Chapter XII.

Chapter XII.The Americans in the Philippines.Manila Bay—The naval battle of Cavite—General Aguinaldo—Progress of the Tagals—The Tagal Republic—Who were the aggressors?—Requisites for a settlement—Scenes of drunkenness—The estates of the religious orders to be restored—Slow progress of the campaign—Colonel Funston’s gallant exploits—Colonel Stotsenburg’s heroic death—General Antonio Luna’s gallant rally of his troops at Macabebe—Reports manipulated—Imaginary hills and jungles—Want of co-operation between army and navy—Advice of Sir Andrew Clarke—Naval officers as administrators—Mr. Whitelaw Reid’s denunciations—Senator Hoar’s opinion—Mr. McKinley’s speech at Pittsburgh—The false prophets of the Philippines—Tagal opinion of American Rule—Señor Mabini’s manifesto—Don Macario Adriatico’s letter—Foreman’s prophecy—The administration misled—Racial antipathy—The curse of the Redskins—The recall of General Otis—McArthur calls for reinforcements—Sixty-five thousand men and forty ships of war—State of the islands—Aguinaldo on the Taft Commission.Manila Bay.The width of the entrance to the vast Bay of Manila is nine and a half marine miles from shore to shore. It is divided into two unequal channels by the Island of Corregidor and Pulo Caballo, and a rock called El Frayle, about a mile and a half from the southern shore, farther reduces that channel.The Boca Chica, or northern entrance between Corregidor Island and Punta Lasisi, is two marine miles wide, and in the middle of the channel the depth of water is about thirty fathoms.The Boca Grande, or southern entrance between Pulo Caballo and El Frayle, is three and a half marine miles wide, with a depth of water in the fairway of about twenty fathoms.In both channels the tide rushes in and out with great force.With channels of such a width there was no difficulty in taking a squadron in at night, and little chance of suffering damage from the hastily improvised batteries of the Spaniards.And it will be evident to all having the slightest knowledge of submarine mining that the conditions are most unfavourable to defence by such means. As a matter of fact, the Spaniards possessed only nine obsolete submarine mines fitted to explode by contact. These were sent over to Corregidor, but were not sunk, as it was obvious that they were useless.On the other hand, it was a perfect position for the employment of torpedo boats or gunboats, there being excellent anchorage for such craft on both sides of the Channel and in Corregidor Cove. But at the time of the declaration of war, the Spaniards had no torpedo boats in the Philippines. The Elswick-built cruisersIsla de CubaandIsla de Luzonwere fitted with torpedoes, and might have been watching the channels for a chance to use them. Admiral Montojo knows best why he did not detach them on this service.There was then nothing to prevent the entrance of the American Squadron; the mines, torpedo boats and narrow channels only existed in the imagination of some American newspaper correspondents.But Admiral Dewey’s exploit does not need any such enhancing, it speaks for itself.To any one having a knowledge of the Spanish navy, and especially of the squadron of the Philippines, the result of an action against an American Squadron of similar force could not be doubtful.As a matter of fact the Spanish ships, except the two small cruisers built at Elswick in 1887, were quite obsolete. TheCastillaandReina Cristinawere wooden vessels, standing very high out of the water, and making admirable targets, whilst their guns were small, some of them had been landed at Corregidor, though never placed in battery. The boilers of one vessel were in the arsenal.But even allowing for the fact that the tonnage of the American Squadron was half as much again as that of the Spaniards, and that they had more than twice as many, and heavier guns, no one would have supposed it possiblethat the Spanish Squadron could have been completely destroyed without inflicting any damage upon the enemy.It was indeed a brilliant victory, reflecting great credit upon Admiral Dewey and the officers and crews of the American ships, not only for what they did that day, but for their careful preparation that enabled them to score so decided a success.The Spanish sailors put up a good fight and showed pluck, but they had no skill as gunners, and so failed in the hour of their country’s need. Admiral Montojo bravely commanded his fleet, but as soon as the action was over he seems to have considered that his duty had terminated, for he returned to his Villa in San Miguel, leaving the remnants of his squadron and the Cavite arsenal to its fate.We must infer that Admiral Dewey’s victory and its consequences were not foreseen by the American Government, for they had made no preparations to send troops to Manila, and from the time they learned of the destruction of the Spanish Squadron, till they had assembled a force strong enough to take and hold the city,three weary months elapsed. This was a very hap-hazard way of making war, and the delay cost many thousands of lives as will be seen later on.General Aguinaldo.On the 19th May, 1898, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, former chief of the insurgents, arrived in Manila in pursuance of an arrangement with the American Consul-General at Singapore. He came with a suite of seventeen persons on board an American gunboat, and after an interview with Admiral Dewey, was landed at Cavite and given two field-pieces, a number of rifles and a supply of ammunition.He soon reasserted himself as the leader of the insurrection, which was already in active progress, and gained some signal successes against the Spaniards. On the 24th May he issued a proclamation enjoining his followers to make war in a civilized manner and to respect property.I do not intend to discuss the negotiations between Mr. Pratt and Aguinaldo, nor between the latter and Admiral Dewey. This subject has been very fully treated by Mr. Foreman in the second edition of his book. The treating with Aguinaldo was not approved by Mr. Day at Washington, and the Consul-General and Consuls who hadparticipated in it, and even taken credit for it, were severely rapped over the knuckles and promptly adopted an apologetic tone (see Blue Book). But whatever was the agreement with Aguinaldo, it is evident that had it not been for his assistance and that of the insurgents, the Spanish forces could have retired from Manila to Tarlac or other place inland out of reach of the guns of the fleet and could have prolonged their resistance for years.The Tagal Republic.The Tagals had made much progress since the insurrection of 1896–7. Their ideas had advanced considerably since their rudimentary organization in the Province of Cavite, as can be gathered from the improved style of the various proclamations and decrees published by Aguinaldo.They now organized a Government, a real Civil Administration, extending over a great part of Luzon, and sent an expedition to Visayas. They established a Constitution, a representative government, and reopened the courts and schools, whilst the native clergy carried on public worship as usual. Aguinaldo repeatedly asserted the determination of the Tagal people to fight to the death for independence. At this time the insurgents held 9000 Spaniards as prisoners of war, and they claimed to have 30,000 men under arms.Paymaster Wilcox, U.S.N., and Mr. Leonard R. Sargent who travelled through part of Luzon for more than 600 miles, and during six weeks, reported1to Admiral Dewey that a regular and orderly Administration had been established, and was in full working order.Aguinaldo was at the head of this Government and of the armyco-operatingwith the American forces by the written request of General Anderson. This should have ensured him and those with him at the very least courteous and considerate treatment at the hands of the American Commanders, and in fact he received this from Admiral Dewey. But as soon as the direction of affairs passed into the hands of the general commanding the army the deeply-rooted contempt felt by Americans for the coloured races was allowed full play, Aguinaldo and his staff found themselves ignored, or treated with scarcely veiled contempt, and the estrangement was gradually increased.I do not know which party was the aggressor on February the 4th, 1899, each swears that it was the other. Thecui bonotest cuts both ways, for whilst it appears that the attack on Manila secured two doubtful votes in the Senate for the ratification of the Treaty whereby the Philippines were bought from Spain, on the other hand, Aguinaldo may have felt it necessary to prove to America that the Philippines would fight rather than bow their necks to the Yankee yoke. So that both parties may have had an interest in beginning hostilities. In any case, the next day Aguinaldo offered to withdraw to a greater distance if an armistice was arranged, but Otis declared that “fighting must go on.”Personally, I think that if a sympathetic and conciliatory attitude had been adopted, had the local government established been recognized, had Aguinaldo and his staff been given commissions in the Native Army or Civil Service, and the flower of the Tagal Army taken into the service of the United States, a peaceful settlement could have been made on the lines of a Protectorate.I therefore look upon the war as unnecessary, and consider the lives already sacrificed, and that will have to be sacrificed, as absolutely thrown away.The tragical side of American unpreparedness is manifest in the state of anarchy in which the whole Archipelago has been plunged by the American unreadiness to occupy the military posts as soon as they were vacated by the Spanish garrisons. A hideous orgy of murder, plunder, and slave-raiding has prevailed in Visayas, and especially in Mindanao.Three conditions were essential to a peaceful settlement:—First.—A broad-minded and sympathetic representative of America, fully authorized to treat, and a lover of peace.Second.—A strict discipline amongst the American forces.Third.—The principal aim and object of the Tagal insurrection must be secured.General Otis does not seem to me to fulfil the first condition, he lacked prestige and patience, and he showed that he had an insufficient conception of the magnitude of his task by occupying himself with petty details of all kinds and by displaying an ill-timed parsimony. Apparently he had no power to grant anything at all, and only dealt invague generalities which the Tagals could not be expected to accept.As regards the second point, I regret that I am not personally acquainted with the gentlemen from Nebraska, Colorado, Dakota and other states serving in the United States Army or volunteers. I have no doubt that they are good fighting-men, but from all I can hear about them they are not conspicuous for strict military discipline, and too many of them have erroneous ideas as to the most suitable drink for a tropical climate.Manila was in the time of the Spaniards a most temperate city; a drunken man was a very rare sight, and would usually be a foreign sailor. Since the American occupation, some hundreds of drinking saloons have been opened, and daily scenes of drunkenness and debauchery have filled the quiet natives with alarm and horror. When John L. Motley wrote his scathing denunciation of the army which the great Duke of Alva led from Spain into the Low Countries, “to enforce the high religious purposes of Philip II.,”not foresee that his words would be applicable to an American Army sent to subjugate men struggling to be free “for their welfare, not our gain,” nor that this army, besides bringing in its train a flood of cosmopolitan harlotry,2would be allowed by its commander to inaugurate amongst a strictly temperate people a mad saturnalia of drunkenness that has scarcely a parallel.Such, however, is undoubtedly the case, and I venture to think that these occurrences have confirmed many of the Tagals in their resolve rather to die fighting for their independence than to be ruled over by such as these.More important still was it to take care that the Tagal insurrection should not have been in vain. That rebellion probably cost fifty thousand human lives, immense loss of property, and untold misery. It was fought against the friars and was at last triumphant. The Spanish friars had been expelled and their lands confiscated. Were the Americans to bring them back and guarantee them in peaceable possession, once more riveting on the chain the Tagals had torn off?This seems to have been General Otis’ intention. I think he might have stood upon the accomplished fact. But he did not.The Treaty of Peace under Article VIII. declares that the cession cannot in any respect impair the rights of ecclesiastical bodies to acquire and possess property, whilst Article IX. allows Spanish subjects to remain in the Islands, to sell or dispose of their property and to carry on their professions. Presumably General Otis felt bound by the Treaty in which these general stipulations had been embodied by the Peace Commission, in direct contradiction to the advice given them by Mr. Foreman (see p. 463, 55th Congress, 3rd Sess., Doc. No. 62, part 1), who pointed out the necessity of confiscating these lands, but Mr. Gray replied: “We have no law which will allow us to arbitrarily do so.”As soon as the effect of the treaty was known, Archbishop Nozaleda, who had fled to China from the vengeance he feared, returned to Manila. He seemed to have a good deal of interest with General Otis, and this did not please the natives, nor inspire them with confidence.Furthermore, it was reported and generally believed that the friars’ vast estates had been purchased by an American Syndicate who would in due time take possession and exploit them.One can understand the Tagals’ grief and desperation; all their blood and tears shed in vain! The friars triumphant after all!I do not wish to trace the particulars of the wretched war that commenced February, 1899, and is still (October, 1900) proceeding.In it the Americans do not seem to have displayed the resourcefulness andadaptabilityone would have expected from them. For my part, I expected a great deal, for so many American generals being selected from men in the active exercise of a profession, or perhaps controlling the administration of some vast business, they ought naturally to have developed their faculties, by constant use, to a far greater degree than men who have vegetated in the futile routine of a barrack or military station. They prevailed in every encounter, but their advance was very slow, and their troops suffered many preventible hardships. We know very little as to what happened, for the censors, acting under instructions from General Otis, prevented the transmissionof accurate information; nothing was cabled, except the accounts of victories gained by the American troops.It would not be right, however, to pass over the fighting without rendering due tribute to the heroism of the American officers and soldiers.Who can forget Colonel Funston’s gallant exploit in crossing the Rio Grande on a raft under fire with two companies of Kansas Infantry and enfilading the Tagals’ position? Or his leading part of same regiment in a charge upon an enemy’s earthwork near Santo Tomás, where he was wounded?What could be finer than the late Colonel Stotsenburg’s leading of the Nebraska regiment in the attack on Quíngua, where he was killed? And since we are speaking of brave men, shall we not remember the late General Antonio Luna and his gallant rally of his army in the advance from Macabébe, when he fearlessly exposed himself on horseback to the American fire, riding along the front of his line? To justify the slow progress of the army, jungles, forests, swamps and hills were introduced on the perfectly flat arable land such as that around Malolos, Calumpit, and San Fernando, extending in fact all the way from Manila to Tarlac.3This country supports a dense population, and almost every bit of it has been under the plough for centuries. The only hill is Arayat. During the dry season, say from November to May or June, the soil is baked quite hard, and vehicles or guns can traverse any part of it with slight assistance from the pioneers. The only obstacles are the small rivers and creeks, mostly fordable, and having clumps of bamboos growing on their banks providing a perfect material for temporary bridges or for making rafts.The campaign was marked by an absence of co-operation between the land and sea forces. Admiral Dewey, apparently, was not pleased with the way things were managed, for he is said to have stayed on board his ship for months at a time. The warships remained at anchor in Manila Bay whilst arms4and ammunition were landed at the outposts or on the coasts without hindrance, and it was not till November that troops were landed at Dagupan,the northern terminus of the railway, though this obviously ought to have been done in February, so as to attack the enemy front and rear.The necessity for small gunboats soon made itself felt, but such was the jealousy of the army towards the navy that it was decided that these must be army gunboats, and General Otis is reported to have purchased thirteen small gunboats at Zamboanga, in March 1899, without consulting or informing Admiral Dewey or even asking for an escort for them. It so happened that the Spaniards evacuated Zamboanga before any American forces arrived, and the insurgents promptly took possession of the gunboats already paid for and proceeded to plunder them of everything useful to them. A native account says that they took the gunboats up the Rio Grande into the interior, but this is denied by the Americans. Ultimately a cruiser was sent down to convoy the gunboats, and if I am correctly informed, they were commissioned in charge of junior naval officers.Obviously, the services of the navy should have been utilised to the utmost extent, and advantage should have been taken of the prestige they had gained by the victory over the Spaniards, and of the great popularity and sympathetic personality of Admiral Dewey. A serious responsibility rests upon whoever allowed jealousy to prevent the co-operation of the land and sea forces, since by failing to secure this they needlessly sacrificed the lives of American soldiers and prolonged the war.Lieut.-General Sir Andrew Clarke, R.E., a former governor of the Straits Settlements, and the greatest authority in England on the affairs of the Malay States and Islands, was good enough to write a letter which was forwarded to Mr. Day, and published in the Blue Book, p. 628.He pointed out that, although a moderate military force might be desirable at one or two important centres, a naval force was of more value, especially gunboats able to move freely amongst the islands and ascend the many rivers and inlets of the sea.Therefore to the fleet and its officers he advised that political and civil administration of the Philippines should, at least in the first instance, be entrusted. Sir Andrew believed, and I venture to say that I thoroughly agree with him, that amongst the officers of the United States navy,active and retired, can be found many men of wide experience, broad views, and generous sympathy well fitted to administer the affairs of the protectorate. Sir Andrew also advised, as Foreman did, and as I do, that the members of the Religious Orders,i.e., the Augustinians, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, and the Recollets, should be advised to return to Spain, receiving compensation for their property.Sir Andrew Clarke summed up his advice as follows: “Enlist native sympathy by fairness and justice, and rule through native agents, supervised by carefully selected American residents.”As the fleet, by destroying the Spanish squadron, had rendered it possible to bring troops by sea, and by capturing the arsenal and blockading the Port of Manila, had invigorated the insurrection, and in fact had brought about the cession of the islands by Spain, it would appear to outsiders that it and its officers had a strong claim to the leading part in completing the settlement and pacification of the Archipelago for which the best authorities considered them to possess special qualifications. Besides, if peace was really wanted, it would have been better to entrust the negotiations to the man who had had his fight rather than to one looking for his chance. The craze for military renown is nowhere more rampant than in the United States. Occasions are few and far between, and we must not expect generals to throw them away and fly in the face of Providence.This, however, did not commend itself to those who pull the strings; we ignore the reasons, but we see the result. Perhaps it was thought that to allow Dewey to add to his victor’s laurel wreath the palm of the pacificator would be too much honour for one man, and might raise him to an inconvenient height in the estimation of his fellow citizens.A year and twenty days after his decisive victory Admiral Dewey sailed from Manila in his flagship. Wherever the British ensign flew he was received with every demonstration of honour and respect both by naval and military officers and by civilians. His reception in New York was marked by an almost delirious enthusiasm. But long before he arrived, Mr. Whitelaw Reid, disgusted with the conduct of the campaign, made a speech at the Miami University and denounced the President for neglect of duty which brought on the war in the Philippines.He said: “If the bitterest enemy of the United States had sought to bring upon it in that quarter the greatest trouble in the shortest time, he could have devised for that end no policy more successful than the one we have already pursued.” It must be added that Mr. Whitelaw Reid, perhaps to prevent being accused of having sympathy with the enemy, denounced Aguinaldo and the Tagals as rebels, savages and treacherous barbarians, unfit for citizenship or self-government, and declared that the Philippines belong to America by right of conquest.I suppose Mr. Whitelaw Reid, or perhaps any citizen of the United States, has a right to denounce his own President, and certainly the management of the Philippine annexation has been bad from the beginning.But I think Mr. McKinley was badly served by the Peace Commission. They seem to me to have made many and egregious mistakes.1. They took General Merritt’s opinion that the Tagals would submit, and accepted Mr. Foreman’s assurance of Tagal plasticity and accommodating nature.2. They disregarded the intimation of D. Felipe Agoncillo, the accredited agent of the Tagals, that these would accept no settlement to which they were not parties.3. They treated several millions of civilised Christian people like a herd of cattle to be purchased with the ranch.4. Under Article VIII., they guaranteed the religious orders the possession of estates already taken from them.5. Under Article IX., they gave the expelled friars the right to return and exercise their profession.To illustrate their careless procedure, I may add that they did not even accurately determine the boundaries of the Archipelago to be ceded, and now, in August 1900, $100,000 is to be paid to Spain for Sibutu and CagayanSuluIslands, left out by mistake. If any man has a right to say, “Save me from my friends,” that man is William McKinley.As regards Aguinaldo and the Tagals, I think that Mr. Whitelaw Reid’s irritation at their protracted resistance has led him on too far. I prefer the opinion of Senator Hoar, who, speaking in the Senate of three proclamations of Aguinaldo, said: “Mr. President, these are three of the greatest state papers in all history. If they were found in our own history of our own revolutionary time we shouldbe proud to have them stand by the side of those great state papers which Chatham declared were equal to the masterpieces of antiquity.”In the same speech he says, and I commend his words to the reader’s attention: “Mr. President, there is one mode by which the people of the Philippine Islands could establish the truth of the charges as to their degradation and incapacity for self-government which have been made by the advocates of Imperialism in this debate, and that mode is by submitting tamely and without resistance to the dominion of the United States.”Mr. Whitelaw Reid, however, was perfectly right in one thing. The Philippines belong (or will belong) to America by right of conquest. On August 28th, 1899, Mr. McKinley addressed the 10th Pennsylvania Regiment at Pittsburgh soon after their arrival from Manila. He said: “The insurgents struck the first blow. They reciprocated our kindness with cruelty, our mercy5with Mausers.... They assailed our sovereignty, and there will be no useless parley until the insurrection is suppressed and American authority acknowledged and established. The Philippines are ours as much as Louisiana, by purchase, or Texas, or Alaska.” Here we get down to the bed rock, and discard all flimsy pretences. The Americans have undertaken a war of conquest, they bought it in fact, but I fear they are not happy either about its material progress or its moral aspect. We shall have to wait till November to see what they think about it.But whenever the cost in lost lives, ruined health, and shattered minds, to say nothing of dollars, comes to be known, there will be a great outcry in America.Mr. McKinley and his advisers are much to be pitied, for they were misled by the information given them by those they relied on.The False Prophets of the Philippines.Here is an extract from General Merritt’s evidence taken from the Blue Book, fifty-sixth congress, third session, document No. 62, partI, p. 367:Mr. Reid: Do you think any danger of conflict is now reasonably remote?General Merritt: I think there is no danger of conflict as long as these people think the United States is going to take possession there. If they imagine or hear from any source that the Spaniards are to be reinstated there, I think they will be very violent.Mr. Davis: Suppose the United States, by virtue of a treaty with Spain, should take Luzon ... paying no attention to the insurgents—how would that be taken by Aguinaldo?General Merritt: I think Aguinaldo and his immediate following would resist it; but whether he could resist to any extent I do not know, because his forces are divided. I believe that, as matters go, Aguinaldo will lose more or less of his power there.The Chairman: If the United States should say, We will take this country and govern it our own way, do you think they would submit to it?General Merritt: Yes, sir.Mr. Davis: How many troops in your opinion will be necessary to administer the government of this island—to secure the administration of our government there?General Merritt: From 20,000 to 25,000 would be requisite at first.I admire the conviction of this distinguished officer that the benefits of American rule would be highly appreciated by the Tagals, of whom, by-the-bye, he knew next to nothing, having only been a few weeks in Manila amongst sycophantic Mestizo-Americanistas.That interesting people were, however, of a different opinion. On p. 4582 of the ‘Congressional Record,’ I find that Señor Mabini, in a manifesto published at San Isidro, April 15th, 1899, states that “race hatred is much morecruel and pitilessamong the Anglo-Saxons” (he is comparing them with the Spaniards). Again he says, “Annexation, in whatever form it may be adopted, will unite us for ever to a nation whose manners and customs are different from our own, a nation whichhates the coloured race with a mortal hatred, and from which we could never separate ourselves except by war.” The outbreaks against the negroes that have recently happened [August, 1900] in New Orleans, Liberty City, Georgia, and in New York, seem to justify Señor Mabini’s remarks.Don Macario Adriatico, in an answer to a message of General Miller, writing from Jaro, January 3rd, 1900, says: “It could easily be conceived that the Philippines would not suffer a new reign, least ofall of a nation on whose conscience the curse of the Redskins rests as a heavy load.”In other documents they refer to the probable action of the Trusts, and anticipate that, what with the Sugar Trust, the Tobacco Trust, and the Hemp Trust, they would soonfind themselves reduced to the condition of porters and workmen, or even of domestic servants.They seem to have an intelligent anticipation of what will probably befall them when conquered, and hence their desperate resistance to a large American army.But let us now turn up the evidence of another expert on the Philippines, Mr. John Foreman, who also ventured to prophesy what the Tagals would do (Blue Book, before mentioned, p. 443).Mr. Foreman(answering Mr. Day): “The Tagals are of a very plastic nature, willing in their nature (sic), I should say, to accommodate themselves and take up any new established dominion which might be decided upon, and I think they would fall into any new system adopted.“The inhabitants of the Central Islands or Visayas are more uncouth, decidedly less hospitable, and somewhat more averse to associations and relations with outsiders than the Tagals, but I think they would easily come under sway. They want a little more pressure and would have to be guided, more closely watched, and perhaps a little more of the iron hand used than in Luzon.”Thus was the administration in Washington misled, and it is probable that the American military chiefs reported that they could easily overcome all opposition, so they were allowed to try.Yet in June, 1900, we read, “The recall of General Otis is taken to mean that the administration considers the war to be at an end, and that there is no longer any necessity for military rule.”General McArthur is appointed to the command, however, and the first thing he does is to cable to Washington for more troops, whilst Admiral Remey asks for an extra battalion of marines. These are to be sent, also at least three regiments of infantry. Sixty-five thousand men and forty ships of war are now admitted to be the proper garrison to hold down the Philippines.However necessary reinforcements may be, so deep is the racial antipathy between the United States’ soldiers, white or black, and the natives, that every additional man sent out is a source of disaffection, and even exasperation. Not only will the volunteers become demoralised and diseased in mind and body by their sojourn in America’s new possession, but the very fact of their presence renders the pacification of the country more difficult. The more troops are kept there, the more discontented the natives will be.To bring this chapter up to date, the position seems to be as follows: There is a recrudescence of activity amongst the insurgents; fighting is going on over a great part of the Archipelago, the American troops are harassed and overworked, sickness is rife, including the bubonic plague; yet, notwithstanding all this, the Taft Commission has taken over the administration of the islands from September 1st.The date fixed is not a convenient one for the Commission, as it is in the middle of the rainy season, but it has probably been selected to suit the presidential campaign in America.Aguinaldo has issued a proclamation warning the Filipinos against the Taft Commission, which, he says, has no authority from Congress; does not represent the sentiments of the American people, and is simply the personal instrument of Mr. McKinley sent out to make promises which it has no power to keep, and which the United States Government will not be bound to observe. He denounces the Americanistas, and threatens condign punishment to all who accept offices under the Commission. It would appear that a settlement on present lines is still some way off.Judge Taft seems to have inherited the cheerful optimism of General Otis. On September 1st he reported that the insurrection is virtually ended, and on 20th forwarded another favourable report. On 21st, General McArthur cabled accounts of engagements in several provinces of Luzon. The American troops at Pekin are being hurried to Manila, as the reinforcement of General McArthur is absolutely imperative.1Report published inOutlook, September 1st and 21st, 1899.2The Abbé de Brantôme, whose appreciative remarks upon the courtesans who accompanied the Army of the Duke of Alva are quoted by Motley in ‘The Rise of the Dutch Republic,’ would have been delighted to take up his favourite subject and chronicle the following of the American Army.3My remarks apply to the accounts published in theTimes.4May 11th, 1899,The New York Herald’scorrespondent at Manila reports that the insurgents have succeeded in landing ten machine guns on the island of Panay.5The kindness and mercy are not obvious.

Chapter XII.The Americans in the Philippines.Manila Bay—The naval battle of Cavite—General Aguinaldo—Progress of the Tagals—The Tagal Republic—Who were the aggressors?—Requisites for a settlement—Scenes of drunkenness—The estates of the religious orders to be restored—Slow progress of the campaign—Colonel Funston’s gallant exploits—Colonel Stotsenburg’s heroic death—General Antonio Luna’s gallant rally of his troops at Macabebe—Reports manipulated—Imaginary hills and jungles—Want of co-operation between army and navy—Advice of Sir Andrew Clarke—Naval officers as administrators—Mr. Whitelaw Reid’s denunciations—Senator Hoar’s opinion—Mr. McKinley’s speech at Pittsburgh—The false prophets of the Philippines—Tagal opinion of American Rule—Señor Mabini’s manifesto—Don Macario Adriatico’s letter—Foreman’s prophecy—The administration misled—Racial antipathy—The curse of the Redskins—The recall of General Otis—McArthur calls for reinforcements—Sixty-five thousand men and forty ships of war—State of the islands—Aguinaldo on the Taft Commission.Manila Bay.The width of the entrance to the vast Bay of Manila is nine and a half marine miles from shore to shore. It is divided into two unequal channels by the Island of Corregidor and Pulo Caballo, and a rock called El Frayle, about a mile and a half from the southern shore, farther reduces that channel.The Boca Chica, or northern entrance between Corregidor Island and Punta Lasisi, is two marine miles wide, and in the middle of the channel the depth of water is about thirty fathoms.The Boca Grande, or southern entrance between Pulo Caballo and El Frayle, is three and a half marine miles wide, with a depth of water in the fairway of about twenty fathoms.In both channels the tide rushes in and out with great force.With channels of such a width there was no difficulty in taking a squadron in at night, and little chance of suffering damage from the hastily improvised batteries of the Spaniards.And it will be evident to all having the slightest knowledge of submarine mining that the conditions are most unfavourable to defence by such means. As a matter of fact, the Spaniards possessed only nine obsolete submarine mines fitted to explode by contact. These were sent over to Corregidor, but were not sunk, as it was obvious that they were useless.On the other hand, it was a perfect position for the employment of torpedo boats or gunboats, there being excellent anchorage for such craft on both sides of the Channel and in Corregidor Cove. But at the time of the declaration of war, the Spaniards had no torpedo boats in the Philippines. The Elswick-built cruisersIsla de CubaandIsla de Luzonwere fitted with torpedoes, and might have been watching the channels for a chance to use them. Admiral Montojo knows best why he did not detach them on this service.There was then nothing to prevent the entrance of the American Squadron; the mines, torpedo boats and narrow channels only existed in the imagination of some American newspaper correspondents.But Admiral Dewey’s exploit does not need any such enhancing, it speaks for itself.To any one having a knowledge of the Spanish navy, and especially of the squadron of the Philippines, the result of an action against an American Squadron of similar force could not be doubtful.As a matter of fact the Spanish ships, except the two small cruisers built at Elswick in 1887, were quite obsolete. TheCastillaandReina Cristinawere wooden vessels, standing very high out of the water, and making admirable targets, whilst their guns were small, some of them had been landed at Corregidor, though never placed in battery. The boilers of one vessel were in the arsenal.But even allowing for the fact that the tonnage of the American Squadron was half as much again as that of the Spaniards, and that they had more than twice as many, and heavier guns, no one would have supposed it possiblethat the Spanish Squadron could have been completely destroyed without inflicting any damage upon the enemy.It was indeed a brilliant victory, reflecting great credit upon Admiral Dewey and the officers and crews of the American ships, not only for what they did that day, but for their careful preparation that enabled them to score so decided a success.The Spanish sailors put up a good fight and showed pluck, but they had no skill as gunners, and so failed in the hour of their country’s need. Admiral Montojo bravely commanded his fleet, but as soon as the action was over he seems to have considered that his duty had terminated, for he returned to his Villa in San Miguel, leaving the remnants of his squadron and the Cavite arsenal to its fate.We must infer that Admiral Dewey’s victory and its consequences were not foreseen by the American Government, for they had made no preparations to send troops to Manila, and from the time they learned of the destruction of the Spanish Squadron, till they had assembled a force strong enough to take and hold the city,three weary months elapsed. This was a very hap-hazard way of making war, and the delay cost many thousands of lives as will be seen later on.General Aguinaldo.On the 19th May, 1898, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, former chief of the insurgents, arrived in Manila in pursuance of an arrangement with the American Consul-General at Singapore. He came with a suite of seventeen persons on board an American gunboat, and after an interview with Admiral Dewey, was landed at Cavite and given two field-pieces, a number of rifles and a supply of ammunition.He soon reasserted himself as the leader of the insurrection, which was already in active progress, and gained some signal successes against the Spaniards. On the 24th May he issued a proclamation enjoining his followers to make war in a civilized manner and to respect property.I do not intend to discuss the negotiations between Mr. Pratt and Aguinaldo, nor between the latter and Admiral Dewey. This subject has been very fully treated by Mr. Foreman in the second edition of his book. The treating with Aguinaldo was not approved by Mr. Day at Washington, and the Consul-General and Consuls who hadparticipated in it, and even taken credit for it, were severely rapped over the knuckles and promptly adopted an apologetic tone (see Blue Book). But whatever was the agreement with Aguinaldo, it is evident that had it not been for his assistance and that of the insurgents, the Spanish forces could have retired from Manila to Tarlac or other place inland out of reach of the guns of the fleet and could have prolonged their resistance for years.The Tagal Republic.The Tagals had made much progress since the insurrection of 1896–7. Their ideas had advanced considerably since their rudimentary organization in the Province of Cavite, as can be gathered from the improved style of the various proclamations and decrees published by Aguinaldo.They now organized a Government, a real Civil Administration, extending over a great part of Luzon, and sent an expedition to Visayas. They established a Constitution, a representative government, and reopened the courts and schools, whilst the native clergy carried on public worship as usual. Aguinaldo repeatedly asserted the determination of the Tagal people to fight to the death for independence. At this time the insurgents held 9000 Spaniards as prisoners of war, and they claimed to have 30,000 men under arms.Paymaster Wilcox, U.S.N., and Mr. Leonard R. Sargent who travelled through part of Luzon for more than 600 miles, and during six weeks, reported1to Admiral Dewey that a regular and orderly Administration had been established, and was in full working order.Aguinaldo was at the head of this Government and of the armyco-operatingwith the American forces by the written request of General Anderson. This should have ensured him and those with him at the very least courteous and considerate treatment at the hands of the American Commanders, and in fact he received this from Admiral Dewey. But as soon as the direction of affairs passed into the hands of the general commanding the army the deeply-rooted contempt felt by Americans for the coloured races was allowed full play, Aguinaldo and his staff found themselves ignored, or treated with scarcely veiled contempt, and the estrangement was gradually increased.I do not know which party was the aggressor on February the 4th, 1899, each swears that it was the other. Thecui bonotest cuts both ways, for whilst it appears that the attack on Manila secured two doubtful votes in the Senate for the ratification of the Treaty whereby the Philippines were bought from Spain, on the other hand, Aguinaldo may have felt it necessary to prove to America that the Philippines would fight rather than bow their necks to the Yankee yoke. So that both parties may have had an interest in beginning hostilities. In any case, the next day Aguinaldo offered to withdraw to a greater distance if an armistice was arranged, but Otis declared that “fighting must go on.”Personally, I think that if a sympathetic and conciliatory attitude had been adopted, had the local government established been recognized, had Aguinaldo and his staff been given commissions in the Native Army or Civil Service, and the flower of the Tagal Army taken into the service of the United States, a peaceful settlement could have been made on the lines of a Protectorate.I therefore look upon the war as unnecessary, and consider the lives already sacrificed, and that will have to be sacrificed, as absolutely thrown away.The tragical side of American unpreparedness is manifest in the state of anarchy in which the whole Archipelago has been plunged by the American unreadiness to occupy the military posts as soon as they were vacated by the Spanish garrisons. A hideous orgy of murder, plunder, and slave-raiding has prevailed in Visayas, and especially in Mindanao.Three conditions were essential to a peaceful settlement:—First.—A broad-minded and sympathetic representative of America, fully authorized to treat, and a lover of peace.Second.—A strict discipline amongst the American forces.Third.—The principal aim and object of the Tagal insurrection must be secured.General Otis does not seem to me to fulfil the first condition, he lacked prestige and patience, and he showed that he had an insufficient conception of the magnitude of his task by occupying himself with petty details of all kinds and by displaying an ill-timed parsimony. Apparently he had no power to grant anything at all, and only dealt invague generalities which the Tagals could not be expected to accept.As regards the second point, I regret that I am not personally acquainted with the gentlemen from Nebraska, Colorado, Dakota and other states serving in the United States Army or volunteers. I have no doubt that they are good fighting-men, but from all I can hear about them they are not conspicuous for strict military discipline, and too many of them have erroneous ideas as to the most suitable drink for a tropical climate.Manila was in the time of the Spaniards a most temperate city; a drunken man was a very rare sight, and would usually be a foreign sailor. Since the American occupation, some hundreds of drinking saloons have been opened, and daily scenes of drunkenness and debauchery have filled the quiet natives with alarm and horror. When John L. Motley wrote his scathing denunciation of the army which the great Duke of Alva led from Spain into the Low Countries, “to enforce the high religious purposes of Philip II.,”not foresee that his words would be applicable to an American Army sent to subjugate men struggling to be free “for their welfare, not our gain,” nor that this army, besides bringing in its train a flood of cosmopolitan harlotry,2would be allowed by its commander to inaugurate amongst a strictly temperate people a mad saturnalia of drunkenness that has scarcely a parallel.Such, however, is undoubtedly the case, and I venture to think that these occurrences have confirmed many of the Tagals in their resolve rather to die fighting for their independence than to be ruled over by such as these.More important still was it to take care that the Tagal insurrection should not have been in vain. That rebellion probably cost fifty thousand human lives, immense loss of property, and untold misery. It was fought against the friars and was at last triumphant. The Spanish friars had been expelled and their lands confiscated. Were the Americans to bring them back and guarantee them in peaceable possession, once more riveting on the chain the Tagals had torn off?This seems to have been General Otis’ intention. I think he might have stood upon the accomplished fact. But he did not.The Treaty of Peace under Article VIII. declares that the cession cannot in any respect impair the rights of ecclesiastical bodies to acquire and possess property, whilst Article IX. allows Spanish subjects to remain in the Islands, to sell or dispose of their property and to carry on their professions. Presumably General Otis felt bound by the Treaty in which these general stipulations had been embodied by the Peace Commission, in direct contradiction to the advice given them by Mr. Foreman (see p. 463, 55th Congress, 3rd Sess., Doc. No. 62, part 1), who pointed out the necessity of confiscating these lands, but Mr. Gray replied: “We have no law which will allow us to arbitrarily do so.”As soon as the effect of the treaty was known, Archbishop Nozaleda, who had fled to China from the vengeance he feared, returned to Manila. He seemed to have a good deal of interest with General Otis, and this did not please the natives, nor inspire them with confidence.Furthermore, it was reported and generally believed that the friars’ vast estates had been purchased by an American Syndicate who would in due time take possession and exploit them.One can understand the Tagals’ grief and desperation; all their blood and tears shed in vain! The friars triumphant after all!I do not wish to trace the particulars of the wretched war that commenced February, 1899, and is still (October, 1900) proceeding.In it the Americans do not seem to have displayed the resourcefulness andadaptabilityone would have expected from them. For my part, I expected a great deal, for so many American generals being selected from men in the active exercise of a profession, or perhaps controlling the administration of some vast business, they ought naturally to have developed their faculties, by constant use, to a far greater degree than men who have vegetated in the futile routine of a barrack or military station. They prevailed in every encounter, but their advance was very slow, and their troops suffered many preventible hardships. We know very little as to what happened, for the censors, acting under instructions from General Otis, prevented the transmissionof accurate information; nothing was cabled, except the accounts of victories gained by the American troops.It would not be right, however, to pass over the fighting without rendering due tribute to the heroism of the American officers and soldiers.Who can forget Colonel Funston’s gallant exploit in crossing the Rio Grande on a raft under fire with two companies of Kansas Infantry and enfilading the Tagals’ position? Or his leading part of same regiment in a charge upon an enemy’s earthwork near Santo Tomás, where he was wounded?What could be finer than the late Colonel Stotsenburg’s leading of the Nebraska regiment in the attack on Quíngua, where he was killed? And since we are speaking of brave men, shall we not remember the late General Antonio Luna and his gallant rally of his army in the advance from Macabébe, when he fearlessly exposed himself on horseback to the American fire, riding along the front of his line? To justify the slow progress of the army, jungles, forests, swamps and hills were introduced on the perfectly flat arable land such as that around Malolos, Calumpit, and San Fernando, extending in fact all the way from Manila to Tarlac.3This country supports a dense population, and almost every bit of it has been under the plough for centuries. The only hill is Arayat. During the dry season, say from November to May or June, the soil is baked quite hard, and vehicles or guns can traverse any part of it with slight assistance from the pioneers. The only obstacles are the small rivers and creeks, mostly fordable, and having clumps of bamboos growing on their banks providing a perfect material for temporary bridges or for making rafts.The campaign was marked by an absence of co-operation between the land and sea forces. Admiral Dewey, apparently, was not pleased with the way things were managed, for he is said to have stayed on board his ship for months at a time. The warships remained at anchor in Manila Bay whilst arms4and ammunition were landed at the outposts or on the coasts without hindrance, and it was not till November that troops were landed at Dagupan,the northern terminus of the railway, though this obviously ought to have been done in February, so as to attack the enemy front and rear.The necessity for small gunboats soon made itself felt, but such was the jealousy of the army towards the navy that it was decided that these must be army gunboats, and General Otis is reported to have purchased thirteen small gunboats at Zamboanga, in March 1899, without consulting or informing Admiral Dewey or even asking for an escort for them. It so happened that the Spaniards evacuated Zamboanga before any American forces arrived, and the insurgents promptly took possession of the gunboats already paid for and proceeded to plunder them of everything useful to them. A native account says that they took the gunboats up the Rio Grande into the interior, but this is denied by the Americans. Ultimately a cruiser was sent down to convoy the gunboats, and if I am correctly informed, they were commissioned in charge of junior naval officers.Obviously, the services of the navy should have been utilised to the utmost extent, and advantage should have been taken of the prestige they had gained by the victory over the Spaniards, and of the great popularity and sympathetic personality of Admiral Dewey. A serious responsibility rests upon whoever allowed jealousy to prevent the co-operation of the land and sea forces, since by failing to secure this they needlessly sacrificed the lives of American soldiers and prolonged the war.Lieut.-General Sir Andrew Clarke, R.E., a former governor of the Straits Settlements, and the greatest authority in England on the affairs of the Malay States and Islands, was good enough to write a letter which was forwarded to Mr. Day, and published in the Blue Book, p. 628.He pointed out that, although a moderate military force might be desirable at one or two important centres, a naval force was of more value, especially gunboats able to move freely amongst the islands and ascend the many rivers and inlets of the sea.Therefore to the fleet and its officers he advised that political and civil administration of the Philippines should, at least in the first instance, be entrusted. Sir Andrew believed, and I venture to say that I thoroughly agree with him, that amongst the officers of the United States navy,active and retired, can be found many men of wide experience, broad views, and generous sympathy well fitted to administer the affairs of the protectorate. Sir Andrew also advised, as Foreman did, and as I do, that the members of the Religious Orders,i.e., the Augustinians, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, and the Recollets, should be advised to return to Spain, receiving compensation for their property.Sir Andrew Clarke summed up his advice as follows: “Enlist native sympathy by fairness and justice, and rule through native agents, supervised by carefully selected American residents.”As the fleet, by destroying the Spanish squadron, had rendered it possible to bring troops by sea, and by capturing the arsenal and blockading the Port of Manila, had invigorated the insurrection, and in fact had brought about the cession of the islands by Spain, it would appear to outsiders that it and its officers had a strong claim to the leading part in completing the settlement and pacification of the Archipelago for which the best authorities considered them to possess special qualifications. Besides, if peace was really wanted, it would have been better to entrust the negotiations to the man who had had his fight rather than to one looking for his chance. The craze for military renown is nowhere more rampant than in the United States. Occasions are few and far between, and we must not expect generals to throw them away and fly in the face of Providence.This, however, did not commend itself to those who pull the strings; we ignore the reasons, but we see the result. Perhaps it was thought that to allow Dewey to add to his victor’s laurel wreath the palm of the pacificator would be too much honour for one man, and might raise him to an inconvenient height in the estimation of his fellow citizens.A year and twenty days after his decisive victory Admiral Dewey sailed from Manila in his flagship. Wherever the British ensign flew he was received with every demonstration of honour and respect both by naval and military officers and by civilians. His reception in New York was marked by an almost delirious enthusiasm. But long before he arrived, Mr. Whitelaw Reid, disgusted with the conduct of the campaign, made a speech at the Miami University and denounced the President for neglect of duty which brought on the war in the Philippines.He said: “If the bitterest enemy of the United States had sought to bring upon it in that quarter the greatest trouble in the shortest time, he could have devised for that end no policy more successful than the one we have already pursued.” It must be added that Mr. Whitelaw Reid, perhaps to prevent being accused of having sympathy with the enemy, denounced Aguinaldo and the Tagals as rebels, savages and treacherous barbarians, unfit for citizenship or self-government, and declared that the Philippines belong to America by right of conquest.I suppose Mr. Whitelaw Reid, or perhaps any citizen of the United States, has a right to denounce his own President, and certainly the management of the Philippine annexation has been bad from the beginning.But I think Mr. McKinley was badly served by the Peace Commission. They seem to me to have made many and egregious mistakes.1. They took General Merritt’s opinion that the Tagals would submit, and accepted Mr. Foreman’s assurance of Tagal plasticity and accommodating nature.2. They disregarded the intimation of D. Felipe Agoncillo, the accredited agent of the Tagals, that these would accept no settlement to which they were not parties.3. They treated several millions of civilised Christian people like a herd of cattle to be purchased with the ranch.4. Under Article VIII., they guaranteed the religious orders the possession of estates already taken from them.5. Under Article IX., they gave the expelled friars the right to return and exercise their profession.To illustrate their careless procedure, I may add that they did not even accurately determine the boundaries of the Archipelago to be ceded, and now, in August 1900, $100,000 is to be paid to Spain for Sibutu and CagayanSuluIslands, left out by mistake. If any man has a right to say, “Save me from my friends,” that man is William McKinley.As regards Aguinaldo and the Tagals, I think that Mr. Whitelaw Reid’s irritation at their protracted resistance has led him on too far. I prefer the opinion of Senator Hoar, who, speaking in the Senate of three proclamations of Aguinaldo, said: “Mr. President, these are three of the greatest state papers in all history. If they were found in our own history of our own revolutionary time we shouldbe proud to have them stand by the side of those great state papers which Chatham declared were equal to the masterpieces of antiquity.”In the same speech he says, and I commend his words to the reader’s attention: “Mr. President, there is one mode by which the people of the Philippine Islands could establish the truth of the charges as to their degradation and incapacity for self-government which have been made by the advocates of Imperialism in this debate, and that mode is by submitting tamely and without resistance to the dominion of the United States.”Mr. Whitelaw Reid, however, was perfectly right in one thing. The Philippines belong (or will belong) to America by right of conquest. On August 28th, 1899, Mr. McKinley addressed the 10th Pennsylvania Regiment at Pittsburgh soon after their arrival from Manila. He said: “The insurgents struck the first blow. They reciprocated our kindness with cruelty, our mercy5with Mausers.... They assailed our sovereignty, and there will be no useless parley until the insurrection is suppressed and American authority acknowledged and established. The Philippines are ours as much as Louisiana, by purchase, or Texas, or Alaska.” Here we get down to the bed rock, and discard all flimsy pretences. The Americans have undertaken a war of conquest, they bought it in fact, but I fear they are not happy either about its material progress or its moral aspect. We shall have to wait till November to see what they think about it.But whenever the cost in lost lives, ruined health, and shattered minds, to say nothing of dollars, comes to be known, there will be a great outcry in America.Mr. McKinley and his advisers are much to be pitied, for they were misled by the information given them by those they relied on.The False Prophets of the Philippines.Here is an extract from General Merritt’s evidence taken from the Blue Book, fifty-sixth congress, third session, document No. 62, partI, p. 367:Mr. Reid: Do you think any danger of conflict is now reasonably remote?General Merritt: I think there is no danger of conflict as long as these people think the United States is going to take possession there. If they imagine or hear from any source that the Spaniards are to be reinstated there, I think they will be very violent.Mr. Davis: Suppose the United States, by virtue of a treaty with Spain, should take Luzon ... paying no attention to the insurgents—how would that be taken by Aguinaldo?General Merritt: I think Aguinaldo and his immediate following would resist it; but whether he could resist to any extent I do not know, because his forces are divided. I believe that, as matters go, Aguinaldo will lose more or less of his power there.The Chairman: If the United States should say, We will take this country and govern it our own way, do you think they would submit to it?General Merritt: Yes, sir.Mr. Davis: How many troops in your opinion will be necessary to administer the government of this island—to secure the administration of our government there?General Merritt: From 20,000 to 25,000 would be requisite at first.I admire the conviction of this distinguished officer that the benefits of American rule would be highly appreciated by the Tagals, of whom, by-the-bye, he knew next to nothing, having only been a few weeks in Manila amongst sycophantic Mestizo-Americanistas.That interesting people were, however, of a different opinion. On p. 4582 of the ‘Congressional Record,’ I find that Señor Mabini, in a manifesto published at San Isidro, April 15th, 1899, states that “race hatred is much morecruel and pitilessamong the Anglo-Saxons” (he is comparing them with the Spaniards). Again he says, “Annexation, in whatever form it may be adopted, will unite us for ever to a nation whose manners and customs are different from our own, a nation whichhates the coloured race with a mortal hatred, and from which we could never separate ourselves except by war.” The outbreaks against the negroes that have recently happened [August, 1900] in New Orleans, Liberty City, Georgia, and in New York, seem to justify Señor Mabini’s remarks.Don Macario Adriatico, in an answer to a message of General Miller, writing from Jaro, January 3rd, 1900, says: “It could easily be conceived that the Philippines would not suffer a new reign, least ofall of a nation on whose conscience the curse of the Redskins rests as a heavy load.”In other documents they refer to the probable action of the Trusts, and anticipate that, what with the Sugar Trust, the Tobacco Trust, and the Hemp Trust, they would soonfind themselves reduced to the condition of porters and workmen, or even of domestic servants.They seem to have an intelligent anticipation of what will probably befall them when conquered, and hence their desperate resistance to a large American army.But let us now turn up the evidence of another expert on the Philippines, Mr. John Foreman, who also ventured to prophesy what the Tagals would do (Blue Book, before mentioned, p. 443).Mr. Foreman(answering Mr. Day): “The Tagals are of a very plastic nature, willing in their nature (sic), I should say, to accommodate themselves and take up any new established dominion which might be decided upon, and I think they would fall into any new system adopted.“The inhabitants of the Central Islands or Visayas are more uncouth, decidedly less hospitable, and somewhat more averse to associations and relations with outsiders than the Tagals, but I think they would easily come under sway. They want a little more pressure and would have to be guided, more closely watched, and perhaps a little more of the iron hand used than in Luzon.”Thus was the administration in Washington misled, and it is probable that the American military chiefs reported that they could easily overcome all opposition, so they were allowed to try.Yet in June, 1900, we read, “The recall of General Otis is taken to mean that the administration considers the war to be at an end, and that there is no longer any necessity for military rule.”General McArthur is appointed to the command, however, and the first thing he does is to cable to Washington for more troops, whilst Admiral Remey asks for an extra battalion of marines. These are to be sent, also at least three regiments of infantry. Sixty-five thousand men and forty ships of war are now admitted to be the proper garrison to hold down the Philippines.However necessary reinforcements may be, so deep is the racial antipathy between the United States’ soldiers, white or black, and the natives, that every additional man sent out is a source of disaffection, and even exasperation. Not only will the volunteers become demoralised and diseased in mind and body by their sojourn in America’s new possession, but the very fact of their presence renders the pacification of the country more difficult. The more troops are kept there, the more discontented the natives will be.To bring this chapter up to date, the position seems to be as follows: There is a recrudescence of activity amongst the insurgents; fighting is going on over a great part of the Archipelago, the American troops are harassed and overworked, sickness is rife, including the bubonic plague; yet, notwithstanding all this, the Taft Commission has taken over the administration of the islands from September 1st.The date fixed is not a convenient one for the Commission, as it is in the middle of the rainy season, but it has probably been selected to suit the presidential campaign in America.Aguinaldo has issued a proclamation warning the Filipinos against the Taft Commission, which, he says, has no authority from Congress; does not represent the sentiments of the American people, and is simply the personal instrument of Mr. McKinley sent out to make promises which it has no power to keep, and which the United States Government will not be bound to observe. He denounces the Americanistas, and threatens condign punishment to all who accept offices under the Commission. It would appear that a settlement on present lines is still some way off.Judge Taft seems to have inherited the cheerful optimism of General Otis. On September 1st he reported that the insurrection is virtually ended, and on 20th forwarded another favourable report. On 21st, General McArthur cabled accounts of engagements in several provinces of Luzon. The American troops at Pekin are being hurried to Manila, as the reinforcement of General McArthur is absolutely imperative.1Report published inOutlook, September 1st and 21st, 1899.2The Abbé de Brantôme, whose appreciative remarks upon the courtesans who accompanied the Army of the Duke of Alva are quoted by Motley in ‘The Rise of the Dutch Republic,’ would have been delighted to take up his favourite subject and chronicle the following of the American Army.3My remarks apply to the accounts published in theTimes.4May 11th, 1899,The New York Herald’scorrespondent at Manila reports that the insurgents have succeeded in landing ten machine guns on the island of Panay.5The kindness and mercy are not obvious.

Chapter XII.The Americans in the Philippines.Manila Bay—The naval battle of Cavite—General Aguinaldo—Progress of the Tagals—The Tagal Republic—Who were the aggressors?—Requisites for a settlement—Scenes of drunkenness—The estates of the religious orders to be restored—Slow progress of the campaign—Colonel Funston’s gallant exploits—Colonel Stotsenburg’s heroic death—General Antonio Luna’s gallant rally of his troops at Macabebe—Reports manipulated—Imaginary hills and jungles—Want of co-operation between army and navy—Advice of Sir Andrew Clarke—Naval officers as administrators—Mr. Whitelaw Reid’s denunciations—Senator Hoar’s opinion—Mr. McKinley’s speech at Pittsburgh—The false prophets of the Philippines—Tagal opinion of American Rule—Señor Mabini’s manifesto—Don Macario Adriatico’s letter—Foreman’s prophecy—The administration misled—Racial antipathy—The curse of the Redskins—The recall of General Otis—McArthur calls for reinforcements—Sixty-five thousand men and forty ships of war—State of the islands—Aguinaldo on the Taft Commission.Manila Bay.The width of the entrance to the vast Bay of Manila is nine and a half marine miles from shore to shore. It is divided into two unequal channels by the Island of Corregidor and Pulo Caballo, and a rock called El Frayle, about a mile and a half from the southern shore, farther reduces that channel.The Boca Chica, or northern entrance between Corregidor Island and Punta Lasisi, is two marine miles wide, and in the middle of the channel the depth of water is about thirty fathoms.The Boca Grande, or southern entrance between Pulo Caballo and El Frayle, is three and a half marine miles wide, with a depth of water in the fairway of about twenty fathoms.In both channels the tide rushes in and out with great force.With channels of such a width there was no difficulty in taking a squadron in at night, and little chance of suffering damage from the hastily improvised batteries of the Spaniards.And it will be evident to all having the slightest knowledge of submarine mining that the conditions are most unfavourable to defence by such means. As a matter of fact, the Spaniards possessed only nine obsolete submarine mines fitted to explode by contact. These were sent over to Corregidor, but were not sunk, as it was obvious that they were useless.On the other hand, it was a perfect position for the employment of torpedo boats or gunboats, there being excellent anchorage for such craft on both sides of the Channel and in Corregidor Cove. But at the time of the declaration of war, the Spaniards had no torpedo boats in the Philippines. The Elswick-built cruisersIsla de CubaandIsla de Luzonwere fitted with torpedoes, and might have been watching the channels for a chance to use them. Admiral Montojo knows best why he did not detach them on this service.There was then nothing to prevent the entrance of the American Squadron; the mines, torpedo boats and narrow channels only existed in the imagination of some American newspaper correspondents.But Admiral Dewey’s exploit does not need any such enhancing, it speaks for itself.To any one having a knowledge of the Spanish navy, and especially of the squadron of the Philippines, the result of an action against an American Squadron of similar force could not be doubtful.As a matter of fact the Spanish ships, except the two small cruisers built at Elswick in 1887, were quite obsolete. TheCastillaandReina Cristinawere wooden vessels, standing very high out of the water, and making admirable targets, whilst their guns were small, some of them had been landed at Corregidor, though never placed in battery. The boilers of one vessel were in the arsenal.But even allowing for the fact that the tonnage of the American Squadron was half as much again as that of the Spaniards, and that they had more than twice as many, and heavier guns, no one would have supposed it possiblethat the Spanish Squadron could have been completely destroyed without inflicting any damage upon the enemy.It was indeed a brilliant victory, reflecting great credit upon Admiral Dewey and the officers and crews of the American ships, not only for what they did that day, but for their careful preparation that enabled them to score so decided a success.The Spanish sailors put up a good fight and showed pluck, but they had no skill as gunners, and so failed in the hour of their country’s need. Admiral Montojo bravely commanded his fleet, but as soon as the action was over he seems to have considered that his duty had terminated, for he returned to his Villa in San Miguel, leaving the remnants of his squadron and the Cavite arsenal to its fate.We must infer that Admiral Dewey’s victory and its consequences were not foreseen by the American Government, for they had made no preparations to send troops to Manila, and from the time they learned of the destruction of the Spanish Squadron, till they had assembled a force strong enough to take and hold the city,three weary months elapsed. This was a very hap-hazard way of making war, and the delay cost many thousands of lives as will be seen later on.General Aguinaldo.On the 19th May, 1898, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, former chief of the insurgents, arrived in Manila in pursuance of an arrangement with the American Consul-General at Singapore. He came with a suite of seventeen persons on board an American gunboat, and after an interview with Admiral Dewey, was landed at Cavite and given two field-pieces, a number of rifles and a supply of ammunition.He soon reasserted himself as the leader of the insurrection, which was already in active progress, and gained some signal successes against the Spaniards. On the 24th May he issued a proclamation enjoining his followers to make war in a civilized manner and to respect property.I do not intend to discuss the negotiations between Mr. Pratt and Aguinaldo, nor between the latter and Admiral Dewey. This subject has been very fully treated by Mr. Foreman in the second edition of his book. The treating with Aguinaldo was not approved by Mr. Day at Washington, and the Consul-General and Consuls who hadparticipated in it, and even taken credit for it, were severely rapped over the knuckles and promptly adopted an apologetic tone (see Blue Book). But whatever was the agreement with Aguinaldo, it is evident that had it not been for his assistance and that of the insurgents, the Spanish forces could have retired from Manila to Tarlac or other place inland out of reach of the guns of the fleet and could have prolonged their resistance for years.The Tagal Republic.The Tagals had made much progress since the insurrection of 1896–7. Their ideas had advanced considerably since their rudimentary organization in the Province of Cavite, as can be gathered from the improved style of the various proclamations and decrees published by Aguinaldo.They now organized a Government, a real Civil Administration, extending over a great part of Luzon, and sent an expedition to Visayas. They established a Constitution, a representative government, and reopened the courts and schools, whilst the native clergy carried on public worship as usual. Aguinaldo repeatedly asserted the determination of the Tagal people to fight to the death for independence. At this time the insurgents held 9000 Spaniards as prisoners of war, and they claimed to have 30,000 men under arms.Paymaster Wilcox, U.S.N., and Mr. Leonard R. Sargent who travelled through part of Luzon for more than 600 miles, and during six weeks, reported1to Admiral Dewey that a regular and orderly Administration had been established, and was in full working order.Aguinaldo was at the head of this Government and of the armyco-operatingwith the American forces by the written request of General Anderson. This should have ensured him and those with him at the very least courteous and considerate treatment at the hands of the American Commanders, and in fact he received this from Admiral Dewey. But as soon as the direction of affairs passed into the hands of the general commanding the army the deeply-rooted contempt felt by Americans for the coloured races was allowed full play, Aguinaldo and his staff found themselves ignored, or treated with scarcely veiled contempt, and the estrangement was gradually increased.I do not know which party was the aggressor on February the 4th, 1899, each swears that it was the other. Thecui bonotest cuts both ways, for whilst it appears that the attack on Manila secured two doubtful votes in the Senate for the ratification of the Treaty whereby the Philippines were bought from Spain, on the other hand, Aguinaldo may have felt it necessary to prove to America that the Philippines would fight rather than bow their necks to the Yankee yoke. So that both parties may have had an interest in beginning hostilities. In any case, the next day Aguinaldo offered to withdraw to a greater distance if an armistice was arranged, but Otis declared that “fighting must go on.”Personally, I think that if a sympathetic and conciliatory attitude had been adopted, had the local government established been recognized, had Aguinaldo and his staff been given commissions in the Native Army or Civil Service, and the flower of the Tagal Army taken into the service of the United States, a peaceful settlement could have been made on the lines of a Protectorate.I therefore look upon the war as unnecessary, and consider the lives already sacrificed, and that will have to be sacrificed, as absolutely thrown away.The tragical side of American unpreparedness is manifest in the state of anarchy in which the whole Archipelago has been plunged by the American unreadiness to occupy the military posts as soon as they were vacated by the Spanish garrisons. A hideous orgy of murder, plunder, and slave-raiding has prevailed in Visayas, and especially in Mindanao.Three conditions were essential to a peaceful settlement:—First.—A broad-minded and sympathetic representative of America, fully authorized to treat, and a lover of peace.Second.—A strict discipline amongst the American forces.Third.—The principal aim and object of the Tagal insurrection must be secured.General Otis does not seem to me to fulfil the first condition, he lacked prestige and patience, and he showed that he had an insufficient conception of the magnitude of his task by occupying himself with petty details of all kinds and by displaying an ill-timed parsimony. Apparently he had no power to grant anything at all, and only dealt invague generalities which the Tagals could not be expected to accept.As regards the second point, I regret that I am not personally acquainted with the gentlemen from Nebraska, Colorado, Dakota and other states serving in the United States Army or volunteers. I have no doubt that they are good fighting-men, but from all I can hear about them they are not conspicuous for strict military discipline, and too many of them have erroneous ideas as to the most suitable drink for a tropical climate.Manila was in the time of the Spaniards a most temperate city; a drunken man was a very rare sight, and would usually be a foreign sailor. Since the American occupation, some hundreds of drinking saloons have been opened, and daily scenes of drunkenness and debauchery have filled the quiet natives with alarm and horror. When John L. Motley wrote his scathing denunciation of the army which the great Duke of Alva led from Spain into the Low Countries, “to enforce the high religious purposes of Philip II.,”not foresee that his words would be applicable to an American Army sent to subjugate men struggling to be free “for their welfare, not our gain,” nor that this army, besides bringing in its train a flood of cosmopolitan harlotry,2would be allowed by its commander to inaugurate amongst a strictly temperate people a mad saturnalia of drunkenness that has scarcely a parallel.Such, however, is undoubtedly the case, and I venture to think that these occurrences have confirmed many of the Tagals in their resolve rather to die fighting for their independence than to be ruled over by such as these.More important still was it to take care that the Tagal insurrection should not have been in vain. That rebellion probably cost fifty thousand human lives, immense loss of property, and untold misery. It was fought against the friars and was at last triumphant. The Spanish friars had been expelled and their lands confiscated. Were the Americans to bring them back and guarantee them in peaceable possession, once more riveting on the chain the Tagals had torn off?This seems to have been General Otis’ intention. I think he might have stood upon the accomplished fact. But he did not.The Treaty of Peace under Article VIII. declares that the cession cannot in any respect impair the rights of ecclesiastical bodies to acquire and possess property, whilst Article IX. allows Spanish subjects to remain in the Islands, to sell or dispose of their property and to carry on their professions. Presumably General Otis felt bound by the Treaty in which these general stipulations had been embodied by the Peace Commission, in direct contradiction to the advice given them by Mr. Foreman (see p. 463, 55th Congress, 3rd Sess., Doc. No. 62, part 1), who pointed out the necessity of confiscating these lands, but Mr. Gray replied: “We have no law which will allow us to arbitrarily do so.”As soon as the effect of the treaty was known, Archbishop Nozaleda, who had fled to China from the vengeance he feared, returned to Manila. He seemed to have a good deal of interest with General Otis, and this did not please the natives, nor inspire them with confidence.Furthermore, it was reported and generally believed that the friars’ vast estates had been purchased by an American Syndicate who would in due time take possession and exploit them.One can understand the Tagals’ grief and desperation; all their blood and tears shed in vain! The friars triumphant after all!I do not wish to trace the particulars of the wretched war that commenced February, 1899, and is still (October, 1900) proceeding.In it the Americans do not seem to have displayed the resourcefulness andadaptabilityone would have expected from them. For my part, I expected a great deal, for so many American generals being selected from men in the active exercise of a profession, or perhaps controlling the administration of some vast business, they ought naturally to have developed their faculties, by constant use, to a far greater degree than men who have vegetated in the futile routine of a barrack or military station. They prevailed in every encounter, but their advance was very slow, and their troops suffered many preventible hardships. We know very little as to what happened, for the censors, acting under instructions from General Otis, prevented the transmissionof accurate information; nothing was cabled, except the accounts of victories gained by the American troops.It would not be right, however, to pass over the fighting without rendering due tribute to the heroism of the American officers and soldiers.Who can forget Colonel Funston’s gallant exploit in crossing the Rio Grande on a raft under fire with two companies of Kansas Infantry and enfilading the Tagals’ position? Or his leading part of same regiment in a charge upon an enemy’s earthwork near Santo Tomás, where he was wounded?What could be finer than the late Colonel Stotsenburg’s leading of the Nebraska regiment in the attack on Quíngua, where he was killed? And since we are speaking of brave men, shall we not remember the late General Antonio Luna and his gallant rally of his army in the advance from Macabébe, when he fearlessly exposed himself on horseback to the American fire, riding along the front of his line? To justify the slow progress of the army, jungles, forests, swamps and hills were introduced on the perfectly flat arable land such as that around Malolos, Calumpit, and San Fernando, extending in fact all the way from Manila to Tarlac.3This country supports a dense population, and almost every bit of it has been under the plough for centuries. The only hill is Arayat. During the dry season, say from November to May or June, the soil is baked quite hard, and vehicles or guns can traverse any part of it with slight assistance from the pioneers. The only obstacles are the small rivers and creeks, mostly fordable, and having clumps of bamboos growing on their banks providing a perfect material for temporary bridges or for making rafts.The campaign was marked by an absence of co-operation between the land and sea forces. Admiral Dewey, apparently, was not pleased with the way things were managed, for he is said to have stayed on board his ship for months at a time. The warships remained at anchor in Manila Bay whilst arms4and ammunition were landed at the outposts or on the coasts without hindrance, and it was not till November that troops were landed at Dagupan,the northern terminus of the railway, though this obviously ought to have been done in February, so as to attack the enemy front and rear.The necessity for small gunboats soon made itself felt, but such was the jealousy of the army towards the navy that it was decided that these must be army gunboats, and General Otis is reported to have purchased thirteen small gunboats at Zamboanga, in March 1899, without consulting or informing Admiral Dewey or even asking for an escort for them. It so happened that the Spaniards evacuated Zamboanga before any American forces arrived, and the insurgents promptly took possession of the gunboats already paid for and proceeded to plunder them of everything useful to them. A native account says that they took the gunboats up the Rio Grande into the interior, but this is denied by the Americans. Ultimately a cruiser was sent down to convoy the gunboats, and if I am correctly informed, they were commissioned in charge of junior naval officers.Obviously, the services of the navy should have been utilised to the utmost extent, and advantage should have been taken of the prestige they had gained by the victory over the Spaniards, and of the great popularity and sympathetic personality of Admiral Dewey. A serious responsibility rests upon whoever allowed jealousy to prevent the co-operation of the land and sea forces, since by failing to secure this they needlessly sacrificed the lives of American soldiers and prolonged the war.Lieut.-General Sir Andrew Clarke, R.E., a former governor of the Straits Settlements, and the greatest authority in England on the affairs of the Malay States and Islands, was good enough to write a letter which was forwarded to Mr. Day, and published in the Blue Book, p. 628.He pointed out that, although a moderate military force might be desirable at one or two important centres, a naval force was of more value, especially gunboats able to move freely amongst the islands and ascend the many rivers and inlets of the sea.Therefore to the fleet and its officers he advised that political and civil administration of the Philippines should, at least in the first instance, be entrusted. Sir Andrew believed, and I venture to say that I thoroughly agree with him, that amongst the officers of the United States navy,active and retired, can be found many men of wide experience, broad views, and generous sympathy well fitted to administer the affairs of the protectorate. Sir Andrew also advised, as Foreman did, and as I do, that the members of the Religious Orders,i.e., the Augustinians, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, and the Recollets, should be advised to return to Spain, receiving compensation for their property.Sir Andrew Clarke summed up his advice as follows: “Enlist native sympathy by fairness and justice, and rule through native agents, supervised by carefully selected American residents.”As the fleet, by destroying the Spanish squadron, had rendered it possible to bring troops by sea, and by capturing the arsenal and blockading the Port of Manila, had invigorated the insurrection, and in fact had brought about the cession of the islands by Spain, it would appear to outsiders that it and its officers had a strong claim to the leading part in completing the settlement and pacification of the Archipelago for which the best authorities considered them to possess special qualifications. Besides, if peace was really wanted, it would have been better to entrust the negotiations to the man who had had his fight rather than to one looking for his chance. The craze for military renown is nowhere more rampant than in the United States. Occasions are few and far between, and we must not expect generals to throw them away and fly in the face of Providence.This, however, did not commend itself to those who pull the strings; we ignore the reasons, but we see the result. Perhaps it was thought that to allow Dewey to add to his victor’s laurel wreath the palm of the pacificator would be too much honour for one man, and might raise him to an inconvenient height in the estimation of his fellow citizens.A year and twenty days after his decisive victory Admiral Dewey sailed from Manila in his flagship. Wherever the British ensign flew he was received with every demonstration of honour and respect both by naval and military officers and by civilians. His reception in New York was marked by an almost delirious enthusiasm. But long before he arrived, Mr. Whitelaw Reid, disgusted with the conduct of the campaign, made a speech at the Miami University and denounced the President for neglect of duty which brought on the war in the Philippines.He said: “If the bitterest enemy of the United States had sought to bring upon it in that quarter the greatest trouble in the shortest time, he could have devised for that end no policy more successful than the one we have already pursued.” It must be added that Mr. Whitelaw Reid, perhaps to prevent being accused of having sympathy with the enemy, denounced Aguinaldo and the Tagals as rebels, savages and treacherous barbarians, unfit for citizenship or self-government, and declared that the Philippines belong to America by right of conquest.I suppose Mr. Whitelaw Reid, or perhaps any citizen of the United States, has a right to denounce his own President, and certainly the management of the Philippine annexation has been bad from the beginning.But I think Mr. McKinley was badly served by the Peace Commission. They seem to me to have made many and egregious mistakes.1. They took General Merritt’s opinion that the Tagals would submit, and accepted Mr. Foreman’s assurance of Tagal plasticity and accommodating nature.2. They disregarded the intimation of D. Felipe Agoncillo, the accredited agent of the Tagals, that these would accept no settlement to which they were not parties.3. They treated several millions of civilised Christian people like a herd of cattle to be purchased with the ranch.4. Under Article VIII., they guaranteed the religious orders the possession of estates already taken from them.5. Under Article IX., they gave the expelled friars the right to return and exercise their profession.To illustrate their careless procedure, I may add that they did not even accurately determine the boundaries of the Archipelago to be ceded, and now, in August 1900, $100,000 is to be paid to Spain for Sibutu and CagayanSuluIslands, left out by mistake. If any man has a right to say, “Save me from my friends,” that man is William McKinley.As regards Aguinaldo and the Tagals, I think that Mr. Whitelaw Reid’s irritation at their protracted resistance has led him on too far. I prefer the opinion of Senator Hoar, who, speaking in the Senate of three proclamations of Aguinaldo, said: “Mr. President, these are three of the greatest state papers in all history. If they were found in our own history of our own revolutionary time we shouldbe proud to have them stand by the side of those great state papers which Chatham declared were equal to the masterpieces of antiquity.”In the same speech he says, and I commend his words to the reader’s attention: “Mr. President, there is one mode by which the people of the Philippine Islands could establish the truth of the charges as to their degradation and incapacity for self-government which have been made by the advocates of Imperialism in this debate, and that mode is by submitting tamely and without resistance to the dominion of the United States.”Mr. Whitelaw Reid, however, was perfectly right in one thing. The Philippines belong (or will belong) to America by right of conquest. On August 28th, 1899, Mr. McKinley addressed the 10th Pennsylvania Regiment at Pittsburgh soon after their arrival from Manila. He said: “The insurgents struck the first blow. They reciprocated our kindness with cruelty, our mercy5with Mausers.... They assailed our sovereignty, and there will be no useless parley until the insurrection is suppressed and American authority acknowledged and established. The Philippines are ours as much as Louisiana, by purchase, or Texas, or Alaska.” Here we get down to the bed rock, and discard all flimsy pretences. The Americans have undertaken a war of conquest, they bought it in fact, but I fear they are not happy either about its material progress or its moral aspect. We shall have to wait till November to see what they think about it.But whenever the cost in lost lives, ruined health, and shattered minds, to say nothing of dollars, comes to be known, there will be a great outcry in America.Mr. McKinley and his advisers are much to be pitied, for they were misled by the information given them by those they relied on.The False Prophets of the Philippines.Here is an extract from General Merritt’s evidence taken from the Blue Book, fifty-sixth congress, third session, document No. 62, partI, p. 367:Mr. Reid: Do you think any danger of conflict is now reasonably remote?General Merritt: I think there is no danger of conflict as long as these people think the United States is going to take possession there. If they imagine or hear from any source that the Spaniards are to be reinstated there, I think they will be very violent.Mr. Davis: Suppose the United States, by virtue of a treaty with Spain, should take Luzon ... paying no attention to the insurgents—how would that be taken by Aguinaldo?General Merritt: I think Aguinaldo and his immediate following would resist it; but whether he could resist to any extent I do not know, because his forces are divided. I believe that, as matters go, Aguinaldo will lose more or less of his power there.The Chairman: If the United States should say, We will take this country and govern it our own way, do you think they would submit to it?General Merritt: Yes, sir.Mr. Davis: How many troops in your opinion will be necessary to administer the government of this island—to secure the administration of our government there?General Merritt: From 20,000 to 25,000 would be requisite at first.I admire the conviction of this distinguished officer that the benefits of American rule would be highly appreciated by the Tagals, of whom, by-the-bye, he knew next to nothing, having only been a few weeks in Manila amongst sycophantic Mestizo-Americanistas.That interesting people were, however, of a different opinion. On p. 4582 of the ‘Congressional Record,’ I find that Señor Mabini, in a manifesto published at San Isidro, April 15th, 1899, states that “race hatred is much morecruel and pitilessamong the Anglo-Saxons” (he is comparing them with the Spaniards). Again he says, “Annexation, in whatever form it may be adopted, will unite us for ever to a nation whose manners and customs are different from our own, a nation whichhates the coloured race with a mortal hatred, and from which we could never separate ourselves except by war.” The outbreaks against the negroes that have recently happened [August, 1900] in New Orleans, Liberty City, Georgia, and in New York, seem to justify Señor Mabini’s remarks.Don Macario Adriatico, in an answer to a message of General Miller, writing from Jaro, January 3rd, 1900, says: “It could easily be conceived that the Philippines would not suffer a new reign, least ofall of a nation on whose conscience the curse of the Redskins rests as a heavy load.”In other documents they refer to the probable action of the Trusts, and anticipate that, what with the Sugar Trust, the Tobacco Trust, and the Hemp Trust, they would soonfind themselves reduced to the condition of porters and workmen, or even of domestic servants.They seem to have an intelligent anticipation of what will probably befall them when conquered, and hence their desperate resistance to a large American army.But let us now turn up the evidence of another expert on the Philippines, Mr. John Foreman, who also ventured to prophesy what the Tagals would do (Blue Book, before mentioned, p. 443).Mr. Foreman(answering Mr. Day): “The Tagals are of a very plastic nature, willing in their nature (sic), I should say, to accommodate themselves and take up any new established dominion which might be decided upon, and I think they would fall into any new system adopted.“The inhabitants of the Central Islands or Visayas are more uncouth, decidedly less hospitable, and somewhat more averse to associations and relations with outsiders than the Tagals, but I think they would easily come under sway. They want a little more pressure and would have to be guided, more closely watched, and perhaps a little more of the iron hand used than in Luzon.”Thus was the administration in Washington misled, and it is probable that the American military chiefs reported that they could easily overcome all opposition, so they were allowed to try.Yet in June, 1900, we read, “The recall of General Otis is taken to mean that the administration considers the war to be at an end, and that there is no longer any necessity for military rule.”General McArthur is appointed to the command, however, and the first thing he does is to cable to Washington for more troops, whilst Admiral Remey asks for an extra battalion of marines. These are to be sent, also at least three regiments of infantry. Sixty-five thousand men and forty ships of war are now admitted to be the proper garrison to hold down the Philippines.However necessary reinforcements may be, so deep is the racial antipathy between the United States’ soldiers, white or black, and the natives, that every additional man sent out is a source of disaffection, and even exasperation. Not only will the volunteers become demoralised and diseased in mind and body by their sojourn in America’s new possession, but the very fact of their presence renders the pacification of the country more difficult. The more troops are kept there, the more discontented the natives will be.To bring this chapter up to date, the position seems to be as follows: There is a recrudescence of activity amongst the insurgents; fighting is going on over a great part of the Archipelago, the American troops are harassed and overworked, sickness is rife, including the bubonic plague; yet, notwithstanding all this, the Taft Commission has taken over the administration of the islands from September 1st.The date fixed is not a convenient one for the Commission, as it is in the middle of the rainy season, but it has probably been selected to suit the presidential campaign in America.Aguinaldo has issued a proclamation warning the Filipinos against the Taft Commission, which, he says, has no authority from Congress; does not represent the sentiments of the American people, and is simply the personal instrument of Mr. McKinley sent out to make promises which it has no power to keep, and which the United States Government will not be bound to observe. He denounces the Americanistas, and threatens condign punishment to all who accept offices under the Commission. It would appear that a settlement on present lines is still some way off.Judge Taft seems to have inherited the cheerful optimism of General Otis. On September 1st he reported that the insurrection is virtually ended, and on 20th forwarded another favourable report. On 21st, General McArthur cabled accounts of engagements in several provinces of Luzon. The American troops at Pekin are being hurried to Manila, as the reinforcement of General McArthur is absolutely imperative.1Report published inOutlook, September 1st and 21st, 1899.2The Abbé de Brantôme, whose appreciative remarks upon the courtesans who accompanied the Army of the Duke of Alva are quoted by Motley in ‘The Rise of the Dutch Republic,’ would have been delighted to take up his favourite subject and chronicle the following of the American Army.3My remarks apply to the accounts published in theTimes.4May 11th, 1899,The New York Herald’scorrespondent at Manila reports that the insurgents have succeeded in landing ten machine guns on the island of Panay.5The kindness and mercy are not obvious.

Chapter XII.The Americans in the Philippines.Manila Bay—The naval battle of Cavite—General Aguinaldo—Progress of the Tagals—The Tagal Republic—Who were the aggressors?—Requisites for a settlement—Scenes of drunkenness—The estates of the religious orders to be restored—Slow progress of the campaign—Colonel Funston’s gallant exploits—Colonel Stotsenburg’s heroic death—General Antonio Luna’s gallant rally of his troops at Macabebe—Reports manipulated—Imaginary hills and jungles—Want of co-operation between army and navy—Advice of Sir Andrew Clarke—Naval officers as administrators—Mr. Whitelaw Reid’s denunciations—Senator Hoar’s opinion—Mr. McKinley’s speech at Pittsburgh—The false prophets of the Philippines—Tagal opinion of American Rule—Señor Mabini’s manifesto—Don Macario Adriatico’s letter—Foreman’s prophecy—The administration misled—Racial antipathy—The curse of the Redskins—The recall of General Otis—McArthur calls for reinforcements—Sixty-five thousand men and forty ships of war—State of the islands—Aguinaldo on the Taft Commission.Manila Bay.The width of the entrance to the vast Bay of Manila is nine and a half marine miles from shore to shore. It is divided into two unequal channels by the Island of Corregidor and Pulo Caballo, and a rock called El Frayle, about a mile and a half from the southern shore, farther reduces that channel.The Boca Chica, or northern entrance between Corregidor Island and Punta Lasisi, is two marine miles wide, and in the middle of the channel the depth of water is about thirty fathoms.The Boca Grande, or southern entrance between Pulo Caballo and El Frayle, is three and a half marine miles wide, with a depth of water in the fairway of about twenty fathoms.In both channels the tide rushes in and out with great force.With channels of such a width there was no difficulty in taking a squadron in at night, and little chance of suffering damage from the hastily improvised batteries of the Spaniards.And it will be evident to all having the slightest knowledge of submarine mining that the conditions are most unfavourable to defence by such means. As a matter of fact, the Spaniards possessed only nine obsolete submarine mines fitted to explode by contact. These were sent over to Corregidor, but were not sunk, as it was obvious that they were useless.On the other hand, it was a perfect position for the employment of torpedo boats or gunboats, there being excellent anchorage for such craft on both sides of the Channel and in Corregidor Cove. But at the time of the declaration of war, the Spaniards had no torpedo boats in the Philippines. The Elswick-built cruisersIsla de CubaandIsla de Luzonwere fitted with torpedoes, and might have been watching the channels for a chance to use them. Admiral Montojo knows best why he did not detach them on this service.There was then nothing to prevent the entrance of the American Squadron; the mines, torpedo boats and narrow channels only existed in the imagination of some American newspaper correspondents.But Admiral Dewey’s exploit does not need any such enhancing, it speaks for itself.To any one having a knowledge of the Spanish navy, and especially of the squadron of the Philippines, the result of an action against an American Squadron of similar force could not be doubtful.As a matter of fact the Spanish ships, except the two small cruisers built at Elswick in 1887, were quite obsolete. TheCastillaandReina Cristinawere wooden vessels, standing very high out of the water, and making admirable targets, whilst their guns were small, some of them had been landed at Corregidor, though never placed in battery. The boilers of one vessel were in the arsenal.But even allowing for the fact that the tonnage of the American Squadron was half as much again as that of the Spaniards, and that they had more than twice as many, and heavier guns, no one would have supposed it possiblethat the Spanish Squadron could have been completely destroyed without inflicting any damage upon the enemy.It was indeed a brilliant victory, reflecting great credit upon Admiral Dewey and the officers and crews of the American ships, not only for what they did that day, but for their careful preparation that enabled them to score so decided a success.The Spanish sailors put up a good fight and showed pluck, but they had no skill as gunners, and so failed in the hour of their country’s need. Admiral Montojo bravely commanded his fleet, but as soon as the action was over he seems to have considered that his duty had terminated, for he returned to his Villa in San Miguel, leaving the remnants of his squadron and the Cavite arsenal to its fate.We must infer that Admiral Dewey’s victory and its consequences were not foreseen by the American Government, for they had made no preparations to send troops to Manila, and from the time they learned of the destruction of the Spanish Squadron, till they had assembled a force strong enough to take and hold the city,three weary months elapsed. This was a very hap-hazard way of making war, and the delay cost many thousands of lives as will be seen later on.General Aguinaldo.On the 19th May, 1898, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, former chief of the insurgents, arrived in Manila in pursuance of an arrangement with the American Consul-General at Singapore. He came with a suite of seventeen persons on board an American gunboat, and after an interview with Admiral Dewey, was landed at Cavite and given two field-pieces, a number of rifles and a supply of ammunition.He soon reasserted himself as the leader of the insurrection, which was already in active progress, and gained some signal successes against the Spaniards. On the 24th May he issued a proclamation enjoining his followers to make war in a civilized manner and to respect property.I do not intend to discuss the negotiations between Mr. Pratt and Aguinaldo, nor between the latter and Admiral Dewey. This subject has been very fully treated by Mr. Foreman in the second edition of his book. The treating with Aguinaldo was not approved by Mr. Day at Washington, and the Consul-General and Consuls who hadparticipated in it, and even taken credit for it, were severely rapped over the knuckles and promptly adopted an apologetic tone (see Blue Book). But whatever was the agreement with Aguinaldo, it is evident that had it not been for his assistance and that of the insurgents, the Spanish forces could have retired from Manila to Tarlac or other place inland out of reach of the guns of the fleet and could have prolonged their resistance for years.The Tagal Republic.The Tagals had made much progress since the insurrection of 1896–7. Their ideas had advanced considerably since their rudimentary organization in the Province of Cavite, as can be gathered from the improved style of the various proclamations and decrees published by Aguinaldo.They now organized a Government, a real Civil Administration, extending over a great part of Luzon, and sent an expedition to Visayas. They established a Constitution, a representative government, and reopened the courts and schools, whilst the native clergy carried on public worship as usual. Aguinaldo repeatedly asserted the determination of the Tagal people to fight to the death for independence. At this time the insurgents held 9000 Spaniards as prisoners of war, and they claimed to have 30,000 men under arms.Paymaster Wilcox, U.S.N., and Mr. Leonard R. Sargent who travelled through part of Luzon for more than 600 miles, and during six weeks, reported1to Admiral Dewey that a regular and orderly Administration had been established, and was in full working order.Aguinaldo was at the head of this Government and of the armyco-operatingwith the American forces by the written request of General Anderson. This should have ensured him and those with him at the very least courteous and considerate treatment at the hands of the American Commanders, and in fact he received this from Admiral Dewey. But as soon as the direction of affairs passed into the hands of the general commanding the army the deeply-rooted contempt felt by Americans for the coloured races was allowed full play, Aguinaldo and his staff found themselves ignored, or treated with scarcely veiled contempt, and the estrangement was gradually increased.I do not know which party was the aggressor on February the 4th, 1899, each swears that it was the other. Thecui bonotest cuts both ways, for whilst it appears that the attack on Manila secured two doubtful votes in the Senate for the ratification of the Treaty whereby the Philippines were bought from Spain, on the other hand, Aguinaldo may have felt it necessary to prove to America that the Philippines would fight rather than bow their necks to the Yankee yoke. So that both parties may have had an interest in beginning hostilities. In any case, the next day Aguinaldo offered to withdraw to a greater distance if an armistice was arranged, but Otis declared that “fighting must go on.”Personally, I think that if a sympathetic and conciliatory attitude had been adopted, had the local government established been recognized, had Aguinaldo and his staff been given commissions in the Native Army or Civil Service, and the flower of the Tagal Army taken into the service of the United States, a peaceful settlement could have been made on the lines of a Protectorate.I therefore look upon the war as unnecessary, and consider the lives already sacrificed, and that will have to be sacrificed, as absolutely thrown away.The tragical side of American unpreparedness is manifest in the state of anarchy in which the whole Archipelago has been plunged by the American unreadiness to occupy the military posts as soon as they were vacated by the Spanish garrisons. A hideous orgy of murder, plunder, and slave-raiding has prevailed in Visayas, and especially in Mindanao.Three conditions were essential to a peaceful settlement:—First.—A broad-minded and sympathetic representative of America, fully authorized to treat, and a lover of peace.Second.—A strict discipline amongst the American forces.Third.—The principal aim and object of the Tagal insurrection must be secured.General Otis does not seem to me to fulfil the first condition, he lacked prestige and patience, and he showed that he had an insufficient conception of the magnitude of his task by occupying himself with petty details of all kinds and by displaying an ill-timed parsimony. Apparently he had no power to grant anything at all, and only dealt invague generalities which the Tagals could not be expected to accept.As regards the second point, I regret that I am not personally acquainted with the gentlemen from Nebraska, Colorado, Dakota and other states serving in the United States Army or volunteers. I have no doubt that they are good fighting-men, but from all I can hear about them they are not conspicuous for strict military discipline, and too many of them have erroneous ideas as to the most suitable drink for a tropical climate.Manila was in the time of the Spaniards a most temperate city; a drunken man was a very rare sight, and would usually be a foreign sailor. Since the American occupation, some hundreds of drinking saloons have been opened, and daily scenes of drunkenness and debauchery have filled the quiet natives with alarm and horror. When John L. Motley wrote his scathing denunciation of the army which the great Duke of Alva led from Spain into the Low Countries, “to enforce the high religious purposes of Philip II.,”not foresee that his words would be applicable to an American Army sent to subjugate men struggling to be free “for their welfare, not our gain,” nor that this army, besides bringing in its train a flood of cosmopolitan harlotry,2would be allowed by its commander to inaugurate amongst a strictly temperate people a mad saturnalia of drunkenness that has scarcely a parallel.Such, however, is undoubtedly the case, and I venture to think that these occurrences have confirmed many of the Tagals in their resolve rather to die fighting for their independence than to be ruled over by such as these.More important still was it to take care that the Tagal insurrection should not have been in vain. That rebellion probably cost fifty thousand human lives, immense loss of property, and untold misery. It was fought against the friars and was at last triumphant. The Spanish friars had been expelled and their lands confiscated. Were the Americans to bring them back and guarantee them in peaceable possession, once more riveting on the chain the Tagals had torn off?This seems to have been General Otis’ intention. I think he might have stood upon the accomplished fact. But he did not.The Treaty of Peace under Article VIII. declares that the cession cannot in any respect impair the rights of ecclesiastical bodies to acquire and possess property, whilst Article IX. allows Spanish subjects to remain in the Islands, to sell or dispose of their property and to carry on their professions. Presumably General Otis felt bound by the Treaty in which these general stipulations had been embodied by the Peace Commission, in direct contradiction to the advice given them by Mr. Foreman (see p. 463, 55th Congress, 3rd Sess., Doc. No. 62, part 1), who pointed out the necessity of confiscating these lands, but Mr. Gray replied: “We have no law which will allow us to arbitrarily do so.”As soon as the effect of the treaty was known, Archbishop Nozaleda, who had fled to China from the vengeance he feared, returned to Manila. He seemed to have a good deal of interest with General Otis, and this did not please the natives, nor inspire them with confidence.Furthermore, it was reported and generally believed that the friars’ vast estates had been purchased by an American Syndicate who would in due time take possession and exploit them.One can understand the Tagals’ grief and desperation; all their blood and tears shed in vain! The friars triumphant after all!I do not wish to trace the particulars of the wretched war that commenced February, 1899, and is still (October, 1900) proceeding.In it the Americans do not seem to have displayed the resourcefulness andadaptabilityone would have expected from them. For my part, I expected a great deal, for so many American generals being selected from men in the active exercise of a profession, or perhaps controlling the administration of some vast business, they ought naturally to have developed their faculties, by constant use, to a far greater degree than men who have vegetated in the futile routine of a barrack or military station. They prevailed in every encounter, but their advance was very slow, and their troops suffered many preventible hardships. We know very little as to what happened, for the censors, acting under instructions from General Otis, prevented the transmissionof accurate information; nothing was cabled, except the accounts of victories gained by the American troops.It would not be right, however, to pass over the fighting without rendering due tribute to the heroism of the American officers and soldiers.Who can forget Colonel Funston’s gallant exploit in crossing the Rio Grande on a raft under fire with two companies of Kansas Infantry and enfilading the Tagals’ position? Or his leading part of same regiment in a charge upon an enemy’s earthwork near Santo Tomás, where he was wounded?What could be finer than the late Colonel Stotsenburg’s leading of the Nebraska regiment in the attack on Quíngua, where he was killed? And since we are speaking of brave men, shall we not remember the late General Antonio Luna and his gallant rally of his army in the advance from Macabébe, when he fearlessly exposed himself on horseback to the American fire, riding along the front of his line? To justify the slow progress of the army, jungles, forests, swamps and hills were introduced on the perfectly flat arable land such as that around Malolos, Calumpit, and San Fernando, extending in fact all the way from Manila to Tarlac.3This country supports a dense population, and almost every bit of it has been under the plough for centuries. The only hill is Arayat. During the dry season, say from November to May or June, the soil is baked quite hard, and vehicles or guns can traverse any part of it with slight assistance from the pioneers. The only obstacles are the small rivers and creeks, mostly fordable, and having clumps of bamboos growing on their banks providing a perfect material for temporary bridges or for making rafts.The campaign was marked by an absence of co-operation between the land and sea forces. Admiral Dewey, apparently, was not pleased with the way things were managed, for he is said to have stayed on board his ship for months at a time. The warships remained at anchor in Manila Bay whilst arms4and ammunition were landed at the outposts or on the coasts without hindrance, and it was not till November that troops were landed at Dagupan,the northern terminus of the railway, though this obviously ought to have been done in February, so as to attack the enemy front and rear.The necessity for small gunboats soon made itself felt, but such was the jealousy of the army towards the navy that it was decided that these must be army gunboats, and General Otis is reported to have purchased thirteen small gunboats at Zamboanga, in March 1899, without consulting or informing Admiral Dewey or even asking for an escort for them. It so happened that the Spaniards evacuated Zamboanga before any American forces arrived, and the insurgents promptly took possession of the gunboats already paid for and proceeded to plunder them of everything useful to them. A native account says that they took the gunboats up the Rio Grande into the interior, but this is denied by the Americans. Ultimately a cruiser was sent down to convoy the gunboats, and if I am correctly informed, they were commissioned in charge of junior naval officers.Obviously, the services of the navy should have been utilised to the utmost extent, and advantage should have been taken of the prestige they had gained by the victory over the Spaniards, and of the great popularity and sympathetic personality of Admiral Dewey. A serious responsibility rests upon whoever allowed jealousy to prevent the co-operation of the land and sea forces, since by failing to secure this they needlessly sacrificed the lives of American soldiers and prolonged the war.Lieut.-General Sir Andrew Clarke, R.E., a former governor of the Straits Settlements, and the greatest authority in England on the affairs of the Malay States and Islands, was good enough to write a letter which was forwarded to Mr. Day, and published in the Blue Book, p. 628.He pointed out that, although a moderate military force might be desirable at one or two important centres, a naval force was of more value, especially gunboats able to move freely amongst the islands and ascend the many rivers and inlets of the sea.Therefore to the fleet and its officers he advised that political and civil administration of the Philippines should, at least in the first instance, be entrusted. Sir Andrew believed, and I venture to say that I thoroughly agree with him, that amongst the officers of the United States navy,active and retired, can be found many men of wide experience, broad views, and generous sympathy well fitted to administer the affairs of the protectorate. Sir Andrew also advised, as Foreman did, and as I do, that the members of the Religious Orders,i.e., the Augustinians, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, and the Recollets, should be advised to return to Spain, receiving compensation for their property.Sir Andrew Clarke summed up his advice as follows: “Enlist native sympathy by fairness and justice, and rule through native agents, supervised by carefully selected American residents.”As the fleet, by destroying the Spanish squadron, had rendered it possible to bring troops by sea, and by capturing the arsenal and blockading the Port of Manila, had invigorated the insurrection, and in fact had brought about the cession of the islands by Spain, it would appear to outsiders that it and its officers had a strong claim to the leading part in completing the settlement and pacification of the Archipelago for which the best authorities considered them to possess special qualifications. Besides, if peace was really wanted, it would have been better to entrust the negotiations to the man who had had his fight rather than to one looking for his chance. The craze for military renown is nowhere more rampant than in the United States. Occasions are few and far between, and we must not expect generals to throw them away and fly in the face of Providence.This, however, did not commend itself to those who pull the strings; we ignore the reasons, but we see the result. Perhaps it was thought that to allow Dewey to add to his victor’s laurel wreath the palm of the pacificator would be too much honour for one man, and might raise him to an inconvenient height in the estimation of his fellow citizens.A year and twenty days after his decisive victory Admiral Dewey sailed from Manila in his flagship. Wherever the British ensign flew he was received with every demonstration of honour and respect both by naval and military officers and by civilians. His reception in New York was marked by an almost delirious enthusiasm. But long before he arrived, Mr. Whitelaw Reid, disgusted with the conduct of the campaign, made a speech at the Miami University and denounced the President for neglect of duty which brought on the war in the Philippines.He said: “If the bitterest enemy of the United States had sought to bring upon it in that quarter the greatest trouble in the shortest time, he could have devised for that end no policy more successful than the one we have already pursued.” It must be added that Mr. Whitelaw Reid, perhaps to prevent being accused of having sympathy with the enemy, denounced Aguinaldo and the Tagals as rebels, savages and treacherous barbarians, unfit for citizenship or self-government, and declared that the Philippines belong to America by right of conquest.I suppose Mr. Whitelaw Reid, or perhaps any citizen of the United States, has a right to denounce his own President, and certainly the management of the Philippine annexation has been bad from the beginning.But I think Mr. McKinley was badly served by the Peace Commission. They seem to me to have made many and egregious mistakes.1. They took General Merritt’s opinion that the Tagals would submit, and accepted Mr. Foreman’s assurance of Tagal plasticity and accommodating nature.2. They disregarded the intimation of D. Felipe Agoncillo, the accredited agent of the Tagals, that these would accept no settlement to which they were not parties.3. They treated several millions of civilised Christian people like a herd of cattle to be purchased with the ranch.4. Under Article VIII., they guaranteed the religious orders the possession of estates already taken from them.5. Under Article IX., they gave the expelled friars the right to return and exercise their profession.To illustrate their careless procedure, I may add that they did not even accurately determine the boundaries of the Archipelago to be ceded, and now, in August 1900, $100,000 is to be paid to Spain for Sibutu and CagayanSuluIslands, left out by mistake. If any man has a right to say, “Save me from my friends,” that man is William McKinley.As regards Aguinaldo and the Tagals, I think that Mr. Whitelaw Reid’s irritation at their protracted resistance has led him on too far. I prefer the opinion of Senator Hoar, who, speaking in the Senate of three proclamations of Aguinaldo, said: “Mr. President, these are three of the greatest state papers in all history. If they were found in our own history of our own revolutionary time we shouldbe proud to have them stand by the side of those great state papers which Chatham declared were equal to the masterpieces of antiquity.”In the same speech he says, and I commend his words to the reader’s attention: “Mr. President, there is one mode by which the people of the Philippine Islands could establish the truth of the charges as to their degradation and incapacity for self-government which have been made by the advocates of Imperialism in this debate, and that mode is by submitting tamely and without resistance to the dominion of the United States.”Mr. Whitelaw Reid, however, was perfectly right in one thing. The Philippines belong (or will belong) to America by right of conquest. On August 28th, 1899, Mr. McKinley addressed the 10th Pennsylvania Regiment at Pittsburgh soon after their arrival from Manila. He said: “The insurgents struck the first blow. They reciprocated our kindness with cruelty, our mercy5with Mausers.... They assailed our sovereignty, and there will be no useless parley until the insurrection is suppressed and American authority acknowledged and established. The Philippines are ours as much as Louisiana, by purchase, or Texas, or Alaska.” Here we get down to the bed rock, and discard all flimsy pretences. The Americans have undertaken a war of conquest, they bought it in fact, but I fear they are not happy either about its material progress or its moral aspect. We shall have to wait till November to see what they think about it.But whenever the cost in lost lives, ruined health, and shattered minds, to say nothing of dollars, comes to be known, there will be a great outcry in America.Mr. McKinley and his advisers are much to be pitied, for they were misled by the information given them by those they relied on.The False Prophets of the Philippines.Here is an extract from General Merritt’s evidence taken from the Blue Book, fifty-sixth congress, third session, document No. 62, partI, p. 367:Mr. Reid: Do you think any danger of conflict is now reasonably remote?General Merritt: I think there is no danger of conflict as long as these people think the United States is going to take possession there. If they imagine or hear from any source that the Spaniards are to be reinstated there, I think they will be very violent.Mr. Davis: Suppose the United States, by virtue of a treaty with Spain, should take Luzon ... paying no attention to the insurgents—how would that be taken by Aguinaldo?General Merritt: I think Aguinaldo and his immediate following would resist it; but whether he could resist to any extent I do not know, because his forces are divided. I believe that, as matters go, Aguinaldo will lose more or less of his power there.The Chairman: If the United States should say, We will take this country and govern it our own way, do you think they would submit to it?General Merritt: Yes, sir.Mr. Davis: How many troops in your opinion will be necessary to administer the government of this island—to secure the administration of our government there?General Merritt: From 20,000 to 25,000 would be requisite at first.I admire the conviction of this distinguished officer that the benefits of American rule would be highly appreciated by the Tagals, of whom, by-the-bye, he knew next to nothing, having only been a few weeks in Manila amongst sycophantic Mestizo-Americanistas.That interesting people were, however, of a different opinion. On p. 4582 of the ‘Congressional Record,’ I find that Señor Mabini, in a manifesto published at San Isidro, April 15th, 1899, states that “race hatred is much morecruel and pitilessamong the Anglo-Saxons” (he is comparing them with the Spaniards). Again he says, “Annexation, in whatever form it may be adopted, will unite us for ever to a nation whose manners and customs are different from our own, a nation whichhates the coloured race with a mortal hatred, and from which we could never separate ourselves except by war.” The outbreaks against the negroes that have recently happened [August, 1900] in New Orleans, Liberty City, Georgia, and in New York, seem to justify Señor Mabini’s remarks.Don Macario Adriatico, in an answer to a message of General Miller, writing from Jaro, January 3rd, 1900, says: “It could easily be conceived that the Philippines would not suffer a new reign, least ofall of a nation on whose conscience the curse of the Redskins rests as a heavy load.”In other documents they refer to the probable action of the Trusts, and anticipate that, what with the Sugar Trust, the Tobacco Trust, and the Hemp Trust, they would soonfind themselves reduced to the condition of porters and workmen, or even of domestic servants.They seem to have an intelligent anticipation of what will probably befall them when conquered, and hence their desperate resistance to a large American army.But let us now turn up the evidence of another expert on the Philippines, Mr. John Foreman, who also ventured to prophesy what the Tagals would do (Blue Book, before mentioned, p. 443).Mr. Foreman(answering Mr. Day): “The Tagals are of a very plastic nature, willing in their nature (sic), I should say, to accommodate themselves and take up any new established dominion which might be decided upon, and I think they would fall into any new system adopted.“The inhabitants of the Central Islands or Visayas are more uncouth, decidedly less hospitable, and somewhat more averse to associations and relations with outsiders than the Tagals, but I think they would easily come under sway. They want a little more pressure and would have to be guided, more closely watched, and perhaps a little more of the iron hand used than in Luzon.”Thus was the administration in Washington misled, and it is probable that the American military chiefs reported that they could easily overcome all opposition, so they were allowed to try.Yet in June, 1900, we read, “The recall of General Otis is taken to mean that the administration considers the war to be at an end, and that there is no longer any necessity for military rule.”General McArthur is appointed to the command, however, and the first thing he does is to cable to Washington for more troops, whilst Admiral Remey asks for an extra battalion of marines. These are to be sent, also at least three regiments of infantry. Sixty-five thousand men and forty ships of war are now admitted to be the proper garrison to hold down the Philippines.However necessary reinforcements may be, so deep is the racial antipathy between the United States’ soldiers, white or black, and the natives, that every additional man sent out is a source of disaffection, and even exasperation. Not only will the volunteers become demoralised and diseased in mind and body by their sojourn in America’s new possession, but the very fact of their presence renders the pacification of the country more difficult. The more troops are kept there, the more discontented the natives will be.To bring this chapter up to date, the position seems to be as follows: There is a recrudescence of activity amongst the insurgents; fighting is going on over a great part of the Archipelago, the American troops are harassed and overworked, sickness is rife, including the bubonic plague; yet, notwithstanding all this, the Taft Commission has taken over the administration of the islands from September 1st.The date fixed is not a convenient one for the Commission, as it is in the middle of the rainy season, but it has probably been selected to suit the presidential campaign in America.Aguinaldo has issued a proclamation warning the Filipinos against the Taft Commission, which, he says, has no authority from Congress; does not represent the sentiments of the American people, and is simply the personal instrument of Mr. McKinley sent out to make promises which it has no power to keep, and which the United States Government will not be bound to observe. He denounces the Americanistas, and threatens condign punishment to all who accept offices under the Commission. It would appear that a settlement on present lines is still some way off.Judge Taft seems to have inherited the cheerful optimism of General Otis. On September 1st he reported that the insurrection is virtually ended, and on 20th forwarded another favourable report. On 21st, General McArthur cabled accounts of engagements in several provinces of Luzon. The American troops at Pekin are being hurried to Manila, as the reinforcement of General McArthur is absolutely imperative.

Manila Bay—The naval battle of Cavite—General Aguinaldo—Progress of the Tagals—The Tagal Republic—Who were the aggressors?—Requisites for a settlement—Scenes of drunkenness—The estates of the religious orders to be restored—Slow progress of the campaign—Colonel Funston’s gallant exploits—Colonel Stotsenburg’s heroic death—General Antonio Luna’s gallant rally of his troops at Macabebe—Reports manipulated—Imaginary hills and jungles—Want of co-operation between army and navy—Advice of Sir Andrew Clarke—Naval officers as administrators—Mr. Whitelaw Reid’s denunciations—Senator Hoar’s opinion—Mr. McKinley’s speech at Pittsburgh—The false prophets of the Philippines—Tagal opinion of American Rule—Señor Mabini’s manifesto—Don Macario Adriatico’s letter—Foreman’s prophecy—The administration misled—Racial antipathy—The curse of the Redskins—The recall of General Otis—McArthur calls for reinforcements—Sixty-five thousand men and forty ships of war—State of the islands—Aguinaldo on the Taft Commission.

Manila Bay—The naval battle of Cavite—General Aguinaldo—Progress of the Tagals—The Tagal Republic—Who were the aggressors?—Requisites for a settlement—Scenes of drunkenness—The estates of the religious orders to be restored—Slow progress of the campaign—Colonel Funston’s gallant exploits—Colonel Stotsenburg’s heroic death—General Antonio Luna’s gallant rally of his troops at Macabebe—Reports manipulated—Imaginary hills and jungles—Want of co-operation between army and navy—Advice of Sir Andrew Clarke—Naval officers as administrators—Mr. Whitelaw Reid’s denunciations—Senator Hoar’s opinion—Mr. McKinley’s speech at Pittsburgh—The false prophets of the Philippines—Tagal opinion of American Rule—Señor Mabini’s manifesto—Don Macario Adriatico’s letter—Foreman’s prophecy—The administration misled—Racial antipathy—The curse of the Redskins—The recall of General Otis—McArthur calls for reinforcements—Sixty-five thousand men and forty ships of war—State of the islands—Aguinaldo on the Taft Commission.

Manila Bay.The width of the entrance to the vast Bay of Manila is nine and a half marine miles from shore to shore. It is divided into two unequal channels by the Island of Corregidor and Pulo Caballo, and a rock called El Frayle, about a mile and a half from the southern shore, farther reduces that channel.The Boca Chica, or northern entrance between Corregidor Island and Punta Lasisi, is two marine miles wide, and in the middle of the channel the depth of water is about thirty fathoms.The Boca Grande, or southern entrance between Pulo Caballo and El Frayle, is three and a half marine miles wide, with a depth of water in the fairway of about twenty fathoms.In both channels the tide rushes in and out with great force.With channels of such a width there was no difficulty in taking a squadron in at night, and little chance of suffering damage from the hastily improvised batteries of the Spaniards.And it will be evident to all having the slightest knowledge of submarine mining that the conditions are most unfavourable to defence by such means. As a matter of fact, the Spaniards possessed only nine obsolete submarine mines fitted to explode by contact. These were sent over to Corregidor, but were not sunk, as it was obvious that they were useless.On the other hand, it was a perfect position for the employment of torpedo boats or gunboats, there being excellent anchorage for such craft on both sides of the Channel and in Corregidor Cove. But at the time of the declaration of war, the Spaniards had no torpedo boats in the Philippines. The Elswick-built cruisersIsla de CubaandIsla de Luzonwere fitted with torpedoes, and might have been watching the channels for a chance to use them. Admiral Montojo knows best why he did not detach them on this service.There was then nothing to prevent the entrance of the American Squadron; the mines, torpedo boats and narrow channels only existed in the imagination of some American newspaper correspondents.But Admiral Dewey’s exploit does not need any such enhancing, it speaks for itself.To any one having a knowledge of the Spanish navy, and especially of the squadron of the Philippines, the result of an action against an American Squadron of similar force could not be doubtful.As a matter of fact the Spanish ships, except the two small cruisers built at Elswick in 1887, were quite obsolete. TheCastillaandReina Cristinawere wooden vessels, standing very high out of the water, and making admirable targets, whilst their guns were small, some of them had been landed at Corregidor, though never placed in battery. The boilers of one vessel were in the arsenal.But even allowing for the fact that the tonnage of the American Squadron was half as much again as that of the Spaniards, and that they had more than twice as many, and heavier guns, no one would have supposed it possiblethat the Spanish Squadron could have been completely destroyed without inflicting any damage upon the enemy.It was indeed a brilliant victory, reflecting great credit upon Admiral Dewey and the officers and crews of the American ships, not only for what they did that day, but for their careful preparation that enabled them to score so decided a success.The Spanish sailors put up a good fight and showed pluck, but they had no skill as gunners, and so failed in the hour of their country’s need. Admiral Montojo bravely commanded his fleet, but as soon as the action was over he seems to have considered that his duty had terminated, for he returned to his Villa in San Miguel, leaving the remnants of his squadron and the Cavite arsenal to its fate.We must infer that Admiral Dewey’s victory and its consequences were not foreseen by the American Government, for they had made no preparations to send troops to Manila, and from the time they learned of the destruction of the Spanish Squadron, till they had assembled a force strong enough to take and hold the city,three weary months elapsed. This was a very hap-hazard way of making war, and the delay cost many thousands of lives as will be seen later on.

Manila Bay.

The width of the entrance to the vast Bay of Manila is nine and a half marine miles from shore to shore. It is divided into two unequal channels by the Island of Corregidor and Pulo Caballo, and a rock called El Frayle, about a mile and a half from the southern shore, farther reduces that channel.The Boca Chica, or northern entrance between Corregidor Island and Punta Lasisi, is two marine miles wide, and in the middle of the channel the depth of water is about thirty fathoms.The Boca Grande, or southern entrance between Pulo Caballo and El Frayle, is three and a half marine miles wide, with a depth of water in the fairway of about twenty fathoms.In both channels the tide rushes in and out with great force.With channels of such a width there was no difficulty in taking a squadron in at night, and little chance of suffering damage from the hastily improvised batteries of the Spaniards.And it will be evident to all having the slightest knowledge of submarine mining that the conditions are most unfavourable to defence by such means. As a matter of fact, the Spaniards possessed only nine obsolete submarine mines fitted to explode by contact. These were sent over to Corregidor, but were not sunk, as it was obvious that they were useless.On the other hand, it was a perfect position for the employment of torpedo boats or gunboats, there being excellent anchorage for such craft on both sides of the Channel and in Corregidor Cove. But at the time of the declaration of war, the Spaniards had no torpedo boats in the Philippines. The Elswick-built cruisersIsla de CubaandIsla de Luzonwere fitted with torpedoes, and might have been watching the channels for a chance to use them. Admiral Montojo knows best why he did not detach them on this service.There was then nothing to prevent the entrance of the American Squadron; the mines, torpedo boats and narrow channels only existed in the imagination of some American newspaper correspondents.But Admiral Dewey’s exploit does not need any such enhancing, it speaks for itself.To any one having a knowledge of the Spanish navy, and especially of the squadron of the Philippines, the result of an action against an American Squadron of similar force could not be doubtful.As a matter of fact the Spanish ships, except the two small cruisers built at Elswick in 1887, were quite obsolete. TheCastillaandReina Cristinawere wooden vessels, standing very high out of the water, and making admirable targets, whilst their guns were small, some of them had been landed at Corregidor, though never placed in battery. The boilers of one vessel were in the arsenal.But even allowing for the fact that the tonnage of the American Squadron was half as much again as that of the Spaniards, and that they had more than twice as many, and heavier guns, no one would have supposed it possiblethat the Spanish Squadron could have been completely destroyed without inflicting any damage upon the enemy.It was indeed a brilliant victory, reflecting great credit upon Admiral Dewey and the officers and crews of the American ships, not only for what they did that day, but for their careful preparation that enabled them to score so decided a success.The Spanish sailors put up a good fight and showed pluck, but they had no skill as gunners, and so failed in the hour of their country’s need. Admiral Montojo bravely commanded his fleet, but as soon as the action was over he seems to have considered that his duty had terminated, for he returned to his Villa in San Miguel, leaving the remnants of his squadron and the Cavite arsenal to its fate.We must infer that Admiral Dewey’s victory and its consequences were not foreseen by the American Government, for they had made no preparations to send troops to Manila, and from the time they learned of the destruction of the Spanish Squadron, till they had assembled a force strong enough to take and hold the city,three weary months elapsed. This was a very hap-hazard way of making war, and the delay cost many thousands of lives as will be seen later on.

The width of the entrance to the vast Bay of Manila is nine and a half marine miles from shore to shore. It is divided into two unequal channels by the Island of Corregidor and Pulo Caballo, and a rock called El Frayle, about a mile and a half from the southern shore, farther reduces that channel.

The Boca Chica, or northern entrance between Corregidor Island and Punta Lasisi, is two marine miles wide, and in the middle of the channel the depth of water is about thirty fathoms.

The Boca Grande, or southern entrance between Pulo Caballo and El Frayle, is three and a half marine miles wide, with a depth of water in the fairway of about twenty fathoms.

In both channels the tide rushes in and out with great force.

With channels of such a width there was no difficulty in taking a squadron in at night, and little chance of suffering damage from the hastily improvised batteries of the Spaniards.

And it will be evident to all having the slightest knowledge of submarine mining that the conditions are most unfavourable to defence by such means. As a matter of fact, the Spaniards possessed only nine obsolete submarine mines fitted to explode by contact. These were sent over to Corregidor, but were not sunk, as it was obvious that they were useless.

On the other hand, it was a perfect position for the employment of torpedo boats or gunboats, there being excellent anchorage for such craft on both sides of the Channel and in Corregidor Cove. But at the time of the declaration of war, the Spaniards had no torpedo boats in the Philippines. The Elswick-built cruisersIsla de CubaandIsla de Luzonwere fitted with torpedoes, and might have been watching the channels for a chance to use them. Admiral Montojo knows best why he did not detach them on this service.

There was then nothing to prevent the entrance of the American Squadron; the mines, torpedo boats and narrow channels only existed in the imagination of some American newspaper correspondents.

But Admiral Dewey’s exploit does not need any such enhancing, it speaks for itself.

To any one having a knowledge of the Spanish navy, and especially of the squadron of the Philippines, the result of an action against an American Squadron of similar force could not be doubtful.As a matter of fact the Spanish ships, except the two small cruisers built at Elswick in 1887, were quite obsolete. TheCastillaandReina Cristinawere wooden vessels, standing very high out of the water, and making admirable targets, whilst their guns were small, some of them had been landed at Corregidor, though never placed in battery. The boilers of one vessel were in the arsenal.

But even allowing for the fact that the tonnage of the American Squadron was half as much again as that of the Spaniards, and that they had more than twice as many, and heavier guns, no one would have supposed it possiblethat the Spanish Squadron could have been completely destroyed without inflicting any damage upon the enemy.

It was indeed a brilliant victory, reflecting great credit upon Admiral Dewey and the officers and crews of the American ships, not only for what they did that day, but for their careful preparation that enabled them to score so decided a success.

The Spanish sailors put up a good fight and showed pluck, but they had no skill as gunners, and so failed in the hour of their country’s need. Admiral Montojo bravely commanded his fleet, but as soon as the action was over he seems to have considered that his duty had terminated, for he returned to his Villa in San Miguel, leaving the remnants of his squadron and the Cavite arsenal to its fate.

We must infer that Admiral Dewey’s victory and its consequences were not foreseen by the American Government, for they had made no preparations to send troops to Manila, and from the time they learned of the destruction of the Spanish Squadron, till they had assembled a force strong enough to take and hold the city,three weary months elapsed. This was a very hap-hazard way of making war, and the delay cost many thousands of lives as will be seen later on.

General Aguinaldo.On the 19th May, 1898, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, former chief of the insurgents, arrived in Manila in pursuance of an arrangement with the American Consul-General at Singapore. He came with a suite of seventeen persons on board an American gunboat, and after an interview with Admiral Dewey, was landed at Cavite and given two field-pieces, a number of rifles and a supply of ammunition.He soon reasserted himself as the leader of the insurrection, which was already in active progress, and gained some signal successes against the Spaniards. On the 24th May he issued a proclamation enjoining his followers to make war in a civilized manner and to respect property.I do not intend to discuss the negotiations between Mr. Pratt and Aguinaldo, nor between the latter and Admiral Dewey. This subject has been very fully treated by Mr. Foreman in the second edition of his book. The treating with Aguinaldo was not approved by Mr. Day at Washington, and the Consul-General and Consuls who hadparticipated in it, and even taken credit for it, were severely rapped over the knuckles and promptly adopted an apologetic tone (see Blue Book). But whatever was the agreement with Aguinaldo, it is evident that had it not been for his assistance and that of the insurgents, the Spanish forces could have retired from Manila to Tarlac or other place inland out of reach of the guns of the fleet and could have prolonged their resistance for years.

General Aguinaldo.

On the 19th May, 1898, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, former chief of the insurgents, arrived in Manila in pursuance of an arrangement with the American Consul-General at Singapore. He came with a suite of seventeen persons on board an American gunboat, and after an interview with Admiral Dewey, was landed at Cavite and given two field-pieces, a number of rifles and a supply of ammunition.He soon reasserted himself as the leader of the insurrection, which was already in active progress, and gained some signal successes against the Spaniards. On the 24th May he issued a proclamation enjoining his followers to make war in a civilized manner and to respect property.I do not intend to discuss the negotiations between Mr. Pratt and Aguinaldo, nor between the latter and Admiral Dewey. This subject has been very fully treated by Mr. Foreman in the second edition of his book. The treating with Aguinaldo was not approved by Mr. Day at Washington, and the Consul-General and Consuls who hadparticipated in it, and even taken credit for it, were severely rapped over the knuckles and promptly adopted an apologetic tone (see Blue Book). But whatever was the agreement with Aguinaldo, it is evident that had it not been for his assistance and that of the insurgents, the Spanish forces could have retired from Manila to Tarlac or other place inland out of reach of the guns of the fleet and could have prolonged their resistance for years.

On the 19th May, 1898, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, former chief of the insurgents, arrived in Manila in pursuance of an arrangement with the American Consul-General at Singapore. He came with a suite of seventeen persons on board an American gunboat, and after an interview with Admiral Dewey, was landed at Cavite and given two field-pieces, a number of rifles and a supply of ammunition.

He soon reasserted himself as the leader of the insurrection, which was already in active progress, and gained some signal successes against the Spaniards. On the 24th May he issued a proclamation enjoining his followers to make war in a civilized manner and to respect property.

I do not intend to discuss the negotiations between Mr. Pratt and Aguinaldo, nor between the latter and Admiral Dewey. This subject has been very fully treated by Mr. Foreman in the second edition of his book. The treating with Aguinaldo was not approved by Mr. Day at Washington, and the Consul-General and Consuls who hadparticipated in it, and even taken credit for it, were severely rapped over the knuckles and promptly adopted an apologetic tone (see Blue Book). But whatever was the agreement with Aguinaldo, it is evident that had it not been for his assistance and that of the insurgents, the Spanish forces could have retired from Manila to Tarlac or other place inland out of reach of the guns of the fleet and could have prolonged their resistance for years.

The Tagal Republic.The Tagals had made much progress since the insurrection of 1896–7. Their ideas had advanced considerably since their rudimentary organization in the Province of Cavite, as can be gathered from the improved style of the various proclamations and decrees published by Aguinaldo.They now organized a Government, a real Civil Administration, extending over a great part of Luzon, and sent an expedition to Visayas. They established a Constitution, a representative government, and reopened the courts and schools, whilst the native clergy carried on public worship as usual. Aguinaldo repeatedly asserted the determination of the Tagal people to fight to the death for independence. At this time the insurgents held 9000 Spaniards as prisoners of war, and they claimed to have 30,000 men under arms.Paymaster Wilcox, U.S.N., and Mr. Leonard R. Sargent who travelled through part of Luzon for more than 600 miles, and during six weeks, reported1to Admiral Dewey that a regular and orderly Administration had been established, and was in full working order.Aguinaldo was at the head of this Government and of the armyco-operatingwith the American forces by the written request of General Anderson. This should have ensured him and those with him at the very least courteous and considerate treatment at the hands of the American Commanders, and in fact he received this from Admiral Dewey. But as soon as the direction of affairs passed into the hands of the general commanding the army the deeply-rooted contempt felt by Americans for the coloured races was allowed full play, Aguinaldo and his staff found themselves ignored, or treated with scarcely veiled contempt, and the estrangement was gradually increased.I do not know which party was the aggressor on February the 4th, 1899, each swears that it was the other. Thecui bonotest cuts both ways, for whilst it appears that the attack on Manila secured two doubtful votes in the Senate for the ratification of the Treaty whereby the Philippines were bought from Spain, on the other hand, Aguinaldo may have felt it necessary to prove to America that the Philippines would fight rather than bow their necks to the Yankee yoke. So that both parties may have had an interest in beginning hostilities. In any case, the next day Aguinaldo offered to withdraw to a greater distance if an armistice was arranged, but Otis declared that “fighting must go on.”Personally, I think that if a sympathetic and conciliatory attitude had been adopted, had the local government established been recognized, had Aguinaldo and his staff been given commissions in the Native Army or Civil Service, and the flower of the Tagal Army taken into the service of the United States, a peaceful settlement could have been made on the lines of a Protectorate.I therefore look upon the war as unnecessary, and consider the lives already sacrificed, and that will have to be sacrificed, as absolutely thrown away.The tragical side of American unpreparedness is manifest in the state of anarchy in which the whole Archipelago has been plunged by the American unreadiness to occupy the military posts as soon as they were vacated by the Spanish garrisons. A hideous orgy of murder, plunder, and slave-raiding has prevailed in Visayas, and especially in Mindanao.Three conditions were essential to a peaceful settlement:—First.—A broad-minded and sympathetic representative of America, fully authorized to treat, and a lover of peace.Second.—A strict discipline amongst the American forces.Third.—The principal aim and object of the Tagal insurrection must be secured.General Otis does not seem to me to fulfil the first condition, he lacked prestige and patience, and he showed that he had an insufficient conception of the magnitude of his task by occupying himself with petty details of all kinds and by displaying an ill-timed parsimony. Apparently he had no power to grant anything at all, and only dealt invague generalities which the Tagals could not be expected to accept.As regards the second point, I regret that I am not personally acquainted with the gentlemen from Nebraska, Colorado, Dakota and other states serving in the United States Army or volunteers. I have no doubt that they are good fighting-men, but from all I can hear about them they are not conspicuous for strict military discipline, and too many of them have erroneous ideas as to the most suitable drink for a tropical climate.Manila was in the time of the Spaniards a most temperate city; a drunken man was a very rare sight, and would usually be a foreign sailor. Since the American occupation, some hundreds of drinking saloons have been opened, and daily scenes of drunkenness and debauchery have filled the quiet natives with alarm and horror. When John L. Motley wrote his scathing denunciation of the army which the great Duke of Alva led from Spain into the Low Countries, “to enforce the high religious purposes of Philip II.,”not foresee that his words would be applicable to an American Army sent to subjugate men struggling to be free “for their welfare, not our gain,” nor that this army, besides bringing in its train a flood of cosmopolitan harlotry,2would be allowed by its commander to inaugurate amongst a strictly temperate people a mad saturnalia of drunkenness that has scarcely a parallel.Such, however, is undoubtedly the case, and I venture to think that these occurrences have confirmed many of the Tagals in their resolve rather to die fighting for their independence than to be ruled over by such as these.More important still was it to take care that the Tagal insurrection should not have been in vain. That rebellion probably cost fifty thousand human lives, immense loss of property, and untold misery. It was fought against the friars and was at last triumphant. The Spanish friars had been expelled and their lands confiscated. Were the Americans to bring them back and guarantee them in peaceable possession, once more riveting on the chain the Tagals had torn off?This seems to have been General Otis’ intention. I think he might have stood upon the accomplished fact. But he did not.The Treaty of Peace under Article VIII. declares that the cession cannot in any respect impair the rights of ecclesiastical bodies to acquire and possess property, whilst Article IX. allows Spanish subjects to remain in the Islands, to sell or dispose of their property and to carry on their professions. Presumably General Otis felt bound by the Treaty in which these general stipulations had been embodied by the Peace Commission, in direct contradiction to the advice given them by Mr. Foreman (see p. 463, 55th Congress, 3rd Sess., Doc. No. 62, part 1), who pointed out the necessity of confiscating these lands, but Mr. Gray replied: “We have no law which will allow us to arbitrarily do so.”As soon as the effect of the treaty was known, Archbishop Nozaleda, who had fled to China from the vengeance he feared, returned to Manila. He seemed to have a good deal of interest with General Otis, and this did not please the natives, nor inspire them with confidence.Furthermore, it was reported and generally believed that the friars’ vast estates had been purchased by an American Syndicate who would in due time take possession and exploit them.One can understand the Tagals’ grief and desperation; all their blood and tears shed in vain! The friars triumphant after all!I do not wish to trace the particulars of the wretched war that commenced February, 1899, and is still (October, 1900) proceeding.In it the Americans do not seem to have displayed the resourcefulness andadaptabilityone would have expected from them. For my part, I expected a great deal, for so many American generals being selected from men in the active exercise of a profession, or perhaps controlling the administration of some vast business, they ought naturally to have developed their faculties, by constant use, to a far greater degree than men who have vegetated in the futile routine of a barrack or military station. They prevailed in every encounter, but their advance was very slow, and their troops suffered many preventible hardships. We know very little as to what happened, for the censors, acting under instructions from General Otis, prevented the transmissionof accurate information; nothing was cabled, except the accounts of victories gained by the American troops.It would not be right, however, to pass over the fighting without rendering due tribute to the heroism of the American officers and soldiers.Who can forget Colonel Funston’s gallant exploit in crossing the Rio Grande on a raft under fire with two companies of Kansas Infantry and enfilading the Tagals’ position? Or his leading part of same regiment in a charge upon an enemy’s earthwork near Santo Tomás, where he was wounded?What could be finer than the late Colonel Stotsenburg’s leading of the Nebraska regiment in the attack on Quíngua, where he was killed? And since we are speaking of brave men, shall we not remember the late General Antonio Luna and his gallant rally of his army in the advance from Macabébe, when he fearlessly exposed himself on horseback to the American fire, riding along the front of his line? To justify the slow progress of the army, jungles, forests, swamps and hills were introduced on the perfectly flat arable land such as that around Malolos, Calumpit, and San Fernando, extending in fact all the way from Manila to Tarlac.3This country supports a dense population, and almost every bit of it has been under the plough for centuries. The only hill is Arayat. During the dry season, say from November to May or June, the soil is baked quite hard, and vehicles or guns can traverse any part of it with slight assistance from the pioneers. The only obstacles are the small rivers and creeks, mostly fordable, and having clumps of bamboos growing on their banks providing a perfect material for temporary bridges or for making rafts.The campaign was marked by an absence of co-operation between the land and sea forces. Admiral Dewey, apparently, was not pleased with the way things were managed, for he is said to have stayed on board his ship for months at a time. The warships remained at anchor in Manila Bay whilst arms4and ammunition were landed at the outposts or on the coasts without hindrance, and it was not till November that troops were landed at Dagupan,the northern terminus of the railway, though this obviously ought to have been done in February, so as to attack the enemy front and rear.The necessity for small gunboats soon made itself felt, but such was the jealousy of the army towards the navy that it was decided that these must be army gunboats, and General Otis is reported to have purchased thirteen small gunboats at Zamboanga, in March 1899, without consulting or informing Admiral Dewey or even asking for an escort for them. It so happened that the Spaniards evacuated Zamboanga before any American forces arrived, and the insurgents promptly took possession of the gunboats already paid for and proceeded to plunder them of everything useful to them. A native account says that they took the gunboats up the Rio Grande into the interior, but this is denied by the Americans. Ultimately a cruiser was sent down to convoy the gunboats, and if I am correctly informed, they were commissioned in charge of junior naval officers.Obviously, the services of the navy should have been utilised to the utmost extent, and advantage should have been taken of the prestige they had gained by the victory over the Spaniards, and of the great popularity and sympathetic personality of Admiral Dewey. A serious responsibility rests upon whoever allowed jealousy to prevent the co-operation of the land and sea forces, since by failing to secure this they needlessly sacrificed the lives of American soldiers and prolonged the war.Lieut.-General Sir Andrew Clarke, R.E., a former governor of the Straits Settlements, and the greatest authority in England on the affairs of the Malay States and Islands, was good enough to write a letter which was forwarded to Mr. Day, and published in the Blue Book, p. 628.He pointed out that, although a moderate military force might be desirable at one or two important centres, a naval force was of more value, especially gunboats able to move freely amongst the islands and ascend the many rivers and inlets of the sea.Therefore to the fleet and its officers he advised that political and civil administration of the Philippines should, at least in the first instance, be entrusted. Sir Andrew believed, and I venture to say that I thoroughly agree with him, that amongst the officers of the United States navy,active and retired, can be found many men of wide experience, broad views, and generous sympathy well fitted to administer the affairs of the protectorate. Sir Andrew also advised, as Foreman did, and as I do, that the members of the Religious Orders,i.e., the Augustinians, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, and the Recollets, should be advised to return to Spain, receiving compensation for their property.Sir Andrew Clarke summed up his advice as follows: “Enlist native sympathy by fairness and justice, and rule through native agents, supervised by carefully selected American residents.”As the fleet, by destroying the Spanish squadron, had rendered it possible to bring troops by sea, and by capturing the arsenal and blockading the Port of Manila, had invigorated the insurrection, and in fact had brought about the cession of the islands by Spain, it would appear to outsiders that it and its officers had a strong claim to the leading part in completing the settlement and pacification of the Archipelago for which the best authorities considered them to possess special qualifications. Besides, if peace was really wanted, it would have been better to entrust the negotiations to the man who had had his fight rather than to one looking for his chance. The craze for military renown is nowhere more rampant than in the United States. Occasions are few and far between, and we must not expect generals to throw them away and fly in the face of Providence.This, however, did not commend itself to those who pull the strings; we ignore the reasons, but we see the result. Perhaps it was thought that to allow Dewey to add to his victor’s laurel wreath the palm of the pacificator would be too much honour for one man, and might raise him to an inconvenient height in the estimation of his fellow citizens.A year and twenty days after his decisive victory Admiral Dewey sailed from Manila in his flagship. Wherever the British ensign flew he was received with every demonstration of honour and respect both by naval and military officers and by civilians. His reception in New York was marked by an almost delirious enthusiasm. But long before he arrived, Mr. Whitelaw Reid, disgusted with the conduct of the campaign, made a speech at the Miami University and denounced the President for neglect of duty which brought on the war in the Philippines.He said: “If the bitterest enemy of the United States had sought to bring upon it in that quarter the greatest trouble in the shortest time, he could have devised for that end no policy more successful than the one we have already pursued.” It must be added that Mr. Whitelaw Reid, perhaps to prevent being accused of having sympathy with the enemy, denounced Aguinaldo and the Tagals as rebels, savages and treacherous barbarians, unfit for citizenship or self-government, and declared that the Philippines belong to America by right of conquest.I suppose Mr. Whitelaw Reid, or perhaps any citizen of the United States, has a right to denounce his own President, and certainly the management of the Philippine annexation has been bad from the beginning.But I think Mr. McKinley was badly served by the Peace Commission. They seem to me to have made many and egregious mistakes.1. They took General Merritt’s opinion that the Tagals would submit, and accepted Mr. Foreman’s assurance of Tagal plasticity and accommodating nature.2. They disregarded the intimation of D. Felipe Agoncillo, the accredited agent of the Tagals, that these would accept no settlement to which they were not parties.3. They treated several millions of civilised Christian people like a herd of cattle to be purchased with the ranch.4. Under Article VIII., they guaranteed the religious orders the possession of estates already taken from them.5. Under Article IX., they gave the expelled friars the right to return and exercise their profession.To illustrate their careless procedure, I may add that they did not even accurately determine the boundaries of the Archipelago to be ceded, and now, in August 1900, $100,000 is to be paid to Spain for Sibutu and CagayanSuluIslands, left out by mistake. If any man has a right to say, “Save me from my friends,” that man is William McKinley.As regards Aguinaldo and the Tagals, I think that Mr. Whitelaw Reid’s irritation at their protracted resistance has led him on too far. I prefer the opinion of Senator Hoar, who, speaking in the Senate of three proclamations of Aguinaldo, said: “Mr. President, these are three of the greatest state papers in all history. If they were found in our own history of our own revolutionary time we shouldbe proud to have them stand by the side of those great state papers which Chatham declared were equal to the masterpieces of antiquity.”In the same speech he says, and I commend his words to the reader’s attention: “Mr. President, there is one mode by which the people of the Philippine Islands could establish the truth of the charges as to their degradation and incapacity for self-government which have been made by the advocates of Imperialism in this debate, and that mode is by submitting tamely and without resistance to the dominion of the United States.”Mr. Whitelaw Reid, however, was perfectly right in one thing. The Philippines belong (or will belong) to America by right of conquest. On August 28th, 1899, Mr. McKinley addressed the 10th Pennsylvania Regiment at Pittsburgh soon after their arrival from Manila. He said: “The insurgents struck the first blow. They reciprocated our kindness with cruelty, our mercy5with Mausers.... They assailed our sovereignty, and there will be no useless parley until the insurrection is suppressed and American authority acknowledged and established. The Philippines are ours as much as Louisiana, by purchase, or Texas, or Alaska.” Here we get down to the bed rock, and discard all flimsy pretences. The Americans have undertaken a war of conquest, they bought it in fact, but I fear they are not happy either about its material progress or its moral aspect. We shall have to wait till November to see what they think about it.But whenever the cost in lost lives, ruined health, and shattered minds, to say nothing of dollars, comes to be known, there will be a great outcry in America.Mr. McKinley and his advisers are much to be pitied, for they were misled by the information given them by those they relied on.

The Tagal Republic.

The Tagals had made much progress since the insurrection of 1896–7. Their ideas had advanced considerably since their rudimentary organization in the Province of Cavite, as can be gathered from the improved style of the various proclamations and decrees published by Aguinaldo.They now organized a Government, a real Civil Administration, extending over a great part of Luzon, and sent an expedition to Visayas. They established a Constitution, a representative government, and reopened the courts and schools, whilst the native clergy carried on public worship as usual. Aguinaldo repeatedly asserted the determination of the Tagal people to fight to the death for independence. At this time the insurgents held 9000 Spaniards as prisoners of war, and they claimed to have 30,000 men under arms.Paymaster Wilcox, U.S.N., and Mr. Leonard R. Sargent who travelled through part of Luzon for more than 600 miles, and during six weeks, reported1to Admiral Dewey that a regular and orderly Administration had been established, and was in full working order.Aguinaldo was at the head of this Government and of the armyco-operatingwith the American forces by the written request of General Anderson. This should have ensured him and those with him at the very least courteous and considerate treatment at the hands of the American Commanders, and in fact he received this from Admiral Dewey. But as soon as the direction of affairs passed into the hands of the general commanding the army the deeply-rooted contempt felt by Americans for the coloured races was allowed full play, Aguinaldo and his staff found themselves ignored, or treated with scarcely veiled contempt, and the estrangement was gradually increased.I do not know which party was the aggressor on February the 4th, 1899, each swears that it was the other. Thecui bonotest cuts both ways, for whilst it appears that the attack on Manila secured two doubtful votes in the Senate for the ratification of the Treaty whereby the Philippines were bought from Spain, on the other hand, Aguinaldo may have felt it necessary to prove to America that the Philippines would fight rather than bow their necks to the Yankee yoke. So that both parties may have had an interest in beginning hostilities. In any case, the next day Aguinaldo offered to withdraw to a greater distance if an armistice was arranged, but Otis declared that “fighting must go on.”Personally, I think that if a sympathetic and conciliatory attitude had been adopted, had the local government established been recognized, had Aguinaldo and his staff been given commissions in the Native Army or Civil Service, and the flower of the Tagal Army taken into the service of the United States, a peaceful settlement could have been made on the lines of a Protectorate.I therefore look upon the war as unnecessary, and consider the lives already sacrificed, and that will have to be sacrificed, as absolutely thrown away.The tragical side of American unpreparedness is manifest in the state of anarchy in which the whole Archipelago has been plunged by the American unreadiness to occupy the military posts as soon as they were vacated by the Spanish garrisons. A hideous orgy of murder, plunder, and slave-raiding has prevailed in Visayas, and especially in Mindanao.Three conditions were essential to a peaceful settlement:—First.—A broad-minded and sympathetic representative of America, fully authorized to treat, and a lover of peace.Second.—A strict discipline amongst the American forces.Third.—The principal aim and object of the Tagal insurrection must be secured.General Otis does not seem to me to fulfil the first condition, he lacked prestige and patience, and he showed that he had an insufficient conception of the magnitude of his task by occupying himself with petty details of all kinds and by displaying an ill-timed parsimony. Apparently he had no power to grant anything at all, and only dealt invague generalities which the Tagals could not be expected to accept.As regards the second point, I regret that I am not personally acquainted with the gentlemen from Nebraska, Colorado, Dakota and other states serving in the United States Army or volunteers. I have no doubt that they are good fighting-men, but from all I can hear about them they are not conspicuous for strict military discipline, and too many of them have erroneous ideas as to the most suitable drink for a tropical climate.Manila was in the time of the Spaniards a most temperate city; a drunken man was a very rare sight, and would usually be a foreign sailor. Since the American occupation, some hundreds of drinking saloons have been opened, and daily scenes of drunkenness and debauchery have filled the quiet natives with alarm and horror. When John L. Motley wrote his scathing denunciation of the army which the great Duke of Alva led from Spain into the Low Countries, “to enforce the high religious purposes of Philip II.,”not foresee that his words would be applicable to an American Army sent to subjugate men struggling to be free “for their welfare, not our gain,” nor that this army, besides bringing in its train a flood of cosmopolitan harlotry,2would be allowed by its commander to inaugurate amongst a strictly temperate people a mad saturnalia of drunkenness that has scarcely a parallel.Such, however, is undoubtedly the case, and I venture to think that these occurrences have confirmed many of the Tagals in their resolve rather to die fighting for their independence than to be ruled over by such as these.More important still was it to take care that the Tagal insurrection should not have been in vain. That rebellion probably cost fifty thousand human lives, immense loss of property, and untold misery. It was fought against the friars and was at last triumphant. The Spanish friars had been expelled and their lands confiscated. Were the Americans to bring them back and guarantee them in peaceable possession, once more riveting on the chain the Tagals had torn off?This seems to have been General Otis’ intention. I think he might have stood upon the accomplished fact. But he did not.The Treaty of Peace under Article VIII. declares that the cession cannot in any respect impair the rights of ecclesiastical bodies to acquire and possess property, whilst Article IX. allows Spanish subjects to remain in the Islands, to sell or dispose of their property and to carry on their professions. Presumably General Otis felt bound by the Treaty in which these general stipulations had been embodied by the Peace Commission, in direct contradiction to the advice given them by Mr. Foreman (see p. 463, 55th Congress, 3rd Sess., Doc. No. 62, part 1), who pointed out the necessity of confiscating these lands, but Mr. Gray replied: “We have no law which will allow us to arbitrarily do so.”As soon as the effect of the treaty was known, Archbishop Nozaleda, who had fled to China from the vengeance he feared, returned to Manila. He seemed to have a good deal of interest with General Otis, and this did not please the natives, nor inspire them with confidence.Furthermore, it was reported and generally believed that the friars’ vast estates had been purchased by an American Syndicate who would in due time take possession and exploit them.One can understand the Tagals’ grief and desperation; all their blood and tears shed in vain! The friars triumphant after all!I do not wish to trace the particulars of the wretched war that commenced February, 1899, and is still (October, 1900) proceeding.In it the Americans do not seem to have displayed the resourcefulness andadaptabilityone would have expected from them. For my part, I expected a great deal, for so many American generals being selected from men in the active exercise of a profession, or perhaps controlling the administration of some vast business, they ought naturally to have developed their faculties, by constant use, to a far greater degree than men who have vegetated in the futile routine of a barrack or military station. They prevailed in every encounter, but their advance was very slow, and their troops suffered many preventible hardships. We know very little as to what happened, for the censors, acting under instructions from General Otis, prevented the transmissionof accurate information; nothing was cabled, except the accounts of victories gained by the American troops.It would not be right, however, to pass over the fighting without rendering due tribute to the heroism of the American officers and soldiers.Who can forget Colonel Funston’s gallant exploit in crossing the Rio Grande on a raft under fire with two companies of Kansas Infantry and enfilading the Tagals’ position? Or his leading part of same regiment in a charge upon an enemy’s earthwork near Santo Tomás, where he was wounded?What could be finer than the late Colonel Stotsenburg’s leading of the Nebraska regiment in the attack on Quíngua, where he was killed? And since we are speaking of brave men, shall we not remember the late General Antonio Luna and his gallant rally of his army in the advance from Macabébe, when he fearlessly exposed himself on horseback to the American fire, riding along the front of his line? To justify the slow progress of the army, jungles, forests, swamps and hills were introduced on the perfectly flat arable land such as that around Malolos, Calumpit, and San Fernando, extending in fact all the way from Manila to Tarlac.3This country supports a dense population, and almost every bit of it has been under the plough for centuries. The only hill is Arayat. During the dry season, say from November to May or June, the soil is baked quite hard, and vehicles or guns can traverse any part of it with slight assistance from the pioneers. The only obstacles are the small rivers and creeks, mostly fordable, and having clumps of bamboos growing on their banks providing a perfect material for temporary bridges or for making rafts.The campaign was marked by an absence of co-operation between the land and sea forces. Admiral Dewey, apparently, was not pleased with the way things were managed, for he is said to have stayed on board his ship for months at a time. The warships remained at anchor in Manila Bay whilst arms4and ammunition were landed at the outposts or on the coasts without hindrance, and it was not till November that troops were landed at Dagupan,the northern terminus of the railway, though this obviously ought to have been done in February, so as to attack the enemy front and rear.The necessity for small gunboats soon made itself felt, but such was the jealousy of the army towards the navy that it was decided that these must be army gunboats, and General Otis is reported to have purchased thirteen small gunboats at Zamboanga, in March 1899, without consulting or informing Admiral Dewey or even asking for an escort for them. It so happened that the Spaniards evacuated Zamboanga before any American forces arrived, and the insurgents promptly took possession of the gunboats already paid for and proceeded to plunder them of everything useful to them. A native account says that they took the gunboats up the Rio Grande into the interior, but this is denied by the Americans. Ultimately a cruiser was sent down to convoy the gunboats, and if I am correctly informed, they were commissioned in charge of junior naval officers.Obviously, the services of the navy should have been utilised to the utmost extent, and advantage should have been taken of the prestige they had gained by the victory over the Spaniards, and of the great popularity and sympathetic personality of Admiral Dewey. A serious responsibility rests upon whoever allowed jealousy to prevent the co-operation of the land and sea forces, since by failing to secure this they needlessly sacrificed the lives of American soldiers and prolonged the war.Lieut.-General Sir Andrew Clarke, R.E., a former governor of the Straits Settlements, and the greatest authority in England on the affairs of the Malay States and Islands, was good enough to write a letter which was forwarded to Mr. Day, and published in the Blue Book, p. 628.He pointed out that, although a moderate military force might be desirable at one or two important centres, a naval force was of more value, especially gunboats able to move freely amongst the islands and ascend the many rivers and inlets of the sea.Therefore to the fleet and its officers he advised that political and civil administration of the Philippines should, at least in the first instance, be entrusted. Sir Andrew believed, and I venture to say that I thoroughly agree with him, that amongst the officers of the United States navy,active and retired, can be found many men of wide experience, broad views, and generous sympathy well fitted to administer the affairs of the protectorate. Sir Andrew also advised, as Foreman did, and as I do, that the members of the Religious Orders,i.e., the Augustinians, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, and the Recollets, should be advised to return to Spain, receiving compensation for their property.Sir Andrew Clarke summed up his advice as follows: “Enlist native sympathy by fairness and justice, and rule through native agents, supervised by carefully selected American residents.”As the fleet, by destroying the Spanish squadron, had rendered it possible to bring troops by sea, and by capturing the arsenal and blockading the Port of Manila, had invigorated the insurrection, and in fact had brought about the cession of the islands by Spain, it would appear to outsiders that it and its officers had a strong claim to the leading part in completing the settlement and pacification of the Archipelago for which the best authorities considered them to possess special qualifications. Besides, if peace was really wanted, it would have been better to entrust the negotiations to the man who had had his fight rather than to one looking for his chance. The craze for military renown is nowhere more rampant than in the United States. Occasions are few and far between, and we must not expect generals to throw them away and fly in the face of Providence.This, however, did not commend itself to those who pull the strings; we ignore the reasons, but we see the result. Perhaps it was thought that to allow Dewey to add to his victor’s laurel wreath the palm of the pacificator would be too much honour for one man, and might raise him to an inconvenient height in the estimation of his fellow citizens.A year and twenty days after his decisive victory Admiral Dewey sailed from Manila in his flagship. Wherever the British ensign flew he was received with every demonstration of honour and respect both by naval and military officers and by civilians. His reception in New York was marked by an almost delirious enthusiasm. But long before he arrived, Mr. Whitelaw Reid, disgusted with the conduct of the campaign, made a speech at the Miami University and denounced the President for neglect of duty which brought on the war in the Philippines.He said: “If the bitterest enemy of the United States had sought to bring upon it in that quarter the greatest trouble in the shortest time, he could have devised for that end no policy more successful than the one we have already pursued.” It must be added that Mr. Whitelaw Reid, perhaps to prevent being accused of having sympathy with the enemy, denounced Aguinaldo and the Tagals as rebels, savages and treacherous barbarians, unfit for citizenship or self-government, and declared that the Philippines belong to America by right of conquest.I suppose Mr. Whitelaw Reid, or perhaps any citizen of the United States, has a right to denounce his own President, and certainly the management of the Philippine annexation has been bad from the beginning.But I think Mr. McKinley was badly served by the Peace Commission. They seem to me to have made many and egregious mistakes.1. They took General Merritt’s opinion that the Tagals would submit, and accepted Mr. Foreman’s assurance of Tagal plasticity and accommodating nature.2. They disregarded the intimation of D. Felipe Agoncillo, the accredited agent of the Tagals, that these would accept no settlement to which they were not parties.3. They treated several millions of civilised Christian people like a herd of cattle to be purchased with the ranch.4. Under Article VIII., they guaranteed the religious orders the possession of estates already taken from them.5. Under Article IX., they gave the expelled friars the right to return and exercise their profession.To illustrate their careless procedure, I may add that they did not even accurately determine the boundaries of the Archipelago to be ceded, and now, in August 1900, $100,000 is to be paid to Spain for Sibutu and CagayanSuluIslands, left out by mistake. If any man has a right to say, “Save me from my friends,” that man is William McKinley.As regards Aguinaldo and the Tagals, I think that Mr. Whitelaw Reid’s irritation at their protracted resistance has led him on too far. I prefer the opinion of Senator Hoar, who, speaking in the Senate of three proclamations of Aguinaldo, said: “Mr. President, these are three of the greatest state papers in all history. If they were found in our own history of our own revolutionary time we shouldbe proud to have them stand by the side of those great state papers which Chatham declared were equal to the masterpieces of antiquity.”In the same speech he says, and I commend his words to the reader’s attention: “Mr. President, there is one mode by which the people of the Philippine Islands could establish the truth of the charges as to their degradation and incapacity for self-government which have been made by the advocates of Imperialism in this debate, and that mode is by submitting tamely and without resistance to the dominion of the United States.”Mr. Whitelaw Reid, however, was perfectly right in one thing. The Philippines belong (or will belong) to America by right of conquest. On August 28th, 1899, Mr. McKinley addressed the 10th Pennsylvania Regiment at Pittsburgh soon after their arrival from Manila. He said: “The insurgents struck the first blow. They reciprocated our kindness with cruelty, our mercy5with Mausers.... They assailed our sovereignty, and there will be no useless parley until the insurrection is suppressed and American authority acknowledged and established. The Philippines are ours as much as Louisiana, by purchase, or Texas, or Alaska.” Here we get down to the bed rock, and discard all flimsy pretences. The Americans have undertaken a war of conquest, they bought it in fact, but I fear they are not happy either about its material progress or its moral aspect. We shall have to wait till November to see what they think about it.But whenever the cost in lost lives, ruined health, and shattered minds, to say nothing of dollars, comes to be known, there will be a great outcry in America.Mr. McKinley and his advisers are much to be pitied, for they were misled by the information given them by those they relied on.

The Tagals had made much progress since the insurrection of 1896–7. Their ideas had advanced considerably since their rudimentary organization in the Province of Cavite, as can be gathered from the improved style of the various proclamations and decrees published by Aguinaldo.

They now organized a Government, a real Civil Administration, extending over a great part of Luzon, and sent an expedition to Visayas. They established a Constitution, a representative government, and reopened the courts and schools, whilst the native clergy carried on public worship as usual. Aguinaldo repeatedly asserted the determination of the Tagal people to fight to the death for independence. At this time the insurgents held 9000 Spaniards as prisoners of war, and they claimed to have 30,000 men under arms.

Paymaster Wilcox, U.S.N., and Mr. Leonard R. Sargent who travelled through part of Luzon for more than 600 miles, and during six weeks, reported1to Admiral Dewey that a regular and orderly Administration had been established, and was in full working order.

Aguinaldo was at the head of this Government and of the armyco-operatingwith the American forces by the written request of General Anderson. This should have ensured him and those with him at the very least courteous and considerate treatment at the hands of the American Commanders, and in fact he received this from Admiral Dewey. But as soon as the direction of affairs passed into the hands of the general commanding the army the deeply-rooted contempt felt by Americans for the coloured races was allowed full play, Aguinaldo and his staff found themselves ignored, or treated with scarcely veiled contempt, and the estrangement was gradually increased.

I do not know which party was the aggressor on February the 4th, 1899, each swears that it was the other. Thecui bonotest cuts both ways, for whilst it appears that the attack on Manila secured two doubtful votes in the Senate for the ratification of the Treaty whereby the Philippines were bought from Spain, on the other hand, Aguinaldo may have felt it necessary to prove to America that the Philippines would fight rather than bow their necks to the Yankee yoke. So that both parties may have had an interest in beginning hostilities. In any case, the next day Aguinaldo offered to withdraw to a greater distance if an armistice was arranged, but Otis declared that “fighting must go on.”

Personally, I think that if a sympathetic and conciliatory attitude had been adopted, had the local government established been recognized, had Aguinaldo and his staff been given commissions in the Native Army or Civil Service, and the flower of the Tagal Army taken into the service of the United States, a peaceful settlement could have been made on the lines of a Protectorate.

I therefore look upon the war as unnecessary, and consider the lives already sacrificed, and that will have to be sacrificed, as absolutely thrown away.

The tragical side of American unpreparedness is manifest in the state of anarchy in which the whole Archipelago has been plunged by the American unreadiness to occupy the military posts as soon as they were vacated by the Spanish garrisons. A hideous orgy of murder, plunder, and slave-raiding has prevailed in Visayas, and especially in Mindanao.

Three conditions were essential to a peaceful settlement:—

First.—A broad-minded and sympathetic representative of America, fully authorized to treat, and a lover of peace.

Second.—A strict discipline amongst the American forces.

Third.—The principal aim and object of the Tagal insurrection must be secured.

General Otis does not seem to me to fulfil the first condition, he lacked prestige and patience, and he showed that he had an insufficient conception of the magnitude of his task by occupying himself with petty details of all kinds and by displaying an ill-timed parsimony. Apparently he had no power to grant anything at all, and only dealt invague generalities which the Tagals could not be expected to accept.

As regards the second point, I regret that I am not personally acquainted with the gentlemen from Nebraska, Colorado, Dakota and other states serving in the United States Army or volunteers. I have no doubt that they are good fighting-men, but from all I can hear about them they are not conspicuous for strict military discipline, and too many of them have erroneous ideas as to the most suitable drink for a tropical climate.

Manila was in the time of the Spaniards a most temperate city; a drunken man was a very rare sight, and would usually be a foreign sailor. Since the American occupation, some hundreds of drinking saloons have been opened, and daily scenes of drunkenness and debauchery have filled the quiet natives with alarm and horror. When John L. Motley wrote his scathing denunciation of the army which the great Duke of Alva led from Spain into the Low Countries, “to enforce the high religious purposes of Philip II.,”not foresee that his words would be applicable to an American Army sent to subjugate men struggling to be free “for their welfare, not our gain,” nor that this army, besides bringing in its train a flood of cosmopolitan harlotry,2would be allowed by its commander to inaugurate amongst a strictly temperate people a mad saturnalia of drunkenness that has scarcely a parallel.

Such, however, is undoubtedly the case, and I venture to think that these occurrences have confirmed many of the Tagals in their resolve rather to die fighting for their independence than to be ruled over by such as these.

More important still was it to take care that the Tagal insurrection should not have been in vain. That rebellion probably cost fifty thousand human lives, immense loss of property, and untold misery. It was fought against the friars and was at last triumphant. The Spanish friars had been expelled and their lands confiscated. Were the Americans to bring them back and guarantee them in peaceable possession, once more riveting on the chain the Tagals had torn off?

This seems to have been General Otis’ intention. I think he might have stood upon the accomplished fact. But he did not.

The Treaty of Peace under Article VIII. declares that the cession cannot in any respect impair the rights of ecclesiastical bodies to acquire and possess property, whilst Article IX. allows Spanish subjects to remain in the Islands, to sell or dispose of their property and to carry on their professions. Presumably General Otis felt bound by the Treaty in which these general stipulations had been embodied by the Peace Commission, in direct contradiction to the advice given them by Mr. Foreman (see p. 463, 55th Congress, 3rd Sess., Doc. No. 62, part 1), who pointed out the necessity of confiscating these lands, but Mr. Gray replied: “We have no law which will allow us to arbitrarily do so.”

As soon as the effect of the treaty was known, Archbishop Nozaleda, who had fled to China from the vengeance he feared, returned to Manila. He seemed to have a good deal of interest with General Otis, and this did not please the natives, nor inspire them with confidence.

Furthermore, it was reported and generally believed that the friars’ vast estates had been purchased by an American Syndicate who would in due time take possession and exploit them.

One can understand the Tagals’ grief and desperation; all their blood and tears shed in vain! The friars triumphant after all!

I do not wish to trace the particulars of the wretched war that commenced February, 1899, and is still (October, 1900) proceeding.

In it the Americans do not seem to have displayed the resourcefulness andadaptabilityone would have expected from them. For my part, I expected a great deal, for so many American generals being selected from men in the active exercise of a profession, or perhaps controlling the administration of some vast business, they ought naturally to have developed their faculties, by constant use, to a far greater degree than men who have vegetated in the futile routine of a barrack or military station. They prevailed in every encounter, but their advance was very slow, and their troops suffered many preventible hardships. We know very little as to what happened, for the censors, acting under instructions from General Otis, prevented the transmissionof accurate information; nothing was cabled, except the accounts of victories gained by the American troops.

It would not be right, however, to pass over the fighting without rendering due tribute to the heroism of the American officers and soldiers.

Who can forget Colonel Funston’s gallant exploit in crossing the Rio Grande on a raft under fire with two companies of Kansas Infantry and enfilading the Tagals’ position? Or his leading part of same regiment in a charge upon an enemy’s earthwork near Santo Tomás, where he was wounded?

What could be finer than the late Colonel Stotsenburg’s leading of the Nebraska regiment in the attack on Quíngua, where he was killed? And since we are speaking of brave men, shall we not remember the late General Antonio Luna and his gallant rally of his army in the advance from Macabébe, when he fearlessly exposed himself on horseback to the American fire, riding along the front of his line? To justify the slow progress of the army, jungles, forests, swamps and hills were introduced on the perfectly flat arable land such as that around Malolos, Calumpit, and San Fernando, extending in fact all the way from Manila to Tarlac.3This country supports a dense population, and almost every bit of it has been under the plough for centuries. The only hill is Arayat. During the dry season, say from November to May or June, the soil is baked quite hard, and vehicles or guns can traverse any part of it with slight assistance from the pioneers. The only obstacles are the small rivers and creeks, mostly fordable, and having clumps of bamboos growing on their banks providing a perfect material for temporary bridges or for making rafts.

The campaign was marked by an absence of co-operation between the land and sea forces. Admiral Dewey, apparently, was not pleased with the way things were managed, for he is said to have stayed on board his ship for months at a time. The warships remained at anchor in Manila Bay whilst arms4and ammunition were landed at the outposts or on the coasts without hindrance, and it was not till November that troops were landed at Dagupan,the northern terminus of the railway, though this obviously ought to have been done in February, so as to attack the enemy front and rear.

The necessity for small gunboats soon made itself felt, but such was the jealousy of the army towards the navy that it was decided that these must be army gunboats, and General Otis is reported to have purchased thirteen small gunboats at Zamboanga, in March 1899, without consulting or informing Admiral Dewey or even asking for an escort for them. It so happened that the Spaniards evacuated Zamboanga before any American forces arrived, and the insurgents promptly took possession of the gunboats already paid for and proceeded to plunder them of everything useful to them. A native account says that they took the gunboats up the Rio Grande into the interior, but this is denied by the Americans. Ultimately a cruiser was sent down to convoy the gunboats, and if I am correctly informed, they were commissioned in charge of junior naval officers.

Obviously, the services of the navy should have been utilised to the utmost extent, and advantage should have been taken of the prestige they had gained by the victory over the Spaniards, and of the great popularity and sympathetic personality of Admiral Dewey. A serious responsibility rests upon whoever allowed jealousy to prevent the co-operation of the land and sea forces, since by failing to secure this they needlessly sacrificed the lives of American soldiers and prolonged the war.

Lieut.-General Sir Andrew Clarke, R.E., a former governor of the Straits Settlements, and the greatest authority in England on the affairs of the Malay States and Islands, was good enough to write a letter which was forwarded to Mr. Day, and published in the Blue Book, p. 628.

He pointed out that, although a moderate military force might be desirable at one or two important centres, a naval force was of more value, especially gunboats able to move freely amongst the islands and ascend the many rivers and inlets of the sea.

Therefore to the fleet and its officers he advised that political and civil administration of the Philippines should, at least in the first instance, be entrusted. Sir Andrew believed, and I venture to say that I thoroughly agree with him, that amongst the officers of the United States navy,active and retired, can be found many men of wide experience, broad views, and generous sympathy well fitted to administer the affairs of the protectorate. Sir Andrew also advised, as Foreman did, and as I do, that the members of the Religious Orders,i.e., the Augustinians, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, and the Recollets, should be advised to return to Spain, receiving compensation for their property.

Sir Andrew Clarke summed up his advice as follows: “Enlist native sympathy by fairness and justice, and rule through native agents, supervised by carefully selected American residents.”

As the fleet, by destroying the Spanish squadron, had rendered it possible to bring troops by sea, and by capturing the arsenal and blockading the Port of Manila, had invigorated the insurrection, and in fact had brought about the cession of the islands by Spain, it would appear to outsiders that it and its officers had a strong claim to the leading part in completing the settlement and pacification of the Archipelago for which the best authorities considered them to possess special qualifications. Besides, if peace was really wanted, it would have been better to entrust the negotiations to the man who had had his fight rather than to one looking for his chance. The craze for military renown is nowhere more rampant than in the United States. Occasions are few and far between, and we must not expect generals to throw them away and fly in the face of Providence.

This, however, did not commend itself to those who pull the strings; we ignore the reasons, but we see the result. Perhaps it was thought that to allow Dewey to add to his victor’s laurel wreath the palm of the pacificator would be too much honour for one man, and might raise him to an inconvenient height in the estimation of his fellow citizens.

A year and twenty days after his decisive victory Admiral Dewey sailed from Manila in his flagship. Wherever the British ensign flew he was received with every demonstration of honour and respect both by naval and military officers and by civilians. His reception in New York was marked by an almost delirious enthusiasm. But long before he arrived, Mr. Whitelaw Reid, disgusted with the conduct of the campaign, made a speech at the Miami University and denounced the President for neglect of duty which brought on the war in the Philippines.

He said: “If the bitterest enemy of the United States had sought to bring upon it in that quarter the greatest trouble in the shortest time, he could have devised for that end no policy more successful than the one we have already pursued.” It must be added that Mr. Whitelaw Reid, perhaps to prevent being accused of having sympathy with the enemy, denounced Aguinaldo and the Tagals as rebels, savages and treacherous barbarians, unfit for citizenship or self-government, and declared that the Philippines belong to America by right of conquest.

I suppose Mr. Whitelaw Reid, or perhaps any citizen of the United States, has a right to denounce his own President, and certainly the management of the Philippine annexation has been bad from the beginning.

But I think Mr. McKinley was badly served by the Peace Commission. They seem to me to have made many and egregious mistakes.

1. They took General Merritt’s opinion that the Tagals would submit, and accepted Mr. Foreman’s assurance of Tagal plasticity and accommodating nature.

2. They disregarded the intimation of D. Felipe Agoncillo, the accredited agent of the Tagals, that these would accept no settlement to which they were not parties.

3. They treated several millions of civilised Christian people like a herd of cattle to be purchased with the ranch.

4. Under Article VIII., they guaranteed the religious orders the possession of estates already taken from them.

5. Under Article IX., they gave the expelled friars the right to return and exercise their profession.

To illustrate their careless procedure, I may add that they did not even accurately determine the boundaries of the Archipelago to be ceded, and now, in August 1900, $100,000 is to be paid to Spain for Sibutu and CagayanSuluIslands, left out by mistake. If any man has a right to say, “Save me from my friends,” that man is William McKinley.

As regards Aguinaldo and the Tagals, I think that Mr. Whitelaw Reid’s irritation at their protracted resistance has led him on too far. I prefer the opinion of Senator Hoar, who, speaking in the Senate of three proclamations of Aguinaldo, said: “Mr. President, these are three of the greatest state papers in all history. If they were found in our own history of our own revolutionary time we shouldbe proud to have them stand by the side of those great state papers which Chatham declared were equal to the masterpieces of antiquity.”

In the same speech he says, and I commend his words to the reader’s attention: “Mr. President, there is one mode by which the people of the Philippine Islands could establish the truth of the charges as to their degradation and incapacity for self-government which have been made by the advocates of Imperialism in this debate, and that mode is by submitting tamely and without resistance to the dominion of the United States.”

Mr. Whitelaw Reid, however, was perfectly right in one thing. The Philippines belong (or will belong) to America by right of conquest. On August 28th, 1899, Mr. McKinley addressed the 10th Pennsylvania Regiment at Pittsburgh soon after their arrival from Manila. He said: “The insurgents struck the first blow. They reciprocated our kindness with cruelty, our mercy5with Mausers.... They assailed our sovereignty, and there will be no useless parley until the insurrection is suppressed and American authority acknowledged and established. The Philippines are ours as much as Louisiana, by purchase, or Texas, or Alaska.” Here we get down to the bed rock, and discard all flimsy pretences. The Americans have undertaken a war of conquest, they bought it in fact, but I fear they are not happy either about its material progress or its moral aspect. We shall have to wait till November to see what they think about it.

But whenever the cost in lost lives, ruined health, and shattered minds, to say nothing of dollars, comes to be known, there will be a great outcry in America.

Mr. McKinley and his advisers are much to be pitied, for they were misled by the information given them by those they relied on.

The False Prophets of the Philippines.Here is an extract from General Merritt’s evidence taken from the Blue Book, fifty-sixth congress, third session, document No. 62, partI, p. 367:Mr. Reid: Do you think any danger of conflict is now reasonably remote?General Merritt: I think there is no danger of conflict as long as these people think the United States is going to take possession there. If they imagine or hear from any source that the Spaniards are to be reinstated there, I think they will be very violent.Mr. Davis: Suppose the United States, by virtue of a treaty with Spain, should take Luzon ... paying no attention to the insurgents—how would that be taken by Aguinaldo?General Merritt: I think Aguinaldo and his immediate following would resist it; but whether he could resist to any extent I do not know, because his forces are divided. I believe that, as matters go, Aguinaldo will lose more or less of his power there.The Chairman: If the United States should say, We will take this country and govern it our own way, do you think they would submit to it?General Merritt: Yes, sir.Mr. Davis: How many troops in your opinion will be necessary to administer the government of this island—to secure the administration of our government there?General Merritt: From 20,000 to 25,000 would be requisite at first.I admire the conviction of this distinguished officer that the benefits of American rule would be highly appreciated by the Tagals, of whom, by-the-bye, he knew next to nothing, having only been a few weeks in Manila amongst sycophantic Mestizo-Americanistas.That interesting people were, however, of a different opinion. On p. 4582 of the ‘Congressional Record,’ I find that Señor Mabini, in a manifesto published at San Isidro, April 15th, 1899, states that “race hatred is much morecruel and pitilessamong the Anglo-Saxons” (he is comparing them with the Spaniards). Again he says, “Annexation, in whatever form it may be adopted, will unite us for ever to a nation whose manners and customs are different from our own, a nation whichhates the coloured race with a mortal hatred, and from which we could never separate ourselves except by war.” The outbreaks against the negroes that have recently happened [August, 1900] in New Orleans, Liberty City, Georgia, and in New York, seem to justify Señor Mabini’s remarks.Don Macario Adriatico, in an answer to a message of General Miller, writing from Jaro, January 3rd, 1900, says: “It could easily be conceived that the Philippines would not suffer a new reign, least ofall of a nation on whose conscience the curse of the Redskins rests as a heavy load.”In other documents they refer to the probable action of the Trusts, and anticipate that, what with the Sugar Trust, the Tobacco Trust, and the Hemp Trust, they would soonfind themselves reduced to the condition of porters and workmen, or even of domestic servants.They seem to have an intelligent anticipation of what will probably befall them when conquered, and hence their desperate resistance to a large American army.But let us now turn up the evidence of another expert on the Philippines, Mr. John Foreman, who also ventured to prophesy what the Tagals would do (Blue Book, before mentioned, p. 443).Mr. Foreman(answering Mr. Day): “The Tagals are of a very plastic nature, willing in their nature (sic), I should say, to accommodate themselves and take up any new established dominion which might be decided upon, and I think they would fall into any new system adopted.“The inhabitants of the Central Islands or Visayas are more uncouth, decidedly less hospitable, and somewhat more averse to associations and relations with outsiders than the Tagals, but I think they would easily come under sway. They want a little more pressure and would have to be guided, more closely watched, and perhaps a little more of the iron hand used than in Luzon.”Thus was the administration in Washington misled, and it is probable that the American military chiefs reported that they could easily overcome all opposition, so they were allowed to try.Yet in June, 1900, we read, “The recall of General Otis is taken to mean that the administration considers the war to be at an end, and that there is no longer any necessity for military rule.”General McArthur is appointed to the command, however, and the first thing he does is to cable to Washington for more troops, whilst Admiral Remey asks for an extra battalion of marines. These are to be sent, also at least three regiments of infantry. Sixty-five thousand men and forty ships of war are now admitted to be the proper garrison to hold down the Philippines.However necessary reinforcements may be, so deep is the racial antipathy between the United States’ soldiers, white or black, and the natives, that every additional man sent out is a source of disaffection, and even exasperation. Not only will the volunteers become demoralised and diseased in mind and body by their sojourn in America’s new possession, but the very fact of their presence renders the pacification of the country more difficult. The more troops are kept there, the more discontented the natives will be.To bring this chapter up to date, the position seems to be as follows: There is a recrudescence of activity amongst the insurgents; fighting is going on over a great part of the Archipelago, the American troops are harassed and overworked, sickness is rife, including the bubonic plague; yet, notwithstanding all this, the Taft Commission has taken over the administration of the islands from September 1st.The date fixed is not a convenient one for the Commission, as it is in the middle of the rainy season, but it has probably been selected to suit the presidential campaign in America.Aguinaldo has issued a proclamation warning the Filipinos against the Taft Commission, which, he says, has no authority from Congress; does not represent the sentiments of the American people, and is simply the personal instrument of Mr. McKinley sent out to make promises which it has no power to keep, and which the United States Government will not be bound to observe. He denounces the Americanistas, and threatens condign punishment to all who accept offices under the Commission. It would appear that a settlement on present lines is still some way off.Judge Taft seems to have inherited the cheerful optimism of General Otis. On September 1st he reported that the insurrection is virtually ended, and on 20th forwarded another favourable report. On 21st, General McArthur cabled accounts of engagements in several provinces of Luzon. The American troops at Pekin are being hurried to Manila, as the reinforcement of General McArthur is absolutely imperative.

The False Prophets of the Philippines.

Here is an extract from General Merritt’s evidence taken from the Blue Book, fifty-sixth congress, third session, document No. 62, partI, p. 367:Mr. Reid: Do you think any danger of conflict is now reasonably remote?General Merritt: I think there is no danger of conflict as long as these people think the United States is going to take possession there. If they imagine or hear from any source that the Spaniards are to be reinstated there, I think they will be very violent.Mr. Davis: Suppose the United States, by virtue of a treaty with Spain, should take Luzon ... paying no attention to the insurgents—how would that be taken by Aguinaldo?General Merritt: I think Aguinaldo and his immediate following would resist it; but whether he could resist to any extent I do not know, because his forces are divided. I believe that, as matters go, Aguinaldo will lose more or less of his power there.The Chairman: If the United States should say, We will take this country and govern it our own way, do you think they would submit to it?General Merritt: Yes, sir.Mr. Davis: How many troops in your opinion will be necessary to administer the government of this island—to secure the administration of our government there?General Merritt: From 20,000 to 25,000 would be requisite at first.I admire the conviction of this distinguished officer that the benefits of American rule would be highly appreciated by the Tagals, of whom, by-the-bye, he knew next to nothing, having only been a few weeks in Manila amongst sycophantic Mestizo-Americanistas.That interesting people were, however, of a different opinion. On p. 4582 of the ‘Congressional Record,’ I find that Señor Mabini, in a manifesto published at San Isidro, April 15th, 1899, states that “race hatred is much morecruel and pitilessamong the Anglo-Saxons” (he is comparing them with the Spaniards). Again he says, “Annexation, in whatever form it may be adopted, will unite us for ever to a nation whose manners and customs are different from our own, a nation whichhates the coloured race with a mortal hatred, and from which we could never separate ourselves except by war.” The outbreaks against the negroes that have recently happened [August, 1900] in New Orleans, Liberty City, Georgia, and in New York, seem to justify Señor Mabini’s remarks.Don Macario Adriatico, in an answer to a message of General Miller, writing from Jaro, January 3rd, 1900, says: “It could easily be conceived that the Philippines would not suffer a new reign, least ofall of a nation on whose conscience the curse of the Redskins rests as a heavy load.”In other documents they refer to the probable action of the Trusts, and anticipate that, what with the Sugar Trust, the Tobacco Trust, and the Hemp Trust, they would soonfind themselves reduced to the condition of porters and workmen, or even of domestic servants.They seem to have an intelligent anticipation of what will probably befall them when conquered, and hence their desperate resistance to a large American army.But let us now turn up the evidence of another expert on the Philippines, Mr. John Foreman, who also ventured to prophesy what the Tagals would do (Blue Book, before mentioned, p. 443).Mr. Foreman(answering Mr. Day): “The Tagals are of a very plastic nature, willing in their nature (sic), I should say, to accommodate themselves and take up any new established dominion which might be decided upon, and I think they would fall into any new system adopted.“The inhabitants of the Central Islands or Visayas are more uncouth, decidedly less hospitable, and somewhat more averse to associations and relations with outsiders than the Tagals, but I think they would easily come under sway. They want a little more pressure and would have to be guided, more closely watched, and perhaps a little more of the iron hand used than in Luzon.”Thus was the administration in Washington misled, and it is probable that the American military chiefs reported that they could easily overcome all opposition, so they were allowed to try.Yet in June, 1900, we read, “The recall of General Otis is taken to mean that the administration considers the war to be at an end, and that there is no longer any necessity for military rule.”General McArthur is appointed to the command, however, and the first thing he does is to cable to Washington for more troops, whilst Admiral Remey asks for an extra battalion of marines. These are to be sent, also at least three regiments of infantry. Sixty-five thousand men and forty ships of war are now admitted to be the proper garrison to hold down the Philippines.However necessary reinforcements may be, so deep is the racial antipathy between the United States’ soldiers, white or black, and the natives, that every additional man sent out is a source of disaffection, and even exasperation. Not only will the volunteers become demoralised and diseased in mind and body by their sojourn in America’s new possession, but the very fact of their presence renders the pacification of the country more difficult. The more troops are kept there, the more discontented the natives will be.To bring this chapter up to date, the position seems to be as follows: There is a recrudescence of activity amongst the insurgents; fighting is going on over a great part of the Archipelago, the American troops are harassed and overworked, sickness is rife, including the bubonic plague; yet, notwithstanding all this, the Taft Commission has taken over the administration of the islands from September 1st.The date fixed is not a convenient one for the Commission, as it is in the middle of the rainy season, but it has probably been selected to suit the presidential campaign in America.Aguinaldo has issued a proclamation warning the Filipinos against the Taft Commission, which, he says, has no authority from Congress; does not represent the sentiments of the American people, and is simply the personal instrument of Mr. McKinley sent out to make promises which it has no power to keep, and which the United States Government will not be bound to observe. He denounces the Americanistas, and threatens condign punishment to all who accept offices under the Commission. It would appear that a settlement on present lines is still some way off.Judge Taft seems to have inherited the cheerful optimism of General Otis. On September 1st he reported that the insurrection is virtually ended, and on 20th forwarded another favourable report. On 21st, General McArthur cabled accounts of engagements in several provinces of Luzon. The American troops at Pekin are being hurried to Manila, as the reinforcement of General McArthur is absolutely imperative.

Here is an extract from General Merritt’s evidence taken from the Blue Book, fifty-sixth congress, third session, document No. 62, partI, p. 367:

Mr. Reid: Do you think any danger of conflict is now reasonably remote?General Merritt: I think there is no danger of conflict as long as these people think the United States is going to take possession there. If they imagine or hear from any source that the Spaniards are to be reinstated there, I think they will be very violent.Mr. Davis: Suppose the United States, by virtue of a treaty with Spain, should take Luzon ... paying no attention to the insurgents—how would that be taken by Aguinaldo?General Merritt: I think Aguinaldo and his immediate following would resist it; but whether he could resist to any extent I do not know, because his forces are divided. I believe that, as matters go, Aguinaldo will lose more or less of his power there.The Chairman: If the United States should say, We will take this country and govern it our own way, do you think they would submit to it?General Merritt: Yes, sir.Mr. Davis: How many troops in your opinion will be necessary to administer the government of this island—to secure the administration of our government there?General Merritt: From 20,000 to 25,000 would be requisite at first.

Mr. Reid: Do you think any danger of conflict is now reasonably remote?

General Merritt: I think there is no danger of conflict as long as these people think the United States is going to take possession there. If they imagine or hear from any source that the Spaniards are to be reinstated there, I think they will be very violent.

Mr. Davis: Suppose the United States, by virtue of a treaty with Spain, should take Luzon ... paying no attention to the insurgents—how would that be taken by Aguinaldo?

General Merritt: I think Aguinaldo and his immediate following would resist it; but whether he could resist to any extent I do not know, because his forces are divided. I believe that, as matters go, Aguinaldo will lose more or less of his power there.

The Chairman: If the United States should say, We will take this country and govern it our own way, do you think they would submit to it?

General Merritt: Yes, sir.

Mr. Davis: How many troops in your opinion will be necessary to administer the government of this island—to secure the administration of our government there?

General Merritt: From 20,000 to 25,000 would be requisite at first.

I admire the conviction of this distinguished officer that the benefits of American rule would be highly appreciated by the Tagals, of whom, by-the-bye, he knew next to nothing, having only been a few weeks in Manila amongst sycophantic Mestizo-Americanistas.

That interesting people were, however, of a different opinion. On p. 4582 of the ‘Congressional Record,’ I find that Señor Mabini, in a manifesto published at San Isidro, April 15th, 1899, states that “race hatred is much morecruel and pitilessamong the Anglo-Saxons” (he is comparing them with the Spaniards). Again he says, “Annexation, in whatever form it may be adopted, will unite us for ever to a nation whose manners and customs are different from our own, a nation whichhates the coloured race with a mortal hatred, and from which we could never separate ourselves except by war.” The outbreaks against the negroes that have recently happened [August, 1900] in New Orleans, Liberty City, Georgia, and in New York, seem to justify Señor Mabini’s remarks.

Don Macario Adriatico, in an answer to a message of General Miller, writing from Jaro, January 3rd, 1900, says: “It could easily be conceived that the Philippines would not suffer a new reign, least ofall of a nation on whose conscience the curse of the Redskins rests as a heavy load.”

In other documents they refer to the probable action of the Trusts, and anticipate that, what with the Sugar Trust, the Tobacco Trust, and the Hemp Trust, they would soonfind themselves reduced to the condition of porters and workmen, or even of domestic servants.

They seem to have an intelligent anticipation of what will probably befall them when conquered, and hence their desperate resistance to a large American army.

But let us now turn up the evidence of another expert on the Philippines, Mr. John Foreman, who also ventured to prophesy what the Tagals would do (Blue Book, before mentioned, p. 443).

Mr. Foreman(answering Mr. Day): “The Tagals are of a very plastic nature, willing in their nature (sic), I should say, to accommodate themselves and take up any new established dominion which might be decided upon, and I think they would fall into any new system adopted.“The inhabitants of the Central Islands or Visayas are more uncouth, decidedly less hospitable, and somewhat more averse to associations and relations with outsiders than the Tagals, but I think they would easily come under sway. They want a little more pressure and would have to be guided, more closely watched, and perhaps a little more of the iron hand used than in Luzon.”

Mr. Foreman(answering Mr. Day): “The Tagals are of a very plastic nature, willing in their nature (sic), I should say, to accommodate themselves and take up any new established dominion which might be decided upon, and I think they would fall into any new system adopted.

“The inhabitants of the Central Islands or Visayas are more uncouth, decidedly less hospitable, and somewhat more averse to associations and relations with outsiders than the Tagals, but I think they would easily come under sway. They want a little more pressure and would have to be guided, more closely watched, and perhaps a little more of the iron hand used than in Luzon.”

Thus was the administration in Washington misled, and it is probable that the American military chiefs reported that they could easily overcome all opposition, so they were allowed to try.

Yet in June, 1900, we read, “The recall of General Otis is taken to mean that the administration considers the war to be at an end, and that there is no longer any necessity for military rule.”

General McArthur is appointed to the command, however, and the first thing he does is to cable to Washington for more troops, whilst Admiral Remey asks for an extra battalion of marines. These are to be sent, also at least three regiments of infantry. Sixty-five thousand men and forty ships of war are now admitted to be the proper garrison to hold down the Philippines.

However necessary reinforcements may be, so deep is the racial antipathy between the United States’ soldiers, white or black, and the natives, that every additional man sent out is a source of disaffection, and even exasperation. Not only will the volunteers become demoralised and diseased in mind and body by their sojourn in America’s new possession, but the very fact of their presence renders the pacification of the country more difficult. The more troops are kept there, the more discontented the natives will be.

To bring this chapter up to date, the position seems to be as follows: There is a recrudescence of activity amongst the insurgents; fighting is going on over a great part of the Archipelago, the American troops are harassed and overworked, sickness is rife, including the bubonic plague; yet, notwithstanding all this, the Taft Commission has taken over the administration of the islands from September 1st.

The date fixed is not a convenient one for the Commission, as it is in the middle of the rainy season, but it has probably been selected to suit the presidential campaign in America.

Aguinaldo has issued a proclamation warning the Filipinos against the Taft Commission, which, he says, has no authority from Congress; does not represent the sentiments of the American people, and is simply the personal instrument of Mr. McKinley sent out to make promises which it has no power to keep, and which the United States Government will not be bound to observe. He denounces the Americanistas, and threatens condign punishment to all who accept offices under the Commission. It would appear that a settlement on present lines is still some way off.

Judge Taft seems to have inherited the cheerful optimism of General Otis. On September 1st he reported that the insurrection is virtually ended, and on 20th forwarded another favourable report. On 21st, General McArthur cabled accounts of engagements in several provinces of Luzon. The American troops at Pekin are being hurried to Manila, as the reinforcement of General McArthur is absolutely imperative.

1Report published inOutlook, September 1st and 21st, 1899.2The Abbé de Brantôme, whose appreciative remarks upon the courtesans who accompanied the Army of the Duke of Alva are quoted by Motley in ‘The Rise of the Dutch Republic,’ would have been delighted to take up his favourite subject and chronicle the following of the American Army.3My remarks apply to the accounts published in theTimes.4May 11th, 1899,The New York Herald’scorrespondent at Manila reports that the insurgents have succeeded in landing ten machine guns on the island of Panay.5The kindness and mercy are not obvious.

1Report published inOutlook, September 1st and 21st, 1899.

2The Abbé de Brantôme, whose appreciative remarks upon the courtesans who accompanied the Army of the Duke of Alva are quoted by Motley in ‘The Rise of the Dutch Republic,’ would have been delighted to take up his favourite subject and chronicle the following of the American Army.

3My remarks apply to the accounts published in theTimes.

4May 11th, 1899,The New York Herald’scorrespondent at Manila reports that the insurgents have succeeded in landing ten machine guns on the island of Panay.

5The kindness and mercy are not obvious.

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