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FOOTNOTES:[1]New York, Appleton and Co.[2]Chicago, Griggs and Co., 1885.[3]Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, 1886.[4]Of these, Chapter III. is subdivided into two Parts, because of the disproportionate length of the division in the original to which it corresponds.[5]Preface to "Sordello."[6]"Endless duration makes good no better, nor white any whiter," is one of Aristotle's comments on Plato's "eternal" ideas, and is just, unless "eternal" conveys a difference of kind.[7]Whewell, I think, misinterprets Plato's language about astronomy in this sense. Plato is not decrying observation, but demanding a theoretical treatment of the laws of motion,—a remarkable anticipation of modern ideas.[8]"A Year with the Birds," by an Oxford Tutor.[9]See note above, p. xii.[10]The fusion of these meanings in the German "Geist" gives a force to his pleading which English cannot render. He appeals,e.g., triumphantly to "God is a Spirit,"i.e.not "a ghost" but "mind."[11]See Tennyson's "Higher Pantheism," especially the fine lines—"Speak to Him thou, for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet,Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet."[12]In Baumgarten's "Æsthetica," 1750. See Lotze's "Æsthetik in Deutschland," p. 4, and Scherer's "Hist. of German Literature," Engl. Transl., ii. 25.[13]Aus dem Geiste—allusion to "born of water and of the Spirit."[14]Not in the sense of fancying what you please, but in the technical sense of having separate existence; detached, so to speak, from the general background of things, not a mere concurrence of other elements.[15]Has no power of distinguishing itself from other things.[16]"Das Schöne—in dem Scheine."[17]"Gesetzmässigkeit."[18]"Raisonnement"—a disparaging term in Hegel.[19]"Particular"—different unconnected matters, considered as merely thrown together in an aggregate, or occurring in a series; opposed to parts or cases united by an essential principle.[20]"Das Göttliche."[21]"Schiene und erschiene."[22]The life in which we treat common circumstances and sensations as, in their degree, realities.[23]"Das An—und Fürsichseyende."[24]"Explication."[25]"Material,"e.g.colour, sound, heavy matter, etc.[26]"Element:" perhaps more especially any mental function entering into art—sense, imagination, understanding, etc.[27]"Philosophy," "Wissenschaft."[28]"Haltpunkte:" ultimate points that the matter of art must not leave hold of, leading ideas that must somehow dominate it.[29]"Gestaltung:" shaping, as if arrangement of shapes.[30]"Kunstkenntniss."[31]"Gelehrsamkeit."[32]"Paränetischen Lehren."[33]"Bildenden Künste." I am not sure if I have given the best rendering. It is wider thanPlastik, because it includes painting and architecture.[34]Die Horen—the monthly magazine whose establishment by Schiller, in 1795, first brought Schiller and Goethe into contact. It only existed for three years. See Scherer, Eng. Trans., ii. 173.[35]That is, not a caprice of nature or art, but the perfection of the objectafter its kind.[36]"Individualität."[37]"Helldunkel."[38]"Drama," Gr. δραμα =Handlung, "action."[39]"Erscheinung."[40]"Bestimmung."[41]"Bestimmend."[42]"Begeistet wird"—"Is spiritualized."[43]I have no doubt he means Shakespeare, who was unpopular in Germany before Goethe's time.Vide"Wilhelm Meister."[44]"Das Wahre sehen nicht die einzelnen," etc.[45]The exhibition of particulars as contained in the principle, and of the principle as contained in particulars.[46]"Machen."[47]"Nach-machen."[48]See Appendix to Eng. Trans. of Scherer, ii. 347. Goethe's "Götz von Berlichingen" appeared in 1773; Schiller's "Raüber" in 1781.[49]The "Iphigenie" was completed in Goethe's thirty-eighth year, fourteen years later than "Götz." The bulk of his great works are of the same date as the "Iphigenie," or later. See Scherer, ii. 152, and Appendix, 1. c. Schiller's "Wallenstein" was completed after his thirty-fifth year.[50]Free from irrelevancies.[51]i.e.it requires a definite or determinate answer, depending on a number of ideas which cannot be explained in an introduction.[52]i.e.considered generally, apart from the wishes and, perhaps, selfish aims of individual artists.[53]"Fursichsein."[54]Reality derivative from his own reality.[55]He means as in attitude, bearing, gentle movement, etc.[56]"Bildung."[57]"Bedurfniss zur Kunst."[58]i.e.you cannot describe it or picture it definitely, like a thing with attributes, although you feel it in yourself.[59]i.e.you may be afraid of anything; the fact that you are afraid does not in itself indicate what you are afraid of.[60]My private feeling is compared to a small circle, in which morality, justice, etc., maybe, but have not room to show their nature. Feeling allows of no definition.[61]Allits positive aspects or relations, age, phase, artist's history, etc.[62]Its sensuous aspect has no independent warrant or justification, as that, for example, of an animal has in its own separate life. So it must simply be such as is enough to appeal to man's mind,e.g.mere surface painting.[63]i.e.person.[64]Nothing can be tasted which is not dissolved in a liquid.[65]"Anschauungen."[66]Abstract forms, which are to reality as a diagram to a picture.[67]Lit. "figure,"Gestalt.[68]"Handgriffen."[69]"Eines geistreichen."[70]General, abstract, as much applicable to one thing as to another.[71]"Heuchelei," lit. "hypocrisy."[72]"Kunststück."[73]i.e.merecopying, devoting one's-self to the one-sided purpose of making a thing over again, without putting any life or meaning into it.[74]Which says that the business of art is to imitate.[75]Of imitation.[76]"Phantastischen." "Fantastic" means "odd or wild." Hegel only means "original," "creative."[77]Mechanical, without origination.[78]"Nüancen." Context seems to forbid referring it to colour. I suspect it of meaning character of outline.[79]"Erschüttern."[80]"Raisonnirende;" a term of disparagement in Hegel, applied to proofs,proandcon, which do not rest on a thorough conception of the fundamental nature of what is being discussed.[81]"Raisonnement."[82]"Formal" means here as usual, empty, or general;i.e.not taking account of varieties in the matter to which it is applied.[83]"Befangensein."[84]"Theoretisch." I have no doubt that it has here the meaning of Θεωρειν without a trace of allusion to "theory." It is opposed to "destructive," or "appetitive."[85]The moral.[86]Person,i.e., here, audience or spectator.[87]"Kernspruch."[88]"Contingent" means, not so much "what may or may not exist," as the trivial, which makes no difference whether it exists or not.[89]"In ihm selbst gebrochenes." I do not suppose there is an allusion to the words I use.[90]"Sittlichkeit" almost = morality in the English sense. It means the habit of virtue, without the reflective aspiration after goodness as an ideal.[91]"Moralität" almost = conscientiousness or scrupulosity. The above sentence is hardly true with the English word "moral."[92]"Für sich," is often used where there is no notion of development, and seems very like "an sich."[93]"Gemüth."[94]Ase.g.if we suppose that an act done at the bidding of natural affection cannot also be a fulfilment of the command of duty. The "reconciliation" would be in supposing the natural affection,e.g.for parents, to operate as a moral motive, being transformed by a recognition of its sacred or spiritual character.[95]"An und für sich."[96]"An und für sich Wahre."[97]"Allgemeine Bildung."[98]"Vorstellung."[99]See Pref. Essay, p. xix.[100]Or conscientiousness—what was above described as the moralistic view.[101]"An sich."[102]"An und für sich wahrem und wirklichem."[103]See p. 68,supra.[104]"Der mensch wie er geht und steht."[105]"An und für sich."[106]"Zweck-mässigkeit."[107]i.e.in any means which we adopt in order to effect an end which we have distinctly before us as an idea. A knife does not include cutting, nor a spade digging, although their construction is relative to these ends. But a man does include living,i.e.he is not a man if he ceases to live.[108]"Für sich."[109]"An und für sich."[110]By Kant.[111]"Unbefangenheit."[112]On Goethe's discoveries in morphology and errors in optics, see Helmholtz's "Popular Lectures," series i., lecture ii.; but compare Schopenhauer, "Werke," vol. i., "Ueber das Sehn und die Farben."[113]Compare Browning's "Luria:"—"A people is but the attempt of manyTo rise to the completer life of one."[114]Or "Of the moral, etc., man."[115]"Ueber Anmuth und Würde," "Of Grace and Dignity," a work of Schiller that appeared in 1793.[116]"Gesinnungen."[117]The Baccalaureus' speech in Faust (Part 2) "Die Welt, sie war nicht, eh' ich sie erschuf," etc., appears to be a parody of Fichte's ideas in this aspect.[118]I think the order of the German must be a misprint. "So ist nichts an und für sich und in sich selbst werthvoll betrachtet."[119]"An und für sich seyende."[120]The three points are, (i.) The I is abstract. (ii.) Everything is a semblance for it. (iii.) Its own acts, even, are a semblance.[121]Not literal. "Das alles an sich setzende und auflösende Ich."[122]Formalfreedom is detachment from everything, or the (apparent) capacity of alternatives; it is opposed torealfreedom, which is identification of one's-self with something that is capable of satisfying one.[123]"Genialität:" the character or state of mind in which genius is dominant—here, the mere self-enjoyment of genius.[124]"Selbstgenuss." I do not think it means self-indulgence, but the above-described enjoyment of reposing in the superiority of the ego.[125]"Eitelkeit," also = "conceit;" which is the other side of this attitude. Hegel uses it on purpose.[126]"Eitle."[127]"Sehnsuchtigkeit."[128]"Krankhafte Schönseligkeit."Schönseligkeitseems to be really a word formed likeRedselig, etc., but to be given an equivocating reference to "Schöne Seele," which I have rendered in the next sentence by "saintly soul."[129]"Eitlen," "Eitelkeit."[130]This recurring phrase may be used etymologically, as a reminiscence of the Platonic πληρουσθαι.[131]Haltung: "bearing" in general, and more especiallythebearing of one who bears himself nobly by reason of a principle.[132]See Scherer, Eng. Transl., ii. 248.[133]It is natural for a reader to ask inwhatperson or subject God is conceived to have reality. On this see below, p. 165. It appears certain to me that Hegel, when he writes thus, is referring to the self-consciousness of individual human beings as constituting, and reflecting on, an ideal unity between them. This may seem to put a non-natural meaning on the term "person" or "subject," as if the common element of a number of intelligences could be a single person. It is obvious that the question hinges on the degree in which a unity that is not sensuous but ideal can be effective and actual. I can only say here, that the more we consider the nature of ideal unity the higher we shall rate its capabilities. See Prefatory Essay, p. xiv.[134]Fackeldistel= "Torch thistle," a plant of the genusCereus, Nat. OrderCactaceæ.[135]Or "as spirit and in spirit."[136]The idea of art.[137]The two evolutions are, speaking roughly, (i.) that of the subject-matter; (ii.) that of the particular mode of art: (i.)e.g.you have Egyptian, Greek, Christian religion, etc., with the corresponding views and sentiments, each in its own relation to art; (ii.) you have, as a cross division to the former, the several arts—sculpture, music, poetry, etc., each having its special ground and warrant.[138]He is asking himself why sound or paint, etc., should correspond to one type of art as theoretically defined—this being intellectual, not sensuous, at root—and answers that these mediaquanatural objects have, though more latent than in works of art, an import and purpose of their own, which reveals itself in their suitability to particular forms of art.[139]"Gestaltungsformen." I use "plastic" all through in a pregnant sense, as one speaks of plastic fancy, etc.; meaning ideally determinate, and fit for translating into pictures, poetry, etc. These "plastic forms" are the various modifications of the subject-matter of art. See note, p. 139, above.[140]See note, p. 139, above.[141]See p. 134, above.[142]"Gestaltung." I do not think this means the process of shaping, but the shapes taken collectively.[143]i.e.not in a separate ideal shape devoted to it. He means that man takes a stock or stone as representation or symbol of the divine, and as there is no real connection between divinity and the stone, it may either be left untouched and unshaped, or be hewn into any bizarre or arbitrary shape that comes to hand: see next paragraph.[144]This description is probably directed, in the first place, to the Indian representation of deities, and would apply to those of many barbaric religions. But its truth may be very simply verified in daily observation of the first attempts of the uneducated at plastic presentation of their ideas, where costliness, ingenuity, labour, or size take the place of beauty.[145]"Sie als Inneres."[146]i.e.an idea or purpose which gives these partial and defective representations all the meaning they have, although they are incapable of really expressing it.[147]"Gährung," lit. "fermentation."[148]"Der ursprüngliche Begriff," lit. "the original notion."[149]i.e.God or the Universeinventedman to be the expression of mind; artfindshim, and adapts his shape to the artistic embodiment of mind as concentrated in individual instances.[150]Because it represents the soul as independent of an appropriate body—the human soul as capable of existing in a beast's body.[151]"Geistigkeit." "The nature of thought, mind, or spirit." It cannot be here rendered by mind or spirit, because these words make us think of an isolated individual, a mind or soul, and neglect the common spiritual or intellectual nature, which is referred to by the author.[152]It is the essence of mind or thought not to have its parts outside one another. The so-called terms of a judgment are a good instance of parts in thought which are inward to each other.[153]Compare Browning's "Old Pictures in Florence."[154]i.e.in the form of feeling and imagination—not reflected upon.[155]Subject,i.e.conscious individual person.[156]"Innerlichkeit," lit. "inwardness."[157]Taken, considered as or determined to be negative.[158]"Inward," again, does not mean merely inside our heads, but having the character of spirit in that its parts are not external to one another. A judgment is thus "inward."[159]i.e.does not keep up a distinction between percipient and object, as between things in space. Goodness, nobleness, etc., are not felt to be other than or outside the mind.[160]The romantic.[161]i.e.species, modifications naturally arising out of a principle.[162]Thuse.g.Sculpture istheart which correspondspar excellenceto the general type called Classical Art; but there isaSymbolic kind of sculpture, and I supposeaRomantic or modern kind of sculpture, although neither of these types are exactly fitted to the capabilities of Sculpture.[163]Architecture as relative to the purposes of life and of religion. See below, p. 162.[164]"Die schöne Architectur."[165]In the sense "self-complete," "not primarily regarded as explained by anything outside," like a machine or an animal contrasted with a wheel or a limb, which latter are finite, because they demand explanation and supplementation from without,i.e.necessarily draw attention to their own limit.[166]i.e.shape taken simply as an object filling space.[167]The terms used in the text explain themselves if we compare,e.g., a Teniers with a Greek statue, or again, say, a Turner with the same. "Subjectivity" means that the work of art appeals to our ordinary feelings, experiences, etc. Music and poetry are still stronger cases than painting, according to the theory. Poetry especially can deal witheverything.[168]The unity of the individuals forming a church or nation is not visible, but exists in common sentiments, purposes, etc., and in the recognition of their community.[169]An expression constantly applied to consciousness, because it can look at itself.Cf.:—"'Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face?''No, Cassius; for the eye sees not itselfBut by reflection, by some other things.'"Julius Cæsar.[170]Posited or laid down to be ideal; almost = pronounced or madeto bein the sense ofnot being; e.g. musical sound is "ideal" as existing,quawork of art, in memory only, the moment in which it is actually heard being fugitive; a picture, in respect of the third dimension, which has to be read into it; and poetry is almost wholly ideal,i.e.uses hardly any sensuous element, but appeals almost entirely to what existsin the mind. "Subdivided," "besondert," like "particularisirt" above; because of the variety and diversity present in the mere material of colours, musical sounds, and ideas.[171]Again, the subject of a Turner or Teniers is not objectively universal, in the simplest sense; not something that is actually and literally the same everywhere and for every one. And both painting and music (immediately sensuous elements) are less completely amalgamated with the ideal, represent it less solidly and thoroughly than the statue, so far as the ideal is itself external or plastic.[172]The greater affinity of Romantic art with the movement and variety of the modern spirit displays itself not only in the greater flexibility of painting, music, or poetry, as compared with architecture and sculpture, but in the fact that the Romantic type contains these three arts at least, while the Symbolic and Classical types had only one art each.[173]This is drawn from Goethe's doctrine of colour, which Hegel unfortunately adopted in opposition to Newton's theory.[174]He means landscape, principally.[175]"Aufheben," used pregnantly by Hegel to meanboth"cancel," "annul,"and, "preserve," "fix in mind," "idealize." The use of this word is a cardinal point of his dialectic. See "Wiss. der Logik.," i. 104. I know of no equivalent but "put by," provincial Scotch "put past." The negation of space is an attribute of music. The parts of a chord are no more in space than are the parts of a judgment. Hegel expresses this by saying that music idealizes space and concentrates it into a point.[176]The parts of space, though external to each other, are not distinguished by qualitative peculiarities.[177]"Aufheben."[178]"Ideality of matter:" the distinctively material attribute of a sonorous body, its extension, only appears in its sound indirectly, or inferentially, by modifying the nature of the sound. It is, therefore, "idealized."[179]Succession in time is a degree more "ideal" than co-existence in space, because it exists solely in the medium of memory.[180]"Seele:" mind on its individual side, as a particular feeling subject. "Geist" is rather mind as the common nature of intelligence. Thus in feeling and self-feeling, mind is said to concentrate itself into a soul.[181]Hegel seems to accept this view. Was he insensible to sound in poetry? Some very grotesque verses of his, preserved in his biography, go to show that his ear was not sensitive. Yet his critical estimate of poetry is usually just. Shakespeare and Sophocles were probably his favourites. And, as a matter of proportion, what he here says is true. It must be remembered that the beauty of sound in poetry is to a great extent indirect, being supplied by the passion or emotion which the ideas symbolized by the sounds arouse. The beauty of poetical sound in itselfisvery likely less than often supposed. It must have the capacity for receiving passionate expression; but that is not the same as the sensuous beauty of a note or a colour. If the words used in a noble poem were divested of all meaning, they would lose much, though not all, of the beauty of their sound.[182]"Stages or elements." "Momente," Hegel's technical phrase for the stages which form the essential parts or factors of any idea. They make their appearance successively, but the earlier are implied and retained in the later.[183]Adequate, and so of permanent value.
[1]New York, Appleton and Co.[2]Chicago, Griggs and Co., 1885.[3]Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, 1886.[4]Of these, Chapter III. is subdivided into two Parts, because of the disproportionate length of the division in the original to which it corresponds.[5]Preface to "Sordello."[6]"Endless duration makes good no better, nor white any whiter," is one of Aristotle's comments on Plato's "eternal" ideas, and is just, unless "eternal" conveys a difference of kind.[7]Whewell, I think, misinterprets Plato's language about astronomy in this sense. Plato is not decrying observation, but demanding a theoretical treatment of the laws of motion,—a remarkable anticipation of modern ideas.[8]"A Year with the Birds," by an Oxford Tutor.[9]See note above, p. xii.[10]The fusion of these meanings in the German "Geist" gives a force to his pleading which English cannot render. He appeals,e.g., triumphantly to "God is a Spirit,"i.e.not "a ghost" but "mind."[11]See Tennyson's "Higher Pantheism," especially the fine lines—"Speak to Him thou, for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet,Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet."[12]In Baumgarten's "Æsthetica," 1750. See Lotze's "Æsthetik in Deutschland," p. 4, and Scherer's "Hist. of German Literature," Engl. Transl., ii. 25.[13]Aus dem Geiste—allusion to "born of water and of the Spirit."[14]Not in the sense of fancying what you please, but in the technical sense of having separate existence; detached, so to speak, from the general background of things, not a mere concurrence of other elements.[15]Has no power of distinguishing itself from other things.[16]"Das Schöne—in dem Scheine."[17]"Gesetzmässigkeit."[18]"Raisonnement"—a disparaging term in Hegel.[19]"Particular"—different unconnected matters, considered as merely thrown together in an aggregate, or occurring in a series; opposed to parts or cases united by an essential principle.[20]"Das Göttliche."[21]"Schiene und erschiene."[22]The life in which we treat common circumstances and sensations as, in their degree, realities.[23]"Das An—und Fürsichseyende."[24]"Explication."[25]"Material,"e.g.colour, sound, heavy matter, etc.[26]"Element:" perhaps more especially any mental function entering into art—sense, imagination, understanding, etc.[27]"Philosophy," "Wissenschaft."[28]"Haltpunkte:" ultimate points that the matter of art must not leave hold of, leading ideas that must somehow dominate it.[29]"Gestaltung:" shaping, as if arrangement of shapes.[30]"Kunstkenntniss."[31]"Gelehrsamkeit."[32]"Paränetischen Lehren."[33]"Bildenden Künste." I am not sure if I have given the best rendering. It is wider thanPlastik, because it includes painting and architecture.[34]Die Horen—the monthly magazine whose establishment by Schiller, in 1795, first brought Schiller and Goethe into contact. It only existed for three years. See Scherer, Eng. Trans., ii. 173.[35]That is, not a caprice of nature or art, but the perfection of the objectafter its kind.[36]"Individualität."[37]"Helldunkel."[38]"Drama," Gr. δραμα =Handlung, "action."[39]"Erscheinung."[40]"Bestimmung."[41]"Bestimmend."[42]"Begeistet wird"—"Is spiritualized."[43]I have no doubt he means Shakespeare, who was unpopular in Germany before Goethe's time.Vide"Wilhelm Meister."[44]"Das Wahre sehen nicht die einzelnen," etc.[45]The exhibition of particulars as contained in the principle, and of the principle as contained in particulars.[46]"Machen."[47]"Nach-machen."[48]See Appendix to Eng. Trans. of Scherer, ii. 347. Goethe's "Götz von Berlichingen" appeared in 1773; Schiller's "Raüber" in 1781.[49]The "Iphigenie" was completed in Goethe's thirty-eighth year, fourteen years later than "Götz." The bulk of his great works are of the same date as the "Iphigenie," or later. See Scherer, ii. 152, and Appendix, 1. c. Schiller's "Wallenstein" was completed after his thirty-fifth year.[50]Free from irrelevancies.[51]i.e.it requires a definite or determinate answer, depending on a number of ideas which cannot be explained in an introduction.[52]i.e.considered generally, apart from the wishes and, perhaps, selfish aims of individual artists.[53]"Fursichsein."[54]Reality derivative from his own reality.[55]He means as in attitude, bearing, gentle movement, etc.[56]"Bildung."[57]"Bedurfniss zur Kunst."[58]i.e.you cannot describe it or picture it definitely, like a thing with attributes, although you feel it in yourself.[59]i.e.you may be afraid of anything; the fact that you are afraid does not in itself indicate what you are afraid of.[60]My private feeling is compared to a small circle, in which morality, justice, etc., maybe, but have not room to show their nature. Feeling allows of no definition.[61]Allits positive aspects or relations, age, phase, artist's history, etc.[62]Its sensuous aspect has no independent warrant or justification, as that, for example, of an animal has in its own separate life. So it must simply be such as is enough to appeal to man's mind,e.g.mere surface painting.[63]i.e.person.[64]Nothing can be tasted which is not dissolved in a liquid.[65]"Anschauungen."[66]Abstract forms, which are to reality as a diagram to a picture.[67]Lit. "figure,"Gestalt.[68]"Handgriffen."[69]"Eines geistreichen."[70]General, abstract, as much applicable to one thing as to another.[71]"Heuchelei," lit. "hypocrisy."[72]"Kunststück."[73]i.e.merecopying, devoting one's-self to the one-sided purpose of making a thing over again, without putting any life or meaning into it.[74]Which says that the business of art is to imitate.[75]Of imitation.[76]"Phantastischen." "Fantastic" means "odd or wild." Hegel only means "original," "creative."[77]Mechanical, without origination.[78]"Nüancen." Context seems to forbid referring it to colour. I suspect it of meaning character of outline.[79]"Erschüttern."[80]"Raisonnirende;" a term of disparagement in Hegel, applied to proofs,proandcon, which do not rest on a thorough conception of the fundamental nature of what is being discussed.[81]"Raisonnement."[82]"Formal" means here as usual, empty, or general;i.e.not taking account of varieties in the matter to which it is applied.[83]"Befangensein."[84]"Theoretisch." I have no doubt that it has here the meaning of Θεωρειν without a trace of allusion to "theory." It is opposed to "destructive," or "appetitive."[85]The moral.[86]Person,i.e., here, audience or spectator.[87]"Kernspruch."[88]"Contingent" means, not so much "what may or may not exist," as the trivial, which makes no difference whether it exists or not.[89]"In ihm selbst gebrochenes." I do not suppose there is an allusion to the words I use.[90]"Sittlichkeit" almost = morality in the English sense. It means the habit of virtue, without the reflective aspiration after goodness as an ideal.[91]"Moralität" almost = conscientiousness or scrupulosity. The above sentence is hardly true with the English word "moral."[92]"Für sich," is often used where there is no notion of development, and seems very like "an sich."[93]"Gemüth."[94]Ase.g.if we suppose that an act done at the bidding of natural affection cannot also be a fulfilment of the command of duty. The "reconciliation" would be in supposing the natural affection,e.g.for parents, to operate as a moral motive, being transformed by a recognition of its sacred or spiritual character.[95]"An und für sich."[96]"An und für sich Wahre."[97]"Allgemeine Bildung."[98]"Vorstellung."[99]See Pref. Essay, p. xix.[100]Or conscientiousness—what was above described as the moralistic view.[101]"An sich."[102]"An und für sich wahrem und wirklichem."[103]See p. 68,supra.[104]"Der mensch wie er geht und steht."[105]"An und für sich."[106]"Zweck-mässigkeit."[107]i.e.in any means which we adopt in order to effect an end which we have distinctly before us as an idea. A knife does not include cutting, nor a spade digging, although their construction is relative to these ends. But a man does include living,i.e.he is not a man if he ceases to live.[108]"Für sich."[109]"An und für sich."[110]By Kant.[111]"Unbefangenheit."[112]On Goethe's discoveries in morphology and errors in optics, see Helmholtz's "Popular Lectures," series i., lecture ii.; but compare Schopenhauer, "Werke," vol. i., "Ueber das Sehn und die Farben."[113]Compare Browning's "Luria:"—"A people is but the attempt of manyTo rise to the completer life of one."[114]Or "Of the moral, etc., man."[115]"Ueber Anmuth und Würde," "Of Grace and Dignity," a work of Schiller that appeared in 1793.[116]"Gesinnungen."[117]The Baccalaureus' speech in Faust (Part 2) "Die Welt, sie war nicht, eh' ich sie erschuf," etc., appears to be a parody of Fichte's ideas in this aspect.[118]I think the order of the German must be a misprint. "So ist nichts an und für sich und in sich selbst werthvoll betrachtet."[119]"An und für sich seyende."[120]The three points are, (i.) The I is abstract. (ii.) Everything is a semblance for it. (iii.) Its own acts, even, are a semblance.[121]Not literal. "Das alles an sich setzende und auflösende Ich."[122]Formalfreedom is detachment from everything, or the (apparent) capacity of alternatives; it is opposed torealfreedom, which is identification of one's-self with something that is capable of satisfying one.[123]"Genialität:" the character or state of mind in which genius is dominant—here, the mere self-enjoyment of genius.[124]"Selbstgenuss." I do not think it means self-indulgence, but the above-described enjoyment of reposing in the superiority of the ego.[125]"Eitelkeit," also = "conceit;" which is the other side of this attitude. Hegel uses it on purpose.[126]"Eitle."[127]"Sehnsuchtigkeit."[128]"Krankhafte Schönseligkeit."Schönseligkeitseems to be really a word formed likeRedselig, etc., but to be given an equivocating reference to "Schöne Seele," which I have rendered in the next sentence by "saintly soul."[129]"Eitlen," "Eitelkeit."[130]This recurring phrase may be used etymologically, as a reminiscence of the Platonic πληρουσθαι.[131]Haltung: "bearing" in general, and more especiallythebearing of one who bears himself nobly by reason of a principle.[132]See Scherer, Eng. Transl., ii. 248.[133]It is natural for a reader to ask inwhatperson or subject God is conceived to have reality. On this see below, p. 165. It appears certain to me that Hegel, when he writes thus, is referring to the self-consciousness of individual human beings as constituting, and reflecting on, an ideal unity between them. This may seem to put a non-natural meaning on the term "person" or "subject," as if the common element of a number of intelligences could be a single person. It is obvious that the question hinges on the degree in which a unity that is not sensuous but ideal can be effective and actual. I can only say here, that the more we consider the nature of ideal unity the higher we shall rate its capabilities. See Prefatory Essay, p. xiv.[134]Fackeldistel= "Torch thistle," a plant of the genusCereus, Nat. OrderCactaceæ.[135]Or "as spirit and in spirit."[136]The idea of art.[137]The two evolutions are, speaking roughly, (i.) that of the subject-matter; (ii.) that of the particular mode of art: (i.)e.g.you have Egyptian, Greek, Christian religion, etc., with the corresponding views and sentiments, each in its own relation to art; (ii.) you have, as a cross division to the former, the several arts—sculpture, music, poetry, etc., each having its special ground and warrant.[138]He is asking himself why sound or paint, etc., should correspond to one type of art as theoretically defined—this being intellectual, not sensuous, at root—and answers that these mediaquanatural objects have, though more latent than in works of art, an import and purpose of their own, which reveals itself in their suitability to particular forms of art.[139]"Gestaltungsformen." I use "plastic" all through in a pregnant sense, as one speaks of plastic fancy, etc.; meaning ideally determinate, and fit for translating into pictures, poetry, etc. These "plastic forms" are the various modifications of the subject-matter of art. See note, p. 139, above.[140]See note, p. 139, above.[141]See p. 134, above.[142]"Gestaltung." I do not think this means the process of shaping, but the shapes taken collectively.[143]i.e.not in a separate ideal shape devoted to it. He means that man takes a stock or stone as representation or symbol of the divine, and as there is no real connection between divinity and the stone, it may either be left untouched and unshaped, or be hewn into any bizarre or arbitrary shape that comes to hand: see next paragraph.[144]This description is probably directed, in the first place, to the Indian representation of deities, and would apply to those of many barbaric religions. But its truth may be very simply verified in daily observation of the first attempts of the uneducated at plastic presentation of their ideas, where costliness, ingenuity, labour, or size take the place of beauty.[145]"Sie als Inneres."[146]i.e.an idea or purpose which gives these partial and defective representations all the meaning they have, although they are incapable of really expressing it.[147]"Gährung," lit. "fermentation."[148]"Der ursprüngliche Begriff," lit. "the original notion."[149]i.e.God or the Universeinventedman to be the expression of mind; artfindshim, and adapts his shape to the artistic embodiment of mind as concentrated in individual instances.[150]Because it represents the soul as independent of an appropriate body—the human soul as capable of existing in a beast's body.[151]"Geistigkeit." "The nature of thought, mind, or spirit." It cannot be here rendered by mind or spirit, because these words make us think of an isolated individual, a mind or soul, and neglect the common spiritual or intellectual nature, which is referred to by the author.[152]It is the essence of mind or thought not to have its parts outside one another. The so-called terms of a judgment are a good instance of parts in thought which are inward to each other.[153]Compare Browning's "Old Pictures in Florence."[154]i.e.in the form of feeling and imagination—not reflected upon.[155]Subject,i.e.conscious individual person.[156]"Innerlichkeit," lit. "inwardness."[157]Taken, considered as or determined to be negative.[158]"Inward," again, does not mean merely inside our heads, but having the character of spirit in that its parts are not external to one another. A judgment is thus "inward."[159]i.e.does not keep up a distinction between percipient and object, as between things in space. Goodness, nobleness, etc., are not felt to be other than or outside the mind.[160]The romantic.[161]i.e.species, modifications naturally arising out of a principle.[162]Thuse.g.Sculpture istheart which correspondspar excellenceto the general type called Classical Art; but there isaSymbolic kind of sculpture, and I supposeaRomantic or modern kind of sculpture, although neither of these types are exactly fitted to the capabilities of Sculpture.[163]Architecture as relative to the purposes of life and of religion. See below, p. 162.[164]"Die schöne Architectur."[165]In the sense "self-complete," "not primarily regarded as explained by anything outside," like a machine or an animal contrasted with a wheel or a limb, which latter are finite, because they demand explanation and supplementation from without,i.e.necessarily draw attention to their own limit.[166]i.e.shape taken simply as an object filling space.[167]The terms used in the text explain themselves if we compare,e.g., a Teniers with a Greek statue, or again, say, a Turner with the same. "Subjectivity" means that the work of art appeals to our ordinary feelings, experiences, etc. Music and poetry are still stronger cases than painting, according to the theory. Poetry especially can deal witheverything.[168]The unity of the individuals forming a church or nation is not visible, but exists in common sentiments, purposes, etc., and in the recognition of their community.[169]An expression constantly applied to consciousness, because it can look at itself.Cf.:—"'Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face?''No, Cassius; for the eye sees not itselfBut by reflection, by some other things.'"Julius Cæsar.[170]Posited or laid down to be ideal; almost = pronounced or madeto bein the sense ofnot being; e.g. musical sound is "ideal" as existing,quawork of art, in memory only, the moment in which it is actually heard being fugitive; a picture, in respect of the third dimension, which has to be read into it; and poetry is almost wholly ideal,i.e.uses hardly any sensuous element, but appeals almost entirely to what existsin the mind. "Subdivided," "besondert," like "particularisirt" above; because of the variety and diversity present in the mere material of colours, musical sounds, and ideas.[171]Again, the subject of a Turner or Teniers is not objectively universal, in the simplest sense; not something that is actually and literally the same everywhere and for every one. And both painting and music (immediately sensuous elements) are less completely amalgamated with the ideal, represent it less solidly and thoroughly than the statue, so far as the ideal is itself external or plastic.[172]The greater affinity of Romantic art with the movement and variety of the modern spirit displays itself not only in the greater flexibility of painting, music, or poetry, as compared with architecture and sculpture, but in the fact that the Romantic type contains these three arts at least, while the Symbolic and Classical types had only one art each.[173]This is drawn from Goethe's doctrine of colour, which Hegel unfortunately adopted in opposition to Newton's theory.[174]He means landscape, principally.[175]"Aufheben," used pregnantly by Hegel to meanboth"cancel," "annul,"and, "preserve," "fix in mind," "idealize." The use of this word is a cardinal point of his dialectic. See "Wiss. der Logik.," i. 104. I know of no equivalent but "put by," provincial Scotch "put past." The negation of space is an attribute of music. The parts of a chord are no more in space than are the parts of a judgment. Hegel expresses this by saying that music idealizes space and concentrates it into a point.[176]The parts of space, though external to each other, are not distinguished by qualitative peculiarities.[177]"Aufheben."[178]"Ideality of matter:" the distinctively material attribute of a sonorous body, its extension, only appears in its sound indirectly, or inferentially, by modifying the nature of the sound. It is, therefore, "idealized."[179]Succession in time is a degree more "ideal" than co-existence in space, because it exists solely in the medium of memory.[180]"Seele:" mind on its individual side, as a particular feeling subject. "Geist" is rather mind as the common nature of intelligence. Thus in feeling and self-feeling, mind is said to concentrate itself into a soul.[181]Hegel seems to accept this view. Was he insensible to sound in poetry? Some very grotesque verses of his, preserved in his biography, go to show that his ear was not sensitive. Yet his critical estimate of poetry is usually just. Shakespeare and Sophocles were probably his favourites. And, as a matter of proportion, what he here says is true. It must be remembered that the beauty of sound in poetry is to a great extent indirect, being supplied by the passion or emotion which the ideas symbolized by the sounds arouse. The beauty of poetical sound in itselfisvery likely less than often supposed. It must have the capacity for receiving passionate expression; but that is not the same as the sensuous beauty of a note or a colour. If the words used in a noble poem were divested of all meaning, they would lose much, though not all, of the beauty of their sound.[182]"Stages or elements." "Momente," Hegel's technical phrase for the stages which form the essential parts or factors of any idea. They make their appearance successively, but the earlier are implied and retained in the later.[183]Adequate, and so of permanent value.
[1]New York, Appleton and Co.
[2]Chicago, Griggs and Co., 1885.
[3]Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, 1886.
[4]Of these, Chapter III. is subdivided into two Parts, because of the disproportionate length of the division in the original to which it corresponds.
[5]Preface to "Sordello."
[6]"Endless duration makes good no better, nor white any whiter," is one of Aristotle's comments on Plato's "eternal" ideas, and is just, unless "eternal" conveys a difference of kind.
[7]Whewell, I think, misinterprets Plato's language about astronomy in this sense. Plato is not decrying observation, but demanding a theoretical treatment of the laws of motion,—a remarkable anticipation of modern ideas.
[8]"A Year with the Birds," by an Oxford Tutor.
[9]See note above, p. xii.
[10]The fusion of these meanings in the German "Geist" gives a force to his pleading which English cannot render. He appeals,e.g., triumphantly to "God is a Spirit,"i.e.not "a ghost" but "mind."
[11]See Tennyson's "Higher Pantheism," especially the fine lines—
"Speak to Him thou, for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet,Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet."
"Speak to Him thou, for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet,Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet."
"Speak to Him thou, for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet,
Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet."
[12]In Baumgarten's "Æsthetica," 1750. See Lotze's "Æsthetik in Deutschland," p. 4, and Scherer's "Hist. of German Literature," Engl. Transl., ii. 25.
[13]Aus dem Geiste—allusion to "born of water and of the Spirit."
[14]Not in the sense of fancying what you please, but in the technical sense of having separate existence; detached, so to speak, from the general background of things, not a mere concurrence of other elements.
[15]Has no power of distinguishing itself from other things.
[16]"Das Schöne—in dem Scheine."
[17]"Gesetzmässigkeit."
[18]"Raisonnement"—a disparaging term in Hegel.
[19]"Particular"—different unconnected matters, considered as merely thrown together in an aggregate, or occurring in a series; opposed to parts or cases united by an essential principle.
[20]"Das Göttliche."
[21]"Schiene und erschiene."
[22]The life in which we treat common circumstances and sensations as, in their degree, realities.
[23]"Das An—und Fürsichseyende."
[24]"Explication."
[25]"Material,"e.g.colour, sound, heavy matter, etc.
[26]"Element:" perhaps more especially any mental function entering into art—sense, imagination, understanding, etc.
[27]"Philosophy," "Wissenschaft."
[28]"Haltpunkte:" ultimate points that the matter of art must not leave hold of, leading ideas that must somehow dominate it.
[29]"Gestaltung:" shaping, as if arrangement of shapes.
[30]"Kunstkenntniss."
[31]"Gelehrsamkeit."
[32]"Paränetischen Lehren."
[33]"Bildenden Künste." I am not sure if I have given the best rendering. It is wider thanPlastik, because it includes painting and architecture.
[34]Die Horen—the monthly magazine whose establishment by Schiller, in 1795, first brought Schiller and Goethe into contact. It only existed for three years. See Scherer, Eng. Trans., ii. 173.
[35]That is, not a caprice of nature or art, but the perfection of the objectafter its kind.
[36]"Individualität."
[37]"Helldunkel."
[38]"Drama," Gr. δραμα =Handlung, "action."
[39]"Erscheinung."
[40]"Bestimmung."
[41]"Bestimmend."
[42]"Begeistet wird"—"Is spiritualized."
[43]I have no doubt he means Shakespeare, who was unpopular in Germany before Goethe's time.Vide"Wilhelm Meister."
[44]"Das Wahre sehen nicht die einzelnen," etc.
[45]The exhibition of particulars as contained in the principle, and of the principle as contained in particulars.
[46]"Machen."
[47]"Nach-machen."
[48]See Appendix to Eng. Trans. of Scherer, ii. 347. Goethe's "Götz von Berlichingen" appeared in 1773; Schiller's "Raüber" in 1781.
[49]The "Iphigenie" was completed in Goethe's thirty-eighth year, fourteen years later than "Götz." The bulk of his great works are of the same date as the "Iphigenie," or later. See Scherer, ii. 152, and Appendix, 1. c. Schiller's "Wallenstein" was completed after his thirty-fifth year.
[50]Free from irrelevancies.
[51]i.e.it requires a definite or determinate answer, depending on a number of ideas which cannot be explained in an introduction.
[52]i.e.considered generally, apart from the wishes and, perhaps, selfish aims of individual artists.
[53]"Fursichsein."
[54]Reality derivative from his own reality.
[55]He means as in attitude, bearing, gentle movement, etc.
[56]"Bildung."
[57]"Bedurfniss zur Kunst."
[58]i.e.you cannot describe it or picture it definitely, like a thing with attributes, although you feel it in yourself.
[59]i.e.you may be afraid of anything; the fact that you are afraid does not in itself indicate what you are afraid of.
[60]My private feeling is compared to a small circle, in which morality, justice, etc., maybe, but have not room to show their nature. Feeling allows of no definition.
[61]Allits positive aspects or relations, age, phase, artist's history, etc.
[62]Its sensuous aspect has no independent warrant or justification, as that, for example, of an animal has in its own separate life. So it must simply be such as is enough to appeal to man's mind,e.g.mere surface painting.
[63]i.e.person.
[64]Nothing can be tasted which is not dissolved in a liquid.
[65]"Anschauungen."
[66]Abstract forms, which are to reality as a diagram to a picture.
[67]Lit. "figure,"Gestalt.
[68]"Handgriffen."
[69]"Eines geistreichen."
[70]General, abstract, as much applicable to one thing as to another.
[71]"Heuchelei," lit. "hypocrisy."
[72]"Kunststück."
[73]i.e.merecopying, devoting one's-self to the one-sided purpose of making a thing over again, without putting any life or meaning into it.
[74]Which says that the business of art is to imitate.
[75]Of imitation.
[76]"Phantastischen." "Fantastic" means "odd or wild." Hegel only means "original," "creative."
[77]Mechanical, without origination.
[78]"Nüancen." Context seems to forbid referring it to colour. I suspect it of meaning character of outline.
[79]"Erschüttern."
[80]"Raisonnirende;" a term of disparagement in Hegel, applied to proofs,proandcon, which do not rest on a thorough conception of the fundamental nature of what is being discussed.
[81]"Raisonnement."
[82]"Formal" means here as usual, empty, or general;i.e.not taking account of varieties in the matter to which it is applied.
[83]"Befangensein."
[84]"Theoretisch." I have no doubt that it has here the meaning of Θεωρειν without a trace of allusion to "theory." It is opposed to "destructive," or "appetitive."
[85]The moral.
[86]Person,i.e., here, audience or spectator.
[87]"Kernspruch."
[88]"Contingent" means, not so much "what may or may not exist," as the trivial, which makes no difference whether it exists or not.
[89]"In ihm selbst gebrochenes." I do not suppose there is an allusion to the words I use.
[90]"Sittlichkeit" almost = morality in the English sense. It means the habit of virtue, without the reflective aspiration after goodness as an ideal.
[91]"Moralität" almost = conscientiousness or scrupulosity. The above sentence is hardly true with the English word "moral."
[92]"Für sich," is often used where there is no notion of development, and seems very like "an sich."
[93]"Gemüth."
[94]Ase.g.if we suppose that an act done at the bidding of natural affection cannot also be a fulfilment of the command of duty. The "reconciliation" would be in supposing the natural affection,e.g.for parents, to operate as a moral motive, being transformed by a recognition of its sacred or spiritual character.
[95]"An und für sich."
[96]"An und für sich Wahre."
[97]"Allgemeine Bildung."
[98]"Vorstellung."
[99]See Pref. Essay, p. xix.
[100]Or conscientiousness—what was above described as the moralistic view.
[101]"An sich."
[102]"An und für sich wahrem und wirklichem."
[103]See p. 68,supra.
[104]"Der mensch wie er geht und steht."
[105]"An und für sich."
[106]"Zweck-mässigkeit."
[107]i.e.in any means which we adopt in order to effect an end which we have distinctly before us as an idea. A knife does not include cutting, nor a spade digging, although their construction is relative to these ends. But a man does include living,i.e.he is not a man if he ceases to live.
[108]"Für sich."
[109]"An und für sich."
[110]By Kant.
[111]"Unbefangenheit."
[112]On Goethe's discoveries in morphology and errors in optics, see Helmholtz's "Popular Lectures," series i., lecture ii.; but compare Schopenhauer, "Werke," vol. i., "Ueber das Sehn und die Farben."
[113]Compare Browning's "Luria:"—
"A people is but the attempt of manyTo rise to the completer life of one."
"A people is but the attempt of manyTo rise to the completer life of one."
[114]Or "Of the moral, etc., man."
[115]"Ueber Anmuth und Würde," "Of Grace and Dignity," a work of Schiller that appeared in 1793.
[116]"Gesinnungen."
[117]The Baccalaureus' speech in Faust (Part 2) "Die Welt, sie war nicht, eh' ich sie erschuf," etc., appears to be a parody of Fichte's ideas in this aspect.
[118]I think the order of the German must be a misprint. "So ist nichts an und für sich und in sich selbst werthvoll betrachtet."
[119]"An und für sich seyende."
[120]The three points are, (i.) The I is abstract. (ii.) Everything is a semblance for it. (iii.) Its own acts, even, are a semblance.
[121]Not literal. "Das alles an sich setzende und auflösende Ich."
[122]Formalfreedom is detachment from everything, or the (apparent) capacity of alternatives; it is opposed torealfreedom, which is identification of one's-self with something that is capable of satisfying one.
[123]"Genialität:" the character or state of mind in which genius is dominant—here, the mere self-enjoyment of genius.
[124]"Selbstgenuss." I do not think it means self-indulgence, but the above-described enjoyment of reposing in the superiority of the ego.
[125]"Eitelkeit," also = "conceit;" which is the other side of this attitude. Hegel uses it on purpose.
[126]"Eitle."
[127]"Sehnsuchtigkeit."
[128]"Krankhafte Schönseligkeit."Schönseligkeitseems to be really a word formed likeRedselig, etc., but to be given an equivocating reference to "Schöne Seele," which I have rendered in the next sentence by "saintly soul."
[129]"Eitlen," "Eitelkeit."
[130]This recurring phrase may be used etymologically, as a reminiscence of the Platonic πληρουσθαι.
[131]Haltung: "bearing" in general, and more especiallythebearing of one who bears himself nobly by reason of a principle.
[132]See Scherer, Eng. Transl., ii. 248.
[133]It is natural for a reader to ask inwhatperson or subject God is conceived to have reality. On this see below, p. 165. It appears certain to me that Hegel, when he writes thus, is referring to the self-consciousness of individual human beings as constituting, and reflecting on, an ideal unity between them. This may seem to put a non-natural meaning on the term "person" or "subject," as if the common element of a number of intelligences could be a single person. It is obvious that the question hinges on the degree in which a unity that is not sensuous but ideal can be effective and actual. I can only say here, that the more we consider the nature of ideal unity the higher we shall rate its capabilities. See Prefatory Essay, p. xiv.
[134]Fackeldistel= "Torch thistle," a plant of the genusCereus, Nat. OrderCactaceæ.
[135]Or "as spirit and in spirit."
[136]The idea of art.
[137]The two evolutions are, speaking roughly, (i.) that of the subject-matter; (ii.) that of the particular mode of art: (i.)e.g.you have Egyptian, Greek, Christian religion, etc., with the corresponding views and sentiments, each in its own relation to art; (ii.) you have, as a cross division to the former, the several arts—sculpture, music, poetry, etc., each having its special ground and warrant.
[138]He is asking himself why sound or paint, etc., should correspond to one type of art as theoretically defined—this being intellectual, not sensuous, at root—and answers that these mediaquanatural objects have, though more latent than in works of art, an import and purpose of their own, which reveals itself in their suitability to particular forms of art.
[139]"Gestaltungsformen." I use "plastic" all through in a pregnant sense, as one speaks of plastic fancy, etc.; meaning ideally determinate, and fit for translating into pictures, poetry, etc. These "plastic forms" are the various modifications of the subject-matter of art. See note, p. 139, above.
[140]See note, p. 139, above.
[141]See p. 134, above.
[142]"Gestaltung." I do not think this means the process of shaping, but the shapes taken collectively.
[143]i.e.not in a separate ideal shape devoted to it. He means that man takes a stock or stone as representation or symbol of the divine, and as there is no real connection between divinity and the stone, it may either be left untouched and unshaped, or be hewn into any bizarre or arbitrary shape that comes to hand: see next paragraph.
[144]This description is probably directed, in the first place, to the Indian representation of deities, and would apply to those of many barbaric religions. But its truth may be very simply verified in daily observation of the first attempts of the uneducated at plastic presentation of their ideas, where costliness, ingenuity, labour, or size take the place of beauty.
[145]"Sie als Inneres."
[146]i.e.an idea or purpose which gives these partial and defective representations all the meaning they have, although they are incapable of really expressing it.
[147]"Gährung," lit. "fermentation."
[148]"Der ursprüngliche Begriff," lit. "the original notion."
[149]i.e.God or the Universeinventedman to be the expression of mind; artfindshim, and adapts his shape to the artistic embodiment of mind as concentrated in individual instances.
[150]Because it represents the soul as independent of an appropriate body—the human soul as capable of existing in a beast's body.
[151]"Geistigkeit." "The nature of thought, mind, or spirit." It cannot be here rendered by mind or spirit, because these words make us think of an isolated individual, a mind or soul, and neglect the common spiritual or intellectual nature, which is referred to by the author.
[152]It is the essence of mind or thought not to have its parts outside one another. The so-called terms of a judgment are a good instance of parts in thought which are inward to each other.
[153]Compare Browning's "Old Pictures in Florence."
[154]i.e.in the form of feeling and imagination—not reflected upon.
[155]Subject,i.e.conscious individual person.
[156]"Innerlichkeit," lit. "inwardness."
[157]Taken, considered as or determined to be negative.
[158]"Inward," again, does not mean merely inside our heads, but having the character of spirit in that its parts are not external to one another. A judgment is thus "inward."
[159]i.e.does not keep up a distinction between percipient and object, as between things in space. Goodness, nobleness, etc., are not felt to be other than or outside the mind.
[160]The romantic.
[161]i.e.species, modifications naturally arising out of a principle.
[162]Thuse.g.Sculpture istheart which correspondspar excellenceto the general type called Classical Art; but there isaSymbolic kind of sculpture, and I supposeaRomantic or modern kind of sculpture, although neither of these types are exactly fitted to the capabilities of Sculpture.
[163]Architecture as relative to the purposes of life and of religion. See below, p. 162.
[164]"Die schöne Architectur."
[165]In the sense "self-complete," "not primarily regarded as explained by anything outside," like a machine or an animal contrasted with a wheel or a limb, which latter are finite, because they demand explanation and supplementation from without,i.e.necessarily draw attention to their own limit.
[166]i.e.shape taken simply as an object filling space.
[167]The terms used in the text explain themselves if we compare,e.g., a Teniers with a Greek statue, or again, say, a Turner with the same. "Subjectivity" means that the work of art appeals to our ordinary feelings, experiences, etc. Music and poetry are still stronger cases than painting, according to the theory. Poetry especially can deal witheverything.
[168]The unity of the individuals forming a church or nation is not visible, but exists in common sentiments, purposes, etc., and in the recognition of their community.
[169]An expression constantly applied to consciousness, because it can look at itself.Cf.:—
"'Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face?''No, Cassius; for the eye sees not itselfBut by reflection, by some other things.'"
Julius Cæsar.
[170]Posited or laid down to be ideal; almost = pronounced or madeto bein the sense ofnot being; e.g. musical sound is "ideal" as existing,quawork of art, in memory only, the moment in which it is actually heard being fugitive; a picture, in respect of the third dimension, which has to be read into it; and poetry is almost wholly ideal,i.e.uses hardly any sensuous element, but appeals almost entirely to what existsin the mind. "Subdivided," "besondert," like "particularisirt" above; because of the variety and diversity present in the mere material of colours, musical sounds, and ideas.
[171]Again, the subject of a Turner or Teniers is not objectively universal, in the simplest sense; not something that is actually and literally the same everywhere and for every one. And both painting and music (immediately sensuous elements) are less completely amalgamated with the ideal, represent it less solidly and thoroughly than the statue, so far as the ideal is itself external or plastic.
[172]The greater affinity of Romantic art with the movement and variety of the modern spirit displays itself not only in the greater flexibility of painting, music, or poetry, as compared with architecture and sculpture, but in the fact that the Romantic type contains these three arts at least, while the Symbolic and Classical types had only one art each.
[173]This is drawn from Goethe's doctrine of colour, which Hegel unfortunately adopted in opposition to Newton's theory.
[174]He means landscape, principally.
[175]"Aufheben," used pregnantly by Hegel to meanboth"cancel," "annul,"and, "preserve," "fix in mind," "idealize." The use of this word is a cardinal point of his dialectic. See "Wiss. der Logik.," i. 104. I know of no equivalent but "put by," provincial Scotch "put past." The negation of space is an attribute of music. The parts of a chord are no more in space than are the parts of a judgment. Hegel expresses this by saying that music idealizes space and concentrates it into a point.
[176]The parts of space, though external to each other, are not distinguished by qualitative peculiarities.
[177]"Aufheben."
[178]"Ideality of matter:" the distinctively material attribute of a sonorous body, its extension, only appears in its sound indirectly, or inferentially, by modifying the nature of the sound. It is, therefore, "idealized."
[179]Succession in time is a degree more "ideal" than co-existence in space, because it exists solely in the medium of memory.
[180]"Seele:" mind on its individual side, as a particular feeling subject. "Geist" is rather mind as the common nature of intelligence. Thus in feeling and self-feeling, mind is said to concentrate itself into a soul.
[181]Hegel seems to accept this view. Was he insensible to sound in poetry? Some very grotesque verses of his, preserved in his biography, go to show that his ear was not sensitive. Yet his critical estimate of poetry is usually just. Shakespeare and Sophocles were probably his favourites. And, as a matter of proportion, what he here says is true. It must be remembered that the beauty of sound in poetry is to a great extent indirect, being supplied by the passion or emotion which the ideas symbolized by the sounds arouse. The beauty of poetical sound in itselfisvery likely less than often supposed. It must have the capacity for receiving passionate expression; but that is not the same as the sensuous beauty of a note or a colour. If the words used in a noble poem were divested of all meaning, they would lose much, though not all, of the beauty of their sound.
[182]"Stages or elements." "Momente," Hegel's technical phrase for the stages which form the essential parts or factors of any idea. They make their appearance successively, but the earlier are implied and retained in the later.
[183]Adequate, and so of permanent value.