raised out of each of the states to oppose this enemy, Philip promised that he would relieve them of that care, as far as concerned Nabis and the Lacedaemonians; and that he would not only secure the lands of their allies from devastation, but transfer the whole terror of the war on Laconia itself, by leading his army thither instantly. This discourse being received with general approbation, he added,--"It is but reasonable, however, that while I am employed in protecting your property by my arms, my own should not be deprived of protection; therefore, if you think proper, provide such a number of troops as will be sufficient to secure Orcus, Chalcis, and Corinth; that my affairs being in a state of safety behind me, I may without anxiety make war on Nabis and the Lacedaemonians." The Achaeans were not ignorant of the tendency of this so kind promise, and of his proffered assistance against the Lacedaemonians; that his purpose was to draw the Achaean youth out of Peloponnesus as hostages, in order to implicate the nation in a war with the Romans. Cycliades, the Achaean praetor, thinking that it was irrelevant to develope the matter by argument, said nothing more than that it was not allowable, according to the laws of the Achaeans, to take any matters into consideration except those on which they had been called together: and the decree for levying an army against Nabis being passed, he dismissed the assembly, after having presided in it with much resolution and public spirit, and until that day having been reckoned among the partisans of the king. Philip, disappointed in a high expectation, after having collected a few voluntary soldiers, returned to Corinth, and from thence into the territories of Athens.
26
In those days in which Philip was in Achaia, Philocles, one of the king's generals, marching from Euboea with two thousand Thracians and Macedonians, in order to lay waste the territories of the Athenians, crossed the forest of Cithaeron opposite to Eleusis. Despatching half of his troops, make depredations in all parts of the country, he himself lay concealed with the remainder in a place convenient for an ambush; in order that, if any attack should be made from the fort at Eleusis on his men employed in plundering, he might suddenly fall upon the enemy unawares, and while they were in disorder. His stratagem did not escape discovery: wherefore calling back the soldiers, who had gone different ways in pursuit of booty, and drawing them up in order, he advanced to assault the fort at Eleusis; but being repulsed from thence with many wounds, he formed a junction with Philip on his return from Achaia. The storming of this fort was also attempted by the king in person: but the Roman ships coming from Piraeeus, and a body of forces thrown into the fort, compelled him to relinquish the design. On this the king, dividing his army, sent Philocles with one part to Athens, and went himself with the other to Piraeeus; that, while his general, by advancing to the walls and threatening an assault, might keep the Athenians within the city, he might be able to make himself master of the harbour, when left with only a slight garrison. But he found the attack of Piraeeus no less difficult than that of Eleusis, the same persons for the most part acting in its defence. He therefore hastily led his troops to Athens, and being repulsed by a sudden sally of both foot and horse, who engaged him in the narrow ground, enclosed by the half-ruined wall, which, with two arms, joins Piraeus to Athens, he desisted from the assault of the city, and, dividing his forces again with Philocles, set out to complete the devastation of the country. As, in his former ravages, he had employed himself in levelling the sepulchres round the city, so now, not to leave any thing unviolated, he ordered the temples of the gods, of which they had one consecrated in every village, to be demolished and burned. The country of Attica afforded ample matter for the exercise of this barbarous rage: being highly embellished with works of that kind, having plenty of indigenous marble, and abounding with artists of exquisite ingenuity. Nor was he satisfied with merely destroying the temples themselves, and overthrowing the images, but he ordered even the stones to be broken, lest, remaining whole, they should give stateliness to the ruins; and then, his rage not being satiated, but no object remaining on which it could be exercised, he retired from the country of the enemy into Boeotia, without having performed in Greece any thing else worth mention.
27
The consul, Sulpicius, who was at that time encamped; on the river Apsus, between Apollonia and Dyrrachium, having ordered Lucius Apustius, lieutenant-general, thither, sent him with part of the forces to lay waste the enemy's territory. Apustius, after ravaging the frontiers of Macedonia, and having, at the first assault, taken the forts of Corragos, Gerrunios, and Orgessos, came to Antipatria, a city situated in a narrow gorge; where, at first inviting the leading men to a conference, he endeavoured to entice them to commit themselves to the good faith of the Romans; but finding that from confidence in the size, fortifications, and situation of their city, they paid no regard to his discourse, he attacked the place by force of arms, and took it by assault: then, putting all the young men to death, and giving up the entire spoil to his soldiers, he razed the walls and burned the city. This proceeding spread such terror, that Codrion, a strong and well-fortified town, surrendered to the Romans without a struggle. Leaving a garrison there, he took Ilion by force, a name better known than the town, on account of that of the same name in Asia. As the lieutenant-general was returning to the consul with a great quantity of spoil, Athenagoras, one of the king's generals, falling on his extreme rear, in its passage over a river, threw the hindmost into disorder. On hearing the shouting and tumult, Apustius rode back in full speed, ordered the troops to face about, and drew them up in order, arranging the baggage in the centre. The king's troops could not support the onset of the Roman soldiers, many of them were slain, and more made prisoners. The lieutenant-general, having brought back the army without loss to the consul, was despatched immediately to the fleet.
28
The war commencing thus brilliantly with this successful expedition, several petty kings and princes, neighbours of the Macedonians, came to the Roman camp: Pleuratus, son of Scerdilaedus, and Amynander, king of the Athamanians; and from the Dardanians, Bato, son of Longarus. This Longarus had, in his own quarrel, supported a war against Demetrius, father of Philip. To their offers of aid, the consul answered, that he would make use of the assistance of the Dardanians, and of Pleuratus, when he should lead his troops into Macedonia. To Amynander he allotted the part of exciting the Aetolians to war. To the ambassadors of Attalus, (for they also had come at the same time,) he gave directions that the king should wait at Aegina, where he wintered, for the arrival of the Roman fleet; and when joined by that, he should, as before, harass Philip with attacks by sea. To the Rhodians, also, an embassy was sent, to engage them to contribute their share towards carrying on the war. Nor was Philip, who had by this time arrived in Macedonia, remiss in his preparations for the campaign. He sent his son Perseus, then very young, with part of his forces to block up the pass near Pelagonia, appointing persons out of the number of his friends to direct his inexperienced age. Sciathus and Peparethus, no inconsiderable cities, he demolished, lest they should become a prey and prize to the enemy's fleet; despatching at the same time ambassadors to the Aetolians, lest that restless nation might change sides on the arrival of the Romans.
29
The assembly of the Aetolians, which they call Panaetolium, was to meet on a certain day. In order to be present at this, the king's ambassadors hastened their journey, and Lucius Furius Purpureo also arrived, deputed by the consul. Ambassadors from the Athenians, likewise, came to this assembly. The Macedonians were first heard, as with them the latest treaty had been made; and they declared, that as no change of circumstances had occurred, they had nothing new to introduce: for the same reasons which had induced them to make peace with Philip, after experiencing the unprofitableness of an alliance with the Romans, should engage them to preserve it now that it was established. "Do you rather choose," said one of the ambassadors, "to imitate the inconsistency, or levity, shall I call it, of the Romans, who ordered this answer to be given to your ambassadors at Rome: 'Why, Aetolians, do you apply to us, when, without our approbation, you have made peace with Philip?' Yet these same people now require that you should, in conjunction with them, wage war against Philip. Formerly, too, they pretended that they took arms on your account, and in your defence against Philip: now they do not allow you to continue at peace with him. To assist Messana, they first embarked for Sicily; and a second time, that they might redeem Syracuse to freedom when oppressed by the Carthaginians. Both Messana and Syracuse, and all Sicily, they hold in their own possession, and have reduced it into a tributary province under their axes and rods. You imagine, perhaps, that in the same manner as you hold an assembly at Naupactus, according to your own laws, under magistrates created by yourselves, at liberty to choose allies and enemies, and to have peace or war at your own option, so the assembly of the states of Sicily is summoned, to Syracuse, or Messana, or Lilybaeum. No, a Roman praetor presides at the meeting; summoned by his command they assemble; they behold him, attended by his lictors seated on a lofty throne, issuing his haughty edicts. His rods are ready for their backs, his axes for their necks, and every year they are allotted a different master. Neither ought they nor can they, wonder at this, when they see all the cities of Italy bending under the same yoke,--Rhegium, Tarentum Capua, not to mention those in their own neighbourhood, out of the ruins of which their city of Rome grew into power. Capua indeed subsists, the grave and monument of the Campanian people, that entire people having been either cut off or driven into banishment; the mutilated carcass of a city, without senate, without commons, without magistrates; a sort of prodigy, the leaving which to be inhabited, showed more cruelty than if it had been utterly destroyed. If foreigners who are separated from us to a greater distance by their language, manners, and laws, than by the distance by sea and land, are allowed to get footing here, it is madness to hope that any thing will continue in its present state. Does the sovereignty of Philip seem in any degree incompatible with your freedom, who, at a time when he was justly incensed against you, demanded nothing more of you than peace; and at present requires no more than the observance of the peace which he agreed to? Accustom foreign legions to these countries, and receive the yoke; too late, and in vain, will you look for Philip as an ally, when you shall have the Roman as a master. Trifling causes occasionally unite and disunite the Aetolians, Acarnanians, and Macedonians, men speaking the same language. With foreigners, with barbarians, all Greeks have, and ever will have, eternal war: because they are enemies by nature, which is always the same, and not from causes which change with the times. My discourse shall conclude with the same argument with which it began. Three years since, the same persons, assembled in this same place, determined on peace with the same Philip, contrary to the inclinations of the same Romans, who now wish that the peace should be broken, after it has been adjusted and ratified. In the subject of your deliberation, fortune has made no change; why you should make any, I do not see."
30
Next, after the Macedonians, with the consent and at the desire of the Romans, the Athenians were introduced; who, having suffered grievously, could, with the greater justice, inveigh against the cruelty and inhumanity of the king. They represented, in a deplorable light, the miserable devastation and spoliation of their fields; adding, that "they did not complain on account of having, from an enemy, suffered hostile treatment; for there were certain rights of war, according to which, as it was just to act, so it was just to endure. Their crops being burned, their houses demolished, their men and cattle carried off as spoil, were to be considered rather as misfortunes to the sufferer than as ill-treatment. But of this they had good reason to complain, that he who called the Romans foreigners and barbarians, had himself so atrociously violated all rights, both divine and human, as, in his former inroad, to have waged an impious war against the infernal gods, in the latter, against those above. That the sepulchres and monuments of all within their country had been demolished, the graves laid open, and the bones left unprotected by the soil. There had been several temples, which, in former times, when their ancestors dwelt in the country in their separate districts, had been consecrated in each of their little forts and villages, and which, even after they were incorporated into one city, they did not neglect or forsake. That around all these temples Philip had scattered his destructive flames, and left the images of the gods lying scorched and mutilated among the prostrated pillars of their fanes. Such as he had rendered the country of Attica, formerly opulent and adorned, such, if he were suffered, would he render Aetolia and the whole of Greece. That the mutilation of their own city, also, would have been similar, if the Romans had not come to its relief: for he had shown the same wicked rage against the gods who are the guardians of the city, and Minerva who presides over the citadel; the same against the temple of Ceres at Eleusis; the same against Jupiter and Minerva at Piraeeus. In a word, having been repelled by force of arms not only from their temples, but even from their walls, he had vented his fury on those sacred edifices which were protected by religion alone. They therefore entreated and besought the Aetolians, that, compassionating the Athenians, and with the immortal gods for their leaders, and, under them, the Romans, who, next to the gods, possessed the greatest power they would take part in the war."
31
The Roman ambassador then replied: "The Macedonians first, and afterwards the Athenians, have obliged me to change entirely the method of my discourse. For, on the one hand, the Macedonians, by aggressively introducing charges against the Romans, when I had come prepared to make complaint of the injuries committed by Philip against so many cities in alliance with us, have obliged me to think of defence rather than accusation; and, on the other hand, what have the Athenians, after relating his inhuman and impious crimes against the gods both celestial and infernal, left for me, or any one else, which I can further urge against him. You are to suppose, that the same complaints are made by the Cianians, Abydenians, Aeneans, Maronites, Thasians, Parians, Samians, Larissenians, Messenians, on the side of Achaia; and complaints, still heavier and more grievous, by those whom he had it more in his power to injure. For as to those proceedings which he censures in us, if they are not deserving of honour, I will admit that they cannot be defended at all. He has objected to us, Rhegium, and Capua, and Syracuse. As to Rhegium, during the war with Pyrrhus, a legion which, at the earnest request of the Rhegians themselves, we had sent thither as a garrison, wickedly possessed themselves of the city which they had been sent to defend. Did we then approve of that deed? or did we exert the force of our arms against that guilty legion, until we reduced them under our power; and then, after making them give satisfaction to the allies, by their stripes and the loss of their heads, restore to the Rhegians their city, their lands, and all their effects, together with their liberty and laws? To the Syracusans, when oppressed, and that by foreign tyrants, which was a still greater indignity, we lent assistance; and after enduring great fatigues in carrying on the siege of so strong a city, both by land and sea, for almost three years, (although the Syracusans themselves chose to continue in slavery to the tyrants rather than be taken to us,) yet, becoming masters of the place, and by exertion of the same force setting it at liberty, we restored it to the inhabitants. At the same time, we do not deny that Sicily is our province, and that the states which sided with the Carthaginians, and, in conjunction with them, waged war against us, pay us tribute and taxes; on the contrary, we wish that you and all nations should know, that the condition of each is such as it has deserved at our hands: and ought we to repent of the punishment inflicted on the Campanians, of which even they themselves cannot complain? These men, after we had on their account carried on war against the Samnites for near seventy years, with great loss on our side; had united them to ourselves, first by treaty, and then by intermarriages, and the relationships arising thence; and lastly, by the right of citizenship; yet, in the time of our adversity, were the first of all the states of Italy which revolted to Hannibal, after basely putting our garrison to death, and afterwards, through resentment at being besieged by us, sent Hannibal to attack Rome. If neither their city nor one man of them had been left remaining, who could take offence, or consider them as treated with more severity than they had deserved? From consciousness of guilt, greater numbers of them perished by their own hands, than by the punishments inflicted by us. And while from the rest we took away the town and the lands, still we left them a place to dwell in, we suffered the city which partook not of the guilt to stand uninjured; so that he who should see it this day would find no trace of its having been besieged or taken. But why do I speak of Capua, when even to vanquished Carthage we granted peace and liberty? The greatest danger is, that, by our too great readiness to pardon the conquered, we may encourage others to try the fortune of war against us. Let so much suffice in our defence, and against Philip, whose domestic crimes, whose parricides and murders of his relations and friends, and whose lust, more disgraceful to human nature, if possible, than his cruelty, you, as being nearer to Macedonia, are better acquainted with. As to what concerns yourselves, Aetolians, we entered into a war with Philip on your account: you made peace with him without consulting us. Perhaps you will say, that while we were occupied in the Punic war, you were constrained by fear to accept terms of pacification, from him who at that time possessed superior power; and that on our side, pressed by more urgent affairs we suspended our operations in a war which you had laid aside. At present, as we, having, by the favour of the gods brought the Punic war to a conclusion, have fallen on Macedonia with the whole weight of our power, so you have an opportunity offered you of regaining a place in our friendship and alliance, unless you choose to perish with Philip, rather than to conquer with the Romans."
32
When these things had been said by the ambassador the minds of all leaning towards the Romans, Damocritus, praetor of the Aetolians, (who, it was reported, had received money from the king,) assenting in no degree to one party or the other, said,--that "in consultations of great and critical importance, nothing was so injurious as haste. That repentance, indeed, generally followed, and that quickly but yet too late and unavailing; because designs carried on with precipitation could not be recalled, nor matters brought back to their original state. The time, however, for determining the point under consideration, which, for his part, he thought should not be too early, might yet immediately be fixed in this manner. As it had been provided by the laws, that no determination should be made concerning peace or war, except in the Panaetolic or Pylaic councils; let them immediately pass a decree, that the praetor, when he chooses to treat respecting war and peace, may have full authority to summon a council, and that whatever shall be then debated and decreed, shall be, to all intents and purposes, legal and valid, as if it had been transacted in the Panaetolic or Pylaic assembly." And thus dismissing the ambassadors, with the matter undetermined, he said, that therein he had acted most prudently for the interest of the state; for the Aetolians would have it in their power to join in alliance with whichever of the parties should be more successful in the war. Such were the proceedings in the council of the Aetolians.
33
Meanwhile Philip was making vigorous preparations for carrying on the war both by sea and land. His naval forces he drew together at Demetrias in Thessaly; supposing that Attalus, and the Roman fleet, would move from Aegina in the beginning of the spring. He gave the command of the fleet and of the sea-coast to Heraclides, to whom he had formerly intrusted it. The equipment of the land forces he took care of in person; considering that he had deprived the Romans of two powerful auxiliaries, the Aetolians on the one side and the Dardanians on the other, by making his son Perseus block up the pass at Pelagonia. The consul was employed, not in preparations, but in the operations of war. He led his army through the country of the Dassaretians, conveying the corn untouched which he had brought from his winter quarters, for the fields afforded supplies sufficient for the consumption of the troops. The towns and villages surrendered to him, some through inclination, others through fear; some were taken by assault, others were found deserted, the barbarians flying to the neighbouring mountains. He fixed a standing camp at Lycus near the river Bevus, and from thence sent to bring in corn from the magazines of the Dassaretians. Philip saw the whole country filled with consternation, and not knowing the designs of the consul, he sent a party of horse to discover whither he was directing his course. The same state of uncertainty possessed the consul; he knew that the king had moved from his winter quarters, but in what direction he had proceeded he knew not: he also had sent horsemen to gain intelligence. These two parties, having set out from opposite quarters, after wandering a long time among the Dassaretians, through unknown roads, fell at length into the same track. Neither doubted, as soon as the noise of men and horses was heard at a distance, that the enemy was approaching, therefore, before they came within sight of each other, they got their arms in readiness, nor, when they saw their foe, was there any delay in engaging. As they happened to be nearly equal in number and valour, being picked men on both sides, they fought during several hours with vigour, until fatigue, both of men and horses, put an end to the fight, without deciding the victory. Of the Macedonians there fell forty horsemen; of the Romans thirty-five. Still, however, neither did the one party carry back to the king, nor the other to the consul, any certain information in what quarter the camp of his enemy lay. But this was soon made known to them by deserters, whom their recklessness of disposition supplies in all wars in sufficient number to discover the affairs of the contending parties.
34
Philip, judging that he should make some progress towards conciliating the affections of his men, and induce them to face danger more readily on his account, if he bestowed some pains on the burial of the horsemen who fell in that expedition, ordered them to be conveyed into the camp, in order that all might be spectators of the honours paid them at their funeral. Nothing is so uncertain, or so difficult to form a judgment of, as the minds of the multitude. That which seems calculated to increase their alacrity, in exertions of every sort, often creates in them fear and inactivity. Accordingly, those who, being always accustomed to fight with Greeks and Illyrians, had only seen wounds made with javelins and arrows, seldom even by lances, came to behold bodies dismembered by the Spanish sword, some with their arms lopped off, with the shoulder or the neck entirely cut through, heads severed from the trunk, and the bowels laid open, with other frightful exhibitions of wounds: they therefore perceived, with horror, against what weapons and what men they were to fight. Even the king himself was seized with apprehensions, having never yet engaged the Romans in a regular battle. Wherefore, recalling his son, and the guard posted at the pass of Pelagonia, in order to strengthen his army by the addition of those troops, he thereby opened a passage into Macedonia for Pleuratus and the Dardanians. Then, taking deserters for guides, he marched towards the enemy with twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse, and at the distance of somewhat more than a thousand paces from the Roman camp, and near Ithacus, he fortified a hill with a trench and rampart. From this place, taking a view of the Roman station in the valley beneath, he is said to have been struck with admiration, both at the general appearance of the camp, and the regular disposition of each particular part; then with the disposition of the tents, and the intervals of the passages; and to have declared, that, certainly, that could not be regarded by any as the camp of barbarians. For two days, the consul and the king, each waiting for the other's making some attempt, kept their troops within the ramparts. On the third day, the Roman led out all his forces, and offered battle.
35
But the king, not daring to risk so hastily a general engagement, sent four hundred Trallians, who are a tribe of the Illyrians, as we have said in another place, and three hundred Cretans; adding to this body of infantry an equal number of horse, under the command of Athenagoras, one of his nobles honoured with the purple, to make an attack on the enemy's cavalry. When these troops arrived within a little more than five hundred paces, the Romans sent out the light infantry, and two cohorts of horse, that both cavalry and infantry might be equal in number to the Macedonians. The king's troops expected that the method of fighting would be such as they had been accustomed to; that the horsemen, pursuing and retreating alternately, would at one time use their weapons, at another time turn their backs; that the agility of the Illyrians would be serviceable for excursions and sudden attacks, and that the Cretans might discharge their arrows against the enemy, as they advanced eagerly to the charge. But the onset of the Romans, which was not more vigorous than persevering, entirely disconcerted this method of fighting: for the light infantry, as if they were fighting with their whole line of battle, after discharging their javelins, carried on a close fight with their swords; and the horsemen, when they had once made a charge, stopping their horses, fought, some on horseback, while others dismounted and intermixed themselves with the foot. By this means neither were the king's cavalry, who were unaccustomed to a steady fight, a match for the others; nor were the infantry, who were only skirmishing and irregular troops, and were besides but half covered with the kind of harness which they used, at all equal to the Roman infantry, who carried a sword and buckler, and were furnished with proper armour, both to defend themselves and to annoy the enemy: nor did they sustain the combat, but fled to their camp, trusting entirely to their speed for safety.
36
After an interval of one day, the king, resolving to make an attack with all his forces of cavalry and light-armed infantry, had, during the night, placed in ambush, in a convenient place between the two camps, a body of targeteers, whom they call Peltastae, and given orders to Athenagoras and the cavalry, if they found they had the advantage in the open fight, to pursue their success; if otherwise, that they should retreat leisurely, and by that means draw on the enemy to the place where the ambush lay. The cavalry accordingly did retreat; but the officers of the body of targeteers, by bringing forward their men before the time, and not waiting for the signal, as they ought, lost an opportunity of performing considerable service. The Romans, having gained the victory in open fight, and also escaped the danger of the ambuscade, retired to their camp. Next day the consul marched out with all his forces, and offered battle, placing his elephants in the front of the foremost battalions. Of this resource the Romans then for the first time availed themselves; having a number of them which had been taken in the Punic war. Finding that the enemy kept himself quiet behind his intrenchments, he advanced close up to them, upbraiding him with cowardice; and as, notwithstanding, no opportunity of an engagement was afforded, the consul, considering how dangerous foraging must be while the camps lay so near each other, where the cavalry were ready at any moment to attack the soldiers, when dispersed through the country, removed his camp to a place called Ortholophus, distant about eight miles, where by reason of the intervening distance he could forage with more safety. While the Romans were collecting corn in the adjacent fields, the king kept his men within the trenches, in order to increase both the negligence and confidence of the enemy. But, when he saw them scattered, he set out with all his cavalry, and the auxiliary Cretans, and marching with such speed that the swiftest footmen could, by running, but just keep up with the horse, he planted his standards between the camp of the Romans and their foragers. Then, dividing the forces, he sent one part of them in quest of the marauders, with orders to leave not one alive; with the other, he himself halted, and placed guards on the roads through which the enemy seemed likely to fly back to their camp. And now carnage and flight prevailed in all directions, and no intelligence of the misfortune had yet reached the Roman camp, because those who fled towards the camp fell in with the guards, which the king had stationed to intercept them, and greater numbers were slain by those who were placed in the roads, than by those who had been sent out to attack them. At length, a few effected their escape, through the midst of the enemy's posts, but were so filled with terror, that they excited a general consternation in the camp, rather than brought intelligible information.
37
The consul, ordering the cavalry to carry aid to those who were in danger, in the best manner they could, drew out the legions from the camp, and led them drawn up in a square towards the enemy. The cavalry, taking different ways through the fields, missed the road, being deceived by the various shouts raised in several quarters. Some of them met with the enemy, and battles began in many places at once. The hottest part of the action was at the station where the king commanded; for the guard there was, in numbers both of horse and foot, almost a complete army; and, as they were posted on the middle road, the greatest number of the Romans fell in with them. The Macedonians had also the advantage in this, that the king himself was present to encourage them; and the Cretan auxiliaries, fighting in good order, and in a state of preparation, against troops disordered and irregular, wounded many at a distance, where no such danger was apprehended. If they had acted with prudence in the pursuit, they would have secured an advantage of great importance, not only in regard to the glory of the present contest, but to the general interest of the war; but, greedy of slaughter, and following with too much eagerness, they fell in with the advanced cohorts of the Romans under the military tribunes. The horsemen who were flying, as soon as they saw the ensigns of their friends, faced about against the enemy, now in disorder; so that in a moment's time the fortune of the battle was changed, those now turning their backs who had lately been the pursuers. Many were slain in close fight, many in the pursuit; nor was it by the sword alone that they perished; several, being driven into morasses, were, together with their horses, swallowed up in the deep mud. The king himself was in danger; for his horse falling, in consequence of a wound, threw him headlong to the ground, and he very narrowly escaped being overpowered while prostrate. He owed his safety to a trooper, who instantly leaped down and mounted the affrighted king on his horse; himself, as he could not on foot keep up with the flying horsemen, was slain by the enemy, who had collected about the place where Philip fell. The king, in his desperate flight, rode about among the morasses, some of which were easily passed, and others not; at length, when most men despaired of his ever escaping in safety, he arrived in safety at his camp. Two hundred Macedonian horsemen perished in that action; about one hundred were taken: eighty horses, richly caparisoned, were led off the field; at the same time the spoils of arms were also carried off.
38
There were some who found fault with the king, as guilty of rashness on that day; and with the consul, for want of energy. For Philip, they say, on his part, ought to have avoided coming to action, knowing that in a few days the enemy, having exhausted all the adjacent country, must be reduced to the extremity of want; and that the consul, after having routed the Macedonian cavalry and light infantry, and nearly taken the king himself, ought to have led on his troops directly to the enemy's camp, where, dismayed as they were, they would have made no stand, and that he might have finished the war in a moment's time. This, like most other matters, was easier to be talked about than to be done. For, if the king had brought the whole of his infantry into the engagement, then, indeed, during the tumult, and while, vanquished and struck with dismay, they fled from the field into their intrenchments, (and even continued their flight from thence on seeing the victorious enemy mounting the ramparts,) the king might have been deprived of his camp. But as some forces of infantry had remained in the camp, fresh and free from fatigue, with outposts before the gates, and guard properly disposed, what would he have done but imitated the rashness of which the king had just now been guilty, by pursuing the routed horse? On the other side, the king's first plan of an attack on the foragers, while dispersed through the fields, would not have been a subject of censure, could he have satisfied himself with a moderate degree of success: and it is the less surprising that he should have made a trial of fortune, as there was a report, that Pleuratus and the Dardanians had set out from home with very numerous forces, and had already passed into Macedonia; so that if he should be surrounded on all sides by these forces, there was reason to think that the Roman might put an end to the war without stirring from his seat. Philip, however, considered, that after his cavalry had been defeated in two engagements, he could with much less safety continue in the same post; accordingly, wishing to remove from thence, and, at the same time, to keep the enemy in ignorance of his design, he sent a herald to the consul a little before sun-set, to demand a truce for the purpose of burying the horsemen; and thus imposing on him, he began his march in silence, about the second watch, leaving a number of fires in all parts of his camp.
39
The consul was now taking refreshment, when he was told that the herald had arrived, and on what business; he gave him no other answer, than that he should be admitted to an audience early the next morning: by which means Philip gained what he wanted--the length of that night, and part of the following day, during which he might get the start on his march. He directed his route towards the mountains, a road which he knew the Romans with their heavy baggage would not attempt. The consul, having, at the first light, dismissed the herald with a grant of a truce, in a short time after discovered that the enemy had gone off; but not knowing what course to take in pursuit of them, he remained in the same camp for several days, which he employed in collecting forage. He then marched to Stubera, and brought thither, from Pelagonia, the corn that was in the fields. From thence he advanced to Pluvina, not having yet discovered to what quarter the Macedonian had bent his course. Philip, having at first fixed his camp at Bryanium, marched thence through cross-roads, and gave a sudden alarm to the enemy. The Romans, on this, removed from Pluvina, and pitched their camp near the river Osphagus. The king also sat down at a small distance, forming his intrenchment on the bank of a river which the inhabitants call Erigonus. Having there received certain information that the Romans intended to proceed to Eordaea, he marched away before them, in order to take possession of the defiles, and prevent the enemy from making their way, where the roads are confined in narrow straits. There, with great haste, he fortified some places with a rampart, others with a trench, others with stones heaped up instead of walls, others with trees laid across, according as the situation required, or as materials lay convenient; and thus a road, in its own nature difficult, he rendered, as he imagined, impregnable by the works which he drew across every pass. The adjoining ground, being mostly covered with woods, was exceedingly incommodious to the phalanx of the Macedonians, which is of no manner of use, except when they extend their very long spears before their shields, forming as it were a palisade; to perform which, they require an open plain. The Thracians, too, were embarrassed by their lances, which also are of a great length, and were entangled among the branches that stood in their way on every side. The body of Cretans alone was not unserviceable; and yet even these, though, in case of an attack made on them, they could to good purpose discharge their arrows against the horses or riders, where they were open to a wound, yet against the Roman shields they could do nothing, because they had neither strength sufficient to pierce through them, nor was there any part exposed at which they could aim. Perceiving, therefore, that kind of weapon to be useless, they annoyed the enemy with stones, which lay in plenty in all parts of the valley: the strokes made by these on their shields, with greater noise than injury, for a short time retarded the advance of the Romans; but quickly disregarding these missiles also, some, closing their shields in form of a tortoise, forced their way through the enemy in front; others having, by a short circuit, gained the summit of the hill, dislodged the dismayed Macedonians from their guards and posts, and even slew the greater part of them, their retreat being embarrassed by the difficulties of the ground.
40
Thus, with less opposition than they had expected to meet, the defiles were passed, and they came to Eordaea; then, having laid waste the whole country, the consul withdrew into Elimea. From thence he made an irruption into Orestis, and attacked the city Celetrum, situated in a peninsula: a lake surrounds the walls; and there is but one entrance from the main land along a narrow isthmus. Relying on their situation, the townsmen at first shut the gates, and refused to submit; but afterwards, when they saw the troops in motion, and advancing in the tortoise method, and the isthmus covered by the enemy marching in, they surrendered in terror rather than hazard a struggle. From Celetrum he advanced into the country of the Dassaretians, took the city Pelium by storm, carried off the slaves with the rest of the spoil, and discharging the freemen without ransom, restored the city to them, after placing a strong garrison in it, for it was very conveniently situated for making inroads into Macedonia. Having thus traversed the enemy's country, the consul led back his forces into those parts which were already reduced to obedience near Apollonia, from whence the campaign had commenced. Philip's attention had been drawn to other quarters by the Aetolians, Athamanians, and Dardanians: so many were the wars that started up on different sides of him. Against the Dardanians, who were now retiring out of Macedonia, he sent Athenagoras with the light infantry and the greater part of the cavalry, and ordered him to hang on their rear as they retreated; and, by cutting off their hindmost troops, make them more cautious for the future of leading out their armies from home. As to the Aetolians, Damocritus, their praetor, the same who at Naupactum had persuaded them to defer passing a decree concerning the war, had in the next meeting roused them to arms, after the report of the battle between the cavalry at Ortholophus; the irruption of the Dardanians and of Pleuratus, with the Illyrians, into Macedonia; of the arrival of the Roman fleet, too, at Oreus; and that Macedonia, besides being beset on all sides by so many nations, was in danger of being invested by sea also.
41
These reasons had brought back Damocritus and the Aetolians to the interest of the Romans. Marching out, therefore, in conjunction with Amynander, king of the Athamanians, they laid siege to Cercinium. The inhabitants here had shut their gates, whether of their own choice or by compulsion is unknown, as they had a garrison of the king's troops. However, in a few days Cercinium was taken and burned; and after great slaughter had been made, those who survived, both freemen and slaves, were carried off amongst other spoil. This caused such terror, as made all those who dwelt round the lake Baebius abandon their cities and fly to the mountains: and the Aetolians, in the absence of booty, turned away from thence, and proceeded into Perrhaebia. There they took Cyretiae by storm and sacked it unmercifully. The inhabitants of Mallaea, making a voluntary submission, were received into alliance. From Perrhaebia, Amynander advised to march to Gomphi, because that city lies close to Athamania, and there was reason to think that it might be reduced without any great difficulty. But the Aetolians, for the sake of plunder, directed their march to the rich plains of Thessaly. Amynander following, though he did not approve either of their careless method of carrying on their depredations, or of their pitching their camp in any place which chance presented, without choice, and without taking any care to fortify it. Therefore, lest their rashness and negligence might be the cause of some misfortune to himself and his troops, when he saw them forming their camp in low grounds, under the city Phecadus, he took possession, with his own troops, of an eminence about five hundred paces distant, which could be rendered secure by a slight fortification. The Aetolians seemed to have forgotten that they were in an enemy's country, excepting that they continued to plunder, some straggling about half-armed, others spending whole days and nights alike in drinking and sleeping in the camp, neglecting even to fix guards, when Philip unexpectedly came upon them. His approach being announced by those who had fled out of the fields in a fright, Damocritus and the rest of the officers were thrown into great confusion. It happened to be mid-day, and when most of the men after a hearty meal lay fast asleep. Their officers roused them, however, as fast as possible; ordered them to take arms; despatched some to recall those who were straggling through the fields in search of plunder; and so violent was their hurry, that many of the horsemen went out without their swords, and but few of them put on their corslets. After marching out in this precipitate manner, (the whole horse and foot scarcely making up six hundred,) they met the king's cavalry, superior in number, in spirit, and in arms. They were, therefore, routed at the first charge; and having scarcely attempted resistance, returned to the camp in shameful flight. Several were slain; and some taken, having been cut off from the main body of the fugitives.
42
Philip, when his troops had advanced almost to the rampart, ordered a retreat to be sounded, because both men and horses were fatigued, not so much by the action, as at once by the length of their march, and the extraordinary celerity with which they had made it. He therefore despatched the horsemen by troops, and the companies of light infantry in turn, to procure water and take refreshment. The rest he kept on guard, under arms, waiting for the main body of the infantry, which had marched with less expedition, on account of the weight of their armour. As soon as these arrived, they also were ordered to fix their standards, and, laying down their arms before them, to take food in haste; sending two, or at most three, out of each company, to provide water. In the mean time the cavalry and light infantry stood in order, and ready, in case the enemy should make any movement. The Aetolians, as if resolved to defend their fortifications, (the multitude which had been scattered about the fields having, by this time, returned to the camp,) posted bodies of armed men at the gates, and on the rampart, and from this safe situation looked with a degree of confidence on the enemy, as long as they continued quiet. But, as soon as the troops of the Macedonians began to move, and to advance to the rampart, in order of battle, and ready for an assault, they all quickly abandoned their posts, and fled through the opposite part of the camp, to the eminence where the Athamanians were stationed. During their flight in this confusion, many of the Aetolians were slain, and many made prisoners. Philip doubted not that, had there been daylight enough remaining, he should have been able to make himself master of the camp of the Athamanians also; but the day having been spent in the fight, and in plundering the camp afterwards, he sat down under the eminence, in the adjacent plain, determined to attack the enemy at the first dawn of the following day. But the Aetolians, under the same apprehensions which had made them desert their camp, dispersed, and fled during the following night. Amynander was of the greatest service; for, by his directions, the Athamanians, who were acquainted with the roads, conducted them into Aetolia, whilst the Macedonians pursued them over the highest mountains, through unknown paths. In this disorderly flight, a few, missing their way, fell into the hands of the Macedonian horsemen, whom Philip, at the earliest dawn, on seeing the eminence abandoned, had sent to harass the marching body of the enemy.