Chapter 10

FOOTNOTES:[1]The reader will recall Nast’s skeleton representing the Regular Army with the legend, “Match it for grit if you can” or words to that effect.[2]Statement based on statistics.[3]Authorities concede these matters.[4]See War Department Reports, 1915.[5]Taken from actual stations of various troops at various times. The army post system is considered indefensible among military men.[6]Speed of embarkation of a mobilized and prepared army as calculated by European military staff officers.[7]One thousand rifled cannon could be enumerated from the naval lists of less than four Powers. Less than four Powers could match our Navy with battleships.[8]This is exactly what happened during the Spanish-American War.[9]From U. S. War Department Reports for 1915 on Militia Organization.[10]This statement does not betray a military secret. It is well known to all foreign governments that we cannot defend our coast defenses against land attack.[11]Certain naval experts, basing their opinion on study of the recent naval battles, claim that a difference of as little as 10 per cent. in efficiency between fleets otherwise absolutely equal means inevitable destruction for the inferior fleet.[12]A tactical necessity for an outnumbered fleet.[13]This statement is based on official army calculations.[14]From tabulated returns by the militia departments of twelve Eastern States.[15]From annual reports of rifle practice for 1914, militia organizations.[16]See tabulated returns published by War Department, 1915.[17]Under-stated. Annual reports for 1915 show many practically useless batteries.[18]Annual report Militia Organization, 1915. (An Eastern seaboard State.)[19]Tables given in War Department statistics, 1915.[20]Extracted from tabulated returns to War Department. (Report on Militia Organization, 1915.)[21]Official figures: 12 Army aeroplanes, 13 Navy aeroplanes, no dirigibles, two aeroplanes not serviceable, total effective, 23.[22]Block Island men helped in the capture of a troopship during the War of the Revolution.[23]A landing party seizing an outlying island for a base, as Block Island would infallibly be seized, always destroys everything that might enable the inhabitants to communicate with the mainland.[24]A submarine cannot attack until it has risen near enough to the surface to lift its periscope above water. Having thus obtained its aim, it submerges again only deep enough to conceal the periscope. It fires its torpedo blind when submerged. If it dives too deep, it might send the weapon harmlessly under the ship’s keel. Hence, it is possible, often, to “spot” the disturbed, whitened water above a submarine even though it is sunken out of sight.[25]Target practice near the land has been found to so affect all life nearby that it seriously injures the commercial fisheries. The fishermen of Cape Cod have opposed fleet-firing several times. On one occasion it is recorded that the fishing for lobsters (exclusively bottom-haunting crustacean) was quite ruined for months owing to the firing of big guns.[26]As a matter of fact, the extreme range of the present armament of American harbor defenses is 23,000 yards. This is not a reliably effective fighting range, and is merely stated as being the extreme range, “under crucial test,” of the 12-inch steel rifled mortars. The rifled guns as now mounted have a range of not more than 13,000 yards. Battle-ships now being constructed are armed with 15 and 16-inch guns that can outrange the extreme theoretical range of the mortars.[27]Harbor defenses are not constructed, necessarily, to protect places near them. Their purpose is to prevent a naval force from occupying an important harbor whose possession would open the way to rich territory or lay commerce prostrate. Therefore it is no defect in the construction of the Long Island entrance defenses that it is possible to bombard coast places near them. It is physically impossible ever to defend all the places on our coast with fortifications.[28]The Army War College has repeatedly called attention to the urgent need of the mobile army for siege artillery and for the organization of an efficient body of troops trained in its use to beavailable whenever needed. “Ammunition on hand for artillery, 38 per cent. of amount required.” (See report of Army Board, and Secretary of War Garrison’s statement to House Appropriations Committee, 1915.) Another estimate in the possession of the author would indicate that the ammunition on hand forheavyartillery is only about 15 per cent. of the amount required.[29]Troops cannot be landed with as little delay as this. But naval tactics assume as a matter of course that an advance body of bluejackets, trained for beach and surf work, can effect an immediate landing if protected from attack.[30]Lord Cochran landed 18,000 men on the open coast of Chile in five hours, with some guns. The surf conditions there are extremely hazardous.[31]American submarines now in commission do not carry more than one 3-inch rapid fire gun. It is set in a watertight compartment from which it is elevated when the vessel is on the surface. Armaments of destroyers are: Ammen class, five 3-inch rapid fire 30 cal. rifles; Aylwin class, four 4-inch rapid fire 50 cal. rifles; Bainbridge class, two 3-inch rifles and five 6-pounders rapid fire.[32]Submarine wire entanglements are being used effectively for the protection of harbors during the present war. The wire cannot resist cutting much more than twine can. It stops the submarine by menacing it with being entangled and trapped. A submarine caught under water cannot be cleared by its crew. The utmost the men can do is to try to reach the surface by putting on “special escape helmets” and emerging through the air-locks.[33]With periscopes shot away, a submarine, even though uninjured, is quite helpless. She may escape, if she is in deep water and the assailant is far enough away to give her time to dive and flee, deeply submerged. See loss of U-12 on March 10 merely through destruction of periscope, which permitted enemy destroyers to ram her.[34]Even steam vessels of high power often are rendered helpless by jamming a trailing hawser around the shaft. The revolution of the shaft so macerates and binds the fouled material that the engines are unable to turn the propellor in either direction and only a diver can clear it.[35]The reserve buoyancy of a submarine when awash (technically known as “diving-trim”) is so delicate that 100 additional gallons of water would sink a 300-ton vessel.[36]“From an altitude of 2,000 feet the movements of a submarine torpedo boat may be easily observed unless the water is very muddy”—Capt. V. E. Clark, Aviation Corps, U. S. A., December issue,Coast Artillery Journal.[37]Important cities in this territory besides New York and Boston are Fall River, Providence, New Bedford, New London, Bridgeport, New Haven, Hartford, Worcester, Springfield, Willimantic and Pawtucket.[38]Colonel Abbott, U. S. A., one of the leading Chiefs of Engineers who constructed the U. S. harbor defenses, stated that the fire of the sixteen mortars, “like one giant musket throwing a charge of buckshot, each pellet weighing ¼ ton,” could drop their sixteen projectiles into a space 800 feet long by 300 feet wide. The author was present at a test of a 16-mortar battery on Sandy Hook when the sixteen shells were fired simultaneously at a deck-plan of the United States cruiserSan Francisco, the plan being outlined with stakes on the New Jersey beach five and a half miles from the battery. Each projectile struck inside of the staked outline.[39]“It will thus be seen that there are now provided about one-fourth of the officers and one-half of the enlisted men necessary for this purpose,” i.e. manning the defenses of the American coast—Report, Chief of Coast Artillery, U. S. A., to Chief of Staff, September 19, 1914.[40]“It is certain that present-day coast defenses could not withstand an energetic attack from the land side,” i.e. they must be defended with a mobile army—“Over-Seas Operations.”[41]The present war has made evident to military observers that in the future the “aeroplane screen” will play a vital part similar to the “cavalry screen.” It is based on the simple principle of overpowering the adversary’s attempts by vastly superior numbers.[42]Estimates that were transmitted confidentially to this country by observers in Europe and are now before the writer are that the European Nations had raised their aeroplane efficiency to the following magnitude: France 1,400, Germany 1,000, Russia 800, Italy 600, England 400 (probably greatly increased since then), Austria 400, Spain 100, Belgium (in the beginning) 100, Switzerland 20 and Servia 60 aeroplanes. The United States has at present 12 army aeroplanes, 13 naval planes, no dirigibles, 2 aeroplanes old model, total effective 23. The first aero squadron of the army has just been formed at the Signal Corps Aviation School, San Diego, Cal. It will contain twenty officers and ninety-six enlisted men. The last House of Congress refused to consent to the Senate’s appropriation of $400,000 for military aviation, and the amount available this year was cut down to $300,000. The Navy Department is making specifications for a small dirigible, and on February 27 opened bids for the construction of six hydro-aeroplanes, bi-plane sea-going type, armored, to carry two men, wireless, guns and ammunition at speeds of from fifty to eighty miles an hour.[43]Strength of Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, 1914, as per returns of inspecting officers, 5,369 men, 424 officers.[44]Only eleven States had on hand at the time of the last annual inspection one complete uniform (less shoes) for each enlisted man of the authorized minimum strength.... “In the opinion of the Division of Militia Affairs the States could have by this time, by proper economy and care in the use of property and the expenditure of funds, acquired stores sufficient to equip the militia at war strength.... The militia is not now equipped with supplies sufficient for peace strength.... In no State is the prescribed minimum peace strength maintained.”—Pages 206, 283 and 287, Organization and Federal Property, Annual Reports, War Department, June 13, 1913 to October 1, 1914.[45]“We are still without an adequate reserve system either of officers or men.”—Leonard Wood, Major General, Chief of Staff, U. S. A., official report, January 20, 1914.[46]So stated in instructions issued to foreign armies for the event of disembarkation.[47]Landing barges of this capacity are possessed by at least three Powers and have been tested in maneuvers.[48]All these details, and many more, are systematically worked out in European army instructions, both confidential and public.[49]Under average conditions it is possible to land 25,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 60 guns in six hours.... In the Crimean War 45,000 men, 83 guns and 100 horses were disembarked and set on shore in less than eleven hours, without modern appliances.—“Over-Seas Operations.” See also British and French records.[50]This quotation is a literal quotation from the War Department report on “The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States,” August 10, 1912.[51]This point has been emphasized in practically every War Department report on organization for many years back. Congress never has acted on the matter. The Chief of Militia Affairs, U. S. A., was forced to report in his last report that: “Little or no progress appears to be making toward correct Divisional organization.”—Part III, 1914, Report on Organization. Only two States have approachably organized their militia in correct proportions.[52]The Division is the fundamental army unit.... The mobile elements of the Regular Army should have a Divisional organization in time of peace.—Office of the Chief of Staff, U. S. A., January 20, 1914.[53]Tables 17 and 18, pages 228, 229, Annual Report Division of Militia Affairs, U. S. A., October 1, 1914.... “The States which send their Infantry into active service without having made every possible effort to supply it with an adequate Field Artillery support, will see in the needless sacrifice of that Infantry the cost of their short-sightedness in time of preparation.”—A. L. Mills, Brigadier General, General Staff, U. S. A.[54]Page 26, Organization of the Land forces of the United States, U. S. Army report.[55]“While the men who wish to spend the Army and Navy appropriation upon unnecessary army posts or unfit navy yards have such a voice as well as a vote,” i.e. in the Houses of Congress, “a great deal of waste and extravagance is sure to result.”—Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of War.[56]Only the most perfectly organized intelligence department can extract from the incredible mass of reports that come in during army movements, the few true and important facts on which the final orders of the commander may be based. An inadequate scouting service is worse than merely weak. It betrays its own forces to disaster.[57]The Long Island Sound defenses are built to prevent the entrance of a hostile fleet into Long Island Sound. By thus closing Long Island Sound they protect all the Sound cities and the City of New York; but they cannot and do not protect all the possible landing places. Long Island, the land highway to New York City, is entirely undefended. The War Department desires to erect proper defenses on or near Montauk Point, but has still to get the authority.[58]Trinitrotol, now being used in Europe largely for under-water work, is one of the most violently acting explosives known to-day.[59]The latest type of 16-inch naval gun has a range of 23,000 yards or eleven and a half nautical miles, which is a little more than thirteen statute miles.... A projectile from a 12-inch rifled gun (U. S. A. coast-defense type) which was fired in the presence of the author, ricochetted seven times.[60]Not a fanciful description. The impact of a 12-inch projectile was calculated exactly by Major General Abbot, Chief of Engineers, U. S. A., in order to formulate a precise comparison.[61]The writer has seen iron bars two and a half inches wide, which locked the steel doors to a casemate, buckle and bend outward from the vacuum created by the blast of a rifled gun.[62]Report, Chief of Coast Artillery, U. S. A., September 19, 1914, pages 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15.[63]The ammunition now on hand and under manufacture is 73 per cent. of the allowance fixed by the National Coast Defense Board. Last report to the Chief of Staff, U. S. A.... “The actual supply of ammunition at present is very considerably behind even that modest standard,” i.e. the minimum allowance, “and in many cases of our most important sea-coast guns would be sufficient for only thirty or forty minutes of firing.”—Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of War, March 1, 1915.[64]Army and naval officers, both American and foreign, believe that 5,000 men would be more than sufficient to take such works if they are manned only by their Coast Artillery companies and undefended by a mobile army.[65]We have less than one quarter of the ammunition considered necessary as an adequate supply and reserve for our full number of small-arms. (Author’s Note.) ... “We are less adequately supplied with field artillery material than with any other form of fighting equipment.”—Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, 1911.... “A full supply of this type of material must be stored and ready for use before war is undertaken.”—W. W. Wotherspoon, Major General, Chief of Staff, U. S. A., November 15, 1914, Annual Report.[66]It has been said authoritatively that if all the guns of the army should have to go into action at any one time there is not enough ammunition for a single day’s engagement, even at a conservative estimate of the amount of shells expended by each gun. In some of the European battles, more guns than our whole supply were engaged on each side.[67]There is only enough material on hand to keep our present mobile army (at its present low peace strength) in the field for six months in the event of war. There is nothing to spare.[68]Cavalry troops in the regular army as now constituted are under law rarely filled to a number of more than 70, while their proper complement is 100.[69]A comparatively small number of modern liners would be enough to aggregate this net tonnage.[70]Based on foreign army calculations.[71]Modern artillery is almost invariably concealed. Experienced soldiers would suspect that an infantry regiment hardly would be without at least one battery, and more probably two, of field artillery support.[72]“Unless provision is made in the near future for additional Coast Artillery personnel, it will be necessary to reduce the garrisons to mere caretaker establishments at some of the defenses.”—E. M. Weaver, Brigadier General, Chief of Coast Artillery, U. S. A., September 19, 1914, Annual Report.[73]Actual manning detail for New Bedford defenses, 1914, one company regular Coast Artillery.[74]There is said to be only one firm in the United States that can produce the rifling tools, jigs, gauges and other exact and intricate machinery needed to make a rifle. Consequently, the loss of the Springfield Arsenal would be disastrous.[75]Official statistics.[76]Large numbers of guns and large numbers of ammunition are liable to capture and destruction.... To start into field operations with the expectation that the proper proportions will be maintained without large sources of manufacture, would be fallacious.”—Chief of Staff, U. S. A., 1914.—See Report on Militia Organization, 1914, for comments on the great loss and destruction of equipment and material.[77]Some observers of the European War declare that the reserve of one gun per man has proved itself necessary for the proper equipment of an active army.[78]“He,” i.e., Secretary Garrison, present Secretary of War, “asks for an increase in the number of officers to take the place, in time of peace, of such officers as are serving with the militia or on detached duty, and in time of war to assist in the organization of the citizens’ army. The necessity of these requests is self-evident. Yet the House of Representatives has completely ignored each and every one of them, and the pending appropriation bill contains no provision for them.”—Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of War.[79]The scandal caused in 1898 by appointing incompetent civilians to the Quartermaster’s Department and the ensuing difficulties with commissariat, etc., have been the subject of much discussion.[80]Our War Department has asked for only about five guns to every thousand men, but has not yet been able to have this quota finished. European practice has been to increase the number of guns to the thousand rifles and sabers steadily. Before the war it was at least five. It has been enormously increased as a result of the experience gained during the recent fighting, in which it was established that infantry or cavalry without absolutely dominating gun protection were hopelessly weak.[81]These movements of advance bodies and patrols have been carefully worked out as a campaign problem. The lines of advance mentioned are those that present themselves to military observers as the ones most likely to be selected by an invading army moving toward Boston from a base on Narragansett Bay or Buzzards Bay.[82]So laid down as the most likely movement to be made by invading armies with heavy cavalry supports.[83]The elementary tactics for the procedure of every army that has to hold any extended territory.[84]Worked out from a consensus of opinions and plans by tactical experts both here and abroad.[85]“When the defenses outside the Continental United States are provided for, there will remain for home gun defenses 176 officers and 7,543 enlisted men,which is about one-third of one relief.”—Page 15, Report, Chief of Coast Artillery, U. S. A., for year ended June 30, 1914.[86]“The searchlight project is approximately 50 per cent. completed.... The fire-control system may be said to be approximately 60 per cent. completed.... Installation of power generating and distributing equipment is 25 per cent. completed.... Submarine mine structures are 83 per cent. completed.”—Report, Chief of Coast Artillery, U. S. A., for year ended June 30, 1914.[87]Regular manning detail for Boston defenses, twelve companies of Coast Artillery. These have seven systems of defense to maintain. The companies are not enlisted to their full strength. Even if they were, there would be less than two hundred men to each defense. This is not sufficient for any sustained action at the big guns alone. A sufficiently energetic enemy, even if he might not damage the works, could wear out the men by incessant attack for a few days and nights. There certainly would not be men enough to provide for outlying defense against landing parties.[88]These are all vitally necessary parts of the defense of the Boston harbor forts. They are only a small part of what would have to be done in case of naval attack. The data used here are not theoretical. They have been developed by actual test.[89]So developed in sea and land maneuvers undertaken for the purpose of establishing the very points here mentioned.[90]It is estimated, from careful calculations, that to put out of action a searchlight at night with shipfire at a range of 6,000 yards, more than a thousand shots from 3-inch guns should be required. The fact is mentioned here to illustrate the great strength of harbor defenses against fire from the sea, if there be enough mobile troops on the land to prohibit destruction by landing parties.[91]That the American harbor defense system and construction are of the very highest type, has been acknowledged many times by the technical experts of the world. More than once the author has heard foreign officers express the belief that they were practically impregnable to naval fire, providing they were fully supplied and equipped with the material necessary for continuous defense.[92]A generous system of reliefs is imperative in harbor defenses during war. Peace time maneuvers have developed the fact that the mere strain of incessant watchfulness while waiting for an enemy who may appear at unexpected points suddenly, is so great that unless the men have frequent relief, they cannot exert that concentrated energy which is needed instantly in the crisis.[93]This system of night attack has been developed and tested by actual trial, and is such as is now laid down for battle practice in the tactics of most navies. “The ... squadron will enter ..., and will maneuver at range of about 9,000 yards from Fort ..., firing heavily, to induce the defense to expend as much ammunition as possible.”—Extract from actual orders in author’s possession, given to a squadron of battleships and cruisers for night attack. It will be noted that this distance is less than one-half the range of the 12-inch rifled mortars in a harbor defense battery.[94]The search-light system, recognized as a vital part of harbor defense by the Endicott Board on harbor defense (appointed in 1885) has grown steadily in importance with the steady increase in ship armament and ship speed. A thoroughly efficient installation of search-lights for modern harbors demands as much scientific calculation and interlocation as do the gun-systems. If the search-lights cannot infallibly find any vessel that may approach within range, the guns of the fortification are useless.[95]The inadequacy of the installation has been made the subject of continuous reports. It is a fact that a few years ago, when a mock attack on one of the most important Atlantic defenses was ordered by the War Department, the commander had to requisition search-lights from other coast defenses, and that during the maneuvers the search-light defense, because of its inadequacy and temporary character, failed at several critical points, permitting attacking ships to come within less than 4,000 yards of one important battery.[96]Usually the firing zones are: first, 6,000 yards to the extreme range of biggest guns; second or intermediate, 3,000 yards to 6,000 yards; third (mine field zone), 3,000 yards. The order of fire is worked out absolutely for every condition that is possible. The movements of attacking ships, and their combinations, although very numerous, can be predicated with some accuracy beforehand.[97]Estimated number of shots required at night from ships afloat at 6,000 yards: to destroy position-finding tower which is visible, 22 12-inch shells, 250 4-inch shells or 2,500 3-inch shells; to destroy invisible station without tower, 400 12-inch shells, 5,000 4-inch shells; to destroy search-light, 24 12-inch shells, 300 4-inch shells or 3,000 3-inch shells. This fact makes it feasible to protect outlying and secondary range stations perfectly if sufficient troops can guard each station to fight off landing parties. An enemy will surely land men to destroy them unless he knows they are well defended.[98]Actual records of American harbor batteries: three 6-inch guns on disappearing carriages, 15 shots in 1 minute, 27 seconds.[99]From an actual maneuver performed successfully by a destroyer division attempting to destroy a base station during a mock battle on the Atlantic coast.[100]The Weir River would enable assailants to reach the inner harbor and take the defenses in the rear.[101]Mr. Garrison, Secretary of War, again represented to Congress at its last session that changes in the 12-inch gun carriages are absolutely necessary to give them an elevation of 15 degrees. This matter has been so well established that all military engineers are unanimous both as to the urgent need for the change and the excellent result that will follow.[102]These are points lying south of the southern defenses of Boston Harbor, and so near them that modern siege guns planted there could fire into them at short range.[103]The primary harbor defense batteries (12-inch, 10-inch and 8-inch guns and 12-inch mortars) are not emplaced for anything except sea-ward fire, nor should they be. To use them against land attack would be only a matter of desperation, as in the case here described. As a matter of fact, they would be rather inefficient against smaller guns that are more mobile and durable.[104]“Firing at speed, the shots from a dozen guns shooting at successive intervals, would not have five seconds between them.”[105]The tremendous air-compression in fortifications during gun-action almost always tears out parts of the general installation even in mere target practice. If fire-control installation, wiring, telephone systems, etc., are efficient only to the minimum degree, and there is no adequate reserve supply of material for repairs, they are certain to break down in any attack that is pressed with vigor. An attacked harbor-work is subjected to the most terrible destructive attempts that humanity has been able to devise.[106]Long range investment with modern artillery serves the double purpose of commanding the ultimate target, and commanding all the territory in between, thus giving the artillerist possession of many miles of area.[107]Financial Statistics, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1914.[108]In Brown versus the United States, the U. S. Supreme Court decreed that “war gives to the sovereign,” i.e. the conquering power, “full right to take the persons and confiscate the property of the enemy wherever found.—Humane mitigations may affect exercise of this right but cannot impair the right itself.”[109]“The so-called exemption of private property from capture or seizure on land may be called almost nominal.”—Rear-Admiral Stockton, Outlines of International Law.[110]Napoleon made Valencia pay $100,000 for the support of his army. Receipts were provided for originally when troops made requisitions, not necessarily to insure pay to the despoiled inhabitants, but merely to prevent unauthorized plundering.[111]A universally accepted form of military rule, and distinguished from merely martial law.[112]U. S. Census Bureau Report, 1914; also Boston City Manual.[113]So certified to City Clerk, Boston, by Board of Assessors, June 30, 1914, exact number 123,657.[114]Statistics of Cities of the United States, 1914.[115]From “Instructions for Government of Armies of the United States in the Field” (with exception of statement as to specific punishment for infraction. Punishment mentioned here, however, is such as all military authorities will claim the right to inflict.)[116]The right of quartering troops on the inhabitants of enemy country is unquestioned and universally exercised. Equally universal is the military commanders’ right to punish treachery by death.[117]“Complete conquest carries with it all rights of former government.”—U. S. Supreme Court.[118]Benjamin Harris’ “Publick Occurrences,” suppressed after one issue.[119]There is an immense literature on military law, and every army contains officers who have taken degrees in law, for the purpose of expounding and administering it.[120]The legal and technical correctness of all acts is of extreme importance in the peace settlements.[121]All authority in conquered country is only by and with the authority of the military conqueror. His power, practically, is limited only by his motives of policy or kindness.[122]This requisition is taken almost verbatim from a requisition issued by a belligerent army in the field. It is an accepted and acknowledged principle of war that the conqueror may force the enemy to pay his expenses to as large an extent as possible. A commander may waive the right, but it is held unimpaired.[123]This decision covered a case that arose during the Civil War, and was cited by the Law Office, Division of Insular Affairs, on several occasions to fortify United States procedure after the Spanish-American War.[124]A literal extract from the Sedition Act (No. 292, etc.) of the Philippine Commission, except that the act provides for specific imprisonment and fine.[125]So laid down by nearly all writers on military law who touch on this subject.[126]This principle was laid down in regard to territory subjected to military occupation by the United States during the war with Mexico. The United States claimed (and sparingly exercised) the right to court martial and execute as rebels certain leaders of an insurrection against the military government in New Mexico, 1847-8.[127]“In many instances the deficiency has reached such a figure as to leave militia organizations such in name only.”—Page 206, last report, General Mills, U. S. A.[128]Table No. 9, Report, Division of Militia Affairs, U. S. A., 1914.[129]Range of four miles.[130]Page 231, Report on militia field artillery, General Mills, U. S. A., 1914.[131]Table 9, militia cavalry statistics, Division of Militia Affairs, U. S. A. Annual Report, 1914.[132]From statistics, gathered before the present European War, of the armament then owned by at least four of the great Powers.[133]From statistics, gathered before the present European War, of the armament then owned by at least four of the great Powers.[134]A literal transcript of the report of two medical officers on the conditions existing among good militia troops who were ordered out for maneuvers distinctly specified as war maneuvers to be conducted under war conditions.[135]This figure is purposely placed below what is actually expected. During the Connecticut maneuvers, 1909, the straggling was a subject for comment among both militia and regular officers, though the troops did well considering their softness. One officer reported that the straggling amounted to 15 to 25 per cent. of some regiments.[136]From the report of an umpire at a maneuver under war conditions. He reported that the batteries of both sides fired into woods actually occupied by their own troops.[137]So reported by a General of Militia, as the result of his observations in field practice.[138]Schedule laid down by General von Bernhardi as the maximum time that should be expended by properly trained troops under experienced officers.[139]Army heads have called the attention of Congress and the public repeatedly to the fact that officers cannot possibly be prepared for the complex work of handling an army if they never get an opportunity to learn by actual experience. The post system is to blame to a considerable extent.... Remarks about commissary troubles in this paragraph are based on actual occurrences in the field, as set forth in an official report.[140]From “The Army in Action.”[141]Watervliet, situated near Troy, N. Y., is one of the most important Government gun factories in the United States. It produces the 12, 14 and 16-inch all steel rifled guns for the harbor defenses and is fitted out with enormously expensive machinery for making many other different types of ordnance. Its exposed situation, under our present conditions of defenselessness, has long been a cause for anxiety.[142]It has been pointed out often that within a radius of less than a hundred miles around New York City there is a large percentage of the works and factories on which the Government depends for much of its war material.[143]Vessels actually building in places named when the last annual edition of the Navy Year Book was published.[144]Strength of total force, including all individuals, October 1, 1914, 10,740. It is held that New York’s conformation, long and narrow, makes it an unusually easy city to control, as it is possible to prevent mobs from combining, and trouble can be confined to limited areas.[145]Bureau of Census, U. S., 1914.[146]Census Office Tabular Statement issued in 1911. Figures are for all boroughs of Greater New York, and include only establishments conducted under factory system. Building and similar industries and small establishments producing less than $500 worth of products a year are not counted.[147]Paragraph 373, Acts Punished As War Treason: Rules of Land Warfare, published for the information and government of the armed land forces of the United States, April 25, 1914.[148]“A town surrounded by detached forts is considered jointly with such forts as an indivisible whole, as a defended place. A place that is occupied by a military force or through which such a force is passing, is a defended place.”—Bombardments, Assaults and Sieges, Rules of Land Warfare, U. S. A.[149]Office of Naval Intelligence, July 1, 1914.[150]Practical completion of battery construction and armament, power plants, fire control, searchlight installation and supply of ammunition reported by Chief of Coast Artillery, September 19, 1914.[151]Congress has appropriated comparatively little for the needs of Guantanamo Harbor.[152]Usually one of the first orders given to the occupants of occupied territory.[153]The practice laid down for our own army and followed in the Insular campaigns.[154]Paragraph 301, Rules of Land Warfare, U. S. A., 1914.[155]This is one of the rules accepted among all nations and followed by all armies.[156]Issued during the Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria and cited by recent writers as acknowledged precedents.[157]“While a military government continues as an instrument of warfare, used to promote the objects of invasion, its powers are practically boundless.”—Magoon, Law of Civil Government under Military Occupation, U. S. Bureau of Insular Affairs.[158]Table 4, 13th Census, Volume 8. The Metropolitan District, as referred to in this sense, comprises Greater New York and the New Jersey manufacturing counties that contain Newark, Bayonne, Paterson, Hackensack, Passaic, Rutherford, etc.[159]Spaight, an authority, says that “practically everything under the sun” may be requisitioned and cites the case of a boot-jack being demanded for army use. See quotation and rulings of U. S. Army.[160]Under Hague Rule, Article LIII, it is held that “everything susceptible of military use” may be requisitioned, and modern army practice defines this as meaning anything from telegraph wire to canal boats.[161]Not a large sum as compared with some imposts laid on quite small and unimportant towns in wars during the past century. One such levy was $1,000,000 from one town in one day, according to European writers.[162]See case of seizure by Major General Otis of $100,000 from Philippine bankers, being money owned by insurgents and payable on presentation of a draft held by insurgents. Report, Charles E. Magoon, Law Officer, Division of Insular Affairs, 1902.[163]List of non-assessable Federal property, N. Y., 1914.[164]At present it is considered that one military flying machine in two months is good speed of production.[165]Result of inquiry made by U. S. Army after tests on Texas border had developed the high value of motor trucks for war.[166]Orders issued by War Department, March 6, 1911, for concentration at San Antonio, Texas, of maneuver division of three infantry brigades, one field artillery brigade, an independent cavalry brigade and the necessary auxiliary troops. Strength should have been 15,669 officers and men. On March 31 the division mustered only 11,254 men. On April 30 it had reached a strength of 12,598. On May 30 it numbered 12,809. It never reached its full required strength and it did not reach its maximum actual strength until three months after it had been ordered out. On Feb. 21 and 24, 1913, three brigades of the second division were ordered to mobilize at Texas City and Galveston. This force did not reach its maximum strength till June 30, 1913. See Report of Major General Carter, U. S. A.[167]Table 26, page 262, Report, Chief of Division of Militia Affairs, U. S. A., October 1, 1914.[168]Census of Manufactures, U. S., 1910.[169]Report, Brigadier General A. L. Mills, U. S. A., 1914.[170]Secretary of War Garrison says: “It will require six months at the lowest possible estimate to equip, organize, train, drill and make ready our volunteers.”[171]Census Bureau, Volume 8.[172]From Tax Lists, New York City and Boston, and assessable values of New England, U. S. Census Bureau.[173]Many so-called “non-intercourse acts” were passed during the Civil War. These authorized the President both to prohibit and to license and permit intercourse and trade with belligerent territory. Under these acts President Lincoln permitted the purchase of cotton in the south, and his procedure was upheld by the United States Supreme Court on the ground that “the United States has power to permit intercourse with an enemy during the time of war.”

FOOTNOTES:

[1]The reader will recall Nast’s skeleton representing the Regular Army with the legend, “Match it for grit if you can” or words to that effect.

[2]Statement based on statistics.

[3]Authorities concede these matters.

[4]See War Department Reports, 1915.

[5]Taken from actual stations of various troops at various times. The army post system is considered indefensible among military men.

[6]Speed of embarkation of a mobilized and prepared army as calculated by European military staff officers.

[7]One thousand rifled cannon could be enumerated from the naval lists of less than four Powers. Less than four Powers could match our Navy with battleships.

[8]This is exactly what happened during the Spanish-American War.

[9]From U. S. War Department Reports for 1915 on Militia Organization.

[10]This statement does not betray a military secret. It is well known to all foreign governments that we cannot defend our coast defenses against land attack.

[11]Certain naval experts, basing their opinion on study of the recent naval battles, claim that a difference of as little as 10 per cent. in efficiency between fleets otherwise absolutely equal means inevitable destruction for the inferior fleet.

[12]A tactical necessity for an outnumbered fleet.

[13]This statement is based on official army calculations.

[14]From tabulated returns by the militia departments of twelve Eastern States.

[15]From annual reports of rifle practice for 1914, militia organizations.

[16]See tabulated returns published by War Department, 1915.

[17]Under-stated. Annual reports for 1915 show many practically useless batteries.

[18]Annual report Militia Organization, 1915. (An Eastern seaboard State.)

[19]Tables given in War Department statistics, 1915.

[20]Extracted from tabulated returns to War Department. (Report on Militia Organization, 1915.)

[21]Official figures: 12 Army aeroplanes, 13 Navy aeroplanes, no dirigibles, two aeroplanes not serviceable, total effective, 23.

[22]Block Island men helped in the capture of a troopship during the War of the Revolution.

[23]A landing party seizing an outlying island for a base, as Block Island would infallibly be seized, always destroys everything that might enable the inhabitants to communicate with the mainland.

[24]A submarine cannot attack until it has risen near enough to the surface to lift its periscope above water. Having thus obtained its aim, it submerges again only deep enough to conceal the periscope. It fires its torpedo blind when submerged. If it dives too deep, it might send the weapon harmlessly under the ship’s keel. Hence, it is possible, often, to “spot” the disturbed, whitened water above a submarine even though it is sunken out of sight.

[25]Target practice near the land has been found to so affect all life nearby that it seriously injures the commercial fisheries. The fishermen of Cape Cod have opposed fleet-firing several times. On one occasion it is recorded that the fishing for lobsters (exclusively bottom-haunting crustacean) was quite ruined for months owing to the firing of big guns.

[26]As a matter of fact, the extreme range of the present armament of American harbor defenses is 23,000 yards. This is not a reliably effective fighting range, and is merely stated as being the extreme range, “under crucial test,” of the 12-inch steel rifled mortars. The rifled guns as now mounted have a range of not more than 13,000 yards. Battle-ships now being constructed are armed with 15 and 16-inch guns that can outrange the extreme theoretical range of the mortars.

[27]Harbor defenses are not constructed, necessarily, to protect places near them. Their purpose is to prevent a naval force from occupying an important harbor whose possession would open the way to rich territory or lay commerce prostrate. Therefore it is no defect in the construction of the Long Island entrance defenses that it is possible to bombard coast places near them. It is physically impossible ever to defend all the places on our coast with fortifications.

[28]The Army War College has repeatedly called attention to the urgent need of the mobile army for siege artillery and for the organization of an efficient body of troops trained in its use to beavailable whenever needed. “Ammunition on hand for artillery, 38 per cent. of amount required.” (See report of Army Board, and Secretary of War Garrison’s statement to House Appropriations Committee, 1915.) Another estimate in the possession of the author would indicate that the ammunition on hand forheavyartillery is only about 15 per cent. of the amount required.

[29]Troops cannot be landed with as little delay as this. But naval tactics assume as a matter of course that an advance body of bluejackets, trained for beach and surf work, can effect an immediate landing if protected from attack.

[30]Lord Cochran landed 18,000 men on the open coast of Chile in five hours, with some guns. The surf conditions there are extremely hazardous.

[31]American submarines now in commission do not carry more than one 3-inch rapid fire gun. It is set in a watertight compartment from which it is elevated when the vessel is on the surface. Armaments of destroyers are: Ammen class, five 3-inch rapid fire 30 cal. rifles; Aylwin class, four 4-inch rapid fire 50 cal. rifles; Bainbridge class, two 3-inch rifles and five 6-pounders rapid fire.

[32]Submarine wire entanglements are being used effectively for the protection of harbors during the present war. The wire cannot resist cutting much more than twine can. It stops the submarine by menacing it with being entangled and trapped. A submarine caught under water cannot be cleared by its crew. The utmost the men can do is to try to reach the surface by putting on “special escape helmets” and emerging through the air-locks.

[33]With periscopes shot away, a submarine, even though uninjured, is quite helpless. She may escape, if she is in deep water and the assailant is far enough away to give her time to dive and flee, deeply submerged. See loss of U-12 on March 10 merely through destruction of periscope, which permitted enemy destroyers to ram her.

[34]Even steam vessels of high power often are rendered helpless by jamming a trailing hawser around the shaft. The revolution of the shaft so macerates and binds the fouled material that the engines are unable to turn the propellor in either direction and only a diver can clear it.

[35]The reserve buoyancy of a submarine when awash (technically known as “diving-trim”) is so delicate that 100 additional gallons of water would sink a 300-ton vessel.

[36]“From an altitude of 2,000 feet the movements of a submarine torpedo boat may be easily observed unless the water is very muddy”—Capt. V. E. Clark, Aviation Corps, U. S. A., December issue,Coast Artillery Journal.

[37]Important cities in this territory besides New York and Boston are Fall River, Providence, New Bedford, New London, Bridgeport, New Haven, Hartford, Worcester, Springfield, Willimantic and Pawtucket.

[38]Colonel Abbott, U. S. A., one of the leading Chiefs of Engineers who constructed the U. S. harbor defenses, stated that the fire of the sixteen mortars, “like one giant musket throwing a charge of buckshot, each pellet weighing ¼ ton,” could drop their sixteen projectiles into a space 800 feet long by 300 feet wide. The author was present at a test of a 16-mortar battery on Sandy Hook when the sixteen shells were fired simultaneously at a deck-plan of the United States cruiserSan Francisco, the plan being outlined with stakes on the New Jersey beach five and a half miles from the battery. Each projectile struck inside of the staked outline.

[39]“It will thus be seen that there are now provided about one-fourth of the officers and one-half of the enlisted men necessary for this purpose,” i.e. manning the defenses of the American coast—Report, Chief of Coast Artillery, U. S. A., to Chief of Staff, September 19, 1914.

[40]“It is certain that present-day coast defenses could not withstand an energetic attack from the land side,” i.e. they must be defended with a mobile army—“Over-Seas Operations.”

[41]The present war has made evident to military observers that in the future the “aeroplane screen” will play a vital part similar to the “cavalry screen.” It is based on the simple principle of overpowering the adversary’s attempts by vastly superior numbers.

[42]Estimates that were transmitted confidentially to this country by observers in Europe and are now before the writer are that the European Nations had raised their aeroplane efficiency to the following magnitude: France 1,400, Germany 1,000, Russia 800, Italy 600, England 400 (probably greatly increased since then), Austria 400, Spain 100, Belgium (in the beginning) 100, Switzerland 20 and Servia 60 aeroplanes. The United States has at present 12 army aeroplanes, 13 naval planes, no dirigibles, 2 aeroplanes old model, total effective 23. The first aero squadron of the army has just been formed at the Signal Corps Aviation School, San Diego, Cal. It will contain twenty officers and ninety-six enlisted men. The last House of Congress refused to consent to the Senate’s appropriation of $400,000 for military aviation, and the amount available this year was cut down to $300,000. The Navy Department is making specifications for a small dirigible, and on February 27 opened bids for the construction of six hydro-aeroplanes, bi-plane sea-going type, armored, to carry two men, wireless, guns and ammunition at speeds of from fifty to eighty miles an hour.

[43]Strength of Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, 1914, as per returns of inspecting officers, 5,369 men, 424 officers.

[44]Only eleven States had on hand at the time of the last annual inspection one complete uniform (less shoes) for each enlisted man of the authorized minimum strength.... “In the opinion of the Division of Militia Affairs the States could have by this time, by proper economy and care in the use of property and the expenditure of funds, acquired stores sufficient to equip the militia at war strength.... The militia is not now equipped with supplies sufficient for peace strength.... In no State is the prescribed minimum peace strength maintained.”—Pages 206, 283 and 287, Organization and Federal Property, Annual Reports, War Department, June 13, 1913 to October 1, 1914.

[45]“We are still without an adequate reserve system either of officers or men.”—Leonard Wood, Major General, Chief of Staff, U. S. A., official report, January 20, 1914.

[46]So stated in instructions issued to foreign armies for the event of disembarkation.

[47]Landing barges of this capacity are possessed by at least three Powers and have been tested in maneuvers.

[48]All these details, and many more, are systematically worked out in European army instructions, both confidential and public.

[49]Under average conditions it is possible to land 25,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 60 guns in six hours.... In the Crimean War 45,000 men, 83 guns and 100 horses were disembarked and set on shore in less than eleven hours, without modern appliances.—“Over-Seas Operations.” See also British and French records.

[50]This quotation is a literal quotation from the War Department report on “The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States,” August 10, 1912.

[51]This point has been emphasized in practically every War Department report on organization for many years back. Congress never has acted on the matter. The Chief of Militia Affairs, U. S. A., was forced to report in his last report that: “Little or no progress appears to be making toward correct Divisional organization.”—Part III, 1914, Report on Organization. Only two States have approachably organized their militia in correct proportions.

[52]The Division is the fundamental army unit.... The mobile elements of the Regular Army should have a Divisional organization in time of peace.—Office of the Chief of Staff, U. S. A., January 20, 1914.

[53]Tables 17 and 18, pages 228, 229, Annual Report Division of Militia Affairs, U. S. A., October 1, 1914.... “The States which send their Infantry into active service without having made every possible effort to supply it with an adequate Field Artillery support, will see in the needless sacrifice of that Infantry the cost of their short-sightedness in time of preparation.”—A. L. Mills, Brigadier General, General Staff, U. S. A.

[54]Page 26, Organization of the Land forces of the United States, U. S. Army report.

[55]“While the men who wish to spend the Army and Navy appropriation upon unnecessary army posts or unfit navy yards have such a voice as well as a vote,” i.e. in the Houses of Congress, “a great deal of waste and extravagance is sure to result.”—Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of War.

[56]Only the most perfectly organized intelligence department can extract from the incredible mass of reports that come in during army movements, the few true and important facts on which the final orders of the commander may be based. An inadequate scouting service is worse than merely weak. It betrays its own forces to disaster.

[57]The Long Island Sound defenses are built to prevent the entrance of a hostile fleet into Long Island Sound. By thus closing Long Island Sound they protect all the Sound cities and the City of New York; but they cannot and do not protect all the possible landing places. Long Island, the land highway to New York City, is entirely undefended. The War Department desires to erect proper defenses on or near Montauk Point, but has still to get the authority.

[58]Trinitrotol, now being used in Europe largely for under-water work, is one of the most violently acting explosives known to-day.

[59]The latest type of 16-inch naval gun has a range of 23,000 yards or eleven and a half nautical miles, which is a little more than thirteen statute miles.... A projectile from a 12-inch rifled gun (U. S. A. coast-defense type) which was fired in the presence of the author, ricochetted seven times.

[60]Not a fanciful description. The impact of a 12-inch projectile was calculated exactly by Major General Abbot, Chief of Engineers, U. S. A., in order to formulate a precise comparison.

[61]The writer has seen iron bars two and a half inches wide, which locked the steel doors to a casemate, buckle and bend outward from the vacuum created by the blast of a rifled gun.

[62]Report, Chief of Coast Artillery, U. S. A., September 19, 1914, pages 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15.

[63]The ammunition now on hand and under manufacture is 73 per cent. of the allowance fixed by the National Coast Defense Board. Last report to the Chief of Staff, U. S. A.... “The actual supply of ammunition at present is very considerably behind even that modest standard,” i.e. the minimum allowance, “and in many cases of our most important sea-coast guns would be sufficient for only thirty or forty minutes of firing.”—Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of War, March 1, 1915.

[64]Army and naval officers, both American and foreign, believe that 5,000 men would be more than sufficient to take such works if they are manned only by their Coast Artillery companies and undefended by a mobile army.

[65]We have less than one quarter of the ammunition considered necessary as an adequate supply and reserve for our full number of small-arms. (Author’s Note.) ... “We are less adequately supplied with field artillery material than with any other form of fighting equipment.”—Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, 1911.... “A full supply of this type of material must be stored and ready for use before war is undertaken.”—W. W. Wotherspoon, Major General, Chief of Staff, U. S. A., November 15, 1914, Annual Report.

[66]It has been said authoritatively that if all the guns of the army should have to go into action at any one time there is not enough ammunition for a single day’s engagement, even at a conservative estimate of the amount of shells expended by each gun. In some of the European battles, more guns than our whole supply were engaged on each side.

[67]There is only enough material on hand to keep our present mobile army (at its present low peace strength) in the field for six months in the event of war. There is nothing to spare.

[68]Cavalry troops in the regular army as now constituted are under law rarely filled to a number of more than 70, while their proper complement is 100.

[69]A comparatively small number of modern liners would be enough to aggregate this net tonnage.

[70]Based on foreign army calculations.

[71]Modern artillery is almost invariably concealed. Experienced soldiers would suspect that an infantry regiment hardly would be without at least one battery, and more probably two, of field artillery support.

[72]“Unless provision is made in the near future for additional Coast Artillery personnel, it will be necessary to reduce the garrisons to mere caretaker establishments at some of the defenses.”—E. M. Weaver, Brigadier General, Chief of Coast Artillery, U. S. A., September 19, 1914, Annual Report.

[73]Actual manning detail for New Bedford defenses, 1914, one company regular Coast Artillery.

[74]There is said to be only one firm in the United States that can produce the rifling tools, jigs, gauges and other exact and intricate machinery needed to make a rifle. Consequently, the loss of the Springfield Arsenal would be disastrous.

[75]Official statistics.

[76]Large numbers of guns and large numbers of ammunition are liable to capture and destruction.... To start into field operations with the expectation that the proper proportions will be maintained without large sources of manufacture, would be fallacious.”—Chief of Staff, U. S. A., 1914.—See Report on Militia Organization, 1914, for comments on the great loss and destruction of equipment and material.

[77]Some observers of the European War declare that the reserve of one gun per man has proved itself necessary for the proper equipment of an active army.

[78]“He,” i.e., Secretary Garrison, present Secretary of War, “asks for an increase in the number of officers to take the place, in time of peace, of such officers as are serving with the militia or on detached duty, and in time of war to assist in the organization of the citizens’ army. The necessity of these requests is self-evident. Yet the House of Representatives has completely ignored each and every one of them, and the pending appropriation bill contains no provision for them.”—Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of War.

[79]The scandal caused in 1898 by appointing incompetent civilians to the Quartermaster’s Department and the ensuing difficulties with commissariat, etc., have been the subject of much discussion.

[80]Our War Department has asked for only about five guns to every thousand men, but has not yet been able to have this quota finished. European practice has been to increase the number of guns to the thousand rifles and sabers steadily. Before the war it was at least five. It has been enormously increased as a result of the experience gained during the recent fighting, in which it was established that infantry or cavalry without absolutely dominating gun protection were hopelessly weak.

[81]These movements of advance bodies and patrols have been carefully worked out as a campaign problem. The lines of advance mentioned are those that present themselves to military observers as the ones most likely to be selected by an invading army moving toward Boston from a base on Narragansett Bay or Buzzards Bay.

[82]So laid down as the most likely movement to be made by invading armies with heavy cavalry supports.

[83]The elementary tactics for the procedure of every army that has to hold any extended territory.

[84]Worked out from a consensus of opinions and plans by tactical experts both here and abroad.

[85]“When the defenses outside the Continental United States are provided for, there will remain for home gun defenses 176 officers and 7,543 enlisted men,which is about one-third of one relief.”—Page 15, Report, Chief of Coast Artillery, U. S. A., for year ended June 30, 1914.

[86]“The searchlight project is approximately 50 per cent. completed.... The fire-control system may be said to be approximately 60 per cent. completed.... Installation of power generating and distributing equipment is 25 per cent. completed.... Submarine mine structures are 83 per cent. completed.”—Report, Chief of Coast Artillery, U. S. A., for year ended June 30, 1914.

[87]Regular manning detail for Boston defenses, twelve companies of Coast Artillery. These have seven systems of defense to maintain. The companies are not enlisted to their full strength. Even if they were, there would be less than two hundred men to each defense. This is not sufficient for any sustained action at the big guns alone. A sufficiently energetic enemy, even if he might not damage the works, could wear out the men by incessant attack for a few days and nights. There certainly would not be men enough to provide for outlying defense against landing parties.

[88]These are all vitally necessary parts of the defense of the Boston harbor forts. They are only a small part of what would have to be done in case of naval attack. The data used here are not theoretical. They have been developed by actual test.

[89]So developed in sea and land maneuvers undertaken for the purpose of establishing the very points here mentioned.

[90]It is estimated, from careful calculations, that to put out of action a searchlight at night with shipfire at a range of 6,000 yards, more than a thousand shots from 3-inch guns should be required. The fact is mentioned here to illustrate the great strength of harbor defenses against fire from the sea, if there be enough mobile troops on the land to prohibit destruction by landing parties.

[91]That the American harbor defense system and construction are of the very highest type, has been acknowledged many times by the technical experts of the world. More than once the author has heard foreign officers express the belief that they were practically impregnable to naval fire, providing they were fully supplied and equipped with the material necessary for continuous defense.

[92]A generous system of reliefs is imperative in harbor defenses during war. Peace time maneuvers have developed the fact that the mere strain of incessant watchfulness while waiting for an enemy who may appear at unexpected points suddenly, is so great that unless the men have frequent relief, they cannot exert that concentrated energy which is needed instantly in the crisis.

[93]This system of night attack has been developed and tested by actual trial, and is such as is now laid down for battle practice in the tactics of most navies. “The ... squadron will enter ..., and will maneuver at range of about 9,000 yards from Fort ..., firing heavily, to induce the defense to expend as much ammunition as possible.”—Extract from actual orders in author’s possession, given to a squadron of battleships and cruisers for night attack. It will be noted that this distance is less than one-half the range of the 12-inch rifled mortars in a harbor defense battery.

[94]The search-light system, recognized as a vital part of harbor defense by the Endicott Board on harbor defense (appointed in 1885) has grown steadily in importance with the steady increase in ship armament and ship speed. A thoroughly efficient installation of search-lights for modern harbors demands as much scientific calculation and interlocation as do the gun-systems. If the search-lights cannot infallibly find any vessel that may approach within range, the guns of the fortification are useless.

[95]The inadequacy of the installation has been made the subject of continuous reports. It is a fact that a few years ago, when a mock attack on one of the most important Atlantic defenses was ordered by the War Department, the commander had to requisition search-lights from other coast defenses, and that during the maneuvers the search-light defense, because of its inadequacy and temporary character, failed at several critical points, permitting attacking ships to come within less than 4,000 yards of one important battery.

[96]Usually the firing zones are: first, 6,000 yards to the extreme range of biggest guns; second or intermediate, 3,000 yards to 6,000 yards; third (mine field zone), 3,000 yards. The order of fire is worked out absolutely for every condition that is possible. The movements of attacking ships, and their combinations, although very numerous, can be predicated with some accuracy beforehand.

[97]Estimated number of shots required at night from ships afloat at 6,000 yards: to destroy position-finding tower which is visible, 22 12-inch shells, 250 4-inch shells or 2,500 3-inch shells; to destroy invisible station without tower, 400 12-inch shells, 5,000 4-inch shells; to destroy search-light, 24 12-inch shells, 300 4-inch shells or 3,000 3-inch shells. This fact makes it feasible to protect outlying and secondary range stations perfectly if sufficient troops can guard each station to fight off landing parties. An enemy will surely land men to destroy them unless he knows they are well defended.

[98]Actual records of American harbor batteries: three 6-inch guns on disappearing carriages, 15 shots in 1 minute, 27 seconds.

[99]From an actual maneuver performed successfully by a destroyer division attempting to destroy a base station during a mock battle on the Atlantic coast.

[100]The Weir River would enable assailants to reach the inner harbor and take the defenses in the rear.

[101]Mr. Garrison, Secretary of War, again represented to Congress at its last session that changes in the 12-inch gun carriages are absolutely necessary to give them an elevation of 15 degrees. This matter has been so well established that all military engineers are unanimous both as to the urgent need for the change and the excellent result that will follow.

[102]These are points lying south of the southern defenses of Boston Harbor, and so near them that modern siege guns planted there could fire into them at short range.

[103]The primary harbor defense batteries (12-inch, 10-inch and 8-inch guns and 12-inch mortars) are not emplaced for anything except sea-ward fire, nor should they be. To use them against land attack would be only a matter of desperation, as in the case here described. As a matter of fact, they would be rather inefficient against smaller guns that are more mobile and durable.

[104]“Firing at speed, the shots from a dozen guns shooting at successive intervals, would not have five seconds between them.”

[105]The tremendous air-compression in fortifications during gun-action almost always tears out parts of the general installation even in mere target practice. If fire-control installation, wiring, telephone systems, etc., are efficient only to the minimum degree, and there is no adequate reserve supply of material for repairs, they are certain to break down in any attack that is pressed with vigor. An attacked harbor-work is subjected to the most terrible destructive attempts that humanity has been able to devise.

[106]Long range investment with modern artillery serves the double purpose of commanding the ultimate target, and commanding all the territory in between, thus giving the artillerist possession of many miles of area.

[107]Financial Statistics, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1914.

[108]In Brown versus the United States, the U. S. Supreme Court decreed that “war gives to the sovereign,” i.e. the conquering power, “full right to take the persons and confiscate the property of the enemy wherever found.—Humane mitigations may affect exercise of this right but cannot impair the right itself.”

[109]“The so-called exemption of private property from capture or seizure on land may be called almost nominal.”—Rear-Admiral Stockton, Outlines of International Law.

[110]Napoleon made Valencia pay $100,000 for the support of his army. Receipts were provided for originally when troops made requisitions, not necessarily to insure pay to the despoiled inhabitants, but merely to prevent unauthorized plundering.

[111]A universally accepted form of military rule, and distinguished from merely martial law.

[112]U. S. Census Bureau Report, 1914; also Boston City Manual.

[113]So certified to City Clerk, Boston, by Board of Assessors, June 30, 1914, exact number 123,657.

[114]Statistics of Cities of the United States, 1914.

[115]From “Instructions for Government of Armies of the United States in the Field” (with exception of statement as to specific punishment for infraction. Punishment mentioned here, however, is such as all military authorities will claim the right to inflict.)

[116]The right of quartering troops on the inhabitants of enemy country is unquestioned and universally exercised. Equally universal is the military commanders’ right to punish treachery by death.

[117]“Complete conquest carries with it all rights of former government.”—U. S. Supreme Court.

[118]Benjamin Harris’ “Publick Occurrences,” suppressed after one issue.

[119]There is an immense literature on military law, and every army contains officers who have taken degrees in law, for the purpose of expounding and administering it.

[120]The legal and technical correctness of all acts is of extreme importance in the peace settlements.

[121]All authority in conquered country is only by and with the authority of the military conqueror. His power, practically, is limited only by his motives of policy or kindness.

[122]This requisition is taken almost verbatim from a requisition issued by a belligerent army in the field. It is an accepted and acknowledged principle of war that the conqueror may force the enemy to pay his expenses to as large an extent as possible. A commander may waive the right, but it is held unimpaired.

[123]This decision covered a case that arose during the Civil War, and was cited by the Law Office, Division of Insular Affairs, on several occasions to fortify United States procedure after the Spanish-American War.

[124]A literal extract from the Sedition Act (No. 292, etc.) of the Philippine Commission, except that the act provides for specific imprisonment and fine.

[125]So laid down by nearly all writers on military law who touch on this subject.

[126]This principle was laid down in regard to territory subjected to military occupation by the United States during the war with Mexico. The United States claimed (and sparingly exercised) the right to court martial and execute as rebels certain leaders of an insurrection against the military government in New Mexico, 1847-8.

[127]“In many instances the deficiency has reached such a figure as to leave militia organizations such in name only.”—Page 206, last report, General Mills, U. S. A.

[128]Table No. 9, Report, Division of Militia Affairs, U. S. A., 1914.

[129]Range of four miles.

[130]Page 231, Report on militia field artillery, General Mills, U. S. A., 1914.

[131]Table 9, militia cavalry statistics, Division of Militia Affairs, U. S. A. Annual Report, 1914.

[132]From statistics, gathered before the present European War, of the armament then owned by at least four of the great Powers.

[133]From statistics, gathered before the present European War, of the armament then owned by at least four of the great Powers.

[134]A literal transcript of the report of two medical officers on the conditions existing among good militia troops who were ordered out for maneuvers distinctly specified as war maneuvers to be conducted under war conditions.

[135]This figure is purposely placed below what is actually expected. During the Connecticut maneuvers, 1909, the straggling was a subject for comment among both militia and regular officers, though the troops did well considering their softness. One officer reported that the straggling amounted to 15 to 25 per cent. of some regiments.

[136]From the report of an umpire at a maneuver under war conditions. He reported that the batteries of both sides fired into woods actually occupied by their own troops.

[137]So reported by a General of Militia, as the result of his observations in field practice.

[138]Schedule laid down by General von Bernhardi as the maximum time that should be expended by properly trained troops under experienced officers.

[139]Army heads have called the attention of Congress and the public repeatedly to the fact that officers cannot possibly be prepared for the complex work of handling an army if they never get an opportunity to learn by actual experience. The post system is to blame to a considerable extent.... Remarks about commissary troubles in this paragraph are based on actual occurrences in the field, as set forth in an official report.

[140]From “The Army in Action.”

[141]Watervliet, situated near Troy, N. Y., is one of the most important Government gun factories in the United States. It produces the 12, 14 and 16-inch all steel rifled guns for the harbor defenses and is fitted out with enormously expensive machinery for making many other different types of ordnance. Its exposed situation, under our present conditions of defenselessness, has long been a cause for anxiety.

[142]It has been pointed out often that within a radius of less than a hundred miles around New York City there is a large percentage of the works and factories on which the Government depends for much of its war material.

[143]Vessels actually building in places named when the last annual edition of the Navy Year Book was published.

[144]Strength of total force, including all individuals, October 1, 1914, 10,740. It is held that New York’s conformation, long and narrow, makes it an unusually easy city to control, as it is possible to prevent mobs from combining, and trouble can be confined to limited areas.

[145]Bureau of Census, U. S., 1914.

[146]Census Office Tabular Statement issued in 1911. Figures are for all boroughs of Greater New York, and include only establishments conducted under factory system. Building and similar industries and small establishments producing less than $500 worth of products a year are not counted.

[147]Paragraph 373, Acts Punished As War Treason: Rules of Land Warfare, published for the information and government of the armed land forces of the United States, April 25, 1914.

[148]“A town surrounded by detached forts is considered jointly with such forts as an indivisible whole, as a defended place. A place that is occupied by a military force or through which such a force is passing, is a defended place.”—Bombardments, Assaults and Sieges, Rules of Land Warfare, U. S. A.

[149]Office of Naval Intelligence, July 1, 1914.

[150]Practical completion of battery construction and armament, power plants, fire control, searchlight installation and supply of ammunition reported by Chief of Coast Artillery, September 19, 1914.

[151]Congress has appropriated comparatively little for the needs of Guantanamo Harbor.

[152]Usually one of the first orders given to the occupants of occupied territory.

[153]The practice laid down for our own army and followed in the Insular campaigns.

[154]Paragraph 301, Rules of Land Warfare, U. S. A., 1914.

[155]This is one of the rules accepted among all nations and followed by all armies.

[156]Issued during the Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria and cited by recent writers as acknowledged precedents.

[157]“While a military government continues as an instrument of warfare, used to promote the objects of invasion, its powers are practically boundless.”—Magoon, Law of Civil Government under Military Occupation, U. S. Bureau of Insular Affairs.

[158]Table 4, 13th Census, Volume 8. The Metropolitan District, as referred to in this sense, comprises Greater New York and the New Jersey manufacturing counties that contain Newark, Bayonne, Paterson, Hackensack, Passaic, Rutherford, etc.

[159]Spaight, an authority, says that “practically everything under the sun” may be requisitioned and cites the case of a boot-jack being demanded for army use. See quotation and rulings of U. S. Army.

[160]Under Hague Rule, Article LIII, it is held that “everything susceptible of military use” may be requisitioned, and modern army practice defines this as meaning anything from telegraph wire to canal boats.

[161]Not a large sum as compared with some imposts laid on quite small and unimportant towns in wars during the past century. One such levy was $1,000,000 from one town in one day, according to European writers.

[162]See case of seizure by Major General Otis of $100,000 from Philippine bankers, being money owned by insurgents and payable on presentation of a draft held by insurgents. Report, Charles E. Magoon, Law Officer, Division of Insular Affairs, 1902.

[163]List of non-assessable Federal property, N. Y., 1914.

[164]At present it is considered that one military flying machine in two months is good speed of production.

[165]Result of inquiry made by U. S. Army after tests on Texas border had developed the high value of motor trucks for war.

[166]Orders issued by War Department, March 6, 1911, for concentration at San Antonio, Texas, of maneuver division of three infantry brigades, one field artillery brigade, an independent cavalry brigade and the necessary auxiliary troops. Strength should have been 15,669 officers and men. On March 31 the division mustered only 11,254 men. On April 30 it had reached a strength of 12,598. On May 30 it numbered 12,809. It never reached its full required strength and it did not reach its maximum actual strength until three months after it had been ordered out. On Feb. 21 and 24, 1913, three brigades of the second division were ordered to mobilize at Texas City and Galveston. This force did not reach its maximum strength till June 30, 1913. See Report of Major General Carter, U. S. A.

[167]Table 26, page 262, Report, Chief of Division of Militia Affairs, U. S. A., October 1, 1914.

[168]Census of Manufactures, U. S., 1910.

[169]Report, Brigadier General A. L. Mills, U. S. A., 1914.

[170]Secretary of War Garrison says: “It will require six months at the lowest possible estimate to equip, organize, train, drill and make ready our volunteers.”

[171]Census Bureau, Volume 8.

[172]From Tax Lists, New York City and Boston, and assessable values of New England, U. S. Census Bureau.

[173]Many so-called “non-intercourse acts” were passed during the Civil War. These authorized the President both to prohibit and to license and permit intercourse and trade with belligerent territory. Under these acts President Lincoln permitted the purchase of cotton in the south, and his procedure was upheld by the United States Supreme Court on the ground that “the United States has power to permit intercourse with an enemy during the time of war.”

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