Map VII.—Poelcappelle, 20th September 1917.mapThe attack was launched in the grey of the morning at 5.40A.M.In the first phase strong resistance was encountered in and in front of Pheasant Trench. On the right “A” and “B” companies of the 9th Royal Scots were engaged with rifle and machine-gun fire from the start. “A” company assisted by “C” Company, whose real objective was the dotted Blue line, advanced with the greatest skill and gallantry, moving from shell-hole to shell-hole in twos and threes, pouring into the German trenches rifle grenades and rifle fire. By this means they gained their objective, and enabled the advance to the dotted Blue line to be continued.On the left, where “B” Company 9th Royal Scots, followed by “D” Company (dotted Blue line), was engaged, Pheasant Trench was occupied in the centre of the company front almost at once. The left two platoons of the company front reached the trench, but were heavily engaged by machine-gun fire, and returned to our lines. Thereupon the company commander, the battalion intelligence officer, and the artillery liaison officer rapidly reorganised the men, and led them forward again, accompanied by some of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who were destined for the capture of the Blue line. Assisted by the platoon which had already gained a footing in Pheasant Trench, and which fought its way along the trench to its left flank, this party captured its objective. The gallantry and initiative of these officers and men bore important results, as had Pheasant Trench not been captured, the whole attack of the left battalion would have been held up, and the final objective could not have been reached. It was a typical example of that combination of tactical skill and gallantry which contributed so much towards the success of the Division.The 4th Seaforth Highlanders on the left also encountered serious resistance, and hand-to-hand fighting developed in which they completely outmatched the Boches. It was in Pheasant Trench between Point 85 and the Lekkerboterbeek that they experienced the fiercest fighting. Here the trench was very strongly held, with newly-constructed posts in front, some being as much as forty yards in advance of it. Machine-guns were fired from the tops of blockhouses, while bombs and rifle-fire came from the trench itself. The company detailed for the capture of the trench advanced by twos and threes from shell-hole to shell-hole, rifle grenades, Lewis guns and rifles being freely used. Meanwhile the company detailed for the capture of the dotted Blue line, seeing what was afoot, moved round and attacked Pheasant Trench from a flank. The advance culminated in hand-to-hand fighting, in which the 4th Seaforth Highlanders signally triumphed.Their left company was engaged by three machine-guns firing from Pheasant Trench and from a pill-box west of it. These were all knocked out, but not before thirty Germans had been killed who fought most gallantly round the pill-box.After the capture of Pheasant Trench the advance on the dotted Blue line was continued. “C” Company of the 9th Royal Scots had some hard fighting round Flora Cot, in which they killed fifteen Germans. Later they came under enfilade fire from machine-guns on Hubner Farm (300 yards south of the Divisional right boundary). The company commander immediately detached two Lewis guns and two rifle sections to deal with Hubner Farm. This detachment fought for twenty minutes, during which they inflicted such losses on the occupants of the farm that the 2/8 London Regiment was able to capture it frontally.On their left “D” Company of the 9th Royal Scots reached the Blue line successfully, but was much reduced in strength, having suffered serious casualties in the fighting round Pheasant Trench.The 4th Seaforth Highlanders had little difficulty in capturing the Blue dotted line, and in consolidating according to prearranged plan. Pheasant Trench on both battalion fronts was in some parts literally choked with dead. In one stretch of about 200 yards in the left sector alone 150 German bodies were counted. Many dead were also found amongst the garrisons of the enemy’s shell-hole posts, the artillery barrage having been most effective in this respect.When one remembers the amount of shells which had been deluged on the Germans in the Pheasant Trench position, one cannot but admire the resolute manner in which they resisted our attack. It was indeed the strengthof their resistance which made the capture of this line by the 4th Seaforths and 9th Royal Scots such a magnificent performance. One can gauge the severity of the fighting by the fact that so much rifle ammunition had been used by the infantry in this attack that 12,000 rounds had to be sent up to the parties consolidating the Blue line.The enemy’s barrage did not open until five minutes after the attack was launched, and was then particularly heavy on the area between our original front line and the Langemarck road.Both the battalions detailed for the capture of the Blue line, the 4th Gordon Highlanders and the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, had suffered serious casualties from having become involved in the fighting for Pheasant Trench before they formed up under the barrage. “D” Company of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had also suffered heavily from shell-fire when advancing from the old British front line.The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders reached the Blue line after having overcome, chiefly by means of rifle grenades, Flora Cot, Quebec Farm, and Bavaroise House, capturing four machine-guns, of which one was turned on the enemy with good results, and about thirty prisoners.The 4th Gordon Highlanders, who had already lost five officers before forming up under the barrage, had their first fight after the barrage moved forward at Pheasant Farm Cemetery. Here a lance-corporal was responsible for capturing two machine-guns and twenty-eight prisoners. Malta House, Bose House, and Delta House were all captured after stiff fighting, several machine-guns being destroyed.By the time the 4th Gordon Highlanders had reached the Blue line, they had only three officers and six platoons of about ten men each in the front line; the remainder of the reserve company with two officers was therefore sent up as a reinforcement.The situation on the left was a delicate one, as the neighbouring Division attacking on that flank had been unable to make progress, so that the two battalions on the left had between them to form a defensive flank some 1000 yards in depth. The Blue line was thus consolidated,as had been intended, as far as Rose House, and the line then bent round towards White House.The 9th Royal Scots reported that they could not supply the two platoons which they had been ordered to send to support the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders as counter-attack troops. Two platoons of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders therefore moved forward in their place. Of these only thirty men reached their destination owing to heavy casualties suffered in passing through the hostile barrage.Consolidation had not long been in progress before that series of enemy counter-attacks began which culminated in the late afternoon in a most determined assault backed by heavy masses.Our advance had not seriously threatened the enemy’s gun line; he was therefore able to employ his artillery fully throughout the operations. The valley of the Steenbeek was heavily and continuously shelled, and after the capture of the Blue line, the area subjected to heavy bombardment extended up to the Pheasant Trench Ridge and across the Stroombeek. In consequence many casualties were sustained by reserve troops, machine-gun teams, &c., moving forward, while heavy losses sustained by the runners made communication difficult.In these days a runner, if he was to survive, had to be a runner in the true sense of the word. Starting from his platoon or company headquarters, during a battle, he stood a good chance of being shot, particularly by that unpleasantly accurate weapon the telescopic-sighted machine-gun. As soon as he was clear of the bullet zone he then had to dodge the shells, the shell with the instantaneous fuze, since it had a missile effect of several hundred yards, being a particularly difficult one to avoid.Having delivered his message, he then had to return whence he came, and compete with the same risks on his return journey. The company and platoon runners were usually officers’ servants, and belonged to that class which an agitated Press described as able-bodied men doing menial work.It was not long before the enemy tested the strength of the defensive flank, and at 11.45A.M.he made a demonstration against the left of the 4th Gordon Highlanders.The defensive flank made short work of this attack. At 12.30P.M.he repeated the experiment, but in greater numbers. The defensive flank again wiped out the attack. Meanwhile, so as to strengthen the line, “A” Company of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were sent forward as reinforcements, and were disposed two platoons on a line from the Poelcappelle road through Pheasant Farm Cemetery to north of Delta Huts, two platoons just west of the Poelcappelle road in Stroom Trench.By this time Tank D44 had reached a point on the Poelcappelle road near Malta House, where it broke down. It was therefore taken into use as a company headquarters. One Lewis gun from it was sent forward to Delta House, two were sent to Beer Trench, and one was retained in the tank, while 200 rounds of ammunition were distributed from it to each man in Beer Trench. A corporal was also detailed to work the tank’s 6-pounder gun.Throughout the morning machine-guns had been taking up their prearranged positions. On the right two were in action at Bavaroise House, two a hundred yards in front of Flora Cot, two between the Steenbeek and New House. On the left four were in the vicinity of Pheasant Farm Cemetery, two at Malta House, and one at Rose House.During the afternoon, then, the Blue line was held along its length up to Rose House, where the line bent back forming a defensive flank, until touch was obtained with the Division on the left. The troops which had carried out the assault had been reinforced by two platoons of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and the bulk of the machine-guns had reached the positions allotted to them for consolidation.Meanwhile from the direction of Poelcappelle parties of the enemy moving from shell-hole to shell-hole in ones and twos were dribbling up through the afternoon towards the captured position, and concentrating for a counter-attack in dead ground. Further in rear, out of range of rifles and machine-guns, larger bodies of the enemy could be seen massing.At 5P.M.the counter-attack, accompanied by a barrage of unusual intensity, was fairly launched, the Houthulst, Poelcappelle, and Passchendaele groups of artillery all actively co-operating in support of the German infantry.On the right the 451st Infantry Brigade of the 234th German Division advanced between York House and Tweed House, but it never reached the Blue line. In fact, the attack carried out by the regiment was completely broken by our artillery, rifle, and machine-gun fire, the artillery in particular causing heavy losses.In the centre the 452nd Infantry Regiment of the 234th Division continued to attack, the 5th Grenadiers of the 36th Division and the 208th Division attacking on the battalion left flank. The attack was firmly held all along the line until the rifle and Lewis-gun ammunition, of which there had been an extraordinary expenditure, was exhausted. Rose House continued to hold out, but was isolated. After the front line had given, the three platoons of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders north of the Lekkerboterbeek held firm and broke up attack after attack, punishing the enemy severely. On their right, after every officer of the 4th Gordon Highlanders who had taken part in the initial attack had become a casualty, the small party in Beer Trench gave. Malta House was next overwhelmed, and the platoon garrisoning Stroom Trench was forced back.About 6P.M.a general withdrawal of the troops inside the V formed by the Poelcappelle road and the Lekkerboterbeek took place.During this withdrawal the local commanders, realising the necessity of reducing the area of the enemy penetration to a minimum, formed defensive flanks. On the right “C” Company 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, two platoons of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and “D” Company of the 9th Royal Scots; and on the left the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the 4th Seaforth Highlanders, were all so disposed as to pin the enemy into the V; in this position he was caught under enfilade fire from both flanks, and suffered heavily.Meanwhile the troops who had withdrawn from the V were rallied, and having collected ammunition from the dead and wounded, were led forward from Pheasant Trench. At the same time the company of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders which earlier had been sent forward to assist in countering any enemy counter-attack, also launched an attack from the same trench. This attackwas successful in clearing the enemy out of the angle of the V, and it left him with his farthest point of penetration about Point 82 on the Poelcappelle road.The front line was then reorganised so as to run from a point 500 yards north of Delta Huts through Pheasant Farm Cemetery on the south side of Point 82 to the Lekkerboterbeek, thence along the stream until it joined the original Blue line.As soon as it was dusk the remaining company of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders was brought up to reinforce the left, and consolidation was continued throughout the night.During the same night the Germans found that the 452nd Regiment which had penetrated the V had been so severely handled that it was necessary for them to be relieved. Accordingly the 371st Infantry Regiment from a fresh Division took over from them.The position remained substantially unaltered until the night of the 21-22nd, when the 152nd Infantry Brigade relieved the 154th.During the afternoon of 23rd September an intense barrage broke out all along the brigade front, culminating just after 7P.M.in a heavy German attack. This attack came from south of Poelcappelle towards the centre of the position.The enemy first advanced in great columns, and while extending to the south and east of Malta House, were caught in an artillery barrage and in the fire of Lewis guns and Vickers guns and rifles.As a result the attack melted away, and the morning disclosed the enemy’s dead strewn in heaps about Malta House. The right battalion, the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, had most opportunities of inflicting losses on the enemy, and fully availed itself of them. One company alone had five Lewis guns firing on the enemy at the same moment, of which one fired twenty-eight drums.Later the left battalion, the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, carried out some satisfactory shooting. On one occasion in the early morning they arose to find a platoon of forty strong, in marching order, advancing within close range of them. They immediately wiped it out. On another occasion they inflicted by enfilade fire such heavy losseson a storm trupp attempting to raid the 12th Battalion King’s Royal Rifles on their left that the survivors of the storm trupp, twenty-three in number, ran towards the King’s Royal Rifles with their hands up and surrendered.The total casualties to the Division during the operations were 45 officers and 1110 other ranks, the 154th Brigade, which carried out the attack, losing 32 officers and 891 other ranks, and the 4th Gordon Highlanders 12 officers.On 26th September the 152nd Infantry Brigade was relieved by the 32nd Infantry Brigade, 11th Division, and on the 27th the G.O.C., 11th Division, took over the command of the line.This battle affords an admirable illustration of the economic use of troops. It must be remembered that only five battalions were employed in the attack and subsequent counter-attacks; that these five battalions—though through want of ammunition they did not hold their entire gains—had established themselves for a while in their final objective, and had accounted for every German garrisoning the area allotted to them for attack. Moreover, these battalions were fighting not only facing their front, but also facing their left flank, as the Division on their left had not made equal progress in the attack. That it was possible for so few men to do what they did was due to two things: first, to the combination of gallantry and skill on the part of the men and the leadership and initiative on the part of the officers and N.C.O.’s. The men had been trained in the use of ground, movement supported by fire, and in platoon tactics in general, and they put what they had learned into practice from the outset of the attack. The enemy fought bravely, perhaps as bravely as our men, but he was outmatched in tactical skill, and was in consequence defeated.Secondly, the handling of the troops by the senior commanders was such as to forestall every move on the part of the enemy. It was anticipated that the enemy would do his utmost to prevent us from making ground towards Poelcappelle, and rightly so, for on the evening of the attack nine out of ten battalions massed against the XVIIIth Corps were directed against the 51st. The Divisional commander, having rightly appreciated the situation, solved absolutely the problems connected with the two importantfactors of time and space,—the problem of having the right number of troops at the right place at the right time. The reserve did not require to be moved after the enemy had disclosed his intentions; but his intentions were anticipated, so that in each case reserve troops (counter-counter-attack troops) were ready to deal with hostile enterprises. Thus the weak points in the line were strengthened before they were threatened and not after the line had been pierced, and the main counter-attack was delivered by the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders while the enemy’s troops were still on the move and before they had had time to reorganise or consolidate their gains. In fact, the Germans were on this occasion completely outmatched in generalship, leadership, tactical skill, and skill at arms.On the conclusion of these operations, the following messages were received:—1. From Lieut.-General Sir I. Maxse, K.C.B., D.S.O., commanding XVIIIth Corps.“Before the 51st (Highland) Division quits the XVIIIth Corps, I desire to express to its commander and to all ranks in the Division how highly I have appreciated their services throughout three months of strenuous fighting.“What has struck me most is the thoroughness of the organisation within the Division, and the fact that all usual war problems have been thought out beforehand, discussed in detail, and are embodied in simple doctrines well known to all ranks. The result is the Division fights with gallantry, and can be depended upon to carry out any reasonable task allotted to it in any battle. For this reason I venture to place it among the three best fighting Divisions I have met in France during the past three years.“Its record in this Corps comprises:—“(1)On 31st July 1917, a shattering assault on High Command Redoubt, the capture in their entirety of three separate systems of German defence lines, an advance of two miles in depth into hostile territory, and the consolidation and retention of the line of the river Steenbeek and all the objectives allotted to the Division.“(2)On the 20th September 1917, an assault on a sectorof the Langemarck-Gheluvelt line which had resisted capture for more than a month, an incursion into hostile territory, and the consolidation of important hills south-west of Poelcappelle and at Bavaroise House. The same afternoon these two hills were repeatedly attacked by five Prussian battalions, all of whom were defeated with sanguinary losses.“In conclusion, I wish good luck to all ranks, and hope to serve with them again in this war.”2. From General Sir H. de la P. Gough, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., commanding Fifth Army.“In bidding farewell to the Highland Division, the Army Commander wishes to express his great admiration for and appreciation of their splendid record during the fighting of the past two months.“Their fine advance, their gallant defence of ground, even against repeated enemy attacks, and the severe punishment they inflicted on the enemy during the last battle, will ever remain one of their proudest records, and has helped materially towards the enemy’s final defeat. He heartily wishes them all success in the future. Scotland for ever.”CHAPTER XIII.THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI.After relief in the Ypres salient the Division, less its artillery, moved to the VIth Corps area, with headquarters at Achiet le Petit. By 5th October, ten days after coming out of their last battle, the 154th and 153rd Brigades were back in the trenches in the Heninel-Wancourt sector, with Divisional headquarters at Boisleux au Mont.On this occasion the Division was for the first time introduced to the area which the Germans had wilfully devastated prior to their withdrawal from it to the Hindenburg line just before the battle of Arras.One cannot do better than allow a German newspaper, the ‘Local Anzeiger’ of 18th March 1917, to describe this area. It says: “In the course of these last months great stretches of French territory have been turned by us into a dead country. It varies in width from ten, twelve, to thirteen kilometres, and extends along the whole of our new positions. No village or farm was left standing, no road was left passable, no railway track or embankment was left in being. Where once were woods, there are gaunt rows of stumps; the wells have been blown up. In front of our new positions runs like a gigantic ribbon our Empire of Death.”One could not fail to appreciate the diabolical efficiency with which the work had been carried out. Where time had been too short to enable fruit-trees to be felled, their bark had been ringed. Wells before destruction had been turned into cess-pits. The effect on every unit on first entering the devastated area was the same. It produced a determination in all ranks to kill every German that it was possible to put out of the world with any degree ofdecency. By this wanton act of vandalism the Hun had turned himself, in the eyes of the British soldier, into a vermin fit only for extermination.“Our new positions” mentioned above were the Hindenburg Line. The Hindenburg Line was not a line in the true sense of the word, since, in addition to having length, it also had considerable breadth. It was, in fact, a highly-elaborated system of trenches running roughly from St. Quentin to just south of Arras. The trenches were skilfully sited, so as to have every advantage of observation; they were of immense breadth and depth; they contained numerous concrete machine-gun emplacements and dug-outs; they were connected with one another by underground tunnels; they were protected by tremendous belts of wire many yards in depth. Yet, in spite of the skill with which it had been constructed, several portions of the Hindenburg Line were twice captured by the British army.From this point onwards the Highland Division was so continuously involved in important operations that space cannot be given to detailed accounts of uneventful periods in quiet parts of the line. It must, however, be understood that uneventful is a relative term, and that even the quiet periods were often eventful enough for those in immediate contact with the enemy.As regards the sojourn in the Boisleux au Mont area, suffice it to say that all three brigades carried out tours of duty in the line there, and that the Division was relieved on 2nd November. On completion of this relief the Division moved to Hermaville, the infantry brigades being billeted at Warlus, Hautvillers, and Izel les Hameaux.Prior to taking over the line in this sector a change in command had taken place in the 154th Brigade. Brigadier-General J. G. H. Hamilton, D.S.O., who had commanded the brigade since General Stewart’s death in September 1916, gave up his command, and returned home for a period of rest. General Hamilton had come to the brigade from the command of a battalion, and had been with it through many trying ordeals, including Beaumont Hamel, Courcelette, Arras, and Ypres. By many of his officers, both senior and junior, he was regarded not only as their brigade commander, but also as an intimate friend, and his departure was in consequence keenly felt.He was succeeded by Brigadier-General K. G. Buchanan, D.S.O., Seaforth Highlanders. General Buchanan possessed not only consummate judgment in all matters of tactics, but also a charming personality, with the result that his brigade throughout the period of his command could be relied on to render a splendid account of itself. His coolness in action and his tactical instincts enabled him so to dispose his troops in the varying phases of a battle that they were always ready to meet any sudden emergency. Moreover, his personality was such that officers and men would at all times make any sacrifice to carry out what he asked of them. The magnificent resistance offered by the 154th Brigade on the right flank of the Division both in March and again in April of 1918 afford in themselves ample proof of General Buchanan’s powers as an infantry commander.The Division had not been long in rest in its new area before it transpired that it was again required to take part in active operations. The news that this was the case came rather as a shock, as the Division had already fought battles in the year 1917 on 9-12th April, 23-24th April, 16th May, 31st July-1st August, 20-23rd September, and had lost in casualties since 9th April 457 officers and 9966 other ranks—a total of 10,523.Moreover, the forthcoming operations were to be of an experimental nature, since the plan of attack was to attempt to break through the Hindenburg Line by employing a large number of tanks in an offensive which was to be a complete surprise.To quote Sir Douglas Haig’s despatch: “The object of these operations was to gain a local success at a point where the enemy did not expect it. Our repeated attacks in Flanders, and of our Allies elsewhere, had brought about large concentrations of the enemy’s forces on the threatened points, with a consequent reduction in the garrisons of certain other sectors of the line. Of these weakened sectors the Cambrai front had been selected as the most suitable for the surprise operations in contemplation.”In order to maintain this element of surprise up to the last moment, various measures had to be taken. In the first place, the Division was left in its present quarters in the neighbourhood of Hermaville, so as not to draw theattention of the enemy to the area to be attacked. For the same reason the usual full-sized replica of the enemy’s trenches was taped out west of the town of Arras, and all training took place in that area.Further, the Division was not allowed to take over the trenches from which it was to deliver the attack. It had therefore little opportunity for preliminary reconnaissances of the battle area, with the exception that parties of officers and N.C.O.’s daily visited the trenches to spy out the land. These parties were all clothed in trousers to prevent the enemy’s observers from suspecting the presence of the Highland Division in the neighbourhood of the position to be attacked.The Division was given every opportunity of practising the attack with tanks, the platoons carrying out their training with the actual tanks and crews which were to accompany them in the operations. It will be seen that, as usual, liaison was synonymous with success, and that on the day of the attack the co-operation between the tanks and the infantry was admirable.An additional difficulty lay in the fact that somehow or another the Division had to be concentrated in the battle area some thirty-six to forty-eight hours before the battle, so as to allow the troops adequate rest before proceeding to the assembly trenches.On this account the C.R.E. and the three field companies, R.E., with the 8th Royal Scots, moved to the IVth Corps area early in November to prepare hidden shelters in which the troops might be accommodated during this period. The sappers and pioneers worked with such effect that between the 2nd and 19th November camouflaged accommodation had been provided for 5500 men in the ruined village of Metz and for 4000 men in Havrincourt Wood. The necessary dumps of material were also formed by the C.R.E., tracks for moving guns forward prepared, and, as cavalry were also detailed to take part in the operations, six water points with a capacity for watering 7000 horses per hour were constructed. Forward routes for infantry were also laid out and advanced dressing stations completed; no mean record for a little over a fortnight’s work.All undertakings of this nature were made more difficult than usual by the fact that no increase in the normalamount of lorry traffic on the roads during the hours of daylight was allowed. Further, no new work was carried out in the forward area, in case it might be noticed by enemy airmen. As it turned out, the weather was fortunately cloudy and misty, so that observation from the air became practically impossible throughout the period of preparation.The area through which the Division was destined to advance was traversed by three separate trench systems, each forming integral parts of the Hindenburg system. Of these, the first, known as the Hindenburg front system, was composed of a maze of wide, heavily-wired trenches, supplemented by numerous saps, the whole presenting such a tangle of excavations that it was impossible to foretell accurately where the principle points of resistance were most likely to be found.The main framework of this front system was, however, composed of a lightly-held outpost line, a front line, and a support line.In rear of the front system, and just south of the village of Flesquières, lay the Hindenburg support system, composed of two lines of heavily-wired deep trenches, connected with each other and with the front system by numerous communication trenches.Four thousand yards in rear of the support system lay a third double line of trenches, south-west of the village of Cantaing. The area allotted to the Division was not uniform in shape, being in the Hindenburg front system 1500 yards in breadth, 2700 yards at the second system, 3500 yards at the third, and ending just north of the village of Fontaine Notre Dame at a breadth of 2200 yards.Our assembly trenches rested on the summit of a spur, from which the country gradually sloped down to the Grand Ravine, a feature which traversed the Divisional front just north of the Hindenburg front system.From here it switchbacked up to the village of Flesquières, thence it declined in a series of gentle undulations to Cantaing and Fontaine Notre Dame.Just west of Fontaine stood Bourlon Wood, a hanging wood on the summit and slopes of a spur, from which the whole country-side could be surveyed, and from which it was always difficult to hide.The position to be attacked was, in the first instance, divided into three main objectives: the Blue line, which included the Hindenburg front system and Chapel Trench; the Brown line, which included Flesquières and the Hindenburg support system; and the Red dotted line, which was the sunken road running from Marcoing to Graincourt.For the first phase, the plan was for the Division to attack on a two-brigade front, the 152nd Brigade on the right, the 153rd on the left. Each brigade was to work on a two-battalion front, the leading two battalions to take as far as the Blue line in the case of the 153rd Brigade, and the Grand Ravine in the case of the 152nd Brigade.The order of battle of the leading battalions from right to left was as follows: 5th Seaforth Highlanders, 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 6th Black Watch, 5th Gordon Highlanders. The remaining battalions of the two brigades were detailed for the capture of the Brown and Red dotted lines, the order of battle from right to left being 6th Gordon Highlanders, 6th Seaforth Highlanders, 7th Black Watch, 7th Gordon Highlanders.Each battalion taking part in the attack of the Blue line detailed two companies for the capture of the enemy front system up to Mole Trench, a third company to cross the Grand Ravine, while the fourth company was kept in reserve. The battalions detailed for the capture of the Brown and dotted Red lines allotted objectives to each of their four companies.For the first day’s fighting, seventy-two of the 1st Brigade Tank Corps were allotted to the Divisional front, of which seventy actually took part in the operation. One-half of the tanks, “E” Battalion, were allotted to 152nd Brigade, the other half, “D” Battalion, to the 153rd.They were divided into three waves. The first, formed of twelve “Rovers” or wire-crushers, moved forward at zero, 150 yards in advance of the second, to crush the wire protecting the enemy front and support trenches, and then to engage machine-guns and any special posts outside the main trenches. The second wave, formed of thirty-six “Fighting” tanks, dealt with the trenches up to and including the Blue line. The third, composed of all the remaining fighting tanks, was detailed to form up an hour and a half after zero just south of the Grand Ravine,and to proceed with the survivors of the first two to attack the Flesquières Ridge.The distribution was on the basis of one section of three tanks to a platoon frontage (i.e., about 150 yards). The general principle on which sections were to work was for the two outside tanks to cross a trench, turn alongside it and help to clear it, while the centre tanks carried on to the next trench, there to be joined by the two others as soon as the infantry had reached the first trench.However, in tackling a system which contained many crater posts and sap-heads, and which was thickly interlaced with short communication trenches and backed by many subsidiary trenches and detached posts, some modifications of the general principles were necessary.Special tasks were therefore given to many of the second wave sections of tanks, in which each tank was given some sap-head, crater post, or communication trench to deal with in addition to assailing the main trenches.Similarly, detailed instructions were given as to routes and individual objectives in the village fighting that was anticipated.Each tank carried on its back a huge fascine or faggot, resting on a giant pair of arms. A contrivance existed by which these arms raised the fascines off the back of the tank, and dropped them into any unusually wide trenches encountered, so as to form a stepping-stone, which enabled the tanks to keep their noses from dropping into the bottom of the trench.In spite of this precaution the Hindenburg Line was in some parts so broad and deep that a number of tanks were ditched in spite of the fascines.The first wave of the infantry followed the tanks at a distance of 150-200 yards, their orders being to assault immediately the tanks reached and opened fire on a trench. On reaching their objectives, the infantry marked with red strips of cloth the gaps in the wire, and filled in portions of the trenches to make crossing-places for subsequent tanks, cavalry, and artillery.Each tank carried for the use of the infantry Lewis gun drums, rifle ammunition, bombs, and rifle grenades.The field artillery supporting the attacks was divided into two groups, each composed of two field artillerybrigades and one R.H.A. brigade. Each brigade was supported by one of these groups, that containing 256th Brigade, R.F.A., being on the right and that containing 255th Brigade, R.F.A., on the left.One brigade of artillery covered each battalion front, while the 3rd Brigade of artillery covered its whole infantry brigade front. The fifteen 18-pounder batteries firing in the creeping barrage fired 33 per cent. of smoke shells, so as to screen the movement of the tanks.Two 4·5 howitzer batteries also kept a standing smoke barrage in front of Flesquières Ridge.No registration was carried out, so that the presence of fresh batteries in the area might not be disclosed. The whole of the firing was therefore carried out from the map and by calibration.The concentration of artillery, tanks, and infantry immediately behind the line from which the attack was to be launched was successfully effected between 17th and 19th November with great rapidity and complete secrecy, mainly under cover of darkness.The artillery was moved up on 17th November; the tanks were assembled on the night of 18th November in Havrincourt Wood, and travelled to their assembly positions in the early hours of the 20th. The infantry came into Metz on the evening of the 18th, and began taking over the line on the 19th.It must be borne in mind that a similar concentration of tanks, guns, and troops was taking place simultaneously on the fronts of Divisions on either flank. The fact that all the necessary moves took place, and that the troops were eventually formed up in the assembly trenches without any suspicions being aroused in the mind of the enemy, shows how admirably the arrangements for ensuring secrecy were carried out.A taped line was laid out in front of the assembly trenches to ensure that the main wave of tanks formed up on its proper alignment. By zero hour the bulk of them were on this line, while the remainder which had been delayed from one cause and another were crossing the British front line.The twelve “Rovers” were formed up beyond this line, the third wave being deployed behind the support line.The platoons to form the first two waves in the attack took over the line on the morning of the 19th, and thus had an opportunity of viewing the ground to their front. At midnight the remainder of the four leading battalions arrived in their assembly trenches.Before zero hour the four battalions for the later stages of the initial attack were assembled in rear of the trench area, with their leading platoons on the Charing Cross-Trescault road.As soon as darkness set in the platoons which had arrived first set to work to make causeways across their trenches for the passage of the tanks. They also freed the troops that were to assemble during the night from any chances of confusion and unnecessary fatigue by placing in position red lamps, flags, signboards, and markers to show routes and positions of platoons.Before zero hour all ranks were issued with a hot meal.Naturally considerable anxiety was felt, as it was feared that the noise of the engines of the assembling tanks might be heard by the enemy and cause him to open a heavy bombardment of our trenches. However, though a light southerly breeze carried the noise made by the seventy tanks on the move towards the enemy, there was between 2A.M.and 6A.M.only slight hostile artillery activity, and that only on the left front.During the whole period of assembly there were a few casualties in the forward battalions of the 153rd Brigade, and none on the 152nd Brigade front.At 6.30A.M., 20th November, the advance began on a fine but cloudy morning, the visibility being such that a man could be seen at a distance of about 200 yards. As the artillery barrage opened, the twelve wire-crushing tanks moved off, accompanied by small parties of infantry detailed for the capture of the outpost line.Four minutes later a light artillery barrage came down on and just in front of our assembly trenches, causing slight casualties. Considerable hostile machine-gun fire was also opened, but it was wild and harmless. Between 9.15 and 9.40A.M.all the leading battalions had reached their objectives.The 5th Seaforth Highlanders on the right carried out their advance practically without a check, making a bagof 9 machine-guns and 230 prisoners, including 14 officers. The total number of casualties sustained by the battalion in this operation was twenty-five.On arrival at the railway, “A” Company, 5th Seaforth Highlanders, found that the situation at Ribécourt was obscure, hostile machine-guns still being active there. Lance-Corporal E. MacBeath was therefore sent out with a patrol to report on the situation. Having proceeded 150 yards from his company MacBeath discovered the first machine-gun, and killed the gunner with his revolver. A tank then arrived and drove the teams of some of the other machine-guns down a deep dug-out. MacBeath bounded down the dug-out steps after them, killed a German who resisted him on the staircase, and drove the remainder—3 officers and 30 other ranks—out of the dug-out by another exit. Sending these men to the rear as prisoners, he again entered the dug-out and thoroughly searched it, accounting for two more Germans. In all, five machine-guns were found mounted round the dug-out, which proved to be a battalion headquarters.The capture of these guns not only freed the right flank of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, but also considerably helped the advance of the 9th Norfolks on the right.For his courage and initiative on this occasion MacBeath was awarded the Victoria Cross.The 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had rather more fighting than the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, as active machine-guns and bombing-posts were encountered in the first and second German lines and between them.In the case of the former the Argylls overcame the resistance by advancing in short rushes, while the advent of the tanks encouraged the enemy to surrender in other parts of the front. During these operations a private soldier led his platoon to its objective in Mole Trench, his platoon commander and two sergeants having become casualties as the advance began.On the left of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders the 6th Black Watch met no resistance until they had passed the Hindenburg front line. In the later stages of their advance many machine-guns had to be tackled.The front line proved a serious obstacle to the tanks, in spite of their fascines, four of them becoming ditchedin it on this battalion front. In consequence, portions of the second wave came under close-range machine-gun fire. Of these guns one was disposed of by a sergeant, who, crawling forward, threw a hand-grenade amongst its team. The remainder were destroyed with the assistance of tanks.In the advance to Mole Trench further resistance was encountered by the 6th Black Watch. First two machine-gun posts on the right held up the advance; but in one case a sergeant, in the other a corporal, worked forward alone and knocked out the teams with hand-grenades.On the left the advance was held up by uncut wire; but the infantry summoned by signals three third-wave tanks from the next battalion front, which crushed the wire and enabled the advance to be continued.On arrival in Mole Trench the 6th Black Watch were raked with enfilade machine-gun fire from Sammy’s Trench. A platoon was therefore immediately detached, which, advancing by section rushes under cover of the fire of its Lewis guns, wiped out the entire garrison of Sammy’s Trench. The Germans here offered a magnificent resistance, and fought until the last man was killed.Still further fighting occurred, heavy machine-gun and rifle fire being opened on the advancing 6th Black Watch from the Grand Ravine. Individual skill and initiative were again displayed. The first machine-gun was put out of action by a private soldier, who, working towards it alone, killed five and wounded two of the team with rifle grenades. A tank at that moment arrived, and the Grand Ravine was cleared, 6 officers and 100 other ranks being taken prisoner.Meanwhile Lieut.-Colonel N. D. Campbell, commanding this battalion, in making a reconnaissance of the captured ground, came across a dug-out which had not previously been noticed, and with the help of his orderly captured twelve prisoners in it.On the extreme left the 5th Gordon Highlanders made a surprisingly big bag in the outpost line, capturing 21 prisoners in one sap-head, and capturing or killing 22 in another. The Hindenburg front line was entered without difficulty with the tanks, the bulk of the garrison having run back to Triangle Support. Up to this point 2 machine-guns and 200 prisoners had been captured.It was some time before the garrison of Triangle Support could be overcome, as only one second-wave tank on the battalion front managed to cross the Hindenburg front line.Subsequently the resistance collapsed on the arrival of some third-wave tanks, but not before odd platoons had gallantly fought their way into the trench.Wood Trench and Mole Trench were occupied without particular effort; but beyond Mole Trench lay a sunken road, into which large numbers of the enemy had fled at the first sight of the tanks. This road was cleared with the assistance of a tank, which did magnificent execution with its 6-pounder gun, shell after shell bursting in the midst of parties of panic-stricken Germans.By this time the 7th Black Watch, who were detailed to pass through the 5th Gordon Highlanders for the second phase of the attack, came up, and with some of the latter crossed the Grand Ravine and moved towards Chapel Trench. Here again the Germans fought stubbornly, some 40 of them being killed before the trench was occupied. The 5th Gordon Highlanders thus arrived on their objectives, having captured a total of 10 machine-guns, 2 trench-mortars, and 400 prisoners, including a battalion commander complete with his staff.So far the attack had proceeded smoothly enough, but in the next phase the conditions under which the advance was to be carried out changed considerably. Up to the present the main difficulty of the tanks had been the width and depth of the trenches which they had to traverse, effective action against them on the part of the enemy having been negligible.In the next stage the advance was to be carried out through the enemy’s gun line, with the result that the tanks had not only to contend with the crossing of the trenches, but were also exposed to the close-range fire of field-guns. As the infantry depended absolutely and entirely on the tanks for the crushing of the large belts of wire opposed to them, any losses sustained by the tanks, as will be seen, seriously prejudiced the infantry’s chances of success.The enemy’s support system, which was to be overcome in the next bound, consisted of a strong fire-trench known as the Hindenburg Support, protected by two to four beltsof heavy wire, and supported by a trench some 100 yards in rear known as Flesquières Trench—a trench in many places shallow, and protected by little wire. Of these the former lay on the crest of the Flesquières Ridge, and the latter just behind it. Both skirted a chateau at the south-west corner of the village, which, with its walls and wooded grounds, offered great possibilities for concealed defences.On the right, the 6th Gordon Highlanders advanced on a two-company front, the leading two companies being detailed for the capture of the Hindenburg support system. These companies were preceded by six tanks. On arriving at the enemy wire the tanks came within view of a field battery some 500 yards distant, which immediately opened on them, and by a succession of direct hits knocked out all six in the space of a few minutes, an admirable exhibition of shooting on the part of the German gunners.Owing to the formation of the enemy’s entanglements, which projected in irregular V shapes for over 180 yards from the trench, the infantry did not appreciate, until they were held up by the wire, that the tanks had failed to penetrate it. In this position they were suddenly swept by close-range machine-gun fire, and in a few moments had lost some sixty men killed and wounded.As a farther advance in face of the uncut wire was out of the question, the companies were immediately withdrawn to Station Avenue and the sunken Ribécourt-Flesquières road. An advance up Station Avenue was then organised with the intention of breaking into the Hindenburg support line on the right and of working inwards along it. Though it turned out that Station Avenue did not join up with the Hindenburg support line, one platoon was successful in dashing across the open, entering the support line, and capturing two machine-guns. This platoon, in attempting to work along the trench towards its left flank, found portions of it so shallow that they could not continue their advance in face of the intense machine-gun fire coming from Flesquières.Meanwhile the remaining two companies of the 6th Gordon Highlanders had been collected in the Ribécourt-Flesquières sunken road.The 6th Seaforth Highlanders fared better. Seven tanks on the left and centre of the battalion front passed throughthe wire, and enabled the left company to enter the trench with only three casualties.On the right of the battalion front the tanks appear to have lost their direction, as no gaps were cut in the wire. “C” Company, however, discovered a gap on their left flank, and having passed through it, pushed on towards the trench. Here they had some severe fighting before they finally established themselves in it, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy and capturing many prisoners.This company then tried to force their way along the Hindenburg support line towards their right to join up with the 6th Gordon Highlanders. By leaving the trench and running along the parapet, shooting and bombing the Germans, they cleared some fifty yards of the trench. The rifle and machine-gun fire from Flesquières, however, became so heavy that they were forced to take to the trench again and establish a bombing-block on their flanks between them and the enemy.While this fighting was in progress the surviving tanks were pushing on towards Flesquières Trench; but they, too, came under artillery fire, and were knocked out by direct hits.The personnel of the tanks suffered heavy losses, as in some cases the tanks burst into flames on being struck by a shell, and their crews were burnt to death before help could be brought to them. There is no need to describe the sufferings of the unfortunate men who died in this manner, imprisoned in the flaming tanks.The tanks which still survived shortly became non-effective for the time being owing to shortage of petrol. The crews which survived, however, still continued to assist the infantry after their tanks were out of action. For example, 2nd Lieutenant Blow, after his tank, the Edward II., was struck by a shell, took his Lewis guns from it, placed one in action at the head of a communication trench, and himself fired a Lewis gun from the roof of his tank until the gun became too hot to hold. He then attached himself to the Seaforths for the remainder of the action.The second wave of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, in spite of a heavy fire directed against them from Flesquières Trench, made repeated attempts to enter it, in which all officers except one per company became casualties.One officer in particular, 2nd Lieutenant Donald Grant, displayed great courage and initiative in his efforts to gain his objective. Leading his platoon along a communication trench, east of Flesquières Wood, he drove the enemy before him, bayoneting many himself. When all his men but one were casualties, he climbed out of his communication trench and attempted to rush Flesquières Trench from above ground. He and his companion were, however, immediately shot dead.The 7th Gordon Highlanders, just as they had done at Beaumont Hamel and again at the chemical works, carried their advance to the farthest point reached in the attack. They made short work of the Hindenburg Support, where they picked up 100 prisoners. On approaching Flesquières Trench their tanks became subjected to close-range field-gun fire, and drew most of the fire of the riflemen and machine-gunners. The infantry were thus able to enter the trench and establish themselves in it after some heavy fighting.On the right at first only one section gained a lodgment in this trench, but a platoon advancing over the area which the section had just traversed followed it into the trench, and then fought its way along it with bombs and rifles until it reached the battalion right boundary.The next waves thus passed on to assault the village, unsupported by tanks, and in the face of a terrific fire. At one period they were able to sweep the main street of the village with Lewis-gun fire; but subjected to machine-gun fire from all sides, they could not maintain their position, and were forced back into Flesquières Trench.The Germans then delivered a counter-attack against the right of the 7th Gordon Highlanders, and forced them out of Flesquières Trench, which in this sector was in many places only a few inches deep.The 7th Gordon Highlanders were thus left, holding the Hindenburg support line throughout the battalion front, and with three platoons in Flesquières Trench.The 7th Black Watch on the left flank of the Division encountered a series of misfortunes. In the first place, two of their tanks were ditched in crossing the front line. Secondly, before encountering Hindenburg support line, they met tremendous resistance from Cemetery Alley.Here both their second and third waves became involved in heavy fighting, and after a severe engagement, in which the attackers were subjected to a considerable volume of machine-gun fire from Cemetery Ridge, the trench was captured with 200 prisoners.Hindenburg support line was thus successfully captured in conjunction with tanks; but on crossing this trench, all the remaining tanks were knocked out. As uncut wire lay in front of them, and a great volume of fire was being directed against them from the village, the waves could not continue their advance. Attempts were made to get forward by small parties, but with no success, and the battalion was ordered to consolidate its gains as it stood.At this stage the prospects of a farther advance were not good. The German gunner, always an unpleasantly efficient person, seemed to have got the measure of the tanks, and without them it appeared impossible in the near future to give the advance further impetus.Meanwhile, Lieut.-Colonel S. MacDonald, D.S.O., commanding the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, had arrived at the Hindenburg support line, and had reorganised his two companies there for further efforts. He found that the village, wood, and chateau were a series of strong nests of machine-guns. However, employing tanks in the vicinity, which had run out of petrol, to open on the village with their 6-pounders and Lewis guns, he led his battalion forward in person, and gained a foothold in Flesquières Trench, which extended from the Ribécourt-Flesquières road for 300 yards to the left.From this position Colonel MacDonald, showing splendid qualities of leadership, organised two determined attempts to reach the village under cover of rifle and Lewis-gun fire. Though one or two machine-guns were put out of action, the intense fire which this enterprise attracted from the high walls of the chateau grounds and the houses in the village, checked the advance on both occasions. During one of these attempts a private soldier, single-handed, killed the team of a machine-gun and carried the gun back to the British lines.About 5P.M.seven more tanks arrived, of which six entered the village. They were not, however, sufficiently closely supported by the infantry, and the attack failed.The enemy, with great cunning, offered no resistance to the tanks in the streets, either lying motionless in his emplacements or retiring into dug-outs and cellars while the tanks were passing. The tanks, after cruising about the village until the light began to fail, returned after an uneventful voyage.Meanwhile, in support of the tanks two platoons of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders were ordered to advance through the wood, and two to enter the village from the north. The first party was held up in the wood by machine-guns, and the second entered the village only to meet the tanks withdrawing. They therefore attempted to establish a chain of posts round the village; but, fired at from front and flanks, were compelled to withdraw.Arrangements were now made to prevent the enemy from evacuating his guns during the night by placing a machine-gun barrage on the northern slopes of the Flesquières Ridge. With this object the 152nd Machine Gun Company alone fired over 19,000 rounds before daylight. By dawn, however, the enemy had withdrawn from Flesquières Trench and the villages.A patrol of the 7th Gordon Highlanders had left their trenches as early as 3.45P.M., circled the north-west side of the village to the north-west corner, and reported that that flank was only held by a few machine-guns and snipers. At 4P.M.a patrol of the 7th Black Watch found Flesquières Trench unoccupied, and the battalion moved into it.At 2.45A.M.three patrols of the 7th Gordon Highlanders returned and reported that they had advanced as far as the Brown line, and that the whole area was clear of the enemy. About the same time a patrol of the 7th Black Watch returned with similar information. These two battalions therefore advanced and occupied the Brown line, troops of the 7th Gordon Highlanders passing right through the village and encountering only slight machine-gun and rifle fire.At 6.15A.M.on the following morning troops of the 6th Gordon Highlanders and 6th Seaforth Highlanders also established themselves on the Brown line without opposition.Thus within twenty-four hours of the attack having been launched the Brown line was occupied in its entirety,largely owing to the vigilance with which the 153rd Brigade had kept in touch with the enemy’s movements by patrolling.During the final advance to the Brown line considerable booty was taken, the following guns being captured by the 6th Gordon Highlanders: two 5·9 howitzers and two 4·2 guns; by the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, five field-guns; by the 7th Gordon Highlanders, two 8-inch howitzers, five 5·9 howitzers, and a field-gun.By nightfall on the day of the attack the artillery had considerably advanced their positions, one brigade being at the Grand Ravine, and two in No Man’s Land.The advance to the Red dotted line was now accomplished without difficulty. On the right the 5th Seaforth Highlanders passed through the 6th Gordon Highlanders, reached the Red dotted line, and made a reconnaissance in force towards Cantaing with a total of fourteen casualties. On their left the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders also reached the Red dotted line, having killed five Germans and captured thirty-three in an attack by section rushes against a sunken road. They also reconnoitred towards Cantaing, but found it strongly held.Similarly, the 6th Black Watch and the 5th Gordon Highlanders occupied the Red dotted line with a total of two and three casualties respectively. The former captured three field-guns and four 4·2 howitzers, and the latter three field-guns.During these operations the 154th Brigade, which had assembled at Metz at 5A.M.on the day of the attack, had at 10A.M.moved two battalions to the old British front line and two just clear of Metz, in readiness to move forward should Flesquières fall.On the evening of the 20th it was decided that should the Red dotted line be captured during the night, the 154th Brigade should pass through the 152nd and 153rd Brigades, capture the Cantaing Line and Cantaing, and advance on the village of Fontaine Notre Dame.Of these objectives Cantaing and the Cantaing Line proved themselves to be formidable obstacles. The latter, though the trenches were for the most part only traced out, contained numerous completed dug-outs and machine-gun emplacements, and was for the greater portion of its lengthprotected by a double belt of wire some fifteen yards in depth. The defences of the village of Cantaing were also considerably strengthened by a well-traversed trench encircling its south-western corner.The 154th Brigade began its advance with the 4th Gordon Highlanders covering the front of the 152nd Infantry Brigade, and the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders covering the 153rd. In rear were the 9th Royal Scots on the right, and the 4th Seaforth Highlanders on the left.The 4th Gordon Highlanders passed through the Red dotted line at 10.30A.M., and continued their advance at first uneventfully. As, however, they began to approach Cantaing Trench, machine-guns from the trenches and from buildings in the village, as well as light trench-mortars, opened on them in sufficient volume to hold up the advance until shortly after noon. At that hour ten tanks arrived from Premy Chapel, and made towards the village, followed by “B” Company of the 4th Gordon Highlanders. Cantaing was entered, and after a little street fighting 300 prisoners were taken from it.Meanwhile about the south-western end of the village, in the trenches in that vicinity and in the sunken road running to Cantaing Mill, bodies of the enemy continued to offer a magnificent resistance. “D” Company of the 4th Gordon Highlanders managed to force their way through the wire into a position on the Cantaing-Flesquières road, but could make no farther progress. Two Stokes guns were then brought into action, but even these failed to dislodge the enemy. Indeed, it was not until 3P.M., when one of the tanksen routefor Fontaine arrived, that the pocket was finally cleared. This gallant stand made by the enemy had disorganised this attack, which came to a standstill with “B” and “D” Companies of the 4th Gordon Highlanders consolidating the line north and north-east of the village, and with “A” and “C” Companies connecting them on the right flank with the 29th Division, who were by this time in Nine Wood. Subsequently three squadrons of the Queen’s Bays and the 9th Cavalry Brigade M.G. Squadron arrived, and took up defensive positions round the perimeter of the village in conjunction with the 4th Gordon Highlanders.While this operation was in progress, the 7th Argyll andSutherland Highlanders, on the left of the 4th Gordon Highlanders, could not join in the advance until 11.20A.M., as they were held up by heavy fire from the village of Anneux. However, at that hour the village was captured by the 62nd Division, and they were able to move forward again.By noon the advance had again been completely held up about 300 yards from the Cantaing Line by heavy enfilade fire from Cantaing on the right and Bourlon Wood on the left. As no tanks had as yet arrived, the battalion therefore began to dig in.During this time and until the end of the day low-flying enemy aeroplanes, sometimes only 150 feet from the ground, patrolled our lines, observed the position of our troops, disclosed them by dropping lights, and fired with machine-guns on the men.Meanwhile, the 4th Gordon Highlanders having been led away rather to the right to deal with Cantaing, touch had been lost between the two battalions. A company of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders was therefore ordered forward to fill the gap between the Gordons and the Argylls.At 3.30P.M.the situation was cleared up by the arrival of seven tanks, which moved forward, followed by the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the company of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders. At the sight of the tanks the Germans in the Cantaing Line surrendered, 130 men being taken prisoners.The advance on Fontaine Notre Dame was thus begun, and was carried out without any opposition being met beyond a few shots fired by riflemen in Bourlon Wood. The village was in our hands by 5P.M.The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were then disposed so as to defend Fontaine, the point of junction being north of the village, with the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on the left and the 4th Seaforth Highlanders on the right. One company of the latter was also detached to connect up the 62nd Division north of Anneux with the reserve platoons of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders garrisoning the Cantaing Line.
Map VII.—Poelcappelle, 20th September 1917.map
Map VII.—Poelcappelle, 20th September 1917.
The attack was launched in the grey of the morning at 5.40A.M.
In the first phase strong resistance was encountered in and in front of Pheasant Trench. On the right “A” and “B” companies of the 9th Royal Scots were engaged with rifle and machine-gun fire from the start. “A” company assisted by “C” Company, whose real objective was the dotted Blue line, advanced with the greatest skill and gallantry, moving from shell-hole to shell-hole in twos and threes, pouring into the German trenches rifle grenades and rifle fire. By this means they gained their objective, and enabled the advance to the dotted Blue line to be continued.
On the left, where “B” Company 9th Royal Scots, followed by “D” Company (dotted Blue line), was engaged, Pheasant Trench was occupied in the centre of the company front almost at once. The left two platoons of the company front reached the trench, but were heavily engaged by machine-gun fire, and returned to our lines. Thereupon the company commander, the battalion intelligence officer, and the artillery liaison officer rapidly reorganised the men, and led them forward again, accompanied by some of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who were destined for the capture of the Blue line. Assisted by the platoon which had already gained a footing in Pheasant Trench, and which fought its way along the trench to its left flank, this party captured its objective. The gallantry and initiative of these officers and men bore important results, as had Pheasant Trench not been captured, the whole attack of the left battalion would have been held up, and the final objective could not have been reached. It was a typical example of that combination of tactical skill and gallantry which contributed so much towards the success of the Division.
The 4th Seaforth Highlanders on the left also encountered serious resistance, and hand-to-hand fighting developed in which they completely outmatched the Boches. It was in Pheasant Trench between Point 85 and the Lekkerboterbeek that they experienced the fiercest fighting. Here the trench was very strongly held, with newly-constructed posts in front, some being as much as forty yards in advance of it. Machine-guns were fired from the tops of blockhouses, while bombs and rifle-fire came from the trench itself. The company detailed for the capture of the trench advanced by twos and threes from shell-hole to shell-hole, rifle grenades, Lewis guns and rifles being freely used. Meanwhile the company detailed for the capture of the dotted Blue line, seeing what was afoot, moved round and attacked Pheasant Trench from a flank. The advance culminated in hand-to-hand fighting, in which the 4th Seaforth Highlanders signally triumphed.
Their left company was engaged by three machine-guns firing from Pheasant Trench and from a pill-box west of it. These were all knocked out, but not before thirty Germans had been killed who fought most gallantly round the pill-box.
After the capture of Pheasant Trench the advance on the dotted Blue line was continued. “C” Company of the 9th Royal Scots had some hard fighting round Flora Cot, in which they killed fifteen Germans. Later they came under enfilade fire from machine-guns on Hubner Farm (300 yards south of the Divisional right boundary). The company commander immediately detached two Lewis guns and two rifle sections to deal with Hubner Farm. This detachment fought for twenty minutes, during which they inflicted such losses on the occupants of the farm that the 2/8 London Regiment was able to capture it frontally.
On their left “D” Company of the 9th Royal Scots reached the Blue line successfully, but was much reduced in strength, having suffered serious casualties in the fighting round Pheasant Trench.
The 4th Seaforth Highlanders had little difficulty in capturing the Blue dotted line, and in consolidating according to prearranged plan. Pheasant Trench on both battalion fronts was in some parts literally choked with dead. In one stretch of about 200 yards in the left sector alone 150 German bodies were counted. Many dead were also found amongst the garrisons of the enemy’s shell-hole posts, the artillery barrage having been most effective in this respect.
When one remembers the amount of shells which had been deluged on the Germans in the Pheasant Trench position, one cannot but admire the resolute manner in which they resisted our attack. It was indeed the strengthof their resistance which made the capture of this line by the 4th Seaforths and 9th Royal Scots such a magnificent performance. One can gauge the severity of the fighting by the fact that so much rifle ammunition had been used by the infantry in this attack that 12,000 rounds had to be sent up to the parties consolidating the Blue line.
The enemy’s barrage did not open until five minutes after the attack was launched, and was then particularly heavy on the area between our original front line and the Langemarck road.
Both the battalions detailed for the capture of the Blue line, the 4th Gordon Highlanders and the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, had suffered serious casualties from having become involved in the fighting for Pheasant Trench before they formed up under the barrage. “D” Company of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had also suffered heavily from shell-fire when advancing from the old British front line.
The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders reached the Blue line after having overcome, chiefly by means of rifle grenades, Flora Cot, Quebec Farm, and Bavaroise House, capturing four machine-guns, of which one was turned on the enemy with good results, and about thirty prisoners.
The 4th Gordon Highlanders, who had already lost five officers before forming up under the barrage, had their first fight after the barrage moved forward at Pheasant Farm Cemetery. Here a lance-corporal was responsible for capturing two machine-guns and twenty-eight prisoners. Malta House, Bose House, and Delta House were all captured after stiff fighting, several machine-guns being destroyed.
By the time the 4th Gordon Highlanders had reached the Blue line, they had only three officers and six platoons of about ten men each in the front line; the remainder of the reserve company with two officers was therefore sent up as a reinforcement.
The situation on the left was a delicate one, as the neighbouring Division attacking on that flank had been unable to make progress, so that the two battalions on the left had between them to form a defensive flank some 1000 yards in depth. The Blue line was thus consolidated,as had been intended, as far as Rose House, and the line then bent round towards White House.
The 9th Royal Scots reported that they could not supply the two platoons which they had been ordered to send to support the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders as counter-attack troops. Two platoons of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders therefore moved forward in their place. Of these only thirty men reached their destination owing to heavy casualties suffered in passing through the hostile barrage.
Consolidation had not long been in progress before that series of enemy counter-attacks began which culminated in the late afternoon in a most determined assault backed by heavy masses.
Our advance had not seriously threatened the enemy’s gun line; he was therefore able to employ his artillery fully throughout the operations. The valley of the Steenbeek was heavily and continuously shelled, and after the capture of the Blue line, the area subjected to heavy bombardment extended up to the Pheasant Trench Ridge and across the Stroombeek. In consequence many casualties were sustained by reserve troops, machine-gun teams, &c., moving forward, while heavy losses sustained by the runners made communication difficult.
In these days a runner, if he was to survive, had to be a runner in the true sense of the word. Starting from his platoon or company headquarters, during a battle, he stood a good chance of being shot, particularly by that unpleasantly accurate weapon the telescopic-sighted machine-gun. As soon as he was clear of the bullet zone he then had to dodge the shells, the shell with the instantaneous fuze, since it had a missile effect of several hundred yards, being a particularly difficult one to avoid.
Having delivered his message, he then had to return whence he came, and compete with the same risks on his return journey. The company and platoon runners were usually officers’ servants, and belonged to that class which an agitated Press described as able-bodied men doing menial work.
It was not long before the enemy tested the strength of the defensive flank, and at 11.45A.M.he made a demonstration against the left of the 4th Gordon Highlanders.The defensive flank made short work of this attack. At 12.30P.M.he repeated the experiment, but in greater numbers. The defensive flank again wiped out the attack. Meanwhile, so as to strengthen the line, “A” Company of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were sent forward as reinforcements, and were disposed two platoons on a line from the Poelcappelle road through Pheasant Farm Cemetery to north of Delta Huts, two platoons just west of the Poelcappelle road in Stroom Trench.
By this time Tank D44 had reached a point on the Poelcappelle road near Malta House, where it broke down. It was therefore taken into use as a company headquarters. One Lewis gun from it was sent forward to Delta House, two were sent to Beer Trench, and one was retained in the tank, while 200 rounds of ammunition were distributed from it to each man in Beer Trench. A corporal was also detailed to work the tank’s 6-pounder gun.
Throughout the morning machine-guns had been taking up their prearranged positions. On the right two were in action at Bavaroise House, two a hundred yards in front of Flora Cot, two between the Steenbeek and New House. On the left four were in the vicinity of Pheasant Farm Cemetery, two at Malta House, and one at Rose House.
During the afternoon, then, the Blue line was held along its length up to Rose House, where the line bent back forming a defensive flank, until touch was obtained with the Division on the left. The troops which had carried out the assault had been reinforced by two platoons of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and the bulk of the machine-guns had reached the positions allotted to them for consolidation.
Meanwhile from the direction of Poelcappelle parties of the enemy moving from shell-hole to shell-hole in ones and twos were dribbling up through the afternoon towards the captured position, and concentrating for a counter-attack in dead ground. Further in rear, out of range of rifles and machine-guns, larger bodies of the enemy could be seen massing.
At 5P.M.the counter-attack, accompanied by a barrage of unusual intensity, was fairly launched, the Houthulst, Poelcappelle, and Passchendaele groups of artillery all actively co-operating in support of the German infantry.
On the right the 451st Infantry Brigade of the 234th German Division advanced between York House and Tweed House, but it never reached the Blue line. In fact, the attack carried out by the regiment was completely broken by our artillery, rifle, and machine-gun fire, the artillery in particular causing heavy losses.
In the centre the 452nd Infantry Regiment of the 234th Division continued to attack, the 5th Grenadiers of the 36th Division and the 208th Division attacking on the battalion left flank. The attack was firmly held all along the line until the rifle and Lewis-gun ammunition, of which there had been an extraordinary expenditure, was exhausted. Rose House continued to hold out, but was isolated. After the front line had given, the three platoons of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders north of the Lekkerboterbeek held firm and broke up attack after attack, punishing the enemy severely. On their right, after every officer of the 4th Gordon Highlanders who had taken part in the initial attack had become a casualty, the small party in Beer Trench gave. Malta House was next overwhelmed, and the platoon garrisoning Stroom Trench was forced back.
About 6P.M.a general withdrawal of the troops inside the V formed by the Poelcappelle road and the Lekkerboterbeek took place.
During this withdrawal the local commanders, realising the necessity of reducing the area of the enemy penetration to a minimum, formed defensive flanks. On the right “C” Company 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, two platoons of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and “D” Company of the 9th Royal Scots; and on the left the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the 4th Seaforth Highlanders, were all so disposed as to pin the enemy into the V; in this position he was caught under enfilade fire from both flanks, and suffered heavily.
Meanwhile the troops who had withdrawn from the V were rallied, and having collected ammunition from the dead and wounded, were led forward from Pheasant Trench. At the same time the company of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders which earlier had been sent forward to assist in countering any enemy counter-attack, also launched an attack from the same trench. This attackwas successful in clearing the enemy out of the angle of the V, and it left him with his farthest point of penetration about Point 82 on the Poelcappelle road.
The front line was then reorganised so as to run from a point 500 yards north of Delta Huts through Pheasant Farm Cemetery on the south side of Point 82 to the Lekkerboterbeek, thence along the stream until it joined the original Blue line.
As soon as it was dusk the remaining company of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders was brought up to reinforce the left, and consolidation was continued throughout the night.
During the same night the Germans found that the 452nd Regiment which had penetrated the V had been so severely handled that it was necessary for them to be relieved. Accordingly the 371st Infantry Regiment from a fresh Division took over from them.
The position remained substantially unaltered until the night of the 21-22nd, when the 152nd Infantry Brigade relieved the 154th.
During the afternoon of 23rd September an intense barrage broke out all along the brigade front, culminating just after 7P.M.in a heavy German attack. This attack came from south of Poelcappelle towards the centre of the position.
The enemy first advanced in great columns, and while extending to the south and east of Malta House, were caught in an artillery barrage and in the fire of Lewis guns and Vickers guns and rifles.
As a result the attack melted away, and the morning disclosed the enemy’s dead strewn in heaps about Malta House. The right battalion, the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, had most opportunities of inflicting losses on the enemy, and fully availed itself of them. One company alone had five Lewis guns firing on the enemy at the same moment, of which one fired twenty-eight drums.
Later the left battalion, the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, carried out some satisfactory shooting. On one occasion in the early morning they arose to find a platoon of forty strong, in marching order, advancing within close range of them. They immediately wiped it out. On another occasion they inflicted by enfilade fire such heavy losseson a storm trupp attempting to raid the 12th Battalion King’s Royal Rifles on their left that the survivors of the storm trupp, twenty-three in number, ran towards the King’s Royal Rifles with their hands up and surrendered.
The total casualties to the Division during the operations were 45 officers and 1110 other ranks, the 154th Brigade, which carried out the attack, losing 32 officers and 891 other ranks, and the 4th Gordon Highlanders 12 officers.
On 26th September the 152nd Infantry Brigade was relieved by the 32nd Infantry Brigade, 11th Division, and on the 27th the G.O.C., 11th Division, took over the command of the line.
This battle affords an admirable illustration of the economic use of troops. It must be remembered that only five battalions were employed in the attack and subsequent counter-attacks; that these five battalions—though through want of ammunition they did not hold their entire gains—had established themselves for a while in their final objective, and had accounted for every German garrisoning the area allotted to them for attack. Moreover, these battalions were fighting not only facing their front, but also facing their left flank, as the Division on their left had not made equal progress in the attack. That it was possible for so few men to do what they did was due to two things: first, to the combination of gallantry and skill on the part of the men and the leadership and initiative on the part of the officers and N.C.O.’s. The men had been trained in the use of ground, movement supported by fire, and in platoon tactics in general, and they put what they had learned into practice from the outset of the attack. The enemy fought bravely, perhaps as bravely as our men, but he was outmatched in tactical skill, and was in consequence defeated.
Secondly, the handling of the troops by the senior commanders was such as to forestall every move on the part of the enemy. It was anticipated that the enemy would do his utmost to prevent us from making ground towards Poelcappelle, and rightly so, for on the evening of the attack nine out of ten battalions massed against the XVIIIth Corps were directed against the 51st. The Divisional commander, having rightly appreciated the situation, solved absolutely the problems connected with the two importantfactors of time and space,—the problem of having the right number of troops at the right place at the right time. The reserve did not require to be moved after the enemy had disclosed his intentions; but his intentions were anticipated, so that in each case reserve troops (counter-counter-attack troops) were ready to deal with hostile enterprises. Thus the weak points in the line were strengthened before they were threatened and not after the line had been pierced, and the main counter-attack was delivered by the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders while the enemy’s troops were still on the move and before they had had time to reorganise or consolidate their gains. In fact, the Germans were on this occasion completely outmatched in generalship, leadership, tactical skill, and skill at arms.
On the conclusion of these operations, the following messages were received:—
1. From Lieut.-General Sir I. Maxse, K.C.B., D.S.O., commanding XVIIIth Corps.
“Before the 51st (Highland) Division quits the XVIIIth Corps, I desire to express to its commander and to all ranks in the Division how highly I have appreciated their services throughout three months of strenuous fighting.“What has struck me most is the thoroughness of the organisation within the Division, and the fact that all usual war problems have been thought out beforehand, discussed in detail, and are embodied in simple doctrines well known to all ranks. The result is the Division fights with gallantry, and can be depended upon to carry out any reasonable task allotted to it in any battle. For this reason I venture to place it among the three best fighting Divisions I have met in France during the past three years.“Its record in this Corps comprises:—“(1)On 31st July 1917, a shattering assault on High Command Redoubt, the capture in their entirety of three separate systems of German defence lines, an advance of two miles in depth into hostile territory, and the consolidation and retention of the line of the river Steenbeek and all the objectives allotted to the Division.“(2)On the 20th September 1917, an assault on a sectorof the Langemarck-Gheluvelt line which had resisted capture for more than a month, an incursion into hostile territory, and the consolidation of important hills south-west of Poelcappelle and at Bavaroise House. The same afternoon these two hills were repeatedly attacked by five Prussian battalions, all of whom were defeated with sanguinary losses.“In conclusion, I wish good luck to all ranks, and hope to serve with them again in this war.”
“Before the 51st (Highland) Division quits the XVIIIth Corps, I desire to express to its commander and to all ranks in the Division how highly I have appreciated their services throughout three months of strenuous fighting.
“What has struck me most is the thoroughness of the organisation within the Division, and the fact that all usual war problems have been thought out beforehand, discussed in detail, and are embodied in simple doctrines well known to all ranks. The result is the Division fights with gallantry, and can be depended upon to carry out any reasonable task allotted to it in any battle. For this reason I venture to place it among the three best fighting Divisions I have met in France during the past three years.
“Its record in this Corps comprises:—
“(1)On 31st July 1917, a shattering assault on High Command Redoubt, the capture in their entirety of three separate systems of German defence lines, an advance of two miles in depth into hostile territory, and the consolidation and retention of the line of the river Steenbeek and all the objectives allotted to the Division.
“(2)On the 20th September 1917, an assault on a sectorof the Langemarck-Gheluvelt line which had resisted capture for more than a month, an incursion into hostile territory, and the consolidation of important hills south-west of Poelcappelle and at Bavaroise House. The same afternoon these two hills were repeatedly attacked by five Prussian battalions, all of whom were defeated with sanguinary losses.
“In conclusion, I wish good luck to all ranks, and hope to serve with them again in this war.”
2. From General Sir H. de la P. Gough, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., commanding Fifth Army.
“In bidding farewell to the Highland Division, the Army Commander wishes to express his great admiration for and appreciation of their splendid record during the fighting of the past two months.“Their fine advance, their gallant defence of ground, even against repeated enemy attacks, and the severe punishment they inflicted on the enemy during the last battle, will ever remain one of their proudest records, and has helped materially towards the enemy’s final defeat. He heartily wishes them all success in the future. Scotland for ever.”
“In bidding farewell to the Highland Division, the Army Commander wishes to express his great admiration for and appreciation of their splendid record during the fighting of the past two months.
“Their fine advance, their gallant defence of ground, even against repeated enemy attacks, and the severe punishment they inflicted on the enemy during the last battle, will ever remain one of their proudest records, and has helped materially towards the enemy’s final defeat. He heartily wishes them all success in the future. Scotland for ever.”
After relief in the Ypres salient the Division, less its artillery, moved to the VIth Corps area, with headquarters at Achiet le Petit. By 5th October, ten days after coming out of their last battle, the 154th and 153rd Brigades were back in the trenches in the Heninel-Wancourt sector, with Divisional headquarters at Boisleux au Mont.
On this occasion the Division was for the first time introduced to the area which the Germans had wilfully devastated prior to their withdrawal from it to the Hindenburg line just before the battle of Arras.
One cannot do better than allow a German newspaper, the ‘Local Anzeiger’ of 18th March 1917, to describe this area. It says: “In the course of these last months great stretches of French territory have been turned by us into a dead country. It varies in width from ten, twelve, to thirteen kilometres, and extends along the whole of our new positions. No village or farm was left standing, no road was left passable, no railway track or embankment was left in being. Where once were woods, there are gaunt rows of stumps; the wells have been blown up. In front of our new positions runs like a gigantic ribbon our Empire of Death.”
One could not fail to appreciate the diabolical efficiency with which the work had been carried out. Where time had been too short to enable fruit-trees to be felled, their bark had been ringed. Wells before destruction had been turned into cess-pits. The effect on every unit on first entering the devastated area was the same. It produced a determination in all ranks to kill every German that it was possible to put out of the world with any degree ofdecency. By this wanton act of vandalism the Hun had turned himself, in the eyes of the British soldier, into a vermin fit only for extermination.
“Our new positions” mentioned above were the Hindenburg Line. The Hindenburg Line was not a line in the true sense of the word, since, in addition to having length, it also had considerable breadth. It was, in fact, a highly-elaborated system of trenches running roughly from St. Quentin to just south of Arras. The trenches were skilfully sited, so as to have every advantage of observation; they were of immense breadth and depth; they contained numerous concrete machine-gun emplacements and dug-outs; they were connected with one another by underground tunnels; they were protected by tremendous belts of wire many yards in depth. Yet, in spite of the skill with which it had been constructed, several portions of the Hindenburg Line were twice captured by the British army.
From this point onwards the Highland Division was so continuously involved in important operations that space cannot be given to detailed accounts of uneventful periods in quiet parts of the line. It must, however, be understood that uneventful is a relative term, and that even the quiet periods were often eventful enough for those in immediate contact with the enemy.
As regards the sojourn in the Boisleux au Mont area, suffice it to say that all three brigades carried out tours of duty in the line there, and that the Division was relieved on 2nd November. On completion of this relief the Division moved to Hermaville, the infantry brigades being billeted at Warlus, Hautvillers, and Izel les Hameaux.
Prior to taking over the line in this sector a change in command had taken place in the 154th Brigade. Brigadier-General J. G. H. Hamilton, D.S.O., who had commanded the brigade since General Stewart’s death in September 1916, gave up his command, and returned home for a period of rest. General Hamilton had come to the brigade from the command of a battalion, and had been with it through many trying ordeals, including Beaumont Hamel, Courcelette, Arras, and Ypres. By many of his officers, both senior and junior, he was regarded not only as their brigade commander, but also as an intimate friend, and his departure was in consequence keenly felt.
He was succeeded by Brigadier-General K. G. Buchanan, D.S.O., Seaforth Highlanders. General Buchanan possessed not only consummate judgment in all matters of tactics, but also a charming personality, with the result that his brigade throughout the period of his command could be relied on to render a splendid account of itself. His coolness in action and his tactical instincts enabled him so to dispose his troops in the varying phases of a battle that they were always ready to meet any sudden emergency. Moreover, his personality was such that officers and men would at all times make any sacrifice to carry out what he asked of them. The magnificent resistance offered by the 154th Brigade on the right flank of the Division both in March and again in April of 1918 afford in themselves ample proof of General Buchanan’s powers as an infantry commander.
The Division had not been long in rest in its new area before it transpired that it was again required to take part in active operations. The news that this was the case came rather as a shock, as the Division had already fought battles in the year 1917 on 9-12th April, 23-24th April, 16th May, 31st July-1st August, 20-23rd September, and had lost in casualties since 9th April 457 officers and 9966 other ranks—a total of 10,523.
Moreover, the forthcoming operations were to be of an experimental nature, since the plan of attack was to attempt to break through the Hindenburg Line by employing a large number of tanks in an offensive which was to be a complete surprise.
To quote Sir Douglas Haig’s despatch: “The object of these operations was to gain a local success at a point where the enemy did not expect it. Our repeated attacks in Flanders, and of our Allies elsewhere, had brought about large concentrations of the enemy’s forces on the threatened points, with a consequent reduction in the garrisons of certain other sectors of the line. Of these weakened sectors the Cambrai front had been selected as the most suitable for the surprise operations in contemplation.”
In order to maintain this element of surprise up to the last moment, various measures had to be taken. In the first place, the Division was left in its present quarters in the neighbourhood of Hermaville, so as not to draw theattention of the enemy to the area to be attacked. For the same reason the usual full-sized replica of the enemy’s trenches was taped out west of the town of Arras, and all training took place in that area.
Further, the Division was not allowed to take over the trenches from which it was to deliver the attack. It had therefore little opportunity for preliminary reconnaissances of the battle area, with the exception that parties of officers and N.C.O.’s daily visited the trenches to spy out the land. These parties were all clothed in trousers to prevent the enemy’s observers from suspecting the presence of the Highland Division in the neighbourhood of the position to be attacked.
The Division was given every opportunity of practising the attack with tanks, the platoons carrying out their training with the actual tanks and crews which were to accompany them in the operations. It will be seen that, as usual, liaison was synonymous with success, and that on the day of the attack the co-operation between the tanks and the infantry was admirable.
An additional difficulty lay in the fact that somehow or another the Division had to be concentrated in the battle area some thirty-six to forty-eight hours before the battle, so as to allow the troops adequate rest before proceeding to the assembly trenches.
On this account the C.R.E. and the three field companies, R.E., with the 8th Royal Scots, moved to the IVth Corps area early in November to prepare hidden shelters in which the troops might be accommodated during this period. The sappers and pioneers worked with such effect that between the 2nd and 19th November camouflaged accommodation had been provided for 5500 men in the ruined village of Metz and for 4000 men in Havrincourt Wood. The necessary dumps of material were also formed by the C.R.E., tracks for moving guns forward prepared, and, as cavalry were also detailed to take part in the operations, six water points with a capacity for watering 7000 horses per hour were constructed. Forward routes for infantry were also laid out and advanced dressing stations completed; no mean record for a little over a fortnight’s work.
All undertakings of this nature were made more difficult than usual by the fact that no increase in the normalamount of lorry traffic on the roads during the hours of daylight was allowed. Further, no new work was carried out in the forward area, in case it might be noticed by enemy airmen. As it turned out, the weather was fortunately cloudy and misty, so that observation from the air became practically impossible throughout the period of preparation.
The area through which the Division was destined to advance was traversed by three separate trench systems, each forming integral parts of the Hindenburg system. Of these, the first, known as the Hindenburg front system, was composed of a maze of wide, heavily-wired trenches, supplemented by numerous saps, the whole presenting such a tangle of excavations that it was impossible to foretell accurately where the principle points of resistance were most likely to be found.
The main framework of this front system was, however, composed of a lightly-held outpost line, a front line, and a support line.
In rear of the front system, and just south of the village of Flesquières, lay the Hindenburg support system, composed of two lines of heavily-wired deep trenches, connected with each other and with the front system by numerous communication trenches.
Four thousand yards in rear of the support system lay a third double line of trenches, south-west of the village of Cantaing. The area allotted to the Division was not uniform in shape, being in the Hindenburg front system 1500 yards in breadth, 2700 yards at the second system, 3500 yards at the third, and ending just north of the village of Fontaine Notre Dame at a breadth of 2200 yards.
Our assembly trenches rested on the summit of a spur, from which the country gradually sloped down to the Grand Ravine, a feature which traversed the Divisional front just north of the Hindenburg front system.
From here it switchbacked up to the village of Flesquières, thence it declined in a series of gentle undulations to Cantaing and Fontaine Notre Dame.
Just west of Fontaine stood Bourlon Wood, a hanging wood on the summit and slopes of a spur, from which the whole country-side could be surveyed, and from which it was always difficult to hide.
The position to be attacked was, in the first instance, divided into three main objectives: the Blue line, which included the Hindenburg front system and Chapel Trench; the Brown line, which included Flesquières and the Hindenburg support system; and the Red dotted line, which was the sunken road running from Marcoing to Graincourt.
For the first phase, the plan was for the Division to attack on a two-brigade front, the 152nd Brigade on the right, the 153rd on the left. Each brigade was to work on a two-battalion front, the leading two battalions to take as far as the Blue line in the case of the 153rd Brigade, and the Grand Ravine in the case of the 152nd Brigade.
The order of battle of the leading battalions from right to left was as follows: 5th Seaforth Highlanders, 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 6th Black Watch, 5th Gordon Highlanders. The remaining battalions of the two brigades were detailed for the capture of the Brown and Red dotted lines, the order of battle from right to left being 6th Gordon Highlanders, 6th Seaforth Highlanders, 7th Black Watch, 7th Gordon Highlanders.
Each battalion taking part in the attack of the Blue line detailed two companies for the capture of the enemy front system up to Mole Trench, a third company to cross the Grand Ravine, while the fourth company was kept in reserve. The battalions detailed for the capture of the Brown and dotted Red lines allotted objectives to each of their four companies.
For the first day’s fighting, seventy-two of the 1st Brigade Tank Corps were allotted to the Divisional front, of which seventy actually took part in the operation. One-half of the tanks, “E” Battalion, were allotted to 152nd Brigade, the other half, “D” Battalion, to the 153rd.
They were divided into three waves. The first, formed of twelve “Rovers” or wire-crushers, moved forward at zero, 150 yards in advance of the second, to crush the wire protecting the enemy front and support trenches, and then to engage machine-guns and any special posts outside the main trenches. The second wave, formed of thirty-six “Fighting” tanks, dealt with the trenches up to and including the Blue line. The third, composed of all the remaining fighting tanks, was detailed to form up an hour and a half after zero just south of the Grand Ravine,and to proceed with the survivors of the first two to attack the Flesquières Ridge.
The distribution was on the basis of one section of three tanks to a platoon frontage (i.e., about 150 yards). The general principle on which sections were to work was for the two outside tanks to cross a trench, turn alongside it and help to clear it, while the centre tanks carried on to the next trench, there to be joined by the two others as soon as the infantry had reached the first trench.
However, in tackling a system which contained many crater posts and sap-heads, and which was thickly interlaced with short communication trenches and backed by many subsidiary trenches and detached posts, some modifications of the general principles were necessary.
Special tasks were therefore given to many of the second wave sections of tanks, in which each tank was given some sap-head, crater post, or communication trench to deal with in addition to assailing the main trenches.
Similarly, detailed instructions were given as to routes and individual objectives in the village fighting that was anticipated.
Each tank carried on its back a huge fascine or faggot, resting on a giant pair of arms. A contrivance existed by which these arms raised the fascines off the back of the tank, and dropped them into any unusually wide trenches encountered, so as to form a stepping-stone, which enabled the tanks to keep their noses from dropping into the bottom of the trench.
In spite of this precaution the Hindenburg Line was in some parts so broad and deep that a number of tanks were ditched in spite of the fascines.
The first wave of the infantry followed the tanks at a distance of 150-200 yards, their orders being to assault immediately the tanks reached and opened fire on a trench. On reaching their objectives, the infantry marked with red strips of cloth the gaps in the wire, and filled in portions of the trenches to make crossing-places for subsequent tanks, cavalry, and artillery.
Each tank carried for the use of the infantry Lewis gun drums, rifle ammunition, bombs, and rifle grenades.
The field artillery supporting the attacks was divided into two groups, each composed of two field artillerybrigades and one R.H.A. brigade. Each brigade was supported by one of these groups, that containing 256th Brigade, R.F.A., being on the right and that containing 255th Brigade, R.F.A., on the left.
One brigade of artillery covered each battalion front, while the 3rd Brigade of artillery covered its whole infantry brigade front. The fifteen 18-pounder batteries firing in the creeping barrage fired 33 per cent. of smoke shells, so as to screen the movement of the tanks.
Two 4·5 howitzer batteries also kept a standing smoke barrage in front of Flesquières Ridge.
No registration was carried out, so that the presence of fresh batteries in the area might not be disclosed. The whole of the firing was therefore carried out from the map and by calibration.
The concentration of artillery, tanks, and infantry immediately behind the line from which the attack was to be launched was successfully effected between 17th and 19th November with great rapidity and complete secrecy, mainly under cover of darkness.
The artillery was moved up on 17th November; the tanks were assembled on the night of 18th November in Havrincourt Wood, and travelled to their assembly positions in the early hours of the 20th. The infantry came into Metz on the evening of the 18th, and began taking over the line on the 19th.
It must be borne in mind that a similar concentration of tanks, guns, and troops was taking place simultaneously on the fronts of Divisions on either flank. The fact that all the necessary moves took place, and that the troops were eventually formed up in the assembly trenches without any suspicions being aroused in the mind of the enemy, shows how admirably the arrangements for ensuring secrecy were carried out.
A taped line was laid out in front of the assembly trenches to ensure that the main wave of tanks formed up on its proper alignment. By zero hour the bulk of them were on this line, while the remainder which had been delayed from one cause and another were crossing the British front line.
The twelve “Rovers” were formed up beyond this line, the third wave being deployed behind the support line.
The platoons to form the first two waves in the attack took over the line on the morning of the 19th, and thus had an opportunity of viewing the ground to their front. At midnight the remainder of the four leading battalions arrived in their assembly trenches.
Before zero hour the four battalions for the later stages of the initial attack were assembled in rear of the trench area, with their leading platoons on the Charing Cross-Trescault road.
As soon as darkness set in the platoons which had arrived first set to work to make causeways across their trenches for the passage of the tanks. They also freed the troops that were to assemble during the night from any chances of confusion and unnecessary fatigue by placing in position red lamps, flags, signboards, and markers to show routes and positions of platoons.
Before zero hour all ranks were issued with a hot meal.
Naturally considerable anxiety was felt, as it was feared that the noise of the engines of the assembling tanks might be heard by the enemy and cause him to open a heavy bombardment of our trenches. However, though a light southerly breeze carried the noise made by the seventy tanks on the move towards the enemy, there was between 2A.M.and 6A.M.only slight hostile artillery activity, and that only on the left front.
During the whole period of assembly there were a few casualties in the forward battalions of the 153rd Brigade, and none on the 152nd Brigade front.
At 6.30A.M., 20th November, the advance began on a fine but cloudy morning, the visibility being such that a man could be seen at a distance of about 200 yards. As the artillery barrage opened, the twelve wire-crushing tanks moved off, accompanied by small parties of infantry detailed for the capture of the outpost line.
Four minutes later a light artillery barrage came down on and just in front of our assembly trenches, causing slight casualties. Considerable hostile machine-gun fire was also opened, but it was wild and harmless. Between 9.15 and 9.40A.M.all the leading battalions had reached their objectives.
The 5th Seaforth Highlanders on the right carried out their advance practically without a check, making a bagof 9 machine-guns and 230 prisoners, including 14 officers. The total number of casualties sustained by the battalion in this operation was twenty-five.
On arrival at the railway, “A” Company, 5th Seaforth Highlanders, found that the situation at Ribécourt was obscure, hostile machine-guns still being active there. Lance-Corporal E. MacBeath was therefore sent out with a patrol to report on the situation. Having proceeded 150 yards from his company MacBeath discovered the first machine-gun, and killed the gunner with his revolver. A tank then arrived and drove the teams of some of the other machine-guns down a deep dug-out. MacBeath bounded down the dug-out steps after them, killed a German who resisted him on the staircase, and drove the remainder—3 officers and 30 other ranks—out of the dug-out by another exit. Sending these men to the rear as prisoners, he again entered the dug-out and thoroughly searched it, accounting for two more Germans. In all, five machine-guns were found mounted round the dug-out, which proved to be a battalion headquarters.
The capture of these guns not only freed the right flank of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, but also considerably helped the advance of the 9th Norfolks on the right.
For his courage and initiative on this occasion MacBeath was awarded the Victoria Cross.
The 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had rather more fighting than the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, as active machine-guns and bombing-posts were encountered in the first and second German lines and between them.
In the case of the former the Argylls overcame the resistance by advancing in short rushes, while the advent of the tanks encouraged the enemy to surrender in other parts of the front. During these operations a private soldier led his platoon to its objective in Mole Trench, his platoon commander and two sergeants having become casualties as the advance began.
On the left of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders the 6th Black Watch met no resistance until they had passed the Hindenburg front line. In the later stages of their advance many machine-guns had to be tackled.
The front line proved a serious obstacle to the tanks, in spite of their fascines, four of them becoming ditchedin it on this battalion front. In consequence, portions of the second wave came under close-range machine-gun fire. Of these guns one was disposed of by a sergeant, who, crawling forward, threw a hand-grenade amongst its team. The remainder were destroyed with the assistance of tanks.
In the advance to Mole Trench further resistance was encountered by the 6th Black Watch. First two machine-gun posts on the right held up the advance; but in one case a sergeant, in the other a corporal, worked forward alone and knocked out the teams with hand-grenades.
On the left the advance was held up by uncut wire; but the infantry summoned by signals three third-wave tanks from the next battalion front, which crushed the wire and enabled the advance to be continued.
On arrival in Mole Trench the 6th Black Watch were raked with enfilade machine-gun fire from Sammy’s Trench. A platoon was therefore immediately detached, which, advancing by section rushes under cover of the fire of its Lewis guns, wiped out the entire garrison of Sammy’s Trench. The Germans here offered a magnificent resistance, and fought until the last man was killed.
Still further fighting occurred, heavy machine-gun and rifle fire being opened on the advancing 6th Black Watch from the Grand Ravine. Individual skill and initiative were again displayed. The first machine-gun was put out of action by a private soldier, who, working towards it alone, killed five and wounded two of the team with rifle grenades. A tank at that moment arrived, and the Grand Ravine was cleared, 6 officers and 100 other ranks being taken prisoner.
Meanwhile Lieut.-Colonel N. D. Campbell, commanding this battalion, in making a reconnaissance of the captured ground, came across a dug-out which had not previously been noticed, and with the help of his orderly captured twelve prisoners in it.
On the extreme left the 5th Gordon Highlanders made a surprisingly big bag in the outpost line, capturing 21 prisoners in one sap-head, and capturing or killing 22 in another. The Hindenburg front line was entered without difficulty with the tanks, the bulk of the garrison having run back to Triangle Support. Up to this point 2 machine-guns and 200 prisoners had been captured.
It was some time before the garrison of Triangle Support could be overcome, as only one second-wave tank on the battalion front managed to cross the Hindenburg front line.
Subsequently the resistance collapsed on the arrival of some third-wave tanks, but not before odd platoons had gallantly fought their way into the trench.
Wood Trench and Mole Trench were occupied without particular effort; but beyond Mole Trench lay a sunken road, into which large numbers of the enemy had fled at the first sight of the tanks. This road was cleared with the assistance of a tank, which did magnificent execution with its 6-pounder gun, shell after shell bursting in the midst of parties of panic-stricken Germans.
By this time the 7th Black Watch, who were detailed to pass through the 5th Gordon Highlanders for the second phase of the attack, came up, and with some of the latter crossed the Grand Ravine and moved towards Chapel Trench. Here again the Germans fought stubbornly, some 40 of them being killed before the trench was occupied. The 5th Gordon Highlanders thus arrived on their objectives, having captured a total of 10 machine-guns, 2 trench-mortars, and 400 prisoners, including a battalion commander complete with his staff.
So far the attack had proceeded smoothly enough, but in the next phase the conditions under which the advance was to be carried out changed considerably. Up to the present the main difficulty of the tanks had been the width and depth of the trenches which they had to traverse, effective action against them on the part of the enemy having been negligible.
In the next stage the advance was to be carried out through the enemy’s gun line, with the result that the tanks had not only to contend with the crossing of the trenches, but were also exposed to the close-range fire of field-guns. As the infantry depended absolutely and entirely on the tanks for the crushing of the large belts of wire opposed to them, any losses sustained by the tanks, as will be seen, seriously prejudiced the infantry’s chances of success.
The enemy’s support system, which was to be overcome in the next bound, consisted of a strong fire-trench known as the Hindenburg Support, protected by two to four beltsof heavy wire, and supported by a trench some 100 yards in rear known as Flesquières Trench—a trench in many places shallow, and protected by little wire. Of these the former lay on the crest of the Flesquières Ridge, and the latter just behind it. Both skirted a chateau at the south-west corner of the village, which, with its walls and wooded grounds, offered great possibilities for concealed defences.
On the right, the 6th Gordon Highlanders advanced on a two-company front, the leading two companies being detailed for the capture of the Hindenburg support system. These companies were preceded by six tanks. On arriving at the enemy wire the tanks came within view of a field battery some 500 yards distant, which immediately opened on them, and by a succession of direct hits knocked out all six in the space of a few minutes, an admirable exhibition of shooting on the part of the German gunners.
Owing to the formation of the enemy’s entanglements, which projected in irregular V shapes for over 180 yards from the trench, the infantry did not appreciate, until they were held up by the wire, that the tanks had failed to penetrate it. In this position they were suddenly swept by close-range machine-gun fire, and in a few moments had lost some sixty men killed and wounded.
As a farther advance in face of the uncut wire was out of the question, the companies were immediately withdrawn to Station Avenue and the sunken Ribécourt-Flesquières road. An advance up Station Avenue was then organised with the intention of breaking into the Hindenburg support line on the right and of working inwards along it. Though it turned out that Station Avenue did not join up with the Hindenburg support line, one platoon was successful in dashing across the open, entering the support line, and capturing two machine-guns. This platoon, in attempting to work along the trench towards its left flank, found portions of it so shallow that they could not continue their advance in face of the intense machine-gun fire coming from Flesquières.
Meanwhile the remaining two companies of the 6th Gordon Highlanders had been collected in the Ribécourt-Flesquières sunken road.
The 6th Seaforth Highlanders fared better. Seven tanks on the left and centre of the battalion front passed throughthe wire, and enabled the left company to enter the trench with only three casualties.
On the right of the battalion front the tanks appear to have lost their direction, as no gaps were cut in the wire. “C” Company, however, discovered a gap on their left flank, and having passed through it, pushed on towards the trench. Here they had some severe fighting before they finally established themselves in it, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy and capturing many prisoners.
This company then tried to force their way along the Hindenburg support line towards their right to join up with the 6th Gordon Highlanders. By leaving the trench and running along the parapet, shooting and bombing the Germans, they cleared some fifty yards of the trench. The rifle and machine-gun fire from Flesquières, however, became so heavy that they were forced to take to the trench again and establish a bombing-block on their flanks between them and the enemy.
While this fighting was in progress the surviving tanks were pushing on towards Flesquières Trench; but they, too, came under artillery fire, and were knocked out by direct hits.
The personnel of the tanks suffered heavy losses, as in some cases the tanks burst into flames on being struck by a shell, and their crews were burnt to death before help could be brought to them. There is no need to describe the sufferings of the unfortunate men who died in this manner, imprisoned in the flaming tanks.
The tanks which still survived shortly became non-effective for the time being owing to shortage of petrol. The crews which survived, however, still continued to assist the infantry after their tanks were out of action. For example, 2nd Lieutenant Blow, after his tank, the Edward II., was struck by a shell, took his Lewis guns from it, placed one in action at the head of a communication trench, and himself fired a Lewis gun from the roof of his tank until the gun became too hot to hold. He then attached himself to the Seaforths for the remainder of the action.
The second wave of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, in spite of a heavy fire directed against them from Flesquières Trench, made repeated attempts to enter it, in which all officers except one per company became casualties.
One officer in particular, 2nd Lieutenant Donald Grant, displayed great courage and initiative in his efforts to gain his objective. Leading his platoon along a communication trench, east of Flesquières Wood, he drove the enemy before him, bayoneting many himself. When all his men but one were casualties, he climbed out of his communication trench and attempted to rush Flesquières Trench from above ground. He and his companion were, however, immediately shot dead.
The 7th Gordon Highlanders, just as they had done at Beaumont Hamel and again at the chemical works, carried their advance to the farthest point reached in the attack. They made short work of the Hindenburg Support, where they picked up 100 prisoners. On approaching Flesquières Trench their tanks became subjected to close-range field-gun fire, and drew most of the fire of the riflemen and machine-gunners. The infantry were thus able to enter the trench and establish themselves in it after some heavy fighting.
On the right at first only one section gained a lodgment in this trench, but a platoon advancing over the area which the section had just traversed followed it into the trench, and then fought its way along it with bombs and rifles until it reached the battalion right boundary.
The next waves thus passed on to assault the village, unsupported by tanks, and in the face of a terrific fire. At one period they were able to sweep the main street of the village with Lewis-gun fire; but subjected to machine-gun fire from all sides, they could not maintain their position, and were forced back into Flesquières Trench.
The Germans then delivered a counter-attack against the right of the 7th Gordon Highlanders, and forced them out of Flesquières Trench, which in this sector was in many places only a few inches deep.
The 7th Gordon Highlanders were thus left, holding the Hindenburg support line throughout the battalion front, and with three platoons in Flesquières Trench.
The 7th Black Watch on the left flank of the Division encountered a series of misfortunes. In the first place, two of their tanks were ditched in crossing the front line. Secondly, before encountering Hindenburg support line, they met tremendous resistance from Cemetery Alley.Here both their second and third waves became involved in heavy fighting, and after a severe engagement, in which the attackers were subjected to a considerable volume of machine-gun fire from Cemetery Ridge, the trench was captured with 200 prisoners.
Hindenburg support line was thus successfully captured in conjunction with tanks; but on crossing this trench, all the remaining tanks were knocked out. As uncut wire lay in front of them, and a great volume of fire was being directed against them from the village, the waves could not continue their advance. Attempts were made to get forward by small parties, but with no success, and the battalion was ordered to consolidate its gains as it stood.
At this stage the prospects of a farther advance were not good. The German gunner, always an unpleasantly efficient person, seemed to have got the measure of the tanks, and without them it appeared impossible in the near future to give the advance further impetus.
Meanwhile, Lieut.-Colonel S. MacDonald, D.S.O., commanding the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, had arrived at the Hindenburg support line, and had reorganised his two companies there for further efforts. He found that the village, wood, and chateau were a series of strong nests of machine-guns. However, employing tanks in the vicinity, which had run out of petrol, to open on the village with their 6-pounders and Lewis guns, he led his battalion forward in person, and gained a foothold in Flesquières Trench, which extended from the Ribécourt-Flesquières road for 300 yards to the left.
From this position Colonel MacDonald, showing splendid qualities of leadership, organised two determined attempts to reach the village under cover of rifle and Lewis-gun fire. Though one or two machine-guns were put out of action, the intense fire which this enterprise attracted from the high walls of the chateau grounds and the houses in the village, checked the advance on both occasions. During one of these attempts a private soldier, single-handed, killed the team of a machine-gun and carried the gun back to the British lines.
About 5P.M.seven more tanks arrived, of which six entered the village. They were not, however, sufficiently closely supported by the infantry, and the attack failed.The enemy, with great cunning, offered no resistance to the tanks in the streets, either lying motionless in his emplacements or retiring into dug-outs and cellars while the tanks were passing. The tanks, after cruising about the village until the light began to fail, returned after an uneventful voyage.
Meanwhile, in support of the tanks two platoons of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders were ordered to advance through the wood, and two to enter the village from the north. The first party was held up in the wood by machine-guns, and the second entered the village only to meet the tanks withdrawing. They therefore attempted to establish a chain of posts round the village; but, fired at from front and flanks, were compelled to withdraw.
Arrangements were now made to prevent the enemy from evacuating his guns during the night by placing a machine-gun barrage on the northern slopes of the Flesquières Ridge. With this object the 152nd Machine Gun Company alone fired over 19,000 rounds before daylight. By dawn, however, the enemy had withdrawn from Flesquières Trench and the villages.
A patrol of the 7th Gordon Highlanders had left their trenches as early as 3.45P.M., circled the north-west side of the village to the north-west corner, and reported that that flank was only held by a few machine-guns and snipers. At 4P.M.a patrol of the 7th Black Watch found Flesquières Trench unoccupied, and the battalion moved into it.
At 2.45A.M.three patrols of the 7th Gordon Highlanders returned and reported that they had advanced as far as the Brown line, and that the whole area was clear of the enemy. About the same time a patrol of the 7th Black Watch returned with similar information. These two battalions therefore advanced and occupied the Brown line, troops of the 7th Gordon Highlanders passing right through the village and encountering only slight machine-gun and rifle fire.
At 6.15A.M.on the following morning troops of the 6th Gordon Highlanders and 6th Seaforth Highlanders also established themselves on the Brown line without opposition.
Thus within twenty-four hours of the attack having been launched the Brown line was occupied in its entirety,largely owing to the vigilance with which the 153rd Brigade had kept in touch with the enemy’s movements by patrolling.
During the final advance to the Brown line considerable booty was taken, the following guns being captured by the 6th Gordon Highlanders: two 5·9 howitzers and two 4·2 guns; by the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, five field-guns; by the 7th Gordon Highlanders, two 8-inch howitzers, five 5·9 howitzers, and a field-gun.
By nightfall on the day of the attack the artillery had considerably advanced their positions, one brigade being at the Grand Ravine, and two in No Man’s Land.
The advance to the Red dotted line was now accomplished without difficulty. On the right the 5th Seaforth Highlanders passed through the 6th Gordon Highlanders, reached the Red dotted line, and made a reconnaissance in force towards Cantaing with a total of fourteen casualties. On their left the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders also reached the Red dotted line, having killed five Germans and captured thirty-three in an attack by section rushes against a sunken road. They also reconnoitred towards Cantaing, but found it strongly held.
Similarly, the 6th Black Watch and the 5th Gordon Highlanders occupied the Red dotted line with a total of two and three casualties respectively. The former captured three field-guns and four 4·2 howitzers, and the latter three field-guns.
During these operations the 154th Brigade, which had assembled at Metz at 5A.M.on the day of the attack, had at 10A.M.moved two battalions to the old British front line and two just clear of Metz, in readiness to move forward should Flesquières fall.
On the evening of the 20th it was decided that should the Red dotted line be captured during the night, the 154th Brigade should pass through the 152nd and 153rd Brigades, capture the Cantaing Line and Cantaing, and advance on the village of Fontaine Notre Dame.
Of these objectives Cantaing and the Cantaing Line proved themselves to be formidable obstacles. The latter, though the trenches were for the most part only traced out, contained numerous completed dug-outs and machine-gun emplacements, and was for the greater portion of its lengthprotected by a double belt of wire some fifteen yards in depth. The defences of the village of Cantaing were also considerably strengthened by a well-traversed trench encircling its south-western corner.
The 154th Brigade began its advance with the 4th Gordon Highlanders covering the front of the 152nd Infantry Brigade, and the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders covering the 153rd. In rear were the 9th Royal Scots on the right, and the 4th Seaforth Highlanders on the left.
The 4th Gordon Highlanders passed through the Red dotted line at 10.30A.M., and continued their advance at first uneventfully. As, however, they began to approach Cantaing Trench, machine-guns from the trenches and from buildings in the village, as well as light trench-mortars, opened on them in sufficient volume to hold up the advance until shortly after noon. At that hour ten tanks arrived from Premy Chapel, and made towards the village, followed by “B” Company of the 4th Gordon Highlanders. Cantaing was entered, and after a little street fighting 300 prisoners were taken from it.
Meanwhile about the south-western end of the village, in the trenches in that vicinity and in the sunken road running to Cantaing Mill, bodies of the enemy continued to offer a magnificent resistance. “D” Company of the 4th Gordon Highlanders managed to force their way through the wire into a position on the Cantaing-Flesquières road, but could make no farther progress. Two Stokes guns were then brought into action, but even these failed to dislodge the enemy. Indeed, it was not until 3P.M., when one of the tanksen routefor Fontaine arrived, that the pocket was finally cleared. This gallant stand made by the enemy had disorganised this attack, which came to a standstill with “B” and “D” Companies of the 4th Gordon Highlanders consolidating the line north and north-east of the village, and with “A” and “C” Companies connecting them on the right flank with the 29th Division, who were by this time in Nine Wood. Subsequently three squadrons of the Queen’s Bays and the 9th Cavalry Brigade M.G. Squadron arrived, and took up defensive positions round the perimeter of the village in conjunction with the 4th Gordon Highlanders.
While this operation was in progress, the 7th Argyll andSutherland Highlanders, on the left of the 4th Gordon Highlanders, could not join in the advance until 11.20A.M., as they were held up by heavy fire from the village of Anneux. However, at that hour the village was captured by the 62nd Division, and they were able to move forward again.
By noon the advance had again been completely held up about 300 yards from the Cantaing Line by heavy enfilade fire from Cantaing on the right and Bourlon Wood on the left. As no tanks had as yet arrived, the battalion therefore began to dig in.
During this time and until the end of the day low-flying enemy aeroplanes, sometimes only 150 feet from the ground, patrolled our lines, observed the position of our troops, disclosed them by dropping lights, and fired with machine-guns on the men.
Meanwhile, the 4th Gordon Highlanders having been led away rather to the right to deal with Cantaing, touch had been lost between the two battalions. A company of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders was therefore ordered forward to fill the gap between the Gordons and the Argylls.
At 3.30P.M.the situation was cleared up by the arrival of seven tanks, which moved forward, followed by the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the company of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders. At the sight of the tanks the Germans in the Cantaing Line surrendered, 130 men being taken prisoners.
The advance on Fontaine Notre Dame was thus begun, and was carried out without any opposition being met beyond a few shots fired by riflemen in Bourlon Wood. The village was in our hands by 5P.M.
The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were then disposed so as to defend Fontaine, the point of junction being north of the village, with the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on the left and the 4th Seaforth Highlanders on the right. One company of the latter was also detached to connect up the 62nd Division north of Anneux with the reserve platoons of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders garrisoning the Cantaing Line.