“Will you please accept for yourself and convey to all concerned very heartiest congratulations and thanks for the excellent and successful attack made by the Division to-day. The gallantry and steadiness of the 153rd Infantry Brigade were most marked, the artillery barrage was all that could be desired, and the work on this and previousdays in bridging the river under heavy shell-fire and difficult circumstances was beyond all praise.”October 25th was a day of heavy fighting, in which the enemy sustained serious losses. The Canadians were facing Valenciennes from the west bank of the canal, and the Highland Division and the 4th Division were ordered to continue the pressure on the east bank of the canal. The objective given for this attack was the high ground east of the railway east of Maing, and it was also hoped that it might be possible to gain Famars and Mont Houy by exploitation.Of these objectives Mont Houy was an outstanding hillock north of Famars 88.1 metres in height, from which practically all the ground from the Ecaillon to the foot of the hillock could be observed. It thus commanded the approaches to Valenciennes from the south.For this attack the Divisional front was divided into two sectors, the 152nd Infantry Brigade relieving the 6th Black Watch on the right, the 153rd Brigade relieving the 7th Black Watch on the left. The 152nd Brigade employed two battalions, the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders on the right and the 6th Seaforth Highlanders on the left in the front line of the attack, and the 153rd Brigade one, the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.So that the attack might be launched behind a regular barrage, all troops were withdrawn behind a line running through the centre of Maing village.At 7A.M.the advance began and at once made rapid progress. Two companies of the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders reached the railway embankment without difficulty; the two remaining companies passed through them and established themselves by 11A.M.on the high ground at Caumont Farm and Grand Mont—not, however, without some brisk fighting with machine-gun posts. The 6th Seaforth Highlanders met with some stiff resistance on the railway, where they rushed a machine-gun post and captured an officer and twelve men. They met further opposition on Rouge Mont, but were equally successful in dealing with it. From this point, however, they came in contact with a strong enemy line west of Famars, which checked all their further efforts to advance.On the left the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on their right flank reached their objective by 8.30A.M., but on the left they met determined resistance opposite La Fontenelle and at the houses alongside the canal opposite Trith-St Leger. It was not until they had successfully employed their light trench-mortars that on this part of the field they reached their objective at noon.In this action, a section of 4.5 howitzers (under the command of Lieutenant D. L. MacMasters, M.C.) was employed as a mobile section for the first time, and did excellent work.It engaged machine-guns in La Fontenelle and Poirier Farm with direct observation, and made such accurate shooting that the enemy ran in a panic in all directions.On the attainment of these objectives, the fighting did not abate. All along the front our troops were in close contact with the enemy holding his line in strength. Our line then ran from the northern Divisional boundary along the railway down to the point where it crosses the Maing-Famars road, and then bulged forward in a loop to enclose Rouge Mont, Grand Mont, and Caumont.Enemy machine-guns at fairly close range throughout the day kept up continual bursts of fire, which made any movement a matter of great difficulty, while low-flying aeroplanes constantly machine-gunned the troops in their new positions. The shelling was also very heavy, particularly along the railway, where, owing to the large proportion of gas used, masks had to be worn almost continuously.At 4P.M.the enemy opened a hurricane bombardment of our lines, and shortly afterwards launched a counter-attack. The S.O.S. was fired, and the artillery protective barrage came down. Observing officers reported that this was most effective, and that the enemy, who was counter-attacking in large numbers from the village of Famars, was well caught in the barrage and suffered seriously.He was, however, in spite of his losses in the barrage, able to push back the line of the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders in the loop, and compel them gradually to give way until they were able to take up a firm stand along the railway.The conformation of our line now enabled him to press the 6th Seaforth Highlanders on both flanks. They opposedhis advance resolutely, inflicting further serious losses on him with rifle and Lewis-gun fire, until their ammunition, of which a quantity had been expended in combating low-flying aeroplanes, began to run short. They then fell back fighting by stages to the railway.On the left, where the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had taken up their position west of the railway, the attack was stopped before it reached our lines. In this action two sections of machine-guns distributed along the railway caught the enemy in their fire just as the artillery had done, and also took a heavy toll of them. The mobile section of 18-pounders attached to the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders also seized many opportunities of cutting up enemy parties crossing over the high ground west of Famars.Considering the amount of fire in which it became involved, this counter-attack was a gallant performance on the part of a retiring enemy, and proved that themoraleof his troops was, at any rate in some units, still high.At 6P.M.the enemy delivered a second counter-attack, this time with its weight against the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. The Argylls, who had knocked out the first attack against their lines with rifle-fire, on this occasion adopted another method. As the enemy approached, they sprang from their shell-holes and charged down the hill against the approaching enemy with such vigour that those attackers who survived the onslaught fled from the field. The net result was that the Argylls carried their line forward for 500 yards, and established themselves in a line of trenches which, running east of the railway on the left, crossed it 100-200 yards south-west of La Fontenelle Wood. In this brilliant action they captured seventy-four unwounded prisoners, a trench-mortar, and several machine-guns. After this treatment the enemy had no further stomach for counter-attacks, but he vented his spleen by maintaining a heavy bombardment of our whole line with his artillery and machine-guns, which he maintained throughout the night.October 26th was another day of savage fighting, the enemy resisting stubbornly, and being aggressive with his artillery and in counter-attacks.Orders were issued for the advance to be resumed inconjunction with the 4th Division, the objectives of the 51st being Famars and Mont Houy.For this attack the 152nd Brigade employed the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders on the right and the 4th Gordon Highlanders (attached) on the left, while the 153rd Brigade employed the 6th Black Watch. The artillery fired a creeping barrage, and a company of machine-guns was again placed across the canal at Trith-St Leger in positions in enfilade, in which it had many opportunities of engaging good targets with machine-gun fire.The attack was launched at 10A.M., and on the right both battalions made good progress. Caumont and Betterave Farm were soon in the hands of the leading companies of the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders, and these joined with the 4th Gordon Highlanders on the left in surrounding Rouge Mont Copse and accounting for its entire garrison. The rear two companies then passed through them, and also reached the objective allotted to them, a line south of Famars facing the Rhonelle river.The two leading companies of the 4th Gordon Highlanders were no less successful. They forced their way by short rushes to the high ground south of Famars, having rounded up a number of machine-gunsen route. The two following companies then passed through them and entered Famars village. Here, after a series of struggles with machine-gun posts and some street fighting, the village was cleared and posts established east of it by 11.30A.M.On the left the 6th Black Watch carried out their advance successfully, though subjected to considerable artillery and machine-gun fire. By 11.30A.M.the two leading companies had made their way close up to Mont Houy. The two rear companies then passed through them, the one to attack the hill, and the other to continue the advance beyond La Poirier Station. These troops were assisted by one of the machine-guns on the north side of the river, which, seeing some infantry held up by an enemy machine-gun, fired a burst into the gun, scattered the survivors of the detachment, and enabled the infantry to capture it.On Mont Houy there was prolonged rather close fighting, but the company, now much depleted by losses from machine-gun and shell-fire, gradually overcame the Germans, and eventually forced its way to the summit of thehill and held on there. The left company got to within about 200 yards of La Poirier Station, when machine-gun fire from houses on the canal bank which caught them in the left flank brought their advance to a standstill.Throughout the afternoon fighting continued in the neighbourhood of Mont Houy, where the situation was very obscure. Finally, after the protective barrage had stopped, the enemy dribbled round the flanks of the position, and by 5P.M.the remnants of the 6th Black Watch were almost surrounded, and compelled to extricate themselves, falling back to a line between Famars and La Fontenelle.When the situation had become clear, orders were issued that at dusk the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders, with artillery support, should advance to secure a bridgehead over the Rhonelle river at Aulnoy, while the 6th Black Watch, with one company of the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, were ordered to push forward beyond Mont Houy.At the same time the enemy decided to counter-attack with a view to regaining Famars. It thus happened that while the troops were moving forward to give effect to these orders, the enemy put down a tremendous gas-shell and high-explosive bombardment, which stretched in depth from our foremost trenches to Maing. This bombardment led up to a counter-attack, which succeeded in forcing the 4th and 6/7 Gordon Highlanders out of Famars. They were, however, immediately reorganised at the south end of the village and led forward again. They forced their way back through the village, drove out the enemy, and restored the line.Meanwhile, on the left, owing to the darkness and the fact that the bombardment had cut all communications, the advance of the 6th Black Watch and 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders was rendered very difficult. However, in spite of this, it was attempted; but the machine-gun fire was so severe that it offered no prospect of success, and was in consequence abandoned.Patrols of the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders then advanced, but they found Aulnoy strongly held, and it was therefore decided that for the present no further advance should be contemplated.During the day 2 officers and 172 other ranks were captured, and many machine-guns. On the right the 4th Division were now established on the line Betterave Farm-Artres.At the conclusion of the day’s fighting the following message was received by the G.O.C. from the Corps Commander:—“The Corps Commander wishes to compliment the Division on their continued success of yesterday and to-day, and would be glad if you would convey his special congratulations to the 1/6 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on their fine repulse of yesterday’s counter-attack.”October 27th, though no attack on a large scale was planned, turned out a day of fighting almost as strenuous as that of the last three days, the enemy becoming active and aggressive.It had been decided that the 154th Brigade should take over the front during the night 26-27th October; but the situation had fluctuated and remained so obscure that this relief was not carried out. Certain reliefs, however, did take place.The 4th Seaforth Highlanders took over from the 6th Black Watch, the front-line reliefs having to be carried out by the incomers and outgoers dribbling in and out singly, owing to the lightness of the morning. The operation was, however, successfully completed by 9A.M.On the right one company of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders went into the line north of Famars, the remaining three companies holding the line of the railway, while the 6/7 and 4th Gordon Highlanders remained in position under the command of the B.G.C. 154th Brigade.Famars was now to change hands for a fourth and fifth time. During the morning the enemy continued to shell it heavily, and after an intense bombardment attacked at 10.30A.M.The 4th Gordon Highlanders were gradually pressed back, and the enemy established posts in the village. A counter-attack was therefore immediately organised. At 12.30P.M.parties were put out round the flanks, and when these had worked their way forward, the counter-attack companies advanced through the village. The enemy fought stubbornly amongst the houses; but afterhe had suffered many casualties at the hands of the 4th Gordon Highlanders in heavy street fighting, his resistance collapsed, and the line was again restored east of Famars.No further infantry action followed, though the enemy continued to shell our front positions viciously, employing large quantities of gas.In the afternoon, as much movement had been observed in Mont Houy by the artillery observers, a series of five Chinese barrages were fired across it. A mobile section of 4.5 howitzers also did good work, and materially assisted the infantry. 2nd Lieutenant W. Baines, who was in command, established an observation post in Famars, and from it silenced a forward section of German field-guns that were harassing our infantry, and also engaged much enemy movement.From this point the importance of the capture of Mont Houy increased, as an attack on a wider front south of Valenciennes was now being planned which necessitated the move of the artillery supporting this attack into the valley south of Maing, which was in full view of the summit of Mont Houy. It was of great importance, therefore, to deny to the enemy the use of the hill for purposes of observation.In view of this attack further readjustments had taken place. The 5th and 6th Seaforth Highlanders had taken over the line on the right and the 4th Seaforth Highlanders on the left. The latter were ordered to carry out an attack against Mont Houy on the morning of 28th October, the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders being detailed to link up the new line reached with the right brigade front, and to support the attack and exploit it should it be successful.The final objective was a line from the cross-roads west of Aulnoy to a point 400 yards north of La Poirier Station.All four companies of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders were launched in this attack at 5.15A.M., covered by a barrage fired by the artillery, by a machine-gun company on the east bank of the canal, and by machine-guns firing from the railway.The Seaforths advanced with three companies leading, supported by two sections of machine-guns, and followed by the fourth company 150 yards in rear of the centre.The right company worked along Mont Houy Wood, two platoons going to the right and two to the left. The Germans were in the wood in strength, but after some hard fighting fifty prisoners were captured and a line established through the wood.The centre company advanced with great gallantry in the face of heavy shell and machine-gun fire, which was inflicting considerable casualties on them. They captured some forty prisoners defending a quarry at the north-west corner of the wood, and finally reached their objective—a trench north-west of Chemin Vert—after all its ranks had fallen with the exception of twelve men. The effort to reach their objective shown by these twelve survivors after having been shelled and machine-gunned during an advance of 1500 yards shows what a spirit of determination animated the men even after a fortnight’s continuous fighting.The support company at once sent two platoons to reinforce the twelve men, and two platoons to the cemetery east of Aulnoy. The former successfully reached their objective, and captured those Germans that were not killed in the assault. The latter reached the cross-roads, but, owing to the number of houses in the vicinity in which machine-guns were mounted, they were pinned to the ground and surrounded. Their comrades on their left were too closely engaged to render them any help, and it is assumed that they were all either killed or captured.The company on the left, divided into two waves, reached a line about 400 yards north of La Poirier Station before being held up by machine-gun fire from La Targette. In this advance the first wave captured four machine-guns and the second wave ten, and cleared numerous factories along the canal bank occupied by parties of the enemy.At 8A.M., then, the whole of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders were on or close to their objectives, had captured many machine-guns and prisoners, and killed a number of the enemy. They had, however, experienced heavy fighting, and were weakened by serious losses, and had one half-company surrounded and isolated. Parties of the enemy were also still left in Mont Houy Wood.The situation, however, remained obscure, and as the runners from the most advanced troops had to traverse areas swept by machine-gun bullets, few of them survivedto deliver their messages. It was therefore not known in what serious straits the 4th Seaforth Highlanders were. Gradually the enemy dribbled his men in between the posts and began threatening them on their flanks and forcing them back. Machine-guns also were active against them from parts of Mont Houy that had not been entirely cleared.The 4th Seaforth Highlanders were now too weak to maintain themselves in this situation against the increasing numbers of the enemy, and they were thus gradually forced back, still fighting, to a line running a little north of La Poirier Station, and west and south of Mont Houy Wood, to the junction with the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders north-west of Famars.During these operations a company of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders that had been waiting in readiness to move forward for exploitation had advanced on its own initiative to the support of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders left, while a second company, having been sent forward to strengthen the centre, found the troops establishing the line just described at about 12 noon and joined them.In view of the situation, the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who were on the march to rest billets at Lieu St Amand, were turned back to Maing and placed at the disposal of the 154th Brigade.Fighting went on all day, but there was no substantial alteration in the line. The action had so far resulted in the infantry establishing themselves so close to Mont Houy that it could no longer be used as an observation post, so that the objectives had in some degree been obtained.At 4P.M.the artillery fire again became intense along the whole forward area. This was followed by what the enemy intended for a counter-attack. The German infantry had, however, apparently experienced all the fighting that they could endure for one day, and few of them left their trenches. Those that did were easily dispersed with machine-gun and Lewis-gun fire.During this day’s fighting 117 unwounded prisoners were taken.Map XIII. The Final Advance: Dispositions of 51st (Highland) Division, 5 p.m., 28th October 1918.mapOn the 28th orders had been issued for the relief of the left brigade by the 4th Canadian Division, and of the rightbrigade by the 49th Division. This arrangement had been made to allow the Canadians, whose general line faced Valenciennes from the west, also to attack the town from the south. Only the relief of the 49th Division was, however, carried out, as the situation about Mont Houy was still considered too obscure for adequate arrangements to be made. The relief of the left sector was therefore postponed for twenty-four hours. The troops about Mont Houy were, however, greatly reduced in fighting strength, and were exhausted; the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders therefore relieved the 4th Seaforth Highlanders and the two companies of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders who had joined with them in consolidating the line. One company of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders remained in the front line north of Famars.On 29th October the line of the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who had already successfully dealt with several counter-attacks, was twice tested by the enemy. The night 28-29th had passed quietly, the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders putting the enemy’s inactivity to good use by establishing a post on the southern edge of Mont Houy.At 6.30A.M.the enemy attacked on the left, but chiefly on account of the fire which took him in enfilade from the recently established post the attack broke down in front of our lines.At 4P.M., after another heavy artillery bombardment, the enemy again attacked, about 250 of his infantry debouching from Mont Houy Wood. The Argylls and machine-gunners, however, stood their ground, and had smothered the attack with their fire before it reached our lines, the new post again giving effective aid.Meanwhile the G.O.C. 49th Division had taken over command of the Divisional front at 10A.M.At 9P.M., 29th October, the 6th and 7th Argylls, the last of the infantry of the Highland Division to hold the battle front in France, were relieved by the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade. The Divisional artillery, however, remained in the line, and continued the battle for Valenciennes.In these operations the Division advanced its line ten miles, captured 661 unwounded prisoners, 164 machine-guns, 4 trench-mortars, 3 minnenwerfers, and 6 anti-tank rifles.Though the enemy’s military power was fast crumpling, the armistice occurring twelve days after the relief of the Division, the resistance encountered, particularly as regards artillery, was at times very formidable. On four occasions attacks were delivered on a two-brigade front, and twice on a one-brigade front, a heavy burden of fighting to be borne in nineteen days by nine battalions of infantry. The casualties were not light, amounting as they did to 112 officers and 2723 other ranks, some battalions suffering particularly heavily, such as the 5th Seaforth Highlanders (14 officers and 409 other ranks), the 6th Seaforth Highlanders (13 officers and 283 other ranks), the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders (16 officers and 425 other ranks), the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (8 officers and 294 other ranks), while the 4th Seaforth Highlanders and the 4th Gordon Highlanders lost 13 and 14 officers respectively. Fortunately the numbers of killed and missing—21 officers and 292 men killed, and 6 officers and 184 men missing—were not so proportionately high as had been the case in some of the previous operations.In few battles did the various arms of the service co-operate more successfully in face of such great difficulties.The support given by the artillery to the infantry and machine-gunners contributed largely to the success of the advance, inflicted considerable casualties on the enemy, and materially reduced our losses by its effectiveness. This support was largely made possible by the work of the R.E., who, in spite of all the attempts made by the German gunners to hinder their work, completed their bridges in the minimum of time, and so allowed the gunners to keep in close support of the infantry.As regards the infantry, these battles were a succession of gallant acts and heroism. The 7th Argylls at Lieu St Amand, and again at Thiant, the charge of the 6th Argylls, the forcing of the Ecaillon by the Black Watch battalions, take one back to a war of romance, such as the long days of stationary warfare and stereotyped trench-to-trench attacks had led one to forget. There must, however, always exist a natural feeling of sorrow for the loss of those officers and men who, in many cases after months of continuousfighting, gave their lives within a few days of the close of the war, particularly perhaps for those men of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders who pressed on to the farthest point reached by the infantry of the Highland Division in the Great War, and fell at Aulnoy cemetery.The work of the R.A.M.C. in battle, since it is usually performed during the times when the thoughts of all are naturally turned to the foremost infantry, does not always take its fair place in the public eye. On this occasion it was carried out in face of great difficulties, due to the abnormal conditions. Nevertheless, it reached the same standards which the R.A.M.C. had set for itself in the varying circumstances that had arisen during the retirements in March and April and in the advance in Champagne.In the first place, the demolition of cross-roads by mines and the blocking of routes by the blowing up of railway arches and bridges rendered the evacuation of casualties a difficult matter. Ford ambulances were, however, employed immediately any route was sufficiently cleared to give them passage. They proved invaluable, as owing to their lightness they could cross fields, pick their way through shell-holes in the roads, climb banks, or be man-handled through soft cut-up ground.They could therefore in most cases be run up to regimental aid-posts, and in consequence a large amount of their work was done under heavy shell-fire. In the village of Iwuy one Ford was hit twice by shell-fire, one orderly being killed and the M.O. wounded. On both occasions the driver, Private Highmore, D.C.M., M.M., M.T., R.A.S.C., attached 1/2 Highland Field Ambulance, managed temporarily to repair his car under shell-fire and safely evacuate the cases entrusted to him.During this advance a problem entirely new to the Division arose. The civil population was present in large numbers in the area of active operations, either in process of being evacuated from their homes or of returning from the back areas to villages recently released from the enemy. About one-half of these people were ill, largely owing to exhaustion, exposure, and long-continued underfeeding while in enemy hands. A large proportion of them were tubercular; for instance, in the village of Haulchin, witha population of 1500, over 90 cases of tubercular disease, many of them in an advanced stage, were treated, and this was by no means the total.Medical attendance of the sick was organised through the field ambulances and M.O.’s of units; in Neuville sur l’Escaut alone over 200 cases were visited in three hours.Soup kitchens and centres of distribution of bones were installed and handed over to the French authorities in eleven different villages, and it is estimated that over 5000 civilians were supplied with nourishing food, in addition to the rations and medical comforts issued.On 30th October 3760 rations were issued to the inhabitants of Douchy, Haulchin, Noyelles, Neuville, and Famars.Thirty-five cases of civilians suffering either from gunshot wounds or gas were also evacuated, most of them from Famars.The French authorities and the people themselves expressed the greatest appreciation of the work carried out on their behalf by the Division, and especially by the R.A.M.C.In all the reoccupied areas the sanitation was in a deplorable condition. In view of the enemy’s boasted efficiency in this respect, this was probably intentional on his part. The conditions were made worse by the amount of refuse which had to be cleared out of the houses. Owing to the mildness of the weather, these conditions produced a plague of flies. Moreover, incineration, the usual safeguard against them, was seriously handicapped by the fact that it could only be carried out with the greatest caution owing to the number of loose bombs, hand-grenades, and booby traps in general that had been left behind by the enemy. For instance, in Iwuy a bomb had been placed inside a mattress that had been intentionally fouled, with the result that when it was burnt the bomb exploded, wounding two men.At Douchy a refuse-pit full of dry refuse, inviting incineration, was found on examination to have the bottom layer lined with hand-grenades.Throughout the operations two parties, each of an officer and ten men of the 172nd Tunnelling Company, wore employed in making a systematic search for mines and traps, and a large number of them were found and removed.The work carried out by the 51st Divisional Ammunition Column in these operations was enormous. They organised and controlled six different ammunition dumps. Throughout they assisted the batteries in the supply of ammunition to the gun line, and at the same time salved and brought forward all ammunition left behind in old gun positions and rear dumps. They also collected the empty cartridge-cases from the vacated gun positions, and thousands of these were salved, boxed, and returned to railhead.During the operations the D.A.C. handled 229,162 rounds of 18-pounder and 73,000 rounds of 4·5 howitzer ammunition.The work of the signal company was also heavier than it had been in any other offensive operation. They not only had to compete with an advance of ten miles, but also with the following number of changes in the location of the various headquarters:—Divisional headquarters with Divisional artillery headquarters2152nd Brigade headquarters6153rd Brigade headquarters9154th Brigade headquarters5The fact that Signals were able to maintain an efficient service throughout these operations was largely due to the energy and skill of the officer commanding the 51st Divisional Signal Company, Major J. Muirhead, D.S.O., M.C.In short, probably no previous operation had demanded a greater or more prolonged effort on the part of all arms and branches of the service than this, the last fight of the Highland Division.CHAPTER XIX.CONCLUSION.The Divisional artillery came out of action in the neighbourhood of Famars on 2nd November, but returned to the line on 6th November under orders of the C.R.A. 56th Division. They remained attached to the advancing Divisions until the declaration of the armistice at 11A.M.on 11th November, within forty-eight hours of the second anniversary of the battle of Beaumont Hamel.With the armistice ends the real history of the Highland Division, and it is well to leave the story of the gradual fading away of the Division during the period of demobilisation untold. Suffice it to say that the last commander who finally hauled down the Divisional flag was Brigadier-General L. Oldfield, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., the C.R.A., who had joined the Division on July 1916, and had served longer with it than any other of its Brigadiers.The last of the battalions that had served with the Division left in Belgium or France was the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who remained at Charleroi under the command of Major Andrew Lockie. Attached to this battalion were a number of non-demobilisable Jocks from many different battalions, and it in consequence came to be known as the 8th Argyll and some other Highlanders.No history of the Highland Division would be complete without a word spoken about both the incomparable Jock and his adversary the Boche.That the Boche was such a magnificent fighter reflects more to the credit of the Highland Division probably than any other factor. The picture of the Boche as a fat, crop-eared, spectacled, middle-aged gentleman, holding up his hands and crying “Kamerad,” was a libellous portrait ofhim that appeared almost daily in the illustrated press, and sickened the men who had to fight him.The German was, in fact, a magnificent worker in trenches, a rifle-shot full of initiative, a machine-gunner whose courage did not fail him up to the last days of the war, an accurate gunner, a skilful and at times very aggressive airman, an infantryman capable of great skill and initiative in his attacks, of prolonged resistance in the defence, and of occasional bursts of great enterprise in raiding.That the Jocks should have defeated him in every department of the game from 13th November 1916 until 29th October 1918 would not have been so praiseworthy a feat were the military qualities of the Germans less.As regards the Jock, the men of the Highland Division, while Scotland had men to give, were difficult to equal. Of splendid physique, and with their fine characteristic open countenances, they compared favourably in appearance with the Guards Division.At Arras in 1916, as one walked round the vast hollow square of Highland soldiers within which the Divisional band of 100 pipers used to play, one felt that one would never be privileged to see the manhood of a nation better expressed, or a nation that could provide a better exhibition of manhood.Here were men from all those various callings which by their nature tend to give men physical strength—miners, fishermen, farm-servants, gillies, stalkers, all in their prime of life. Later, particularly in 1918, when the Highlands had nothing further to give but her boys, the physique and general appearance of the Division naturally deteriorated. However, though called upon to shoulder a man’s burden before their physical development was complete, these same boys, in Champagne and in the last phases of the war, showed that they had at least inherited the spirit of their fathers and elder brothers.The past records of the Highland regiments had afforded ample proof that the Highlander was well endowed by nature for any form of warfare that he had taken part in prior to the Great War. From the time that they were raised there has hardly been a battle of first importance in which some act of gallantry on the part of one or other of the kilted regiments has not become proverbial. But experience hadalready proved that this war was not one in which thearme blanche,élan, and physical courage, unassisted by considerable tactical skill and the power of prolonged endurance of nerve-shattering things, could hope for success.Modern conditions of war have, however, only added lustre to the reputation of the Highlander as a fighting man. The Jock soon learned to temper his natural courage and dash with skill and intelligence. He regarded the war not as a sport, but as a business. He took his training seriously, and in consequence was easily trained. In battle his great virtue was that he did not “see red” or lose his head, but coolly and intelligently put into practice what he had learnt in his training. The men had thus the necessary aptitude to be moulded by their commanders into a highly-perfected fighting machine.According to their own statements, the Germans feared the Highland Division more than any other Division on the Western Front. This was not because it was the most savage, for the Jock was a clean fighter, if anything over-kind, but because, after the evil days of High Wood, the Division never knew failure.One of the great factors on which the reputation of the 51st Division rested was its intenseesprit de division, which continuously increased as success followed success. No matter in what arm of the service he might be, the Jock was proud of the 51st. As a result, the various arms were all animated by the common ideal of enhancing the reputation of their Division.This feeling dominated the whole Division from its commanders down to the cook in the Divisional soup kitchen, and the old warrior, some sixty years of age, who drove the Foden disinfector.Proud of their Division and proud of their record, themoraleof the Jocks was always maintained at a high pitch throughout the war, with perhaps the exception of the period after the two heavy German attacks with the consequent enormous losses in March and April 1918.During this period the Division was so decimated and so exhausted that a fear existed that it might never regain its old fighting efficiency. However, a quiet tour of trench life on the familiar Vimy Ridge soon dispelled this fear, and the Division was able to give as good an account ofitself as ever when fighting alongside the French in Champagne in the following July and August.In billets the Jock was as good a soldier as he was in the field; crime, apart from the most minor offences, was almost non-existent. The periods of rest, which were seldom long, were ungrudgingly devoted to restoring uniform and equipment to an almost pre-war standard of smartness and to training for further encounters.The inhabitants of France and Belgium had a deep affection forles Écossaisand the 51st. This, no doubt, was in a measure due to the Highland dress, but more particularly to the natural courtesy and kindly disposition of the Jocks.It will always remain a mystery how the Jock understood the patois of the natives, and how the natives understood the mixture of broad Scots and bad French which the Jock employed. The fact remained that their disabilities in respect of language apparently placed little restriction on their intimacy with one another.For many years to come the inhabitants of the erstwhile British lines in France and Belgium will regard the 51st (Highland) Division not only with admiration for their fighting qualities, but also with deep affection for that gallant gentleman, the Jock.FOOTNOTES:[1]On 11th May 1915 the 1/1 Highland Division was renamed the 51st (Highland) Division, the Infantry Brigades being numbered, 152nd (Seaforth and Camerons), 153rd (Gordon Battalions), 154th (Lancashire Battalions).[2]Shortly after this move Lieut.-Colonel A. J. G. Moir, who had mobilised as G.S.O. 1 to the Division, returned to the Division as A.A. and Q.M.G.[3]The 6th Scottish Rifles had replaced the 2/5 Lancashire Regiment, a second-line battalion, which was withdrawn from the Division to complete its training.[4]With the later and more delayed fuzes it was necessary to have thirty feet of head cover to be secure against bursts of 5·9-in. or 8-in. shells.[5]Knife-rests are portable wire entanglements. The framework is shaped like a knife-rest, numerous strands of barbed wire being stretched from end to end of it. It is carried up to the trenches folded up so as to make it easily portable. At night they are taken into No Man’s Land, opened out, and placed in position and pegged to the ground.[6]Obtaining identifications was a matter of extreme importance, as it enabled G.H.Q. to estimate the number of German Divisions holding the line, and the number in reserve available to be moved from one portion of the front to another.[7]This passage is quoted from Lieut.-General Sir G. M. Harper’s ‘Notes on Infantry Tactics and Training.’ Appendix, p. 126.[8]To protect the troops in the shell-holes from the shrapnel barrage the Germans had about this time equipped them with body armour, proof against shrapnel bullets and against rifle bullets from a range of 400 yards and over. This armour, which could be worn either on the back or the front, according to whether a man was standing or lying down, proved too heavy and was soon discarded.[9]On the arrival of the first smoke shells the enemy, thinking they were some new form of frightfulness, put on gas masks.PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONSTranscribers’ NoteHyphenation has been standardised.Stop has been added after cent in per cent. (treated as an abbreviation for "per centum").All instances of Bois de Coutron changed to Bois de Courton.All instances of Bois des Eclisses changed to Bois d’Éclisse.All instances of Minnenwerfer changed to Minenwerfer.page 11: Le Quinque Rue-de Bethune ——> La Quinque Rue-Rue de Béthunepage 56: vigiliance ——> vigilancepage 94: bayonetted ——> bayonetedpage 212: 6.5 ——> 6.05page 234: Hauteville ——> Hautvillerspage 286: 293th ——> 293rdpage 318: appreciaton ——> appreciationpage 348: Charmuzy ——> Chaumuzy.
“Will you please accept for yourself and convey to all concerned very heartiest congratulations and thanks for the excellent and successful attack made by the Division to-day. The gallantry and steadiness of the 153rd Infantry Brigade were most marked, the artillery barrage was all that could be desired, and the work on this and previousdays in bridging the river under heavy shell-fire and difficult circumstances was beyond all praise.”
“Will you please accept for yourself and convey to all concerned very heartiest congratulations and thanks for the excellent and successful attack made by the Division to-day. The gallantry and steadiness of the 153rd Infantry Brigade were most marked, the artillery barrage was all that could be desired, and the work on this and previousdays in bridging the river under heavy shell-fire and difficult circumstances was beyond all praise.”
October 25th was a day of heavy fighting, in which the enemy sustained serious losses. The Canadians were facing Valenciennes from the west bank of the canal, and the Highland Division and the 4th Division were ordered to continue the pressure on the east bank of the canal. The objective given for this attack was the high ground east of the railway east of Maing, and it was also hoped that it might be possible to gain Famars and Mont Houy by exploitation.
Of these objectives Mont Houy was an outstanding hillock north of Famars 88.1 metres in height, from which practically all the ground from the Ecaillon to the foot of the hillock could be observed. It thus commanded the approaches to Valenciennes from the south.
For this attack the Divisional front was divided into two sectors, the 152nd Infantry Brigade relieving the 6th Black Watch on the right, the 153rd Brigade relieving the 7th Black Watch on the left. The 152nd Brigade employed two battalions, the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders on the right and the 6th Seaforth Highlanders on the left in the front line of the attack, and the 153rd Brigade one, the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
So that the attack might be launched behind a regular barrage, all troops were withdrawn behind a line running through the centre of Maing village.
At 7A.M.the advance began and at once made rapid progress. Two companies of the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders reached the railway embankment without difficulty; the two remaining companies passed through them and established themselves by 11A.M.on the high ground at Caumont Farm and Grand Mont—not, however, without some brisk fighting with machine-gun posts. The 6th Seaforth Highlanders met with some stiff resistance on the railway, where they rushed a machine-gun post and captured an officer and twelve men. They met further opposition on Rouge Mont, but were equally successful in dealing with it. From this point, however, they came in contact with a strong enemy line west of Famars, which checked all their further efforts to advance.
On the left the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on their right flank reached their objective by 8.30A.M., but on the left they met determined resistance opposite La Fontenelle and at the houses alongside the canal opposite Trith-St Leger. It was not until they had successfully employed their light trench-mortars that on this part of the field they reached their objective at noon.
In this action, a section of 4.5 howitzers (under the command of Lieutenant D. L. MacMasters, M.C.) was employed as a mobile section for the first time, and did excellent work.
It engaged machine-guns in La Fontenelle and Poirier Farm with direct observation, and made such accurate shooting that the enemy ran in a panic in all directions.
On the attainment of these objectives, the fighting did not abate. All along the front our troops were in close contact with the enemy holding his line in strength. Our line then ran from the northern Divisional boundary along the railway down to the point where it crosses the Maing-Famars road, and then bulged forward in a loop to enclose Rouge Mont, Grand Mont, and Caumont.
Enemy machine-guns at fairly close range throughout the day kept up continual bursts of fire, which made any movement a matter of great difficulty, while low-flying aeroplanes constantly machine-gunned the troops in their new positions. The shelling was also very heavy, particularly along the railway, where, owing to the large proportion of gas used, masks had to be worn almost continuously.
At 4P.M.the enemy opened a hurricane bombardment of our lines, and shortly afterwards launched a counter-attack. The S.O.S. was fired, and the artillery protective barrage came down. Observing officers reported that this was most effective, and that the enemy, who was counter-attacking in large numbers from the village of Famars, was well caught in the barrage and suffered seriously.
He was, however, in spite of his losses in the barrage, able to push back the line of the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders in the loop, and compel them gradually to give way until they were able to take up a firm stand along the railway.
The conformation of our line now enabled him to press the 6th Seaforth Highlanders on both flanks. They opposedhis advance resolutely, inflicting further serious losses on him with rifle and Lewis-gun fire, until their ammunition, of which a quantity had been expended in combating low-flying aeroplanes, began to run short. They then fell back fighting by stages to the railway.
On the left, where the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had taken up their position west of the railway, the attack was stopped before it reached our lines. In this action two sections of machine-guns distributed along the railway caught the enemy in their fire just as the artillery had done, and also took a heavy toll of them. The mobile section of 18-pounders attached to the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders also seized many opportunities of cutting up enemy parties crossing over the high ground west of Famars.
Considering the amount of fire in which it became involved, this counter-attack was a gallant performance on the part of a retiring enemy, and proved that themoraleof his troops was, at any rate in some units, still high.
At 6P.M.the enemy delivered a second counter-attack, this time with its weight against the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. The Argylls, who had knocked out the first attack against their lines with rifle-fire, on this occasion adopted another method. As the enemy approached, they sprang from their shell-holes and charged down the hill against the approaching enemy with such vigour that those attackers who survived the onslaught fled from the field. The net result was that the Argylls carried their line forward for 500 yards, and established themselves in a line of trenches which, running east of the railway on the left, crossed it 100-200 yards south-west of La Fontenelle Wood. In this brilliant action they captured seventy-four unwounded prisoners, a trench-mortar, and several machine-guns. After this treatment the enemy had no further stomach for counter-attacks, but he vented his spleen by maintaining a heavy bombardment of our whole line with his artillery and machine-guns, which he maintained throughout the night.
October 26th was another day of savage fighting, the enemy resisting stubbornly, and being aggressive with his artillery and in counter-attacks.
Orders were issued for the advance to be resumed inconjunction with the 4th Division, the objectives of the 51st being Famars and Mont Houy.
For this attack the 152nd Brigade employed the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders on the right and the 4th Gordon Highlanders (attached) on the left, while the 153rd Brigade employed the 6th Black Watch. The artillery fired a creeping barrage, and a company of machine-guns was again placed across the canal at Trith-St Leger in positions in enfilade, in which it had many opportunities of engaging good targets with machine-gun fire.
The attack was launched at 10A.M., and on the right both battalions made good progress. Caumont and Betterave Farm were soon in the hands of the leading companies of the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders, and these joined with the 4th Gordon Highlanders on the left in surrounding Rouge Mont Copse and accounting for its entire garrison. The rear two companies then passed through them, and also reached the objective allotted to them, a line south of Famars facing the Rhonelle river.
The two leading companies of the 4th Gordon Highlanders were no less successful. They forced their way by short rushes to the high ground south of Famars, having rounded up a number of machine-gunsen route. The two following companies then passed through them and entered Famars village. Here, after a series of struggles with machine-gun posts and some street fighting, the village was cleared and posts established east of it by 11.30A.M.
On the left the 6th Black Watch carried out their advance successfully, though subjected to considerable artillery and machine-gun fire. By 11.30A.M.the two leading companies had made their way close up to Mont Houy. The two rear companies then passed through them, the one to attack the hill, and the other to continue the advance beyond La Poirier Station. These troops were assisted by one of the machine-guns on the north side of the river, which, seeing some infantry held up by an enemy machine-gun, fired a burst into the gun, scattered the survivors of the detachment, and enabled the infantry to capture it.
On Mont Houy there was prolonged rather close fighting, but the company, now much depleted by losses from machine-gun and shell-fire, gradually overcame the Germans, and eventually forced its way to the summit of thehill and held on there. The left company got to within about 200 yards of La Poirier Station, when machine-gun fire from houses on the canal bank which caught them in the left flank brought their advance to a standstill.
Throughout the afternoon fighting continued in the neighbourhood of Mont Houy, where the situation was very obscure. Finally, after the protective barrage had stopped, the enemy dribbled round the flanks of the position, and by 5P.M.the remnants of the 6th Black Watch were almost surrounded, and compelled to extricate themselves, falling back to a line between Famars and La Fontenelle.
When the situation had become clear, orders were issued that at dusk the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders, with artillery support, should advance to secure a bridgehead over the Rhonelle river at Aulnoy, while the 6th Black Watch, with one company of the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, were ordered to push forward beyond Mont Houy.
At the same time the enemy decided to counter-attack with a view to regaining Famars. It thus happened that while the troops were moving forward to give effect to these orders, the enemy put down a tremendous gas-shell and high-explosive bombardment, which stretched in depth from our foremost trenches to Maing. This bombardment led up to a counter-attack, which succeeded in forcing the 4th and 6/7 Gordon Highlanders out of Famars. They were, however, immediately reorganised at the south end of the village and led forward again. They forced their way back through the village, drove out the enemy, and restored the line.
Meanwhile, on the left, owing to the darkness and the fact that the bombardment had cut all communications, the advance of the 6th Black Watch and 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders was rendered very difficult. However, in spite of this, it was attempted; but the machine-gun fire was so severe that it offered no prospect of success, and was in consequence abandoned.
Patrols of the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders then advanced, but they found Aulnoy strongly held, and it was therefore decided that for the present no further advance should be contemplated.
During the day 2 officers and 172 other ranks were captured, and many machine-guns. On the right the 4th Division were now established on the line Betterave Farm-Artres.
At the conclusion of the day’s fighting the following message was received by the G.O.C. from the Corps Commander:—
“The Corps Commander wishes to compliment the Division on their continued success of yesterday and to-day, and would be glad if you would convey his special congratulations to the 1/6 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on their fine repulse of yesterday’s counter-attack.”
“The Corps Commander wishes to compliment the Division on their continued success of yesterday and to-day, and would be glad if you would convey his special congratulations to the 1/6 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on their fine repulse of yesterday’s counter-attack.”
October 27th, though no attack on a large scale was planned, turned out a day of fighting almost as strenuous as that of the last three days, the enemy becoming active and aggressive.
It had been decided that the 154th Brigade should take over the front during the night 26-27th October; but the situation had fluctuated and remained so obscure that this relief was not carried out. Certain reliefs, however, did take place.
The 4th Seaforth Highlanders took over from the 6th Black Watch, the front-line reliefs having to be carried out by the incomers and outgoers dribbling in and out singly, owing to the lightness of the morning. The operation was, however, successfully completed by 9A.M.On the right one company of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders went into the line north of Famars, the remaining three companies holding the line of the railway, while the 6/7 and 4th Gordon Highlanders remained in position under the command of the B.G.C. 154th Brigade.
Famars was now to change hands for a fourth and fifth time. During the morning the enemy continued to shell it heavily, and after an intense bombardment attacked at 10.30A.M.The 4th Gordon Highlanders were gradually pressed back, and the enemy established posts in the village. A counter-attack was therefore immediately organised. At 12.30P.M.parties were put out round the flanks, and when these had worked their way forward, the counter-attack companies advanced through the village. The enemy fought stubbornly amongst the houses; but afterhe had suffered many casualties at the hands of the 4th Gordon Highlanders in heavy street fighting, his resistance collapsed, and the line was again restored east of Famars.
No further infantry action followed, though the enemy continued to shell our front positions viciously, employing large quantities of gas.
In the afternoon, as much movement had been observed in Mont Houy by the artillery observers, a series of five Chinese barrages were fired across it. A mobile section of 4.5 howitzers also did good work, and materially assisted the infantry. 2nd Lieutenant W. Baines, who was in command, established an observation post in Famars, and from it silenced a forward section of German field-guns that were harassing our infantry, and also engaged much enemy movement.
From this point the importance of the capture of Mont Houy increased, as an attack on a wider front south of Valenciennes was now being planned which necessitated the move of the artillery supporting this attack into the valley south of Maing, which was in full view of the summit of Mont Houy. It was of great importance, therefore, to deny to the enemy the use of the hill for purposes of observation.
In view of this attack further readjustments had taken place. The 5th and 6th Seaforth Highlanders had taken over the line on the right and the 4th Seaforth Highlanders on the left. The latter were ordered to carry out an attack against Mont Houy on the morning of 28th October, the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders being detailed to link up the new line reached with the right brigade front, and to support the attack and exploit it should it be successful.
The final objective was a line from the cross-roads west of Aulnoy to a point 400 yards north of La Poirier Station.
All four companies of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders were launched in this attack at 5.15A.M., covered by a barrage fired by the artillery, by a machine-gun company on the east bank of the canal, and by machine-guns firing from the railway.
The Seaforths advanced with three companies leading, supported by two sections of machine-guns, and followed by the fourth company 150 yards in rear of the centre.
The right company worked along Mont Houy Wood, two platoons going to the right and two to the left. The Germans were in the wood in strength, but after some hard fighting fifty prisoners were captured and a line established through the wood.
The centre company advanced with great gallantry in the face of heavy shell and machine-gun fire, which was inflicting considerable casualties on them. They captured some forty prisoners defending a quarry at the north-west corner of the wood, and finally reached their objective—a trench north-west of Chemin Vert—after all its ranks had fallen with the exception of twelve men. The effort to reach their objective shown by these twelve survivors after having been shelled and machine-gunned during an advance of 1500 yards shows what a spirit of determination animated the men even after a fortnight’s continuous fighting.
The support company at once sent two platoons to reinforce the twelve men, and two platoons to the cemetery east of Aulnoy. The former successfully reached their objective, and captured those Germans that were not killed in the assault. The latter reached the cross-roads, but, owing to the number of houses in the vicinity in which machine-guns were mounted, they were pinned to the ground and surrounded. Their comrades on their left were too closely engaged to render them any help, and it is assumed that they were all either killed or captured.
The company on the left, divided into two waves, reached a line about 400 yards north of La Poirier Station before being held up by machine-gun fire from La Targette. In this advance the first wave captured four machine-guns and the second wave ten, and cleared numerous factories along the canal bank occupied by parties of the enemy.
At 8A.M., then, the whole of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders were on or close to their objectives, had captured many machine-guns and prisoners, and killed a number of the enemy. They had, however, experienced heavy fighting, and were weakened by serious losses, and had one half-company surrounded and isolated. Parties of the enemy were also still left in Mont Houy Wood.
The situation, however, remained obscure, and as the runners from the most advanced troops had to traverse areas swept by machine-gun bullets, few of them survivedto deliver their messages. It was therefore not known in what serious straits the 4th Seaforth Highlanders were. Gradually the enemy dribbled his men in between the posts and began threatening them on their flanks and forcing them back. Machine-guns also were active against them from parts of Mont Houy that had not been entirely cleared.
The 4th Seaforth Highlanders were now too weak to maintain themselves in this situation against the increasing numbers of the enemy, and they were thus gradually forced back, still fighting, to a line running a little north of La Poirier Station, and west and south of Mont Houy Wood, to the junction with the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders north-west of Famars.
During these operations a company of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders that had been waiting in readiness to move forward for exploitation had advanced on its own initiative to the support of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders left, while a second company, having been sent forward to strengthen the centre, found the troops establishing the line just described at about 12 noon and joined them.
In view of the situation, the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who were on the march to rest billets at Lieu St Amand, were turned back to Maing and placed at the disposal of the 154th Brigade.
Fighting went on all day, but there was no substantial alteration in the line. The action had so far resulted in the infantry establishing themselves so close to Mont Houy that it could no longer be used as an observation post, so that the objectives had in some degree been obtained.
At 4P.M.the artillery fire again became intense along the whole forward area. This was followed by what the enemy intended for a counter-attack. The German infantry had, however, apparently experienced all the fighting that they could endure for one day, and few of them left their trenches. Those that did were easily dispersed with machine-gun and Lewis-gun fire.
During this day’s fighting 117 unwounded prisoners were taken.
Map XIII. The Final Advance: Dispositions of 51st (Highland) Division, 5 p.m., 28th October 1918.map
Map XIII. The Final Advance: Dispositions of 51st (Highland) Division, 5 p.m., 28th October 1918.
On the 28th orders had been issued for the relief of the left brigade by the 4th Canadian Division, and of the rightbrigade by the 49th Division. This arrangement had been made to allow the Canadians, whose general line faced Valenciennes from the west, also to attack the town from the south. Only the relief of the 49th Division was, however, carried out, as the situation about Mont Houy was still considered too obscure for adequate arrangements to be made. The relief of the left sector was therefore postponed for twenty-four hours. The troops about Mont Houy were, however, greatly reduced in fighting strength, and were exhausted; the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders therefore relieved the 4th Seaforth Highlanders and the two companies of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders who had joined with them in consolidating the line. One company of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders remained in the front line north of Famars.
On 29th October the line of the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who had already successfully dealt with several counter-attacks, was twice tested by the enemy. The night 28-29th had passed quietly, the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders putting the enemy’s inactivity to good use by establishing a post on the southern edge of Mont Houy.
At 6.30A.M.the enemy attacked on the left, but chiefly on account of the fire which took him in enfilade from the recently established post the attack broke down in front of our lines.
At 4P.M., after another heavy artillery bombardment, the enemy again attacked, about 250 of his infantry debouching from Mont Houy Wood. The Argylls and machine-gunners, however, stood their ground, and had smothered the attack with their fire before it reached our lines, the new post again giving effective aid.
Meanwhile the G.O.C. 49th Division had taken over command of the Divisional front at 10A.M.
At 9P.M., 29th October, the 6th and 7th Argylls, the last of the infantry of the Highland Division to hold the battle front in France, were relieved by the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade. The Divisional artillery, however, remained in the line, and continued the battle for Valenciennes.
In these operations the Division advanced its line ten miles, captured 661 unwounded prisoners, 164 machine-guns, 4 trench-mortars, 3 minnenwerfers, and 6 anti-tank rifles.
Though the enemy’s military power was fast crumpling, the armistice occurring twelve days after the relief of the Division, the resistance encountered, particularly as regards artillery, was at times very formidable. On four occasions attacks were delivered on a two-brigade front, and twice on a one-brigade front, a heavy burden of fighting to be borne in nineteen days by nine battalions of infantry. The casualties were not light, amounting as they did to 112 officers and 2723 other ranks, some battalions suffering particularly heavily, such as the 5th Seaforth Highlanders (14 officers and 409 other ranks), the 6th Seaforth Highlanders (13 officers and 283 other ranks), the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders (16 officers and 425 other ranks), the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (8 officers and 294 other ranks), while the 4th Seaforth Highlanders and the 4th Gordon Highlanders lost 13 and 14 officers respectively. Fortunately the numbers of killed and missing—21 officers and 292 men killed, and 6 officers and 184 men missing—were not so proportionately high as had been the case in some of the previous operations.
In few battles did the various arms of the service co-operate more successfully in face of such great difficulties.
The support given by the artillery to the infantry and machine-gunners contributed largely to the success of the advance, inflicted considerable casualties on the enemy, and materially reduced our losses by its effectiveness. This support was largely made possible by the work of the R.E., who, in spite of all the attempts made by the German gunners to hinder their work, completed their bridges in the minimum of time, and so allowed the gunners to keep in close support of the infantry.
As regards the infantry, these battles were a succession of gallant acts and heroism. The 7th Argylls at Lieu St Amand, and again at Thiant, the charge of the 6th Argylls, the forcing of the Ecaillon by the Black Watch battalions, take one back to a war of romance, such as the long days of stationary warfare and stereotyped trench-to-trench attacks had led one to forget. There must, however, always exist a natural feeling of sorrow for the loss of those officers and men who, in many cases after months of continuousfighting, gave their lives within a few days of the close of the war, particularly perhaps for those men of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders who pressed on to the farthest point reached by the infantry of the Highland Division in the Great War, and fell at Aulnoy cemetery.
The work of the R.A.M.C. in battle, since it is usually performed during the times when the thoughts of all are naturally turned to the foremost infantry, does not always take its fair place in the public eye. On this occasion it was carried out in face of great difficulties, due to the abnormal conditions. Nevertheless, it reached the same standards which the R.A.M.C. had set for itself in the varying circumstances that had arisen during the retirements in March and April and in the advance in Champagne.
In the first place, the demolition of cross-roads by mines and the blocking of routes by the blowing up of railway arches and bridges rendered the evacuation of casualties a difficult matter. Ford ambulances were, however, employed immediately any route was sufficiently cleared to give them passage. They proved invaluable, as owing to their lightness they could cross fields, pick their way through shell-holes in the roads, climb banks, or be man-handled through soft cut-up ground.
They could therefore in most cases be run up to regimental aid-posts, and in consequence a large amount of their work was done under heavy shell-fire. In the village of Iwuy one Ford was hit twice by shell-fire, one orderly being killed and the M.O. wounded. On both occasions the driver, Private Highmore, D.C.M., M.M., M.T., R.A.S.C., attached 1/2 Highland Field Ambulance, managed temporarily to repair his car under shell-fire and safely evacuate the cases entrusted to him.
During this advance a problem entirely new to the Division arose. The civil population was present in large numbers in the area of active operations, either in process of being evacuated from their homes or of returning from the back areas to villages recently released from the enemy. About one-half of these people were ill, largely owing to exhaustion, exposure, and long-continued underfeeding while in enemy hands. A large proportion of them were tubercular; for instance, in the village of Haulchin, witha population of 1500, over 90 cases of tubercular disease, many of them in an advanced stage, were treated, and this was by no means the total.
Medical attendance of the sick was organised through the field ambulances and M.O.’s of units; in Neuville sur l’Escaut alone over 200 cases were visited in three hours.
Soup kitchens and centres of distribution of bones were installed and handed over to the French authorities in eleven different villages, and it is estimated that over 5000 civilians were supplied with nourishing food, in addition to the rations and medical comforts issued.
On 30th October 3760 rations were issued to the inhabitants of Douchy, Haulchin, Noyelles, Neuville, and Famars.
Thirty-five cases of civilians suffering either from gunshot wounds or gas were also evacuated, most of them from Famars.
The French authorities and the people themselves expressed the greatest appreciation of the work carried out on their behalf by the Division, and especially by the R.A.M.C.
In all the reoccupied areas the sanitation was in a deplorable condition. In view of the enemy’s boasted efficiency in this respect, this was probably intentional on his part. The conditions were made worse by the amount of refuse which had to be cleared out of the houses. Owing to the mildness of the weather, these conditions produced a plague of flies. Moreover, incineration, the usual safeguard against them, was seriously handicapped by the fact that it could only be carried out with the greatest caution owing to the number of loose bombs, hand-grenades, and booby traps in general that had been left behind by the enemy. For instance, in Iwuy a bomb had been placed inside a mattress that had been intentionally fouled, with the result that when it was burnt the bomb exploded, wounding two men.
At Douchy a refuse-pit full of dry refuse, inviting incineration, was found on examination to have the bottom layer lined with hand-grenades.
Throughout the operations two parties, each of an officer and ten men of the 172nd Tunnelling Company, wore employed in making a systematic search for mines and traps, and a large number of them were found and removed.
The work carried out by the 51st Divisional Ammunition Column in these operations was enormous. They organised and controlled six different ammunition dumps. Throughout they assisted the batteries in the supply of ammunition to the gun line, and at the same time salved and brought forward all ammunition left behind in old gun positions and rear dumps. They also collected the empty cartridge-cases from the vacated gun positions, and thousands of these were salved, boxed, and returned to railhead.
During the operations the D.A.C. handled 229,162 rounds of 18-pounder and 73,000 rounds of 4·5 howitzer ammunition.
The work of the signal company was also heavier than it had been in any other offensive operation. They not only had to compete with an advance of ten miles, but also with the following number of changes in the location of the various headquarters:—
The fact that Signals were able to maintain an efficient service throughout these operations was largely due to the energy and skill of the officer commanding the 51st Divisional Signal Company, Major J. Muirhead, D.S.O., M.C.
In short, probably no previous operation had demanded a greater or more prolonged effort on the part of all arms and branches of the service than this, the last fight of the Highland Division.
The Divisional artillery came out of action in the neighbourhood of Famars on 2nd November, but returned to the line on 6th November under orders of the C.R.A. 56th Division. They remained attached to the advancing Divisions until the declaration of the armistice at 11A.M.on 11th November, within forty-eight hours of the second anniversary of the battle of Beaumont Hamel.
With the armistice ends the real history of the Highland Division, and it is well to leave the story of the gradual fading away of the Division during the period of demobilisation untold. Suffice it to say that the last commander who finally hauled down the Divisional flag was Brigadier-General L. Oldfield, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., the C.R.A., who had joined the Division on July 1916, and had served longer with it than any other of its Brigadiers.
The last of the battalions that had served with the Division left in Belgium or France was the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who remained at Charleroi under the command of Major Andrew Lockie. Attached to this battalion were a number of non-demobilisable Jocks from many different battalions, and it in consequence came to be known as the 8th Argyll and some other Highlanders.
No history of the Highland Division would be complete without a word spoken about both the incomparable Jock and his adversary the Boche.
That the Boche was such a magnificent fighter reflects more to the credit of the Highland Division probably than any other factor. The picture of the Boche as a fat, crop-eared, spectacled, middle-aged gentleman, holding up his hands and crying “Kamerad,” was a libellous portrait ofhim that appeared almost daily in the illustrated press, and sickened the men who had to fight him.
The German was, in fact, a magnificent worker in trenches, a rifle-shot full of initiative, a machine-gunner whose courage did not fail him up to the last days of the war, an accurate gunner, a skilful and at times very aggressive airman, an infantryman capable of great skill and initiative in his attacks, of prolonged resistance in the defence, and of occasional bursts of great enterprise in raiding.
That the Jocks should have defeated him in every department of the game from 13th November 1916 until 29th October 1918 would not have been so praiseworthy a feat were the military qualities of the Germans less.
As regards the Jock, the men of the Highland Division, while Scotland had men to give, were difficult to equal. Of splendid physique, and with their fine characteristic open countenances, they compared favourably in appearance with the Guards Division.
At Arras in 1916, as one walked round the vast hollow square of Highland soldiers within which the Divisional band of 100 pipers used to play, one felt that one would never be privileged to see the manhood of a nation better expressed, or a nation that could provide a better exhibition of manhood.
Here were men from all those various callings which by their nature tend to give men physical strength—miners, fishermen, farm-servants, gillies, stalkers, all in their prime of life. Later, particularly in 1918, when the Highlands had nothing further to give but her boys, the physique and general appearance of the Division naturally deteriorated. However, though called upon to shoulder a man’s burden before their physical development was complete, these same boys, in Champagne and in the last phases of the war, showed that they had at least inherited the spirit of their fathers and elder brothers.
The past records of the Highland regiments had afforded ample proof that the Highlander was well endowed by nature for any form of warfare that he had taken part in prior to the Great War. From the time that they were raised there has hardly been a battle of first importance in which some act of gallantry on the part of one or other of the kilted regiments has not become proverbial. But experience hadalready proved that this war was not one in which thearme blanche,élan, and physical courage, unassisted by considerable tactical skill and the power of prolonged endurance of nerve-shattering things, could hope for success.
Modern conditions of war have, however, only added lustre to the reputation of the Highlander as a fighting man. The Jock soon learned to temper his natural courage and dash with skill and intelligence. He regarded the war not as a sport, but as a business. He took his training seriously, and in consequence was easily trained. In battle his great virtue was that he did not “see red” or lose his head, but coolly and intelligently put into practice what he had learnt in his training. The men had thus the necessary aptitude to be moulded by their commanders into a highly-perfected fighting machine.
According to their own statements, the Germans feared the Highland Division more than any other Division on the Western Front. This was not because it was the most savage, for the Jock was a clean fighter, if anything over-kind, but because, after the evil days of High Wood, the Division never knew failure.
One of the great factors on which the reputation of the 51st Division rested was its intenseesprit de division, which continuously increased as success followed success. No matter in what arm of the service he might be, the Jock was proud of the 51st. As a result, the various arms were all animated by the common ideal of enhancing the reputation of their Division.
This feeling dominated the whole Division from its commanders down to the cook in the Divisional soup kitchen, and the old warrior, some sixty years of age, who drove the Foden disinfector.
Proud of their Division and proud of their record, themoraleof the Jocks was always maintained at a high pitch throughout the war, with perhaps the exception of the period after the two heavy German attacks with the consequent enormous losses in March and April 1918.
During this period the Division was so decimated and so exhausted that a fear existed that it might never regain its old fighting efficiency. However, a quiet tour of trench life on the familiar Vimy Ridge soon dispelled this fear, and the Division was able to give as good an account ofitself as ever when fighting alongside the French in Champagne in the following July and August.
In billets the Jock was as good a soldier as he was in the field; crime, apart from the most minor offences, was almost non-existent. The periods of rest, which were seldom long, were ungrudgingly devoted to restoring uniform and equipment to an almost pre-war standard of smartness and to training for further encounters.
The inhabitants of France and Belgium had a deep affection forles Écossaisand the 51st. This, no doubt, was in a measure due to the Highland dress, but more particularly to the natural courtesy and kindly disposition of the Jocks.
It will always remain a mystery how the Jock understood the patois of the natives, and how the natives understood the mixture of broad Scots and bad French which the Jock employed. The fact remained that their disabilities in respect of language apparently placed little restriction on their intimacy with one another.
For many years to come the inhabitants of the erstwhile British lines in France and Belgium will regard the 51st (Highland) Division not only with admiration for their fighting qualities, but also with deep affection for that gallant gentleman, the Jock.
[1]On 11th May 1915 the 1/1 Highland Division was renamed the 51st (Highland) Division, the Infantry Brigades being numbered, 152nd (Seaforth and Camerons), 153rd (Gordon Battalions), 154th (Lancashire Battalions).
[1]On 11th May 1915 the 1/1 Highland Division was renamed the 51st (Highland) Division, the Infantry Brigades being numbered, 152nd (Seaforth and Camerons), 153rd (Gordon Battalions), 154th (Lancashire Battalions).
[2]Shortly after this move Lieut.-Colonel A. J. G. Moir, who had mobilised as G.S.O. 1 to the Division, returned to the Division as A.A. and Q.M.G.
[2]Shortly after this move Lieut.-Colonel A. J. G. Moir, who had mobilised as G.S.O. 1 to the Division, returned to the Division as A.A. and Q.M.G.
[3]The 6th Scottish Rifles had replaced the 2/5 Lancashire Regiment, a second-line battalion, which was withdrawn from the Division to complete its training.
[3]The 6th Scottish Rifles had replaced the 2/5 Lancashire Regiment, a second-line battalion, which was withdrawn from the Division to complete its training.
[4]With the later and more delayed fuzes it was necessary to have thirty feet of head cover to be secure against bursts of 5·9-in. or 8-in. shells.
[4]With the later and more delayed fuzes it was necessary to have thirty feet of head cover to be secure against bursts of 5·9-in. or 8-in. shells.
[5]Knife-rests are portable wire entanglements. The framework is shaped like a knife-rest, numerous strands of barbed wire being stretched from end to end of it. It is carried up to the trenches folded up so as to make it easily portable. At night they are taken into No Man’s Land, opened out, and placed in position and pegged to the ground.
[5]Knife-rests are portable wire entanglements. The framework is shaped like a knife-rest, numerous strands of barbed wire being stretched from end to end of it. It is carried up to the trenches folded up so as to make it easily portable. At night they are taken into No Man’s Land, opened out, and placed in position and pegged to the ground.
[6]Obtaining identifications was a matter of extreme importance, as it enabled G.H.Q. to estimate the number of German Divisions holding the line, and the number in reserve available to be moved from one portion of the front to another.
[6]Obtaining identifications was a matter of extreme importance, as it enabled G.H.Q. to estimate the number of German Divisions holding the line, and the number in reserve available to be moved from one portion of the front to another.
[7]This passage is quoted from Lieut.-General Sir G. M. Harper’s ‘Notes on Infantry Tactics and Training.’ Appendix, p. 126.
[7]This passage is quoted from Lieut.-General Sir G. M. Harper’s ‘Notes on Infantry Tactics and Training.’ Appendix, p. 126.
[8]To protect the troops in the shell-holes from the shrapnel barrage the Germans had about this time equipped them with body armour, proof against shrapnel bullets and against rifle bullets from a range of 400 yards and over. This armour, which could be worn either on the back or the front, according to whether a man was standing or lying down, proved too heavy and was soon discarded.
[8]To protect the troops in the shell-holes from the shrapnel barrage the Germans had about this time equipped them with body armour, proof against shrapnel bullets and against rifle bullets from a range of 400 yards and over. This armour, which could be worn either on the back or the front, according to whether a man was standing or lying down, proved too heavy and was soon discarded.
[9]On the arrival of the first smoke shells the enemy, thinking they were some new form of frightfulness, put on gas masks.
[9]On the arrival of the first smoke shells the enemy, thinking they were some new form of frightfulness, put on gas masks.
PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
Transcribers’ NoteHyphenation has been standardised.Stop has been added after cent in per cent. (treated as an abbreviation for "per centum").All instances of Bois de Coutron changed to Bois de Courton.All instances of Bois des Eclisses changed to Bois d’Éclisse.All instances of Minnenwerfer changed to Minenwerfer.page 11: Le Quinque Rue-de Bethune ——> La Quinque Rue-Rue de Béthunepage 56: vigiliance ——> vigilancepage 94: bayonetted ——> bayonetedpage 212: 6.5 ——> 6.05page 234: Hauteville ——> Hautvillerspage 286: 293th ——> 293rdpage 318: appreciaton ——> appreciationpage 348: Charmuzy ——> Chaumuzy.
Hyphenation has been standardised.
Stop has been added after cent in per cent. (treated as an abbreviation for "per centum").
All instances of Bois de Coutron changed to Bois de Courton.
All instances of Bois des Eclisses changed to Bois d’Éclisse.
All instances of Minnenwerfer changed to Minenwerfer.
page 11: Le Quinque Rue-de Bethune ——> La Quinque Rue-Rue de Béthune
page 56: vigiliance ——> vigilance
page 94: bayonetted ——> bayoneted
page 212: 6.5 ——> 6.05
page 234: Hauteville ——> Hautvillers
page 286: 293th ——> 293rd
page 318: appreciaton ——> appreciation
page 348: Charmuzy ——> Chaumuzy.