CHAPTER XXTHE RETREAT

Sketch Map to illustrate the movements of the C.S.R. from 28 Nov. 1917 to 6 Dec. 1917

The members of the reconnoitring party had only just thrown off their equipment for a rest when it was found that they had been brought to the wrong place, so, dispensing with the doubtful services of a guide, Colonel Segrave led his officers through the wood in search of some one willing to be relieved by his Battalion. The right place was found to be in a smallGerman dug-out in the road leading to the village of Bourlon along the western edge of the wood, and here the Colonel, learning that he was to take over that night the positions held by the 2nd Dismounted Cavalry Brigade and the 2nd/5th West Yorks Battalion, made his dispositions and set off with his Adjutant and Medical Officer to find his Battalion in the Hindenburg Line. The Company Commanders remained behind to look round their respective fronts.

On his way back, Colonel Segrave surprised a member of the R.A.M.C. at a dressing station by begging from him a tin of bully beef and a biscuit. The spectacle of a Colonel eating bully beef was too much for the R.A.M.C. man, who stared after the three officers as though he had seen ghosts.

A long wait for orders in the Hindenburg Line ended in the Battalion moving off without any at 9.0 p.m. There was a bright moon, and the night was perfectly quiet at the start, when there was nothing to suggest the exciting time that was in store for the troops before they were to arrive at the front line. But on reaching the Relay Post on the Cambrai road, where the guides and Company Commanders were to have been, the head of the Battalion became enveloped in a barrage of gas shells. The rest of the journey was what is known as “windy” in the extreme. Gas masks had to be worn, and in pushing through the barrage, some casualties were suffered, one platoon of “C” Company losing very heavily after passing Battalion Headquarters.

The relief was complete at about 2.0 a.m., and except for gas shelling the situation became much quieter.

“B” and “D” Companies held the front line, the former, under Lieutenant C. M. Kilner, being on the left, just outside the southern edge of the village, and with half a Company on each side of the road leading from Battalion Headquarters to the village. “D” Company, under Captain R. Middleton, connected with the right of “B” and held a position inside the wood and about 300 yards south-east of the village. “D” Company Headquarters was in a most palatial deep-dug out which had formerly been the Headquarters of a German artillery brigade. “C” Company, under Captain T. H. Sharratt, was in support near “D”. Soon after taking up their positions, both “B” and “D” Companies sent out patrols towards the village, but although Lieutenant W. E. Hoste took his patrol into the village, and entered one or two houses, no Bosches were found.

The quiet night was followed by a distinctly noisy day, throughout which the enemy heavily bombarded the front line positions, the whole of the wood, and the roads all round the outside of the wood.

In the middle of the morning, the Brigadier arrived with thenews that there would be no further advance, and that the positions now being held were to be consolidated. “A” Company, who were in reserve, under Lieutenant L. C. Morris, M.C., round about Battalion Headquarters, accordingly spent the rest of the day in carrying barbed wire, pickets, sandbags and ammunition from a dump at the cross roads known as Anneux Chapel to a forward dump near Battalion Headquarters. The casualties during the day amounted to one officer and no less than fifty four other ranks—a pretty heavy toll for a day when no attack took place!

BOURLON WOOD FROM SOUTH-WEST CORNER, 1917.To face page 164.

BOURLON WOOD FROM SOUTH-WEST CORNER, 1917.

To face page 164.

In the opinion of those holding the line, the decision not to advance any further was unnecessary—it was felt that the Battalion might well be engaged very soon in defensive rather than offensive operations, and some such idea was in the mind of Colonel Segrave as he went round the Battalion front that day.

Any remaining doubts as to the enemy intentions were dispersed on the morning of the 30th of November, which opened with an intense bombardment from German guns of every calibre. Smoke barrages were put down on the flanks of the intended attack, and before long the enemy infantry could be seen advancing in many waves from the country beyond Bourlon village. The Battalion was not in signal communication with anybody, either Brigade Headquarters or adjoining units, and the Commanding Officer had therefore to rely on the services of runners and four pigeons. According to the rules of the signal service, pigeons had to be despatched in pairs, so the stock was only good for two messages. When it is mentioned that it took a good runner well over an hour to reach Brigade, the state of isolation of the Battalion will be realised.

The battle raged throughout the morning without any infantry engagement on the front held by the Civil Service Rifles, though S.O.S. rockets were seen on several occasions on adjoining sections of the line.

Company Commanders reported that the attack appeared to be directed on the sectors held on each side of them, but up to midday they had not been interfered with. The waves of enemy infantry had advanced diagonally across their front, and both “B” and “D” Companies had put in some excellent work with rifles and Lewis guns. The enemy, however, was extraordinarily well served by his low-flying aeroplanes, which seemed to swarm like bees over the Battalion area, and the machine-gun fire from these caused a good many casualties during the day.

Prominent among the early incidents of the battle was the performance of Lance Corporal S. Fletcher of the Battalion scouts, and a “D” Company runner who brought the first report fromthe front line to Battalion Headquarters. The distance they had to cover was more than a mile over very rough country, but in their anxiety to deliver the result of their observations as quickly as possible they ran the whole way, although fully equipped, and carrying rifles. The effort proved too much for the runner, who collapsed on reaching Battalion Headquarters, and fell unconscious down the stairs of the dug-out without being able to deliver his message. The N.C.O. was little better off, but after a time he recovered sufficiently to be able to give a good account of what was going on.

Soon after midday the S.O.S. signal was seen on the Battalion front, and it was reported that a gap had been made in the Brigade front on the left of the line held by “B” Company.

The Support Company, “C,” led by 2nd Lieutenant C. V. Marchant, had by this time moved up to reinforce “B” and “D” Companies, who had both suffered heavy losses. The remnants of the left platoon of “B” Company, finding the line originally held by the Battalion on their left to be unoccupied, pushed along to try to find touch. Instead of finding their friends, however, they found Bosches in large numbers, who appeared to come from all sides, with the result that about ten of the Civil Service Rifles were taken prisoners.

Lieutenant Kilner, observing the enemy in the left rear of the Battalion front, gathered the rest of his Company together and formed a defensive flank in the sunken road on the Western edge of the wood. Meanwhile, Colonel Segrave formed up the personnel of Battalion Headquarters and his reserve Company, “A,” and led them in two waves across the open country outside the wood. Leaving the vicinity of Battalion Headquarters at about 4.0 p.m., they advanced through heavy fire from rifles, machine guns, and low-flying aeroplanes, and although they suffered many casualties, they succeeded before dusk in restoring the line as originally held, and later in the evening established touch on the left with the Post Office Rifles, who had come up from Brigade Reserve to reinforce the line. The example set by their Commanding Officer inspired the men of the Civil Service Rifles with such confidence and enthusiasm, that they carried out their advance as at a Salisbury Plain manœuvre, the Colonel, with a map in one hand and a whistle in the other, giving his directions by signal.

Colonel Segrave’s prompt action was specially commended in a pamphlet afterwards published by General Headquarters entitled “The Story of a Great Fight,” and those who were with him on that day regard it as the finest example of leadership in the history of the Battalion. There was nothing theatrical about the affair—it was just done in the calm and methodical manner in which Colonel Segrave always behaved in the front line.

Photo by Langfier, Ltd.LT.-COL. W. H. E. SEGRAVE, D.S.O. (H.L.I.)Commanded 1st Battalion, 3rd September, 1917, to 6th August, 1918.To face page 166.

Photo by Langfier, Ltd.

LT.-COL. W. H. E. SEGRAVE, D.S.O. (H.L.I.)Commanded 1st Battalion, 3rd September, 1917, to 6th August, 1918.

To face page 166.

The effects of the continuous gas shelling during the past three days had told heavily on the Battalion—particularly the Headquarters Company and “A” Company. Of the Headquarters Officers, Colonel Segrave was the only one remaining on the night of the 30th of November, and during the day he had lost no less than four Adjutants, the last one being an Artillery Liaison Officer whom he had converted into an infantryman. The other ranks of Headquarters fared no better, but the losses in the Companies holding the front line were heavier still, and when the 1st Surrey Rifles arrived on the night of the 1st of December, and the Civil Service Rifles moved back into tents at Femy Wood near Havrincourt, the losses in Bourlon Wood were found to be 12 officers, 278 other ranks. At Femy Wood it was found that the Colonel himself was badly gassed, and he too left for hospital on the 2nd of December.

Although it is not possible here to pay just tribute to those gallant fellows individually, special mention must be made of the great loss the Battalion suffered by the death of three of its members who had already done great things, and who would have risen to higher rank in the Regiment before long had they been spared.

C.S.M. Mansbridge, of “D” Company, was as gallant in the front line as he was smart and efficient on the parade ground. An old member of the Regiment who thoroughly understood his brother Warrant Officers, N.C.O.’s, and men, he would undoubtedly have made an ideal Regimental Sergeant Major for the Civil Service Rifles.

Sergeant H. L. Smith, who was acting C.S.M. of “A” Company, had a multitude of friends in all Companies. As “Inky” Smith he had been one of the shining lights of the Lewis gunners, of whom he was one of the first members. He had fought with distinction at Vimy Ridge, and on the Somme, and, like Mansbridge, he was a “17th of March man.” Both were men who quickly won the respect of all who served with them.

Second Lieutenant C. V. Marchant, of “C” Company, was a comparatively young member of the Regiment. Not yet twenty years old, he had just completed a year’s service with the Battalion in France, and during that time he had become very popular with the men of “C” Company, with whom he had served gallantly in the Ypres Salient, and particularly at the battle of Messines. He was cool in battle, keen and fearless. He met his death while leading his Company through the awful barrage of shells and machine gun bullets, but he faced it unflinchingly. The Battalion could ill afford to lose such an officer, who in spite of his youth would soon have made an excellent Company Commander.

“C” Company also lost two valuable members in C.S.M. F. C. Robertson, D.C.M., who was severely wounded on the 29th of November, and Sergeant O. L. H. Levey, wounded on the 30th. Both were “17th of March men,” and Robertson had been a member of the Regiment for many years before the war. He was a quiet unassuming fellow, who was never found wanting, and who was never “rattled” even under the greatest provocation and in the most trying circumstances.

Sergeant Levey was a most enthusiastic member of the Regiment who had distinguished himself by his skill with the rifle. Fortunately he recovered sufficiently from his wounds to return to the Regiment some months later, when he quickly rose to the rank of C.S.M. of his Company. His prowess in the football field gained him fame not only in the Battalion, but throughout the Division.

In addition to the fighting portion of the Battalion, the Transport Section and Quartermaster’s staff suffered casualties in and around Bourlon Wood, the Quartermaster himself, Lieutenant W. G. Hodge, better known as “Ben Hodge,” being gassed on the night of the 29th November while at Battalion Headquarters. On the same night the Transport Column was heavily shelled on the Bapaume-Cambrai Road, with the result that several of the most experienced drivers and horses were wounded.

But in spite of the heavy casualties in Bourlon Wood, and the fact that the enemy bombardment was the most severe and prolonged that the Battalion was called upon to face during the war, the men of the Civil Service Rifles could look back with justifiable pride on their share in the battle, during which they did not yield an inch of ground, although the Bosches gained considerable success in neighbouring parts of the line.

The remnants of the Battalion numbered only about 200, all ranks, when they reached Femy Wood on the 2nd of December with scarcely a kick left in them after their exertions of the past few days, and it came as a great surprise when they had to return to the front line on the 4th of December reinforced by a handful of officers and other ranks from the “non-starters’ camp.”

In order to cover the withdrawal of the 142nd Infantry Brigade from Bourlon Wood, a defensive position on either side of the village of Graincourt was taken up, and there, on the 5th and 6th of December, the Battalion gave yet another exhibition of splendid fighting qualities in its second defensive battle within a week.

The officers who had come up included Major H. Marshall, who was in command of the Battalion, Major H. F. M. Warne, who acted as his second in command, and Captain L. L. Burtt, who commanded “C” and “D” Companies, now formed intoone Company. “A” and “B” Companies were amalgamated under Lieutenant L. C. Morris, M.C.

The positions were taken up at dusk, “A” and “B” Companies being on the left along a sunken road running in a north-westerly direction from about the centre of the village, and “C” and “D” on the right were along a similar road which ran due east from the village. The village itself was not occupied, but posts were established near the cemetery in the sunken roads north-east of the village. These were withdrawn at dawn. The 2nd Division was on the left of “A” and “B” Companies, and the 59th Division was on the right of “C” and “D” Companies.

The troops from the front line in Bourlon Wood passed through as arranged, the evacuation of the wood having been rendered necessary owing to the forcing in by the Germans of both arms of the Cambrai Salient.

The whole front was patrolled throughout the night, but until daylight nothing was seen or heard of the enemy, whose front line was about two miles away. Numerous explosions heard in the wood showed that the Royal Engineers were destroying dug-outs and anything likely to be of use to the enemy.

The garrison on the right, numbering less than 120, all ranks, after trying to dig themselves in in the frost bound ground along the side of the road, moved forward to a well-camouflaged German trench which started just outside the village and continued almost to the 59th Division on the right. Leading out of the back of the trench were four old gun pits with the dismantled 5·9’s still there, and at the village end was a trench running forward at right angles.

It should be mentioned that at the outset it was understood that the garrison would be withdrawn after twenty-four hours, but, as after events show, the troops were doomed to disappointment.

The two halves of the Battalion were not in touch with each other at all, and as they fought during these few days as separate units, their experiences are dealt with separately.

At daylight on the 5th of December it was seen from the trench occupied by “C” and “D” Companies that the Germans had discovered the withdrawal from Bourlon Wood, for small parties of them were seen wandering about the deserted front line and in the wood itself, great interest being shown in a derelict tank, which was subsequently used as a signal station.

It was not, however, until the afternoon that the enemy approached to within reasonable distance of Graincourt, but his patrols now became very active, first coming on in small parties, which were easily dispersed by rifle and Lewis gun fire, and later in larger numbers, which were also dispersed in thesame way. Some excellent shooting was indulged in about this time by the gallant little bands on either side of the village, but although they were able to keep the enemy off while the daylight lasted, it was obvious that the small force defending the village would not be able to prevent him from entering Graincourt during the night. With the coming of darkness it was found that a considerable number of Germans had reached the village, for patrols and even ration parties encountered them, both in front and in rear of the defending garrison. Runners were also involved in small fights, which were quite frequent during the night on the fringes of the village. In one of these a German machine gun team was overwhelmed, the gun and one man being captured, and the rest of the team being killed.

Just as the men of “C” and “D” Companies were expecting to be withdrawn, Major Warne arrived from Battalion Headquarters to take command of the garrison on the right, with orders to hold the position for another twenty-four hours, and, on withdrawal, to occupy a strong post in the rear.

One must have endured the strain of prolonged fighting in a precarious position, worn out by constant watching, with little food or water, and many other discomforts too numerous to mention, in order to realise how intense was the disappointment of these men who, thinking that Major Warne came to tell them their work was done and to take them back to rest, learnt that their job had only just begun.

At about 5.0 a.m. on the 6th, a Lewis gun was posted in the road about 300 yards south of the village with orders to deal with the enemy there as far as possible, but to withdraw if the opposition became too strong, to a strong post about a mile further down the road towards the village of Flesquieres. An enemy patrol soon tried to rush the gun, but without success, and a wounded prisoner was captured as a result.

At daylight two parties tried to rush the gun. Both were beaten off, but not before the gun team had suffered two casualties. As other parties of the enemy were on the move for a further attack, the gun team was ordered to withdraw to the aforementioned point, where the gun was soon in action again in helping to repel an attack on the strong point itself.

Meantime Major Warne’s force was still holding on, and the incidents of the 6th of December are thus described by Sergeant C. Manthorp, who, with Sergeant E. Cooke, was conspicuous throughout the operation by gallantry and good leadership:—

“When dawn broke on the 6th, we were very much on the alert to see what surprises were in store for us, and directly we could see any distance we were well rewarded. The whole German army seemed to be advancing, line after line, crossing the skyline andcoming directly for us. Fortunately for us their orders were obviously not to attack, for when the front line got to within 600 or 700 yards from our trench, they started digging in, or at least making a trench sufficiently deep for protection from our fire. Whilst the advancing and entrenching was proceeding, we, of course, indulged in a fair amount of rifle practice, and not without good results, though, of course, the distance was rather great for anything sensational. After digging-in, the Bosche lay quite dormant for some hours, and we, of course, were on tenter-hooks to know what his next move would be, for with the little force at our disposal, it would have been hopeless to expect us to hold off what must have been thousands of Bosches, should they have chosen to attack.“It was early afternoon before the next move came. Then all the lines of Bosches in front of us attacked, but right across our front on to the 59th Division, the movement being for them a half left movement. Then we had all the shooting we desired. The machine-gunners had a fine time, and so did our riflemen, who were mostly collected in the four gun pits, which were higher than the floor of the trench and enabled us to fire over our camouflage, which was composed of wire netting, turf, etc., and made firing from the greater part of the trench impossible.“By about 3.0 p.m. the Bosches appeared to have gone right through the position held by the 59th Division, and it looked to us as if the latter had been compelled to retire by weight of numbers. Of course this made our position untenable with the Bosches in our right, rear, and working round us, and the village between us and the remainder of our Battalion also in enemy hands.“About 70 yards in rear of our trench and parallel with it, ran a sunken road, connecting the village on our left. Parties of Bosches commenced to approach each way along this road, and this forced us to withdraw most of our garrison from the trench and form a semi-circle with each end resting on the road. Things soon became very exciting, and then those of us who were out at the back of the trench, received the order to retire. From the sunken road back to the permanent front line must have been about 1½ miles, and that journey proved about the most exciting that any of us had experienced. The party’s strength was two officers and probably about 100 other ranks, and the retirement was done in extended order. At the start off we were received with fire from nearly every direction, and also a little shell fire which may or may not have been meant for us. After going about half a mile, we had the best part of the whole business. We came across at least 100 of the enemy in more or less close order, and did not actually discover them until they were within about 100 yards of us, owing to the folds in the ground. It is difficult to say who appeared to be the most surprised, they or us, but we did not give them long to think about it. We flopped and opened rapid fire on them, and also got our Lewis guns going. Our Lewis gunners had been cursing about their loads, but we were more than glad of the guns under the circumstances. This big party of Bosches quickly took fright and it was laughable to see them all double off back towards home like a flock of sheep. It was a marvellous target, only about 200 or 300 yards away. You simplycouldn’t miss, and, of course, our success gave us great help on our journey, for most of us were nearly done, owing to the bitter nights we had had with no proper hot food. Having disposed of this body, we encountered no further opposition from Fritz except occasional rifle fire, and we took four stray Germans prisoners along with us. We were then about three-quarters of a mile from our goal, and came upon a small cable trench about three feet deep running towards our lines. Just about this time, one of our own aeroplanes came upon the scene and indulged in a little machine-gun practice on us, but quickly discovered his mistake. Still, it all helped to cheer us on the way. I was about the first to get into the cable trench, and with the prisoners in front, led the way back to where the Royal Welsh Fusiliers were holding the permanent line. They also mistook us for Bosches, possibly because of the four prisoners in front, and subjected us to rather severe machine-gun fire. It was not till I had waved my shrapnel helmet for some time on top of my rifle as high as I could hold it, that they recognised us as friends. Then one of our officers, who happened to be with them, got out of the trench and led us in. It appeared that they had already beaten off one attack during the afternoon, so one could not be surprised at their mistaking us for foes.“After some delay we eventually got the remains of the two Companies back to Rest Camp, whence we had started off on the evening of the 4th. There were about 15 of ‘C’ Company who got out and 40 of ‘D’ Company.“Those of us who did get through can certainly look back upon the affair as one of the most strenuous and exciting experiences we had in France.”

“It was early afternoon before the next move came. Then all the lines of Bosches in front of us attacked, but right across our front on to the 59th Division, the movement being for them a half left movement. Then we had all the shooting we desired. The machine-gunners had a fine time, and so did our riflemen, who were mostly collected in the four gun pits, which were higher than the floor of the trench and enabled us to fire over our camouflage, which was composed of wire netting, turf, etc., and made firing from the greater part of the trench impossible.

“By about 3.0 p.m. the Bosches appeared to have gone right through the position held by the 59th Division, and it looked to us as if the latter had been compelled to retire by weight of numbers. Of course this made our position untenable with the Bosches in our right, rear, and working round us, and the village between us and the remainder of our Battalion also in enemy hands.

“About 70 yards in rear of our trench and parallel with it, ran a sunken road, connecting the village on our left. Parties of Bosches commenced to approach each way along this road, and this forced us to withdraw most of our garrison from the trench and form a semi-circle with each end resting on the road. Things soon became very exciting, and then those of us who were out at the back of the trench, received the order to retire. From the sunken road back to the permanent front line must have been about 1½ miles, and that journey proved about the most exciting that any of us had experienced. The party’s strength was two officers and probably about 100 other ranks, and the retirement was done in extended order. At the start off we were received with fire from nearly every direction, and also a little shell fire which may or may not have been meant for us. After going about half a mile, we had the best part of the whole business. We came across at least 100 of the enemy in more or less close order, and did not actually discover them until they were within about 100 yards of us, owing to the folds in the ground. It is difficult to say who appeared to be the most surprised, they or us, but we did not give them long to think about it. We flopped and opened rapid fire on them, and also got our Lewis guns going. Our Lewis gunners had been cursing about their loads, but we were more than glad of the guns under the circumstances. This big party of Bosches quickly took fright and it was laughable to see them all double off back towards home like a flock of sheep. It was a marvellous target, only about 200 or 300 yards away. You simplycouldn’t miss, and, of course, our success gave us great help on our journey, for most of us were nearly done, owing to the bitter nights we had had with no proper hot food. Having disposed of this body, we encountered no further opposition from Fritz except occasional rifle fire, and we took four stray Germans prisoners along with us. We were then about three-quarters of a mile from our goal, and came upon a small cable trench about three feet deep running towards our lines. Just about this time, one of our own aeroplanes came upon the scene and indulged in a little machine-gun practice on us, but quickly discovered his mistake. Still, it all helped to cheer us on the way. I was about the first to get into the cable trench, and with the prisoners in front, led the way back to where the Royal Welsh Fusiliers were holding the permanent line. They also mistook us for Bosches, possibly because of the four prisoners in front, and subjected us to rather severe machine-gun fire. It was not till I had waved my shrapnel helmet for some time on top of my rifle as high as I could hold it, that they recognised us as friends. Then one of our officers, who happened to be with them, got out of the trench and led us in. It appeared that they had already beaten off one attack during the afternoon, so one could not be surprised at their mistaking us for foes.

“After some delay we eventually got the remains of the two Companies back to Rest Camp, whence we had started off on the evening of the 4th. There were about 15 of ‘C’ Company who got out and 40 of ‘D’ Company.

“Those of us who did get through can certainly look back upon the affair as one of the most strenuous and exciting experiences we had in France.”

Sergeant Cooke has also written an excellent description of the same action, which bears out his comrade’s story:—

“Daylight on the 6th found everything quiet, but during the morning large bodies of troops were observed filing into Anneux—a village between Graincourt and Bourlon Wood—and it was evident that an attack from this direction was to be expected. The arrival of a motor car, which was at first mistaken for a tank, caused some excitement, but, apart from this and visits from scouting planes, nothing of interest happened until about 3.0 p.m. when the attack from Anneux was launched.The attack, in the form of several waves of infantry, was mainly directed against the positions right of Graincourt, leaving ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies practically untouched.The remaining Companies, leaving the gun pits and taking up positions in the open from which more effective use of the rifle could be made, opened a steady and accurate fire on the advancing waves, with the result that the attack on their immediate front crumpled up.“Attention was now diverted to the right flank, where the enemy appeared to be meeting with more success, and it was discovered that the Battalion on the right had retired earlier in the day—their withdrawal having been hidden from the Civil Service Rifles by rising ground between the two positions.“The situation was now serious, as the enemy had closed round the right rear of ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies, whilst at the same time the left rear of the position was threatened by troops from Graincourt, and the order was given for the garrison to cut its way out and make for the strong points in front of Flesquieres.“Many casualties from machine-gun fire were suffered in getting clear of the encircling troops, but about 50 of the two Companies were left to continue the journey back to the strong points.“After numerous encounters with isolated machine-gun posts this party ran into some 200 or 300 of the enemy in an organised line of shell holes before the positions in front of Flesquieres, where the attack had been beaten off earlier in the afternoon, and, as the line was well supplied with light machine guns, the chances of getting through seemed decidedly slender until a Red Cross man advanced making the usual signs of surrender.“The effect was remarkable, for no sooner had his action been seen than, with a yell, the Civil Service Rifles charged down on the enemy, who, being taken by surprise, hastily crowded off into a small valley, where they afforded excellent targets for the remaining ammunition of the riflemen and Lewis gunners.“A few prisoners were collected, and a fresh start made for the British lines, but, owing to the gathering twilight the party was mistaken for the enemy and subjected to heavy machine-gun fire which caused further casualties.“Eventually, by working their way down a shallow ditch originally intended for a telephone cable, the battered remnant of ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies managed to get near enough to attract the attention of a machine-gun officer who guided them into the Strong Point from which the long and slippery march back to Havrincourt was commenced.”

The attack, in the form of several waves of infantry, was mainly directed against the positions right of Graincourt, leaving ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies practically untouched.

The remaining Companies, leaving the gun pits and taking up positions in the open from which more effective use of the rifle could be made, opened a steady and accurate fire on the advancing waves, with the result that the attack on their immediate front crumpled up.

“Attention was now diverted to the right flank, where the enemy appeared to be meeting with more success, and it was discovered that the Battalion on the right had retired earlier in the day—their withdrawal having been hidden from the Civil Service Rifles by rising ground between the two positions.

“The situation was now serious, as the enemy had closed round the right rear of ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies, whilst at the same time the left rear of the position was threatened by troops from Graincourt, and the order was given for the garrison to cut its way out and make for the strong points in front of Flesquieres.

“Many casualties from machine-gun fire were suffered in getting clear of the encircling troops, but about 50 of the two Companies were left to continue the journey back to the strong points.

“After numerous encounters with isolated machine-gun posts this party ran into some 200 or 300 of the enemy in an organised line of shell holes before the positions in front of Flesquieres, where the attack had been beaten off earlier in the afternoon, and, as the line was well supplied with light machine guns, the chances of getting through seemed decidedly slender until a Red Cross man advanced making the usual signs of surrender.

“The effect was remarkable, for no sooner had his action been seen than, with a yell, the Civil Service Rifles charged down on the enemy, who, being taken by surprise, hastily crowded off into a small valley, where they afforded excellent targets for the remaining ammunition of the riflemen and Lewis gunners.

“A few prisoners were collected, and a fresh start made for the British lines, but, owing to the gathering twilight the party was mistaken for the enemy and subjected to heavy machine-gun fire which caused further casualties.

“Eventually, by working their way down a shallow ditch originally intended for a telephone cable, the battered remnant of ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies managed to get near enough to attract the attention of a machine-gun officer who guided them into the Strong Point from which the long and slippery march back to Havrincourt was commenced.”

When the withdrawal from Graincourt began, the right garrison had been divided into two parties, the smaller, consisting of Major Warne, Captain Burtt, Second-Lieutenants Potts and Houslop, with about 20 or 30 other ranks, being in the trench, and the larger party, under Second Lieutenants Lacy and King, being outside. Second Lieutenant Lacy was wounded during the withdrawal, and afterwards died of wounds, whilst Second Lieutenant King was last seen in the rear of the party as it withdrew, binding up a wounded N.C.O., and was afterwards taken prisoner. The officers and men in the trench found themselves surrounded by Boches, and after lying quiet for some time they decided to try to work their way back to the British lines.

Darkness had now fallen, and they had not gone far on their journey before they ran into a large body of the enemy, who took them prisoners and led them back through Graincourt and Bourlon Wood, stopping at the late “D” CompanyHeadquarters, thence via Cambrai to Le Cateau, where they were split up into different camps.

Much space has been given to the description of the action of “C” and “D” Companies because, of the two halves of the Battalion, their task was much the more complicated. “A” and “B” Companies, on the left of the village, were in touch with Battalion Headquarters throughout.

The big German attack on the 6th of December moved across their front, but well away from their positions. They were thus able to put in some excellent shooting with comparatively little opposition from the enemy. Their patrols, however, were frequently in contact with enemy patrols, and fought with great credit in the numerous “street corner” fights on the outskirts of the village.

The left garrison was withdrawn at 5.30 p.m. on the 6th, and reached Havrincourt without any serious interruption.

The Regimental Aid Post was withdrawn at 6.0 p.m., all the wounded who could be found having been sent down.

Battalion Headquarters reached Havrincourt shortly before midnight, and after a day in tents in Havrincourt Wood, the Battalion moved, on the 8th of December, to billets in the village of Bertincourt, where at last there was time to pause and count the cost. The stay in this village was simply a repetition of the experience in Henencourt Wood in 1916, with the melancholy writing of letters of condolence and despatching of “effects.”

After a week spent at Bertincourt, where the remainder of the “battle surplus” rejoined from the Divisional Reinforcement Camp, the Battalion moved up to take over a piece of line in front of Havrincourt. The troops had been hoping to go back for a rest, and the return to the line came as a not very pleasant surprise, and the statements of Company Commanders that the Battalion would certainly be back at rest for Christmas were received with a certain amount of scepticism.

The neighbourhood of Graincourt proved to be a less exciting place on this occasion, and after six cold but uneventful days the Battalion set off by train to the back area for a rest, and for what was generally felt to be a well-deserved Christmas holiday.

Snow lay thick on the ground when the Battalion marched into the village of Morlancourt, where it was to spend the rest. If the weather was seasonable, that is more than could be said for most of the billets, and a good deal of work had to be done in some of them to obtain any degree of comfort. The Christmas spirit, however, was abroad, and the troops, after their recent experiences, were not in the mood to worry about minor discomforts. The place was hardly one “to write home about,” but the estaminets were plentiful and well stocked, and as achange from Bourlon Wood or even Bertincourt, the village of Morlancourt, with all its drawbacks, was appreciated.

Parades were few, and preparations for Christmas festivities were the order of the day. These were to take the form of plenty to eat, plenty to drink, and concerts and sing-songs in some of the largest halls and barns of the village. Time was too short to permit of the production of a revue or pantomime, though a cynic suggested that the authorities had some such idea in their minds when they called on the Quartermaster’s staff to provide a guard one evening.

The Christmas dinners were a great success. No building, of course, could be found in the village to accommodate the whole Battalion, but it was found possible for “A” and “B” Companies to sit down to dinner together in one place, and “C” and “D” in another. All the officers met together for dinner later in the day.

The fare was varied and plentiful, joints of pork making a welcome change from the everlasting beef and mutton of the Army menu. Concerts and other forms of merrymaking passed away the remainder of the day, and the good spirits of the troops testified to their enjoyment of the Christmas festivities.

The sergeants were planning a dinner for the New Year, and preparations were practically complete when a hard-hearted Staff ordered a move to the neighbouring villages of Ribemont and Mericourt, where the other Battalions of the Brigade were already stationed. The remainder of the holiday was spent in these villages, where the Civil Service Battalion, as last comer, was unfortunate in the allotment of billets, and the men were spread over a large area.

The postponed sergeants’ dinner, attended by the Commanding Officer and acting Adjutant, was held at Ribemont.

On the 10th of January the Battalion moved back by train to work, spending one night at Bertincourt before moving up to support positions in the village of Ribecourt. Now followed two tours, to the sectors in front of Ribecourt and Flesquières, during which there is little outside the ordinary events of trench warfare to record. While in reserve, the Battalion was stationed at Bertincourt, a dilapidated village, where some of the billets were Nissen huts and others damaged houses, and where the chief feature at the time was mud. This neighbourhood was a favourite one for the operations of the Boche night bombers. The Civil Service Rifles had had previous experience of this form of annoyance in billets, and in spite of the extra duties occasioned by Lewis gun anti-aircraft posts, the troops soon regarded the nightly visits of the planes as philosophically as the most hardened Londoner.

At the beginning of February the man-power question was soacute in the British Infantry that it was decided to reduce Infantry Brigades from four to three Battalions—“in order to make a Brigade more mobile and more easily controlled by the Brigade Commander,” said the official explanation. In the 47th Division the three Battalions to be broken up in consequence of this order were the 6th, 7th, and 8th City of London Battalions, who, with the Civil Service Rifles, had till then formed the 140th Brigade. The 17th and 21st Battalions (Poplar and Stepneys and First Surrey Rifles respectively) were transferred from the other Brigades of the Division to complete the 140th. This measure came to the Battalions broken up as an unexpected and sudden shock, the force of which will be fully understood and appreciated by every soldier who knows the strength of the bonds which keep the members of a Battalion together. The men of the Civil Service Rifles, realising what their own feelings would have been if it had fallen to their lot to be split up, were full of sympathy for the fellows who had been their comrades and their rivals for nearly three years of active service.

A number of officers and other ranks of the 6th Battalion were transferred to the Civil Service, and, in spite of the soreness which they must have felt at the loss of the identity of the Battalion whose high name and fame they had helped to win, they settled down to give to their new unit the same wholehearted service that they had given to their own.

One of the results of this reorganisation was the acquisition by the Civil Service of the brass band of the 6th Battalion. Strengthened by the inclusion of some of the more expert musicians of the existing drum and fife band, this band, under the direction of Sergeant W. H. Blackmore, quickly became one of the most valuable assets of the Regiment, and remains so to this day, for Mr. Blackmore still has charge of the Regimental Band, which includes in its ranks the majority of the men who served with him in France. The Regimental Band is one of the most successful features of the post-war Civil Service Rifles.

Although a big German offensive had been expected for some weeks, and elaborate preparations to meet it had been made during the winter months, there were few signs of the eve of a big battle when the Civil Service Rifles, after a two hours’ train journey from Etricourt, arrived at Winchester Valley late in the evening of the 19th of March, and relieved the 1st Berkshire Regiment (2nd Division) in Lincoln Reserve, the support line on Beaucamp Ridge, near Villers Plouich. The Poplar and Stepneys and London Irish were in the front line, and the 20th of March passed off very quietly.

It was thought that the Brigade was in for another spell of peaceful trench warfare, similar to those experienced before the short and pleasant stay at Manancourt. The rumours of the coming battle, which had been so strong during the winter months, had, in fact, begun to die down. The optimistic went so far as to think that the enemy attack would not take place, whilst the “quietly confident,” thinking of the days of strenuous digging on those wide trenches behind the Hindenburg Line—the “Tank traps”—with the miles of barbed wire obstacles which had been erected all around, felt that, even if the enemy did launch a big attack, he would not get beyond the Hindenburg Line. Not even the most pessimistic had imagined the great crisis through which the Allied armies were to pass before another month was over. Nor was there any indication in the daily routine that the authorities were anticipating such a titanic struggle in the near future. Leave, regarded by the soldier as the most reliable “Military Barometer,” was still being granted, and the allotment was indeed very much better than at any other time during the war. Men were actually going home on leave within six months of their last arrival in France, and in such circumstances how could one take any but the rosiest view of the future? The German attack, if it came off at all, would probably be a repetition of Bourlon Wood, and after that both sides would settle down to another long spell of trench warfare. It was folly to talk, as the newspapers were doing, of a decisive battle.

When day broke on the 21st of March, however, it was clear that there had been some truth in the “big battle” rumours, for the first day of spring was heralded by such an intense enemy bombardment that there was no longer any doubt that the Bosche was making a supreme effort, beside which all his previous attacks faded into insignificance.

The difficulty at first was to find out where the attack was being pushed home, for in spite of the bombardment, which lasted from 4.30 a.m. until 11.0 a.m., there was no infantry engagement on the 21st of March on the 140th Brigade front. It was fortunate, too, that this was so, for the gas shells fell so freely all around that box respirators had to be worn continuously for six and a half hours.

There have been many attempts to write the story of the great retreat and, generally speaking, the experience of one battalion was much the same as that of any other. But it is well-nigh impossible to describe in detail the career of any unit throughout the most strenuous days of the fighting—the 21st to the 26th of March. During these days battalions often became split up into several parties engaged in different small fights, where none knew how the battle fared with their comrades in other parts of the field. The war correspondents, it is true, saw the Allied troops fighting every inch of ground, and killing thousands of Germans as they fell back, but it was difficult indeed for those engaged in the fighting to ascertain what the situation was, and a total lack of information was one of the outstanding features of the retreat. It was only when they ultimately got back into reserve, some days after, that the troops were able to learn from the newspapers that the Germans had been badly beaten all along the line. “Still,” thought the British Tommy, who had marched in six days across country covered by two ordnance maps, “I don’t altogether like this new style of winning the war.”

The story of the Civil Service Rifles during these critical days of their career in France is told briefly in the official War Diary, which contains just a simple record of their movements without any comment.

In that record it is told how the Battalion, which was in support in Lincoln Reserve on the morning of the 21st, became at night the front line battalion, the 17th and 18th Battalions having been withdrawn. The second day of the battle was quiet on the Civil Service Rifles’ front, and the Battalion remained undisturbed in Lincoln Reserve until the early hours of the 23rd, when, orders having been received to withdraw, a position was taken up on the Dessart Ridge Switch, on the right of the Metz-Fins Road. The line was complete by dawn, the dispositions being “A” Company on the left, with their left flank on the roadand their right in touch with “B,” with “C” and “D” on the right of “B”: Battalion Headquarters was established in a bank about half a mile behind. “A” was afterwards, owing to congestion, withdrawn to a position slightly in rear of the two companies.

Sketch illustrating the First Day of the C.S.R. Retreat—23 March 1918.

The 23rd of March was the most critical day in the career of the Civil Service Rifles in France. The official narrative disposes of it in less than a page, but a whole book could be written on the many situations which arose on that day, and the many acts of heroism, determination and devotion to duty performed by different members of the Battalion.

The story of the fighting can be followed more or less from the map on the opposite page.

Immediately the position on Dessart Ridge Switch was taken up, i.e., about 5.0 a.m., “D” Company on the right became engaged with the enemy, who attempted to rush in from the right flank, which was unprotected, and by 7.0 a.m. the Battalion was engaging the enemy all along the line. At 8.0 a.m. the enemy made a determined bombing attack on the right of “D” Company, and established machine gun posts which enfiladed the position. Shortly afterwards large numbers of troops were seen to be retiring, apparently from the position known as Metz Switch. Colonel Segrave went over and rallied these, and took them forward with his Headquarters Company to the ridge between Metz and Dessart Wood (east of the Metz-Fins Road), and took up a position facing east, and at right angles to the Dessart Switch line. This was done to form a rallying line for retiring troops and a defensive flank to Dessart Ridge Switch.

After shelling the whole area for an hour or two more, the enemy gained a little more ground and established further machine-gun posts, this time towards the left, south and south-east of Metz. Shortly after noon, troops on the left retired, leaving the left flank of the Civil Service Rifles exposed, and the Battalion now held an isolated position with the enemy working his way round both flanks. The Headquarters Company was accordingly withdrawn to the Vallulart Wood Line, and the remaining Companies, in the Dessart Switch Line facing South, continued the fight in the same position, forming a flank to what had been the third British system of defensive positions, now occupied by some Civil Service Rifles and other troops.

This third system and the Dessart Switch Line were abandoned at about 4.0 p.m., but “D” Company on the right had by this time been surrounded and was never extricated. The cause of this disaster was the fact that the Company’s right flank was completely “in the air” from the time it reached the position. Indeed, this may be said of every position theBattalion took up during the day. There was not at any time any support on the right flank, the troops of the 9th Division (5th Army) having already departed before the fighting began. Many explanations of these repeated withdrawals have since been made, both in after-dinner speeches and in statements to the Press. At least one book has been written on the subject. There was, and apparently still is, considerable difference of opinion as to the justification for the action of the troops of the 5th Army. This story is not concerned with the controversy. The statement is made simply to illustrate how the Civil Service Rifles, on the right of the 47th Division, felt the full effect of the rapid withdrawal of the troops on their right.

Sketch illustrating the Second Day of the C.S.R. Retreat (24 March 1918) and also the Fighting at High Wood and Eaucourt L’Abbe in September and October 1916.

The movements of the various parts of the Battalion after 4.0 p.m. on the 23rd are not even now very clear. Battalion Headquarters (less Headquarters Company) left the third system at 4.0 p.m. and moved to Rocquigny, when Colonel Segrave collected a party of about fifty and put them in position along a ridge north of Four Winds Farm, about a mile and a half south-west of Ytres, where they remained until the enemy drove them out at dusk.

At this point the official narrative breaks down with the remark: “By this time the remnants of the Civil Service Rifles were split up into so many parties, whose movements are too complicated to follow.” The survivors from those small parties, remembering their night of wandering in the dark over rough and strange country, and their inexplicable reunion at dawn, will bear out the truth of the last sentence.

By 9.0 a.m. on the twenty-fourth, the Battalion had been reduced to a mere handful of troops, who were worn out by their twenty-four hours’ continuous fighting. The fate of the majority of the absentees was only too well known, but there were a good many missing whose fate was uncertain. The survivors, however, gallantly stuck to their task, and, numbering about 150, they took up a position under Colonel Segrave, just east of the Bapaume-Peronne road, and about a mile south-east of Le Transloy. Here they remained in support of a party of the 1st Surrey Rifles holding the higher ground to the east, until at noon they had to move back another two miles almost due west, and a position was taken up about half a mile south of Le Transloy and just off the western side of the Le Transloy-Combles road. This position was only held for three hours, when the party, now acting as a rearguard, moved round the western side of Le Transloy to a line north-east of Gueudecourt, whence they were withdrawn at 5.30 p.m. by order of the Brigade Commander through Gueudecourt and Flers to Martinpuich.

It was still light when Martinpuich was reached, and there were a few of the 150 or so survivors to whom the sight of theruins of Eaucourt L’Abbé and the Flers Line recalled their grim struggle of October 1916. It was by no means a happy coincidence that brought the Civil Service Rifles back to this battlefield, where, eighteen months previously, they had paid such a price for the capture of High Wood. On their previous visit to this area they had been filled with confidence and the offensive spirit. They had felt they were really doing something towards winning the war. To retreat across the same country now made it seem as though all the labours of the past eighteen months had been wasted—the lives lost in vain. It had been better if this battlefield had not been reached until darkness had fallen, and perhaps spared those men the bitter reflections on the autumn of 1916 and all they had gone through since.

There was little time, however, for reminiscences, for only a very short stay was made in Martinpuich, and 10.0 p.m. found the Battalion reforming at Bazentin-le-Petit, where further officers and other ranks rejoining brought the strength up to about 230 all ranks. An outpost position was then taken up along the eastern edge of Bazentin-le-Petit and occupied until 10.0 a.m. on the 25th, when a withdrawal was made to Contalmaison Ridge, where the Battalion remained until 3.0 a.m. on the 26th.

After the rapid changes of position during the past two days it had seemed quite a long stay on Contalmaison Ridge, but the troops were not destined to settle there, and the next move was to Bouzincourt. The fighting had now ceased for the time being, so far, at least, as the Civil Service Rifles were concerned, but there was still no rest to be had, and it was not until after a five hours’ march via Contalmaison, La Boiselle and thence across country to Aveluy and Bouzincourt, that billets were reached. The Battalion was now supposed to be resting, but after eight hours in Bouzincourt, the men were on the march again, and at 4.0 p.m. on the 26th they trudged along to billets at Louvencourt, where the night was spent.

At 9.0 a.m. on the 27th the march was resumed and after a rest for an hour or two at Clairfaye Farm, a move was made to billets at Toutencourt, where a halt was made for quite twelve hours!

During these marches the Battalion had been in reserve, but now it began to move back to the front line, but before relieving the 6th Buffs (12th Division) in Aveluy Wood on the night of the 29th, a very welcome twenty-four hours’ rest had been enjoyed in billets at Warloy.

While the fighting portion of the Battalion had been having such a strenuous time in the retreat, the Administrative portion had also had plenty of excitement, and the men of the transport section and Quartermaster’s staff had frequently had to thinkabout knocking the ashes out of their rifles and sharpening their bayonets during days when they were often in touch with the enemy. For a time they had to carry on as a separate unit, and the story of their travels is told in the following narrative contributed by Transport-Sergeant G. M. Sladden, to whom much credit is due for the withdrawal of the Regimental transport without the loss of a man or a horse.

“The period of the ‘Great Retreat’ was an arduous one for the Battalion Transport, entailing conditions vastly different from the ordered routine incidental to trench warfare. Their lines were stationed on the 21st March in a field on the Metz-Fins road, the Quartermaster’s stores being then in Metz, where the Battalion had been billeted prior to relieving the 2nd Division in the line. The stores were filled with an unusually heavy stock of material, including the blankets of the Battalion, the officers’ valises and the men’s packs. In fact, mobile conditions did not exist at this time.“Early on the morning of the 22nd the hostile attack developed on our part of the front, and it rapidly became apparent that the attack was making headway, though hitherto no news had been heard of the great German success on the previous day further south. To the right was seen an aerial attack in great force on the 9th Division, of which some details soon began to pass in retreat by the transport lines. The officers’ mess cart, which had gone early to Nurlu canteen, returned to report the canteen shelled out and Nurlu deserted. Soon orders arrived that the Battalion was to retire after nightfall to the Dessart Switch line, and the Transport to withdraw to Bus. Accordingly, all wagons not required to take up rations and move the Battalion that night were sent off at once with loads to Bus, and orders to return for a second load as soon as possible. Blankets were sent first, valises were left for the second journey: but the congested state of the roads and the rapidity of the enemy advance upset all calculations. The A.S.C. wagons, which were to have cleared the Quartermaster stores, were prevented by the road controls from returning to Metz. Consequently, there are certain officers who cherish regretful memories of persistent but futile efforts to induce a harsh War Office to compensate them for the loss of valuable but non-regulation articles of kit. Some of the limbered wagons—luckier or perhaps swifter than the A.S.C. motors—got back to the Transport lines late that night and picked up second loads. They were none too soon, for as they finished loading they were fired upon by machine guns from a patrol which had reached the ridge overlooking the lines from a few hundred yards away. The wagons, luckily, were standing in a sunken road and down this they were able to escape without casualty. Meanwhile, the ration wagons had gone up to the line, where they found the front line now withdrawn to the support line and preparing to evacuate the position. Ammunition dumps—notably the great dump at Trescault—were being blown up all round: indications of a big retreat abounded. Having delivered rations, the column waited to pick up Lewis guns and other equipment, and to take them back to the new position. Gradually the guns came downuntil all but one had arrived; the Battalion was clear and platoons of other Battalions continued to file by—still no Lewis gun. Yet orders were definite, to wait till all the guns had come. But when the last platoon of the last Battalion had passed, it seemed certain that the missing gun must have gone some other way. The boy who stood on the burning deck was doubtless noble but certainly idiotic: moreover, it seemed possible that the fifteen guns on the wagonsmightbe wanted. So orders were stoutly disobeyed and away went the wagons. They had been warned not to go back by the route by which they had come up, which had been reported occupied by the enemy; so in the blackness of a pitch-dark night, over unreconnoitred ground, they made a bee-line for the road between Metz and Trescault.“Over hill, over dale,Through bush, through briar,Over park, over pale,Through trench, through wire—”and hit it at last, though once nearly ingulfed in a bog. And so up the Fins road to the appointed place, where everything was safely handed over. The next stage was to the Transport lines, where the trekking loads of the wagons were waiting to be picked up; but, at a short distance from the lines, bullets coming from that direction made it appear probable that the enemy was in possession, and this was confirmed by the Battalion Intelligence Officer who happened to meet the column at this juncture. Nothing for it then but to get away and join up with the rest of the Transport at Bus.“At Bus the whole of the Brigade Transport was standing by waiting orders to move; so the tired horses could not even be unharnessed. There was, however, opportunity to water and feed both for horse and man before a move was made, which was not actually until midday. The line of march was by Le Mesnil and Saillisel to Le Transloy, over by roads much cut up. At one point the column had to pass over a quaking bog, of which the thin crust had to be continually reinforced, after the passage at the gallop of each vehicle, with fascines, bits of plank, and anything that came handy. The prevailing fine weather was a god send; without it the column could not have passed this spot. Night had fallen before the column pulled off the road on to a shell-riddled stretch of the old Somme battlefield where wagons and horses could only stand higgledy-piggledy wherever a spot without a shell-hole could be found. Here the A.S.C. supply wagons were waiting, and at once rations were loaded on the limbers and sent off to find the Battalion. This was successfully done, and meanwhile the remaining horses and men were able to snatch a little sleep, though standing by to move at ten minutes’ notice. Orders were hourly expected, for the front line was falling back fast, and shortly before midnight part of it—in the shape of ‘A’ Company, which had lost touch—drifted into the lines in search of the rest of the Battalion. After they had pushed forward again to take up a defensive position it was found that other units of the Brigade Transport had moved off. Assuming that orders had miscarried (as afterwards was found to be the case), and knowing that if the column was to get away at all, it must bebefore dawn, a move was made without orders. It was found afterwards that the rest of the Brigade marched via Les Boeufs, where they had some casualties through shell fire; so the choice of route of the 15th via Saillisel and Combles was a lucky one, for the column was unmolested on this road except by a little heavy shrapnel that did no harm. Some trouble was caused at Saillisel, where, just as dawn began to break, and with the enemy on a ridge only a short distance away, the road was found to be blocked by part of an ammunition column. After some difficulty they were passed—another stroke of luck, for it was heard afterwards that this column failed to get away. Combles, too, was found to contain the Divisional Ordnance Depot, where all stores were being destroyed. A few men were able as they passed to snatch articles of kit that they had lost: the Battalion saddler still mourns over his failure to ‘scrounge’ a complete saddler’s outfit. He found it too heavy to catch the last wagon and stow it there.“It took a weary while to reach Bazentin Le Petit that day, for after Ginchy the road was congested with an enormous mass of traffic. However, it was done, and horses and men, utterly weary hoped for a little rest there. But it seemed that the march would never end, for orders came for the retreat to continue; and at dusk all (except enough cookers and ration wagons to supply the Battalion with food that night) moved off via Albert to a new halting ground. During the afternoon a slight diversion had been caused by several enemy aeroplanes that came over and dropped a few bombs intended for the Brigade Transport; it was, however, a very timid raid of the tip-and-run variety and did no harm. Of a very different kind was the relay raid that the column passing through Albert that night experienced. From dark to light a succession of machines dropped bombs up and down the main street of Albert and the main roads approaching the town. The street was full of moving traffic, and things were made much worse by many motor transport drivers leaving their lorries standing and taking cover in houses. It seemed at one time as if the column of the 140th Brigade would be utterly unable to go forward; but the acting Transport Officer and Quartermaster, Lieutenant A. L. Mills, did excellent work in sorting out the disorganised mass of vehicles ahead, and the Brigade column finally got through with far fewer casualties than might have been expected, and of these the 15th incurred none. Meanwhile the ration column had set out with an escort of armoured cars to meet the Battalion at Bazentin Le Grand. The Battalion was, for the moment, not holding a position, and it was possible to give every man the good, hot meal of which he stood in need. The escort proved unnecessary, and as it was growing light when Albert was passed on the return journey, the ration column escaped the bombing that the others had undergone. But the bodies and the wreckage showed them how much Albert had suffered that night. They rejoined the rest of the transport in the small hours of the morning of the 25th, but within four hours the whole column was on the move again to just outside Millencourt. Here was another short halt, during which the 15th acquired two ‘buckshee’ horses—one of them an excellent animal, who served them well until he was killed six months later, the otherblind and vicious: it was easy to guess how he came to be roving free—and he was soon given his freedom back again. Tired though every man and beast was, it was necessary to move again that afternoon, because the unit was said to be on the wrong side of road. They were sent to a pitch which was also useless because too soft for wagon or horse lines—involving another move, unauthorised this time. Rations went up as soon as the third move had been carried out, and after a long wait at the rendezvous were sent back to the lines, for the Battalion was at last coming out of the line. The ration column got back to the lines just in time to move with the rest of the Transport to Bouzincourt, where the relieved Battalion was met early on the morning of the 26th. From which time for a while the history of the movements of the Transport merges again with that of the Battalion as a whole.

“Early on the morning of the 22nd the hostile attack developed on our part of the front, and it rapidly became apparent that the attack was making headway, though hitherto no news had been heard of the great German success on the previous day further south. To the right was seen an aerial attack in great force on the 9th Division, of which some details soon began to pass in retreat by the transport lines. The officers’ mess cart, which had gone early to Nurlu canteen, returned to report the canteen shelled out and Nurlu deserted. Soon orders arrived that the Battalion was to retire after nightfall to the Dessart Switch line, and the Transport to withdraw to Bus. Accordingly, all wagons not required to take up rations and move the Battalion that night were sent off at once with loads to Bus, and orders to return for a second load as soon as possible. Blankets were sent first, valises were left for the second journey: but the congested state of the roads and the rapidity of the enemy advance upset all calculations. The A.S.C. wagons, which were to have cleared the Quartermaster stores, were prevented by the road controls from returning to Metz. Consequently, there are certain officers who cherish regretful memories of persistent but futile efforts to induce a harsh War Office to compensate them for the loss of valuable but non-regulation articles of kit. Some of the limbered wagons—luckier or perhaps swifter than the A.S.C. motors—got back to the Transport lines late that night and picked up second loads. They were none too soon, for as they finished loading they were fired upon by machine guns from a patrol which had reached the ridge overlooking the lines from a few hundred yards away. The wagons, luckily, were standing in a sunken road and down this they were able to escape without casualty. Meanwhile, the ration wagons had gone up to the line, where they found the front line now withdrawn to the support line and preparing to evacuate the position. Ammunition dumps—notably the great dump at Trescault—were being blown up all round: indications of a big retreat abounded. Having delivered rations, the column waited to pick up Lewis guns and other equipment, and to take them back to the new position. Gradually the guns came downuntil all but one had arrived; the Battalion was clear and platoons of other Battalions continued to file by—still no Lewis gun. Yet orders were definite, to wait till all the guns had come. But when the last platoon of the last Battalion had passed, it seemed certain that the missing gun must have gone some other way. The boy who stood on the burning deck was doubtless noble but certainly idiotic: moreover, it seemed possible that the fifteen guns on the wagonsmightbe wanted. So orders were stoutly disobeyed and away went the wagons. They had been warned not to go back by the route by which they had come up, which had been reported occupied by the enemy; so in the blackness of a pitch-dark night, over unreconnoitred ground, they made a bee-line for the road between Metz and Trescault.

“Over hill, over dale,Through bush, through briar,Over park, over pale,Through trench, through wire—”

and hit it at last, though once nearly ingulfed in a bog. And so up the Fins road to the appointed place, where everything was safely handed over. The next stage was to the Transport lines, where the trekking loads of the wagons were waiting to be picked up; but, at a short distance from the lines, bullets coming from that direction made it appear probable that the enemy was in possession, and this was confirmed by the Battalion Intelligence Officer who happened to meet the column at this juncture. Nothing for it then but to get away and join up with the rest of the Transport at Bus.

“At Bus the whole of the Brigade Transport was standing by waiting orders to move; so the tired horses could not even be unharnessed. There was, however, opportunity to water and feed both for horse and man before a move was made, which was not actually until midday. The line of march was by Le Mesnil and Saillisel to Le Transloy, over by roads much cut up. At one point the column had to pass over a quaking bog, of which the thin crust had to be continually reinforced, after the passage at the gallop of each vehicle, with fascines, bits of plank, and anything that came handy. The prevailing fine weather was a god send; without it the column could not have passed this spot. Night had fallen before the column pulled off the road on to a shell-riddled stretch of the old Somme battlefield where wagons and horses could only stand higgledy-piggledy wherever a spot without a shell-hole could be found. Here the A.S.C. supply wagons were waiting, and at once rations were loaded on the limbers and sent off to find the Battalion. This was successfully done, and meanwhile the remaining horses and men were able to snatch a little sleep, though standing by to move at ten minutes’ notice. Orders were hourly expected, for the front line was falling back fast, and shortly before midnight part of it—in the shape of ‘A’ Company, which had lost touch—drifted into the lines in search of the rest of the Battalion. After they had pushed forward again to take up a defensive position it was found that other units of the Brigade Transport had moved off. Assuming that orders had miscarried (as afterwards was found to be the case), and knowing that if the column was to get away at all, it must bebefore dawn, a move was made without orders. It was found afterwards that the rest of the Brigade marched via Les Boeufs, where they had some casualties through shell fire; so the choice of route of the 15th via Saillisel and Combles was a lucky one, for the column was unmolested on this road except by a little heavy shrapnel that did no harm. Some trouble was caused at Saillisel, where, just as dawn began to break, and with the enemy on a ridge only a short distance away, the road was found to be blocked by part of an ammunition column. After some difficulty they were passed—another stroke of luck, for it was heard afterwards that this column failed to get away. Combles, too, was found to contain the Divisional Ordnance Depot, where all stores were being destroyed. A few men were able as they passed to snatch articles of kit that they had lost: the Battalion saddler still mourns over his failure to ‘scrounge’ a complete saddler’s outfit. He found it too heavy to catch the last wagon and stow it there.

“It took a weary while to reach Bazentin Le Petit that day, for after Ginchy the road was congested with an enormous mass of traffic. However, it was done, and horses and men, utterly weary hoped for a little rest there. But it seemed that the march would never end, for orders came for the retreat to continue; and at dusk all (except enough cookers and ration wagons to supply the Battalion with food that night) moved off via Albert to a new halting ground. During the afternoon a slight diversion had been caused by several enemy aeroplanes that came over and dropped a few bombs intended for the Brigade Transport; it was, however, a very timid raid of the tip-and-run variety and did no harm. Of a very different kind was the relay raid that the column passing through Albert that night experienced. From dark to light a succession of machines dropped bombs up and down the main street of Albert and the main roads approaching the town. The street was full of moving traffic, and things were made much worse by many motor transport drivers leaving their lorries standing and taking cover in houses. It seemed at one time as if the column of the 140th Brigade would be utterly unable to go forward; but the acting Transport Officer and Quartermaster, Lieutenant A. L. Mills, did excellent work in sorting out the disorganised mass of vehicles ahead, and the Brigade column finally got through with far fewer casualties than might have been expected, and of these the 15th incurred none. Meanwhile the ration column had set out with an escort of armoured cars to meet the Battalion at Bazentin Le Grand. The Battalion was, for the moment, not holding a position, and it was possible to give every man the good, hot meal of which he stood in need. The escort proved unnecessary, and as it was growing light when Albert was passed on the return journey, the ration column escaped the bombing that the others had undergone. But the bodies and the wreckage showed them how much Albert had suffered that night. They rejoined the rest of the transport in the small hours of the morning of the 25th, but within four hours the whole column was on the move again to just outside Millencourt. Here was another short halt, during which the 15th acquired two ‘buckshee’ horses—one of them an excellent animal, who served them well until he was killed six months later, the otherblind and vicious: it was easy to guess how he came to be roving free—and he was soon given his freedom back again. Tired though every man and beast was, it was necessary to move again that afternoon, because the unit was said to be on the wrong side of road. They were sent to a pitch which was also useless because too soft for wagon or horse lines—involving another move, unauthorised this time. Rations went up as soon as the third move had been carried out, and after a long wait at the rendezvous were sent back to the lines, for the Battalion was at last coming out of the line. The ration column got back to the lines just in time to move with the rest of the Transport to Bouzincourt, where the relieved Battalion was met early on the morning of the 26th. From which time for a while the history of the movements of the Transport merges again with that of the Battalion as a whole.

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