* Sec Almon's Remembrancer, 1777, p. 28, for Paine's graphicjournal of this retreat, quoted from the PennsylvaniaJournal. In reply to those who censured the retreat aspusillanimous, he states that "our army was at one time lessthan a thousand effective men and never more than 4,000,"the pursuers being "8,000 exclusive of their artillery andlight horse"; he declares that posterity will call theretreat "glorious—and the names of Washington and Fabiuswill run paralell to eternity." In the Pennsylvania Packet(March 20, 1779) Paine says: "I had begun the first numberof the Crisis while on the retreat, at Newark, with a designof publishing it in the Jersies, as it was GeneralWashington's intention to have made a stand at Newark, couldhe have been timely reenforced; instead of which nearlyhalf the army left him at that place, or soon after, theirtime being out."
He could only write at night; during the day there was constant work for every soldier of the little force surrounding Washington. "I am wearied almost to death with the retrogade motion of things," wrote Washington to his brother (November 9th), "and I solemnly protest that a pecuniary reward of twenty thousand pounds a year would not induce me to undergo what I do; and after all, perhaps to lose my character, as it is impossible, under such a variety of distressing circumstances, to conduct matters agreeably to public expectation." On November 27th he writes from Newark to General Lee: "It has been more owing to the badness of the weather that the enemy's progress has been checked, than to any resistance we could make." Even while he wrote the enemy drew near, and the next day (November 28th) entered one end of Newark as Washington left the other. At Brunswick he was joined by General Williamson's militia, and on the Delaware by the Philadelphia militia, and could muster five thousand against Howe's whole army. "I tremble for Philadelphia," writes Washington to Lund Washington (December 10th). "Nothing in my opinion, but General Lee's speedy arrival, who has been long expected, though still at a distance (with about three thousand men), can save it." On December 13th Lee was a prisoner, and on the 17th Washington writes to the same relative:
"Your imagination can scarce extend to a situation more distressing than mine. Our only dependence now is upon the speedy enlistment of a new army. If this fails, I think the game will be pretty well up, as from disaffection and want of spirit and fortitude, the inhabitants, instead of resistance, are offering submission and taking protection from Gen. Howe in Jersey."
The day before, he had written to the President of Congress that the situation was critical, and the distresses of his soldiers "extremely great, many of 'em being entirely naked and most so thinly clad as to be unfit for service." On December 18th he writes to his brother:
"You can form no idea of the perplexity of my situation. No man, I believe, ever had a greater choice of difficulties, and less means to extricate himself from them. However, under a full persuasion of the justice of our cause, I cannot entertain an Idea that it will finally sink, tho' it may remain for some time under a cloud."
Under that cloud, by Washington's side, was silently at work the force that lifted it Marching by day, listening to the consultations of Washington and his generals, Paine wrote by the camp fires; the winter storms, the Delaware's waves, were mingled with his ink; the half-naked soldiers in their troubled sleep dreaming of their distant homes, the skulking deserter creeping off in the dusk, the pallid face of the heavy-hearted commander, made the awful shadows beneath which was written that leaflet which went to the Philadelphia printer along with Washington's last foreboding letters to his relatives in Virginia. It was printed on December 19th,* and many copies reached the camp above Trenton Falls on the eve of that almost desperate attack on which Washington had resolved. On the 23d December he wrote to Colonel Joseph Reed:
* The pamphlet was dated December 23rd, but it had appearedon the 19th in the Pennsylvania Journal, the pen none haveachieved such vast results as Paine's "Common Sense" andhis firstCrisis, Before the battle of Trenton the half-clad, dis-heartened soldiers of Washington werecalled together in groups to listen to that thrillingexhortation.
"Christmas-day, at night, one hour before day, is the time fixed upon for our attempt on Trenton. For Heaven's sake keep this to yourself, as the discovery of it may prove fatal to us; our numbers, sorry I am to say, being less than I had any conception of; but necessity, dire necessity will, nay must, justify any attempt."
America has known some utterances of the lips equivalent to decisive victories in the field,—as some of Patrick Henry's, and the address of President Lincoln at Gettysburg.
The opening words alone were a victory.
"These are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of his country; but he that stands it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict the more glorious the triumph: what we obtain too cheap we esteem too lightly; 't is dearness only that gives everything its value. Heaven knows how to put a proper price upon its goods; and it would be strange indeed if so celestial an article as Freedom should not be highly rated."
Not a chord of faith, or love, or hope was left untouched. The very faults of the composition, which the dilettanti have picked out, were effective to men who had seen Paine on the march, and knew these things were written in sleepless intervals of unwearied labors. He speaks of what Joan of Arc did in "the fourteenth century," and exclaims: "Would that heaven might inspire some Jersey maid to spirit up her countrymen, and save her fair fellow sufferers from ravage and ravishment!" Joan was born in 1410, but Paine had no cyclopaedia in his knapsack. The literary musket reaches its mark. The pamphlet was never surpassed for true eloquence—that is, for the power that carries its point. With skilful illustration of lofty principles by significant details, all summed with simplicity and sympathy, three of the most miserable weeks ever endured by men were raised into epical dignity. The wives, daughters, mothers, sisters, seemed stretching out appealing hands against the mythically monstrous Hessians. The great commander, previously pointed to as "a mind that can even flourish upon care," presently saw his dispirited soldiers beaming with hope, and bounding to the onset,—their watchword:These are the times that try men's souls! /Trenton was won, the Hessians captured, and a New Year broke for America on the morrow of that Christmas Day, 1776.*
* Paine's enemy, Cheetham, durst not, in the face ofWashington's expression of his "lively sense of theimportance of your [Paine's] works," challenge well knownfacts, and must needs partly confess them: "The number wasread in the camp, to every corporal's guard, and in the armyand out of it had more than the intended effect. Theconvention of New York, reduced by dispersion, occasioned byalarm, to nine members, was rallied and reanimated.Militiamen who, already tired of the war, were stragglingfrom the army, returned. Hope succeeded to despair,cheerfulness to gloom, and firmness to irresolution. To theconfidence which it inspired may be attributed much of thebrilliant little affair which in the same month followed atTrenton." Even Oldys is somewhat impressed by Paine'scourage: "The Congress fled. All were dismayed. Not soour author."
Paine's Trenton musket had hardly cooled, or the pen of his firstCrisisdried, before he began to write another. It appeared about four weeks after the battle and is addressed to Lord Howe. The Thetford mechanic has some pride in confronting this English lord who had offered the Americans mercy. "Your lordship, I find, has now commenced author, and published a Proclamation; I have published a Crisis." The rumors of his being a hireling scribe, or gaining wealth by his publications, made it necessary for Paine to speak of himself at the conclusion:
"What I write is pure nature, and my pen and my soul have ever gone together. My writings I have always given away, receiving only the expense of printing and paper, and sometimes not even that. I never counted either fame or interest, and my manner of life, to those who know it, will justify what I say. My study is to be useful, and if your lordship loves mankind as well as I do, you would, seeing you cannot conquer us, cast about and lend your hand towards accomplishing a peace. Our independence, with God's blessing, we will maintain against all the world; but as we wish to avoid evil ourselves, we wish not to inflict it on others. I am never over-inquisitive into the secrets of the cabinet, but I have some notion that, if you neglect the present opportunity, it will not be in our power to make a separate peace with you afterwards; for whatever treaties or alliances we form we shall most faithfully abide by; wherefore you may be deceived if you think you can make it with us at any time."
Thus the humble author of the Crisis offers the noble author of the Proclamation "mercy," on condition of laying down his arms, and going home; but it must be at once!
If Howe, as is most likely, considered this mere impudence, he presently had reason to take it more seriously. For there were increasing indications that Paine was in the confidence of those who controlled affairs. On January 21st he was appointed by the Council of Safety in Philadelphia secretary to the commission sent by Congress to treat with the Indians at Easton, Pennsylvania. The commissioners, with a thousand dollars' worth of presents, met the Indian chiefs in the German Reformed Church (built 1776), and, as they reported to Congress, "after shaking hands, drinking rum, while the organ played, we proceeded to business."*
* Condit's "History of Easton," pp. 60, 118,
The report was, no doubt, written by Paine, who for his services was paid £300 by the Pennsylvania Assembly (one of its advances for Congress, afterwards refunded). In a public letter, written in 1807, Paine relates an anecdote concerning this meeting with the Indians.
"The chief of the tribes, who went by the name of King Last-night, because his tribe had sold their lands, had seen some English men-of-war in some of the waters of Canada, and was impressed with the power of those great canoes; but he saw that the English made no progress against us by land. This was enough for an Indian to form an opinion by. He could speak some English, and in conversation with me, alluding to the great canoes, he gave me his idea of the power of a king of England, by the following metaphor. 'The king of England,' said he, 'is like a fish. When he is in the water he can wag his tail; when he comes on land he lays down on his side.' Now if the English government had but half the sense this Indian had, they would not have sent Duckworth to Constantinople, and Douglas to Norfolk, to lay down on their side."
On April 17th, when Congress transformed the "Committee of Secret Correspondence" into the "Committee of Foreign Affairs," Paine was elected its secretary. His friend, Dr. Franklin, had reached France in December, 1776, where Arthur Lee and Silas Deane were already at work. Lord Howe might, indeed, have done worse than take Paine's advice concerning the "opportunity," which did not return. General Howe did, indeed, presently occupy a fine abode in Philadelphia, but only kept it warm, to be afterwards the executive mansion of President Washington.
After their disaster at Trenton, the English forces suspended hostilities for a long time. Paine, maintaining his place on General Greene's staff, complied with the wish of all the generals by wielding his pen during the truce of arms. He sat himself down in Philadelphia, "Second Street, opposite the Quaker meeting,"—as he writes the address. The Quakers regarded him as Antichrist pursuing them into close quarters. Untaught by castigation, the leaders of the Society, and chiefly one John Pemberton, disguised allies of the Howes, had put forth, November 20, 1776, a second and more dangerous "testimony." In it they counsel Friends to refuse obedience to whatever "instructions or ordinances" may be published, not warranted by "that happy constitution under which they and others long enjoyed tranquillity and peace." In his secondCrisis(January 13, 1777) Paine refers to this document, and a memorial, from "a meeting of a reputable number of the inhabitants of the city of Philadelphia," called attention of the Board of Safety to its treasonable character. The Board, however, not having acted, Paine devoted his next three months to a treatment of that and all other moral and political problems which had been developed by the course of the Revolution, and must be practically dealt with. In reading this thirdCrisis, one feels in every sentence its writer's increased sense of responsibility. Events had given him the seat of a lawgiver. His first pamphlet had dictated the Declaration of Independence, his second had largely won its first victory, his third had demonstrated the impossibility of subjugation, and offered England peace on the only possible terms. The American heart had responded without a dissonant note; he held it in his hand; he knew that what he was writing in that room "opposite the Quaker meeting" were Acts of Congress. So it proved. The thirdCrisiswas dated April 19, 1777, the second anniversary of the first collision (Lexington). It was as effective in dealing with the internal enemies of the country as the first had been in checking its avowed foes. It was written in a city still largely, if not preponderantly, "tory," and he deals with them in all their varieties, not arraigning the Friends as a Society. Having carefully shown that independence, from being a natural right, had become a political and moral necessity, and the war one "on which a world is staked," he says that "Tories" endeavoring to insure their property with the enemy should be made to fear still more losing it on the other side. Paine proposes an "oath or affirmation" renouncing allegiance to the King, pledging support to the United States. At the same time let a tax of ten, fifteen, or twenty per cent be levied on all property. Each who takes the oath may exempt his property by holding himself ready to do what service he can for the cause; they who refuse the oath will be paying a tax on their insurance with the enemy. "It would not only be good policy but strict justice to raise fifty or one hundred thousand pounds, or more, if it is necessary, out of the estates and property of the King of England's votaries, resident in Philadelphia, to be distributed as a reward to those inhabitants of the city and State who should turn out and repulse the enemy should they attempt to march this way."
These words were written at a moment when a vigorous opposition, in and out of Congress, was offered to Washington's Proclamation (Morris-town, January 25, 1777,) demanding that an oath of allegiance to the United States should be required of all who had taken such an oath to the King, non-jurors to remove within the enemy's lines, or be treated as enemies. Paine's proposal was partly followed on June 13th, when Pennsylvania exacted an oath of allegiance to the State from all over eighteen years of age.
Paine was really the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. His election had not been without opposition, and, according to John Adams, there was a suggestion that some of his earlier writings had been unfavorable to this country. What the reference was I cannot understand unless it was to his anti-slavery essay, in which he asked Americans with what consistency they could protest against being enslaved while they were enslaving others. That essay, I have long believed, caused a secret, silent, hostility to the author by which he suffered much without suspecting it. But he was an indefatigable secretary. An example of the care with which foreign representatives were kept informed appears in a letter to William Bingham, agent of Congress at Martinique.
"Philadelphia, July 16th, 1777.—Sir,—A very sudden opportunity offers of sending you the News-papers, from which you will collect the situation of our Affairs. The Enemy finding their attempt of marching thro' the Jersies to this City impracticable, have retreated to Staten Island seemingly discontented and dispirited and quite at a loss what step next to pursue. Our Army is now well recruited and formidable. Our Militia in the several States ready at a day's notice to turn out and support the Army when occasion requires; and tho' we cannot, in the course of a Campaign, expect everything in the several Parts of the Continent, to go just as we wish it; yet the general face of our Affairs assures us of final success.
"In the Papers of June 18th & 25 and July 2d you will find Genl. Washington and Arnold's Letters of the Enemy's movement in, and retreat from the Jersies. We are under some apprehensions for Ticonderoga, as we find the Enemy are unexpectedly come into that Quarter. The Congress have several times had it in contemplation to remove the Garrison from that Place—as by Experience we find that Men shut up in Forts are not of so much use as in the field, especially in the highlands where every hill is a natural fortification.
"I am Sir
"Your Obt. Humble Servt.
"Thomas Paine.
"Secretry to the Committee for Foreign Affairs."'
* MS., for which I am indebted to Mr. Simon Gratz, Philadelphia.
After the occupation of Philadelphia by the British (September 26, 1777), Paine had many adventures, as we shall presently see. He seems to have been with Washington at Valley Forge when the Pennsylvania Assembly and President (Thomas Wharton, Jr.,) confided to him the delicate and arduous task assigned by the following from Timothy Matlack, Secretary of the Assembly:
"Lancaster, Oct. 10, 1777. Sir,—The Hon'ble house of As'y have proposed and Council have adopted a plan of obtaining more regular and constant intelligence of the proceeding of Gen. Washington's army than has hitherto been had. Everyone agrees that you are the proper person for this purpose, and I am directed by his Exc'y, the pr't, to write to you hereon (the Prs't being engaged in writing to the Gen'l, and the Express in waiting).
"The Assembly have agreed to make you a reasonable compensation for your services in this business, if you think proper to engage in it, which I hope you will; as it is a duty of importance that there are few, however well disposed, who are capable of doing in a manner that will answer all the intentions of it—perhaps a correspondence of this kind may be the fairest opportunity of giving to Council some important hints that may occur to you on interesting subjects.
"Proper expresses will be engaged in this business. If the expresses which pass from headquarters to Congress can be made use of so much the better;—of this you must be judge.
"I expect Mr. Rittenhouse will send you a copy of the testimony of the late Y. M. by this opp'y, if time will admit it to be copied—'t is a poor thing.—Yours, &c, T. M."*
* Pa. Arch., 1779, p. 659. Paine at once set to work: p.693, 694.
What with this service, and his correspondence with foreign agents, Paine had his hands pretty full. But at the same time he wrote important letters to leading members of Congress, then in session at York, Pennsylvania.
The subjoined letter sheds fresh light on a somewhat obscure point in our revolutionary history,—the obscurity being due to the evasions of American historians on an episode of which we have little reason to be proud. An article of Burgoyne's capitulation (October 17th) was as follows:
"A free passage to be granted to the army under General Burgoyne to Great Britain, upon condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest: and the port of Boston to be assigned for entry of transports to receive the troops whenever General Howe shall so order."
A letter was written by Paine to Hon. Richard Henry Lee, dated at "Headquarters, fourteen miles from Philadelphia," October 30th, 1777.
"I wrote you last Tuesday 21st Inst., including a Copy of the King's speech, since which nothing material has happened at Camp. Genl. McDougal was sent last Wednesday night 22d. to attack a Party of the Enemy who lay over the Schuylkill at Grey's Ferry where they have a Bridge. Genls. Greene & Sullivan went down to make a diversion below German Town at the same Time. I was with this last Party, but as the Enemy withdrew their Detachment We had only our Labor for our Pains.
"No Particulars of the Northern Affair have yet come to head Qrs., the want of which has caused much Speculation. A copy, said to be the Articles of Capitulation was recd. 3 or 4 days ago, but they rather appear to be some proposals made by Burgoyne, than the Capitulation itself. By those Articles it appears to me that Burgoyne has capitulated upon Terms, which we have a right to doubt the full performance of, Vizt., 'That the Offrs. and Men shall be Transported to England and not serve in or against North America during the present War'—or words to this effect.
"I remark, that this Capitulation, if true, has the air of a National treaty; it is binding, not only on Burgoyne as a General, but on England as a Nation; because the Troops are to be subject to the conditions of the Treaty after they return to England and are out of his Command. It regards England and America as Separate Sovereign States, and puts them on an equal footing by staking the faith and honor of the former for the performance of a Contract entered into with the latter.
"What in the Capitulation is stiled the 'Present War' England affects to call a 'Rebellion,' and while she holds this Idea and denies any knowledge of America as a Separate Sovereign Power, she will not conceive herself bound by any Capitulation or Treaty entered into by her Generals which is to bind her as aNation, and more especially in those Cases where both Pride and present Advantage tempt her to a Violation. She will deny Burgoyne's Right and Authority for making such a Treaty, and will, very possibly, show her insult by first censuring him for entering into it, and then immediately sending the Troops back.
"I think we ought to be exceedingly cautious how we trust her with the power of abusing our Credulity. We have no authority for believing she will perform that part of the Contract which subjects her not to send the Troops to America during the War. The insolent Answer given to the Commissrs. by Ld. Stormont, 'that the King's Ambassadors reed, no Letters from Rebels but when they came to crave Mercy?sufficiently instructs us not to entrust them with the power of insulting Treaties of Capitulation.
"Query, Whether it wd. not be proper to detain the Troops at Boston & direct the Commissioners at Paris to present the Treaty of Capitulation to the English Court thro' the hands of Ld. Stormont, to know whether it be the intention of that Court to abide strictly by the Conditions and Obligations thereof, and if no assurance be obtained to keep the Troops until they can be exchanged here.
"Tho' we have no immediate knowledge of any alliance formed by our Commissioners with France or Spain, yet we have no assurance there is not, and our immediate release of those prisoners, by sending them to England, may operate to the injury of such Allied Powers, and be perhaps directly contrary to some contract subsisting between us and them prior to the Capitulation. I think we ought to know this first.—Query, ought we not (knowing the infidelity they have already acted) to suspect they will evade the Treaty by putting back into New York under pretence of distress.—I would not trust them an inch farther than I could see them in the present state of things.
"The Army was to have marched yesterday about 2 or 3 Miles but the weather has been so exceedingly bad for three days past as to prevent any kind of movement, the waters are so much out and the rivulets so high there is no passing from one part of ye Camp to another.
"I wish the Northern Army was down here. I am apt to think that nothing materially offensive will take place on our part at present. Some Means must be taken to fill up the Army this winter. I look upon the recruiting service at an end and that some other plan must be adopted. Suppose the Service be by draft—and that those who are not drawn should contribute a Dollar or two Dollars a Man to him on whom the lot falls.—something of this kind would proportion the Burthen, and those who are drawn would have something either to encourage them to go, or to provide a substitute with—After closing this Letter I shall go again to Fort Mifflin; all was safe there on the 27th, but from some preparations of the Enemy they expect another attack somewhere.
"The enclosed return of provision and Stores is taken from an account signed by Burgoyne and sent to Ld. George Germain. I have not time to Copy the whole. Burgoyne closes his Letter as follows, 'By a written account found in the Commissary's House at Ticonderoga Six thousand odd hundred Persons were fed from the Magazine the day before the evacuation.'
"I am Dear Sir, Yr. Affectionate Hble. Servt.
"T. Paine. "Respectful Compts. to Friends.
"If the Congress has the Capitulation and Particulars of ye Surrender, they do an exceeding wrong thing by not publishing ym. because they subject the whole Affair to Suspicion."'
* I am indebted for this letter to Dr. John S. H. Fogg ofBoston. It bears the superscription: "Honbl. Richd. HenryLee Esq. (in Congress) York Town. Forwarded by yr humbleServt. T. Matlack, Nov. 1, 1777." Endorsed in handwriting ofLee: "Oct: 1777. Mr. Paine, Author of 'Common Sense.'"
Had this proposal of Paine, with regard to Bur-goyne's capitulation, been followed at once, a blot on the history of our Revolution might have been prevented. The time required to march the prisoners to Boston and prepare the transports would have given England opportunity to ratify the articles of capitulation. Washington, with characteristic inability to see injustice in anything advantageous to America, desired Congress to delay in every possible way the return of the prisoners to England, "since the most virtuous adhesion to the articles would not prevent their replacing in garrison an equal number of soldiers who might be sent against us." The troops were therefore delayed on one pretext and another until Burgoyne declared that "the publick faith is broke." Congress seized on this remark to resolve that the embarkation should be suspended until an "explicit ratification of the Convention of Saratoga shall be properly ratified by the Court of Great Britain." This resolution, passed January 8, 1778, was not communicated to Burgoyne until February 4th. If any one should have suffered because of a remark made in a moment of irritation it should have been Burgoyne himself; but he was presently allowed to proceed to England, while his troops were retained,—a confession that Burgoyne's casual complaint was a mere pretext for further delay. It may be added that the English government behaved to its surrendered soldiers worse than Congress. The question of ratifying the Saratoga Convention was involved in a partisan conflict in Parliament, the suffering prisoners in America were forgotten, and they were not released until the peace,—five years after they had marched "with the honours of war," under a pledge of departure conceded by Gen. Gates in reply to a declaration that unless conceded they would "to a man proceed to any act of desperation sooner than submit."
Concerning this ugly business there is a significant silence in Paine's public writings. He would not have failed to discuss the matter in hisCrisishad he felt that anything honorable to the American name or cause could be made out of it.*
* Professor Fiske ("Am. Revolution," i., p. 341) has aferocious attack on Congress for breaking faith in thismatter, but no doubt he has by this time read, in Ford's"Writings of Washington," (vol. vi.) the letters which bringhis attack on the great commander's own haloed head.
In his letter to Hon. R. H. Lee (October 30, 1777) Paine mentions that he is about leaving the head-quarters near Philadelphia for Fort Mifflin. Mr. Asa Bird Gardener, of New York, who has closely studied Paine's military career, writes me some account of it.
"Major-Gen. Greene was charged with the defence of the Delaware, and part of Brig.-Gen. Varnum's brigade was placed in garrison at Fort Mercer, Red Bank, and at Fort Mifflin, Mud Island. A bloody and unsuccessful assault was made by Count Donop and 1,200 Hessians on Fort Mercer, defended by the 1 st and 2d Reg'ts. R. I. Continental Inf'y. The entire British fleet was then brought up opposite Fort Mifflin, and the most furious cannonade, and most desperate but finally unsuccessful defence of the place was made. The entire works were demolished, and most of the garrison killed and wounded. Major-Gen. Greene being anxious for the garrison and desirous of knowing its ability to resist sent Mr. Paine to ascertain. He accordingly went to Fort Mercer, and from thence, on Nov. 9 (1777) went with Col. Christopher Greene, commanding Fort Mercer, in an open boat to Fort Mifflin, during the cannonade, and were there when the enemy opened with two-gun batteries and a mortar battery. Thisverygallant act shows what a fearless man Mr. Paine was, and entitles him to the same credit for service in the Revolution as any Continental could claim."
The succession of mistakes, surprises, panics, which occasioned the defeats before Philadelphia and ended in the occupation of that city by the British general, seriously affected the reputation of Washington. Though Paine believed that Washington's generalship had been at fault (as Washington himself probably did*), he could utter nothing that might injure the great cause. He mistrusted the singleness of purpose of Washington's opponents, and knew that the commander-in-chief was as devoted as himself to the American cause, and would never surrender it whatever should befall. While, therefore, the intrigues were going on at Yorktown, Pennsylvania, whither Congress had retreated, and Washington with his ill-fed and ill-clad army were suffering at Valley Forge, Paine was writing his fifthCrisis, which had the most happy effect. It was dated at Lancaster, March 121, 1778. Before that time (February 19th) General Gates had made his peace with Washington, and the intrigue was breaking up, but gloom and dissatisfaction remained. The contrast between the luxurious "Tories" surrounding Howe in Philadelphia, and Washington's wretched five thousand at Valley Forge, was demoralizing the country. The first part of thisCrisis, addressed "to General Sir William Howe," pointed wrangling patriots to the common enemy; the second, addressed "to the inhabitants of America," sounded a note of courage, and gave good reasons for it. Never was aid more artistic than that Paine's pen now gave Washington. The allusions to him are incidental, there is no accent of advocacy. While mentioning "the unabated fortitude of a Washington," he lays a laurel on the brow of Gates, on that of Herkimer, and even on the defeated. While belittling all that Howe had gained, telling him that in reaching Philadelphia, he "mistook a trap for a conquest," he reunites Washington and Gates, in the public mind, by showing the manoeuvres of the one near Philadelphia part of the other's victory at Saratoga. It is easy for modern eulogists of Washington to see this, but when Paine said it,—apparently aiming only to humiliate Howe,—the sentence was a sunbeam parting a black cloud. Coming from a member of Greene's staff, from an author whose daring at Fort Mifflin had made him doubly a hero; from the military correspondent of the Pennsylvania Council, and the Secretary of the Congressional Committee of Foreign Affairs,—Paine's optimistic view of the situation had immense effect. He hints his official knowledge that Britain's "reduced strength and exhausted coffers in a three years' war with America hath given a powerful superiority to France and Spain," and advises Americans to leave wrangling to the enemy. "We never had so small an army to fight against, nor so fair an opportunity of final success asnow."
* See his letter to the President of Congress. Ford's,"Writings of Washington," vol. vi., p. 82.
This fifthCrisiswas written mainly at Lancaster, Pa., at the house of William Henry, Jr., where he several times found shelter while dividing his time between Washington's head-quarters and York.* Every number of theCrisiswas thus written with full information from both the military and political leaders. ThisCrisiswas finished and printed at York, and there Paine begins No. VI. The "stone house on the banks of the Cadorus," at York, is still pointed out by a trustworthy tradition as that to which he bore the chest of congressional papers with which he had fled to Trenton, when Howe entered Philadelphia.** It is a pleasant abode in a picturesque country, and no doubt Paine would have been glad to remain there in repose. But whoever slept on his watch during the Revolution Paine did not. The fifthCrisisprinted, he goes to forward the crisis he will publish next. In April he is again at Lancaster, and on the 11th writes thence to his friend Henry Laurens, President of Congress.***
* This I learn by a note from Mr. Henry's descendant, JohnW. Jordan. At this time Paine laid before Henry his schemefor steam-navigation.** The house is marked "B. by J. B. Cookis in the year1761." It is probable that Congress deemed it prudent tokeep important documents a little way from the edifice inthe centre of the town where it met, a building which nolonger stands.*** I am indebted to Mr. Simon Gratz, of Philadelphia, forthis and several other letters of Paine to Laurens.
"Lancaster, April 11th, 1778. Sir,—I take the liberty of mentioning an affair to you which I think deserves the attention of Congress. The persons who came from Philadelphia some time ago with, or in company with, a flag from the Enemy, and were taken up and committed to Lancaster Jail for attempting to put off counterfeit Contl. money, were yesterday brought to Tryal and are likely to escape by means of an artful and partial Construction of an Act of this State for punishing such offences. The Act makes it felony to counterfeit the moneyemittedby Congress, or to circulate such counterfeits knowing them to be so. The offenders' Council explained the word 'emitted' to have only a retrospect meaning by supplying the Idea of 'which have been' 'emitted by Congress.' Therefore say they the Act cannot be applied to any money emitted after the date of the Act. I believe the words 'emitted by Congress' means only, and should be understood, to distinguish Continental Money from other Money, and not one Time from another Time. It has, as I conceive, no referrence to any Particular Time, but only to the particular authority which distinguishes Money so emitted from Money emitted by the State. It is meant only as a discription of the Money, and not of the Time of striking it, but includes the Idea of all Time as inseparable from the Continuance of the authority of Congress. But be this as it may; the offence is Continental and the consequences of the same extent. I can have no Idea of any particular State pardoning an offence against all, or even their letting an offender slip legally who is accountable to all and every State alike for his crime. The place where he commits it is the least circumstance of it. It is a mere accident and has nothing or very little to do with the crime itself. I write this hoping the Information will point out the necessity of the Congress supporting their emissions by claiming every offender in this line where the present deficiency of the Law or the Partial Interpretation of it operates to the Injustice and Injury of the whole Continent.
"I beg leave to trouble you with another hint. Congress I learn has something to propose thro' the Commissrs. on the Cartel respecting the admission and stability of the Continental Currency. As Forgery is a Sin against all men alike, and reprobated by all civil nations, Query, would it not be right to require of General Howe the Persons of Smithers and others in Philadelphia suspected of this crime; and if He, or any other Commander, continues to conceal or protect them in such practices, that, in such case, the Congress will consider the crime as the Act of the Commander-in-Chief. Howe affects not to know the Congress—he ought to be made to know them; and the apprehension of Personal Consequences may have some effect on his Conduct. I am, Dear Sir,
"Your obt. and humble Servt.,
"T. Paine.
"Since writing the foregoing the Prisoners have had their Tryal, the one is acquitted and the other convicted only of a Fraud; for as the law now stands, or rather as it is explained, the counterfeiting—or circulating counterfeits—is only a fraud. I do not believe it was the intention of the Act to make it so, and I think it misapplied Lenity in the Court to suffer such an Explanation, because it has a tendency to invite and encourage a Species of Treason, the most prejudicial to us of any or all the other kinds. I am aware how very difficult it is to make a law so very perfect at first as not to be subject to false or perplexed conclusions. There never was but one Act (said a Member of the House of Commons) which a man might not creep out of,i. e.the Act which obliges a man to be buried in woollen. T. P."
The active author and secretary had remained in Philadelphia two days after Howe had crossed the Schuylkill, namely, until September 21st. The events of that time, and of the winter, are related in a letter to Franklin, in Paris, which is of too much historical importance for any part of it to be omitted. It is dated Yorktown, May 16, 1778.
"Your favor of Oct 7th did not come to me till March. I was at Camp when Capt Folger, arrived with the Blank Packet The private Letters were, I believe, all safe. Mr. Laurens forwarded yours to York Town where I afterwards recd. it.
"The last winter has been rather barren of military events, but for your amusement I send you a little history how I have passed away part of the time.
"The 11th of Sepr. last I was preparing Dispatches for you when the report of cannon at Brandywine interrupted my proceeding. The event of that day you have doubtless been informed of, which, excepting the Enemy keeping the ground, may be deemed a drawn battle. Genl. Washington collected his Army at Chester, and the Enemy's not moving towards him next day must be attributed to the disability they sustained and the burthen of their wounded. On the 16th of the same month, the two Armies were drawn up in order of battle near the White horse on the Lancaster road, when a most violent and incessant storm of rain prevented an action. Our Army sustained a heavy loss in their Ammunition, the Cartouch Boxes, especially as they were not of the most seasoned leather, being no proof agst. the almost incredible fury of the weather, which obliged Genl. Washn. to draw his Army up into the country till those injuries could be repaired, and a new supply of ammunition procured. The Enemy in the mean time kept on the West Side of Schuylkill. On Fryday the 19th about one in the morning the first alarm of their crossing was given, and the confusion, as you may suppose, was very great. It was a beautiful still moonlight morning and the streets as full of men women and children as on a market day. On the eveng. before I was fully persuaded that unless something was done the City would be lost; and under that anxiety I went to Col. Bayard, speaker of the house of Assembly, and represented, as I very particularly knew it, the situation we were in, and the probability of saving the City if proper efforts were made for that purpose. I reasoned thus—Genl. Washn. was about 30 Miles up the Schuylkill with an Army properly collected waiting for Ammunition, besides which, a reinforcement of 1500 men were marching from the North River to join him; and if only an appearance of defence be made in the City by throwing up works at the heads of streets, it will make the Enemy very suspicious how they throw themselves between the City and Genl. Washington, and between two Rivers, which must have been the case; for notwithstanding the knowledge which military gentlemen are supposed to have, I observe they move exceedingly cautiously on new ground, are exceedingly suspicious of Villages and Towns, and more perplexed at seemingly little things which they cannot clearly understand than at great ones which they are fully acquainted with. And I think it very probable that Genl. Howe would have mistaken our necessity for a deep laid scheme and not have ventured himself in the middle of it But admitting that he had, he must either have brought his whole Army down, or a part of it. If the whole. Gen. W. would have followed him, perhaps the same day, in two or three days at most, and our assistance in the City would have been material. If only a part of it, we should have been a match for them, and Gen. W. superior to those which remained above. The chief thing was, whether the cityzens would turn out to defend the City. My proposal to Cols. Bayard and Bradford was to call them together the next morning, make them fully acquainted with the situation and the means and prospect of preserving themselves, and that the City had better voluntarily assess itself 50,000 for its defence than suffer an Enemy to come into it. Cols. Bayard and Bradford were in my opinion, and as Genl. Mifflin was then in town, I next went to him, acquainted him with our design, and mentioned likewise that if two or three thousand men could be mustered up whether we might depend on him to command them, for without some one to lead, nothing could be done. He declined that part, not being then very well, but promised what assistance he could.—A few hours after this the alarm happened. I went directly to Genl. Mifflin but he had sett off, and nothing was done. I cannot help being of opinion that the City might have been saved, but perhaps it is better otherwise.
"I staid in the City till Sunday [Sep. 21st], having sent my Chest and everything belonging to the foreign Committee to Trenton in a Shallop. The Enemy did not cross the river till the Wednesday following. Hearing on the Sunday that Genl. Washn. had moved to Swederford I set off for that place but learning on the road that it was a mistake and that he was six or seven miles above that place, I crossed over to South-field and the next Morning to Trenton, to see after my Chest On the Wednesday Morning I intended returning to Philadelphia, but was informed at Bristol of the Enemy's crossing the Schuylkill. At this place I met Col. Kirkbride of Pennsburg Manor, who invited me home with him. On Fryday the 26th a Party of the Enemy about 1500 took possession of the City, and the same day an account arrived that Col. Brown had taken 300 of the Enemy at the old french lines at Ticonderoga and destroyed all their Water Craft, being about 200 boats of different kinds.
"On the 29th Sept I sett off for Camp without well knowing where to find it, every day occasioning some movement I kept pretty high up the country, and being unwilling to ask questions, not knowing what company I might be in, I was three days before I fell in with it The Army had moved about three miles lower down that morning. The next day they made a movement about the same distance, to the 21 Mile Stone on the Skippach Road—Head Quarters at John Wince's. On the 3d Octr. in the morning they began to fortify the Camp, as a deception; and about 9 at Night marched for German Town. The Number of Continental Troops was between 8 and 9000, besides Militia, the rest remaining as Guards for the security of Camp. Genl. Greene, whose Quarters I was at, desired me to remain there till Morning. I set off for German Town about 5 next morning. The Skirmishing with the Pickets began soon after. I met no person for several miles riding, which I concluded to be a good sign; after this I met a man on horseback who told me he was going to hasten on a supply of ammunition, that the Enemy were broken and retreating fast, which was true. I saw several country people with arms in their hands running cross a field towards German Town, within about five or six miles, at which I met several of the wounded on waggons, horseback, and on foot. I passed Genl. Nash on a litter made of poles, but did not know him. I felt unwilling to ask questions lest the information should not be agreeable, and kept on. About two miles after this I passed a promiscuous crowd of wounded and otherwise who were halted at a house to refresh. Col: Biddle D.Q.N.G. was among them, who called after me, that if I went farther on that road I should be taken, for that the firing which I heard ahead was the Enemy's. I never could, and cannot now learn, and I believe no man can inform truly the cause of that day's miscarriage.
"The retreat was as extraordinary. Nobody hurried themselves. Every one marched his own pace. The Enemy kept a civil distance behind, sending every now and then a Shot after us, and receiving the same from us. That part of the Army which I was with collected and formed on the Hill on the side of the road near White Marsh Church; the Enemy came within three quarters of a mile and halted. The orders on Retreat were to assemble that night on the back of Perki-ominy Creek, about 7 miles above Camp, which had orders to move. The Army had marched the preceding night 14 miles and having full 20 to march back were exceedingly fatigued. They appeared to me to be only sensible of a disappointment, not a defeat, and to be more displeased at their retreating from German Town, than anxious to get to their rendezvous. I was so lucky that night to get to a little house about 4 miles wide of Perkiominy, towards which place in the morning I heard a considerable firing, which distressed me exceedingly, knowing that our army was much harassed and not collected. However, I soon relieved myself by going to see. They were discharging their pieces, wch. tho' necessary, prevented several Parties going till next day. I breakfasted next morning at Genl. W. Quarters, who was at the same loss with every other to account for the accidents of the day. I remember his expressing his Surprise, by saying, that at the time he supposed every thing secure, and was about giving orders for the Army to proceed down to Philadelphia; that he most unexpectedly saw a Part (I think of the Artillery) hastily retreating. This partial Retreat was, I believe, misunderstood, and soon followed by others. The fog was frequently very thick, the Troops young and unused to breaking and rallying, and our men rendered suspicious to each other, many of them being in Red. A new Army once disordered is difficult to manage, the attempt dangerous. To this may be added a prudence in not putting matters to too hazardous a tryal the first time. Men must be taught regular fighting by practice and degrees, and tho' the expedition failed, it had this good effect—that they seemed to feel themselves more important after it than before, as it was the first general attack they had ever made.
"I have not related the affair at Mr Chew's house German Town, as I was not there, but have seen it since. It certainly afforded the Enemy time to rally—yet the matter was difficult. To have pressed on and left 500 Men in ye rear, might by a change of circumstances been ruinous. To attack them was loss of time, as the house is a strong stone building, proof against any 12 pounder. Genl. Washington sent a flag, thinking it would procure their surrender and expedite his march to Philadelphia; it was refused, and circumstances changed almost directly after.
"I staid in Camp two days after the Germantown action, and lest any ill impression should get among the Garrisons at Mud Island and Red Bank, and the Vessels and Gallies stationed there, I crossed over to the Jersies at Trenton and went down to those places. I laid the first night on board the Champion Continental Galley, who was stationed off the mouth of Schuylkill. The Enemy threw up a two Gun Battery on the point of the river's mouth opposite the Pest House. The next morning was a thick fog, and as soon as it cleared away, and we became visible to each other, they opened on the Galley, who returned the fire. The Commodore made a signal to bring the Galley under the Jersey shore, as she was not a match for the Battery, nor the Battery a sufficient Object for the Galley. One Shot went thro' the fore sail, wch. was all. At noon I went with Col. [Christopher] Greene, who commanded at Red Bank, over to fort Mifflin (Mud Island). The Enemy opened that day 2 two-gun Batteries, and a Mortar Battery, on the fort. They threw about 30 Shells into it that afternoon, without doing any damage; the ground being damp and spongy, not above five or six burst; not a man was killed or wounded. I came away in the evening, laid on board the Galley, and the next day came to Col. Kirkbride's [Borden-town N. J.]; staid a few days, and came again to Camp. An Expedition was on foot the evening I got there in which I went as Aid de Camp to Genl. Greene, having a Volunteer Commission for that purpose. The Occasion was—a Party of the Enemy, about 1500, lay over the Schuylkill at Grey's ferry. Genl. McDougall with his Division was sent to attack them; and Sullivan & Greene with their Divisions were to favor the enterprise by a feint on the City, down the German-town road. They set off about nine at night, and halted at day break, between German Town and the City, the advanced Party at the three Miles Run. As I knew the ground I went with two light horse to discover the Enemy's Picket, but the dress of the light horse being white made them, I thought, too visible, as it was then twilight; on which I left them with my horse, and went on foot, till I distinctly saw the Picket at Mr. Dickerson's place,—which is the nearest I have been to Philadelphia since Sepr., except once at Coopers ferry, as I went to the forts. Genl. Sullivan was at Dr. Redman's house, and McDougall's beginning the attack was to be the Signal for moving down to the City. But the Enemy either on the approach of McDougall, or on information of it, called in their Party, and the Expedition was frustrated.
"A Cannonade, by far the most furious I ever heard, began down the river, soon after daylight, the first Gun of which we supposed to be the Signal; but was soon undeceived, there being no small Arms. After waiting two hours beyond the time, we marched back, the cannon was then less frequent; but on the road between German town and White marsh we were stuned with a report as loud as a peal from a hundred Cannon at once; and turning round I saw a thick smoke rising like a pillar, and spreading from the top like a tree. This was the blowing up of the Augusta. I did not hear the explosion of the Berlin.
"After this I returned to Col. Kirkbride's where I staid about a fortnight, and set off again to Camp. The day after I got there Genls. Greene, Wayne, and Cadwallader, with a Party of light horse, were ordered on a reconnoitering Party towards the forts. We were out four days and nights without meeting with any thing material. An East Indiaman, whom the Enemy had cut down so as to draw but little water, came up, without guns, while we were on foot on Carpenter's Island, going to Province Island. Her Guns were brought up in the evening in a flat, she got in the rear of the Fort, where few or no Guns could bear upon her, and the next morning, played on it incessantly. The night following the fort was evacuated. The obstruction the Enemy met with from those forts, and theChevaux de frisewas extraordinary, and had it not been that the Western Channel, deepened by the current, being somewhat obstructed by theChevaux de frisein the main river, which enabled them to bring up the light Indiaman Battery, it is a doubt whether they would have succeeded at last. By that assistance they reduced the fort, and got sufficient command of the river to move some of the late sunkChevaux de frise. Soon after this the fort on Red Bank, (which had bravely repulsed the Enemy a little time before) was avacuated, the Gallies ordered up to Bristol, and the Capts. of such other armed Vessels as thought they could not pass on the Eastward side of Wind mill Island, very precipitately set them on fire. As I judged from this event that the Enemy would winter in Philadelphia, I began to think of preparing for York Town, which however I was willing to delay, hoping that the ice would afford opportunity for new Manoeuvres. But the season passed very barrenly away. I staid at Col. Kirkbride's till the latter end of Janay. Commodore Haslewood, who commanded the remains of the fleet at Trenton, acquainted me with a scheme of his for burning the Enemy's Shipping, which was by sending a charged boat across the river from Cooper's ferry, by means of a Rocket fixt in its stern. Considering the width of the river, the tide, and the variety of accidents that might change its direction, I thought the project trifling and insufficient; and proposed to him, that if he would get a boat properly choyed, and take a Batteau in tow, sufficient to bring three or four persons off, that I would make one with him and two other persons who might be relied on to go down on that business. One of the Company, Capn. Blewer of Philadelphia, seconded the proposal, but the Commodore, and, what I was more surprized at, Col. Bradford, declined it. The burning of part of the Delaware fleet, the precipitate retreat of the rest, the little service rendered by them and the great expence they were at, make the only national blot in the proceedings of the last Campaign. I felt a strong anxiety for them to recover their credit, wch., among others, was one motive for my proposal. After this I came to camp, and from thence to York Town, and published theCrisisNo. 5, To Genl. Howe. I have began No. 6, which I intend to address to Ld. North.
"I was not at Camp when Genl. Howe marched out on the 20th of Deer, towards White marsh. It was a most contemptible affair, the threatenings and seeming fury he sate out with, and haste and Terror the Army retreated with, make it laughable. I have seen several persons from Philadelphia who assure me that their coming back was a mere uproar, and plainly indicated their apprehensions of a pursuit. Genl. Howe, in his Letter to Ld. Go. Germain, dated Dec. 13th, represented Genl. Washington's Camp as a strongly fortified place. There was not, Sir, a work thrown up in it till Genl. Howe marched out, and then only here and there a breast work. It was a temporary Station. Besides which, our men begin to think Works in the field of little use.
"Genl. Washington keeps his Station at the Valley forge. I was there when the Army first began to build huts; they appeared to me like a family of Beavers; every one busy; some carrying Logs, others Mud, and the rest fastening them together. The whole was raised in a few days, and is a curious collection of buildings in the true rustic order.
"As to Politics, I think we are now safely landed. The apprehension which Britain must be under from her neighbours must effectually prevent her sending reinforcements, could she procure them. She dare not, I think, in the present situation of affairs trust her troops so far from home.
"No Commissrs. are yet arrived. I think fighting is nearly over, for Britain, mad, wicked, and foolish, has done her utmost. The only part for her now to act is frugality, and the only way for her to get out of debt is to lessen her Government expenses. Two Millions a year is a sufficient allowance, and as much as she ought to expend exclusive of the interest of her Debt. The Affairs of England are approaching either to ruin or redemption. If the latter, she may bless the resistance of America.
"For my own part, I thought it very hard to have the Country set on fire about my Ears almost the moment I got into it; and among other pleasures I feel in having uniformly done my duty, I feel that of not having discredited your friendship and patronage.
"I live in hopes of seeing and advising with you respecting the History of the American Revolution, as soon as a turn of Affairs make it safe for me to take a passage to Europe. Please to accept my thanks for the Pamphlets, which Mr. Temple Franklin informs me he has sent. They are not yet come to hand. Mr. & Mrs. Bache are at Mainheim, near Lancaster; I heard they were well a few days ago. I laid two nights at Mr. Duffield's, in the winter. Miss Nancy Clifton was there, who said the Enemy had destroyed or sold a great quantity of your furniture. Mr. Duffield has since been taken by them and carried into the City, but is now at his own house. I just now hear they have burnt Col. Kirk-bride's, Mr. Borden's, and some other houses at Borden Town. Governor Johnstone (House of Commons) has wrote to Mr. Robt. Morriss informing him of Commissioners coming from England. The letter is printed in the Newspapers without signature, and is dated Febry. 5th, by which you will know it.*