Mr. Smith left Cape Coast on May 15th, 1879, and reached Jooquah, the seat of Quasi Kaye, king of Denkera, on the 16th. He left Jooquah on the 18th, with the king’s son, an ocrah, and a sword-bearer, and arrived at Becquai, the first Sefwhee town of importance, on June 6th. He remained at Becquai two days, and reached Yorso, the capital of Sefwhee, on June 10th. Here the Governor’s message, to the effect that Mr. Huydekuper’s statements were false, was delivered, after Mr. Smith had been detained twelve days waiting for the chiefs to assemble. In the course of conversation the king told him that the events of 1874 had decided him and his chiefs to give up their friendship with the Ashantis and to ally themselves with the British; but that when Mr. Huydekuper’s message to King Ajiman of Gaman becamecurrent his two principal chiefs had wished to return to their former friendly relations with Ashanti. The king wished to take an oath of allegiance to the British Government, but this was declined.
On June 21st Mr. Smith left Yorso, and, travelling through incessant rain and by flooded and almost impassable bush-paths, reached the village of Appemanim, about twelve miles from Buntuku, the capital of Gaman, on July 21st. Here a messenger from Buntuku met him, desiring him to wait until the king had prepared for his reception. On the 24th, having received no further information, he started for the capital, and met on the road a messenger from the king requesting him to remain a few days longer at Appemanin, as the king was not quite ready. He took no notice of this message, and, continuing on his way, reached Buntuku the same day.
King Ajiman promised to summon his chiefs and hold a meeting within two days, but, what with one excuse and another, eight days elapsed before any meeting was convened, and then it was held so late in the afternoon that, before the chiefs had gone through the preliminary hand-shaking ceremonies, the rain came down in torrents and dispersed them. While thus delayed, however, Mr. Smith acquired the following information:—
1. That Mr. Huydekuper had left Buntukuimmediately after the Gaman messengers had started for Cape Coast, and was not, nor had been at any time, a prisoner.
2. That the messengers sent to Cape Coast did not represent the entire Gaman nation, as they had stated, but merely King Ajiman, Princess Akosuah Ayansuah, the chief of Saiquah and chief Quabina Fofea of Tackiman; and that the majority of the chiefs had declined to send messengers, as they did not wish to break with Ashanti.
3. That the Gaman chiefs were dissatisfied with King Ajiman, and wished to depose him and elect his half-brother Prince Korkobo to the stool.
4. That Prince Korkobo, who was strongly in favour of an Ashanti alliance, was then at Banna, in Ashanti, with Mr. Huydekuper; and had but recently plundered and burned some villages belonging to King Ajiman.
Mr. Smith found in Buntuku an Ashanti captain, Opoku by name, who, having come to demand the surrender of chief Quabina Fofea of Tackiman, was living on the most friendly terms with the chiefs of the Korkobo faction, and domineering over King Ajiman himself. From this it will be seen how little reliance can be placed upon the statements of West African ambassadors.
King Ajiman informed Mr. Smith that the chiefswould assemble on August 7th, but, on proceeding to the place of meeting on the appointed day, the latter found only the king himself there with the chiefs of Tackiman and Saiquah, and one other. The king said the other chiefs would appear shortly, and Mr. Smith waited. After waiting two hours he was told that one chief was drunk and could not come, that another had a sore leg which incapacitated him from attending, and that a third was making fetish. He left the place of meeting, telling the king that if he were again trifled with he would at once return to the coast.
Finally, on August 8th, a palaver was held and the Governor’s message delivered to the assembled chiefs. No enthusiasm of any kind was displayed. The king promised to hand over Mr. Huydekuper to Mr. Smith in thirteen days, and, in answer to a question from that gentleman, said publicly that he had full confidence in the fidelity of his chiefs.
Two days after this meeting King Ajiman paid Mr. Smith a private visit, during which he said that he had told a falsehood when he had affirmed that he had confidence in the fidelity of his chiefs, and endeavoured to excuse it by saying that he dared not put them to shame at a public meeting. He added that all his chiefs, with the exception of one, wereagainst him, and begged Mr. Smith to hold another meeting and compel them to take an oath of allegiance to him.
On August 15th the meeting was held. The chiefs said that they had many grievances against their king; among others, that he had received several chiefs into the Gaman alliance without consulting them, and that he had received from such chiefs “alliance money” without apportioning a share to them, as was customary. On being asked to take an oath of allegiance to Ajiman, they replied that they would consider about it, and let Mr. Smith know as soon as possible.
On August 21st the chiefs re-assembled. As this was the day on which the king had promised to hand over Mr. Huydekuper Mr. Smith asked for him. The king replied that that individual was not in the town, but that he would send again for him. Mr. Smith then told him that he need not try to keep up the deception any longer, since he had known, from the day of his arrival in Buntuku, that Mr. Huydekuper had never been a prisoner, and that it was not now in the king’s power to make him one. The chiefs declared that they could not come to any decision about the oath of allegiance, because one of their number was absent.
On the 23rd another palaver was held at whichthe chiefs openly declared that King Ajiman was their enemy, and refused to take any oath of allegiance to him. Mr. Smith returned to his house, and in a few minutes the king followed him. He declared that he would not remain in Buntuku after Mr. Smith had left, and begged to be allowed to accompany him to the coast for protection; however, after some trouble, Mr. Smith succeeded in persuading him to remain and assert his position.
On August 24th Mr. Smith left Buntuku for Dadiasu, a village some twenty miles from the capital, and was accompanied to that place by the king, one chief, one captain, and the chiefs of Saiquah and Tackiman—in fact all the king’s adherents. On the 31st, messengers reached Mr. Smith at Awhetiaso, forty-five miles from Buntuku, imploring him, in the name of the king, to return, as Prince Korkobo had entered Buntuku the day after he had left, and was now trying to oust the king from the throne, or rather from the stool. Mr. Smith declined to interfere and proceeded on his journey to the coast.
This mission, though entirely unsuccessful in its aim, clearly established the fact that, in the event of hostilities with Ashanti, the Government could not rely upon any assistance from the Gamans. The Sefwhees, it is true, were more of one mind in the matter, yet it seemed almost certain, consideringtheir close connection with, and proximity to, Gaman, that the inaction of the one would paralyse all movement on the part of the other.
In the latter part of the year 1879 and in 1880 Ashanti was convulsed by internal dissensions. King Mensah was, and is, an unpopular monarch. He is much more tyrannical and bloodthirsty than was his predecessor, and, in defiance of the terms of the treaty of 1874, the number of human sacrifices has largely increased during his reign. The sorest point of all, however, with his subjects was that he despoiled them of their gold on the shallowest pretexts, and imposed exorbitant fines for the most trivial offences. People began to talk of the good old times when Quoffi Calcalli was king, and that wily ex-monarch, who had outlived the contempt with which he had at first been regarded for outraging Ashanti prejudices by continuing to live when disgraced, commenced to intrigue with the people of Kokofuah, the most thickly populated district in Ashanti, and the one which supplies the largest contingent for the army. In the meantime Mensah was not idle. He turned his Houssa corps into a body-guard, and ensured its fidelity by gifts and promises of future favour; he gathered round him his ocrahs and retainers, and with this force, armed principally with breech-loading rifles, he easily managed to stifle disaffection and maintain his position.
There was yet another cause of dissension in Coomassie. Not a few of the chiefs, at the head of whom was Opokoo, chief of Becquai, and Awooah, chief of Bantami and general of the Ashanti army, were anxious to declare war against Adansi. They had re-conquered Djuabin, their chief feudatory, and had nothing to fear on that side. On their western or north-western border too there was now nothing to fear, for although King Ajiman of Gaman had contrived to regain a portion of his kingdom, and had fought several undecisive skirmishes with the Korkobo faction, still the latter was quite powerful enough to neutralise any hostile movement on the part of the former against Ashanti. Further, these chiefs knew that they could drive the handful of Adansis across the Prah without any trouble, and they considered that to do this would wipe out the disgrace of the defeats of 1874.
In fact the only thing which at this time prevented the actual invasion of Adansi was the belief held by King Mensah and his chiefs that any act of aggression against Adansi would be equivalent to war with Great Britain; and they were led to this belief by the action taken by Capt. Lees in the spring of 1879, and with which the then Secretary of State for the Colonies had found fault. Notwithstanding this belief, the war party in Coomassie were desirous of invading Adansi, and were quite willing to takethe risk of another war with England. Opposed to the war party were the king, the queen-mother, and the court party. Mensah remembered that he owed his present position to the downfall of Quoffi Calcalli, who had lost the throne in his conflict with the British; and, being advised by Prince Ansah at Cape Coast, he knew perfectly well that should hostilities break out between Ashanti and Great Britain his own ruin would be the result.
Although Mensah was not prepared to face the Colonial Government in the field, yet he was as desirous as any of his chiefs to recover Adansi, which would do so much to re-establish Ashanti in her former position of supremacy, and so he pursued the traditional policy of the country. The new Governor of the Gold Coast Colony, Mr. Ussher, sent presents to the king on taking up his appointment, and the latter seized the opportunity to send messengers down to Accra, nominally to thank Governor. Ussher for his presents, but secretly to ascertain the views and position of the Government with regard to Adansi. These messengers were duly received and dismissed by the Governor and returned to Cape Coast, where they remained, collecting information and watching events on the coast, explaining their delay in returning to their own country by a number of frivolous excuses.
It appears that about this time Mensah also sent a second mission to Gaman, for in October or November, 1880, Gaman messengers came to the Lieutenant-Governor, Mr. Griffith, who had administered the Government since the death of Mr. Ussher, at Accra, saying that the King of Ashanti had sent a message to the Ajiman section of the Gamans to the effect that he, Mensah, had paid a sum of money to the Queen of England in order that the Gaman country should be placed under his rule, and that, the Queen having consented to it, the Gamans were now his people.
While all this was going on, the war party in Coomassie had fast been gaining the upper hand. The bellicose chiefs spoke of Quoffi Calcalli as a man who, whatever might have been his other shortcomings, was, at all events, not afraid of the white men, and recommenced their intrigues with that individual. Matters became so serious that, in December 1880, Mr. Buhl, the Secretary of the Basle Mission Society, reported to the Lieutenant-Governor that there were rumours in Ashanti that the country was going to war; and, in the same month, Chief Taboo of Adansi informed the District Commissioner at Cape Coast that Chief Opokoo of Becquai had publicly sworn before the king at Coomassie that he would force Adansi to become again subject to Ashanti. Confusion began to reign in Coomassie, and the struggle forsupremacy between the court and the war party was fast approaching a crisis, when the events which led to the sending of the golden axe to Cape Coast in January 1881 occurred.
[1]Demands that they should return to their own country.
[2]The Treaty of Fommanagh was the one signed by Sir Garnet Wolseley after the burning of Coomassie. The third article provided for the independence of Adansi.
Cape Coast—The Panic—The Golden Axe—Preparations for Defence—Ansah—A divided Command—A second message from the King—Native Levies—Ordered to Anamaboe.
Cape Coast—The Panic—The Golden Axe—Preparations for Defence—Ansah—A divided Command—A second message from the King—Native Levies—Ordered to Anamaboe.
At 2 p.m. on February 2nd the “Cameroon” dropped anchor off Cape Coast Castle, and the whole reinforcement was landed in safety through the surf by 4 p.m.
The panic reigning on this portion of the Gold Coast would have been amusing had it not been so disgraceful. Seven thousand men had been asked for from England, though the last war had been brought to a successful termination with two West India regiments and two European battalions, for practically the 23rd Regiment took no part in the operations. The walls of Elmina Castle, a fortress impregnable at any time by savages, had been heightened with sand-bags, as though regular siege approaches were anticipated; and a few days before our arrival the advisability of abandoning that post, together with Fort St. Jago, and withdrawing the garrison of Houssa Constabulary to Cape Coast, had been seriously entertained. One hundred and fifteen Houssas were at Prahsu and forty at Mansu, but no attempt was tobe made to arrest the advance of the enemy by occupying either of these places in force and raising field-works; and on February 3rd it was decided that the whole available force of the Colony should be employed in the defence of the forts of Anamaboe, Cape Coast, Elmina, and Axim. In other words, the Ashantis were to be allowed to ravage the whole country from the Prah to the sea, and the natives were to receive no protection whatever; while the garrisons were to be shut up in inglorious safety within stone walls. A high Colonial official said to me:—
“Oh! we’re so glad you fellows have come. There has been no safe place to go to at all, and hardly a man-of-war about to get on board of.”
People seemed to imagine that the Ashanti army had been supplied by some enterprising contractor with seven-leagued boots, and could move in one spring from the northern border of Adansi to the sea-board without our receiving any warning, or information concerning their progress, from the inhabitants of the country. The Lieutenant-Governor, with his principal officers, had taken refuge in the Castle, and, although the ambassadors with the axe had only left Cape Coast Castle on their return journey to Coomassie on January 26th, a scare had taken place on the night of February 1st, when everybody must have been aware that the messengers had not had time to reach theircapital. Some intelligent negro alarmed the town in the dead of night by declaring that he had seen the advancing Ashantis on the Prah road, about three miles from the Castle. Upon this, the garrison was got under arms, a patrol sent out, and all the lights in the Castle extinguished. The object of this last strategic movement is difficult of discovery, unless it was done in the hope that the Ashantis might not see the Castle in the dark, and so pass on and go elsewhere.
Europeans professed to feel unsafe even in the forts, when they must have known from past events, such as the defence of Anamaboe Fort by a garrison of some thirty-nine men against an entire Ashanti army, that the Ashantis could never venture seriously to attack them. In fact the Ashanti is only dangerous in the bush, and when once he comes into the open, or ventures to attack fortified posts, he is of but little importance. Had an invasion really been taking place, thousands of people from the bush villages would have been flocking into Cape Coast for refuge; but that town remained in its usual stagnant condition, and the natives declared that no advance of the enemy was imminent.
What had really been said and done by the ambassadors was, moreover, not very clear. It appeared that on January 18th a refugee fromCoomassie, who had arrived at Cape Coast a day or two previously, had presented himself at Elmina Castle to claim protection. He stated that he was an Ashanti prince, named Awoosoo, and that, having incurred King Mensah’s displeasure, he had sought safety in flight. On January 19th a messenger from the king, with the golden axe and accompanied by three court-criers, demanded an audience of the Lieutenant-Governor. This messenger was a son of the late Ashanti chief, Amanquah Roomah, and he brought with him to the audience Enguie and Busumburu, the two Ashanti messengers who had been sent to thank Governor Ussher for his presents, and who had since been living in Cape Coast collecting information. The former of these two had signed the Treaty of Fommanah with Sir Garnet Wolseley, and the latter was an Ashanti captain.
After the usual compliments the messenger stated that the king had sent him to tell the Governor that a man named Awoosoo, a son of a prince of Ashanti, whoso ancestors were from Gaman, had been persuaded by an Assin trader, named Amankrah, to run away from Coomassie to the Protectorate; and the king had sent him to ask the Governor to send back Awoosoo. Further the envoy demanded that Amankrah should be given up, because, although hehad been regarded by the king as a friend, and had been for many years a resident in Coomassie, it had been reported to the king that he had lately gone to Gaman and obtained money from the king of that country upon a promise that he would use his best endeavours to persuade Awoosoo to go to Gaman.
To this the Lieutenant-Governor replied that as Awoosoo had not committed any crime, and was now under British protection, it was not in his power to give him up to the king. Enguie then asked if the Lieutenant-Governor would prevent Awoosoo from going to Gaman; and was told in reply that he was free to go from British protection or remain under it, as he pleased, no one having any right to control his movements.
So far all who were present at the audience were agreed as to what had occurred, but as to what followed there was a serious difference of opinion. Some said that Enguie then stated that the Assins were people who always caused palavers between Ashanti and the Protectorate, and that the king said if the Lieutenant-Governor would not give up Awoosoo he would invade Assin. Those who held to this version further stated that Busumburu at once got up and confirmed this statement, and that the Lieutenant-Governor thereupon called Enguie’s attention to thetreaty of Fommanah, and pointed out to him that an invasion of Assin meant war with England.
Other officers who were present at the audience positively declared that nothing of the sort had occurred, and that Enguie had at the audience made no threat of invasion; but that, as it had been reported that he had said to the interpreter, informally, and in the course of conversation at the interpreter’s house, that if Awoosoo were not given up the king would take Assin, the treaty of 1874 was shown to him. For my part I am inclined to believe that this latter account is the correct one; but it is a question which can never be satisfactorily settled, as the evidence is so conflicting.
With regard to the golden axe, people spoke of it as being a declaration of war, and said that it had been sent down in 1873, which was not a fact. In reality the golden axe alone is neither a declaration of war nor a menace. It simply means that the embassy which bears it is no ordinary one, and that the matter on which the envoys have come is one in which, as the senders think, great interests are at stake. In this case, however, the axe was accompanied by an additional emblem which did threaten hostilities. This was a fac-simile in gold of a portion of the earthen-nest of a mason-wasp, which escaped the notice of all Colonial officials, with but one exception, or wasconsidered by them unworthy of notice. This emblem denoted that if the affair on which the golden axe was sent were not settled to the satisfaction of the Ashantis they would use their stings, or, in other words, endeavour to attain their ends by force. So little was this symbol understood in Colonial circles that no explanation of its presence or meaning was ever at any time demanded from the Ashantis, not even when, later, they were protesting that they had never threatened or wished for war.
With reference to the report that Amankrah had induced Awoosoo to escape from Coomassie, it seems evident that there was no truth in it. The former stated that he met Awoosoo at Quissah near Fommanah, and that he, Awoosoo, begged to be conducted to the Governor. Awoosoo corroborated this, and neither of them could have any motive for concealing the truth, if the flight had been arranged in Coomassie.
The story that Amankrah had received a sum of money from King Ajiman of Gaman on a promise to do his best to induce Awoosoo to go to Gaman was a plausible one. Awoosoo was the real heir of the Gaman throne, and, if he appeared as a claimant for it, the rival factions of Ajiman and Korkobo would bury their differences, and the Gamanites would become a united people. Naturally, under thesecircumstances, the Ashantis were very anxious to prevent him from going to Gaman. Awoosoo’s grandmother was a princess of Gaman, and it was through her that he derived his right to the throne, the female branches taking precedence of the male in conferring birthright both in Gaman and Ashanti. She married in Coomassie, and bore a daughter who married Prince Osai Cudjo of Ashanti. Awoosoo was the offspring of this union, and was thus a prince of Ashanti in right of his father and a prince of Gaman in right of his mother; but, in consequence of the native rule of precedence, he was considered to be a Gaman, and was always spoken of as a native of that country.
After the departure of the messengers with the golden axe the Colonial Government was suddenly seized with a violent craving for information concerning the tribes of the interior, their relations with Ashanti, and the position, in a military sense, of Ashanti itself. This was, of course, a most praiseworthy desire, but all such information ought to have been collected years before; and the eleventh hour, when all the officials were more or less in a state of panic, was hardly the time at which reliable data could be obtained or a temperate judgment formed. The merest hearsay reports were listened with avidity, and jotted down as most valuable evidence. Inquiries were made of Quabina Annuoah, the linguistof King Chiboo of Yancoomassie-Fanti, who, according to his own statement, had not been to Coomassie for sixteen years, as to the condition of the Snider rifles which were in the possession of the Ashantis, and which they had only obtained during the last three or four years. Quabina promptly replied that Mensah had about three hundred Sniders, with not many cartridges; that sometimes the rifles were not cleaned for a week or two, and were now nearly all useless. To show how utterly unreliable this was I may add that a few weeks later a man named Amoo Quacoo, a blacksmith and a native of Accra, was brought to me, and in the course of conversation stated that he had lately returned from Coomassie, where he had been employed by the king in looking after three hundred Snider rifles stored in the king’s house. He said that the rifles were all in good condition, that the Ashantis took great care of them, cleaning and oiling them daily; and that there were about four boxes of ammunition to each rifle. Awoosoo had also seen these three hundred rifles, and the Government at once jumped to the conclusion that these were all the Ashantis possessed, until the illusion was rudely dispelled by two Germans, Messrs. Buck and Huppenbauer, who saw the king in Coomassie on February 5th, and counted one thousand men armed with Sniders.
The statements of Awoosoo and Quabina Annuoah, to the effect that there were now no good captains or generals in Ashanti, were gravely written down; when the Government must, or at all events ought to have been, aware that both Awooah, chief of Bantama, the conqueror of Djuabin, and Opokoo, chief of Becquai, who had opposed such a vigorous resistance to Sir Garnet Wolseley in 1874, were still in the land of the living. The latter made his statement still more ridiculous by saying that they could not get any men of his size (about 5 feet 7 inches). These two men were also questioned as to the number of men King Mensah could put into the field. The former is stated in the official documents to have said 20,000 and the latter 30,000. I should like to know how these figures were arrived at, for in the Tche language there are no words which can specifically express any such numbers.
On January 30th Prince Ansah returned from Axim, where he had been on some secret errand, probably superintending the transmission of the three tons of powder, which were smuggled at Apollonia, to Coomassie; on the next day, and on February 3rd, he had interviews with the Lieutenant-Governor. He protested that the Ashantis had no intention of making war, and that the Government was making a great mistake. He further added that the golden axe didnot denote hostile action, and that both Enguie and Busumburu denied altogether having said that if Awoosoo were not given up the king would invade Assin. He seemed much impressed at the rapidity with which the reinforcement had arrived from Sierra Leone. The Lieutenant-Governor, adopting a high tone, told Ansah that he would demand 5,000 ounces of gold as compensation for the expense to which the Colony had been put, and said that if the king refused to pay it he would seize some of his territory. As Ansah was not an accredited ambassador, but merely an agent, the Lieutenant-Governor committed himself to nothing by this statement; and probably the former knew quite well that the Imperial Government would never allow us to take the initiative in any hostile measures.
The advent of the two companies from Sierra Leone had raised the total strength of regular troops on the Gold Coast to 400 men. Houssas had also been brought up to Accra, so that there were 295 men of the Gold Coast Constabulary available, and thus stationed:—At Elmina, 140; at Prahsu, 115; and at Mansu, 40. H.M.S. “Flirt” had arrived at Elmina, and fifty of her men were held in readiness to land. These sensible additions to the local defences had somewhat quieted apprehensions, but there was still a good deal of excitement. The officials of the colonyhad plucked up courage, and some positively bristled with warlike ardour; the ordinary duties and peaceful habits of life were discarded, the proverbial phrase “Cedant arma togæ” was cast to the dogs, and high legal functionaries busied themselves in the proposed raising of a local volunteer corps of native clerks and shopmen.
Earthworks were commenced at Java Hill and in the Government Garden at Elmina, where, in June 1873, a handful of the Second West India regiment had repulsed the main Ashanti attack with great slaughter. This work, when completed, was to be garrisoned by the seamen and marines from the men-of-war now lying off Elmina; but the senior naval officer refused to land his men unless he was allowed to take charge of the military operations. As there is a paragraph in the Queen’s Regulations expressly stating that naval officers shall not command troops on shore, this rather created a difficulty, which, however, the Lieutenant-Governor met by placing, much to the disgust of the military, the Houssa Constabulary under the orders of the naval officer. The seamen and marines, to the number of some fifty, were then landed, and remained in Elmina Castle for three days, at great peril to their health, as they were not provided with helmets.
During his short reign the senior naval officer withdrew all the Houssas from Prahsu and Mansu, onthe grounds that if they were left there they would be defeated and cut off. He did not seem to be aware that it was the duty of outposts to delay the advance of an enemy without compromising their own retreat, and to fall back slowly, sending full information to the main body. When the Houssas were withdrawn several thousand rounds of Snider ammunition were left at Prahsu, which the Ashantis could have taken had they so pleased; and had the enemy advanced we should have had to depend upon the ignorant and panic-stricken natives for intelligence, and should have had no reliable information as to the number, line of march, and armament of the foe. In fact, it would be difficult to imagine a more inexpedient step than this withdrawal of our frontier post, for, in addition to weakening our military position, it naturally disheartened the protected tribes, and encouraged the Ashantis.
Before, however, this division in the command was made, the Ashanti messengers, both men of low origin, which in itself, considering the serious state of affairs, was a slight to the Government, arrived at Cape Coast, and had an audience with the Lieutenant-Governor on February 8th. These messengers were Quabina Ewah, a court-crier, and Quabina Oyentaki, a sword-bearer. They were accompanied by Enguie and Busumburu.
These envoys had left Coomassie before the ambassadors with the golden axe had returned, having in fact met them one day’s journey from the capital, and brought the following message:—
“The king has heard that Houssas and officers are at Prahsu, building a bridge. As all that is past is gone and done with, he wishes to know what this means, and why the Governor is going to fight?”
The messengers complained that the Adansis had illtreated them on their way through Adansi territory, and that they had seen them seize two Ashanti traders from the Kokofuah district, and plunder them of their goods and gunpowder. They further stated that the messengers with the golden axe had told them that at an Adansi village, named Ansah, a trader who had joined the retinue had been ill-treated and robbed of his gun. They applied to the Lieutenant-Governor for redress, and were evidently fully under the impression that Adansi was either included in the British protectorate or that we were bound by treaty to protect them from the Ashantis, and were consequently under the obligation of seeing that no Ashantis were maltreated by them.
In fact the Adansis appear to have laboured under the delusion that we were bound to support them, and so behaved in this manner. A renegade is always more bitter than a foe who has not changed sides, andthe Adansis, havingrattedfrom the Ashanti kingdom when they conceived it to be falling to pieces, were now displaying their animosity by the—in this part of the world—unheard-of insult of molesting a person in the retinue of an ambassador. As they are numerically an insignificant tribe, they would not have dared to do this had they not believed that Great Britain was bound to save them from the vengeance of Ashanti; and, now that King Mensah fully understands that they are not a protected people, and provided that our non-intervention policy is still persevered in, their day of reckoning is not far distant.
One of the messengers, Quabina Eunah, having remarked that the Adansis were clearing the roads, the Lieutenant-Governor said that they were bound to do so by the treaty of Fommanah, and expressed a hope that the king of Ashanti was also fulfilling his treaty obligations by keeping the main road to his capital clear of bush, which expression elicited nothing from the messengers but a laugh. Now whether he was annoyed at this, or whether it was simply through ignorance of native customs (he being quite new to the country and people), the Lieutenant-Governor at once questioned the authenticity of the message, and asked the messengers how he was to know that they came from the king. They pointed to the gold plates on their breasts as being theirinsignia of office, and the Lieutenant-Governor then said that the king ought to have sent him something which he had seen before, and could therefore recognise. Upon this Enguie sarcastically observed that hitherto the Governor had seen nothing from the king but the golden axe, and as they had left Coomassie before that state weapon had been returned to the capital it was impossible that they could have brought it down; adding, “even if his Excellency would like to see it again, which I doubt.” Everybody felt that the Lieutenant-Governor had not got the best of this little exchange of words, which had arisen through his groundless suspicion.
The ignorance of the country and mode of thought of the natives displayed by the Lieutenant-Governor’s advisers militated very much against the taking of vigorous measures. A combination of native tribes against Ashanti was talked of, and men who ought to have known better did not hesitate to include the Gamans in this confederation. The truth was, that the fact that a Gaman embassy had visited the coast in 1879, and had stated that the whole nation was actuated by a bitter hostility to Ashanti, was remembered; while all the information gained by Mr. Smith in his mission to Buntuku, which tended to show that no such feeling of ill-will existed, was forgotten. No doubt that gentleman’s report had long since been lostsight of in one of the pigeon-holes in the Private Secretary’s office. Native report concerning Gaman asserted that King Ajiman had contrived to retain possession of the throne, but that Prince Korkobo was, in all but name, the actual ruler, and had been nominated Ajiman’s successor.
The only tribes in the British protectorate who could be relied upon to furnish a certain quota of men are those of Denkera, Assin, Western Akim, and Fanti. Wassaw, Ahanta, and Eastern Akim would not move in 1873, and do not seem to have any feeling of enmity to Ashanti; while to utilize the men of King Blay of Apollonia away from their own country would only be to tempt the disaffected natives surrounding his territory to take up arms.
That the tribes in the neighbourhood of Axim and Apollonia were disaffected was evident from the reports of the District Commissioner there, Mr. Firminger, a young officer who had taken the trouble to study what is too frequently neglected by the Colonial officers on the Gold Coast, namely, the political relations of the tribes with which he was brought in contact. He reported that the Awooins were on the most intimate terms with the Ashantis, and that their disregard for English law was owing to advice from Coomassie. The king of Bayin was also on friendly terms with King Mensah, and in January1881 had sent one of his cane-bearers to Coomassie to reside there, and had received in return an Ashanti agent to reside at Bayin. Mr. Firminger says:—“Should any trouble occur with Ashanti I am assured that the people from Bayin to the frontier would join them.”[3]
Under the general name of Fanti are included the petty kingdoms of Cape Coast, Elmina, Effutu, Abrali, Dunquah, Dominassi, Anamaboe, Mankessim, Ajimacong, and Mumford; and, generally speaking, the men of these sub-divisions are worthless as soldiers, while Elmina and Effutu are more than half friendly to the Ashantis. The number of men which each chief could put into the field is enormously exaggerated; thus the Anamaboe contingent is estimated at from 2,500 to 3,000, whereas it would beexceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to raise more than 500 men from that district. By using strong measures 4,000 men might be got together from the Fanti tribes collectively, but they would all rather carry than fight, and it would be better so to employ them.
On February 8th I received orders to proceed next day to Anamaboe with 100 men and two 4-2/5-inch howitzers, and occupy the fort there, which had hurriedly been put into a state of preparation, after having been without a garrison for some fifty years. With some difficulty I obtained permission to march to my destination instead of going by sea, as fears were entertained as to the liability of my being cut off; but I pointed out that as no enemy had yet crossed the Prah, and as that frontier was seventy-four miles distant, there could be no danger in a march which would only occupy a few hours. At that time war was considered inevitable: the axe, accompanied by the wasp’s nest, was a clear declaration of war; and Ansah’s declarations, and the second message from the king, viewed by the light of similar protestations in 1873, were not considered of much account.
Under such circumstances, to garrison Anamaboe with 100 men was, from a military point of view, a grievous mistake. In the first place it reduced the already sufficiently small force at Cape Coast; in thesecond place the Ashantis had never been near Anamaboe since 1807, and were not likely to go there in 1881, since they had considered it too insignificant in 1814, 1824, 1863, and 1873; and in the third place, should the presence there of troops attract them, the force, being so small, could only act on the defensive. Held with a force sufficiently large to permit of offensive measures being adopted, Anamaboe would be an excellent position, as it is some miles nearer to Dunquah, and consequently to the Prah, than Cape Coast, and the flank of an army threatening the latter town might most effectually be harassed from it.
[3]This opinion, which is based upon unmistakeable facts, shows how precarious would be the position of the various Goldmining Companies now endeavouring to induce the British public to take shares in their enterprises. I have been asked by persons connected with these Companies to state that in the event of complications with Ashanti the Tarquah district would be quite free from molestation. I regret that I am unable to do so; but I believe that immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities the mining camps would be pillaged, the “plant” destroyed, and the persons employed only able to save their lives by instant flight. Of course, if the Colonial Government adopt measures for the protection of these Companies, that is another matter; but the main road from Assinee to Coomassie passes through Awooin, and the Ashantis would not allow their main artery for the supply of munitions of war to be cut off without opposition.
A Teacher of the Gospel—Anamaboe—A third Message from the King—Affairs in Coomassie—Downfall of the War Party—False Rumours—Arrival of the Governor—A fourth Message from the King—Further Complications.
A Teacher of the Gospel—Anamaboe—A third Message from the King—Affairs in Coomassie—Downfall of the War Party—False Rumours—Arrival of the Governor—A fourth Message from the King—Further Complications.
At 5 a.m. on February 9th the company paraded, and we marched off to Anamaboe, a distance of some twelve miles. We followed the Prah road as far as Inquabim market, that is for about four and a half miles, and then branched off to the right by a narrow and irregular bush-path over the Iron Hills: the track was too narrow for two men to walk abreast, and the procession consequently was strung out to some length. The few natives we met, astonished at the unusual spectacle of soldiers in this part of the country, and fancying we were going to seize them as carriers, as was done in 1874, bolted into the bush directly they caught sight of us, dropping their pots of water or loads of plantains in their flight.
After three hours’ marching over vile roads and steep hills we halted for an hour for breakfast at a small village in the bush about nine miles from Cape Coast; the men piled arms and bivouacked under someumbrella-trees in the centre of the village, while we, the officers, went towards a fairly good sort of house that stood close by; The owner and occupier of this mansion was a local preacher belonging to some missionary society, and he at once said, like any other native would have said, that we might make use of his house during our stay; but added, unlike any other native, provided we paid him: we made no difficulty about this, and proceeded to breakfast. While we were discussing that meal the preacher came in accompanied by two young girls, about twelve or thirteen years of age, attired in gorgeous native cloths, with their wool distorted into the latest Fanti fashion, and bedecked with brilliant handkerchiefs. We asked our host if he required anything, and he said “No,” he had only come to do a little business with us; we then inquired what that business might be, and, after a little beating about the bush, he informed us that, as Anamaboe was rather a dull place for Europeans, he thought we might like to buy these two girls, and, if so, we could have them for 4l.a piece. We asked him what authority he had for disposing of them in this unceremonious fashion, and he replied that they were his servants; but, on being pressed for further information, he confessed that they had been given to him by their parents in payment of some debt—in fact they were slaves. Much to hisdisappointment we felt ourselves obliged to decline his generous offer, which refusal he attributed entirely to the price, and lowered his terms first to 3l.10s.and then to 3l., equally without success; while it was easy to see that the dusky damsels considered our rejection of the proposal as a proof of our exceedingly bad taste, and were as much disappointed and chagrined as their master.
A little abashed at the manner in which we had treated his offer, the preacher sent away the two young ladies to the back of his premises, and, beginning to have a faint idea that he had somehow not risen in our estimation, he endeavoured to retrieve his lost ground by falling back upon his more legitimate occupation, and asked that we should delay our departure in order that he might preach a sermon to the men. The hypocrisy of this proposition, coming as it did immediately after the other, was more than we could stand, and, expressing our thoughts in unequivocal terms, we paid him what we owed, went out, and got the men together ready to march off. The village pastor, however, was not going to be done out of an opportunity of showing forth before his unsophisticated flock, and, while we were preparing to start, delivered an exhortation in which “the sword of the Lord and of Gideon,” “soldiers of the Lord,” “smite with the edge of the sword,” and similarexpressions, were jumbled together in a meaningless jargon; while when we moved off he strode alongside for some distance, open-mouthed, shouting in a discordant voice that highly-appropriate hymn called “Hold the Fort,” the work of those itinerant vendors of religion, Messrs. Moody and Sankey.
Whenever I meet such creatures as this local preacher I am moved to anger and restrain myself only with difficulty. Little children in England stint themselves in the luxury of sweets by giving of their scarce pence to aid the “poor missionaries,” and people who can ill afford to be charitable contribute their mite to further the promulgation of Christianity among heathen negroes; while scoundrels like this preacher batten upon the subscriptions thus raised, live in the best house in the village, acquire authority and wealth, and lead a happy life of idleness and vice. The persons who draw up those highly-coloured Mission Reports for the benefit of the gullible British public have a great deal to answer for.
We reached Anamaboe about 10 a.m., and found the fort prepared for our reception as well as could be expected under the circumstances. Of late years it had been occupied by two or three Fanti policemen with their numerous wives and dependents, and consequently was not as clean as it might have been;while no attempt had been made to make good the damage resulting from years of neglect. As a military position, the defects which were the cause of the surrender of the fort to the Ashantis in 1806 had not been remedied; the loopholes in the curtain were so made that fire could only be brought to bear on a point some forty yards from the walls, and persons beyond or within that distance could not be touched, while the embrasures yawned to such an extent that it would cost many lives to work guns so exposed to the fire of an enemy. Added to this, the native swish-houses extended on one side to within twenty yards of the walls; and on another side stood an immense house, built of stone, which actually overlooked the bastions and commanded the whole fort. As neither food nor water fit to drink were to be obtained here, these necessaries of life had to be forwarded daily from Cape Coast in surf-boats: sometimes the water, through some oversight, failed to appear, and we had to use the dysenteric liquid from the neighbouring pools, or go without; the former alternative was usually chosen, and, in spite of every precaution, such as boiling and filtering, a very large percentage of the men were constantly on the sick-list. As for the officers, three in number, we were always more or less ill. The town was in a condition of indescribable filth, and at times the stenchwhich arose was so suffocating that, in spite of the intense heat, we were obliged to keep the doors and windows of our rooms closed. The streets, the yards, the bush—in fact the whole surface of the earth within a radius of half-a-mile from the fort—was covered with the collected refuse of half-a-century, which, under the combined influence of sun and rain, gave forth a curious variety of pestilential odours. Altogether, Anamaboe was an exceedingly salubrious and, under the circumstances, useful post.
On February 17th a third embassy arrived at Cape Coast from Coomassie, consisting of a linguist, a sword-bearer, three court-criers, and an old fetish priestess, the latter of whom threatened to utterly destroy both the English and the Fantis if they did not at once abandon any intention they might have of making war upon Ashanti. On the 18th these ambassadors, with the exception of the old lady, had an interview with the Lieutenant-Governor at Elmina, Enguie and Busumburu being again in attendance. After the preliminary formalities, Bendi, the linguist, said:—
“The king of Ashanti sends his compliments to his friend the Governor, and bids me to speak to the Governor’s interpreter, and to tell him to say to the Governor that some time ago an Assin trader, named Amankrah, came to Coomassie to trade, andstole away the king’s son Awoosoo down to the coast. When Prince Awoosoo ran away from Coomassie the king’s messengers came to ask the Governor to give him up. But by the law of England, if a man runs to the English Government for protection, he cannot be given up. The king of Ashanti says—‘When my son ran away I applied to the Governor to see if he could give him up to me. I have no palaver with the Assins, but Enguie, out of his own head, said to the Governor—‘If you do not give him up, some palaver will come.’ Your Excellency must know that that was not the king’s message.’
“The Governor said—‘Give me the paper.’ He said to Enguie—‘Are you Enguie? Are you the man who signed the treaty that Assin, Gaman, and Denkera, should be under the English, and now do you come to me to break the treaty?’ Enguie said—‘I do not break the treaty.’ After this we wished to leave Elmina in order to go to Cape Coast, but next morning a messenger came and told our messengers that they must not go, for the Governor had still something to say. Then our messengers waited and the Governor said he must make a book,[4]because Enguie had broken the treaty. Ourmessengers replied—‘No one can read at Coomassie, but we will take your letter to the king.’
“Then the letter was carried to the king, and the king said—‘Enguie did not break the treaty. The words he spoke were his own words. He was sent to the Governor to be kept on the coast. He is the Governor’s servant, and it must not be said that he broke the treaty.’ For this reason the king has sent us, his linguist and sword-bearer, to let the Governor know that this is the case. We mean to say that Enguie himself said these words, and not the king. He is the servant of the Governor as well as of the king, and it was his own speech, and not the king’s message.
“Again we say to the Governor, the king of Adansi made a report that the king of Ashanti is going to march upon the Adansis and fight with them. But, in consequence of the treaty between England and Ashanti, the Ashantis would not come down to fight with anybody. They would not bring a single gun across the Prah to fight. As to the people under the English Government, the king will never come to fight any one of them. The king says so. If the Governor has heard that the Ashantis are ready to attack any part of the protectorate, the report is not true. The king wishes to be a friend to this Governor, as Quacoe Duah was toGovernor Maclean. If any one says that the king of Ashanti intends to attack the protectorate it is false, and not true. He has sent us to say that it is not true. He wishes to be friendly with the Governor.
“As to the gold axe, it means nothing. It is not used as a symbol; you can ask any of the chiefs about here. Amankrah Accoomah, the axe-bearer, used to bring the axe, but it is no symbol. The king says—‘You can tell the Governor that the axe is nothing.’ If any one comes and reports to the Governor this and that of the king, let the Governor send a messenger to the king, and the king will clear himself.
“We have finished. For this reason have we come, we wish to be friends with the Governor. As to what Enguie has said, Enguie is the Governor’s servant, and the Governor can forgive Enguie and let that pass.”
After this some conversation ensued, in the course of which both Enguie and Busumburu, amid considerable confusion, denied that the former had ever said that the king would attack Assin. The Lieutenant-Governor thereupon called the Government interpreter, Davis, and in answer to questions the latter said that Enguie had told him, at his house, that if Awoosoo were not given up the Ashantis would attack Assin. It is worthy of notice that Davissaid nothing of any such threat having been formally made during the audience with the Lieutenant-Governor; indeed, for some inscrutable reason, the regular interpreter had not been employed upon that occasion, and the duty of interpretation had been left to a young clerk employed in the Colonial Office, a fact which renders the theory of a formal threat having been made exceedingly doubtful.
This was all that occurred of moment, and as the Governor, Sir Samuel Rowe, was expected to arrive soon, the Lieutenant-Governor decided to leave things as they were, and merely returned a message to the effect that he was glad to hear of King Mensah’s peaceable intentions, and that so long as these were manifest he would be his friend. Yet, having heard that Sir Samuel Rowe would arrive in a few days, he thought it better to leave the matter in his hands, as the Governor coming direct from the Queen would know her mind on the subject.
Having seen what was taking place in the protectorate it may be now interesting to know what the Ashantis had been doing in their capital, and to ascertain the causes which led to the threatening attitude, and to the subsequent peaceful and apologetic messages.
As I have endeavoured to show in Chapter XI., affairs were in rather a critical condition in Coomassieowing to the struggle for supremacy between the war and court parties, and the escape of Awoosoo, happening at this crisis, placed the winning card in the hands of the former. As I have already said, it was necessary in the interests of Prince Korkobo of Gaman, the good friend and ally of Ashanti, that Awoosoo should be detained in Coomassie, and the unexpected escape of a person of such importance in Ashanti politics created the greatest consternation, which feeling, when it became known that the fugitive had claimed British protection, was soon mingled with a longing for revenge. Numerous influential chiefs, who had hitherto either belonged to the court party or had equally held aloof from both sections, now joined the war party, which carried everything before it, and at the “palaver” which was held Mensah could do nothing but acquiesce in their proposals: in fact any attempt on his part to stem the popular current would only have resulted in his downfall.
From time immemorial in Ashanti it had been the custom when any important personage sought asylum with the British Government to send an embassy to demand the surrender of the refugee, with instructions, in the event of a refusal, to threaten prompt hostilities. At the meeting of turbulent “caboceers” it was determined to follow this haughty precedent, and the kingwas compelled to submit. To use the words of an eye-witness—“The king said to the messengers who were to start for Cape Coast—‘All black men are subject to me and I will have my revenge for all this.’ He then took the golden axe and the golden hoe, saying: ‘If this man should escape up a tree, here is an axe with which to cut it down. Should he burrow into the ground, here is a hoe with which to dig him up. Go, and bring him back.’”
This reference to the axe and hoe meant that the ambassadors were to hew or make their way through all obstacles; and that, if necessary, force would be used for the accomplishment of the mission on which they were sent.
So far, but no further, was Mensah influenced by the powerful war party. A number of the chiefs wished to declare war at once, without waiting for any reply from the Government of the Gold Coast to their demand; and Awooah, the Ashanti general, actually swore the king’s oath, to break which is death, that he would drive the Adansis over the Prah. He left Coomassie for Bantama, his town, to call out the men of his district; but Mensah succeeded in persuading all the other chiefs, except Opokoo of Becquai, to postpone actual hostilities until the expected refusal of the Government, had been received, and Awooah, finding only one chief ready to secondhim, gave up his project. As he was too influential a person to be put to death, for in Ashanti as elsewhere the law seems to be made rather for the poor than for the rich, he was punished for breaking the king’s oath by the infliction of a heavy fine.
After the departure of the embassy with the axe, most of the opposition “caboceers” retired to their own towns to await the issue, and Mensah took advantage of this to gather round him all his adherents and strengthen his position. Before, however, the ambassadors returned to the capital with the reply of the Lieutenant-Governor, messengers arrived there with the news that Houssas and officers were at Prahsu building a bridge. This report, which originated in the despatch of a few Houssas to Prahsu to watch events, while it confirmed the worst apprehensions of the court party, seemed to the war party to evince a disposition on the part of the Colonial Government to meet them half-way, which they considered exceedingly suspicious. In all their former wars with the British they had taken the initiative, and over-run the country between the Prah and the sea with their victorious armies. Even in the disastrous war of 1873-4 they had, for more than six months, held entire possession of the western half of the colony, with the exception of two or three towns on the sea-board, which were protected by the forts and gunboats.They wished for war it is true, but they wished to enter upon it when and where they pleased, and were not at all prepared to have it carried into their own country. That they expected this to be done is evident from the message sent by the king on February 6th to Mr. Newenham, the constabulary officer stationed at Prahsu, to the effect that he hoped to receive timely notice before the British forces marched on Coomassie. They remembered the advance of European troops which followed the building of a bridge over the Prah on a former occasion, therefore when told that a bridge was now being built, they jumped to the conclusion that the Government must have some considerable force at hand. The more hot-headed members of the war party wished to invade Adansi at once, so as to dispute the passage of the Prah, but some of the more recent adherents of this group changed sides once more, thus strengthening Mensah’s hands; and the result of the next “palaver” was the despatch of the peaceful and apologetic second message, which was delivered at Cape Coast Castle on February 8th.
The day after this second embassy had left Coomassie, the ambassadors with the golden axe returned with the letter from the Lieutenant-Governor, refusing to comply with the demand which had been made for the surrender of Awoosoo, and two dayslater an important “palaver” was held. The two parties were now fairly matched, and the discussion lasted for several days, each section endeavouring, by eloquence, taunts, threats, and promises, to win over wavering opponents to its own side. While victory was still trembling in the balance news arrived at Coomassie that the Government was arming the Fantis and the Assins, and was about to invade Ashanti with these auxiliaries. This rumour was entirely without foundation, but its effect in Coomassie was prodigious. Neither the war nor the court party could hear patiently that their old enemies, whom they had conquered time after time, and whom they considered to be slaves and women, were about to carry war into their territory; a terrible orgie broke out, the death-drum was beaten, slaves were sacrificed, all the Assins and Fantis in Coomassie were “put in log,” and night closed upon a wild scene of madness and intoxication.
Had not this report been immediately contradicted war would have been inevitable; but next morning it was declared to be unfounded by a messenger from Prince Ansah who opportunely arrived, and who also brought the news of the sudden arrival of troops at Cape Coast from Sierra Leone. The strength of the reinforcement was greatly exaggerated, and it was said that thousands of Europeans wereen routefromEngland and daily expected. The war party then began to think that, considering the divided state of the nation, they had been a little too hasty in their declaration of hostilities, and that it would be better to temporise. The queen-mother, who possessed enormous influence, threatened to commit suicide “on the heads”[5]of the principal chiefs of the war party if they persevered in their intentions, and this threat sealed the fate of their party. Most of the bellicose chiefs returned to their own towns to sulk in dignified silence, and Mensah had things entirely his own way. To show how pacific were his intentions he said, at a palaver which was held at this time, “It is said that white men are coming across the Prah. We have done nothing, we have no quarrel with them. Let us sit still; and, if they wish to fight, let them fire the first shot.” A party of Ashantis whom he had sent to take possession of a gold-mine situated in Adansi territory, and the ownership of which was the subject of a dispute, were also recalled, in order that there might be no pretext for saying that he was interfering in the affairs of tribes who wereindependent The day after the above statement of his intentions Mensah sent his third message to the Lieutenant-Governor, explicitly stating that he had no hostile design. This message was, as we have seen, delivered on February 18th; thus, twenty-five days after the declaration of war, it was known to the government of the Gold Coast that Mensah desired peace, and that there was no prospect of an embroilment; but by that time the first alarming telegram had already reached England.
After the decision of the Lieutenant-Governor to do nothing till the arrival of his superior, the Colony was disturbed by several groundless alarms. One of these was to the effect that the king was calling out his army, and had posted a strong force at Ordahsu; while, according to another, which was current on March 2nd, the Ashantis had crossed the Prah in force, and had reached Dunquah. The author of these false reports was never discovered, though suspicion fell upon a trader, who, having a large supply of goods on hand, wished to keep others from importing. This man was also suspected of sending that telegram from St. Vincent which surprised England with the intelligence that the Ashanti army was within three days’ march of Cape Coast.
But, although there was little or nothing to be feared from the tribes beyond the boundary of theColony, there was a great deal of dissatisfaction amongst the protected tribes. The chiefs of Accra, on being called together to state what quota of men they would be prepared to furnish in case of war, flatly refused to raise any men for the defence of the protectorate until their king, Tacki, was released from imprisonment at Elmina. This refusal was committed to writing and the document signed by forty-eight of the most influential chiefs of the district. I have already referred to the critical state of affairs in the western extremity of the Colony, and to the east the Awoonahs began to make preparations; so energetically, too, that the chiefs of Addah, who had promised to raise some 4,000 men, now said that they could not leave their own country, as, were they to do so, the Awoonahs would pillage their towns and carry off the women and children.
These facts were rude shocks to the Government. Theoretical Governors had fondly nursed the belief, until it had grown into an article of faith, that the years of peace which had succeeded the events of 1874 had induced the various tribes in the protectorate,—distinct though these were by language, traditions, and customs,—to bury their several grievances and become a homogeneous people, and now it was only too evident that the mere rumour of possible hostilities with Ashanti had alone been sufficient tobring again into prominence all their inter-tribal enmities, and make each nation suspicious and jealous of its neighbours. The world can now judge how far any proposed combination of the protected tribes against Ashanti would be likely to be successful.
On March 4th the Governor of the Gold Coast Colony, Sir Samuel Rowe, arrived at Elmina, accompanied by some half-dozen of the Sierra Leone armed police, a number of Kroomen, who had been engaged as carriers, and several officers temporarily in Colonial employ. By the 12th the Chief Justice had arrived from Accra, and the Governor was sworn in.
After this ceremony had been performed everybody expected him to say or do something to re-open communications with the king, to whose peaceful message of February 18th no answer had yet been returned; but, instead, nothing was talked of but meetings of friendly chiefs and the raising of native levies. A demonstration to the Prah was mooted, which, had it been undertaken, would have been quite useless, for the now independent kingdom of Adansi intervenes between that river and Ashanti; while the dreadful mortality of the war of 1863 should have taught that no body of men ought to be encamped at Prahsu, if any other equally suitable locality could be found. As the king had said he desired peace, there did not seem any necessity for ademonstration at all; though, if one were undertaken, the Adansi hills, being at once comparatively healthy and on the southern frontier of Ashanti, would be the proper point at which to make it.
The old rumours of preparations in Ashanti were revived. It was reported that a messenger from the king of Adansi had brought intelligence that the army was being called out, and a letter from a German agent at Addah, one of the last places for obtaining authentic information from Coomassie, was gravely quoted in support of the theory that, in spite of all peaceable protestations, Mensah still meant war. Many people began seriously to think that the Governor intended to force on a war, while others, who were more behind the scenes, surmised that Sir Samuel Rowe was merely raising the Ashanti bugbear in order that he might obtain more credit for laying it.
It was evident that the Home Government thought we were fighting for dear life, for on March 13th the hired transport “Ararat,” with sick and wounded from Natal, put in to Cape Coast,en routefor England, to pick up our wounded. Happily we had not prepared any, and the ship went away as it had come.
Earlier than this, however, namely on March 6th, the Governor had an interview with Enguie and Busumburu, who had remained at Cape Coast since the beginning of the complication. He addressed themto the effect that the British Government did not wish to conquer Ashanti, but rather that the Fantis and Ashantis should live in peace together, and was as ambiguous and encouraging as he could well be. The Ashantis replied that they had brought their message to Prince Ansah, and they wished to give it to the Governor through him.
Accordingly, on March 8th, Prince Ansah came to Elmina, and the ambassadors through him proposed that a portion of the embassy might be allowed to return to Coomassie, to carry a special message to the king. The Governor replied that he considered this request should be made by the ambassadors in person. This was done on the 11th, when the ambassadors stated that they were very anxious to send a message to the king, and requested permission to send three of their number to Coomassie. The Governor said that he had no objection as long as it was clearly understood that the message which they carried was a private one from themselves, and not from him, and that they made that matter perfectly clear to the king. Next day the messengers left for Coomassie, their departure and the final settlement of the Ashanti difficulty having by the above diplomatic subterfuges been delayed for six days.
In the meantime, King Mensah at Coomassie could not at all understand what was taking place. He hadsent to Cape Coast to say he had no intention of making war, and, instead of any reply being vouchsafed, he had been told that he must wait for an answer until the arrival of the Governor. That event had been duly communicated to him by his agent at Cape Coast, but still no message came, and his pacific declaration was treated with contemptuous silence. To say that he was not pleased at this would but feebly express his feelings on the subject. Never before had a message from an Ashanti king been received in such a contumelious manner; the majority of the chiefs were of opinion that it was a premeditated insult, and some went so far as to urge him to soothe his wounded dignity by an appeal to arms. In fact had the Government been desirous of war they could hardly have adopted a line of policy more likely to have produced that result. Mensah, however, was sincerely desirous of peace, and he despatched fresh messengers to Cape Coast, who, as an appeal to the Government was thought to be useless, were instructed to solicit the good offices of the traders, both European and native, to place matters on a friendly footing between the colony and Ashanti.
These messengers left Coomassie before the news of the Governor’s arrival had reached there, and arrived at Cape Coast on March 10th. They were four in number, and were named Osai Bruni, YowEwoah, Quarmin Insia, and Dantando. Their arrival, and the object of their mission, concerning which they made no secret, were at once communicated to the Governor by the District-Commissioner, but they were allowed to remain in the town unnoticed until the 13th, when they of their own accord went over to Elmina. There they asked permission to submit to the Governor the message that they intended to deliver to the merchants. After further unnecessary delays they were allowed to do so on March 16th, and were then informed that the Government had no objection to their delivering such a message, but they must clearly understand that this permission could not in any way affect any action which the Government might afterwards think proper to take.
On March the 18th a meeting of traders was held at Cape Coast, and the following was the message delivered—“The king sent us to come to Prince Ansah and say ‘Let our family differences be at an end.’ He sent us to Prince Ansah for him to take us to the merchants of Cape Coast Castle for them to help the king, and say to the Governor that if he, the king, had done anything wrong in the matter of the message with the axe, that he, the king, asked that the Governor should pardon his mistake.” They further declared that Mensah was willing to do anything to maintain peace, and asked that aEuropean officer might be sent to Coomassie to see for himself that no preparations, either overt or secret, for war were going on.
After this meeting of the mercantile classes the Ashanti messengers again had an interview with the Governor, who told them that he had nothing to do with the message they brought, that what the merchants might have said was their own business, and that the words of the Queen could only be sent to the king through the Governor. He then added that they were to remember that the difficulty between the king and the British Government had not yet been settled or cleared up in any way, and dismissed them with the customary formalities.