Lieut. ColonelNorman Macleod, C.M.G., D.S.O.,commanded from 23rd April, 1917, to 10th June, 1918.
Lieut. ColonelNorman Macleod, C.M.G., D.S.O.,commanded from 23rd April, 1917, to 10th June, 1918.
Lieut. ColonelNorman Macleod, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
commanded from 23rd April, 1917, to 10th June, 1918.
Owing to casualties in the previous fighting, we had now only three Company Officers left, besides the Commanding Officer and Lieut. Legate, who was acting as Adjutant. A request was made to be allowed to bring up fresh officers from the transport lines, but this was refused. Unfortunately, just as the Battalion was moving off, one of the three officers became a casualty, leaving only two, neither of whom had been in action before the previous day's fighting. When we reached the lines and found that the Battalion was to carry out the attack on Cavalry Farm, the Commanding Officer suggested to Brigade that he would go forward to CompanyHeadquarters, as the Battalion had been practically reduced to the strength of a Company, especially in officers. However, the Brigade would not agree to this.
The intention was that the Battalion was to take Cavalry Farm and the trenches to the east of it. The 45th Brigade were to attack to the north of Cambrai Road, and take a German strong point so as to protect our left, while the Black Watch were to advance on our right and form a line of posts. As soon as the Battalion had captured the farm, the 9th Pioneer Gordons were to make a communication trench up to it. The attack commenced at 11 p.m. We managed to capture the farm, but on getting past it we found the trench to the east strongly held by the enemy. These we attacked, but almost immediately found ourselves between two fires, coming from the trenches in front and from machine guns close on our left rear, situated in the strong point which the 45th Brigade had failed to capture. The result was that we had to fall back on the farm. In the meantime the Gordons, having heard that we had taken the farm, came up to commence their trench. They also came under the same heavy cross fire as was holding up our advance, and had to withdraw. The Major in Command and many others become casualties.
This information being received at the Battalion Headquarters, the Commanding Officer decided to go forward and try to re-organisethe attack. The communication trench was filled with 9th Gordons, and it became necessary to advance over the open, which was a slow process, as the ground was being swept by machine guns. On reaching the front line it was found crowded with troops, in consequence of the Seaforths, who were in support, having moved forward into the front line when our Battalion had advanced to the attack. They were now mixed up with our men who had come back. The Seaforths were ordered to withdraw to the support line, with the exception of one Company which was retained to assist us in holding the front line. It was practically impossible to take the trenches east of the farm unless the strong point on the north side of the road was attacked and captured. Having therefore formed posts in the farm and to the right, to link up with the Black Watch, he proceeded to the 45th Brigade Company, who had failed to capture the strong point on the north side of the road, and from which position the enemy were able to fire into our rear when we had gone forward. They informed him that they did not intend to attack the strong point again. This made it impossible for us to continue the attack beyond the farm with any chance of success. That evening the Battalion was relieved by the Seaforths, and moved into support. The next day the Battalion was occupied in burying dead. This work was difficult, as the enemy, seeing the movement, kept up intermittent shelling. However, wemanaged to collect 64 bodies of Camerons, which we buried in one grave. The Commanding Officer took the service, but had to limit the number of men present owing to the danger of casualties from shelling.
In order to save space, the majority of men were buried lying on their side. A touching feature was the fact that someone had taken each man's arm and put it round the body lying next to him. From the top of the trench one could imagine that the men were sleeping, embraced in each other's arms, more especially as they were buried in their kilts just as they had fought, no blankets or other covering being available. Altogether it was a most moving scene. The machine gun, which has already been referred to, and which should have been knocked out before the attack, had taken its toll, as most of these bodies were found round about its emplacement. One could well appreciate the desperate gallantry of the men who rushed it. We had the satisfaction, however, of knowing that many of the enemy's gun crew had been bayoneted by our men.
A good example of the grit of the young officer and also the difficulty of obtaining accurate information regarding casualties was experienced. Lieut. Mackay was missing, and though several men were certain that they had seen him dead in a certain shell-hole, his body could not be found. One reliable N.C.O. was so certain of its position that he guaranteed,if he were allowed to go out, he would return directly with the body. His re-request was granted, but proved a failure. As a matter of fact, Mackay was found dead a considerable distance further on. He had been severely wounded where the men saw him, and they had been wrongly convinced that he was dead. He had been killed finally by a direct hit. He must have suffered severe wounds first of all, as his right hand, which had been blown off, and other wounds, had been dressed. Such wounds would have more than justified anyone going back to the dressing station, but this brave young officer, although stunned and wounded to such an extent that his own men thought he was dead, had evidently advanced with the remainder of the Battalion as soon as he had regained consciousness.
During the second phase of the operations, 4 Headquarter officers, 9 Company officers, and 570 men were engaged, of whom 7 Company officers and 369 men became casualties. Great praise is due to two young officers who went through the whole of the battle (their first engagement), and who individually led the Battalion in the attack on Cavalry Farm. We must refer to Captain W. G. Stuart, who was killed on this occasion—better known as "W.G." He came out with the Battalion in 1915, and had taken part in all the fighting in which the Division had been engaged. A quiet, unassuming man, with a strong personality, he was known and loved not only by the officers andmen of his own Battalion, but throughout the Brigade. He seldom had a man of his Company before the C.O. In fact, the apparent pain which it gave to "W.G." to think that a man had done anything to bring disgrace on his beloved Company was the greatest punishment that man could have. The men would have done anything for him, and discipline was maintained out of love and regard for their Captain.
If the Battalion on our left had succeeded in obtaining their objective, or had at least silenced the enemy, the attack on the farm would probably have proved a success. On the night of the 28/29th of April the Battalion was relieved by the 3rd London Regiment, and withdrew into billets in the Grand Place. The fighting had been long and severe, and if fresh troops had been available to go through on the completion of the first "phase" the success might have been even greater. At the close of the fighting at that time one was able to move a considerable distance forward at night without encountering the enemy, who must have been holding his line very lightly and far back. He had recovered himself, however, when the second phase started. It is interesting to read with what surprise and despondency General Ludendorf, the Chief of the German Staff, writes concerning the battle. He says:—
"On that day (9th April) I celebrated my birthday. I looked forward to the expected offensive with confidence, and was now deeply depressed. Was this to be the result of all our care and trouble during the past half year? A day like April the 9th threw all calculations to the winds."
Such an expression of opinion is high praise to the troops whose vigour and bravery brought such a disaster to the enemy.
It may be remembered that at that time the latter part of the battle of Arras was almost over-shadowed in the press by the very gallant and successful attack by the Canadians when they took Vimy Ridge. It is instructive, however, to read in General Ludendorf's Memoirs the statement:—
"On the 11th they took Monchy, and during the following night we evacuated the Vimy Ridge."
So ends the battle of Arras.
On29th April, 1917, the Battalion moved out of Arras to Semincourt, via Rues St. Aubert, Denvielle, and Bernville. Here training was carried out until the 8th, when the Battalion moved to Grande Rullecourt. On the 21st May the 15th Division were transferred to the 19th Corps, and moved to Vacqueril. On the 22nd they again moved to St. Georges via Conchy and Wail. On the 6th instant, Lieut.-Colonel Crichton officially relinquished command of the Battalion, which was taken over by Major MacLeod, who had been acting C.O. since the second phase of the Battle of Arras. We remained in St. Georges carrying out field training till the 20th of June. This summer it was supposed that the British had adopted the German system of "storm troops," and that the 15th Division was one of these. Whether this was true or not, there is no doubt that we were employed in all the big engagements, and when we were not fighting we were out training for the next attack.
While at St. Georges we held Brigade Sports. Captain Lumsden, who had been acting asAdjutant for some time in place of Captain A. R. Chapman, who had been appointed Staff Captain 46th Brigade, was now confirmed in the appointment. Captain Chapman, who was one of the original officers, had acted as Adjutant for some time, and by his keenness, efficiency, and good temper had proved himself a most suitable officer for the work. We parted with him with regret, and wished him all success on the Staff.
On 18th June, Major-General Sir F. W. N. M'Cracken, K.C.B., D.S.O., relinquished command of the Division, and issued the following special order:—
"In bidding farewell to the 15th Division, I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to all ranks for their continued assistance to me throughout the period of over two years since I assumed Command."The standard of discipline and training which has enabled the results already obtained will, I am convinced, lead in future to still greater success. The maintenance of this standard, added to the high sense of duty of all ranks in the Division, will inevitably enable the same to obtain the final victory before returning to the land of their birth, which is already so justly proud of their fine achievements."I shall at all times watch their movements with the deepest interest, and I wish them every possible success in the future."
"In bidding farewell to the 15th Division, I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to all ranks for their continued assistance to me throughout the period of over two years since I assumed Command.
"The standard of discipline and training which has enabled the results already obtained will, I am convinced, lead in future to still greater success. The maintenance of this standard, added to the high sense of duty of all ranks in the Division, will inevitably enable the same to obtain the final victory before returning to the land of their birth, which is already so justly proud of their fine achievements.
"I shall at all times watch their movements with the deepest interest, and I wish them every possible success in the future."
It was with great regret that we parted with General M'Cracken, who had so ably commanded the Division since its arrival in France, and whose ability in no little way helped to achieve success in many hard fought battles. The command of the Division was taken over by Major-General H. F. Thullier, C.B., C.M.G.
On the 21st June we left St. Georges and began to move northward. The first night westayed with three Companies at Croix and one at Siracourt; next day we went on to Pernes, and the next to Borecq, with two Companies at Ecquedeque, where we spent the Sunday. On the Monday we moved to Steenbecque, and from there to St. Sylvestre Cappel. On the 27th the Battalion went into Reserve in the 9th Corps area, camping about two miles southwest of Vlamertinghe. A special order was issued by the G.O.C. 15th Division, who expressed himself as very pleased with the march, discipline and appearance of the Battalion. In spite of the fact that they had no breakfast, the long march was completed, with only one man falling out.
On the 2nd of July we moved forward into the support line via Reigersburg Chateau, "C" Company being in "Half Moon" trench, "B" and "D" in the Ecole, "A" Company in the Convent Ypres, and Headquarters on the Menin Road. This was our first experience of the Salient, and we got a hot reception, being heavily shelled, and suffering several casualties while going in. In the Salient there were no trenches, as the ground was too wet for digging, and breastworks had to be built. From the support we moved into the front line, with Headquarters at Dragoon Farm, and with support companies in St. James' trench, Milcote, Posier defences and road. Coming out of the line, we returned to Eerie Camp. From there we marched to Poperinghe, trained to Arnecke, and thence we marched again to Le Choche.Here we carried out training on the Rubroucke training ground. On the 17th the Battalion moved to Winnezele under orders of the 46th Brigade. From there we moved to Toronto Camp, via Watou and Poperinghe, halting for an hour on the road for breakfast.
On the 23rd we once more took over the front line with Headquarters under the railway at South Lane, in a dug-out which was exceedingly wet, and the men had to be kept constantly at the pumps. That portion of the dug-out which the C.O. and signallers occupied was a small side shaft without any ventilation, so that a man had to be kept at the top of the stair pumping air down to us. As a rule this gentleman was rather sleepy, and had to be encouraged with powerful language. On one occasion, however, air came blowing in with great force. We soon discovered that some gas shells had exploded near the mouth of the dug-out which had effectually wakened up the warrior at the pump, and he, with a sudden spurt of energy, was diligently pumping the gas down. We were now busy constructing works preparatory to the attack, all of which had to be carefully camouflaged.
On the 24th a successful little raid was carried out by twelve other ranks of "A" Company under command of 2nd Lieut. J. Miller. Taking a course parallel to the railway, they found the enemy's trenches much battered, but the wire, though flattened, was difficult to get over. A machine gun emplacement was discovered onthe railway embankment. Its crew fled, two being killed as they were running away, and one brought back as a prisoner carrying the machine gun. Our casualty was one man slightly wounded.
At this time we were actively patrolling every night as well as carrying out work parties. On the 25th we got orders for relief, but these were cancelled later, and we were told we had to remain in the front line. On the night of the 27/28th, orders were received that we were to carry out a large raid on the enemy's front on the afternoon of the 28th, two Companies being employed in this operation. This was a very tall order. In the first place, we had never had an opportunity of patrolling the part of the front over which the raid was to be carried out. On the map, it appeared as if part of it was an old pond. Neither did we know the condition of the enemy's wire, etc. In addition to this the Battalion had been in the line for some time, and the men were therefore very tired. Further, the time allowed for preparation was so short that it was practically impossible to get up and issue the usual paraphernalia for a raid.
The task appeared to be beyond our powers, and the C.O. reported this to the Brigade, who more or less agreed with him. The Brigadier made representations to the Division, but the answer came back that the raid had to be carried out. No doubt this was inevitable, but it must be remembered that it was usual for a Battalion doing a raid of this size to be takenout of the line and given time to rehearse it, examine the ground, and consider the whole problem with the Artillery Commander, etc. What must be, must be, and we found ourselves with only a few hours wherein to decide on our line of action, issue the necessary orders, and, as far as possible, collect such stores as were available, a somewhat difficult matter, as movement during the day generally led to shelling. The orders were that the raid was to go to a considerable depth, the final objective being the enemy's reserve lines (the first objective in the general attack which was to take place shortly). The raiding party consisted of "D" Company with three platoons of "A" Company, under command of Captain J. L. C. Jenkins. A smaller party of 14 other ranks, under 2nd Lieut. Elliot, were ordered to raid the railway embankment on our right and look for a suspected machine gun.
The zero hour was 7 p.m., the raiding party being lined up at 6.45. At zero the artillery trench mortar and machine guns opened an intense barrage on the enemy's front, and the raiders at the same time left our trenches and followed the barrage. The enemy's front line system was found to be badly knocked about, any of the enemy who had survived the bombardment being either killed or taken prisoners. The raiders then pushed on over the support lines to the reserve lines. Many of the enemy were encountered, and these too were either killed or taken prisoners. A machine gun was alsocaptured. The small party who raided the railway embankment bombed a culvert and dugout which was occupied. They did not discover the machine gun, but they took a few prisoners. Both parties returned, having inflicted many casualties on the enemy and taken 1 officer and 39 other ranks prisoners and 1 machine gun. Several other prisoners were driven in to the Battalion on our left. Our casualties were very slight, being 1 O.R. killed, 2 missing, and 6 wounded. 2nd Lieut. A. Fraser and Lieut. Elliot were both wounded.
Altogether the raid was a huge success, which was all the more creditable considering the very difficult circumstances under which it was carried out. No doubt the element of surprise helped the result. Many raids are given away by the preparations, especially by officers, both Staff and Regimental, coming for days and looking over the top in order to examine the ground. The Battalion received warm congratulations on the success of the raid from the G.O.C. 15th Division. At last we were relieved on the 29th by the 8/10th Gordons, and went into Brigade reserve. Next evening the Battalion moved into position of assembly for the attack, "A" Company with two platoons at "A.R.A." dump, 30 men at "Thatch Barn," 30 men in "Half Moon" trench, "B" Company in "St. James' trench," "C" Company in "Half Moon" trench, and "D" in "Hedge trench" south of "West Lane," the Battalion Headquarters being in South Lane. The Battaliongot into position without any casualties. This was the first night that the enemy's artillery was more or less silent, owing no doubt to the fact that our artillery was gas shelling their batteries. "A" Company was used for a carrying party, the remainder of the Battalion remaining in their assembly position until 10 a.m.
Shortly after zero hour, "Thatch Barn" dump was blown up by the enemy, causing many casualties to the carrying party. This considerably disorganised the party and added greatly to their work. The conditions caused by the shelling and the muddy nature of the ground made it impossible to carry full loads. It was also found that the "Yukon Pack," while enabling men to carry heavy loads, was inclined to make them top-heavy, and on the uneven and slippery ground they easily lost their balance and fell. This either necessitated extra men without packs assisting them to their feet again, or else they had to take the packs off in order to get up, and then reload. This caused considerable delay. The extra weight also made the men's feet sink deep in the mud, rendering marching extremely difficult and exhausting. Most of the party was made up of a draft without any previous training with the "Yukon Pack."
Three out of the four Company Officers and a Company-Sergt.-Major became casualties, the Company being reduced to 26 other ranks. Lieut. Mackay, who was in command, shewed great pluck and determination in the way he organised the parties and got the materialsforward. He was wounded himself in the leg, but insisted on going up to the forward dump to see the work properly handed over before going to the dressing station to have his wounds attended to. In addition to the actual pain involved, his wound was unfortunately saturated with dirt, the result being that this fine young officer died a few days later from the effects. Besides being a good officer, he was a splendid young fellow. He had just left one of the great public schools and had taken a scholarship at Oxford, which was waiting for him on his return.
About 10 a.m. the remaining three companies of the Battalion advanced and occupied the German front system of trenches. At 1 p.m. the Headquarters moved forward to the German reserve lines. The enemy shelling was severe, but they were lucky enough to find an old German concrete machine gun post for a new Headquarters. One platoon went forward about 2 o'clock to construct a strong point under an R.E. officer. When they got there, however, they found they were drawing so much shell fire that the R.E. officer decided not to proceed with the work. About 5 a.m. next morning the Battalion moved forward to support, relieving the Seaforth Highlanders, who replaced the Black Watch in the front line, the latter taking our place in the reserve. The position of the Battalion now was two Companies in the Trench immediately behind North Station Buildings, and one Company in the strong points.
We were suffering considerably from the mud, many of the rifles were almost choked with it, and even ammunition could not be put into the magazine without a portion of the mud on the men's hands going in along with it. The Commanding Officer, on going round in the morning, insisted on getting the arms cleaned as far as possible, a precaution which proved itself of considerable advantage later on, for the enemy counter-attacked about 3 p.m. Captain Symon got his Company out in front of the trench ready to counter-attack. This movement was conformed to by the Company on the left. As soon as he saw that the enemy had broken through our front line Captain Symon gave his orders to charge with fixed bayonets. The enemy were driven back, and we even gained a little ground.
The enemy put down a fairly heavy barrage on our front trench and immediately behind it. There was also a considerable amount of machine gun and rifle fire, as well as some sniping from a distance. We took four prisoners, and killed many of the enemy who were seen retiring on the hill opposite. As our right flank was now in the air no further advance, on our part, could be made, and we had to form a flank defence along the Ypres-Roulers railway. The two Companies remained in the front line. That night we were relieved in support by the 8/10th Gordons and took over the remainder of the front line, which we held for the following two days, until relieved on the night of the3rd/4th by two Companies of the Munster Fusiliers.
During the attack we had found little use for the Mills bomb, partly because there were few trenches to attack, and partly because the men had now got more confidence in their rifles. The Rifle Grenadiers were carrying rifle grenades in sand bags in their hands. Many of these got lost, so that it was decided that it would be better to carry fewer grenades in future and that these should be worn in the equipment, the waistcoat pattern being considered the best for the purpose. In the counter-attack the men fired their rifles from the hip, which possibly had a good moral effect, although cold steel was the deciding factor. The casualties during the operations from the 31st July to 3rd August were 7 officers killed, and 285 other ranks.
On the 4th August the Battalion moved to Winnezwele by bus. Here we were inspected by the G.O.C. 15th Division. We were drawn up in three sections, the first of officers and other ranks who took part in the operations, the second of those who were with details, and the third of drafts. The G.O.C. expressed his appreciation of the excellent work performed by the Battalion in the recent operations under very exceptional circumstances. Here on the 14th we held regimental sports. "A" Company was successful in winning the tug-of-war and the "six-a-side football" match. The sergeants beat the officers in the tug-of-war. The officers,however, were successful in winning the tug-of-war against all comers from the Brigade. The Company championship in points was as follows:—"B" Company, 50; "A" Company, 26; "C" Company, 24; and "D" Company, 20. The best all round athlete was C.S.M. Keith, "B" Company. At the close of the sports, the prizes were presented by Brigadier-General Marshall. The Divisional Band played at intervals during the forenoon, and the massed pipes of the Brigade played at the close of the sports. Everything went off without a hitch, and great credit is due to Lieut. Gibb and his Committee for the way they arranged and carried out the programme.
On the 20th we once more returned to the line in order to continue the offensive, the disposition of the Brigade being, 8th Seaforths on the right, 7th Camerons on the left, and the 8/10th Gordons in support. The route taken by the Headquarters was via Reigersberg Chateau and No. 4 track. The Battalion, less four platoons, proceeded via the White Chateau. The Headquarters were in Pommern Redoubt. The zero hour was 4.45 a.m., when the attack was launched and carried on for about 200 yards west of Hill 35. Here the Battalion came under very heavy machine gun and rifle fire from Gallipoli Farm and Iberin Farm, where they were held up. The Battalions on the right and left also being held up, we consolidated the position which we had gained, with the assistance of the 8/10th Gordons, while the 9th PioneerGordons constructed a strong point immediately in our rear. We held this position till the night of the 22nd/23rd, when we were relieved by the 9th Black Watch, and proceeded to the support position in Rupprecht Farm, with the Battalion Headquarters at Verlorenhock. The next day we were relieved by the 8/10th Gordons and proceeded to Eerie Camp. Our casualties were, 4 officers killed, 5 officers wounded, 3 other ranks killed, and 132 wounded. The time was now employed in re-constructing the Battalion and carrying out preliminary training. The Division then received orders to move south.
General Sir H. P. Gough, K.C.B., Officer Commanding the 5th Army, stated in a farewell message to the 15th Division that "he parted with them with great regret. The reputation of the Division has been earned on many battlefields, and has never stood higher than now. He wishes it all good fortune and many further successes in the future. Will ye no come back again?"
While the Battalion was on the march for the Wateau Area to entrain, it was inspected by the G.O.C. of the 5th Army, who expressed to the Commanding Officer his very high appreciation of the work of the Battalion, and warmly congratulated him on this account, and on the successful raids they had carried out. It was with no feeling of regret that we marched south leaving the Salient behind us, where it was not only a case of fighting the enemy, but also offighting an almost worse enemy in the elements. It is quite impossible to describe the conditions of that half-inundated land and the sea of mud which was stirred up by the heavy shelling on the ground over which we had to attack.
The following is a vivid description by General Ludendorff in his "Memoirs" of the fighting in the Salient. While written of his own Army, it is also applicable to ours:—
"The fifth act of the great drama in Flanders opened. Enormous masses of ammunition, such as the human mind had never imagined before the war, were hurled on the bodies of men who passed a miserable existence, scattered in mud-filled shell-holes."The horror of the shell-hole area of Verdun was surpassed. It was no longer life at all, it was mere unspeakable suffering. Through this world of mud the attackers dragged themselves slowly but steadily. Caught in the advance zone, by our hail of fire, they often collapsed. Then the mass came on again, rifles and machine guns being jammed with mud. Man fought against man, and only too often the mass was successful.... The enemy lost heavily. When we occupied the battlefield in the Spring of 1918 they lay in their thousands. We knew that the enemy suffered heavily, but we also knew he was amazingly strong and, what was equally important, had an extraordinary stubborn will."
"The fifth act of the great drama in Flanders opened. Enormous masses of ammunition, such as the human mind had never imagined before the war, were hurled on the bodies of men who passed a miserable existence, scattered in mud-filled shell-holes.
"The horror of the shell-hole area of Verdun was surpassed. It was no longer life at all, it was mere unspeakable suffering. Through this world of mud the attackers dragged themselves slowly but steadily. Caught in the advance zone, by our hail of fire, they often collapsed. Then the mass came on again, rifles and machine guns being jammed with mud. Man fought against man, and only too often the mass was successful.... The enemy lost heavily. When we occupied the battlefield in the Spring of 1918 they lay in their thousands. We knew that the enemy suffered heavily, but we also knew he was amazingly strong and, what was equally important, had an extraordinary stubborn will."
As there were no dugouts, and the men were living in shelters only, every tour saw a considerable number of casualties. The enemy had the Menin Road and other tracks carefully taped, and the area behind the front line received almost more attention from the enemy's artillery than the front line itself. The Headquarters were generally in the remains of houses partly protected by concrete, but which would have easily been destroyed by a direct hit. In fact, on more than one occasion the officers atHeadquarters left the protection of these buildings and sat in a field watching the enemy bombard them. This, however, proved good for the morale of the front line troops, who often used to be "bucked up" at seeing the Headquarters getting it hot.
The reserve billets in Ecole outside Ypres, and the cellars of the convent in Ypres, did not afford much comfort, for, while they were fairly well protected, the approaches were constantly being shelled, so that the men were more or less confined to the cellars.
We were the first Division to experience the effects of Mustard gas. When we first learned of its power of burning the skin, it was thought that we would probably suffer badly in the kilt. However, it is satisfactory to know that the kilt once again proved its efficiency as a fighting garment. While we have no statistics, we believe it is true that we did not suffer more than the trousered regiments in this respect, the reason being that it was generally the parts of the body where the skin was tender that got burnt. The skin of the legs having got hardened by exposure to the weather, was generally able to withstand the effects of gas in the same way as the hands and face. Again, most of the cases of burning were caused by men sitting down on the ground which was saturated with the gas. The kilt, being thick, the gases could not easily penetrate it, and no doubt its swinging in the air, when the men got up, helped to dispel them. In fact, the men did not suffer much from theeffects of burning unless the shell burst close enough to sprinkle them with the liquid.
We regret to record the fact that within a short time of our handing over our Headquarters in Pommern Redoubt, which was a most unhealthy spot, Major Murray, Commanding the Black Watch (better known as "Haggis," and after whom the Divisional rest camp was called), and some of his staff, were killed by a direct hit at the entrance of the shelter. The Headquarters, which consisted of an old German machine gun concrete emplacement, were very low. We could not stand up in them. There was no ventilation except through the door, and when they were filled with signallers, officers, etc., with one or two candles burning, the heat and exhaustion of the air became terrible. After the first phase we experienced great difficulty in getting back the wounded, of whom there were a great number. One must say a word in praise of the splendid work done on this and many other occasions by the stretcher bearers. Lacking the excitement of fighting, they carried on their humane work often under heavy shell fire, always showing a splendid example of devotion to duty. Owing to the mud in the Salient, their work here was exceedingly arduous as well as dangerous. It often took four men to carry a stretcher back to the aid post, and even then it was a slow job. Their work, therefore, during some of the heavy fighting was practically continuous night and day. Often very weary, yet never complaining,they doggedly carried on. Not many of them received honours, although many well deserved them. The mud so delayed the removal of the wounded that some of them lay in dugouts and shelters for a couple of days. At last the Division sent up a large number of men under a Colonel of the R.A.M.C., who finally got them taken down. His energy was splendid. He wandered about at early dawn, even in No Man's Land, looking for the wounded in shell holes, closely followed by his faithful little dog.
The Headquarters at one time were in an old Boche strong point. Unfortunately, as it was the only place protected, some of the men in the trench round about it would rush to it for shelter, whenever heavy shelling started. As many as possible squeezed inside, but it seldom contained all, and as it was no doubt the enemy's target we had several casualties in the trench outside. It was little use telling the men not to come, for each hoped to be fortunate enough to find room inside, and the desire for security overmastered all else. The floor of the dugout was a foot deep in water, which kept slowly getting deeper as the water in the trench increased, and its smell was horrible, as it was partly mixed with the blood of the men killed outside. There was only one bed, which was occupied for the two days we were there by a wounded officer. We all had to sit and sleep on boxes with our feet perched on petrol tins. The usual result of trying to sleep in this position was that we had hardly got off when our feetwould slip from the tin into the water, wakening us up, after which we had to start again.
The Adjutant, Signallers and Orderly Room Sergeant had a trying time in carrying on their work. One often admired the way in which the Orderly Room Clerk performed his duties on this and other occasions. Numerous returns had to be sent into Brigade, operation orders, orders for work parties and ration parties had to be written out by him, generally in triplicate at least. There he was stowed away in a corner, without a table, writing on his knee with nothing but a bag to keep his papers in, often working late into the night by the light of a solitary candle balanced on a piece of wood stuck into the wall of the dug-out, yet always doing his work efficiently and well without a grumble or complaint.
The transport had some very severe experiences also in getting up rations, which was no easy job. Carrying parties found many difficulties. There was a great deal of work to be done, and therefore ration parties had to be reduced to a minimum. In the dark it was no easy matter to find the map locations where the rations were dumped, as there was nothing to distinguish one shell-hole from another. On more than one occasion the carrying parties were so wearied with the struggle through the mud with heavy loads that they had to leave the rum ration behind, a convincing proof that they were at the last gasp.
Although possibly some of the Division mayhave been a little shaken by their terrible experiences in the fighting during the third battle of Ypres, this was not the case with the Camerons. We had met with great success in all our raids, we had countered the German's determined counter-attack which had driven in our front line, and, while we had certainly suffered heavy casualties during the battle, we had always been able to make ground. In the last phase many of the officers and men had just joined the Battalion from drafts, and their baptism was indeed severe. We therefore marched away with a feeling of elation, although everyone was naturally fagged out and glad of the prospect of a short rest from the mud and dirt.
It is difficult to give a general description of the front line in France and Belgium. It ranged from the breastworks and mud of Ypres to the crater areas and sap heads at Hulluch; where mines exploding were a daily occurrence, and the dead formed part of the parapet; or to the shell-hole area of the Somme, where the enemy looked down on the top of us and could get direct observation for his shell fire. Civilians and even Staff Officers doing a tour of the trenches were very properly sent to quiet areas, and so often formed wrong impressions. Thus a well known officer, who has written an account of the life at G.H.Q., gives the following interesting information concerning the trenches.
"Behind the parapet it was almost as safe, and on dry days as pleasant, as on a marine parade. A solid fortification of sand bags, proof against any blow except that of a big high explosive shell, enclosed each side of a walk, drained, paved with duckboards, and lined with dug-outs, in places adorned with little flower beds."
Possibly these amenities existed somewhere, but certainly all the years we were in France we never came across such a front line. "Big High Explosives!" Why, it did not often require more than a "pip squeak" to push in the parapet! A heavy shower of rain was sufficient to cause it to collapse from its own weight!
The same writer says if he were
""Seeking the fit adjective that could be applied to it in its superlative, it would certainly not be 'exciting,' nor yet 'dangerous.' The life was exciting, and it was dangerous a little."
He then goes on to describe the duties as not so dangerous as that of a policeman who has to stop a runaway horse! He evidently never served in a front line where for days the Boche put down a practice barrage, or where he was in the habit of following you along the trench with a shower of aerial darts; or in a front line which you knew was mined, and it was a question whether you or he were going to be blown up first. But enough! Let the casualty lists for each tour in the line speak for themselves. As for excitement, recommend us to night patrolling with Very Lights and an active enemy.
The Battalion marched from Watau at 7 a.m. on 1st September, 1917, via Godwaers-velde, and Cemelhof to Gaestre Railway Station, where they entrained at 2.5 p.m. for Arras, which was reached at 9 p.m., and marched back to billetsat Montenescourt. On the 7th of September we once more entered the Arras sector, relieving the 10/11th H.L.I. at Blangy Park. We now settled down into this area, and a delightful place it was after our experience in the Salient. The park at Blangy must have contained many fine residences. The grounds were well wooded, although much destroyed, and there were remains of what were formerly beautiful gardens. The river Scarpe flows through the woods and fills several artificial ponds, where the men were able to spend much of their time bathing and basking in the sun.
Major-General Reed, V.C., had now taken over command of the Division, Major-General Thulliers having received an important appointment at home in connection with the production of gas.
On the 14th October we were instructed to send over two small fighting patrols, consisting of 1 officer and 4 O.R.'s each. The idea was that, while a raid was being conducted on our right, these patrols should cross "No Man's Land," enter the German trench, and, if possible, seize some identifications. It was not intended that they should search the German trench, but simply rush over and back again. The raid was to be assisted with a preliminary discharge of thermite shells and a ten minutes' bombardment with trench mortars. It was to take place during daylight, though the proposition to our minds did not appear very hopeful. "No Man's Land" was fairly wide,and one could be sure that the enemy would be fully alert, as the raid on the right was bound to attract his attention.
Lieut. E. D. Hoskins and Lieut. A. Chisholm were chosen to command the raiding parties for which there were many volunteers. The first patrol, under Lieut. Chisholm, got over the top and suffered 2 casualties going across "No Man's Land." The officer was killed near the enemy trench, and only one of the party returned. The second party, under Lieut. Hoskins, got safely across "No Man's Land" and were seen to jump into the enemy trench, but none of them ever returned. It was learned later that Lieut. Hoskins and the others were all killed. Out of the raiders, therefore, only one escaped. We also sustained the further casualties of 4 killed and 6 wounded by the bombardment. These were the only really unsuccessful raids which the Battalion ever undertook. We felt they were foredoomed to failure. No enemy were going to allow a small party of four men to walk across "No Man's Land" in broad daylight. It is reported that Lieut. Hoskins turned to his men before going over the top and said: "I am a Catholic, and am going to say a petition before going over; I don't know what you fellows are, but I advise you also to say your prayers, as none of us will ever come back alive." They went across, and were all killed in the enemy's lines, no doubt fighting as brave men would.
On the 19th, "A" Company returned fromthe third Corps Musketry Camp, where they had been under training, and were congratulated by the C.O. on the successful results of their shooting. They gained the first and second prizes both in the "rapid firing" and in the "knockout" competitions, and they also won the second prize in the "snap" shooting competition for teams of six, and in the "pill box" competition. In the 17th Corps boxing competition Private E. Davies and Private D. Tate both won their heats on points, these being the only two men we entered. This was a very creditable performance. About this time men from the Lovat Scouts, of whom there were a good many in the Battalion, were being formed into a Battalion of "Observers." It was understood they would live behind the line as Corps troops and only have to come up to observe from observation posts which were not generally in the front line, and then only if the weather was clear. Naturally there was a rush for the job, for living behind the line with no more night working parties was too good a thing to miss. In the long run, however, not many men were actually taken away from us.
We were glad to hear of the success of the actions further north, and about the 20th of November the position was so promising that we were under orders to be prepared to move at fifteen minutes notice, in the event of the enemy retiring on our front. Unfortunately, however, this never came off. During the tour in the trenches from the 8th to the 20th of Novemberwe had a very strenuous time in improving trenches and erecting wire. The Brigadier expressed his appreciation of the manner in which all ranks had carried out these duties.
In November Brigadier General Marshall left the Brigade to take over an important home appointment. He had endeared himself to us all. Constantly in the front line in all weather he had a practical knowledge and sympathy with the discomforts and difficulties which the troops had to contend with. Kindly and most considerate yet inspiring all with confidence by his undoubted ability and cheerful manner, it was with great regret that we learned of his departure.
Bythe end of December, 1917, rumours began to circulate regarding a great German offensive. Everyone had to sleep with their clothes on, all troops, even in the reserve billets in Arras, had to "stand to" before sun rise every morning until orders to "stand down" were received from Brigade. Sleeping in your clothes is never comfortable or refreshing. Practically every night large working parties had to be sent up to the trenches, often not returning till the early hours, so that shortly after the men had got comfortably settled down they had to get up again and "stand to" fully equipped ready to move. This "stand to" often lasted several hours. The advantage, therefore, which was supposed to be had in the rest billets was much discounted.
We were fated once again to spend our New Year in the trenches, but on the 2nd of January we were relieved by 2nd Guards Brigade. We had done our best to make the trenches as clean as possible in order that they might take over asystem worthy of the Guards. It is satisfactory to know that the G.O.C. Guards Division informed the G.O.C. 15th Division that he had never had such a satisfactory take over as on this occasion from the 15th (Scottish) Division. It was doubtful if some of the men appreciated the hard fighting qualities of the Guards Brigade, looking upon them as show troops. This is exemplified by a story of a rather dirty Jock who was baling mud out of a trench. One of the splendid clean Guardsmen, who had come up as orderly with some officers, tried to get into conversation with him by remarking that they were coming up to relieve them. The muddy Jock asked him, "Who are ye?" and he replied, "Oh, we are the Guards," and the Jock, proceeding with his digging, rejoined: "Ah! weel! ye can write hame an' tell yer mither ye've seen the sodjers."
On relief the Battalion went into billets in the Ecole des Jeunes Filles. Here on the 9th and 10th the Battalion had their Christmas dinners, which were a great success and much enjoyed. During the proceedings the C.O. addressed the troops and gave a brief review of the operations which the Battalion had taken part in during the past year, also the new honours they had won for the regiment. He wished them all the best of luck for the coming year. We must record the very great kindness and assistance shewn us by Mademoiselle G. Marmier, who always did all she could to add to thecomforts of the troops. On this occasion she made many fine paper flowers to decorate the Christmas dinner tables with. After the dinners the men were entertained in the theatre, where "the Jocks," our Divisional troupe, performed the pantomime "Robinson Crusoe."
The weather was now very cold, in fact when we handed over to the Guards the ground was deep in snow. On the 23rd February we carried out a small raid on the enemy's trenches at 3.30 a.m. The party consisted of 28 other ranks of "A" Company under command of 2nd Lieut. A. R. M'Donald. The raid proved a success. The German trenches were found to be unoccupied, but 4 men were caught in a sap head, one of whom was killed and 3 brought back as prisoners, so we succeeded in getting the identification which was required. Our casualties were nil. For this we received the congratulations of both the Corps and Brigade Commanders.
We now fully expected an attack by the Boche, and everyone was kept on the strain, working hard in preparing belts of wire and improving trench systems. For many weeks neither officers nor men had their clothes off, and the work in the reserve area was almost as strenuous as in the front line. We knew that the Germans had been successful further south, and we were holding what was becoming an acute salient. One can quite understand the nervousness of those behind the line, but those in the front areas were confident of their powers to resist theBoches and in the strength of the defensive systems. On the occasion when the Guards relieved us one of their officers was much impressed with the serious spirit with which he found the Staff behind the line treating the matter. After going round the front line, however, he remarked that the cheerfulness of the troops had put new heart into him.
Indeed, the front line troops (probably in their ignorance) treated the anxiety of those behind with a good deal of levity. An amusing method of dealing with the rumours flying around called the Thermometer game was invented. This consisted in assigning so many degrees or marks to the person reporting a "windy" story according to its source. Whoever got 100 degrees first won. For instance, a terrible story from the cook's mate or transport men was valued at about 10 points; from a brigade-major about two, and a higher staff officer about one.
The Staff, it is to be feared, did not appreciate this chaff, and orders were issued that Regimental Officers were not to refer to the Staff as having the "wind up," as they were only taking necessary precautions. However, it shewed the troops were in good spirits.
On the evening of the 22/23rd of March we were surprised to receive an order that we were to withdraw with all stores to the Army line, the movement to be completed by 3 a.m. The Battalion happened to be occupying La Fosse Farm with the caves below, and also the strongpoints. We had, therefore, a considerable amount of ammunition, etc., in the part of the line held by us. Further, we were instructed to guard our right flank carefully. As we knew that the enemy had driven in the line further south of us, this warning was appreciated. "D" Company, who were occupying Fork, Spade, and Gordon Trenches, were to be left behind to fight the rear guard actions when the Boche discovered we had withdrawn. O.C. "D" Company also had orders to destroy the Headquarters dug-out at Crater Subway, and the electric lighting plant in the Fosse Farm was to be rendered unworkable. Over and above this, R.E.'s were to blow a mine placed under the Cambrai Road.
As soon as it was dark motor lorries and vehicles of all descriptions were brought up to the farm, and we at once started loading them. Luckily for us there was a Y.M.C.A. Canteen in the caves, the officers in charge of which left it when they heard we were retiring. The C.O., taking advantage of this, allowed every man who brought down a box of ammunition from the strong points to help himself to cigarettes. With this encouragement, men carrying ammunition came back in quick succession, and by the time we finally retired, about 3.30 a.m., all ammunition trench stores, etc., with the exception of a few gum boots, had been loaded and withdrawn.
It was difficult to understand how the Boche did not hear the noise of the retiral. Ifhe had done so, and had trained his guns on the Cambrai Road, he would have caused endless confusion and casualties. The road was simply packed with motor lorries, guns and vehicles of all descriptions, with the retiring infantry dodging in and out between them. The congestion was extremely bad at the cross roads at Tilloy, where the different streams of traffic met. While recognising that this movement was necessary from a military point of view, still it was hard to persuade the men to see this, almost as difficult as it is for anyone who was not there to realise their disappointment and surprise. They had worked hard for months in preparing this position. They had carried up tons of wire and constructed belts of it many yards wide. They now felt all this work had gone for nothing. Supremely confident that they would have held this position against all odds, they regretted that they had not an opportunity of proving it. They evidently did not appreciate the dangers of an exposed flank. We got into our new position shortly before sunrise, and from there we could see our artillery, in the morning light, still getting back their guns, but the enemy was not even then aware of the movement.
We knew that an attack by the Germans was almost inevitable. All preparations possible were being made, and it was easy to understand the importance of the orders that the ground we held must be "held at all costs." While it is true that there were many defensive lines behindus, right back almost to the sea, yet we believed that there were practically no troops in our immediate support to man them, so that, if the Boche once more broke through us, it was likely to prove a disaster. Furthermore, if our position was lost the enemy would outflank Vimy Ridge, which would probably necessitate our withdrawing from it. We had gone through a long spell of hard work in the trenches, and had been kept in a state of suspense for several months without a chance of ever getting our clothes off. The men, however, were in good fettle, but the Battalion contained a number of young lads from 18½ to 19, who had been sent out in drafts in the early Spring. They had not been proved in battle or seen any action, and it was impossible to say how they might act, although we had every confidence in them.
On the evening of the 27th March the Brigadier visited our Battalion Headquarters with the joyful news that it looked as if the Boche had given up the idea of attacking us meantime, as he was moving his guns from their battery positions, presumably with the intention of taking them somewhere else. Unfortunately this conclusion proved wrong, for in reality they must have been taking their guns out to move them into position for the attack. When the Brigadier left, the C.O. went round the front line with the good news. He remained in the front line till about 2 a.m. Just as he was leaving, a post reported that a short timeearlier they had discovered a party of Boche in front of our wire, apparently cutting it. They had been driven off with a Lewis gun, and had not been seen since. On examining the wire, which was a fairly broad belt, there were certainly signs that this had been their intention.
About 3 a.m. on the 28th, the enemy opened an intense bombardment on our front and immediate support lines, using gas shells on the left Company's front, south of Cambrai Road. This had lasted for about half an hour, when the bombardment was moved on to the back area, including the town of Arras. It was learnt afterwards that this was largely composed of gas shells. About 4 a.m. the bombardment of the front line having become less, the officer on duty patrolled the whole of the left Company's front up to the Cambrai Road, afterwards returning to the right, when he reported that the whole Company were standing to. There had been a fair number of casualties. Once again our front was heavily bombarded, mostly with trench mortars. This bombardment was exceedingly severe, especially on the left, south of the Cambrai Road. The N.C.O. who was on duty (the officer on duty having been killed) stated afterwards that he had again tried to patrol his front, but found the trenches so flattened that it was hard to say where they had been, and the ground resembled a ploughed field. He believed nearly everyone in this sector was either killed, buried or wounded.
At 5.15 a.m. the enemy again put down a very intense trench mortar barrage on the left, which probably killed any men left in the front trench south of the Cambrai Road. At the same time the enemy could be seen jumping from shell-hole to shell-hole in front of Le Fosse Farm. We now fired S.O.S. signals, and opened rapid fire on the enemy. On the centre of our front line the enemy were about 100 yards away in front of the wire. The men in this part of the line afterwards stated that they were still confident that they could hold them up. Suddenly, however, it was seen that the enemy were working round our flank. An attempt was at once made to form a flank defence, but the casualties had been so great that this was found impossible, and practically no officers were left. Those remaining, therefore, had to fall back rapidly. So quickly did the enemy come round the flank that the signallers and others in the advance Battalion Headquarters (old 44th Brigade) were not able to get out in time to escape.
The extreme right of the Battalion had also been severely shelled along with the left of the 3rd Division. Here, too, the enemy broke through. From the Battalion Headquarters we now saw the lines of the 3rd Division front being driven back, and shortly afterwards our own men were seen retiring. The officer on the right had thrown back a platoon to try and form a flank defence, but soon found the enemy working round his rear and forcing him to withdraw.The withdrawal was carried out in an orderly fashion, a covering fire being kept up with Lewis guns and rifles, the men behaving splendidly, which says a lot for their morale, as by this time most of the officers had been killed, and it must be remembered that many of the men were young recruits who had just come through their first experience of a hurricane bombardment.
At no time was the shelling so severe on the centre of our line as it was on the flanks. It is more than probable that the bombardment was so withering that the men on the flanks were wiped out before the enemy attacked. This seems to be proved by the fact that no officer or man belonging to the three platoons on the left or the platoon on the right, and only 1 man of the next two platoons, returned; in other words, only 7 men returned out of 6 platoons. The smoke and dust were such, however, that no one could see more than a few yards, and in any case it was impossible for us to see what was occurring to the north of the Cambrai Road, as at this point it is raised by an embankment.
The front line Companies Headquarters were in machine gun nest dug-outs in front of our wire. They were rushed early in the attack. No-man's-land certainly was a bad place for Company Headquarters, but there was no better location available. By 8.15 a.m. we had formed a new front line running north along the switch line, being in touch with the 8/10th Gordons on our right andthe 6th Camerons on our left. By this time there were probably not more than 150 other ranks and 3 Company officers remaining. As, however, the 6th Camerons were on our left, some of the men naturally got intermixed with them. The Battalion Headquarters were by this time in the front line, and all the Headquarter officers and men were used in the defence of the line. It was one of the advantages of having the Battalion Headquarters worked more or less on the principle of a Company, that this was so easily carried out: each Headquarter officer had his own section of men, and the men knew under whose command they had to place themselves.
The C.O. now consulted with Captain Wood, commanding the Company of the 8/10th Gordons, who at once took in hand the collection of ammunition, which was rather short in the new trench, from the dump at Shamrock Corner and the old trench systems. This distribution was successfully carried out. It is only right that we should refer to the splendid assistance given to us by Captain Wood. He was one of the few remaining officers who came out with the Division. He therefore had a wide experience in fighting, and shewed as usual that coolness, disregard for danger, and sound judgment with which we all associate him.
After the consultation the C.O. decided to try and counter-attack the enemy and establish a line along the old support trench in the BrownLine. We sent off messages asking for artillery support for 9.30 a.m., when we proposed making the counter-attack. We could not get Brigade on the 'phone, the wires having probably been cut. We sent off pigeons, but the bombardment had been too much for them, and it was only after considerable amount of stone throwing that we got them to fly at all. We sent messages also with the buzzer set, but the annoying thing about both pigeon and power buzzer messages is, that one never knows whether they have been received or not. The artillery support never came, and we held back the counter attack till 10.30, as we did not wish to advance in case we should walk into our own fire. As a matter of fact not one of our messages ever got through.
About 10.30 a.m. the C.O. received a message from the O.C. "A" Company 6th Camerons, who were on our left, stating that his flank was now in the air, and that the enemy were as far back as Feuchy Chapel Crossroads on his left and rear, and he asked what he should do. Instruction were sent him to try to form a flank defence so as to get in touch on his left, but to hold his ground at all costs whatever happened. This information definitely decided us to give up the idea of counter-attacking. In order to get a clear idea of the situation, the C.O. went along the front line to the 6th Camerons, and found they were holding the front in good strength. There was not much doing in their immediate front, butevidently some of the enemy had penetrated along the Cambrai Road to their left rear. Three Vickers gun teams which were in the trench were instructed to get into position where they could defend the flank, if necessary. On returning to the Battalion he ordered a certain number of men to get back into the strong points directly behind the line, and thus increased the depth of our defence.
About 1 p.m., as the line was now well organised, the Headquarters were withdrawn to those of the 8/10th Gordons. The instructions issued previously were that if the front line went the Headquarters were to withdraw immediately. As it turned out, however, it was not possible to withdraw the Headquarters earlier, as they had to be used in the defence of the line. Almost as soon as we arrived (1.30 p.m.) orders were received that the whole line was to be withdrawn to the "Army" line, and instructions were sent forward accordingly. Orders afterwards came through that we were to hold the position we had, but by the time they arrived we had already moved back. The Headquarters were again withdrawn to those of the Reserve Battalion (8th Seaforths), and shortly afterwards we withdrew the Battalion to some old trenches. Lieut. Gibb, however, and a few men remained with the 8/10th Gordons, and during the afternoon this party accounted for many casualties amongst the enemy by sniping them with the Lewis gun which had been attached to Headquarters.At 1 o'clock in the morning we received orders that what remained of the Battalion were to go back and join the Transport at Wanquetim. We could not muster more than 30. Only one Company Officer got back. Some more men came in next morning, but the total number that returned from the fight never reached 100. Luckily, several officers and men who had been left out at the transport line form a nucleus round which to reconstruct the Battalion.
To sum up: the enemy's barrage fire successfully annihilated our right and left flank, the evident intention being to surround those left in the centre. All the officers of the front Company being casualties, the line was methodically withdrawn under N.C.O.'s. The support Companies had more or less the same experience. No officer or other rank returned from the platoons on the flanks, and out of the 4 Companies 1 officer and about 150 other ranks returned to the switch line. The men at all times shewed a good fighting spirit. The rapid fire, together with the subsequent sniping which was brought to bear on the enemy must have caused him heavy casualties. It was noticed early in the fight that the enemy brought up a light gun with pack animals. He also mounted several machine guns, which caused heavy casualties when the line was withdrawn from the switch line. The total casualties for the day were:—